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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
153907	REPORT	RE. SOVIET TRENDS: APRIL 1982 R 6/2/2015 M452/2	14	5/27/1982	B1
153908	REPORT	RE. SOVIET POLICY R 6/2/2015 M452/2	5	5/28/1982	B1
153909	REPORT	RE. SOVIET TRNDS: MAY 1982 R 6/2/2015 M452/2	14	6/24/1982	B1

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unduly in American affairs. Former U.S. officials who have had direct experience in enforcing the act believe that the Aramco program, initiated under Saudi pressure, may constitute a violation. And beyond the legal questions of growing petrodollar influence over U.S. institutions, there are the broader issues related to the newly emerging role of American business in shaping U.S. foreign policy. The Aramco campaign in all likelihood surpasses previous cases of multinational wrongdoing: it may be the first time that American business

has signed on to change U.S. policy at the behest of a foreign power. Many other corporations have been led to believe that they will be rewarded by Saudi Arabia for spreading the Saudi gospel.

But in the end, the consequences of this new corporate role will not be limited to an additional contract, or new revenue for a university. The real costs—to the integrity and independence of the American political process—will be paid not by the corporations, but by the American people.

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He made Russia a military colossus with feet of economic clay.

BREZHNEV: A PRE-POSTMORTEM

BY WILLIAM G. HYLAND

ONCE AGAIN LEONID BREZHNEV has confounded Kremlin watchers, this time by appearing at a celebration of Lenin's birthday after five weeks of unexplained invisibility. Brezhnev had been rumored to be comatose, purged, retired, or dead. And again he turned out to be none of the above. Brezhnev's disappearances are nothing new, but this time the speculation about the succession was unusually fevered. Mikhail Suslov, the elder statesman of Soviet politics, died in January. Andrei Kirilenko, once considered the man most likely to succeed Brezhnev, was genuinely ill. Suddenly there was a vacuum of power. It was promptly filled by the advancement to second place of Konstantin Chernenko, a Brezhnev crony of thirty years standing (See "Brezhnev's Heir Apparent," page 19). Yet it was the 67-year-old chief of the KGB, Yuriy Andropov, who was given the honor of delivering the Lenin Day address, thus reminding onlookers that the succession is by no means settled. Brezhnev may linger for a time, but the transition to the post-Brezhnev era has finally begun.

His legacy is clear: after a decade of tumult following Stalin's death and Khrushchev's adventures, Brezhnev restored order. He dismantled his former mentor's experiments: economic reforms and liberalizations were put aside, dissidents were again harassed or expelled, and Stalin was partially rehabilitated. In the wake of the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis, Brezhnev engaged in a sustained rebuilding of Soviet military power. He achieved true superpower status for the U.S.S.R., and vastly extended Soviet geopolitical

influence. He originated the new and ominous "Brezhnev Doctrine" of Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe. In the East he applied steady pressure against China, and in the West he was accorded legitimacy and equal status. In return, he sought to go beyond peaceful coexistence to detente.

The Soviet Union has paid a price for Brezhnev's policy of internal stability and external expansion. A sluggish economy is stagnating. The Party's monopoly of power is challenged by the appearance of free institutions and ideas on Russia's western border. The intellectual wealth of Russia has been drained; the great artists and writers are abroad as exiles or émigrés, just as they were under the czars. Detente has faltered. China has joined the enemy camp. Gains in far-flung regions such as Angola have been offset by losses in areas of historic Russian interest such as the Middle East. The Red Army is in combat for the first time since the end of the Great Fatherland War, bogged down in a guerrilla war on the Soviet border. As the end of the Brezhnev era approaches, Russia has never been stronger. But in some fundamental respects it has seldom been weaker.

Brezhnev was the ideal candidate to rule the Soviet Union. A Russian from the Ukraine, he was born on December 19, 1906, into a genuine working-class family. He worked at the same steel mill as his father and grandfather, and was educated at Party schools. He became a political-military officer, a Party secretary, and in 1952, at the age of 46, a candidate member (temporarily, as it turned out) of the Party's Politburo under Josef Stalin.

It is not surprising that he would emerge as a staunch defender of orthodoxy. He owed a great deal

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to the revolution. It opened opportunities for a young boy in the provincial town of Kamenskoye (later Dneprodzerzhinsk) who had the intelligence, energy, and tenacity to turn routine openings into major advances. In the early 1930s he landed his first political job, far off in the Urals, where he was involved in Stalin's bloody collectivization of agriculture. At the age of 24 he became a full member of the Party. He served a year in the army, in a tank unit in the Chita military district, where he saw firsthand the problems of defending the long Soviet border with China. His career flourished as the Stalinist purge trickled down to local Party levels. As war approached, he was a Party secretary for propaganda and for defense industries in the neighboring city of Dnepropetrovsk.

It was the war, not the routine of Party politics, that transformed his career. When the Germans attacked in 1941 there were thousands of officials on Brezhnev's level. But by the end of the war he was a major general, the political commissar of the 18th Army, and the protégé of the Ukrainian front military commissar, Nikita Khrushchev.

After the war, Brezhnev returned to Khrushchev's Party hierarchy in the Ukraine. In 1950 he broke out of the pack to become first secretary in the Soviet Republic of Moldavia, which included new territory acquired from Rumania after the war. The post had to go to someone the Party leadership considered to be loyal and disciplined. (It was here that Konstantin Chernenko joined Brezhnev's team.) Brezhnev's performance earned him a vastly more significant breakthrough two years later. In his last days, Stalin stunned his old guard by creating a new, expanded twenty-five-member politburo which included Leonid Brezhnev as an alternate member and a Party secretary. At the age of 46, Brezhnev was a member of the Soviet ruling group. Only a handful of people had greater power.

But arriving at the top in Soviet politics is no guarantee of survival. When Stalin died in March 1953, Brezhnev was demoted from the Politburo, but stayed in Moscow as commissar for the Soviet Navy (his career once again intersecting with military affairs). He was rescued in 1954 by Khrushchev, who put him in charge of a fantastic gamble—developing the virgin

lands of Kazakhstan. Brezhnev stayed for two successful years. Later the experiment began to falter, but by then Brezhnev was back in Moscow as a Party secretary, serving again under Khrushchev.

Brezhnev lost an important round in 1960 when he was promoted to the prestigious but powerless office of President of the U.S.S.R. The position of Khrushchev's heir apparent went to the Leningrader Frol Kozlov. But fate produced one final and crucial opportunity in May 1963: Kozlov suffered a stroke, and Brezhnev returned to the Party secretariat, never to leave. Over the next seventeen months he engineered the coup that removed his old patron from power. On

October 14, 1964, Leonid Brezhnev was installed as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev's leadership of the Soviet Union can be divided into three phases: 1964 to 1970, when he consolidated his power and shaped internal policy; 1970 to 1976, when he moved into the leadership of foreign affairs and achieved some dramatic successes; and 1977 onward, when he has strained to entrench his personal leadership but has become increasingly bogged down in seemingly insoluble ex-



DRAWING BY DONALD GATES FOR THE NEW REPUBLIC

ternal and economic difficulties.

The prevailing view in 1964 was that Brezhnev's role would be chairman of the board of a collective leadership. But Brezhnev chipped away at the power structure. Nikolai Podgorny was eased into Brezhnev's old ceremonial role as President. The young KGB challenger, Alexander Shelepin, was cut down to size and eventually purged. Brezhnevites began to appear in important posts: Andrei Kirilenko was placed on the Party secretariat. By the time of the Party Congress in March 1966, Brezhnev was inching forward.

