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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. briefing book BACKGROUND	the meetings of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, December 1987 40p BROKEN DOWN AS: REGIONAL ISSUES PAPERS, 17p PART. 12/9/05 M03-1471#2C US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES PAPERS, 10p R 12/9/05 M03-1471#2D US-SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES PAPERS, 9p R 12/9/05 M03-1471#2E SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS PAPERS, 4p R 12/9/05 M03-1471#2F	n.d.	P-1, P-5 Folder 2 Folder 3
COLLECTION: DANZANSKY, STEPHEN I.: Files			db
FILE FOLDER:	BACKGROUND Briefing Book: the meetings of Reagan/Gorbachev, 12/87 RAC Box 19 (2 of 3) Box 91605 (2/2)		11/8/94

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Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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File Folder BACKGROUND BOOK FOR MEETING BETWEEN
REAGAN/GORBACHEV 12/1987 (2)

FOIA

M03-1471

Box Number 91605 RAC Box 19

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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1	PAPERS	US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUE PAPERS	10	ND
		(#2D)		
			9	ND
1	PAPERS	RE US-SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES (#2E)	9	ND

III.

REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Central America
4. The Caribbean
5. The Soviets and the Iran-Iraq War
6. Middle East Peace Process
7. Southern Africa
8. Terrorism
9. East Asia and the Pacific
10. India-Pakistan Nuclear Issue
11. President's Berlin Initiative
12. Ethiopia

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NLS M03-1471#2c
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REGIONAL DIALOGUE

PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 1985 INITIATIVE

- o President's UNGA initiative of October 1985 outlines framework for constructive US-Soviet engagement on Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Cambodia:
 - 1) Negotiations among warring parties for end to violence, withdrawal of foreign forces, and national reconciliation;
 - 2) Once first step underway, US-Soviet bilateral talks to support the process, arrange superpower disengagement;
 - 3) Economic reintegration, aid.

SOVIET ACTIVITIES

- o Soviets sharply criticize the "Reagan Doctrine" and American "neoglobalism"; worry about strategic implications of US challenge to weak Soviet clients.
- o Have never formally responded to President's initiative; over time, however, they have tried to adopt, at least rhetorically, some of the concepts -- e.g., national reconciliation. They also now emphasize the importance of regional affairs in East-West relations.
- o While maintaining relations with revolutionary movements and regimes, Soviets also seeking openings to larger, more "legitimate" states (e.g., Brazil, Argentina), emphasizing normal state-to-state relations, improved political, economic ties.
- o Soviets very active diplomatically -- Afghanistan, Middle East peace process, Iran-Iraq War, overtures to PRC and other Asian states. But no slackening of Soviet determination to undermine US influence wherever possible or to hold onto their gains of the 1970s.
- o In the face of continuing stalemate on various battlefields worldwide, the Soviets are pursuing traditional goals through greater reliance on diplomatic maneuver.

REGIONAL DIALOGUE

- o Soviets have implemented, expanded Geneva summit commitment to regularize regional dialogue. Now appear to see meetings of experts as important part of US-Soviet dialogue, and occasionally take initiative in proposing talks.
- o 1987 diplomatic cycle complete: Middle East, southern Africa in July; East Asia/Pacific and Afghanistan in September; Central America in October; Armacost-Vorontsov overview in November.

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AFGHANISTAN

I. BACKGROUND

- o Soviets have been in Afghanistan since December 26, 1979. Current Soviet force level stands at some 120,000. Heavily publicized five regiment "drawdown" in Fall 1986 was a sham. Political initiatives such as ceasefire and a national reconciliation also seen by the world as shams.
- o Gorbachev insists Soviet Union has made decision to get out, but key problems remain unresolved:
 - Central issue is fixed timetable and date certain for rapid Soviet troop withdrawal. In September UN-sponsored talks between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Kabul regime offered sixteen month timetable (down from 18), Pakistan countered with eight months. Next round probably will be in early 1988.
 - Soviets also insist on stricter guarantees that "outside interference" (aid to resistance) will cease even before final agreement; Soviets still want to ensure that Afghan communists will play leading role in post-withdrawal government.

