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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name BAILEY, NORMAN: FILES

Withdrawer

RBW 2/11/2013

File Folder SOVIET POLICY MARCH 1982-APRIL 1982

FOIA

M452

Box Number 3

SHIFRINSON

42

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153897	MEMO	WILLIAM CLARK TO RR RE. PROPOSED INVITATION FOR SOLZHENITSY <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	ND	B1
153898	MEMO	RICHARD PIPES TO RICHARD ALLEN RE. SOLZHENITSYN <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	2	6/24/1981	B1
153899	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SOVIET UNION <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	3/5/1982	B1
153900	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SOVIET UNION [COPY OF DOC. 153899] <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	3/5/1982	B1
153901	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE. TERMS OF REFERENCE <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	2	3/10/1982	B1
153902	NSDD	RE. U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION <i>R 11/27/2017 M452/2</i>	3	ND	B1
153903	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE. U.S. STRATEGY TOWARD SOVIET UNION [COPY OF DOC. 153899] <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	3/5/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153904	MEMO	PIPES TO CLARK RE. SOVIET SUCCESSION CRISIS <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	1	3/18/1982	B1
153906	MEMO	PAUL BREMER TO NANCY DYKE, MICHAEL WHEELER, ET AL, RE. EAST-WEST POLICY STUDY <i>R 11/14/2016 M452/2</i>	1	4/15/1982	B1
153905	MEMO	WILLIAM STEARMAN TO CLARK RE. OBSERVATIONS ON A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT <i>R 6/2/2015 M452/2</i>	2	4/21/1982	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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Bailey

Reflections on the Soviet Crisis

An interview with White House Kremlinologist Richard Pipes

One of the hardest of hard-liners in the Reagan Administration has been keeping one of the lowest of profiles. He is Richard Pipes, 58, a Polish-born historian on leave from Harvard University, who has served since the Inauguration as the chief expert on Soviet affairs for the National Security Council staff. Before joining the Government, he was an outspoken, highly controversial critic of détente and a leader of the Committee on the Present Danger, a private lobbying group that campaigned against SALT II and in favor of larger defense budgets. Partly because of his reputation for vociferous anti-Sovietism, and partly because the NSC has been trying to avoid publicity, Pipes until now was under orders to keep his strong views out of the press. Following the recent shake-up of the NSC, the new National Security Adviser, William Clark, not only asked Pipes to stay on as the White House's resident Kremlinologist but also allowed him to grant his first interview. Talking with TIME Diplomatic Correspondent Strobe Talbott, Pipes discussed the future of Soviet Communism and the possibility of nuclear war. Excerpts:

On Kremlin succession: The Soviet Union is in deep crisis. Its economy is in serious trouble. Soviet power is over-extended globally, and there is mounting disaffection among diverse social and ethnic groups. When [President Leonid] Brezhnev goes, his successors will face two choices. They can keep making outlandish appropriations for defense and engaging in global adventures, or they can face up to their internal problems, turning away from military expansionism toward reform of the domestic system. Russia has experienced throughout its history periods when the government had to turn inward to cope with its problems. The idea that the greatness of the country was achieved not on foreign battlefields but by building the society from within has fresh proponents today. But if Brezhnev's successors let the impetus of expansionism carry them forward rather than take the path of internal reform, that may risk war.

On U.S. influence on the Soviet succession: Many American liberals are wrong in thinking that the Soviet government is in the hands of relatively moderate men and that if we are not accommodating to them, we will strengthen the dreadful hawks waiting in the wings. I believe the contrary. The current leadership is dominated by parochial old Stalinists. What can be worse than that? The next genera-

tion will certainly be less parochial, and it will be post-Stalinist. The people who now run the Soviet Union are really very hawkish, and the alternative to them is not a still more hawkish group, but rather a group that is more reform-minded. These are dedicated, intelligent Russian nationalists who believe that a policy of hostility to the U.S. and confrontation abroad may have become counterproductive: they worry whether the Soviet econo-



DIANA WALKER

"Nuclear weapons are a kind of international cancer. We can't pretend they don't exist."

my can support such egregious imperialism. I think it is worth a gamble to support those latter elements, because every meaningful reform entails a certain degree of democratization, which would be good for the Soviet people as well as the rest of the world.

On the whole, I'm an optimist. I don't believe the Soviet system works. But if the Soviet leaders take the path of reform, they might be able to save the system and their own privileged positions in it, which is all that really matters to them. Hungary is an example of a relatively prosperous, relatively stable Communist country, and there are reasons to believe that the Soviet leadership is attracted by it. There are members of the Soviet hierarchy who

view Hungary as a kind of laboratory that has proved that one can retain the basic elements of the system and still allow for some kind of reinvigoration from below.

On how to support the reformers: The U.S. can do this to a limited extent only, to be sure. First, by raising the cost of a Soviet expansion with a credibly strong military posture, and, second, by extending such support as we can to groups resisting a takeover by Soviet forces or Soviet proxies. I'm talking about Africa, Latin America and Southwest Asia—areas on which the Soviet Union and its clients are currently encroaching, not areas Moscow has long ago taken over. A third way we can encourage internal reform is in the economic field. It would mean for us and our allies not to transfer technology and assign credits to the East bloc. If we proffer help of this kind, then we are only making it easier for those regimes to avoid reform. To the extent that we help the Communist economies to automate, for instance, we are bolstering the position of the present leadership, which is to say of the conservative hawks who don't want to democratize.

On the Kremlin and democracy: The Soviet leadership is neither traditional nor popularly mandated, but it cannot acknowledge this fact. So the leaders face a terrible dilemma: On what basis do they rule dictatorially? The answer they have come up with to justify their dictatorial power is to say, "We're surrounded by enemies, we're in a state of permanent class war, therefore we can't afford the luxury of elections and other democratic paraphernalia." They try to create the illusion of legitimacy by generating or even inventing threats of all sorts and blaming them on alleged foreign enemies. They're constantly telling their people, "We defeated the Nazis; we saved you from slavery and annihilation. And we are doing so today, again."

On the imposition of martial law in Poland: There are two schools of thought on Poland inside the Soviet leadership. One, which was dominated by the late [ideological chief Mikhail] Suslov, has argued that events in Poland were due to the intolerable laxity of the Polish Communists, and that the only way to get rid of the problem is by brutal re-Stalinization. The other school holds that the Polish Communists lost touch with the masses and that mere repression will not restore a viable system there. As of now, the first group has carried the day. But repression alone surely will not solve Poland's desperate problems, and the other group may still have the last word.

On President Reagan's prediction that future historians will look back on Soviet Communism as an aberration of

history: I was certainly impressed by that statement. But I don't think the President advocates historical inevitability. He does not mean for us to sit and wait for Soviet Communism to disappear of itself. If that's going to happen, free people will have to help make it happen.

On the Soviet-U.S. nuclear balance: The principal thrust of our nuclear doctrine has always been, and continues to be, retaliatory. We have concentrated on our ability to launch a second strike against their cities and industries if they were to attack us first. Soviet doctrine and deployments have been primarily ones of counterforce (the ability to destroy military targets). Counterforce suggests first strike rather than retaliation. The reason that we are now building up our own counterforce ability is not because we contemplate a first strike but because we are increasingly concerned that our traditional deterrent has ceased to be credible.

On whether the Soviets believe in a winnable nuclear war: The leaders think in terms of being prepared to do whatever is necessary to save themselves and their system should a general war break out. They cannot have a precise idea whether anyone could win a nuclear war. Nobody knows that. But they want to make certain that by developing redundant systems, by taking such measures as building antisatellite weapons and organizing civil defense, if it ever came to a war, they would win. Or at least they would emerge less the losers than we would.

On what the U.S. attitude toward nuclear war should be: If one believes that nuclear war is unwinnable, then no defensive measures against it make sense. We must adopt the attitude of saying, "Nuclear war is indeed a nightmare, but prudence requires that we face its possibility." I compare it to cancer, which used to be a taboo word. People were afraid to mention it lest they bring it about. Of course, cancer is a horror, but it exists all around us, as do nuclear weapons. Now we face cancer. And we cure a lot of cancer because of that. Nuclear weapons are a kind of international cancer. We can't pretend they don't exist. The Soviets decided 20 years ago that nuclear weapons would be decisive in an extreme situation. They concluded that if they ever had to go to war—which they do hope to avoid—they would have to make serious preparations for effective use of nuclear weapons. If they view the problem that way, we have little choice. If we insist on looking the other way and simply saying over and over again that these weapons are unusable and nuclear war is unthinkable, then we will have a defense unsuited to an adversary's offense, and that could get us into deep trouble. The objective is to formulate a strategy and proceed with deployments that will make a first strike against us not so much "unthinkable" (since the Soviet leadership considers it quite thinkable) as really unwinnable. ■

The Presidency/Hugh Sidey

Taping Time Bombs

An image emerges from shrouded memories of 20 years ago: Bobby Kennedy, hunched in a big chair in the Attorney General's office in September 1962. His arms are wrapped around his legs, his sleeves are rolled up, his eyes are weary. He is engaged in another battle, which has mostly been the story of his young life. He is the field marshal, acting for his brother the President. They have been on the phone with Democratic Governor Ross Barnett of Mississippi, as the Federal Government presses its demand that James Meredith, a black student, be admitted to the all white University of Mississippi at Oxford.

The Kennedys' fragile plan is coming apart, as black rage at injustice simmers across the South. Three times Meredith had tried to register and three times he had been refused. Tension has been building that would lead to riots and death. The National Guard and federal troops have been summoned. Meredith is not on campus yet. But there is no doubt in Bobby's mind about what ultimately must be done. Barnett on the phone tells him and the President one thing, Bobby mutters, but then says another thing publicly. How do you deal with a man like that, he asks, not expecting an answer. Secret agreements are made, and they

vanish as soon as Barnett goes out to meet the press, says Bobby. Then he adds: But we've got it down. We *know* what he said.

Taped. There it was. The real truth in the midst of veiled and chaotic maneuvering. Why not tape those conversations with the Governor? What did it matter when one was battling for a just cause against an unscrupulous adversary? In Bobby's view of political combat, enemies often must be fought on their terms. The good of the nation and a higher morality demanded it. History would understand.

If the brothers learned anything in their first two years of power, it was, to use John Kennedy's borrowed phrase, that "victory has a hundred fathers and defeat is an orphan." Often he had pondered his humiliation at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Some day, he used to muse, he would write the story of the last White House meeting before that debacle, when Kennedy had gone around the table and extracted an opinion from each of his advisers. None foresaw disaster, he said. None. But later some of them had much different memories of their positions. So



Bobby Kennedy: knowledge was power

In October 1962, when he needed counsel on the Cuban missile crisis, he taped again.

As we have since learned, Kennedy did more taping. So did Roosevelt, Eisenhower, Johnson, Nixon, in various amounts, for what their chroniclers now suggest were various reasons. All were strong Presidents in different ways, yet all felt it necessary for protection to make secret records of what was said in the Oval Office.

Secret taping by Presidents has been generally condemned, but there may be another message in those reels and discs. There is no such thing as a casual conversation with a President, either by friend or foe. Every presidential word is a potential time bomb for good or bad, when it is carried out of the Oval Office to be used. Presidents know that. And visitors understand that what they say to a President can be just as explosive. It will always be so, and should be, as long as the office has the power it does.