A strong political conservatism was to be the main characteristic of the Brezhnev era. The Party's role was strengthened. Khrushchev had created tensions by dividing the regional Party administration into agricultural and industrial sectors. Brezhnev restored unity. Khrushchev insisted on a periodic turnover in higher Party officials. Brezhnev revived seniority and tenure. He halted the assaults on Stalin without really rehabilitating him. Nor was there any widespread de-

Khrushchevization; he supposedly told his colleagues after the coup: "We will not pour muck on ourselves." But the brief flirtation with cultural liberalization ended in 1966 with the trial of the writers, Andrei Sinyavskiy and Yuli Daniel. Brezhnev devised a variety of tactics to deal with dissidents. There were occasional trials and imprisonments reminiscent of Stalin, but the political use of psychiatric prisons was a Brezhnev innovation. He also borrowed from the czars in permitting considerable emigration, interspersed with forced expulsions.

Brezhnev deflected Kosygin's economic reform proposals of September 1965. Kosygin wanted to give much greater autonomy to plant managers, to increase direct ties between the industrial customer and the supplier, and even to introduce the idea of a profit incentive for individual plant managers. Brezhnev did not directly oppose the plan; he even favored the part of the scheme that called for an emphasis on new technology. But he saw to it that the reforms were implemented so slowly and within such a limited scope that they became meaningless. He offset this inflexibility by two shrewd economic remedies that paid off in the short term. He poured money into agriculture and enjoyed the benefit of several good harvests. And he increased the construction of housing, the one program for which he is truly popular—at least in Moscow.

Brezhnev's most fundamental change, however, was in the military programs. Khrushchev harassed the military, frequently threatening to cut their forces. Nevertheless, he laid the foundation for a build-up in strategic missiles. Brezhnev built on that foundation, and he also added substantially to naval and ground forces. Khrushchev had ridiculed aircraft carriers; Brezhnev built them. Within five years a massive new front against China was created. This added an annual 15 percent to the Soviet defense budget. But it enabled the Soviets to threaten the Chinese in 1969 after the military clashes on Damansky Island, and to force Chou En-Lai to agree to negotiations. Later, in the diplomatic stalling that followed, the Chinese would outmaneuver the Soviets.

EVEN IN THESE early years it was Brezhnev who put the major stamp on Soviet foreign policy. In 1968, when the Czech Communists threatened Soviet power, Brezhnev finally ordered in Soviet tanks. The retrospective justification for this act may have given Brezhnev a permanent claim to the Communist hall of fame: the claim that the autonomy of any Communist party or state was limited by the vital interests of "socialism," i.e., the Soviet Union, which therefore reserved the right of intervention to protect "socialist" gains. Brezhnev never spoke the words. They appeared in *Pravda* in September 1968, under the name of Sergei Kovalev, but they quickly became the Brezhnev Doctrine.

Still, it was something of a surprise when Brezhnev emerged in the front ranks of Soviet diplomacy during Willy Brandt's visit, in August 1970, to sign the Soviet-German treaty. Kosygin was still regarded as the mastermind of Soviet policy. But Brandt spent several hours with Brezhnev and found him lively and vivacious. Meanwhile in Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin was quietly suggesting to Henry Kissinger that Nixon's correspondence be addressed to Brezhnev rather than Kosygin.

WHY DID BREZHNEV, the careful conservative, venture into foreign policy? Because it was where the action was. Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev had all discovered that they could not delegate foreign affairs for too long without undermining their own power. In 1971 it was clear that trade, technology, and credits would have to be found to finance the build-up of the Soviet economy and military machine. Brezhnev must have also realized that the signature of a state treaty with West Germany signaled the success of decades of Soviet efforts to bring about the recognition of the division of Germany and the division of Europe. It opened up a new era and presented new opportunities that could only benefit the man seen to be in charge of the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. Brezhnev was not about to let this role be played by Kosygin.

On the basis of the newly created Soviet military position, Brezhnev sought recognition of the U.S.S.R. as a genuine superpower. This he achieved ten years ago, in May 1972, at the summit meeting in St. George's Hall. Strategic and political equality were symbolized in the first SALT agreements, which Brezhnev insisted on signing himself, leaving the more mundane agreements to Kosygin and Podgorny. Brezhnev sought American grain, credits, trade, and technology. He obtained some satisfaction, but never the breakthrough he counted on. In 1973, in Washington and San Clemente, detente reached its peak. Brezhnev charmed his American audiences, but he seemed to realize that Watergate was weakening American negotiating authority. The Middle East war that followed in a few months was a shock to U.S.-Soviet relations, but Brezhnev stuck with his general strategy, receiving Nixon again in July 1974. Embracing Ford at the Vladivostok meeting in November, Brezhnev seemed genuinely fond of the new President. Later, in 1975, he confided to Ford his hope for his reelection. Brezhnev continued to pursue SALT, but the promised economic benefits from the United States never came. In July 1975, he appeared with an entourage at the Helsinki Conference, which should have capped his detente diplomacy. But the Western powers turned Helsinki into a demand for greater autonomy in the East. Almost overnight Brezhnev appeared to have become an older man, tired and somewhat resigned. Detente was spiraling downward. In January 1976, in his last meeting with Kissinger, Brezhnev seemed irritated that

BREZHNEV'S HEIR APPARENT

His high slavic cheekbones and Oriental features have been covered for decades with a pudgy coating of fat. His eyebrows are more subdued than those of his hallowed leader. His hair is fluffy and white. But there is something oddly familiar in the face of Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. There is a certain toughness in it, the toughness born of the long years of factionalism, one-upmanship, and betrayal which are requisite for advancement in the hierarchy of the Soviet Union's Communist Party.

Konstantin Chernenko's face now looks out from the front pages because he has come to be viewed as Leonid Brezhnev's heir apparent by those who toil in the arcane vineyards of Kremlinology. He has made a spectacular climb to the top, leapfrogging Andrei Kirilenko, long considered the principal candidate for the succession. Chernenko's advancement occurred in January, after the death of Mikhail Suslov, when Chernenko stepped in to fill the gaunt and ashen ideologist's place in the hierarchy. Here his role as chief of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Moldavian Communist Party, which Brezhnev headed from 1950 to 1952, made him unquestionably qualified for his new role. But it is his long association with Leonid Ilyich which explains his persistent success in the long march through the institutions.

Brezhnev and Chernenko have worked together since 1950. And when the future First Secretary moved into the Kremlin in 1956, Chernenko was pressed into service as head of the Agitprop Department of the Central Committee. Later, when Brezhnev succeeded in his anti-Khrushchev coup d'état, Chernenko was appointed to head the Central Committee's General Department. For many years, the routine administrative duties of this post kept Konstantin in the background, a dim figure noted for roundity and baggy suits.

It is difficult to judge where Cher-

nenko belongs on the ideological spectrum. Some observers point out that Chernenko, who owes his success entirely to Brezhnev's patronage, would not steer a clear and independent course but would pursue the general line of the Brezhnev years.

Nevertheless, Chernenko, who has been listed as the author of three books published since 1980 (*The CPSU and Human Rights, Selected Speeches and Articles, and Questions of the Work of the Party and State Apparatus*), appears to advocate firm discipline as a solution for the many social and economic ills confronting Soviet society. He has a reputation for what by Soviet standards is open-mindedness. He consistently has placed a strong emphasis on the importance of public opinion samplings and on the Party's need to maintain contact with the "masses" by being sensitive to workers' letters and complaints (an area for which he was responsible in his role in the Party's General Department). Such letters, in Chernenko's view, constitute a central mechanism through which Soviet "democracy" functions.

Apart from their occasional moments of turgid grandeur, Chernenko's public pronouncements are mechanical and bland. There are the reflexive quotations of Lenin, the obligatory references to Brezhnev, the hackneyed paeans to the Soviet working class. But there is little to distinguish this creature of the Party from any other, for the Party itself is exhausted and no longer has anything to say. It is Chernenko's very blandness that makes him a safe choice for the immediate future—a Party Secretary who would safeguard the enormous privileges of the Party elite, an elderly man who probably would not remain in office long enough to leave a decisive mark.