II. SOVIET INTENTIONS

- o Soviets seek generalized, vague, joint summit statement recording mutual interest in an early settlement and implying high degree of US-Soviet agreement on concepts such as withdrawal, national reconciliation, neutrality and non-interference.
- o Soviets hint that Gorbachev will say something to the President on withdrawal timetable, but add a specific timetable will not be tabled until UN talks in early 1988.
- o Soviets apparently claim no linkage exists between question of a successor regime in Kabul and setting of withdrawal timetable, and that Moscow is receptive to neutrality for Afghanistan. Recent hints Moscow may be preparing the Afghan communists to accept a minority role in government, but this could still enable PDPA to control power by holding key posts (e.g., Interior, Army).

III. WHAT DO WE WANT?

- o A commitment from Gorbachev to a plan for the speedy withdrawal of all Soviet troops, with date certain for withdrawal to begin and be completed during 1988 (as Shevardnadze has implied in talks with us).

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-- A "frontloaded" timetable in which bulk of troops would be withdrawn in the early stages. Satisfactory Soviet commitment might make possible a joint summit statement.

-- Categorical assurance of no linkage between withdrawal and successor regime.

-- Agreement on large-scale UN presence starting on date withdrawal begins.

- o We are keeping an open mind. If Moscow is serious about a settlement, we can be helpful. If they delay making hard decisions, we will continue to keep up the pressure.
- o The make-up of an interim or permanent government in Kabul and the possibility of a role for ex-king Zahir are questions must be left to the Afghan people to decide, at present via their representatives in the Resistance.

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CENTRAL AMERICA

I. US POSITION

- o We have welcomed Guatemala Agreement; Special Negotiator Busby has conferred regularly with region's democracies.
- o We have taken the necessary steps to send a new ambassador to Nicaragua; he only awaits Senate confirmation.
- o President Reagan told the OAS on November 9, that when serious negotiations between the Sandinistas and the Nicaraguan Resistance are underway, we would meet jointly with all five Central American nations, including Nicaragua.
- o We have agreed to delay a request for military assistance to the Resistance until next year; we will continue non-lethal aid in the interim.

II. REGIONAL

- o Sandinista "concessions" under the Guatemala Agreement are seriously flawed.
 - Only 1,000 of 10,000 prisoners have been pardoned; there is no new amnesty law; harassment of opposition/human rights groups continues.
 - Appointment of Cardinal Obando as intermediary was positive step, but November 13 cease-fire proposal would confine Resistance to small designated areas devoid of support and surrounded by Sandinista military.
 - La Prensa, Radio Catolica reopened, but latter cannot broadcast news; more than 90 media outlets remain closed.
 - Internal dialogue procedures require that 12 of 15 opposition parties, including some collaborators, must agree before the government considers an initiative.

III. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

- o Soviets have expressed support for the Guatemala Agreement while attacking us for supporting the Resistance.
- o The Soviets are seeking to expand their diplomatic and economic ties in the region.
- o Soviet Bloc military deliveries to Nicaragua reached a record high in 1986; have accelerated in 1987. USSR maintains about 200 military, intelligence, and security advisors in Nicaragua.

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THE CARIBBEAN

- o Democratization continues with elections in Suriname and electoral process in Haiti.
- o We are encouraged by the faith that the people of these countries are placing in the electoral process as a means of overcoming intimidation and repression.
- o We believe stability in the region is best promoted by progress toward democratization and economic development.
- o To this end US provides significant economic aid to the region -- about \$300 million last year.

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THE SOVIETS AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I. Soviet Military Presence in the Gulf

- o Soviets keep low-level naval presence to escort Soviet-flagged vessels in Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman.
- o Three Soviet tankers under Kuwaiti charter (since May) operate mostly outside Gulf.
- o Soviet merchant ships make regular runs to Kuwait with arms and other cargo for Iraq -- Iran turns a blind eye.