Maybe we have been going at the problem the wrong way. Right now, because of the new revelations, there is naturally a terrible uncertainty about whether the White House is or is not wired. Why not clear up the doubts once and for all? Why shouldn't the Oval Office and the Cabinet Room be wired and the fact announced that all conversations will be recorded? (Ultra secrets could be whispered in a bug-free cubicle in some other White House corner.) Then set up another rule: that no tape will be released for 50 years or while any participant is alive. Two immediate advantages leap to mind. Presidents might clean up their language. Visitors would not feel betrayed.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment

March 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *R*

SUBJECT: Proposed White House Invitation for Solzhenitsyn

Approximately every two or three months, some influential Senator or other prominent public figures urges a White House invitation for Alexander Solzhenitsyn. This time the recommendation comes from Senator Jepsen and Congressman Kemp. I have repeatedly recommended against this proposal. My reasons are stated in the attached memorandum to Richard V. Allen, dated June 24, 1981 (Tab II). Subsequently, Stearman, Bailey, Lord and I put our heads together and found what seemed the best solution to the problem, namely a Presidential lunch (or dinner) for a group of Soviet dissidents, including Solzhenitsyn, representing the diverse trends in the emigration. A proposed list of these persons is attached at Tab A. Allen approved the recommendation but apparently took no action. I further attach a memorandum from you to the President (previously submitted to Allen) recommending such a course (Tab I). (S)

Once a decision on this matter has been reached, an answer can be drafted to Senator Jepsen and Congressmen Kemp (Tab III). (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Memorandum to the President
Tab A	List of Soviet emigres
Tab II	Memorandum of June 24, 1981 to Richard V. Allen
Tab III	Incoming letter of February 22 from Senator Jepsen and Congressman Kemp

cc: Norman Bailey
Carnes Lord
William Stearman

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ with
~~SECRET~~ Attachment
Review March 5, 1988.

DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
BY NARA *RW*, DATE *2/11/13*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1176

153897

A

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

ACTION

NLRR M452/2#153897

BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: White House Invitation for Solzhenitsyn

Issue

Over the past year, a number of influential persons have been urging that you invite Aleksander Solzhenitsyn for a private meeting at the White House. However, there are strong objections to inviting Solzhenitsyn alone. (C)

Facts

From the time he settled in the United States, Solzhenitsyn has become increasingly active in Russian emigre politics, assuming leadership of the more conservative and nationalistic elements which are often anti-Western and anti-democratic. For you to receive him privately would suggest to Russians in the Soviet Union and abroad that you are endorsing his very controversial views and associations. At the same time, powerful arguments can be made in favor of honoring Solzhenitsyn's great achievements in fighting Communism and exposing it as an inhuman ideology that threatens all countries. (C)

Discussion

A way out of the difficulty may be for you to invite Solzhenitsyn together with several other leading Soviet emigres, including individuals who represent more moderate, pro-Western tendencies as well as the ethnic minorities of the Soviet Union. A suggested list of those is attached at Tab A. All of them have given proof of their courage and most have spent long years in Soviet prisons and psychiatric wards. A lunch or dinner at the White House in their honor would demonstrate your sympathy for the cause of dissent in the USSR -- a very worthy cause -- without identifying you with any particular current in it. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

O.K. No

1. That you approve the scheduling of a lunch or dinner inviting Soviet emigre dissidents listed at Tab A.

Attachment:

Tab A List of Soviet emigres.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review March 5, 1988.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prepared by:
Richard Pipes

A5

LIST OF PROPOSED GUESTS FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DINNER FOR
SOVIET DISSIDENTS

Ludmilla ALEXEEVA (293 Benedict Avenue, Tarrytown, New York 10591).
A founding member of the Russian Helsinki Watch Group, who
had travelled widely around the USSR to investigate abuses
of human rights until expelled in 1977.

Valerii CHALIDZE (145 East 92nd Street, New York, New York 10028).
A scientist, he was one of the earliest to get in trouble
with the authorities in the struggle for human rights. Left
in 1972. Presently publishes Russian political literature
in New York.

General Peter GRIGORENKO (4330 - 48th Street, Apt. 4F, Long Island,
New York, New York 11104). A distinguished Soviet Army general
and once an ardent Communist, he took up in the 1960s the
cause of the Crimean Tatars whom Stalin had expelled from
their homeland in 1944; cashiered from the service, he was
committed to psychiatric wards. An Ukrainian by origin.

Pavel LITVINOV (293 Benedict Avenue, Tarrytown, New York 10591).
The grandson of Stalin's Minister of Foreign Affairs, he was
arrested and tried for organizing in 1968 a demonstration in
Red Square protesting the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Andrei SINIAVSKII (c/o Sorbonne, Paris, France). An eminent writer
and editor, he published for years in the Soviet Union under
the pen-name "Abram Tertz". Caught in 1965 he was given a
prominent trial, spent a long sentence in camp.

Alexander SOLZHENITSYN (Cavendish, Vermont). The prominent
writer and author of Gulag Archipelago, was expelled in 1975.

Valentin TURCHIN (7534 - 113th Street, Forest Hills, New York 11375).
A physician, he headed the Moscow Chapter of Amnesty Inter-
national. Friend of A. Sakharov. Forced to leave USSR in
1977.

Father Georgii VINS (38 Stanton Road, P.O. Box 1188, Elkhart,
Indiana 49515). A Baptist minister, spent many years in
camps.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

EVA HAS SEEN

June 24, 1981

~~SECRET~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN
FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*
SUBJECT: Solzhenitsyn

I understand that you are meeting this afternoon with Senator Jepson to discuss Solzhenitsyn and that you would like a memorandum from me on this subject. (C)

There are really two Solzhenitsyns.

One is the heroic fighter against Communist oppression and the author of Gulag Archipelago, a work that has had a profoundly salutary effect on Western perceptions of the Soviet Union. This Solzhenitsyn is a heroic figure and a symbol of resistance to Communist oppression. The people who wish the President to receive him in the White House usually are aware only of this side of him: it was only this side of him that was known in 1974 when Solzhenitsyn came to the United States, which is why President Ford's refusal to meet with him rightly evoked such a storm of protests. (C)

The other Solzhenitsyn is a cunning politician who has gradually revealed himself since 1974, a man who sees himself as a future leader of Russia. In this capacity he identifies himself with the most reactionary and nationalistic Russian elements in the Soviet Union and abroad. His followers in emigration, consisting heavily of Nazi collaborators in World War II, glorify the old Russian monarchy. extol General Vlasov, the leader of the pro-Nazi Russian army in World War II, sympathize with Petain and Franco, and, following Solzhenitsyn's lead, on every occasion assail Western values because they hold the West directly responsible for Communism and the suffering it has inflicted on Russia. (S)

Thus, while a meeting with Solzhenitsyn might signal to the world at large a reaffirmation of our anti-Communism (which is hardly necessary in any event), to the Russians it would symbolize U.S. identification with the most conservative, nationalist strain in the Russian opposition at the expense of the pro-Western, liberal, human rights opposition, headed by Sakharov and Orlov. Do we want to make such a commitment? (S)

I have no doubt of the good intentions of Americans who promote a Reagan-Solzhenitsyn meeting. I believe, however, that they are innocent victims of a political ploy initiated by Solzhenitsyn

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Review June 24, 1987.

NLRR 17452/2 #153898

BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

for his own political purposes, which are not necessarily ours. Not all anti-Communism is good. We should support only that anti-Communism which is carried out in the name of democratic and liberal principles, and it so happens that Solzhenitsyn does not share those in the least -- indeed, he scorns them as much as does any Soviet leader. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

My recommendation would be that the President not meet with Solzhenitsyn but instead, on some suitable occasion, such as a birthday, send him a congratulatory message similar to the one he had recently sent to Sakharov. (S)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____



United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

ROGER W. JEPSEN
IOWA

February 22, 1982

Mr. William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

We had worked with Vice President George Bush and others to bring President Reagan together with Alexandr Solzhenitsyn during CREED's (see enclosure) last Washington meeting on October 28 and 29, 1981. Unfortunately we weren't able to arrange a meeting at that time.

CREED will next meet in Washington on May 26 and 27. Once again there is an opportunity to bring Solzhenitsyn to Washington and arrange a meeting between him and the President.

Solzhenitsyn's public appearances are rare. An appearance with President Reagan is guaranteed worldwide publicity. This publicity, in turn, would help:

- 1) demonstrate to the Soviets and the rest of the world that this Administration has an unfaltering commitment to speak out against human rights violations behind the Iron Curtain. The inevitable contrast between such a meeting and President Ford's refusal to meet Solzenitsyn will prove that things are different under President Reagan.
- 2) emphasize that repression and persecution are an integral part of the Soviet system -- and an integral threat to the values and security of our nation. This is an important message as the Administration seeks to enact a program for stronger defense and renewed commitment to countering Communist aggression.


9
Mr. William P. Clark
February 22, 1982
Page 2

Can you help us arrange such a meeting?

If the President agrees to meet with Solzhenitsyn, or if your staff should want more information, please contact Herman Pirchner of Senator Jepsen's staff at 224-0046.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Sincerely,

Jack F. Kemp
U.S. Congressman
New York

Roger W. Jepsen
U.S. Senator
Iowa

Enclosure

Bailey 10
153899

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Statement of U.S. Strategy Toward Soviet Union

Gov. P.

Over the past several weeks (ever since the introduction of sanctions toward Poland and the USSR) more and more Europeans are demanding to know what the long-term purpose of our hard-line actions toward the Communist Bloc is. Do we intend to provoke a confrontation? Do we want to isolate the Soviet Bloc? Do we have some other purpose in mind? Or are we being merely impulsive? There is absolutely no hope of securing cooperation for our sanctions from our Allies, who are recalcitrant to follow us anyway, unless our objectives are clearly and persuasively spelled out. And unless such cooperation is forthcoming we will either produce a final split in the Alliance or else have to abandon our current policies, either of which would be a tragedy. The matter was well put by the French Minister of Commerce, Michel Jobert, the other day, when he told a group of Americans at the American Enterprise Institute: "You are asking us to go with you on a journey but you are not telling us where you are heading and where we will end up". (S)

It seems to me, therefore, quite imperative that a decision be made on what our long-term policy toward the Communist Bloc is (i.e., what we expect to result from our hard-line policies) and then to make the broad outlines of these objectives public. The first and most critical step can be accomplished through an NSDD on the Soviet Union (there is no PD on the subject to revise, strange as it may seem). Once this NSDD has been approved by the NSC and the President, a speech could be drafted: ideally, the President could make a major statement on this subject in the context of his June trip to Europe. Time is of some urgency in this matter. (The NSDD on the Soviet Union could be submitted for NSC consideration concurrently with one on Eastern Europe, which is being worked on presently). (S)

JB
Norman Bailey, Jim Rentschler and Bill Stearman concur.RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize NSC staff members to draft the Terms of Reference for a NSDD on the Soviet Union, to be followed by interagency consideration on the subject, chaired by State, and submission to NSC, the process to be completed no later than April 30. (S)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

Classified/Extended by WPC/Clark

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/a #153899
BY *RW* NARA DATE 6/2/15

Bailey 11

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 1286

82 MAR 6 P 1: 15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>		
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	

Other _____

Urgent - Must be developed in coord with State
COMMENTS *promptly*

URGENT

See P.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 5, 1982

ACTIONURGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Statement of U.S. Strategy Toward Soviet Union