If Chernenko emerges as heir to Brezhnev, it may in part be a result of the recent course of events in Poland, where the army and the security apparatus effectively usurped the Party's primacy. As the Polish human rights activist Adam Michnik has suggested in an essay recently smuggled out of a detention camp, "The Polish military coup may become a precedent for the Communist

bloc. Thus far it had been the Party apparatus which governed while the military acted as its armed instrument. Today, it may be that the military apparatus is governing while the Party merely constitutes a facade for its power." In this context, Chernenko's succession would be an unequivocal victory for the Party machine, for Chernenko is the embodiment of *partiynost*. This elusive, specifically Soviet formulation is usually translated as "party-mindedness," but it means something more. It suggests a total devotion to the Party and a sense that one's life is imbued with the Party's spirit and values. It suggests, in short, Chernenko.

Chernenko is 70 years old. His most glaring flaw is his almost total lack of involvement in economic matters; and it is the economy which promises to demand most of any future leader's attention. A second obstacle confronting Chernenko is his lack of a secure political base. Because he is largely the creature of Brezhnev's prestige and power (he is a sort of Ed Meese of the Kremlin) Chernenko does not have a strong regional or institutional base, as do such other putative pretenders to the throne as Moscow Party chief Viktor Grishin and Ukrainian Party Secretary Volodymyr Shcherbitsky. But in Soviet society ultimate power may rest with the army or the security apparatus. Yuri Andropov, the head of the KGB, and Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, a Party man who is highly regarded by the military, are sure to play a central role in the post-Brezhnev succession struggle.

If Chernenko ends up on top, he will be regarded as a caretaker-leader, a temporary compromise choice. His reign will likely be an interregnum in which other actors will jockey to position themselves for the ultimate struggle for power that would reach its climax when he fades from the scene.

ADRIAN KARATNYCKY

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Angola, where the Soviets were exploiting the opportunities for cheap gains, had turned into a source of bitter confrontation with Washington. Only SALT proved salvageable after the U.S. election, but as it turned out, this was a pyrrhic victory.

Detente was by no means directed only at gaining credits, or a German treaty, or even SALT. Underlying these policies was a fundamental effort to isolate China. In all of the summit meetings with Nixon and Ford, Brezhnev raised China and warned of the new perils. He lectured Kissinger and even proposed a new Soviet-American alliance against China. When all of these efforts were rebuffed, he began to lose interest in detente. And after Mao's death in late 1976, new Soviet overtures to Peking were forthcoming, but the antagonism was too deep-seated to be changed by the disappearance of one personality, no matter how legendary. Failing a rapprochement, Soviet policy then turned to another tactic, outflanking China via Vietnam and Cambodia.

THE LAST five years—the final phase of Brezhnevism—are perplexing. A number of different trends and themes seem to be coexisting. At home, Brezhnev could not resist taking back his old job as President in 1977, and pushing aside his old comrade, Podgorny. He then began to fill the ranks of the government and Party with his minions. One of his personal aides, Konstantin Rusakov, was promoted to the Party secretariat. His old comrade, Nikolai Tikhonov, was advanced to first deputy premier. And Chernenko was rapidly pushed up to full Politburo status.

Abroad, with detente no longer an obstacle, a major political offensive was unleashed on the U.S.S.R.'s southern flank in Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Afghanistan; and in Asia, Moscow underwrote Vietnam's Cambodian invasion. Much of this was pure opportunism. But there was also a new sense of assurance that suggested Brezhnev believed the balance of power had indeed changed and the Soviets could translate it into geopolitical gains. But Afghanistan proved a treacherous battleground, and suddenly there was the Polish crisis. Had Brezhnev presided over the Soviet empire for fifteen years, only to see it disintegrate?

Old, sick, and supposedly only a caretaker, Brezhnev and his apparatus proved once again the value of tenacity in Poland. They maneuvered for almost a year, mixing military threats and economic inducements. At least two Soviet-sponsored coups were attempted in the Polish Party leadership. Finally the Soviets found a lackey who would do their work for them in Warsaw. Brezhnev had bought some time, much as he had done in 1968 in Czechoslovakia.

But this man who dreamed up the Brezhnev Doctrine, and who carried it out with ruthless and persistent opportunism, scarcely seemed suited to the role. Almost all of his Western interlocutors have found him jovial, witty, friendly, and a man of impressive

capabilities. Willy Brandt writes that Brezhnev was a man whose "sweeping self-assurance waxed from meeting to meeting." This was about the same judgment reached by Nixon. He found in 1972 that the Soviets had lost their sense of inferiority that had been so noticeable under Khrushchev. The overt signs were Brezhnev's fashionable clothes, his cuff links, his gold cigarette lighter and case. But he was still an earthy Russian who felt compelled to create a physical bond that would somehow transcend political differences. During a ride to a meeting at his country dacha, Brezhnev put his hand on Nixon's knee and expressed his hope that they had developed a "good personal relationship." A few years later at Vladivostok, he held President Ford's hand and explained his ardent desire for peace. In 1973 at Camp David, a buoyant Brezhnev kissed a startled Kissinger, and Brezhnev was startled, but pleased, when President Carter suddenly embraced him at the signing of SALT II in Vienna.

It is always difficult to separate the personal from the political. Stalin was cold and paranoid and so were his policies. Khrushchev was erratic, politically and personally. But Brezhnev is not easy to typecast. Although warm and convivial, he could still prove his manhood by stubbornly bargaining over seemingly trivial details. He could insist that American demands to include the Backfire bomber in SALT were absurd, and then look to the heavens and plead, "Backfire! Backfire! I wish I had never heard of it." He could invent, on the spot, the name for a new Soviet submarine, the Typhoon, or offer to trade a nonexistent Soviet bomber for the American B-1. On one occasion he quickly finished a late-night session by exclaiming, "I've got to get home, my wife will kill me." Then he reappeared looking for something to read, found a copy of the Soviet humor magazine *Krokodil*, and happily tucked it under his arm and marched off.

He talked of his great-granddaughter much as any proud grandfather. He liked to hunt and drive fast cars and tell tall stories—very much the man's man. He had an eye for a pretty girl. The picture of him ogling Jill St. John at San Clemente is worth a thousand words. One always had the impression, however, that he had himself under control—that the humanization was partly rehearsed, the jokes pointed, the good fellowship partly contrived. Once, when a point of controversy erupted, he insisted on summoning a Soviet cabinet officer to the meeting. When the hapless minister appeared, he stood at attention, while being roughly interrogated by Brezhnev, who then curtly dismissed him. This, too, was the real Brezhnev.

IN THE END, of course, it will be up to history to separate politics from personalities. Two judgments will be made: the verdict in the Western or non-Communist world, and the judgment in the Soviet Union. They will not necessarily be the same. Chances are that the historical evaluation of Brezhnev will rest

on a fairly simple proposition: he made the U.S.S.R. a world power, but he did so by risking the long-term well-being of the Soviet state. Russia under Brezhnev is a military colossus with feet of economic clay. History will have to decide whether the military effort has been worth the domestic decay.

Brezhnev changed the strategic balance of power and vastly extended Soviet influence. The Soviets take pride in proclaiming that there is no international issue that can be settled without them. Not completely true, but increasingly so. The U.S.S.R. is in a better global position than in 1964 when Brezhnev assumed Khrushchev's chair. But even more than his American counterparts, Brezhnev has had to confront the paradox of the nuclear age—that the accumulation of military power does not automatically translate into permanent political advances. The Soviets were expelled from Egypt in 1972, even though they wielded much greater military power than they did at the time of their original involvement in 1955. The Soviets were forced into military intervention in Afghanistan, where a Communist coup could not succeed even under the very shadow of Soviet power. The gains in Angola and Ethiopia are real, but it is not clear that they can be sustained by military power as such. To some extent in the third world the U.S.S.R. still plays the role of counterweight and alternative to the West, a powerful and useful patron but not a true friend to emulate. The Polish crisis could not be snuffed out by Soviet troops alone.

