

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Tahir-Kheli, Shirin R.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Afghanistan Reagan (ETC)/  
Rabbanni (1)  
**Box:** RAC Box 2

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 5/6/2009

**File Folder** AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

**FOIA**

F06-105/1

**Box Number** 2

ELIAS

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
69628	PAPER	THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	1	ND	B1
69630	PAPER	RE THE GENEVA TALKS <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	1	ND	B1
69631	MEMO	FROM MURPHY RE VISIT OF AFGHAN RESITANCE ALLIANCE <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	3	ND	B1
69634	TALKING POINTS	FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN RESISTNCE LEADERS	1	6/16/1986	B1 B3
69637	MEMO	FROM POINDEXTER RE VISIT OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP	3	6/16/1986	B1
69638	OUTLINE	PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	3	6/16/1986	B1
69639	TALKING POINTS	FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERS <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	2	6/16/1986	B1
69640	REPORT		1	4/15/1986	B1
69641	REPORT		1	4/14/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 5/6/2009

**File Folder** AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

**FOIA**

F06-105/1

**Box Number** 2

ELIAS

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
69642	REPORT		1	4/14/1986	B1
69643	REPORT		1	4/21/1986	B1
69644	REPORT		1	4/14/1986	B1
69645	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE DAILY REPORT	1	6/13/1986	B1
69646	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE DAILY REPORT	1	6/12/1986	B1
69647	MEMCON	RR MEETING WITH RABBANI AND OTHER LEADERS OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE <b>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</b>	4	6/16/1986	B1
69648	MEMO	SESTANOVICH TO POINDEXTER RE MEMCON FROM RR'S MEETING <b>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</b>	1	6/17/1986	B1
69649	MEMCON	DUPLICATE OF 69647 <b>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</b>	4	6/16/1986	B1
69650	MEMO	MURPHY TO ARMACOST RE FINAL MEETING WITH RESISTANCE DELEGATION <b>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</b>	2	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

**Withdrawer**

SMF 5/6/2009

**File Folder** AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

**FOIA**

F06-105/1

**Box Number** 2

ELIAS

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
69651	CABLE	STATE 193431 <i>R 2/26/2020 M1675/1</i>	2	6/19/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

516

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ANNOUNCEMENT OF AFGHAN VISIT

The President has invited Afghan Alliance spokesman Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani (Boar-hawn-uh-DEEN Rab-baw-KNEE) and other leaders of the resistance to meet with him at the White House on Monday at 11:30 a.m. Professor Rabbani and his colleagues head four of the Afghan political parties that make up the resistance Alliance. They will be in Washington as the first stop of a tour of Western capitals.

The President sees the meeting as an opportunity to discuss the Afghan people's war for national liberation and to hear the views and proposals of the Alliance on the future of Afghanistan.

Djerejian will use  
at 9:15

---

1-7  
69628

### Afghanistan, III: The Resistance Alliance


The Afghan leaders you'll meet Monday -- Professor Rabbani and his colleagues -- head up 4 of the political parties that joined together in early 1985 as the resistance Alliance. (Full name: the Islamic Union of Mujahidin of Afghanistan.) A year later, the Alliance shows major strengths but also weaknesses.

In still-traditional Afghanistan, the social authority of the Alliance leaders carries great weight. As religious figures, they gain further respect through the Islamic world. And their resistance to Soviet occupation gives them the extra appeal of nationalism. The Alliance has strong ties to the fighters inside Afghanistan; the best known mujahidin chief, Commander Masood, belongs to Rabbani's own party. The 3 million refugees in Pakistan also give the parties a valuable base. The camps are used to rest and re-arm insurgent forces.

But the Alliance's weaknesses also loom large. They depend on the good will of the Pak government, which does not want the large (and highly armed) refugee population to be too well organized. The Alliance leaders suspect each other's ambitions; their doctrinal and personal differences hamper both day-to-day coordination and the preparation of a unified political program. Their exclusion from the Geneva peace talks has highlighted their feelings of impotence.

We hope to help the Alliance in numerous ways: making them the channel for more humanitarian aid, urging the Paks to accept more independence, making our own official contacts with them more frequent (and encouraging other governments to do the same), calling for the UN to consult them on the negotiations, etc. The Alliance has its own ideas for strengthening its role, which we'll discuss with them next week.

7A  
STIK  
SS



DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M1675 # 69628  
BY PW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Peter  
Vince  
Shirin —

Comments? (For  
the President's Saturday  
morning DR.)  
Steve

Afghanistan, II: The Geneva Talks

Last month, the 7th round of the UN-sponsored "indirect" talks on Afghanistan was held in Geneva, without result. Key players in the drama -- resistance leaders and Pakistani foreign minister Yaqub Khan -- arrive next week to share their views with us.

Recent disagreement has centered on how long withdrawal would take. The Kabul regime -- and behind it, the Soviets -- suggested four years; the Paks called this absurd, saying that 3-6 months are adequate. (I've used the same figure publicly). There are reports that the next Soviet offer will be 18 months; an informed Pak source says this (much too long for us) might be accepted.

If a timetable were set, other issues would remain. One is verification: Islamabad wants an elaborate system with "teeth;" Kabul, some small bilateral teams. We have also expressed concern to the Paks that the treaty would end aid to the mujahidin before any Soviet troops leave Afghanistan.

The critical unresolved issue is the role of the resistance. The Paks have agreed to keep them out of talks (and have not even shown them the draft text), but recognize that as a practical matter they have to be consulted at some point. Hoping to gain a part in the process, the resistance Alliance has now proposed elections (and intends to hold balloting in camps and liberated areas).

The talks resume on July 30, so six weeks of maneuvering are ahead. We'll use next week's visits (and Pak Prime Minister Junejo's July visit) to coordinate approaches, and especially to urge a voice for the Alliance. At the same time, Moscow will doubtless activate its "backchannel" to Islamabad. A final area of maneuvering will be in Kabul itself: the prospect of a settlement may put severe pressures on this bitterly factionalized regime.

DECLASSIFIED  
NLRR M11675 #69630  
BY RWS NARA DATE 2/26/2020

~~SECRET~~

69631

TO:

FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy

SUBJECT: Scope Paper for the visit of Afghan Resistance Alliance  
Spokesman Burhanuddin Rabbani and Other Afghan Leaders

I. OBJECTIVES

--to establish a substantive and continuing U.S.-alliance political dialogue;

--to explore with Rabbani possible formulas for giving the resistance a credible international political presence.

--to reassure the Afghans that we will not strike a deal on Afghanistan with the Soviets against the Afghan interests;

--to reiterate our unwillingness to guarantee a U.N.-sponsored agreement which is against Afghan interests;

--to exchange views on the state of the war and on our proposed aid and media enhancement programs.

II. WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP STANDS

Our political relationship with the Afghan resistance is a limited one. Until the formation of the alliance of the seven major resistance political parties in May 1985, we had managed most aspects of our dealings with the resistance through the Pakistan Government and confined our dealings with the Afghans largely to information-gathering forays with individual party leaders, commanders, and party staffers. In the year since the alliance was formed, a few senior U.S. officials and politicians have had meetings with the alliance spokesman, but the circumstances have generally not been right for a full exchange of views, let alone agreement on joint courses of action.

For its part, the alliance has not given us much to deal with. Ideological and personal animosities have kept the leaders of the seven parties divided, and a Saudi-led effort in 1982 to force them together behind one man was a disastrous failure. The Afghans want a united resistance movement but are aware that, if they try to move too quickly, they may sacrifice even the very modest level of cooperation they have managed over the past year to achieve.

~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1675 #69631  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

III. WHAT WE WANT

Our overriding objective is for the resistance to be able to wage a political struggle comparable to the effort being mounted on the battlefield by the mujahidin. The resistance should be in a position mount challenges to the Kabul regime in the Islamic Conference Organization, the Non-Aligned Movement and the U.N. and should be seen as administering, as well as fighting in, the free areas of the country. The Afghans also need the capability to make he war a subject of continuous international media attention.

To begin moving towards this objective, the Afghans must find a formula which permits them to make it appear that they are a purposeful political movement rather than a group of fractious, reactionary xenophobes. The leaders must cede enough authority to permit the establishment of an entity able to interact with foreign governments and international organizations. Such a body would need the personnel to direct international efforts to aid the civilian population and to mount campaigns for recognition in the world community. Overseas representation is essential to such an effort.

Once the alliance finds a formula for creating this entity, the following steps should be taken:

- establishment of a secretariat in Peshawar;
- creation of permanent committees able to deal with foreign aid donors;
- opening of offices in key cities around the world, starting with New York and Jeddah;
- development of a credible information organism

Apart from what we want the alliance to accomplish, we must find ways of providing the Afghans with continuous reassurance about our intentions vis a vis the Soviet Union and the Geneva talks. We need to develop a mechanism for continuous consultations both in Pakistan and the U.S. This implies both the regularization of senior-level political contacts between Embassy Islamabad and the alliance and the sending, in effect, of an alliance amabassador to the U.S. Initially, a representative in New York could handle this job.

IV. WHAT THEY WANT FROM US

The Afghans have several objectives in coming here:

- to generate publicity for their cause;

11

~~SECRET~~

- to be reassured that we do not intend to sell them out;
- to get our humanitarian aid program moving and to have an input in shaping it;

We should also be aware of two objectives which are likely on a hidden agenda of Rabbani's. The first is to strengthen his own position vis a vis the other leaders; he will be the first alliance spokesman to be received by the president. Second, he wants to avoid being viewed as a tool of the United States.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69634	TALKING POINTS  FOR PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN RESISTNCE LEADERS	1	6/16/1986	B1 B3

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 12, 1986

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Afghan Resistance  
Leaders, Monday, 16 June 1986, 11:30 a.m.

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a memorandum to the President preparing him for his Monday meeting with Rabbani and the other Afghan resistance leaders.

Peter Rodman, Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Vince Cannistraro, and Michael Castine concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo at Tab I.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I Memo to the President

Tab A Talking Points with 3x5 cards

Tab B List of Participants

Tab C Bio's

*(to follow)*

DECLASSIFIED  
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended  
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008  
BY NARA *Amf* DATE *5/6/09*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restrictions</i>
69637	MEMO  FROM POINDEXTER RE VISIT OF AFGHAN RESISTANCE LEADERSHIP	3	6/16/1986	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PARTICIPANTS LIST

Meeting with Afghan Resistance Leaders -- June 16, 1986, 11:30 -  
12 noon (Oval Office)

The United States

The President

The Vice President (tentative)

Secretary Shultz

Donald Pagan

John M. Poindexter

Undersecretary Michael Armacost

Stephen Sestanovich, NSC staff

\_\_\_\_\_, Interpreter

Afghanistan

Burhanuddin Rabbani

Ahmad Gailani

Sebqatullah Mojadedi

Mohammed Nabi

Mohammed Es'haq



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

4609 ADD-ON

~~SECRET~~

June 12, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: The President's meeting with Afghan Resistance Alliance spokesman Burhanuddin Rabbani and accompanying Resistance leaders, June 16, 11:30 a.m.

Material for the President's meeting with the Afghan resistance Alliance spokesman is attached. Burhanuddin Rabbani will be accompanied by Ahmad Gailani, leader of the National Islamic Front for Afghanistan; Sebqatullah Mojadedi, leader of the Afghanistan National Liberation Front; Mohammed Nabi, leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement; and Mohammad Es'haq, political officer in Rabbani's Islamic Society party.

Nicholas Platt  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments:

- Tab A - Scope Paper
- Tab B - Talking Points
- Tab C - Biographic Sketches on:
  - Burhanuddin Rabbani
  - Ahmad Gailani
  - Sebqatullah Mojadedi
  - Mohammed Nabi
  - Mohammad Es'haq

**DECLASSIFIED**

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By amf NARA, Date 5/6/09~~SECRET~~

DECL: OADR

69638

~~SECRET~~

THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN RESISTANCE SPOKESMAN  
RABBANI AND OTHER RESISTANCE LEADERS  
JUNE 16, 1986, 11:30 A.M.

I. OBJECTIVES

--to establish a substantive and continuing U.S.-alliance political dialogue;

--to encourage more effective Afghan political cooperation, including a credible international political presence;

--to reassure the Afghans that we will not cut a deal on Afghanistan with the Soviets against Afghan interests;

--to emphasize to the resistance our support for Pakistan and our view that we must coordinate closely all our efforts with the GOP;

--to discuss the U.N.-sponsored peace talks and to reiterate our unwillingness to guarantee a bad agreement;

--to exchange views on the state of the war and on our proposed aid and media enhancement programs.

II. WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP STANDS

Our political relationship with the Afghan resistance is a limited one. Until the formation of the alliance of the seven major resistance political parties in May 1985, we had managed most aspects of our dealings with the resistance through the Pakistan Government and confined our dealings with the Afghans largely to information-gathering forays with individual party leaders, commanders, and party staffers. In the year since the alliance was formed, a few senior U.S. officials and politicians have met with the alliance spokesman, but the circumstances generally have not been right for a full exchange of views, let alone agreement, on joint courses of action.

For its part, the alliance has not given us much to deal with. The Afghans want a united resistance movement, but ideological and personal animosities have kept the seven parties divided. The leaders correctly fear that if they move too quickly, they may sacrifice even the very modest level of cooperation they have achieved over the past year.

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1675 # 69638  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

17

~~SECRET~~

-2-

### III. WHAT WE WANT

We seek ways of enabling the resistance to wage a political war comparable to the military efforts of the mujahidin. The resistance should be in a position to challenge the Kabul regime in the Islamic Conference Organization, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the U.N., and should be seen as administering, as well as fighting in, the free areas of the country. The Afghans also need the capability to make the war a subject of continuous international media attention.