Over the past several weeks (ever since the introduction of sanctions toward Poland and the USSR) more and more Europeans are demanding to know what the long-term purpose of our hard-line actions toward the Communist Bloc is. Do we intend to provoke a confrontation? Do we want to isolate the Soviet Bloc? Do we have some other purpose in mind? Or are we being merely impulsive? There is absolutely no hope of securing cooperation for our sanctions from our Allies, who are recalcitrant to follow us anyway, unless our objectives are clearly and persuasively spelled out. And unless such cooperation is forthcoming we will either produce a final split in the Alliance or else have to abandon our current policies, either of which would be a tragedy. The matter was well put by the French Minister of Commerce, Michel Jobert, the other day, when he told a group of Americans at the American Enterprise Institute: "You are asking us to go with you on a journey but you are not telling us where you are heading and where we will end up". (S)

It seems to me, therefore, quite imperative that a decision be made on what our long-term policy toward the Communist Bloc is (i.e., what we expect to result from our hard-line policies) and then to make the broad outlines of these objectives public. The first and most critical step can be accomplished through an NSDD on the Soviet Union (there is no PD on the subject to revise, strange as it may seem). Once this NSDD has been approved by the NSC and the President, a speech could be drafted: ideally, the President could make a major statement on this subject in the context of his June trip to Europe. Time is of some urgency in this matter. (The NSDD on the Soviet Union could be submitted for NSC consideration concurrently with one on Eastern Europe, which is being worked on presently). (S)

MB Norman Bailey, *Jim R* Jim Rentschler and *Bill S* Bill Stearman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize NSC staff members to draft the Terms of Reference for a NSDD on the Soviet Union, to be followed by interagency consideration on the subject, chaired by State, and submission to NSC, the process to be completed no later than April 30. (S)

Approve *RP* Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M45212 #153900

~~SECRET~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark

BY *RP* NARA DATE *6/2/15*

Bailey 13
153901

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 10, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*SUBJECT: Terms of Reference of NSSD on Policy
Toward the Soviet Union~~Second
page
missing~~

Attached is the draft of Terms of Reference (Tab I) for a NSSD on "U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union" which you have asked me to prepare. As soon as you have approved it, I will consult all the interested agencies and produce a revised draft, which I will send over to State for further action. (S)

Two points require your attention:

1. You may be told by State that a new study of U.S. Soviet policy is not necessary because in July 1981 State completed a major interagency review which resulted in an "East-West Policy Study" approved by a Senior Interdepartmental Group (Tab II). This document, however, suffered from two fundamental flaws:
 - It heavily centered on the military dimension and the problems of containment, providing no guidance, so important to our Allied relations, as to ultimate U.S. objectives in dealing with the Soviet Union.
 - It was a long (80 pages) and unwieldy document which did not lend itself to NSC consideration and could not be made into an NSDD even if the five-page Decision Memorandum were taken as its basis.

I have consulted this document and included some of its points into the Terms of Reference, but essentially my Terms are fresh in approach. (S)
2. Although I have assigned the chairmanship of the interagency group dealing with this Study to State, I seriously doubt whether this is a workable arrangement. The differences between State and Defense on the subject of U.S. long-term policies toward the Soviet Union are profound and very hard to reconcile: ultimately the NSC and the President will have to choose between their divergent approaches. The only reason why the "East-West Policy

~~SECRET~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 10, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153901
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/2/15*

~~SECRET~~

2

Study" got approval from both State and Defense was due to the fact that it skirted the fundamental questions. It seems to me that if we are going to be serious about tackling the fundamental questions, rather than confining ourselves to issues where consensus is easy to obtain, then the NSC alone is capable of providing the needed arbitration. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you approve the Terms of Reference at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

2. That a decision be made on the chairmanship of the inter-agency group that will deal with the Study.

State to chair _____ NSC to chair _____

Attachments:

Tab I	Terms of Reference
Tab II	East-West Policy Study

cc: Norman Bailey
Jim Rentschler
Bill Stearman

~~SECRET~~

153902 15
~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Proposed National Security Study
Directive Number

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

Introduction

A Review will be conducted of long-term U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union. This National Security Study Directive establishes the Terms of Reference for the Review. (S)

Objectives of the Review

To determine:

- The nature of the Soviet threat to U.S. national security;
- The kind of changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet internal and external policies that would best serve U.S. national interests; and
- The means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to promote such favorable changes and to discourage unfavorable ones. (S)

To produce a paper that would answer these questions for consideration by the National Security Council, and subsequently, for decision by the President. (S)

Scope of the Review

The Review will deal with the following subjects:

1. The long-term interest of the United States in regard to the Soviet Union: whether it is in the interest of the United States to stabilize the political, economic, and social situation in the Soviet Union and its Bloc, or, conversely, to destabilize it. (S)
2. The likelihood of major changes in the Soviet system: to ascertain what realistic expectation one can have of significant changes in the Soviet system and in Soviet policies; whether such changes are likely to make the country more or less threatening. The question of a non-evolutionary (violent) collapse of the system from within and its implications for U.S. security will also be considered. (S)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 10, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153902
BY RW NARA DATE 11/27/17

3. Soviet vulnerabilities: to identify the sources of strains and tensions within the Soviet system:

- Economic (decline in industrial and agricultural productivity; the burden of military expenditures and support of client states; consumer dissatisfaction).
- Political (dissident movements among Russian and minority intellectuals; the succession problem; tensions in the Eastern Bloc and the international Communist movement; imperial overextension).
- Social (unfavorable demographic trends; discontent among various social strata). (S)

4. Internal forces making for change: to identify elements in the Soviet ruling elite which desire to change the system in a more liberal as well as in a more conservative direction, and to determine what actions by foreign powers assist each of these two competing groups. (S)

5. Western ability to influence Soviet policies: to ascertain the means at the disposal of the United States and its Allies to influence the evolution of the Soviet regime and Soviet policies in a direction favorable to their interests:

- Economic (technology transfer; assistance in development of industry, agriculture, and energy resources; extension of credit; trade, including grain sales).
- Political (aid to non-Communist and anti-Communist elements in the Soviet Bloc and areas encroached upon by the Soviet Union; international fora).
- Military (the military strategy most likely to neutralize Soviet strategic objectives; assistance to anti-Communist guerrillas; regional commitments of U.S. forces).
- Ideological (the nature and thrust of U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet Union). (S)

6. Allied cooperation: to determine how best to secure the support and cooperation of our Allies in the pursuit of its policies toward the Soviet Union. (S)

Administration

Management of the NSSD -82 Review will be the responsibility of an interagency group that will report its findings no later than April 30, 1982. The group will be chaired by the Department

of State, with the Deputy Chairmanship being assumed by a representative of the Department of Defense. It will also include Assistant Secretary-level representation from the National Security Council staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Treasury Department, the Department of Commerce, the International Communication Agency, and the Department of Agriculture. (S)

All matters relating to this NSSD will be classified SECRET or SECRET/SENSITIVE. Dissemination of this NSSD, the subsequent study material, and the resulting draft NSDD will be handled on a strict need-to-know basis. (C)



~~SECRET~~ ~~NO DIS~~

S/S 8121136

425919

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~
WITH SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS

July 14, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

As agreed at the July 13 Senior Interdepartmental Group meeting on East-West Policy, we are forwarding the final, cleared version of the Decision Memorandum, Executive Summary and full study for early NSC consideration.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Decision Memorandum
2. Executive Summary
3. East-West Policy Study

Dist.:

OVP: Ms. Nancy Beard Dyke
DOD: Mr. Jay Rixse
CIA: Mr. Thomas Cormack
JCS: LTC John Pustay
ACDA: Mr. Norman Terrell
UNA: Amb. Kirkpatrick

~~SECRET~~
WITH SENSITIVE ATTACHMENTS
GDS 7/14/87

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY rw NARA, DATE 2/11/13

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 1286

82 MAR 8 P 1:15

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane		<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>2</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>5</u>		<u>A</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

CY To VP		Show CC	
CY To Meese		Show CC	
CY To Baker		Show CC	
CY To Deaver		Show CC	

Other _____

Urgent - Must be developed in coord with State
COMMENTS promptly
URGENT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 5, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *RP*

SUBJECT: Statement of U.S. Strategy Toward Soviet Union

URGENT

Over the past several weeks (ever since the introduction of sanctions toward Poland and the USSR) more and more Europeans are demanding to know what the long-term purpose of our hard-line actions toward the Communist Bloc is. Do we intend to provoke a confrontation? Do we want to isolate the Soviet Bloc? Do we have some other purpose in mind? Or are we being merely impulsive? There is absolutely no hope of securing cooperation for our sanctions from our Allies, who are recalcitrant to follow us anyway, unless our objectives are clearly and persuasively spelled out. And unless such cooperation is forthcoming we will either produce a final split in the Alliance or else have to abandon our current policies, either of which would be a tragedy. The matter was well put by the French Minister of Commerce, Michel Jobert, the other day, when he told a group of Americans at the American Enterprise Institute: "You are asking us to go with you on a journey but you are not telling us where you are heading and where we will end up". (S)

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mb Norman Bailey, *Jim R* Jim Rentschler and Bill Stearman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize NSC staff members to draft the Terms of Reference for a NSDD on the Soviet Union, to be followed by interagency consideration on the subject, chaired by State, and submission to NSC, the process to be completed no later than April 30. (S)

Approve *RP* Disapprove _____

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153903

BY *RW* NARA DATE 6/2/15~~SECRET~~

Bailey
21
153904

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1982

*Sov. P.*ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: RICHARD PIPES

SUBJECT: Preparations for the Coming Soviet Succession
Crisis

There are numerous indications that the struggle for succession in Russia has gotten underway: it may break into the open at any time. An interregnum in the Soviet Union always presents great opportunities for the West because the successor government, requiring time to consolidate its power, is amenable to compromises in its foreign policy. (S)

In view of this fact, we should not be caught unprepared when Brezhnev goes but prepare an agenda of objectives and actions we may want to pursue in such an eventuality. I recommend that we convene as soon as possible at NSC an inter-agency crisis management sub-group to deal with this problem. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the formation of a crisis management sub-group at NSC to discuss and recommend actions to be taken when Brezhnev is forced for political or health reasons to relinquish office. (S)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

cc: Bill Stearman
Norman Bailey~~SECRET~~Classified/Extended by WPClark
Review March 18, 2002
Reason: NSC 1.13(f)

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153904
BY *RW* NARA DATE *6/2/15*

FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

NEW YORK TIMES 23 March 1982 Pg.14

Excerpts From State Department Report on Chemical Warfare

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Mar. 22 — Following are excerpts from "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan," a State Department report, to Congress:


This study presents the evidence available to the U.S. Government on chemical warfare activities in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan through January 1982 and examines the Soviet involvement in those activities. It is based on a massive amount of information from a variety of sources, which has been carefully compiled and analyzed over the years. The paper is accompanied by annexes and tables that provide details of the medical evidence and sample analyses, a technical description of trichothecene toxins, and other supporting data.