IT SEEMS increasingly that the Soviet military power plays the role of neutralizing American military power. While Western statesmen are apprehensive about a Soviet margin of superiority, it seems less and less likely that the Soviets can change the balance of power decisively by military means alone. Indeed, the major centers of power in the world are arrayed against the Soviet Union: China, Japan, Western Europe, and the United States. True, it is a weak coalition because it cannot organize itself; it still presents cracks and openings for the Soviets to slip through; the Middle East and the Persian Gulf seem to be a soft underbelly. But the inability of the Soviet Union to forestall or split this coalition may prove to be an important indictment of the Brezhnev period. It could explain Brezhnev's eleventh-hour appeal for normalization of relations with China, and his startling rechristening of China as a "Socialist country."

The Soviet Union's Eastern European buffer is also weakening. Again Brezhnev seems to have encountered a paradox: Soviet power can maintain an empire in Eastern Europe, but with each passing decade the price is higher and the return is smaller. Dissent and disaffection in Eastern Europe, of course, cannot be blamed on Brezhnev. They were there from the moment the Red Army entered the area. But in an era of European detente, repressing dissent with military

force is more and more costly. In 1968 Soviet intervention was frightening, but the significance of the Polish crisis may well be that the Soviets did not use their own forces. Perhaps they can always find the moral equivalent of Jaruzelski, but perhaps not. In any case, the economic burden of Eastern Europe is growing. Czechoslovakia was rescued from heresy only to turn into an economic disaster. Hungary, which paid a high price in 1956, was then left to its own devices and now looks like a model. But can the Soviet Union afford an empire composed of clients that follow Hungary's economic liberalization, Rumania's foreign policy autonomy, and Poland's indigenous trade working-class movement?

In Soviet eyes, strange as it may seem to Westerners, Brezhnev's historical reputation will probably not rest on his foreign policy. If the remainder of this decade is to be another historic time of troubles, the onus may well fall on Brezhnev. If there is to be a major shift in Soviet economic policy, especially toward reforms and agonizing cutbacks in defense, it is difficult to see how such a new course could be adopted without some degree of de-Brezhnevization.

The case for change is certainly growing. The economy is slowing to a virtual halt. Bad harvests have multiplied. Even Brezhnev has had to acknowledge that the problem goes beyond bad weather. This year's crop was so poor it was not even reported. Moreover, industrial growth is slowing drastically, mainly because productivity is stagnating. The supply of manpower is dwindling. Investments are being cut back, to concentrate on finishing old projects; hard currency earnings are running down; and an energy crisis may be looming. The culprit is not only inefficiency and mismanagement layered onto a defective system, but the continuing burden of an overblown military account. More and more it seems that the Soviets eventually must choose between guns and butter, between the status quo and reform.

ONE SUSPECTS that Brezhnev's successors will have to tread carefully. Can they denounce him without endangering the formidable conservative coalition he created? Can they attack him and continue to convince their own people that, although the system is sound, Russia has been continuously ruled by villains, fools, and incompetents? How can such a system retain its legitimacy?

Had Brezhnev retired in 1977 rather than promoting himself, his place in Soviet history would probably be far more secure. Then he could have pointed to a successful record in raising the standard of living and promoting Soviet power, and could have left with honors, installing his choice as his successor. But that would have been uncharacteristic of the man and of the political system he inherited, and which he will now pass on, slightly improved and stronger, but deeply troubled.

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(U) SOVIET TRENDS: APRIL 1982

Summary

(LOU) Brezhnev's reappearance at the April 22 Lenin birthday ceremonies silenced rumors of an imminent political succession, but signs of political maneuvering were evident at the meeting. Chernenko ranked second in the lineup; Andrey Kirilenko was absent, for either illness or vacation. For the third time since 1964, KGB Chief Andropov gave the speech, bypassing other eligibles on the Politburo.

(LOU) Tension over economic decisionmaking appears to be growing between party and state. Brezhnev's protege Konstantin Chernenko and Pravda have been championing the party's prerogatives in that area, whereas KGB Chief Andropov set forth an order of party priorities that stressed a noneconomic role.

(LOU) Kommunist's reportage on a January meeting of Soviet and Czechoslovak ideologues implied that Polish events had resulted in a severe loss of morale among party functionaries, especially in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet delegation at the meeting advocated putting more money into the consumer section but rejected the management technocrats' views on social problems. Failure to solve economic issues was depicted as creating opportunities for "antisocialist demagogues and counterrevolutionary elements."

(LOU) Kommunist also published an article on bread, ventilating popular complaints about the scarcity and quality of food in general and underscoring for elite audiences the importance of the problem.

(LOU) The May Day slogans contained some new formulations that appear to be associated with

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

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Chernenko; they stressed the need for more attention to consumer demands and closer contacts with the citizenry.

(C) The domestic crackdown on dissent continued, but Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov attempted to take the high ground in explaining to a foreigner the Soviet rationale for exiling Andrey Sakharov to Gorkiy. Aleksandrov pictured Sakharov as being susceptible to exploitation by those interested chiefly in obtaining security information; thus the Soviets faced the alternative of trying him for violations of national security or taking the "humane" course of isolating him from harm.

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(LOU) Brezhnev Returns to Duty for Lenin's Birthday

The indisposition Brezhnev sustained after departing Tashkent on March 25 proved to be not serious; he reappeared on schedule at the Lenin birthday ceremonies on April 22. His return put to rest numerous rumors about his health and imminent departure from office which had led Foreign Ministry and Academy of Sciences spokesmen to announce in the first half of April that Brezhnev was on "a routine vacation."

Although Brezhnev's reappearance silenced speculation about an imminent political succession, signs of political maneuvering were clear at the April 22 ceremony. Chernenko sat on Brezhnev's right, outranking the other members of the Politburo. His rival, Andrey Kirilenko, was absent for either illness or vacation, as he had been since March 1. And KGB Chief Andropov gave the Lenin Day speech once again (he gave it in 1964 and 1976), passing over Politburo members Gorbachev, Pelshe, and Tikhonov, who have never given that particular speech. This fact, combined with rumors of his political ambition and his signing of a military obituary on April 8, suggested that Andropov was assuming a more active political role as the succession drew nearer.

(LOU) Role of the Party as an Issue

As Soviet economic performance worsens, debate in Moscow over the CPSU bureaucracy's right to monopolize economic decisionmaking appears to be sharpening. On one hand, a recent decree of the party's Central Committee demands still tighter party control over the activities of state economic specialists, and Party Secretary Chernenko insisted on it as well.

On the other hand, KGB chief Andropov's Lenin Day speech and the protocol observed at the meeting tends to favor the state managers, who seek more operational authority and policymaking influence. This raises the possibility that at some stage in the post-Brezhnev succession process, someone may bid for the role of helmsman on a "platform" of delimiting or even realigning institutional power, to the detriment of the party bureaucracy.

This issue figured in the 1957 power conflict between Khrushchev and the Anti-Party Group. The Malenkov-Molotov clique was later accused of having "waged a struggle against...the directing role of the party" (Pravda, Nov. 12, 1958). An unnamed conspirator was said to have grumbled that "we have a dictatorship of

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the party," and others tried to justify the "need for the primacy of State bodies over party bodies" (Kommunist, No. 10, 1957). Khrushchev's foes evidently wanted the state managers to be given more rights in day-to-day administration and at least the same share of influence in policymaking as was enjoyed by officials of the party apparatus. Khrushchev and his group wished to keep the state bureaucracy, with its particular interests--primarily efficient administration--subordinated to the general interests of the party machine, with its stress on ideological discipline, above all.

Under Brezhnev, the issue of management initiative versus party control came to the fore in discussion of the 1977 draft constitution. The pro-control partisans wanted the vaguely worded new Basic Law to make this stipulation: "The party formulates economic strategy and policy and keeps their implementation under constant supervision" (Kommunist, No. 14, 1977). The pro-initiative elements asked for a clause to the effect that the party would implement its leading role not directly, but "through party organizations and through communists--leaders in State and public organizations, avoiding substitution of Soviet and other State bodies" (Pravda, Aug. 2, 1977).