II. Soviets and UN Security Council Resolution 598

- o Last July, Soviets joined in unanimous adoption of UNSC Res. 598 which calls for ceasefire and end to Iran-Iraq war. Also agreed to work on measures to enforce UNSC Resolution 598 if needed. Shevardnadze reiterated this in September.
- o But Soviets have stalled on beginning UNSC drafting of follow-up resolution (which would include an arms embargo) despite Iranian noncompliance with Resolution 598.
- o They have told us such efforts would hamper Secretary General's ongoing effort to mediate between belligerents. Soviets have also complained that our naval presence contradicts spirit of Resolution 598 and heightens tensions.
- o They have proposed instead a UN Naval Task Force in Gulf -- rather than a UN role under UNSC Resolution 598 to observe and enforce a ceasefire and withdrawal on land and sea. Proposal intended largely to divert attention from 598. We believe Soviet proposal puts the cart before the horse. Immediate task is to move ahead on 598 and follow-up resolution -- we would be prepared to consider various proposals for UN forces only in context of actually implementing 598 or enforcing an arms embargo.
- o In recent contacts with us, Soviets have left open option of beginning work in UNSC on second resolution, but have emphasized need to ensure that any enforcement measures can be fully implemented. In fact, they continue to avoid any action in UNSC which would place pressure on Iran to implement UNSC Resolution 598.

III. Soviet "Shuttle Diplomacy"

- o Principal Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov visited Baghdad, Kuwait and Tehran last month. Trip billed as "mediation", to point up Soviet influence in the region.

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- o Real purpose to try to sell Soviet proposal for UN Naval Task Force and build pressure for US to leave Gulf.
- o Results disappointing to Soviets:
 - Iraq and Kuwait rebuffed Soviet proposal.
 - Iran wants to force US navy out, but shows no signs of accepting Soviet proposal.

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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- o The Secretary's October trip demonstrated our interest in moving the Middle East peace process forward.
- o All of the leaders with whom he met want a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
- o The Arab League Summit in Amman confirmed that the moderates are gaining the upper hand Arab world. Most Arab countries are resuming full diplomatic ties with Egypt after the Summit, crossing an important threshold in the region and demonstrating that peace with Israel can now be accepted in an inter-Arab context.
- o King Hussein remains committed to an international conference, believing he can not enter direct negotiations without such a framework.
- o The Government of Israel is committed to peace but divided on how to start negotiations.
- o The Soviets want to participate in the peace process, but have yet to demonstrate a serious willingness to play a constructive role:
 - Have maintained traditional close relations with states (Syria, Libya) and groups (PLO) opposed to realistic peace process;
 - Recently voted in the UNGA against Israeli credentials, raising basic questions about Soviet intentions, particularly given hints of improvement with Israel.
 - Israelis remain skeptical about the Soviet Union's commitment to peace, especially in the absence of diplomatic relations and in view of restrictions on Soviet Jewish emigration and manipulation of the issue.
 - Continue to emphasize giving a conference authority to which Israel bitterly objects, something that ensures ongoing role for USSR but is certain to undermine possibility of productive bilateral negotiations.
- o The current positive atmosphere in the region will not continue indefinitely in the absence of real movement.

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SOUTHERN AFRICA

ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

- o We continue to seek a negotiated settlement ensuring the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Namibia and Angola.
- In our recent exchanges with the Angolans, some progress made toward an acceptable schedule for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.
- We have urged the Soviets to use their influence with Luanda to produce a proposal for Cuban withdrawal that we could take to South Africa in our capacity as intermediary.
- In recent exchanges with us, the Soviets have stressed their interest in a negotiated settlement. We have pressed them to back up their words with concrete actions, and urged them to respond to your consistent appeals for a mutual reduction of East-West military involvement in regional conflicts like this.
- In Angola, Savimbi's forces, with South African help, have just defeated another major offensive by the MPLA, backed by the Soviets and Cubans.
- In a November 12 speech, Savimbi repeated his desire for national reconciliation and asked Nigeria and Kenya to help in such an effort.

SOUTH AFRICA

- o We continue to urge the South Africans to begin serious negotiations on their country's future.
- o Recent Soviet statements have been more realistic about the limits of external influence on events in South Africa. Soviet rhetoric appears to be moving away from support for violent revolution, and moving toward peaceful negotiations including guarantees for the white minority.