Introduction

Despite a continued flow of reports, dating back over seven years, of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and more recently Afghanistan and despite the still-mounting physical evidence of the use of trichothecene toxins as warfare agents, doubts as to the conclusive nature of the available evidence have persisted. These doubts have arisen for several reasons. For one, the evidence of the use of lethal chemical weapons has become available over a period of several years and from a variety of sources. Few governments, journalists or interested members of the public have been exposed to all of this evidence, nor has it been available in any one place. A second difficulty has been the inevitable need for the U.S. Government to protect some of the relevant information, often gathered at personal risk to individuals who secured it, or obtained through the use of highly sensitive methods.

This report represents an effort of the U.S. Government to correct the first deficiency and to ameliorate the second to the extent possible. In preparation of this report, all of the information available to the U.S. Government on chemical weapons use in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan was assembled in one place. This information was again reviewed, analyzed, cross-indexed and organized in a coherent fashion. Based upon this comprehensive analysis, a set of conclusions were drawn, conclusions which have since been reviewed and agreed on without qualification by every relevant agency of the U.S. Government.

The evidence upon which this report is based is of several kinds, including:



The New York Times / March 23, 1982

¶Testimony of those who saw, experienced and suffered from chemical weapons attacks.

¶Testimony of doctors, refugee workers, journalists and others who had the opportunity to question large numbers of those with firsthand experience of chemical warfare.

¶Testimony of those who engaged in chemical warfare or were in a position to observe those who did.

¶Scientific evidence, based upon the analysis of physical samples taken from sites where attacks had been conducted.

¶Documentary evidence from open sources.

¶Intelligence derived from "national technical means."

These sources provide compelling evidence that tens of thousands of unsophisticated and defenseless peoples have for a period of years been subjected to a campaign of chemical attacks. Taken together, this evidence has led the U.S. Government to conclude that Lao and Vietnamese forces, operating under Soviet supervision, have, since 1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin weapons in Laos; that Vietnamese forces have, since 1978, used lethal chemical and toxin agents in Kampuchea, and that Soviet forces have used a variety of lethal chemical warfare agents, including nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the Soviet invasion of that country in 1979.

Key Judgments

Laos

The U.S. Government has concluded from all the evidence that selected Lao and Vietnamese forces, under direct Soviet supervision, have employed lethal trichothecene toxins and other combinations of chemical agents against Hmong resisting government control and their villages since at least 1976. Trichothecene toxins have been positively identified, but medical symptoms indicate that irritants, incapacitants and nerve agents also have been employed. Thousands have been killed or severely injured. Thousands also have been driven from their homeland by the use of these agents.

Kampuchea

Vietnamese forces have used lethal trichothecene toxins on Democratic Kampuchean (D.K.) troops and Khmer villages since at least 1978. Medical evidence indicates that irritants, incapacitants and nerve agents also have been used.

Afghanistan

Soviet forces in Afghanistan have used a variety of lethal and nonlethal chemical agents on Mujahedeen

EXCERPTS...Pg.2-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

resistance forces and Afghan villages since the Soviet invasion in December 1979. In addition, there is some evidence that Afghan Government forces may have used Soviet-supplied chemical weapons against the Mujahedeen even before the Soviet invasion. Although it has not been possible to verify through sample analysis the specific agents used by the Soviets, a number of Afghan military defectors have named the agents brought into the country by the Soviets and have described where and when they were employed. This information has been correlated with other evidence, including the reported symptoms, leading to the conclusion that nerve agents, phosgene oxime and various incapacitants and irritants have been used. Other agents and toxic smokes also are in the country. Some reported symptoms are consistent with those produced by lethal or sublethal doses of trichothecene toxins, but this evidence is not conclusive.

The Soviet Connection

The conclusion is inescapable that the toxins and other chemical warfare agents were developed in the Soviet Union, provided to the Lao and Vietnamese either directly or through the transfer of know-how, and weaponized with Soviet assistance in Laos, Vietnam and Kampuchea. Soviet military forces are known to store agents in bulk and move them to the field for munitions fill as needed. This practice also is followed in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, as evidenced by many reports which specify that Soviet technicians supervise the shipment, storage, filling and loading onto aircraft of the chemical munitions. The dissemination techniques reported and observed evidently have been drawn from years of Soviet chemical warfare testing and experimentation. *There is no evidence to support any alternative explanation, such as the hypothesis that the Vietnamese produce and employ toxin weapons completely on their own.*

Methodology


The judgments of this study were arrived at through a rigorous analytical process.

¶Every relevant piece of information on reported chemical warfare incidents was reviewed, recorded, and tabulated. Numbers of attacks and deaths were screened for possible duplication. Extensive data on the Soviet chemical and biological warfare program also were reviewed.

¶All the test data on physical evidence available to the U.S. Government—including environmental samples and background controls—were reviewed.

¶A scientific report on toxins, which concluded that trichothecenes probably were among the agents used in Southeast Asia, was prepared.

¶The medical evidence was analyzed, drawing on all available information from Southeast Asia and Afghanistan and incorporating the find-



The New York Times / March 23, 1982

ings of a Department of Defense medical team, which concluded that at least three types of agents were used in Laos.

¶Extensive consultations were held with Government and non-Government scientists and medical authorities, many of whom were asked to review the evidence. Experts from other countries also were consulted.

After the data were organized to permit comparative analysis, the study focused on three separate questions.

¶Have lethal and other casualty-producing agents been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan?

¶What are these agents, and how and by whom are they employed?

¶Where do these agents originate, and how do they find their way to the field?

Although the evidence differs for each country, the analytical approach was the same. Testimony of eyewitnesses—date, place, and type of attack—was matched against information from defectors, journalists, international organizations, and sensitive information that often pinpointed the time and place of chemical attacks. In addition, information on military operations in the areas where chemical attacks had been reported was examined to establish whether air or artillery strikes took place or where

there was fighting in the areas where chemical agents reportedly were used. *In all three countries, instances were identified in which eyewitness accounts could be correlated directly with information from other sources on military operations in progress.*

Discussion of Findings

As soon as it was determined that chemical agents had been used, an effort was made to identify the specific agents. To do this it was necessary to collect and analyze at least one of the following: environmental samples contaminated with agents; the munitions used to deliver agents, or biological specimens from victims of an attack. A study by medical-toxicological experts of symptoms exhibited by individuals exposed to toxic agents provides a good indication of the general class of chemical agent used. Thus, the range of clinical manifestations from chemical agents, as reported by a U.S. Army investigative team in Thailand, resulted in the determination that nerve agents, irritants such as Cs, and highly toxic hemorrhagic chemicals or mixture of chemicals were used in Laos.

Other medical-toxicological personnel who reviewed the evidence and conducted their own investigation reached the same conclusion. They

EXCERPTS...Pg. 3-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

further indicated that toxins such as the trichothecenes were a probable cause of the lethal hemorrhaging effect seen in Kampuchea and Laos. In many cases, symptoms reported by the Democratic Kampuchean forces in Kampuchea and the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan were similar to those reported by the Hmong in Laos. Moreover, symptoms reported from Afghanistan and Kampuchea indicated that a highly potent, rapid-acting, incapacitant "knockout" chemical also was being used. Mujahedeen victims and witnesses to chemical attacks reported other unusual symptoms, including a blackening of the skin, severe skin irritation along with multiple small blisters and severe itching, severe eye irritation and difficulty in breathing — all of which suggests that phosgene oxime or a similar substance was used.

Problems of Sample-Collecting

Collecting samples possibly contaminated with a toxic agent during or after a chemical assault is difficult under any circumstances, but particularly when the assault is against ill-prepared people without masks or other protective equipment. Obtaining contaminated samples that will yield positive traces of specific chemical agents depends on many factors. These include the persistency of the chemical, the ambient temperature, rainfall, wind conditions, the medium on which the chemical was deposited and the time, care and packaging of the sample from collection to laboratory analysis.

Many traditional or known chemical warfare agents are nonpersistent and disappear from the environment within a few minutes to several hours after being dispersed. Such agents include the nerve agents sarin and tabun; the blood agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen chloride; the choking agents phosgene and diphosgene; and the irritant phosgene oxime. Other standard chemical warfare agents such as the nerve agents VX and thickened soman and the blistering agents sulfur mustard, nitrogen mustard and lewisite may persist for several days to weeks depending on weather conditions.

The Need for Speed

The trichothecene toxins have good persistency but may be diluted by adverse weather conditions to below detectable concentrations. To maximize the chances of detection, sample collections need to be made as rapidly as possible after a chemical assault; as with many agents, this means minutes to hours. Under the circumstances of Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, such rapid collection has simply not been possible. Although many samples were collected, few held any realistic prospect of yielding positive results. It is fortunate that trichothecenes are sufficiently persistent and in some cases were not diluted by adverse weather conditions. Thus we were able to detect them several months after the attack.

Samples have been collected from Southeast Asia since mid-1979 and from Afghanistan since May 1980. To date, about 50 individual samples of

greatly varying types and usefulness for analytical purposes have been collected and analyzed for the presence of known chemical warfare agents, none of which has been detected. Based on recommendations by medical and toxicological experts and findings of investigators from the U.S. Army's Chemical Systems Laboratory, several of the samples have been analyzed for the trichothecene group of mycotoxins. Four samples, two from Kampuchea and two from Laos, were found to contain high levels of trichothecene toxins. In addition, preliminary results of the analysis of blood samples drawn from victims of an attack indicate the presence of a trichothecene metabolite of T-2, namely HT-2.

A review of all reports indicates the use of many different chemical agents, means of delivery and types of chemical attacks. The use of trichothecene toxins has been identified through symptoms and sample analysis. In some cases, however, the symptoms suggest other agents, such as nerve gas, which have not been identified through sample analysis. Significant differences as well as similarities have surfaced in the reports from the three countries. The evidence from each country, therefore, is described separately, with attention drawn to similarities where appropriate.

Laos

Reports of chemical attacks against Hmong villages and guerrilla strongholds in Laos date from the summer of 1975 to the present. Most of the reports were provided by Hmong refugees who were interviewed in Thailand and the United States. More than 200 interviews were carried out variously by U.S. Embassy officials in Thailand, a Department of Defense team of medical-toxicological experts, U.S. physicians, Thai officials, journalists and representatives of international aid and relief organizations. According to the interviews, Soviet AN-2 and captured U.S. L-19 and T-28/41 aircraft usually were employed to disseminate toxic chemical agents by sprays, rockets and bombs. In some cases, Soviet helicopters and jet aircraft were said to have been used.

The reports describe 261 separate attacks in which at least 6,504 deaths were cited as having resulted directly from exposure to chemical agents. The actual number of deaths is almost certainly much higher, since the above figure does not take account of deaths in attacks for which no specific casualty figures were reported. The greatest concentration of reported chemical agent use occurred in the area where the three provinces of Vientiane, Xiengkhouang and Louang Prabang adjoin. This triborder region accounted for 77 percent of the reported attacks and 83 percent of the chemical-associated deaths. Most of the reported attacks took place in 1978 and 1979. Since 1979, the incidence of chemical attacks appears to have been lower, but reported death rates among unprotected and untreated victims were higher. Only seven chemical attacks were reported in the fall of

1981, for example, yet 1,034 deaths were associated with those incidents.

The medical symptoms reportedly produced by the chemical agents are varied. According to knowledgeable physicians, the symptoms clearly point to at least three types of chemical agents: incapacitant or riot-control agents, a nerve agent and an agent causing massive hemorrhaging. The last-named was positively identified as trichothecene toxins. This was announced publicly by Secretary Haig in September 1981.