The difference was finally papered over, but the pro-control extremists were also rebuked. Brezhnev told the Supreme Soviet in October 1977 that the constitution commission had received letters "proposing that State functions should be vested directly in party bodies, that the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee should be vested with legislative power and so on." Brezhnev asserted: "These proposals are profoundly erroneous because they introduce confusion into the understanding of the party's role in our society and seek to obscure the importance and functions of Soviet governmental bodies."

Recently, the party press has revealed fresh and, in some instances, extraordinary evidence of bickering over the legitimate spheres of activity of party officials and managers. A decree of the CPSU Central Committee adopted in February ordered the activation of special party control bodies at economic enterprises. The edict and an appended statute were entitled "On commissions of primary party organizations in implementing supervision of the administration's activity and over the work of offices." It included a new ruling that local party cells could appeal directly to party and government headquarters in Moscow if local bodies did not act on their complaints about management failings. At the same time, it served this warning: "Commissions cannot interfere in the operational activity of an administration, rescind or give any sort of administrative orders" (Partiynaya Zhizn, No. 6, 1982).

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In support of the latest drive for closer political surveillance of managers, a February 18 Pravda editorial advised: "It is very important to distinguish true business ability from narrow practicalism", i.e., putting professional criteria of efficiency above obedience to party directives. A March 23 Pravda article on Lenin's What Is To Be Done? cited Plekhanov: "Short-sighted practicality is very useful to the revisionists," that is, to enemies of the revolutionary vanguard of the working class.

As a result of such instructions, the badgering of managers by party officials seems to have increased markedly. A Pravda editorial for March 26 cautioned that, "To control an administration's actions, of course, does not at all mean to oppose it, to interfere in its operational activity." Another editorial on April 13 told the watchdogs: "Party demandingness, of course, has nothing at all to do with arrogant shouting at people or, worse still, the scoldings organized for managers in certain (party) committees." But the campaign for tightening party oversight of the managers was to go on.

Pravda on April 16 addressed the question of state-party relations in a book review that affirmed: "Socialist statehood in the course of building the new society can fruitfully develop and function only under the party's directing influence." "In any socialist country," Pravda declared, "any weakening of the role of the Marxist-Leninist party as the leading force and core of the political system can shake the people's power, raise a threat to the revolutionary gains and inflict harm to the entire socialist community." "Revisionists" were hit for complaining (as had members of the Khrushchev-era Anti-Party Group) that a "dictatorship of the Communist party" existed in the Soviet Union.

Chernenko has espoused the principle of party supremacy as if he were responding to a challenge on that score from much closer to home than Poland. He has attacked "opportunist and revisionist elements" who are "taking the path of factionalism and groupism and the path of an antiparty spirit" (emphasis supplied). He has warned that "all attempts to weaken the leading role of the party" can lead to "the unleashing of antisocialist chaos" (Voprosy Istorii KPSS, No. 2, 1982).

Chernenko's article in the April 1982 issue of Kommunist (No. 6) stressed once more the view that the party apparatus must pay equal attention to mass indoctrination, personnel selection, and the monitoring of government operations. "Opportunists" were scored for rejecting this idea of "unity of the Communist party's ideological and organizational work." Chernenko implied that it was "opportunists" who wanted party officials to focus on educational work and meddle less in the conduct of public affairs. He said that if this view were to prevail, the party would turn into

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"a motley conglomeration of politically and ideologically disconnected groups and grouplets." In other words, if the CPSU staff officers were to lose their absolute power over job appointments and economic decisionmaking, the party would devolve into a loose coalition of interest groups along Western lines.

Although alleged to be a partisan of creative Marxism, Chernenko seemed to reject any steps toward self-regulation of the economy. He referred scornfully to "falsely conceived innovation where, to suit fashion or purely for reasons of expediency, the principles tested by life are hastily replaced by speculative schemes that have not been comprehensively tested by experience." Chernenko also sniped at "pragmatism" and "economic leaders" who put "excessive trust in material stimuli [i.e., cash incentives] alone."

Chernenko's strong defense of the party apparatus' right to meddle into economic administration was echoed in a new novel, a chapter of which was carried in the April issue of Kommunist. In it, the Moscow literary bureaucrat Georgiy Markov wrote about a veteran Soviet novelist in the provinces who had completed a manuscript that argued: "The intervention of party officials [in economic affairs] only undermines the initiative of managers." The first secretary of the regional party committee interviews the novelist and makes some pithy comments:

"...even in cases of party committees practically supporting managers for some reason or other, or even worse, assuming their functions, they are not doing anything criminal. This happens mostly as a result of poor organization and inability to lead the people who are entrusted with a matter. These are tactical miscalculations. Insofar as the main idea is concerned, the party has an economic policy, a great strategic goal, and it takes onto its shoulders full responsibility for the economy...[ellipsis in text]. It is obliged to concern itself with economics. That is a Leninist principle.... Recall the district-level party conference [in the manuscript]. It is written up in a lively way. Here even [first party secretary] Kuvshinov takes on a character here and there. But...[ellipsis in text], his comrades wrongfully criticize him. All of them in one voice condemn the district party committee for being carried away by economic affairs and they firmly impose a line of educational activity. One delegate says so directly: 'Don't stick your nose into the business of the managers. Busy yourself with houses of culture, lectures and the use of graphics...[ellipsis in text]. The managers know more about economics than you do.' No one contests that thesis, and the conference gives stormy applause to this demagogy. The party's ideological and political-educational work and its economic work intersect. Separating

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them into independent areas would mean the ruin of both economics and ideology. On the contrary, we must strive for still greater fusion and intersection of these spheres of party work."

The chapter is further suggestive of an image problem for party leaders, its hero telling the novelist that he doesn't like a CPSU official to be shown as someone with "short legs...short arms, a round head on a short neck....a flat face with mole-like eyes."

In contrast to Chernenko and Markov, Andropov's speech of April 22 urged a definite order of priorities for party officials that would heavily engage them in noneconomic activities. Andropov said that the party's "very first task" should be concern about "raising the working people's consciousness and political culture." He thereby implied that the economic regulatory and job-assignment work of the party apparatus was of far less importance to society as a whole. Similarly, Andropov ignored the upcoming "special food program" that Chernenko has touted and that features a party-style reshuffling of bureaucratic functions in the countryside rather than the badly needed reform of agricultural prices and labor organization methods.

Andropov too paid homage to a need to enrich Marxism-Leninism, but he avoided Chernenko's qualifier about the perils of misguided innovation. Thus, Andropov may be following in the footsteps of other leaders who, even while in the party Secretariat (Malenkov during the Stalin era, e.g.), tried to divest the party bureaucracy of some of its authority in economic affairs.

A major anomaly of Kremlin protocol tends to support the thesis that Andropov favors the state elites. Every year Pravda's account of the Lenin Day meeting in Moscow has reported that participants heard the "USSR State Hymn," (national anthem) at the start and stood up to sing the Internationale, the party anthem, at the end. This year, however, Pravda reported on April 23 that the national anthem was heard at the end of the meeting; there was no mention of the party anthem. This highly symbolic action downgrading the party's importance may have been intended as a sign of enhanced influence for those who head the state administration in Moscow.

(LOU) Soviet-Czechoslovak Meeting on Deterrence of Counter-Revolution

The issue of Kommunist (No. 5) that went on sale in early April carried material from a January meeting of Soviet and Czechoslovak ideologues in Prague who had exchanged views on how to avert political upheavals in Soviet-type societies. Discord was said to have marked the conference itself, and the reportage

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included the surprising admission that the Polish crisis had had a demoralizing effect on a number of ideological functionaries, at least in Czechoslovakia. The director of Prague's Institute of Marxism-Leninism was quoted:

"One sometimes gets an impression that the difficulties which have lately arisen in the socialist countries, and especially the events in Poland, have engendered a mood of low spiritedness among certain of our social science workers, and at times, perhaps, have led also to a loss of revolutionary optimism, to these people having doubts about the prospects of real socialism."