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TERRORISM

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Under Gorbachev, Soviets have moved toward more constructive public stance on terrorism -- condemning international terrorism in all its forms and engaging in selected modest cooperative contacts with West (e.g., consultations on airport safety).
- o But performance does not match rhetoric. Soviets/East Europeans still allow certain terrorists transit and safehaven, and provide weapons and financial aid. We have had some success in demarches to Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany and Hungary; also with the Soviets on Afghan terrorism in Pakistan. Nonetheless, progress has been slow.
- o In the UN, Soviets and Syrians have made linked proposals, including the convening of an international conference, that would lead UN away from practical ways to prevent terrorism and toward political grandstanding.
- o At European Security Conference, Soviets have made a divisive proposal, but their draft also contains some elements supported by West.
- o Soviets constructive in negotiations for new treaties to protect airports and shipping.
- o Soviets allowed US security assessments of Moscow and Leningrad airports during bilateral civil air security discussions in March in Moscow; Soviet team inspected Kennedy and Dulles Airports in October.

II. FUTURE MOVES

- o US will continue to press Soviets to lessen their support for Libya, Syria and other state supporters of terrorism, and to discourage Afghan terrorism in Pakistan.
- o Bilaterally, US will try to keep dialogue on practical matters, such as placing restrictions on movement and activities of known terrorists in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. We will also explore the possibility of exchanging information on specific terrorist threats.
- o Multilaterally, we will work with allies to counter Soviet attempts to politicize debate on terrorism.

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EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

GENERAL

- Soviet's East Asia policy remains based on military power, but Gorbachev is imaginatively pursuing improved political and trade ties, especially by playing on denuclearization schemes.

CHINA

- Beijing sees its strategic interests as different from Moscow's, and PRC conditions for improved ties are hard for Soviets to accept. Yet, both termed their 1987 border talks "positive".
- The 13th Party Congress showed continued Chinese emphasis on economic reforms and "open door" policy.

JAPAN

- Gorbachev has failed to improve relations with Tokyo, in part because he has shown no flexibility on Japan's demand that Moscow return the "Northern Territories," seized by the Soviets at the end of World War II. We support Japan on this.

KOREAN PENINSULA

- The U.S. and Soviets want reduced tensions on the Korean Peninsula, but the Soviets tend to support North Korea's inflexible bargaining positions.
- U.S. fully supports North-South talks at high-level, with open agenda, and hopes the North and South can find an acceptable forum.
- Soviet's clear intention to attend the Seoul Olympics reduces chances that its client states -- other than North Korea -- will boycott.

VIETNAM/CAMBODIA

- Soviets apparently desire a Cambodian settlement but seem unwilling to risk their investment in Vietnam -- especially basing rights at Cam Ranh Bay naval facilities -- by leaning on the Vietnamese to withdraw.
- U.S. supports ASEAN's Cambodian position, which includes Vietnamese troop withdrawal from Cambodia and Cambodian self-determination.

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PHILIPPINES

- The August 28 coup attempt was a setback for political and economic stability, but President Aquino is being assertive and economic progress is being made.
- Communist insurgents stepped up activities after August's events but do not appear to be receiving any East Bloc military aid.

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INDIA-PAKISTAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

I. BACKGROUND

- o India detonated a nuclear device in 1974. It retains the capability to do so again, but decided for political reasons not to acquire or build nuclear weapons.
- o Pakistan has acquired the capability to build nuclear bombs, including a plant to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium. Pakistan has not yet built a nuclear device.

II. US POSITION

- o US has used leverage provided by our aid program to discourage Pakistan from opting for nuclear weapons.
 - You told Pakistanis that our ability to provide aid is dependent on Pakistan abiding by agreed limits on its nuclear program.
 - Aid is now suspended because Congress has not voted to waive Symington amendment's nuclear sanctions; while concerned about illegal Pakistani nuclear procurements in the US, Congress likely eventually to waive sanctions for a limited time.
- o We continue to press Pakistan on problem areas such as enrichment above five percent and illegal procurement of material for a nuclear weapons program.
- o We favor an India-Pakistan agreement not to acquire nuclear weapons and to take effective regional non-proliferation steps.

III. PAKISTAN'S INITIATIVES

- o Pakistan is, so far, unwilling to abide by the 5% limit on enrichment.
 - o Pakistan has offered to accept far-reaching non-proliferation measures, if India will do likewise.
 - o India has so far opposed any discussions with Pakistan.
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E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

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IV. SOVIET POSITION

- o Despite their strong support for non-proliferation, Soviets have been reluctant to take actions that would antagonize India.
 - Soviets have sought to exploit the nuclear issue to undermine U.S.-Pakistan relationship.
 - We want Soviets to involve India in a diplomatic effort aimed at a South Asian non-proliferation understanding. We have also asked India to weigh in with the Soviets on support for a regional non-proliferation regime.
 - We oppose Soviet supply of a nuclear reactor to India without safeguards on all its nuclear activities.