In a number of the refugee reports, eyewitnesses described attacks as consisting of "red gas" or a "yellow cloud." Red gas was considered the more lethal. A former Lao Army captain stated that the "red gas" caused the Hmong to die within 12 hours. An employee of an international organization interviewed victims of a September 15, 1979, attack in which nonlethal rounds preceded an attack by five or six "red gas" bombs that covered a 500-meter area. Persons within 30 to 100 meters of the circle died in 10 minutes after severe convulsions. Others had headaches, chest pains and vomiting but did not die.

Every qualified interrogator who systematically interviewed the Hmong refugees concluded that they had been subjected to chemical attacks. A U.S. Government medical team returned from Thailand in 1979 convinced that several unidentified chemical warfare agents had produced the symptoms described by the refugees. This evidence was expanded by testimony from a variety of sources, including that of a Lao pilot who flew chemical warfare missions before defecting in 1979. His detailed description of the Lao, Vietnamese and Soviet program to use chemical agents to defeat the Hmong resistance helped dispel any lingering suspicions that the refugees had fabricated or embellished the stories. The Lao pilot described the chemical rocket he had fired as having a more loosely fitting warhead than a conventional rocket. (His account appears in Annex A.)

Kampuchea

Since October 1978, radio broadcasts, press releases and official protests to the United Nations by the Democratic Kampuchea leadership have accused the Vietnamese and the Hanoi-backed People's Republic of Kampuchea regime of using Soviet-made lethal chemical agents and weapons against D.K. guerrilla forces and civilians. D.K. allegations for a time were the only source of information concerning chemical warfare attacks in Kampuchea. In November 1979, however, the guerrilla forces of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front reported that the Vietnamese had attacked them with tear gas which, from their description, resembled the riot-control agent Cs. Subsequently, Thai officials, Democratic Kampuchea informants and refugees, Vietnamese Army defectors, U.S. and Thai medical personnel, officials of international aid and relief organizations and Canadian and West Euro-

EXCERPTS...Pg. 4-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

pean officials also have implicated the Vietnamese in the offensive use of lethal and incapacitating chemical agents in Kampuchea.

There are reports of 124 separate attacks in Kampuchea from 1978 to the fall of 1981 in which lethal chemicals caused the deaths of 981 persons (see Table 2). The mortality figure represents a minimum because some reports state only that there were deaths and do not provide a number. The earliest reports cite attacks in Ratanakiri Province, in the northeastern corner of the country (see map). Reports from 1979 to the present show the use of lethal chemicals primarily in the provinces bordering Thailand. The greatest use of chemical agents apparently has been in Battambang Province, with 51 reported incidents; Pursat Province has experienced the next highest frequency, with 25 reported incidents. These numbers are consistent with the overall high level of military activity reported in the border provinces.

A review of information from all sources provides direct and specific support for 28 of 124 reported attacks. There is in addition some evidence that in all reported instances some form of attack took place. This evidence includes reports of troop movements, supply transfers, operational plans, postoperation reporting and air activity. It indicates that military activity took place at the time and place of every incident reported to involve lethal chemical agents. In some cases, it provides strong circumstantial evidence that the action involved chemical substances — for example, the movement of chemicals and personal protection equipment into the area.

There is no doubt that in late 1978 and 1979 the Vietnamese, and what later became the People's Republic of Kampuchea forces, made at least limited use of riot-control chemicals and possible incapacitating agents against both Communist and non-Communist guerrilla forces in Kampuchea. The chemicals used probably included toxic smokes, riot control agents such as Cs and an unidentified incapacitating agent that caused vertigo and nausea and ultimately rendered victims unconscious with no other signs or symptoms.

In March 1979 during Vietnamese operations against Khmer Rouge forces in the Phnom Melai area, a Vietnamese Army private who later defected observed the following activities related to chemical warfare:

¶During the fighting, all regiment (740th) troops were issued gas masks. However, the Second battalion, a "border defense unit," was not issued masks. This unit was in the Phnom Melai area and was virtually surrounded by Khmer Rouge forces.


¶At another point in the battle, the regiment's troops were ordered to don masks. The Vietnamese Army private reported that he saw two Soviets (Caucasians) fire a DH-10 (a hand-held weapon identified by the private's comrades). He was about 50

meters from the firing point. The weapon at impact, which he was able to observe from his position, gave off clouds of white, gray and green gas or smoke. His signal unit subsequently passed a message reporting that there were 300 dead, including the unprotected Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese of the border defense forces' Second Battalion. The corpses reportedly had traces of white and green powder on their faces and clothes. Their faces were contorted, with eyes wide open. No blood was seen. (A Hmong resistance leader described an incident in 1981 in which two Soviet soldiers fired a hand-held weapon that dispersed a similar lethal agent.)

Starting in February 1980, reports revealed that the Vietnamese were using 60-millimeter mortars, 120-millimeter shells, 107-millimeter rockets, M-79 grenade launchers filled with chemical agents as well as munitions delivered by T-28 aircraft. According to the D.K., the chemicals used were

of a March 1981 attack showed high levels of three trichothecene toxins in a combination that would not be expected to be found in a natural outbreak in this environment. At the levels found on the vegetation, the three trichothecenes would produce vomiting, skin irritations and itching, and bleeding symptoms. Water samples taken from the area of the same attack also contained trichothecene toxins. Control samples from nearby areas confirmed that these toxins were not indigenous to the locale.

There also is ample evidence of military activity at the place and time of the acquisition of the samples. Vietnamese Army defectors described plans for multiregimental sweep operations to be conducted along the border in northwestern Battambang Province before the end of the dry season in May. Actual fighting, however, continued to be characterized by guerrilla tactics on both sides, including, according to a Vietnamese Army de-



The New York Times / March 23, 1982

green and yellow and powderlike in appearance. In some instances the gas was described as yellow or white. The symptoms described were tightening of the chest, disorientation, vomiting, bleeding from the nose and gums, discoloration of the body and "stiffening" of the teeth. In July 1980, the D.K. described artillery attacks that produced a black smoke causing itchy skin, weakness, skin lesions and in some cases decaying skin and blisters. In December 1980, the Vietnamese were once again firing chemical artillery shells, and it was believed that poison chemicals were being brought into Thailand's border region. By March 1981, the Democratic Kampuchea forces had reported numerous attacks directed against them with lethal chemical agents and the poisoning of food and water.

U.S. analysis of contaminated vegetation samples collected within hours

factor, "staging ambushes, laying minefields, and use of deception." Indeed, Democratic Kampuchean resistance forces were ordered to avoid large-scale operations and to limit combat operations to scattered sapper attacks. Such information is consistent with other reports of Vietnamese Army forces spreading toxic chemicals in streams, along roadsides and around villages and firing toxic gas shells against enemy positions. The Phnom Melai sector, where Phnom Mak Hoeun is located, was described as an "anthill of D.K. activity," and actions reported during March were "sporadic firefights" around Phnom Mak Hoeun involving the Vietnamese Army's 2d Battalion, 2d Border Security Regiment.

EXCERPTS...Pg. 5-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

**The Soviet Connection
In Southeast Asia**

Much of the Soviet interest in Southeast Asia is dictated by their rivalry with China and their close alliance with the Vietnamese. Regional Communist forces have been strengthened to contain Chinese influence and deter military incursions. The area of northern Laos between Vientiane and the Chinese border — where the Hmong hill tribes have stubbornly resisted and harassed Vietnamese forces — is strategically significant to the Vietnamese because it adjoins a hostile China. In the last few years the Vietnamese have expanded their military construction and strengthened their forces in Laos, which now number 50,000.

Initially there was a tendency to interpret the Soviet role as strictly advisory. Now, however, there is considerable evidence to suggest that the Soviets are far more involved in the Lao and Vietnamese chemical warfare program than was assumed earlier. An estimated 500 Soviet military advisers provide maintenance assistance and technical support, actually running the Lao Air Force, and give advanced training to Lao personnel in conventional as well as chemical warfare.

The Soviets have had advisers and technicians working in Vietnam and Laos for many years and in Kampuchea since 1979. However, it was not until early 1979 that evidence surfaced on the Soviets' direct involvement in chemical warfare activities. For example, the Lao Army chemical section in Xiangkhoang prepared Soviet-manufactured chemical items for inspection by a Soviet military team on Feb. 7, 1979. A seven-man team of Soviet chemical artillery experts, accompanied by Lao chemical officers, inspected chemical supplies and artillery rounds at the Xeno storage facility in Savannakhet on June 1, 1979. One report stated that the Soviets would be inspecting the same chemical explosives used to suppress the Hmong in the Phou Bia area.

In addition to this information, Hmong accounts have described Soviet advisers and technicians participating in the preparation of the chemical weapons for the attacks on the Hmong villages. Hmong eyewitnesses claim to have seen "Caucasian pilots" in aircraft, and one Hmong report states that a downed Soviet aircraft was discovered in the jungle along with a dead Soviet pilot. In November 1981, a Hmong resistance leader described how Soviet soldiers fighting with the Lao Army fired hand-held weapons that dispersed a lethal agent over a 300-meter area. Several Lao defectors have reported seeing Soviet advisers present when aircraft were loaded with chemical-agent rockets.

In July 1981, a Soviet shipment of wooden crates filled with canisters described by the Vietnamese as "deadly toxic chemicals" was unloaded at the

port of Ho Chi Minh City. This incident further corroborates the judgment that the Soviets have been shipping chemical warfare materiel to Vietnam for some time. During the unloading, Vietnamese soldiers were caught pilfering the wooden crates containing the canisters. The soldiers dropped one of the wooden cases and intentionally broke it open; they wanted to determine if its contents were edible or valuable for pilferage. When a soldier broke the nylon seal and attempted to pry open a canister, special security personnel isolated the area and told the soldiers that the canisters contained deadly toxic substances from the U.S.S.R. The wooden crates, each weighing 100 kilograms, were loaded on military trucks and taken under special guard to the Long Binh storage depot.

This incident is only one in a series involving Soviet chemical warfare materiel dating back several years.

Afghanistan

Attacks with chemical weapons against the Mujahedeen guerrillas in Afghanistan were reported as early as six months before the Soviet invasion on Dec. 27, 1979. The information specifies that Soviet-made aircraft were used to drop chemical bombs, with no clear identification of Soviet or Afghan pilots or of the specific agents used. On Nov. 16, 1979, chemical bombs reportedly were dropped along with conventional air munitions on targets in Farah, Herat and Badghis Provinces by Soviet-supplied Afghan IL-28 bombers based at Shindand. A number of Afghan military defectors have stated that the Soviets provided the Afghan military with chemical warfare training as well as supplies of lethal and incapacitating agents.

For the period from the summer of 1979 to the summer of 1981, the U.S. Government received reports of 47 separate chemical attacks with a claimed death toll of more than 3,000 (see Table 3). Of the 47 reports, 36 came from Afghan Army deserters, Mujahedeen resistance fighters, journalists, U.S. physicians and others. For 24 of the reported attacks, there is additional independent evidence supporting allegations of chemical attacks. In seven instances, further individual reporting exists. Evidence for 20 of the reported incidents comes from information on Soviet or Afghan Army combat operations in progress in areas and at times approximating those of a reported chemical attack.

The reports indicated that fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters usually were employed to disseminate chemical warfare agents by rockets, bombs, and sprays. Chemical-filled landmines were also reportedly used by the Soviets. The chemical clouds were usually gray or blue-black, yellow or a combination of the colors.