A prerequisite in moving towards these objectives is the support of the Government of Pakistan. We sense that the resistance leadership is conscious of Pakistani concerns. We will nonetheless want to note the importance of working in close concert with Pakistan in matters of political strategy.

In light of the alliance's failure to bring the various elements of the resistance together, we will explore with Rabbani ways of mounting an effective political campaign before true unity among the resistance parties is achieved. We will point out that the current efforts of individual parties project an image of fractiousness and will urge that an entity able to interact with foreign governments and international organizations be established. We will want to discuss possible formulas for setting up a secretariat in Peshawar; creating permanent committees for dealing with foreign aid donors; opening offices around the world; and developing a credible public information program.

An effort of this kind is beyond the present human and material capabilities of the resistance. We will make it clear to Rabbani that we are prepared to explore ways of working closely with the alliance and the GOP to develop the alliance's capabilities. After concerting measures with the Pakistanis, we will also want to help the alliance in planning for a more effective lobbying campaign at the 41st UNGA and at the Islamic Conference summit in early 1987.

Apart from what we want the alliance to accomplish, we will want to emphasize our desire for a continuing dialogue with the Afghans on the international aspects of the war. We will brief them both on our exchanges with the Soviets and on our view of proximity talks. We will also stress our confidence in Pakistan's handling of the discussions to date and our view that the Pakistanis have no intention of relenting in their effort to get the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

~~SECRET~~

18

~~SECRET~~

-3-

Beyond this, we will stress our desire for regular senior-level contacts between Embassy Islamabad and the alliance. We will also press for the resistance to station an emissary in New York.

#### IV. WHAT THEY WANT FROM US

The Afghans have a shorter, less complex agenda. They want to generate publicity for their cause and will rely on us and their European interlocutors to see that this happens. They will also seek reassurance that we do not intend to sell them out. Whatever we say to them, they may be expected to use any public forum offered them to condemn the Geneva talks and to indicate their displeasure with our offer to serve as a guarantor of a U.N.-brokered settlement.

They will press both publicly and privately for more aid and will urge in particular that we get on with our long-promised cross-border humanitarian assistance program. They will urge that we dispense this aid through the alliance or the parties. They may also argue that the private voluntary organizations that have taken the lead up to now be compelled to work through the resistance leadership.

#### V. WHAT WE CAN ACHIEVE

The immediate object of this exercise is to establish a serious, ongoing dialogue with the resistance on all aspects of political strategy. There are checks on Rabbani's ability to move ahead with the agenda described above. We will share with him our ideas on how these obstacles can be overcome or circumvented, convey to him our sense that the need for resistance political development is urgent, and indicate our interest in continued policy-level contacts.

With respect to the Geneva talks, we can reassure the resistance of our continued support and emphasize our confidence in Pakistan's negotiating strategy. Beyond this, we should give Rabbani a clear understanding of where things stand in the negotiations and urge that the alliance develop a coherent position on the discussions. A positive approach will serve the resistance better than simply condemning the entire effort as the alliance leadership has done up to now.

Finally, we should listen carefully to what Rabbani has to tell us. We have a lot we want to say, and we must resist the temptation to overwhelm the Afghans with ideas that seem logical to us but that for one reason or another may not be practical. To be good listeners is especially important as we move ahead with our humanitarian and public diplomacy programs.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TALKING POINTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH AFGHAN  
RESISTANCE SPOKESMAN AND OTHER RESISTANCE LEADERS  
JUNE 16, 1986

U.S.-resistance relations

-- The American people strongly support your struggle for freedom. We will not let you down.

-- To support your cause is in our national interest. The West cannot have satisfactory relations with Moscow if the Soviets think they can get away with naked aggression.

-- Your visit signals our shared determination to see Afghanistan free. The upcoming visits of the Pakistan Foreign Minister and the Pakistan Prime Minister reinforce that message.

Support for Pakistan

-- Pakistani support for your effort has been unstinting, and continued cooperation with Pakistan is essential.

-- We understand and support Pakistan's cooperation with the U.N. in the Geneva proximity talks. Pakistan intends no sell out and will continue to press for Soviet withdrawal.

U.S.-Soviet relations

-- There will be no secret U.S.-Soviet deal on Afghanistan. We must show the Soviets they cannot have it both ways, i.e., normal relations with the West and a free hand elsewhere.

-- We believe the Soviets respond mainly to pressure. Thus, military and political pressure must grow steadily.

-- We doubt the Soviets want serious negotiations. We will not allow Moscow to manipulate the diplomatic process in order to deceive world opinion, divide the U.S. and Pakistan, and demoralize your resistance.

U.N.-sponsored talks

-- No agreement lacking the support of the Afghan people can succeed. You must be seriously consulted on any settlement.

-- We are prepared to guarantee an agreement that gets the Soviets out of Afghanistan for good. We have not given the UN a blank check and will look hard at any proposed agreement.

~~SECRET~~  
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1675 # 69639  
BY RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

Bringing the resistance together

-- We urge you to find a way of speaking with one voice. Without such minimal cooperation, it may be hard to sustain support at home and abroad in the protracted struggle you face.

-- Also, we want to work with you to develop free Afghan institutions for delivery of health, education, and agriculture services inside your nation, as well as for telling your own story more effectively through the international media.

-- Above all, we want to continue the high-level political dialogue begun by your visit here. Only through regular exchanges of views and through planning a common strategy in advance can we hope to reach our shared objective of regaining freedom for the Afghan people.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69640	BIO	1	4/15/1986	B1
	BIO			B3

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69641	BIO	1	4/14/1986	B1
	BIO			B3

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69642	BIO	1	4/14/1986	B1
	BIO			B3

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
69644	BIO	1	4/14/1986	B1
	BIO			B3

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN; FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69645	MEMO  POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE DAILY REPORT	1	6/13/1986	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

TAHIR-KHELI, SHIRIN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

SMF 5/6/2009

*File Folder*

AFGHAN REAGAN (ETC)/RABBANI (1)

*FOIA*

F06-105/1

ELIAS

*Box Number*

91883

10

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
69646	MEMO  POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE DAILY REPORT	1	6/12/1986	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

June 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ROD MCDANIEL

FROM:

STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Statement after Afghan Meeting

The attached memo to David Chew seeks his concurrence on a draft Presidential statement to be released after the Monday Afghan meeting.

I have -- following Bob Pearson's suggested procedure -- cleared it with the NEA bureau at State rather than seeking formal S/S clearance.

We will send a copy to Speakes.

*SRS for* Rodman, *SRS for* Tahir-Kheli, and *N.A.* Cannistraro concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Chew  
Tab A Draft Statement

TAE  
I

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

10 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CFEW

FROM: RODNEY MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement after Meeting with Afghan  
Leaders, Monday, 16 June, 11:30 a.m.

Attached is a draft statement that would be released in the President's name after his Monday morning meeting with leaders of the Afghan resistance. Can we have your earliest concurrence?