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PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN

I. President's June 12 Proposals

- o Expand air links to and from the city (air access to West Berlin currently restricted to Allied airlines using the three Berlin air corridors only).
- o Bring more international meetings to the city.
- o Encourage youth exchange between the eastern and western parts of Berlin.
- o Stage more international sports events in Berlin, including a future Olympics.

II. Implementation of the President's Proposals

- o President raised aspects of Initiative during his September meeting with Shevardnadze.
- o Concept paper on form and substance of talks with Soviets on the Initiative has been prepared for review by Washington, London, Paris and Bonn.
- o Allied experts group in Bonn is preparing a diplomatic note inviting the Soviets to talks.
- o Assuming capitals accept concept paper, current plans call for US, UK, French and West German foreign ministers to authorize at their December meeting in Brussels sending this note to the Soviets.
- o If the Soviets accept, talks among US, UK, French and Soviet ambassadors would begin early next year in Berlin.

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ETHIOPIA

I. Background

- o Haile Selassie overthrown in 1974. Mengistu emerged as head of military government, reversed long-standing close US relationship with Ethiopia. Mengistu forged strong ties with Soviets who have provided \$3-4 billion in arms; at same time, Soviets lost influence in neighboring Somalia.
- o In 1984-86 famine, Soviets gave little food or other help. Western donors gave nearly 2 million tons of food, led by US. Same pattern in current drought/famine crisis.

II. US Position

- o Relations are cool.
- o We support Ethiopia's territorial integrity; do not recognize Eritrean or other claims to "independence."
- o We seek predictable ties, halt to human rights abuses, and agricultural reforms to improve prospects to withstand drought.
- o We want end to Ethiopian interference in affairs of Sudan and Somalia; negotiation of differences with secessionist groups.
- o We see little evidence Soviets want to play a constructive role in moderating Ethiopia's behavior toward its neighbors, or in picking up more of Ethiopia's economic/relief burden.

III. Soviet Position

- o Prodded by Soviets, Mengistu has adopted "Soviet style" administration; established "Workers Party" in 1984 and adopted Soviet-style Constitution in 1987.
- o Soviet support enables Mengistu both to fight internal insurrections and to destabilize neighbors -- Sudan and Somalia -- by supporting anti-government forces.

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IV. US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

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U.S.-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

1. Bilateral Cooperation Checklist
2. Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges
3. U.S-Soviet Maritime Boundary
4. Embassy Management Issues
5. Kiev Consulate
6. Soviet Disinformation
7. Free Flow of Information

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BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

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BILATERAL COOPERATION CHECKLIST

Cooperation in Basic Sciences

Unable to conclude a Basic Sciences Agreement before the Summit. Draft language for joint communique would, however, note intention to conclude negotiation of a Basic Sciences Agreement at the earliest possible time.

Cooperation in Transportation

Soviets have accepted our proposal for exploratory talks January 18-20.

Cooperation in Energy

No US interest in USSR proposals submitted last year; prepared to consider new proposals.

Fusion Initiative

Since endorsed at the Geneva summit, the US and USSR, along with Japan and the EC, joined to consider cooperating, under IAEA, in design of fusion test reactor.

Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

US proposed pursuing cooperation under our Civil Space Cooperation and Environmental Protection Agreements for studies in such areas as ozone depletion.

World Ocean Agreement

US recommended one year renewal; will invite Soviets for talks in January.

Housing Agreement

Cooperation successful; new protocol for permafrost studies to be passed soon for Soviet approval.

Atomic Energy Agreement

Nuclear Regulatory Commission reviewing Soviet draft protocol for new working group on nuclear reactor safety; NRC hopes to conclude its review by March.

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Health Agreement

US refused to consider bilateral AIDS cooperation until Soviet disinformation ends, as promised in August.

Maritime Agreement

October talks in Moscow saw progress on key issues. Soviets also want to discuss access for passenger liners; indicated interest in rapidly concluding new agreement.