Evidently to reassure similarly distressed CPSU members, Kommunist observed that martial law in Poland was only temporary and had nothing at all to do with "growing Bonapartism in the lands of real socialism" or with "growth of the role of the army, which must suppress the discontent of the working people, who are rising up against the economic policy of party and state." It identified the professional and working classes as the major sources of potential internal opposition to party rule.

The Soviet delegate to the conference, Kommunist chief editor Kosolapov, focused on the grievances and ambitions of members of the technical intelligentsia. He caricatured those emphasizing modern management techniques as champions of a "technocratic" approach to social issues, envisaging "smart" robots and "egg-headed" intellectuals in ultimate command. Kosolapov blasted the prediction that someday the USSR and allied states would be led by "a few academically mature specialists, some kind of scientific-technical 'elite.'"

Kosolapov's counterpart in Prague was more worried about an upsurge of anarcho-syndicalism along Polish lines. He saw an unhealthy revival of interest in the theories of Ferdinand Lassale, a Bismarck-era German socialist who was an apostle of nonviolence. But this speaker too avowed that troubled communist regimes had been succumbing to "practicism"--a technocratic disorder--on the eve of their internal crises.

The majority in Prague was insistent on keeping power in the hands of party bureaucrats in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Political pluralism and economic reform were attacked, and a struggle was demanded against such mellowing-of-communism tendencies as "opportunism, liberalism and tolerance of enemies of socialism."

But there was also criticism of those trying to explain away anti-regime revolts only in terms of lax "ideological vigilance," or weakening of censorship and the like. Kommunist suggested instead that more funds be allocated to civilian branches of the economy:

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"If ripe problems, especially in the economic sphere, are not solved on a timely and consistent basis, then this leads to an erosion of the authority of socialist policy and weakening of the social base of our political system, which is used by the antisocialist demagogues and counterrevolutionary elements."

A Czech speaker whom Kommunist quoted approvingly disputed the hardline view that asserted the primacy of foreign policy requirements over internal ones and thereby set strict limits on assistance to the consumer:

"...often we discuss the growth of imperialism's aggressiveness, worsening of international political and economic relations, increasing prices in world markets, complication and aggravation of so-called global problems, ideological struggle, etc.... The cited factors have an objective character and to a large extent determine the conditions of socialist development. But their influence is not fatalistic. Only if one takes these factors by themselves he can reach the conclusion of their fatalistic nature...the determining factor of world development...is socialism. And that is not just a propaganda phrase. It is a fundamental conclusion which must guide us. Otherwise we shall not be able to solve our internal problems or help the development of the socialist community."

A minority at Prague evidently had advocated granting too many concessions to popular or professional interests. In any event, Kommunist made a terse reference to "certain formulations and views" of participants that were "clearly for purposes of discussion."

What seems unique in the published material of the Prague conference and suggestive of genuine fear among the ruling Communist elites is use of the phrase "preventive action against counter-revolution." The explicit talk about deterring rebellion suggests that the Solidarnosc phenomenon shook the self-confidence of many more Soviet and East European party officials than did earlier convulsions in the area.

(LOU) "Kommunist" Surveys Consumer Complaints About Bread

Russia's History of Starvation. The April (No. 6) issue of Kommunist published an article ostensibly on bread. Actually, the article's subject was public unhappiness over chronic difficulties in obtaining staple foods in adequate quantity and quality. The author, V. Arkhipenko, publishes only in Kommunist, although he is not a member of its editorial board. Evidently he was commissioned

to respond to a broad range of complaints about chronic food shortages and assess public attitudes toward the shortages.

Arkhipenko chose bread as the Russian archetypical food and staff of life. In an obvious attempt to put into perspective the last three consecutive harvest failures, he cited historical chronicles to show that 200 out of the last 700 years of Russian history had been "hungry" years. More ominously, he recalled that hunger was the cause of innumerable popular revolts throughout Russian history, ending with the February 1917 bread riots that toppled the monarchy. He falsely claimed that the 1921 drought year was the last starvation year under the Soviets, ignoring the 1932-33 famine. The drought of 1946 evoked what he termed "extreme but necessary measures against plunderers" which were depicted in a recent film on the postwar countryside, "Dearest of All."

Food as a Weapon. Arkhipenko noted only briefly but bitterly how "counter-revolutionaries" try to exploit the need for food shipments:

"We remember the repeated bans and restrictions by the directors of imperialist policy on the shipment of grain to our country. We ponder yet again the purpose of the present policy of the Reagan Administration, which has banned the export of food to Poland."

Lower Bread Quality. A major complaint of Soviet consumers is that bread often is stale or available only at certain hours. Arkhipenko blamed poor transport, lack of foil wrappers and storage boxes, and badly run stores for much of the problem. But he did admit that bread was declining in quality throughout the country and that much bread was poorly prepared and baked, resulting in a high rejection and scrap rate (about 7 percent for the RSFSR consumer co-op system in 1981).

Although the November 1979 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee raised the problem of a shrinking assortment of breads and rolls, there has been no improvement, according to trade experts. Certain kinds of bread, especially rye, have disappeared from the stores, and demand for many kinds of rolls is only half met. Softer wheats are being milled for bread flour, and the lower gluten content makes for inferior products.

A joint party/state decree ordered less waste of bread products, and bakeries have reduced loaf weight accordingly. For instance, a double rye loaf has fallen from 1,330 grams to 920 grams. A mass press campaign has also been launched against wasting bread. Despite this, state planning organs, according to Pravda, annually increase total bread production quotas, ignoring the fact that bread consumption has reached a plateau.

The Price of Bread. Arkhipenko noted that bread prices had remained unchanged in the USSR for decades and were very low compared with those of foreign countries. Furthermore, the low cost of bread fostered a disrespectful attitude toward bread products by consumers who, for example, customarily cleaned their silverware in cafeterias with bread. Mass propaganda to conserve bread frequently was undercut by its cheapness.

Bread and the Generation Gap. Arkhipenko obviously was affronted by Soviet youth's attitude toward bread. Older Soviets who had peasant backgrounds and personal knowledge of starvation were still responsive to propaganda pitched to the sacredness of bread and its wartime importance. But young people, he wrote, thought of starving "only in the medical sense" and studied medical pamphlets on the healthful values of dieting. He cited one case of an elderly propagandist whose lecture on wartime Leningrad was interrupted by the sotto voce remark of a young woman in the audience who hissed: "So what, 125 grams, I don't eat more bread than that in a whole day!"

Implications. Arkhipenko's survey of difficulties with regard to bread obviously can do little or nothing to solve the various problems mentioned. He did remind readers that things have been worse in the past. And he reminded them that bread prices, which had been untouchable in the USSR, should be raised if only to curb waste. He also provided a variety of technical explanations, and credible ones, for why bread so often was stale, inferior, or simply absent from store shelves.

But Kommunist's audience is the Soviet elite, people little affected by bread problems. The article's purpose apparently was to alert the elite to the importance of the problem.

(U) Pro-Consumer and Party Fervor

A few striking changes in the May Day slogans (issued April 11) clearly bear the imprint of Party Secretary Chernenko, whose rhetoric stresses a need for officials to be concerned about the satisfaction of human wants and stay in regular contact with ordinary citizens.

An intention to better the consumer's lot is evident in new appeals to:

- "Working people in agricultural machine building: strengthen the material and technical base of kolkhozes and sovkhoses in every possible way! Provide agriculture with highly productive and reliable equipment!"
- "Working people in the food sectors of industry: increase production of high-quality food products!"

--"...strengthen control....in spheres associated with people's everyday needs!" (addressed to People's Control personnel).