We are forwarding a copy to Larry Speakes.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Presidential Statement

TA  
A

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

### Presidential Statement After Meeting Afghan Resistance Leaders

I met this morning with leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance: Professor Burhanuddin Pabbani, who is the current spokesman of the Alliance, and his colleagues. They speak for the many citizens of Afghanistan who are battling Soviet forces in the name of national liberation.

My message to the resistance delegation was simple. In your struggle to regain your nation's independence, the American people stand with you. No policy of our government has broader and deeper support. This is an unshakeable commitment. Your goal is our goal: the freedom of Afghanistan. We will not let you down.

Like the Afghan people, we hope for a negotiated end to this war. Year after year, U.N. resolutions have called for a total and rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops, and for self-determination for the Afghan people.

Let us renew that call today. Only an agreement that has the support of the Afghan people can work. This is a fact of life. And it is why the role of the resistance Alliance is crucial. The diversity of the Alliance -- its roots in the faith and traditions of Afghanistan -- show that it is the true representative of the Afghan people.

People everywhere admire the courage of the Afghans, but the people and government of Pakistan have also borne a large share of the burden of Soviet pressure and intimidation. We are honored to join with them in supporting Afghan freedom.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1675 #69647

BY RWS NARA DATE 2/26/2020

→ STIC  
→ SS

28

CONFIDENTIAL

69647

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and other leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
Donald Regan, Chief of Staff  
John M. Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Stephen R. Sestanovich, NSC staff

Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Spokesman, Afghan resistance Alliance, and leader, Jamiat-i-Islami  
Sebqatullah Mojadedi, leader, Afghan National Liberation Front  
Muhammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader, Islamic Revolutionary Movement  
Ahmad Gailani, leader, National Islamic Front for Afghanistan  
Mohammed Es'haq, Jamiat-i-Islami

DATE, TIME June 16, 1986  
AND PLACE 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m., Oval Office

The Afghan delegation entered, was introduced to the President and sat through two waves of press coverage. (The Secretary had joked beforehand that when the cameramen entered the delegation would find it like an invasion; the President added, "But without AK-47's.") (U)

Opening the discussion, the President expressed satisfaction that the delegation had been able to break away from its duties to make the trip to Washington. He noted that it was an honor to support their struggle for independence, since the leaders of the resistance were the true representatives of the Afghan people. He said he hoped that this first meeting would be the beginning of a regular dialogue between the U.S. government and the Alliance. He was confident that our goals were identical: both of us seek the freedom of Afghanistan. For the United States it was important that the Soviet Union not believe that aggression pays; this was why we reject separate deals with Moscow. Turning to the U.N.-sponsored peace talks, he declared that no peace agreement that is reached will work unless the alliance has been consulted and unless the the Afghan people support the terms of the agreement. For this reason, the U.S. government urges the U.N. to consult the Alliance on the talks;

CONFIDENTIAL

he pledged that we would brief the delegation on the talks that have been held to date. The President said that he himself was skeptical of these talks, because he did not believe that the Soviets had made the decision to get out. Concluding, he observed that greater cooperation among the members of the Alliance would bring the international recognition that we both seek for it. At this point, he expressed interest in hearing what the guests had to say.

Professor Rabbani began by expressing thanks, on behalf of the people of Afghanistan, for the President's sincere interest in them and for the help he had provided. He was sure that the President was familiar with the record of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, even though their occupation was hidden by "a curtain of silence". The Soviets had turned the country into a land of blood and ashes. But he was convinced that the Soviet army would never be able to break the Afghan people's will. The Soviets have the power to burn and kill, but they cannot make us slaves. Already one million have been killed, 5 million turned into refugees abroad, and 2 million into refugees within Afghanistan. Yet with all these sad stories, it was especially sorrowful that the mujahidin were not recognized as the representatives of the Afghan people. "The butchers" have their seat at the U.N. and embassies everywhere; meanwhile the people of Afghanistan were denied the privilege of representation. This could be seen at Geneva: the Alliance was only somewhat aware of what was going on in the talks there; it didn't know what went on behind closed doors. It did know that the Soviets didn't want peace; they were warmongers. Gorbachev has made the world believe he wants peace but he has an iron fist beneath his velvet glove and his promises of good will.

Rabbani noted that the Alliance had to be anxious about the American offer to guarantee an agreement, because the Soviets are not honest. In the meantime the Afghan people are fighting on their own, becoming martyrs and living in poverty. Children were being kidnapped by the Soviets and taken away for education. Biological warfare was being waged. Villages were set afire, and bombs in the form of toys left to kill the surviving children. Rabbani had recently seen a two-month old baby with her face defaced; she had been to the United Kingdom for skin-grafts. To protect themselves the mujahidin need more weapons, especially for air defense. To this, some said that if the freedom fighters had more effective weapons, the Soviets would get mad. But what else could the Soviets do to them? Only nuclear weapons had not been used. Afghanistan had become a testing ground for Soviet weaponry. On the diplomatic side, he asked that the State Department be given instructions to take steps to prepare to recognize the mujahidin officially. No agreements should be reached that are against the wishes of the Afghan people. The people of Afghanistan are the only ones entitled to speak of its future. It was important to avoid a second Yalta. Summarizing, he said that the mujahidin need effective weapons and effective aid of all kinds. They knew of the President's previous statements on Afghanistan and were very grateful. The people of Afghanistan would never forget this stand.

The President recalled seeing victims of Soviet atrocities in a hospital in Boston, among them some children horribly disfigured by fire bombing. One child had only a single arm; another, only one leg. He also told of an Afghan student who recounted her arrest for leafletting; to get her to talk, the police brought in another prisoner and gouged his eyes out in front of her. So, knowing of such things, we could have no illusions about the Soviets, their goals, or their methods. As for the issue of recognition, he noted that it would not be very helpful if only one country recognized the resistance; it was necessary to work to mobilize the whole international community. In the meantime, maintaining a presence in Kabul was useful to us for other reasons. This did not mean we would accept -- or guarantee -- any agreement produced in Geneva regardless of its terms. For us, the withdrawal timetable should be no more than 3-6 months. Until the Soviets began to propose such an agreement, we could have no faith in their statements. It seemed to us that the brave resistance shown by the mujahidin since the invasion was a humiliating embarrassment to the Soviets; they must be thinking of how to find a face-saving way out. (C)

Secretary Shultz suggested that the President might want to hear from the other members of the delegation. (U)

Dr. Mojadedi began by offering thanks to the American people for their help; the Afghan people appreciate. What worried them were the Geneva talks. The real sides to the war are the defenders of Afghanistan -- the mujahidin -- and the aggressors against Afghanistan -- the Soviets. He reminded the President that the resistance antedated the invasion; it was resistance against a Communist regime installed in 1978. The Afghan people would continue this struggle, which was for self-determination.

The President recalled that he had been in Teheran at the time that the Soviets installed this Communist regime; shortly thereafter the American Ambassador had been killed.