Fisheries Agreement

Soviets expressed interest in concluding a fisheries agreement that could be signed at the Summit; conclusion of agreement may hinge on their willingness to meet our conditions for removing a continuing prohibition of Soviet fishing in the US EEZ.

Coast Guard Issues

Soviets still studying revised US draft on Maritime Search and Rescue Agreement; radio navigation talks held August tentatively scheduled to resume at technical level next summer.

Dangerous Soviet Military Activity

Prepared to discuss the range of dangerous Soviet military activities that are of concern; expect Soviets to counter with a list of their own.

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CULTURAL AND PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

I. BACKGROUND

- o Since Geneva, steady progress in implementation of the General Exchanges Agreement and People-to-People Initiative.
- o USIA Director Wick opened "Information USA" exhibit in Moscow in June and had good meetings with Yakovlev, Dobrynin and other senior officials.
- o Soviets somewhat more forthcoming on youth exchanges -- some 300 20-30 year-olds will have come here by the end of 1987; potential for expansion in 1988. Andover Academy-Novosibirsk high school exchange good model.
- o Chautauqua conference in New York in August, following up on last year's in Latvia, gave some 240 visiting Soviets a perspective on U.S. policies and an opportunity to spend a few days with American families.
- o Sister Cities partnerships have expanded dramatically from 6 links in 1985 to 16 firm and another 16 pending.
- o Despite performing arts successes, Soviets reluctant to meet financial needs of big-ticket groups and slow to respond to American proposals. Soviets take advantage of U.S. commercial market; U.S. side limited to what Soviet authorities want to see happen.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets reluctant to take necessary steps to resolve performing arts imbalance; blame USG for withdrawing financial support for US groups.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Pleased with the increase in exchanges, but note that imbalance in performing arts exchanges has slowed expansion.
- o Proposing to Soviets that USIA Director Wick lead discussions with the Soviets during the summit in two main areas of the bilateral engagement--media reciprocity and cultural exchanges
- o Would like to make tradition of televised exchange of New Year's Day greetings between leaders.

US-SOVIET MARITIME BOUNDARY

- o US regards line established by the 1867 US-Russia Convention Ceding Alaska as our maritime boundary with the USSR.
- o US and USSR establishment in 1977 of 200-mile economic zones revealed conflicting depictions of the 1867 Convention Line; as a result, areas in the Bering Sea over which both countries claim maritime resource jurisdiction.
- o Since 1981, eight rounds of discussions, the latest in October 1987 (in Moscow), to resolve boundary dispute.
- o Talks have narrowed differences substantially; remaining issue is how to deal with Soviet claim to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) on the US side of the Convention Line.
 - Soviets willing to give up that EEZ claim and accept the Convention Line as the boundary in exchange for moving the line a short distance towards US from our proposed split-the-difference-line.
 - Both sides actively studying each other's latest proposals.
- o In 1986, both sides declared intention not to take enforcement action against vessels of the other fishing in disputed areas, also intention not to permit third country vessels to fish there. Interim arrangement alleviated fisheries enforcement incidents.
- o Despite differences over boundary, US outer continental shelf leasing program has proceeded in the Navarin Basin in the Bering Sea. Lease bids for the disputed area currently are in escrow.
- o Interested members of Congress and the Alaska governor's office have been briefed on latest talks and have responded positively to most recent US proposal.

EMBASSY MANAGEMENT ISSUESI. THE EXISTING EMBASSY BUILDING

- o Work on new heating and fire safety systems is well under way.
- o New communications center to be completed by February 15.
- o Deputy Secretary Whitehead has told the Soviets we may keep this building even after we move into our new Embassy.
- o Soviet cooperation in issuing visas for our construction personnel has been generally good.

II. THE NEW EMBASSY BUILDING

- o Deputy Secretary Whitehead discussed our plans for the new Embassy with the Soviets in a November 16 meeting in Moscow. He told them that:
 - Technical studies on the problems at the NOB are still underway.
 - It is clear that major dismantling and rebuilding will be necessary before we can move into the new building.
 - It will be at least three to five years before we will be in a position to move in.
 - They will not be allowed to move into their new Embassy on Mt. Alto until we are ready to move into ours.
- o Soviets gave every indication at meeting that they are prepared to cooperate and want to get this problem behind them.