Symptoms reported by victims and witnesses of attacks indicate that nonlethal incapacitating chemicals and lethal chemicals, including nerve

agents, phosgene or phosgene oxime, possibly trithoecene toxins and mustard were used. Medical examinations of some of the victims include reports of paralysis, other neurological effects, blisters, bleeding and sometimes death. While none of the agents being used in Afghanistan has been positively identified through sample analysis, there is no doubt that the agents being used are far more toxic than riot-control agents such as CN and CS or even adamsite.

Action of Chemical Agent

Several descriptions of the physiological action of a chemical agent or of the condition of the corpses of victims were particularly unusual. In one, victims were rapidly rendered unconscious for two to six hours and had few aftereffects. In another, the bodies were characterized by abnormal bloating and blackened skin with a dark reddish tinge, and the flesh appeared decayed very soon after death. In a third incident, three dead Mujahedeen guerrillas were found with hands on rifles and lying in a firing position, indicating that the attacker had used an extremely rapid-acting lethal chemical that is not detectable by normal senses and that causes no outward physiological responses before death.

Shortly after the Soviet invasion, many reports were received that both Soviet and Afghan forces were using various types of chemical agents. Ten separate chemical attacks, resulting in many deaths, were reported in the first three months of 1980. These reports came from northeastern Afghanistan and provide the highest percentage of reported deaths. During the mid-January to February 1980 period, helicopter attacks were reported in northeastern Afghanistan in which a grayish blue smoke resulted in symptoms similar to those described by the Hmong refugees from Laos (e.g., heavy tearing or watering of eyes; extensive blistering and discoloration of the skin, later resulting in large sheetlike peeling; swelling in the areas affected by the blister, and finally numbness, paralysis and death). Medical reports from examinations in Pakistan of refugees from a large attack in the upper Kunar Valley in February 1980 described red skin and blisters containing fluid described as "dirty water." Refugees estimated that about 2,000 people were affected after contact with a dirty yellow cloud.

By spring and summer of 1980, chemical attacks were reported in all areas of concentrated resistance activity. Many reports from different sources strongly support the case that irritants were used to drive the insurgents into the open to expose them to attack with conventional weapons and incapacitants to render them tractable for disarming and capture. On several occasions in April 1980, for example, Soviet helicopter pilots dropped

EXCERPTS...Pg. 6-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

"gas bombs" on insurgents, evidently to drive them from caves.

Account to Dutch Journalist

A Dutch journalist, Bernd de Bruin, published an eyewitness account of two chemical attacks occurring in the Jalalabad area on June 15 and June 21, 1980 (Newsnet, Aug. 2, 1980). He filmed an MI-24 helicopter dropping canisters that produced a dirty yellow cloud. A victim with blackened skin, discolored by extensive subcutaneous hemorrhaging, was photographed in the village five hours after the attack. The journalist evidently was exposed because he developed blisters on his hands and a swollen and itchy face. He also was exposed in the second attack, and it took about 10 days for him to recover from skin lesions, nausea, diarrhea and stomach cramps.

An Afghan insurgent provided an eyewitness account of a July 6, 1980, attack on a village 10 kilometers east of Darae Jelga in Vardak Province. He reported that a Soviet MI-24 helicopter gunship dropped a bomb that, upon explosion, released a lethal chemical. A separate report confirmed that Soviet bombing attacks on villages in Vardak as well as Lowgar and Parvan Provinces were taking place during this period. In August 1980, information surfaced on a Soviet attack with chemical bombs on the village of Sya Wusan, 30 kilometers southeast of Herat, leaving 300 dead. It was during this time that the Soviet chemical battalion at Shindand set up an operational decontamination station.

Reports of chemical weapons use in 1981 essentially parallel 1980 reporting with respect to frequency and location of attack. Soviet helicopter units participated in chemical attacks from April 20 to April 29, 1981, in areas east and west of Kabul and in the Kunar Valley, according to eyewitness accounts. These attacks were intended to drive personnel from sanctuaries, such as caves, in order to engage them with conventional fire. The munitions were described as Soviet 250-kilogram R.B.K. cluster bombs. The Soviets have such a munition, which can be filled with chemical agents. Other reports described similar operations by helicopters north of Kandahar on April 24 and April 26, 1981.

A former Afghan MI-8 helicopter pilot said Soviet forces had used chemical weapons in Badakhshan, Qonduz and Konarha. Chemicals in canisters that contained toxic gas, tear gas and antirespiratory gas, which has an incapacitating effect by causing choking and difficulty in breathing, were manually pushed from the cargo compartment of helicopters. The pilot said that there also was a specific gas that is absorbed by the body and leaves the skin so soft that a finger can be punched through it. In one case, there was a wind shift, and Soviet and Afghan forces were seriously affected. Other sources also have described an incident where Soviet and Afghan forces were victims of their own gas attack.

Annex A

A Lao Pilot's Account

One of the most complete descriptions of chemical warfare activities in the 1976-78 period came from a Lao pilot who was directly involved in chemical warfare. The pilot, a former Lao People's Liberation Army (L.P.L.A.) officer who defected in 1979, reported that he flew captured L-19 and T-41 aircraft equipped to dispense toxic chemical agents on Hmong villagers in the Phou Bia area of northern Laos. He said that the L.P.L.A., in cooperation with the Vietnamese Army, had conducted chemical warfare operations in Laos since April or early May 1976. At that time, two Lao H-34 helicopters were flown between Long Tieng and the Phonsavan airfield, both in Xiangkhoang Province, on a series of flights to transport rockets to Phonsavan for storage.

Between June and August 1976, the L.P.L.A. launched attacks in the area of Bouamlong — in Xiangkhoang Province — a stronghold for remnants of the forces of former Hmong Gen. Vang Pao.

In late 1976, during preparation for air strikes on Kasy (Louang Prabang Province) and in new areas of Phou Bia, the pilot said he began carrying two or three Vietnamese Army staff officers, sometimes accompanied by a Lao staff officer, in T-41 aircraft for reconnaissance over the target areas. When these air strikes were launched, the defector pilot initially flew his L-19 aircraft on missions with another pilot and a Lao staff officer. After two or three weeks, however, Vietnamese staff officers, who spoke excellent Lao, began alternating with the Lao officers. Before each mission, the Vietnamese or Lao staff officer would go over target areas outlined on situation maps — which then were taken along — and would point out the targets to be attacked. The defector pilot noted that at no time did the Vietnamese staff officer communicate with Lao officers on the ground, as did the Lao staff officers.

The pilot related that before flying L-19 air strike missions with a full load of rockets he was often warned by a Lao commander to fly at above-normal altitudes when firing rockets — to preclude hazard to the occupants of the aircraft. For this reason the pilot surmised that the "smoke" rockets fired at the Hmong were unusual. He was able to observe that the "smoke" rockets detonated in the air and that some produced white smoke, with a mixture of blue, while others produced red smoke, with a mixture of yellow.

Before a mission involving "smoke rockets," the commander warned the pilots to keep the operation secret. The Lao defector said that, during the nearly two years in which he flew rocket missions, he learned from the Lao staff officers accompanying him that there were two types of rockets. The first, mostly "smoke" rockets, were to be fired at targets far away from Lao and Vietnamese troops to

avoid exposing them to the poison smoke. The second was of the ordinary explosive type, considered a "close support" rockets that could be fired near Lao troop positions. Initially, the L-19 aircraft carried eight rockets — five "close support" and three "smoke" rockets. Later, only four rockets, mainly of the "smoke" type, were carried.

Annex B

Findings of U.S. Government Investigative Teams;
Use of Chemical Agents Against the Hmong in Laos

State Department Team

In May 1979, State Department officials visited Thailand to interview Hmong refugees and investigate allegations of the use of chemical agents against Hmong tribesmen in Laos. From the signs/symptoms described and observed, it is suggested that at least two and possibly three different chemical agents may have been used, such as:

¶A nerve agent (five or six individuals reported symptoms that could be attributed to a nerve agent).

¶An irritant or riot-control agent (one-third of the interviews).

¶More than half of the interviews indicated such a variety of signs and symptoms that it is difficult to attribute them to a single known agent.

It is possible that in some cases two or more agents were combined.

¶Reported signs and symptoms suggesting a nerve agent include sweating, tearing, excessive salivation, difficulty in breathing, shortness of breath, nausea and vomiting, dizziness, weakness, convulsions and death occurring shortly after exposure.

¶Reported signs and symptoms suggesting a riot-control or irritant agent include marked irritation or burning of the eyes, with tearing and pain; irritation and burning of the nose and throat; coughing; burning and tightness in the chest; headache, and nausea and vomiting in a few cases.

¶Reported signs and symptoms not related to any known single agent include a mixture of the above as well as

profuse bleeding from mucous membranes of the nose, lungs and gastrointestinal tract, with rapid death of the affected individuals in some instances.

Estimates from the Hmong interviewed indicate that approximately 700-1,000 persons may have died as a result of the use of chemical agents and that many times this number became ill. It was reported that on many occasions entire villages were devastated by these agents, leaving no survivors.

In the episodes described, most of the animals exposed to the chemical agents were killed. Generally, all chickens, dogs and pigs died and, to a lesser extent, the cattle and buffalo.

EXCERPTS...Pg. 7-F

EXCERPTS...Continued

On several occasions it was reported that where these agents settled on tree and plant leaves, many small holes appeared in the leaves within two or three days. Rarely did agent exposure result in the defoliation or death of the plants.

Department of Defense Team

From Sept. 28 to Oct. 12, 1979, a team from the U.S. Army Surgeon General's Office was in Thailand to conduct a similar series of interviews. The team visited the following Hmong refugee camps of northern Thailand: the detention center at Nong Kai, the large Hmong camp at Ban Vinai and two smaller camps at Nam Yao and Mae Charim. As the great majority of refugees as well as the Hmong leadership are at Ban Vinai, most interviews were obtained there.

The team was prepared to obtain blood and skin samples (for cholinest-

erase activity and study of pathological changes, respectively) from those exposed to chemical agents. For such samples to yield meaningful results they must be taken within six to eight weeks of exposure. Since the last reported exposure was in May 1979, no blood or skin samples were collected.

The chemical attacks reportedly occurred between June 1976 and May 1979. The absence of reports of attacks after May 1979 may be because few refugees crossed the Mekong River after that time — as a result of heavy rains and flooding from June to September 1979. Most of the early reports were of the use of rockets releasing the agent; beginning in the fall of 1978, the majority of the attacks were carried out by aircraft spraying a yellowish substance which "fell like rain." The attack sites, concentrated around the Hmong stronghold in the moun-

tainous Phou Bia area.

The team was given a plastic vial containing pieces of bark, stained by a yellow substance, which several Hmong refugees claimed was residue from an aircraft spray attack in April 1979. Preliminary chemical analysis of the sample indicates that no standard chemical agent (i.e., an agent listed in TH 8-285, U.S. Army, May 1974) was present.

Conclusions

The conclusions of these teams, based upon interviews obtained from Hmong refugees, are as follows:

¶Chemical agents have been used against the Hmong.

¶The reported effects of these agents suggest the use of a nerve agent, a riot-control agent and an unidentified combination or compound.