Mr. Nabi also expressed thanks for American support. He said that Afghans felt that Americans considered the war to be one of their own problems. It was in fact not a local issue, but a common global problem; not a problem just for the people of Afghanistan but a danger for peace everywhere. The Afghan people were defending against a problem that could become worldwide. They expected support from others, especially Americans, who could help them cut off the hand of the aggressor. The mujahidin wanted to be recognized internationally; they also needed to gain strength on the battlefield, especially by acquiring better air defenses. As for Geneva, he echoed Rabbani's statement that the Soviets were not honest. They would sign an agreement and then not abide by it. They wanted to take full control of Afghanistan under the pretext of peace. They would accept a political solution only if the mujahidin had enough power to resist on the

battlefield. The swords of the mujahidin had to become stronger. The two sides talking at the table should be the Soviets and the resistance. If, on the other hand, the puppet regime were permitted to remain in power, it would only offer the Soviets future excuses for returning.

The President stated emphatically that any agreement must provide not only for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but for the people of Afghanistan to determine the form of government they want.

Ahmad Gailani spoke briefly. After expressing thanks for U.S. aid, he said he hoped that the United States would be behind the resistance until victory.

The President broke in to say, yes.

Gailani continued by expressing hope that America would also support Afghanistan in helping to rebuild after the war.

The President repeated, yes. He recalled a remark by Stalin, that the death of three-quarters of mankind could be justified if the remainder were Communist. It was up to the rest of us to change their minds.

With this, the group rose and the meeting ended at 12:10.

June 16, 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Presidential Statement After Meeting Afghan Resistance Leaders

I met this morning with leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance: Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani, who is the current spokesman of the Alliance, and his colleagues. They speak for the many citizens of Afghanistan who are battling Soviet forces in the name of national liberation.

My message to the resistance delegation was simple. In your struggle to regain your nation's independence, the American people stand with you. No policy of our government has broader and deeper support. This is an unshakeable commitment. Your goal is our goal: the freedom of Afghanistan. We will not let you down.

Like the Afghan people, we hope for a negotiated end to this war. Year after year, U.N. resolutions have called for a total and rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops, and for self-determination for the Afghan people.

Let us renew that call today. Only an agreement that has the support of the Afghan people can work. This is a fact of life. And it is why the role of the resistance Alliance is crucial. The diversity of the Alliance -- its roots in the faith and traditions of Afghanistan -- show that it is the true representative of the Afghan people.

Civilized people everywhere admire the courage of the Afghans, but no one has borne a larger share of the burden of Soviet pressure and intimidation than the people and government of Pakistan. We are honored to join with them in supporting Afghan freedom.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

June 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ROD MCDANIEL

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement after Afghan Meeting

The attached memo to David Chew seeks his concurrence on a draft Presidential statement to be released after the Monday Afghan meeting.

We will send a copy to Speakes at the same time.

Rodman, Tahir-Kheli, and Cannistraro concur.

Attachments

Tab I Memo to Chew  
Tab A Draft Statement

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

ACTION

13 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: RODNEY MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: Presidential Statement after Meeting with Afghan  
Leaders, Monday, 16 June, 11:30 a.m.

Attached is a draft statement that would be released in the President's name after his Monday morning meeting with leaders of the Afghan resistance. Can we have your earliest concurrence?

We are forwarding a copy to Larry Speakes.

Attachment

Tab A Draft Presidential Statement

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

*Rabban*

June 17, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

*69648*

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: STEVE SESTANOVICH *SRS*

SUBJECT: Memcon from President's Afghan Meeting

Attached is the memcon from the President's meeting yesterday with the Afghan delegation. I believe it would be a good idea to send a copy out to Embassy Islamabad so that they can de-brief the Pakistani foreign ministry. (Needless to say, the memcon would not be turned over to them.)

Briefing the Pakistanis would have the advantage of showing them that we're keeping them completely informed, and of conveying some of the firm positions that the President took in the meeting. For example, it would be good for them to hear that he mentioned 3-6 months for a Soviet withdrawal timetable; this would, I think, add some extra caution to their approach in the Geneva talks.

*SRS for* Peter Rodman and Shirin Tahir-Kheli concur. *SRS for*

RECOMMENDATIONS

That you approve the memcon as drafted.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That you approve letting the State Department cable it out to Embassy Islamabad for briefing use with the Foreign Ministry.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A Presidential Memcon

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR # *69648* M1675

BY *RW* NARA DATE *2/26/2020*

TA  
A

1

BY RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020  
 NLRR M1675 #69649

THE WHITE HOUSE  
 WASHINGTON

69649

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and other leaders of the Afghan resistance Alliance (U)

PARTICIPANTS: The President  
 Secretary of State George P. Shultz  
 Donald Regan, Chief of Staff  
 John M. Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
 Michael Armacost, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs  
 Stephen R. Sestanovich, NSC staff

Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani, Spokesman, Afghan resistance Alliance, and leader, Jamiat-i-Islami  
 Sebqatullah Mojadedi, leader, Afghan National Liberation Front  
 Muhammad Nabi Mohammadi, leader, Islamic Revolutionary Movement  
 Ahmad Gailani, leader, National Islamic Front for Afghanistan  
 Mohammed Es'haq, Jamiat-i-Islami

DATE, TIME June 16, 1986  
 AND PLACE: 11:30 a.m. - 12:10 p.m., Oval Office

The Afghan delegation entered, was introduced to the President and sat through two waves of press coverage. (The Secretary had joked beforehand that when the cameramen entered the delegation would find it like an invasion; the President added, "But without AK-47's.") (U)

Opening the discussion, the President expressed satisfaction that the delegation had been able to break away from its duties to make the trip to Washington. He noted that it was an honor to support their struggle for independence, since the leaders of the resistance were the true representatives of the Afghan people. He said he hoped that this first meeting would be the beginning of a regular dialogue between the U.S. government and the Alliance. He was confident that our goals were identical: both of us seek the freedom of Afghanistan. For the United States it was important that the Soviet Union not believe that aggression pays; this was why we reject separate deals with Moscow. Turning to the U.N.-sponsored peace talks, he declared that no peace agreement that is reached will work unless the alliance has been consulted and unless the the Afghan people support the terms of the agreement. For this reason, the U.S. government urges the U.N. to consult the Alliance on the talks; he pledged that we

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

would brief the delegation on the talks that have been held to date. The President said that he himself was skeptical of these talks, because he did not believe that the Soviets had made the decision to get out. Concluding, he observed that greater cooperation among the members of the Alliance would bring the international recognition that we both seek for it. At this point, he expressed interest in hearing what the guests had to say. (C)