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KIEV CONSULATE

I. KIEV PROJECT ON HOLD

- o Soviets responded to our Kiev consulate exchange proposals in late March, just as the Moscow Embassy scandal was breaking.
 - Our proposal had claimed right to tear down existing consulate building and rebuild with US labor and materials.
 - Soviet response conceded our right to use US labor and materials for extensive changes to interior of building, but stopped short of permitting changes to the building's exterior or to structural elements.
- o Secretary Shultz decided to defer further talks on Kiev for several months.
- o Have told the Soviets we are still studying their response to our proposal.
 - Shevardnadze pressed for clarification of our position on the consulate exchange during Secretary Shultz' April visit to Moscow, but Soviets have not raised the subject since that time.
- o Time still does not appear ripe for resurrecting full-fledged Kiev project.
 - Moscow chancery project has tied up construction and security resources.
 - Prospects may be better after interagency and congressional questions on Moscow new office building security have been settled.

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SOVIET DISINFORMATION

I. Soviets Wind Down AIDS Disinformation Campaign; Acknowledge Natural Origins of Virus

- Since 1983, Soviet-generated media reports appearing in over 80 countries have alleged that the AIDS virus was developed in US biological warfare labs.
- In August, following US protests, Soviets told American officials that the false charges would cease to appear in Soviet media.
 - o No subsequent appearances of disinformation in Soviet media.
 - o In October, official government newspaper Izvestia published disavowal of disinformation campaign by leading Soviet scientists.
- In October, Soviets co-sponsored UNGA resolution citing natural origins of AIDS and calling for global cooperation to combat the disease.
- However, AIDS disinformation continues to appear elsewhere: 31 appearances in 23 countries since August.

II. Other Disinformation Campaigns Continue:

- In October, a Soviet publication (Sovetskaya Rossiya) defended the following worldwide campaigns, claiming they are based on Western, including US, sources and that Soviet media "have the right to report different views."
- Jonestown Massacre was a "CIA Crime"
 - o In early 1987, Soviet Ministry of Justice published a 223-page book, The Death of Jonestown -- Crime of the CIA charging that the CIA perpetrated the 1978 Jonestown massacre in Guyana.
- US Responsible for Assassination of Olof Palme
 - o A Soviet government-produced "docu-drama" insinuating US complicity in the assassination of Olof Palme was shown on Swedish and Soviet TV in 1987, and received widespread media attention.
- US Producing an "Ethnic Weapon"
 - o Since 1983, Soviet media have alleged that the US is producing an "ethnic weapon" that will kill only non-whites.

- o Director of Soviet news agency Novosti defended the truth of these charges in a meeting with USIA Director Wick in June.

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION (FFOI)

I. BACKGROUND

- o In Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Yakovlev raised possibility of "trading" end to VOA jamming for access to US medium wave stations. USIA Director Wick turned discussion to broad range of FFOI issues.
- o Director Wick and Yakovlev exchanged letters, met in Moscow. US proposed formal talks on full range of FFOI issues. Yakovlev said individual Soviet ministries would respond to specific proposals.
- o May 23, Soviets ceased most VOA jamming. Jamming continues of some VOA languages as well as RFE/RL. At same time, Soviets began AM broadcasting from Cuban transmitter, interfering with some US stations including, on occasion, the President's old station in Des Moines. Recently began broadcasting in Spanish from Cuba, so far without interference to US stations.
- o US protested to Soviets and Cubans on the harmful interference and took matter to International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Soviets claim it is a US-Cuban issue; owe Wick letter on the subject.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets seek to expand unilaterally their already considerable access to our public.
- o As part of PR campaign, hope to portray USSR as increasingly open while maximizing propaganda benefits from alleged USG restrictions on access to our public.

III. US VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o US will not "trade" for an end to Soviet jamming of foreign broadcasts; it must end because it is illegal.
- o We seek to broaden our discussions with the Soviets to cover the full range of FFOI issues, emphasizing substantial imbalance in our access to the Soviet public. Proposing that Director Wick lead discussion of media reciprocity issues at summit.
- o No objection in principle to Soviet broadcasts here from Cuba. Broadcasts that interfere with existing US stations, however, contravene ITU and are counter to aim of improved communication between our peoples.