The new summons: "Workers of the ideological front: convey the party's ideas to the masses with conviction and passion!" told propagandists to eschew dry formulas and inspire the plain folk. The last such slogan, framed in Suslov's day, was less down to earth and used the language of ideologues: "Enhance the quality of educational, information and propaganda work!"

Also consistent with Chernenko's view of the party apparatus and its auxiliaries as necessary and constant checks on government managers was the insertion of word that Soviet trade unions were "a school of management, school of economic activity."

Discrediting Dissent at Home and Abroad

(LOU) On April 6, authorities staged a mass raid of unprecedented scale against Moscow dissidents, making 12 arrests and some 50 apartment searches. Those arrested proved to be a mixed bag of relatively obscure individuals: writers who contributed to or edited samizdat literature, religious activists, and several persons unknown to other activists. The apartment searches resulted in the confiscation of large quantities of samizdat literature from individuals suspected of collecting or circulating it.

(U) The next day, authorities televised the confession of a well-known and respected human rights activist during an intermission of a USSR-Czechoslovak hockey match. The huge audience that had tuned in to the game heard Aleksandr Bolonkin accuse Soviet dissidents of working for Western "special services" and of transmitting anti-Soviet materials to the West through Moscow-based foreign correspondents. Bolonkin named activists already imprisoned, such as Ivan Kovalev (a Helsinki Group member who had been sentenced just a week earlier for anti-Soviet activities) and Aleksandr Podrabinek (a member of the Commission for Psychiatric Abuses), as well as Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn, and others.

(U) Bolonkin, a 43-year-old engineer, received his first sentence of 6 years in labor camp for anti-Soviet activities in 1972. Ten days before his scheduled release in 1978, he was sentenced to 3 more years of camp, and then, while still serving his second sentence, was charged with anti-Soviet activities once again in 1981. It was the first televised confession since Orthodox priest Dmitriy Dudko repudiated his career as a religious activist in June 1980.

(C) Later in the month, Soviet authorities made one more effort to discredit Andrey Sakharov, this time in the privacy of a high-level US-Soviet bilateral contact. During a meeting with

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Ambassador Hartman on April 28, USSR Academy of Sciences President Aleksandrov provided a lengthy defense of the way Soviet authorities had treated Sakharov in exiling him to Gorkiy. Aleksandrov portrayed the matter primarily as a national security issue rather than as a question of human rights. He described Sakharov as a man susceptible to outside influences and his wife Yelena Bonner as the person responsible for surrounding him with questionable individuals, including foreigners who cultivated him for no other reason than to obtain security information.

(C) Thus, the authorities had to choose between putting Sakharov on trial or moving him out of harm's way. Aleksandrov characterized Moscow's handling of the case as far more humane than that of the Rosenbergs by the US and cited the similarities in the cases of Sakharov and Oppenheimer. He claimed that the authorities could not send Sakharov abroad--much as they would like to do so--because of his involvement in military research and development.

(C) Aleksandrov suggested that the reputation Sakharov enjoyed in the West rested on factors other than his scientific achievements, since his major works had never been published, and the published ones were clearly mediocre. Nevertheless, Sakharov remained free to continue his scientific work in Gorkiy and one of his papers was scheduled for publication in the near future.


(C) Aleksandrov's remarks in the context of a discussion of bilateral scientific cooperation seemed to be an effort to remove Sakharov as an obstacle to the resumption of scientific exchanges. During his hunger strike, Sakharov had appealed to Western scientists for support and had reproached Soviet scientists and the Academy for inaction in his case. In rebutting Sakharov's public statements, Aleksandrov in effect was arguing that Sakharov should not be regarded as a divisive issue and that the Academy had in fact played a positive role in persuading the government to treat him leniently.

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As the Soviets See Themselves



"Let's go!

"Where to? The liquor store isn't open yet."

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- I -

USSR CHRONOLOGY

April 1-30, 1982

April

- 1 Mikhail I. Busygin named Minister of Timber, Cellulose and Paper, and Woodworking Industry USSR.
- 1 Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation Timofeyev announced at press conference that wide-bodied jetliners would be permitted on trans-Siberian routes. Japan Air Lines 747s opened flights in April; Air France Air Buses will begin operations July 1. The USSR flies IL-86s and YAK 42s.
- 2 Dissident Ivan Kovalev received sentence of 5 years in camp and 5 years in exile at close of 3-day trial in Moscow.
- 3 Deputy Foreign Minister Igor N. Zemskov died.
- 4 Tadzhik party leader Dzhabar Rasulov died at age 69.
- 4 Krasnaya Zvezda identified Col. Gen. V. Chebrikov as a first deputy chairman of the KGB. A professional KGB officer since 1967, Chebrikov, age 59, is a member of the CPSU Central Committee and a deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet.
- 5 A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that Brezhnev was taking a "routine winter vacation" and denied newsmen's allegations of a recent stroke as the cause for Brezhnev's disappearance from public view.
- 7 P. A. Rotmistrov, Marshal of Armored Troops, died at age 81.
- 8 Pravda published complaint by reader in Volgograd about large numbers of fur-bearing animals being raised privately, excessive profits being made by owners, and the large amounts of food being consumed by the animals.
- 9 Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya article by V. Tikhonov called for farm reform in order to reduce heavy imports of grain.
- 11 May Day slogans published in central press.

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April

- 12 Western press reported Brezhnev was seen entering Kremlin Polyclinic on Ulitsa Granovskogo on foot and departing two hours later.
- 13 ABC correspondent Anne Garrels' car struck two pedestrians; one later died of injuries. Literaturnaya Gazeta attacked her reportage on April 14.
- 14 Dr. N. N. Blokhin said at press briefing at Academy of Sciences that Brezhnev was on a routine winter rest. Blokhin substituted for injured Yevgeniy Chazov, Brezhnev's cardiologist.
- 16 Defense Minister Ustinov presented award to city of Sochi and praised Brezhnev's wartime record. He ascribed the Soviet military buildup solely to imperialism's military threat.
- 16 Konstantin Zarodov, chief editor of World Marxist Review, died at age 62.
- 17 National "subbotnik" held in honor of Lenin's birthday.
- 18 Brezhnev in Pravda interview countered President Reagan's proposal for a June meeting in New York with proposal for an October summit in Finland or Switzerland.
- 19 Western press reported that seven West European radicals demonstrated in Red Square against nuclear arms and were immediately arrested.
- 19 Ambassador Hartman met P. N. Demichev, Candidate Member of Politburo and Minister of Culture USSR.
- 20 Tadzhik Plenum named Premier Rakhman Nabiyeu as First Secretary of Tadzhik Central Committee (vice late Dzhabar Rasulov).
- 20 Azerbaydzhani party leader Aliyev departed for week-long official visit to Mexico, accompanied by Brezhnev's speechwriter Aleksandrov-Agentov and Gosplan deputy chief Pavel Anisimov.
- 21 Party/government decree earmarked 20.5 billion rubles for agricultural development in Siberia, Far East, and Kurganskaya Oblast over 1981-85 period.

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April

- 21 Uzbek SSR established new oblast, Navoiskaya Oblast, with administrative center in Navoi.
- 22 Brezhnev reappeared after long absence to participate in traditional Lenin Day ceremonies. Kirilenko and Pelshe were absent; Andropov gave the speech for the third time. The seating arrangement put Chernenko on Brezhnev's right.
- 22 Lenin Prizes awarded; winners included Brezhnev's portraitist D. Nalbandyan.
- 27 Prosecutor General A. Rekunkov revealed in Pravda article that former Deputy Minister of Fisheries USSR Rytov had been executed for bribery.
- 30 TASS item on first anniversary of USSR-Vietnam labor cooperation agreement quoted First Deputy Chairman Kostin of State Committee for Labor and Social Problems to the effect that 7,000 Vietnamese workers were in the USSR on 5-year contracts.
- 30 Kakhar M. Makhkamov was named Prime Minister of Tadzhikistan.