Professor Rabbani began by expressing thanks, on behalf of the people of Afghanistan, for the President's sincere interest and for the help he had provided. He was sure that the President was familiar with the record of Soviet atrocities in Afghanistan, even though their occupation was hidden by "a curtain of silence." The Soviets had turned the country into a land of blood and ashes. But he was convinced that the Soviet army would never be able to break the Afghan people's will. The Soviets have the power to burn and kill, but they cannot make us slaves. Already one million have been killed, 5 million turned into refugees abroad, and 2 million into refugees within Afghanistan. Yet with all these sad stories, it was especially sorrowful that the mujahidin were not recognized as the representatives of the Afghan people. "The butchers" have their seat at the U.N. and embassies everywhere; meanwhile the people of Afghanistan were denied the privilege of representation. This could be seen at Geneva: the Alliance was only somewhat aware of what was going on in the talks there; it didn't know what went on behind closed doors. It did know that the Soviets didn't want peace; they were warmongers. Gorbachev has made the world believe he wants peace but he has an iron fist beneath his velvet glove and his promises of good will. (C)

Continuing, Rabbani noted that the Alliance had to be anxious about the American offer to guarantee an agreement, because the Soviets are not honest. In the meantime the Afghan people are fighting on their own, becoming martyrs and living in poverty. Children were being kidnapped by the Soviets and taken away for education. Biological warfare was being waged. Villages were set afire, and bombs in the form of toys left to kill the surviving children. He had recently seen a two-month old baby with her face completely burned; she had been sent to the United Kingdom for skin-grafts. To protect themselves the mujahidin need more weapons, especially for air defense. To this, some said that if the freedom fighters had more effective weapons, the Soviets would get mad. But what else could the Soviets do to them? Only nuclear weapons had not been used. Afghanistan had become a testing ground for Soviet weaponry. On the diplomatic side, he asked that the State Department be given instructions to take steps to prepare to recognize the mujahidin officially. No agreements should be reached that are against the wishes of the Afghan people. The people of Afghanistan are the only ones entitled to speak of its future. It was important to avoid a second Yalta. Summarizing, he said that the mujahidin need effective weapons and effective aid of all kinds. They knew of

the President's previous statements on Afghanistan and were very grateful. The people of Afghanistan would never forget this stand. (C)

The President recalled seeing victims of Soviet atrocities in a hospital in Boston, among them some children horribly disfigured by fire-bombing. One child had only a single arm; another, only one leg. He also told of an Afghan student who recounted her arrest for leafletting; to get her to talk, the police brought in another prisoner and gouged his eyes out in front of her. So, knowing of such things, we could have no illusions about the Soviets, their goals, or their methods. As for the issue of recognition, he noted that it would not be very helpful if only one country recognized the resistance; it was necessary to work to mobilize the whole international community. In the meantime, maintaining a presence in Kabul was useful to us for other reasons. This did not mean we would accept -- or guarantee -- whatever agreement may be produced in Geneva regardless of its terms. For us, the withdrawal timetable should be no more than 3-6 months. Until the Soviets began to propose such an agreement, we could have no faith in their statements. It seemed to us that the brave resistance shown by the mujahidin since the invasion was a humiliating embarrassment to the Soviets; they must be thinking of how to find a face-saving way out. (C)

Secretary Shultz suggested that the President might want to hear from the other members of the delegation. (U)

Dr. Mojadedi began by offering thanks to the American people for their help; the Afghan people appreciate. What worried them were the Geneva talks. The real sides to the war are the defenders of Afghanistan -- i.e., the mujahidin -- and the aggressors against Afghanistan -- i.e., the Soviets. He reminded the President that the resistance antedated the invasion; it was resistance against a Communist regime installed in 1978. The Afghan people would continue this struggle, which was for self-determination. (C)

The President recalled that he had been in Teheran at the time that the Soviets installed this Communist regime; shortly thereafter the American Ambassador had been killed. (U)

Mr. Nabi also expressed thanks for American support. He said that Afghans felt that Americans considered the war to be one of their own problems. It was in fact not a local issue, but a common global problem; not a problem just for the people of Afghanistan but a danger for peace everywhere. The Afghan people were defending against a problem that could become worldwide. They expected support from others, especially Americans, who could help them cut off the hand of the aggressor. The mujahidin wanted to be recognized internationally; they also needed to gain strength on the battlefield, especially by acquiring better air defenses. As for Geneva, he echoed Rabbani's statement that the Soviets were not honest. They would sign an agreement and then not abide by it. They wanted to take full control of Afghanistan

under the pretext of peace. They would accept a political solution only if the mujahidin had enough power to resist on the battlefield. The swords of the mujahidin had to become stronger. The two sides talking at the table should be the Soviets and the resistance. If, on the other hand, the puppet regime were permitted to remain in power, it would only offer the Soviets future excuses for returning. (C)

The President stated emphatically that any agreement must provide not only for the withdrawal of Soviet forces but for the people of Afghanistan to determine the form of government they want. (C)

Ahmad Gailani spoke briefly. After expressing thanks for U.S. aid, he said he hoped that the United States would be behind the resistance until victory. (C)

The President broke in to say, yes. (U)

Gailani continued by expressing hope that America would also support Afghanistan in helping to rebuild after the war. (C)

The President repeated, yes. He recalled a remark by Stalin, that the death of three-quarters of mankind could be justified if the remainder were Communist. It was up to the rest of us to change the Soviets' minds. (C)

With this, the group rose and the meeting ended at 12:10.



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

*Robson 37*

*69650*

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

S/S

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M1675 #69650

BY RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

TO: P - Mr. Armacost  
FROM: NEA - Richard W. Murphy  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Your final meeting with the  
resistance delegation, Thursday, June 19, 3:15 AM

THE SETTING

You have agreed to brief the Afghans at the end of their visit. We suggest you cover the following subjects:

U.N. TALKS

Points to make:

- four instruments cover "mutual relations and non-interference," international guarantees, return of refugees, and "inter-relationship" of instruments; "non-interference" deals primarily with aid to resistance; "inter-relationship" document includes timetable for Soviet withdrawal which is also to be addressed in bilateral Soviet-Kabul agreement;

- work on first three instruments is more or less complete; we consider them to be generally satisfactory;

- at Geneva VII session, juridical status of "inter-relationship" instrument nailed down; document will be signed by GOP and Kabul and, at GOP insistence, will have same status as other instruments; Soviets (and U.S.) would also be formally associated with this document as guarantors; Soviets will thus be more directly committed to withdraw;

- two principal issues in Instrument IV remain outstanding:

1. Monitoring: Soviet side wants minimal monitoring mechanism essentially operated by GOP and Kabul; GOP is insisting on something more substantial, probably involving U.N.;

2. Withdrawal timetable: heart of problem; Soviets are talking of years; GOP of months; Pakistanis consider Soviet proposal to show lack of seriousness about reaching settlement;

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED

38

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- U.S. decision whether or not to "guarantee" agreement will be based on whether settlement provides for prompt, irrevocable withdrawal of Soviet forces; if Soviets sign and then fail to live up to their commitments; we will not consider ourselves to be bound by ours.
- post-Soviet withdrawal political arrangements cannot be part of Geneva settlement; what is essential is that Soviets get out and stay out; self-determination will inevitably follow; your role in process will be crucial.

#### RESISTANCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

##### Points to make:

- press has been making much of our alleged refusal to "recognize" you; we believe journalists are barking up wrong tree and trust this is your view as well;
- in fact, of course, we do "recognize" you as authentic spokesmen for the Afghan people; you are leading struggle for Afghan self-determination; we understand this;
- you have spoken of your intention to hold elections and set up a government and have asked for our recognition when you do so; we understand your position;
- our future actions will be governed by the future development of the struggle;
- in the interim, we welcome what we understand to be a decision of the high resistance council to set up a secretariat and to establish offices overseas; we know it will be hard, but we urge you to keep trying;
- your elections idea is interesting; be sure to follow through; if idea falls through, your image will suffer;

#### U.S.-RESISTANCE RELATIONS

- your visit marks a qualitative change in our dialogue; regular, policy-level exchanges clearly are in order;
- our Embassy in Islamabad and Consulate in Peshawar are your regular points of contact; an office in the U.S. would also, of course, open another channel; the level at which you deal with the Embassy depends on the nature of your business; its doors are open to you;
- for the present, your presentations on our programs are food for thought; specifically, your appeal for aid in the field of transport is one we will try to deal with quickly.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NLRR M1675 #69651

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Rabbani  
file

RW NARA DATE 2/26/2020

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3431 DTG:190513Z JUN 86 PSN:032662  
EOB477 AN002017 TOR: 170/0521Z CSN:HCE304

DISTRIBUTION: ROSS-01 STK-01 STRK-01 /003 A2

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT:  
EOB:

THE US IN MAY AS ORIGINALLY PLANNED, THE USG CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD THAT THE INTENSITY OF THE FIGHTING WAS SUCH THAT IT PREVENTED THEIR TRAVEL. ARMACOST EXPRESSED US SUPPORT FOR THE RESISTANCE STRUGGLE AND UNDERLINED THE IMPORTANCE OF SETTING UP A CONTINUING US-ALLIANCE DIALOGUE. HE INVITED RABBANI AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO COMMENT ON THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AS WELL AS ON INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE AFGHAN ISSUE, INCLUDING THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS. 69651

PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #3431 1700516  
P 190513Z JUN 86  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 0000

INFO AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0000  
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY 0000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 193431

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, AF, US  
SUBJECT: ARMACOST MEETS WITH RESISTANCE ALLIANCE DELEGATION

1. (C) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN A ONE HOUR MEETING WITH UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST, THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE DELEGATION VOICED ITS CONCERNS ABOUT THE LACK OF A RESISTANCE ROLE IN THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF US "GUARANTEES" OF A SETTLEMENT, AND THE NEED FOR POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS - IN THE FORM OF AN UNDEFINED INTERIM GOVERNMENT -- THAT WOULD ENSURE SELF-DETERMINATION FOR THE AFGHAN PEOPLE. THE ALLIANCE SPOKESMAN EQUATED NAJIB WITH A TERRORIST AND OBSERVED THE WAR HAD INTENSIFIED UNDER HIM; BETTER WEAPONS AND MORE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PAY FOR RISING TRANSPORTATION COSTS WERE REQUESTED. ARMACOST REASSURED THE ALLIANCE OF US SUPPORT FOR THEIR STRUGGLE, EMPHASIZED THAT THE US HAD ENCOURAGED BOTH THE GOP AND CORDOVEZ TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH THE RESISTANCE ALLIANCE ON THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, CLARIFIED THE MEANING OF US GUARANTEES, AND STRESSED NEED FOR GREATER RESISTANCE UNITY AND ACTIVE PARTICIPATION ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. END SUMMARY.

3. UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST MET FOR AN HOUR JUNE 16 WITH THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE ALLIANCE DELEGATION COMPRISED OF SPOKESMAN RABBANI, PARTY LEADERS MOJAEDDI, NABI AND GAILANI, AND ENGINEER ESHAQ. ALSO PRESENT WERE DAS PECK, PETER RODMAN (NSC), MORT ABRAMOWITZ (INR), ZALMAY KHALILZAD AND RICHARD SOLOMAN (S/P), CHARLES DUNBAR (NEA), ANDREW STEINFELD (P STAFF) AND DESK OFFICER MILLIKAN (NOTETAKER).

4. UNDER SECRETARY ARMACOST OPENED THE MEETING BY WELCOMING THE ALLIANCE DELEGATION. HE NOTED THAT WHILE HE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED THAT THE ALLIANCE COULD NOT COME TO

5. GENEVA TALKS: RABBANI BEGAN BY ASSERTING THAT WHILE THE SOVIETS WERE TALKING ABOUT WANTING A SETTLEMENT, THEY CONTINUED THE WAR AND THE ATROCITIES. HE SAID THE AFGHANS' RESOLVE TO CONTINUE TO FIGHT WAS UNDIMINISHED AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT AFGHANISTAN WOULD ULTIMATELY BE LIBERATED. HOWEVER, DESPITE SEVEN YEARS OF WARFARE AND THE LIBERATION OF 80 OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, DESPITE WIDESPREAD FAMINE AND DISEASE, ONE MILLION MARTYRS, AND FIVE MILLION REFUGEES, THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE'S EFFORTS WERE NOT OFFICIALLY RECOGNIZED AS EVIDENCED BY THE ABSENCE OF A RESISTANCE REPRESENTATIVE AT GENEVA.

6. THE RESISTANCE DID NOT DOUBT PAKISTANI INTENTIONS AND SUPPORT, BUT NO ONE EXCEPT THE AFGHANS COULD/SHOULD DECIDE THE FATE OF AFGHANISTAN. RABBANI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE GOP BRIEFED THEM OCCASIONALLY BUT STATED THAT THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES SHOULD BE THE RESISTANCE AND THE SOVIETS. PAKISTANI INVOLVEMENT WAS USED BY THE SOVIETS AS EVIDENCE OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT; DRA REGIME INVOLVEMENT WAS USED TO LEGITIMIZE THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE. INFORMATION ABOUT THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS OFTEN

VAGUE AND INACCURATE AND THEY WERE ANXIOUS ABOUT WHAT MIGHT BE GOING ON BEHIND THE SCENES.

7. ARMACOST REPLIED THAT THERE WERE TWO CENTRAL US OBJECTIVES IN SUPPORTING THE GENEVA TALKS: 1) THE COMPLETE AND PROMPT WITHDRAWAL OF ALL SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN; AND 2) THE NEED FOR POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN KABUL THAT WOULD INSPIRE THE VOLUNTARY RETURN OF THE REFUGEES.