Annex D**Analysis and Review of Trichothecene Toxins****Sample Analyses
For Trichothecenes****The Trichothecene Hypothesis**

Since 1975, the U.S. Government has received remarkably consistent reports detailing chemical attacks in Southeast Asia. Some of these reports described the use of lethal agents which produced symptoms that could not be correlated with those produced by known or traditionally recognized chemical warfare agents or combinations of them. It is readily apparent that the symptoms most frequently described in Laos and Kampuchea correspond most closely with those produced by a group of mycotoxins — the trichothecenes. A review of the scientific literature revealed not only that these compounds had physical and chemical properties indicating potential as chemical agents but also that they were the subject of intensive investigation by Soviet scientists at institutes previously linked with chemical and biological warfare research.

In the fall of 1980, the trichothecenes were added to the list of agents suspected to have been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. Other candidates under consideration included phosgene oxime, arsines, cyanogen chloride, nerve agents, riot-control agents and combinations of these agents.

Many samples from chemical attacks in Laos and Kampuchea were examined at the U.S. Army's Chemical Systems Laboratory (C.S.L.) for the presence of traditional chemical warfare agents and were reported to be negative. In March 1981, C.S.L. reported the presence of an unusual compound ($C_{15}H_{24}$) in the vapor analyses from several clothing and tissue samples taken from the victim of a chemical attack. The compound was closely related in structure to the simple trichothecenes.

**The Kampuchean Leaf
And Stem Sample:
The First Analysis
Of Trichothecenes**

On March 24, 1981, a number of samples were received from the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. Two were reported to have been collected from the site of a chemical attack that occurred in the vicinity of TV 3301, an area just south of Phnom Mak Hoeun. A vegetation sample and a water sample were collected within 24 hours of the attack. Examination of bodies of victims of this attack by medical personnel revealed highly unusual degeneration of the mucosal lining of the gastrointestinal tract. The effects described paralleled those known to be produced by the trichothecenes. The samples were submitted to the Chemical Systems Laboratory for analysis for the presence of chemical warfare agents. With the exception of the unusual presence of high levels of CN⁻, Cl⁻, and F⁻ ions, no evidence of known chemical warfare agents was found. An initial test for the trichothecenes by thin-layer chromatography was inconclusive.

WASHINGTON POST (PARADE) 21 March 1982 (23)

INTELLIGENCE**What
Happened
To Libya's
Hit Squad?**

Last December, the U.S. stated that Mu-

ammar Qaddafi, head of Libya, had sent a hit squad here to murder President Reagan and other leaders.

Qaddafi branded the report a lie. Our government, however,

insisted that it had "concrete evidence" of the assassination plot and ordered U.S. citizens in Libya to get out as soon as possible. Americans also were banned from entering Libya.

Qaddafi is an unstable fanatic who has hired Americans—some formerly employed by our CIA—to supervise terrorist training in his country. He also has exported assassins to commit murder in

Pg. 8

However, Washington has yet to release its "concrete evidence" that Libya sent a hit squad here to eliminate Reagan or others in the Administration. Reportedly Qaddafi is willing to accept any investigation by a UN mission on the hit-squad accusation. If we have the goods on the Libyan leader, it might be a good idea to show them—especially if they reveal his complicity in other terrorist activities.

NATO's future

Joseph C. Harsch

If you are worried about the state of the Western alliance I suggest for the sake of perspective that you reread the story of the Suez crisis of 1956.

In case you have forgotten, that was when the British, French and Israelis entered into a secret agreement to invade Egypt in collusion, without telling Washington and without admitting that they were doing it together.

The plot involved an Israeli military advance into the Sinai peninsula on the false pretext that Egyptian "fedayeen" had been raiding Israeli territory. The records show no such raids. Then the British and French, under the pretext of trying to stop the fighting between Israel and Egypt would themselves plunge in — which they did.

The real object was to topple Gamal Abdel Nasser from the leadership of Egypt and regain West European control over the Suez Canal. Israel would keep the Sinai Peninsula as its share of the loot.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was President of the United States. The US was a signatory, with Britain and France, of the "Tripartite Declaration" of 1950 under which the three bound themselves to maintain the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors as they existed at the end of the first Arab-Israeli war (1947-48).

The plot in October 1956 was in direct violation of the 1950 declaration. President Eisenhower felt that the violation of that settlement would seriously damage both American and West European relations with the Arab countries; would cause the Arabs to turn to the Soviet Union for help against Israel; and would jeopardize Western access to the oil of Arabia. He was determined to honor the 1950 declaration.

Britain and France were the two main European members of the NATO alliance. The US Sixth Fleet took up a position just off Suez. There was consideration in Washington of putting the US fleet between the Egyptian coast and the combined Anglo-French invasion force moving toward Suez from Malta. Admiral Arleigh Burke, US chief of naval operations, was prepared, if ordered, for whatever might happen.

The record is not clear as to how close that affair ever came to actual shooting between the US fleet and the forces of the two NATO allies. The US Sixth Fleet was ready.

It did not come to shooting, but President Eisenhower did things immediately after the Anglo-French landing at Suez which the British and French resented almost as much. He demanded an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the three invading forces from all the Egyptian territory they had overrun. He had the US lead in introducing at the United Nations resolutions for the cease-fire and the withdrawal. And he blocked US credit and Western Hemisphere oil to the three invaders.

The squeeze on the British pound and the shortage of oil in Britain and France forced the British and French to their knees. Anthony Eden had to resign the prime ministership of Britain. The French prime minister, Guy Mollet, followed shortly after. It was rough going, and deeply and bitterly resented in all three of the invading countries.

Israel held out longest against withdrawal, but President Eisenhower was adamant. The Israelis mounted a massive lobbying campaign in the US to allow them at least to keep the Gaza strip. But President Eisenhower threatened to cut off all flow of funds from the US to Israel. Israel also gave in.

The Suez crisis was a shock to NATO. There was a question whether it could be put back together again. The US had in fact forced the resignation of the governments of both Britain and France. Yet NATO did survive, for the simple reason that the British and French needed the alliance at least as much as did the US. The three came back together for mutual self-interest.

NATO is in trouble again today, largely because Washington wants the European members to take stronger action against the Soviet Union than they think is either necessary or desirable. Washington has been operating on the theory that sanctions against the Soviets could influence events in Poland. The European members take the view that nothing they can do would influence the Soviets where Soviet control over Poland is concerned — so why punish their own economies to no avail?

One can differ over whether the Polish affair has put a greater or lesser strain on the NATO alliance than did the Suez crisis of 1956. Personally, I think the Suez crisis was worse. But NATO survived the one, and in all reasonable probability will survive this new test of its validity.

'No greater weapon'

From remarks by President Reagan at a recent ceremony in Washington marking the 40th anniversary of the Voice of America.

Forty years ago America opened up a crucial front in its war against the enemies of freedom. It was 79 days after Pearl Harbor and the nation was mobilizing all its resources in the epic struggle that by then had engulfed the planet.

In those days, as now, truth was a vital part of America's arsenal. A spirited band of professionals — men and women dedicated to what their country stood for and anxious to do their part — began broadcasting from the fourth floor of a New York City office building. In those early days, under the able direction of John Houseman, programs were recorded on acetate discs and shipped via bomber to England and Latin America for broadcast.

From this humble beginning the Voice of America has grown into a respected institution of American communication, a global radio network broadcasting 905

hours weekly in 39 different languages.

Though born in war, Voice of America has continued in peace and has made enormous contributions. Today, as we witness new forms of inhumanity threatening peace and freedom in the world, the Voice of America performs a vital function. By giving an objective account of current world events, by communicating a clear picture of America and our policies at home and abroad, the Voice serves the interests not only of the United States but of the world. The Voice of America is for many the only source of reliable information in a world where events move so quickly.

Today we celebrate the 40th anniversary of an institution that has given hope to the citizens of . . . communist regimes and all victims of tyranny. The challenges we face are no less grave and momentous than those that spawned the Voice 40 years ago. Freedom is no less threatened and the opposition no less totalitarian.

In this struggle there is no greater weapon than the truth. Free men have nothing to fear from it, it remains the ultimate weapon in the arsenal of democracy. We are justifiably proud, that unlike Soviet broadcasts, the Voice of America is not only committed to telling its country's story, but also remains faithful to those standards of journalism that will not compromise the truth.

NSC/S PROFILE

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KEYWORDS: EAST WEST POLITICAL

EAST WEST ECONOMICS

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SUBJECT: UPDATE OF EAST WEST POLICY STUDY APPROVED BY EAST - WEST POLICY SIG
IN 1981

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 15, 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution Below

SUBJECT: East-West Policy Study

Under Secretary Lawrence S. Eagleburger, in his capacity as Chairman of the Senior Interagency Group on East-West Policy, has asked the Interagency Group to update and prepare for NSC approval the East-West Policy Study produced and, with the exception of the economic portion, approved by the East-West Policy SIG last year. The Department of State will be in touch with involved agencies shortly to organize this work.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Distribution:

OVP - Ms. Nancy Bearg Dyke
NSC - Mr. Michael O. Wheeler
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NLRR M452/2 #1539DL6

BY RW NARA DATE 11/14/11

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GDS 4/13/89



BUREAU OF
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ASSESSMENTS
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Sov. P.

CREEPING PACIFISM WITHIN THE USSR

Summary

Soviet rulers have long denigrated pacifism abroad as a hindrance to the unleashing of revolutionary violence, even while they have encouraged the involvement of foreign pacifists in communist-led campaigns that serve to discredit rival governments. During the 1960s, however, USSR Defense Ministry officials began to detect seeds of pacifism inside the Soviet Union itself, and the matter has since grown into a cause of serious regime concern.

If public comment on the subject actually reflects official thinking, then the authorities now suspect that all age groups in the population are vulnerable to the lure of pacifism. That in turn suggests a growing popular fear in the USSR of nuclear war and skepticism about the chance of victory in such a conflict, as well as reluctance of more youths to serve in the armed forces.

* * * * *

The Tradition of Anti-Pacifism--and Opportunism

Pacifism in Soviet eyes has always been more than just an ethical problem of individual opposition to war or violence as a means of settling disputes, or of refusal to bear arms on moral or religious grounds.

Communist party leaders have loathed pacifism as a snag to the performance of their historic mission of convincing workers that only the downfall of capitalism will remove the scourge of armed conflict between nations.

UNCLASSIFIED

Report 367-AR
April 20, 1982

Lenin's party during World War I concentrated on the idea of turning that struggle into an international class war of proletarians versus the propertied. The party adopted several resolutions attacking pacifism as "one of the forms of stupefying the working class" (1915); denouncing the "pacifistic bourgeoisie" for its "lies about a 'democratic peace' and the peace-loving intentions of the belligerents" (1916); and condemning "bourgeois and socialist pacifism," along with "the policy of social-pacifism" (1917). During the Russian Civil War in 1919, the Bolshevik Party Congress resolved that "slogans of pacifism, international disarmament under capitalism, courts of arbitration, and the like, are not only a reactionary utopia, but a direct deception of the toilers, leading to the disarmament of the proletariat and distracting it from the task of disarming the exploiters."

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Although Khrushchev in his heyday raised "peaceful coexistence" to the level of the "general line" of Soviet foreign policy, party spokesmen continued to assail Western pacifism as an anti-revolutionary influence. It was deplored for not being supportive of national-liberation and revolutionary wars, as well as for raising the false hope of achieving lasting peace while capitalism survived, even while the Partisans-of-Peace front was given new impetus.