ARMACOST NOTED THAT ALTHOUGH THE US WAS NOT A DIRECT PARTY TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, IT WAS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT AT GENEVA VII, THE SOVIETS, THROUGH THE PUPPET KABUL REGIME, HAD PRESENTED A VERY LENGTHY TIMETABLE. THE PAKISTANIS HAD FIRMLY AND CATEGORICALLY REJECTED THE PROPOSAL AND INTERPRETED IT AS EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE NOT SERIOUS. SOVIET REPLACEMENT OF BABRAK WITH NAJIB TOGETHER WITH INTENSIFIED FIGHTING ALONG THE PAKISTAN-AFGHAN BORDER FURTHER INDICATED SOVIET LACK OF SERIOUSNESS IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT. ON THE SECOND POINT (INTERNAL POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS), ARMACOST STRESSED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT AN ISSUE WITHIN THE GENEVA CONTEXT, IT WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ANY SETTLEMENT. THE US HAD REPEATEDLY ENCOURAGED BOTH THE GOP AND CORDOVEZ TO CONSULT WITH THE ALLIANCE AND TO TAKE ALLIANCE VIEWS AND CONCERNS INTO CONSIDERATION.

8. US GUARANTEES, SELF DETERMINATION, AND THE DRA REGIME: THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION ABOUT THE MEANING OF THE US DECISION TO "GUARANTEE" A SETTLEMENT. GAILANI ASKED WHETHER THE USG WOULD BE WILLING TO GUARANTEE A SETTLEMENT THAT CALLED FOR THE CURRENT REGIME TO REMAIN IN PLACE? HE SAID THAT IF THIS WERE TRUE, THE RESISTANCE WOULD HAVE TO START FIGHTING ALL OVER AND THAT WITHOUT OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE, THEIR CHANCES FOR VICTORY WOULD BE

40

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 02 SECSTATE WASHDC 3431 DTG: 190513Z JUN 86 PSN: 032662

LESS THAN THEY WERE TODAY IN THEIR FIGHT AGAINST THE SOVIETS.

9. ARMACOST SAID THE US HAD NEVER CONSIDERED GUARANTEEING THE LIFE OF ANY GOVERNMENT. HE ADDED THAT IT WAS OUR BELIEF THAT THE QUESTION OF WHO WOULD GOVERN AFGHANISTAN AFTER SOVIET WITHDRAWAL WAS ONE THAT THE AFGHANS THEMSELVES SHOULD DETERMINE. IT WAS OUR CONTINUED SUPPOSITION THAT NO PDPA GOVERNMENT COULD SURVIVE THE DEPARTURE OF SOVIET TROOPS. GAILANI REPLIED THAT THE UN TALKS SHOULD INCLUDE SOME PROVISION FOR AFGHAN

SELF-DETERMINATION, AS CALLED FOR IN THE UN RESOLUTIONS. WITHOUT SOME TRANSITION GOVERNMENT ARRANGED PRIOR TO A FINAL SETTLEMENT, A BLOODBATH WOULD ENSUE. ARRANGEMENTS HAD TO BE AGREED UPON IN ADVANCE THAT WOULD CREATE CONDITIONS FOR AFGHANS TO DETERMINE THEIR OWN FUTURE. WHEN PRESSED BY ARMACOST ABOUT WHAT THE PROCESS OF

SELF-DETERMINATION MIGHT ENTAIL, GAILANI ANSWERED IT WOULD PROBABLY CONSIST OF A LOYA JIRGA WHICH COULD BE HELD UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE UN. PETER RODMAN REITERATED THAT THE US WOULD NOT GUARANTEE A SETTLEMENT THAT DID NOT ADEQUATELY MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE AFGHAN PEOPLE.

10. SIGNIFICANCE OF BABRAK'S REPLACEMENT: RABBANI CHARACTERIZED NAJIB AS A TERRORIST WHO TALKED ABOUT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF AN ISLAMIC GOVERNMENT, BUT WHO WOULD SLAUGHTER ALL MUJAHIDIN WHO ANSWERED HIS CALL TO RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN UNDER AN AMNESTY, MUCH AS STALIN HAD SLAUGHTERED RUSSIANS WHO RETURNED TO THE USSR AFTER FIGHTING HITLER. ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION AGREED THAT NAJIB WAS AS MUCH A SOVIET TOOL AS BABRAK AND BELITTLED HIS PASHTUN BACKGROUND.

11. THE WAR: RABBANI CONFIRMED THAT THE WAR HAD INTENSIFIED UNDER NAJIB. THE SOVIETS HAD TWO MAIN OBJECTIVES: TO CUT OFF RESISTANCE SUPPLY ROUTES AND TO PORTRAY THEIR MILITARY SUCCESSES AS GREATER THAN THEY WERE IN REALITY. THE MAIN PROBLEM FOR THE RESISTANCE CONSISTED OF SOVIET LONG-RANGE ROCKETS AND AIR ATTACKS. BETTER WEAPONS, PARTICULARLY ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS, COULD SOLVE THE PROBLEM AS WELL AS INCREASED FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO PAY FOR ESCALATING TRANSPORT COSTS. ARMACOST REPLIED THAT THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF HELP ON THE WAY. IN RESPONSE TO ARMACOST'S QUERY ABOUT RESISTANCE EFFECTIVENESS IN SHOOTING DOWN SOVIET AIRCRAFT, RABBANI SAID THE MUJAHIDIN HAD SHOT DOWN 227 (SIC) AIRCRAFT IN THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1986.

ALLIANCE POLITICAL UNITY: ARMACOST STRESSED THAT INCREASED ALLIANCE PARTICIPATION IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA WAS VITAL; IT WOULD INCREASE INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE ON THE SOVIET UNION AND DEPRIVE GORBACHEV OF HIS DESIRED IMAGE AS PEACEMAKER. ARMACOST SAID THAT ALTHOUGH HE KNEW DIFFERENCES EXISTED BETWEEN THE VARIOUS PARTIES, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PRESENT A UNIFIED AND COHERENT IMAGE. THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL TO BE DONE, ESPECIALLY IN NEW YORK AND

JEDDAH WHERE THE UN AND OIC OFFERED ARENAS IN WHICH TO MAKE KNOWN THEIR STRUGGLE. ARMACOST ALSO MENTIONED THE AFGHAN MEDIA PROJECT AND CROSS BORDER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AS PROJECTS THAT COULD HELP THE ALLIANCE IN ITS EFFORTS TO EXPOSE THE SOVIET UNION FOR WHAT IT WAS AS WELL AS HELP THE ALLIANCE DEVELOP NEEDED ADMINISTRATIVE SKILLS.

US-SOVIET RELATIONS: ARMACOST BRIEFLY DISCUSSED THE JUNE 85 REGIONAL TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN DURING WHICH THE SOVIETS

PRESENTED STANDARD ARGUMENTS JUSTIFYING THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN AND INSISTED THAT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE SHOULD CEASE AS A PRECONDITION TO WITHDRAWAL. ARMACOST INDICATED ANOTHER ROUND OF US-SOVIET TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN MIGHT TAKE PLACE THIS YEAR BUT ONLY AFTER A SHULTZ-SHEVARDNAZDE MEETING WHEN WE WOULD TRY TO ASSESS SOVIET SERIOUSNESS IN ACHIEVING A SETTLEMENT. ARMACOST STRESSED AFGHANISTAN WOULD REMAIN AN OBSTACLE TO THE OVERALL IMPROVEMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS. SHULTZ

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~