Every new Soviet leader must give pledges of orthodoxy to the party's vested ideological interests, and Brezhnev included a swipe at "toothless pacifism" in his. He told a Kremlin rally marking the 20th anniversary of V-E Day on May 8, 1965, that Politburo efforts to improve living standards were coupled with large outlays for armaments, making it wrongful for anyone to "confuse our ardent desire to uphold peace on earth with toothless pacifism."

After Brezhnev had consolidated his position and embarked on a detente course, Soviet agitprop offered somewhat less caustic definitions of pacifism than was the case under Khrushchev. Western governments were no longer excoriated for trying to manipulate pacifist sentiments. Nor was it deemed necessary to avow that communists were never blood brothers of the pacifists. But the essentials of the party's tradition of anti-pacifism yet tactical alliance with pacifists were conserved. (See Appendix, "Soviet Definitions of Pacifism.")

Pacifism's Lengthening Shadow

The Soviet Union during Khrushchev's reign was beginning to emerge from self-isolation. High officials even then evidently feared a spread of Western-style pacifism to the East. Marshal Filipp Golikov, chief of the armed forces' Main Political Directorate, complained at the 1961 Party Congress that "elements of pacifism" had crept into the works of Soviet writers. Golikov did not elaborate, but he warned that such mistakes could make it more difficult to instill into youths "love for the army and military service." His argument presumably also reflected the military leaders' misgivings about Khrushchev's peace rhetoric and diplomacy, as well as his abortive attempt to scale down the size of the officer corps.

In any event, old warhorse Marshal Ivan Konev asserted in the March 1967 issue of the Young Communist League journal that "false pacifist moods among a part of the youth" were to be observed: "Our propaganda has not always stressed that the path to a stable peace is connected with a strengthening of the country's defense capabilities and with a strengthening of our military organization" (Molodoy Kommunist, No. 3, 1967).

Criticisms of homegrown pacifism have now reappeared in Soviet political and military literature.

An unsigned article in the November 30, 1981, edition of Pravda, which was devoted to the topic of mass indoctrination, insisted that internal propaganda must be "decisively rid of sudden outbursts of pacifism, which sometimes occur in certain materials designed for informational and propaganda purposes." The same message was restated almost verbatim in an editorial article in the January 1982 issue of the party magazine Kommunist (No. 1). Journalists and lecturers evidently were being admonished that they often were not tough enough on the West in their coverage of foreign affairs, but the articles could also have been intended as an antidote to the "nuclear fear" remarks dropped by some top leaders in recent years.

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Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov, chief of the General Staff, deplored "elements of pacifism" in the domestic scene in his Russian-language pamphlet Always in Readiness for Defense of the Fatherland (January 1982). Ogarkov said that the present generation of Soviet youth "and not only youth" were underrating the threat of war emanating from the West. He urged more intensive military-patriotic education of the USSR population at large.

Ogarkov's brochure was the offshoot of a speech he made at an April 1981 ideological conference in Moscow and an article he wrote for the July 1981 issue of the party journal Kommunist. The booklet, however, omitted a reference to pacifist sentiment inside the Soviet Union which appeared in the earlier texts: "Problems of the struggle for peace are at times not understood from the standpoint of class interests, but in a rather simplified manner: any peace is good and any war is bad." (The Marshal's implication that even a bloody and devastating "just" war should be viewed as "good" apparently was judged indelicate.)

Pravda on March 20 gave fresh evidence of official uneasiness about creeping pacifism on the home front. In an article on films, USSR People's Artist Aleksandr Zarkhi decried the stark explicitness in Western cinematography. He then reproached Soviet producers of intensely realistic war films for being heedless of the potentially demoralizing impact on Soviet audiences:

"Unquestionably, the cruel scenes at times found in certain Soviet films are generated by a director's intention to indict the aggressor's devilish inhumanity. But it is a short distance from the excessive viewing of bodily writhing to tearful, pessimistic weakness.... There is a limit beyond which courage and hope can be lost, beyond which ends the wise power of art, which can strengthen a man's dignity, will and confidence in victory.... Streams of blood, disembowelings and bitter suffering in a hospital can sometimes beget cowardice...." (Emphases supplied.)

One can assume that Marshal Golikov in 1961 had exactly this sort of thing in mind when he hit at Soviet literary works that could move youths toward pacifism. Whether Zarkhi's article in Pravda reflected a new rise of the military leader's political influence or was a tardy extension of the party daily's attack on pacifism last November is an open question.

Sources of Concern

A number of factors may help to account for the recent attacks on domestic pacifism in Soviet media.

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Brezhnev's realm is free of Western-style pacifism with public protests and petitions to authorities. (Rumor has it that only isolated groups of pacifists are to be found in certain areas, such as the Baltics.)

Pacifist moods among Soviet youth can be regarded in part as symptomatic of deepening alienation from the regime and greater distaste for military service as conscripts. This is not surprising given the hard, dull, and even brutal life of a Soviet draftee. The prospect of hazardous duty in Afghanistan has certainly not helped make military service more attractive to the average youngster.

The general population is clearly becoming less resigned to material self-sacrifice on behalf of a still further buildup of the country's defense capability. With the rise of educational standards and the number of those tuning in to foreign broadcasts, many Soviet citizens have also become aware that warfare involving a Kremlin-backed group somewhere in the Third World might possibly escalate into a superpower crisis. Thus, popular enthusiasm for clients abroad is on the wane, and reservations about "fraternal assistance" verging in the direction of "pacifism" are growing.

Pravda's criticism of pacifist rumblings inside the domestic propaganda network raises the question whether there is significant dissent among the governing elite on an activist foreign policy that requires a vast arsenal of costly armaments and could lead to world war.

Prepared by Sidney I. Ploss
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Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536

Appendix

SOVIET DEFINITIONS OF PACIFISM

Stalinist

"a political current which preaches peace and opposes any and all war, military service and use of weapons, and asserts that all social conflicts between people, nations, states and classes can be solved by peaceful means. Pacifism, consequently, does not distinguish between just wars, whose goal is either a people's defense against external attack and attempts to enslave it, or the liberation of a people from the slavery of capitalism, or the liberation of colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of the imperialists, and unjust wars, whose goal is the seizure and enslavement of foreign countries and people.... These congresses [of Western pacifists in the 1880s and 1890s] ended fruitlessly as their decisions skirted the question of overthrowing capitalism, which is the main source of imperialistic wars.... The pacifists do not see the progressive nature of wars against serfdom and wars of oppressed nations for their national independence; they deny the necessity of revolutionary struggle by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie.... Capitalism is the basic reason for imperialistic wars and only with its destruction can wars disappear."

--Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopedia). Moscow: 1939, Vol. 44, columns 385-86. (The dots represent historical references.)

Khrushchevite

"a liberal current whose representatives are opposed to any and all wars. Pacifists believe that it is possible to eliminate war merely by the preaching of universal peace. Pacifism has often been used by the imperialists for deception of the masses, to conceal the preparation of war and to deflect the masses from energetic struggle against imperialistic wars.

"Communists have never been pacifists. Communist parties struggle against usurping, unjust wars and support just, liberating wars. The organized movement of partisans of peace, which developed after World War II and embraces hundreds of millions of people, differs from pacifism by virtue of its militant and effective struggle against the threat of war. Sincere pacifists find ways of cooperating with the organized front of the partisans of peace, acting in defense of peace, facilitating its strengthening and the struggle with the war danger."

--Politicheskii slovar (Political Dictionary). Moscow: 1958, pp. 419-20.

Brezhnevist

"the anti-war movement, whose participants believe that the main instrument for averting wars is condemnation of their amoral nature. The pacifists condemn any kind of war, denying the legitimacy of just wars of national liberation. They believe in the possibility of averting war only by means of persuasion and peaceful demonstrations, without eliminating the social-economic and political conditions which produce war. Connected with bourgeois-liberal ideology, pacifism draws fairly broad democratic circles into the sphere of its influence.... After the Second World War, 1939-45, in an atmosphere of a change of the balance of power in the world arena to the advantage of socialism and the drawing of broad strata of the populace in various countries into the struggle for peace, the Communist and worker parties while noting the inadequacy and limitations of pacifism strove to unify all peace-loving forces, including the pacifists who are sincerely seeking to prevent war, in the struggle against the war danger arising from imperialism. Many pacifists and some pacifist organizations are included in the Partisans of Peace Movement."

--Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya (Large Soviet Encyclopedia). Moscow: 1975, Vol. 19, p. 291. (The dots represent historical references.)

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 2729

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3/8

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>I</u>
John Poindexter	<u>5</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Staff Secretary	<u>6</u>		<u>R</u>
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

DISTRIBUTION

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1982

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: William L. Stearman *WLS*
SUBJECT: Observations on a US-Soviet Summit

See P. 7.
NOTED

Brezhnev wants a real summit in Europe (instead of a handshake in New York) in order to promote the current Soviet peace campaign and slow down US and NATO defense improvements. For this and additional reasons described below, I do not believe that a summit this year would serve U.S. interests; however, if the President wants to avoid taking a negative position on a summit, he might follow President Eisenhower's example and put a price tag on it. (C)

Beginning in 1953, Churchill pushed for a summit with the new post-Stalin Soviet leaders. Eisenhower indicated that he would agree to a summit if the Soviets would: sign a German Peace Treaty or an Austrian State Treaty or contribute to real arms control progress. The Soviets agreed to the Austrian Treaty, which was signed in May 1955, and a summit was held in Geneva that July. The resulting "Spirit of Geneva" detente atmosphere was slowly eroding NATO's strength and cohesion when this detente was ended by the 1956 Hungarian Revolution. (It should be noted that the foreign ministers conference, which followed up on the Geneva summit, produced no real results, but this fact was overshadowed by the prevailing post-summit euphoria.) (C)

The record of US-Soviet summit meetings would indicate that they should be avoided altogether. In terms of U.S. interests, these summits have ranged from being unnecessary to disastrous -- with the sole exception of Camp David 1959 which postponed Soviet action on Berlin until U-2 coverage revealed there was no "missile gap," which fact strengthened our negotiating position. In addition to providing the Soviets an ideal propaganda platform and promoting their "super power" image, summits present other intrinsic problems. (U)

At best, summits permit only a superficial exchange of views on complex and potentially dangerous issues. There is little actual time for discussion, and this is halved by the interpreters.

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Review on 4/21/88

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US-Soviet summits engage two men with vastly different backgrounds, mentalities and objectives. (I am only being half facetious when I say that any American President should have had extensive dealings with Mafiosi in order really to be prepared for encounters with Soviet leaders.) Thus, summits can hardly result in any real meeting of minds and can easily lead to serious and even dangerous misunderstandings and miscalculations. For example, I have long been convinced that the 1961 Kennedy-Khrushchev Vienna summit (in which I was involved) was responsible for both the Berlin Wall and the 1962 Cuban missile crisis. (C)

Since U.S. recognition of the USSR in 1933, all previous U.S. Presidents have met with Soviet leaders (bilaterally beginning with Camp David). It is, therefore, unrealistic to expect President Reagan to avoid summitry altogether. He is bound to come under increasing pressure to have a summit. He can, however, follow Eisenhower's example and demand of the Soviets some price of admission, some earnest of their good intentions, such as: acceptance of our "zero option" proposal, withdrawal from Afghanistan or ending martial law in Poland. (C)

Richard Pipes concurs in views expressed above.

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