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BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

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(U) THE CPSU SECRETARIAT'S ROLE AS
SHAPER OF SOVIET POLICY

Summary

Mikhail Suslov's death on January 25 created an opportunity for Konstantin Chernenko to bid for the position of Brezhnev's heir apparent; but that in turn evidently spurred KGB chief Yuriy Andropov to campaign for and attain a senior secretary seat on the CPSU Secretariat.

Andropov would know from his previous experience on the Secretariat that the CPSU post is more important than the KGB job. The five senior CPSU secretaries head a staff of thousands that constitutes a small but more powerful replica of the state apparatus. The Secretariat levies requirements on state agencies and frames decisionmaking papers submitted to the Politburo. The senior secretaries, in their roles as Politburo members, participate in the making of policy and, as secretaries, monitor execution of the decisions. Junior secretaries have more specialized duties and are not Politburo-member decisionmakers.

Andropov had earlier risen through the ranks in the Secretariat to the post of secretary in charge of party relations with Eastern Europe. But in 1967 he was shifted to the KGB as part of Brezhnev's power play against a potential rival, Aleksandr Shelepin. Andropov's return on May 24 as a senior secretary makes him one of the five most powerful figures in the Soviet regime (see appended list of officials).

* * * * *

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RDS-4 5/28/02 (Stoddard, P.)

Report 398-CA
May 28, 1982

Political Maneuvering Since Suslov's Death

Ideology boss Suslov's sudden death opened a major vacancy in the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat. Brezhnev's various illnesses and physical decline had already affected the leadership's ability to make crucial decisions expeditiously, but Suslov's death left the massive ideological empire without supervision. Kirilenko's two-month absence in March and April left only two senior party secretaries, Chernenko and Gorbachev, working fulltime.

With Brezhnev's obvious support, Chernenko seized the opportunity created by Suslov's death and stepped up his campaign to secure the position of heir apparent. Chernenko became active in matters connected with ideology and propaganda, not necessarily in order to acquire Suslov's portfolio for himself, but chiefly as a way to register increased status publicly. At the same time, he was able to forge ahead of Kirilenko in leadership ranking.

Faced with Chernenko's bid for No. 2 status, KGB chief Andropov, or circles around him, obviously concluded that the moment to act had arrived. Any comparison of Andropov's and Chernenko's credentials for leadership show Andropov's as far more substantial. Furthermore, the senior Politburo membership, with the exception of Brezhnev, reportedly accords Chernenko little respect as a future national leader.

Andropov's maneuverings between the time of Suslov's death and the May Plenum are not fully understood, but the following events are clear:

- Andropov probably was behind the Moscow rumors of Galina Brezhneva's links with diamond smugglers, a category of crime falling within the KGB's jurisdiction. The purpose behind the leaks apparently was to threaten Brezhnev and by association his protege Chernenko.
- A subsequent indication of Andropov's progress toward a seat on the Secretariat came on April 22 when he gave the traditional Lenin birthday speech, as he had in 1964 and 1976. Gorbachev, Dolgikh, and Rusakov are CPSU secretaries who have never had that opportunity. There is a strong historical pattern for the Lenin birthday speech to be given by CPSU secretaries or those about to become secretaries (the only recent exception was Solomentsev in 1978).

--Finally, the personnel changes made at the May 24 plenum smack of a compromise between Brezhnev and Andropov whereby Brezhnev got major elements of his long-sought "food program" and Andropov got his seat on the Secretariat. At the same time, Chernenko probably also gained from what appears to be a step toward replacing the aged Kirilenko, i.e., the nomination of CPSU Secretary Dolgikh as candidate member on the Politburo.

The Secretariat's Power Role

The reasons why Andropov would wish to trade his KGB position for a return to the CPSU Secretariat are clear once the powers of the Secretariat are examined.

The 10 secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee supervise an apparatus of several thousand staffers who actually run the CPSU and monitor the performance of every element of Soviet society. As a whole, the Secretariat is a smaller, but more powerful, replica of the state apparatus. Each secretary has one or more departments under his jurisdiction, and several of the junior secretaries actually head departments. (Chernenko is the only senior secretary to head a department.)

Senior Secretaries. The five senior secretaries--Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko, Kirilenko, and Gorbachev--are also full members of the Politburo: they occupy the top combination of powerful posts in the Soviet Union. Together with the other secretaries and their staffs, they frame policy position papers based on documents submitted by the party, state, intelligence, military, and research agencies. Meeting as a body on Tuesdays, the Secretariat coordinates information requirements levied on subordinate organizations. Papers requiring policy decisions are submitted to the Politburo through the General Department of the Secretariat, which is headed by Chernenko. The General Secretary of the CPSU (Brezhnev) or the acting secretary draws up the agenda for the weekly Politburo meetings. This power does much to explain how the General Secretary shapes the policy direction of the Soviet regime.

In their capacity as Politburo members, the senior secretaries participate in the Politburo sessions that accept or reject policy documents--or return them for further coordination in the event of disagreement. Once policy decisions have been made, the Secretariat is entrusted with monitoring their implementation by the executive agencies.

The senior secretaries thus have a privileged position over the other Politburo members who represent the major Soviet

institutions, such as the government, police, armed forces, foreign ministry, and regional party organizations. All Politburo members participate in the regular policymaking Politburo sessions on Thursday afternoons, but only those who hold government posts--Tikhonov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and heretofore Andropov--also participate in the Wednesday meetings of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers USSR. Their respective organizations must respond to requirements levied on them by the Secretariat as a result of Politburo decisions, but it is the Secretariat that coordinates and frames the decision papers on which the Politburo acts.

Candidate members of the Politburo who are also CPSU secretaries, and CPSU secretaries without Politburo status, participate in the regular Tuesday meetings as well as in the daily work of the Secretariat. However, they do not participate as a rule in Politburo sessions. Thus, they do not play at both ends of the policymaking cycle as do the senior secretaries.

Junior Secretaries. While senior secretaries are at the peak of the Soviet power structure, the junior secretaries are within close range. But junior secretaries are more narrowly focused on their specialties than are the seniors. Suslov supervised a vast ideological establishment in the USSR, frequently stood in for Brezhnev during the latter's vacations and absences, and played an active role in Soviet policy toward Eastern Europe and in Soviet foreign policy. By way of contrast, Dolgikh merely supervises the extraction of energy and minerals and plays an episodic role in foreign affairs, chiefly as a visiting fireman. Similarly, senior secretary Kirilenko has long been responsible for heavy industry, especially in the RSFSR, but also has acted as Brezhnev's stand-in; junior secretary Kapitonov is confined chiefly to party personnel work, cadre assignments on the secondary level, organization of such activities as Supreme Soviet elections, etc. Senior-level personnel appointments are too important for a junior like Kapitonov to make alone; senior Politburo figures perform this key political function.

Junior secretaries may move up to senior rank if good fortune is their lot. Gorbachev came to Moscow in 1978 to replace the late Fedor Kulakov as the secretary in charge of agriculture; he rose to full Politburo membership two years later. Dolgikh, the secretary in charge of fuels and minerals for the last decade, has just risen to candidate Politburo status and apparently is headed eventually for the job now held by the ailing Kirilenko.

Conversely, it is possible for a secretary never to rise to the Politburo despite long service in his specialty. Kapitonov has run party personnel operations since 1965 and seems unlikely ever to enter the Politburo.

Andropov's Experience as a Secretary

Andropov knows well the workings of the Secretariat. He began service as an inspector there in 1951 and was chief of a subdepartment by 1953, when he was transferred to Budapest as the Soviet Ambassador. He returned to Moscow in 1957 as head of the Secretariat department supervising Eastern Europe, then became the secretary in charge of relations with Eastern Europe in 1962. He transferred from that post to the KGB in 1967 as part of Brezhnev's maneuverings to oust Shelepin from power.

During his long service as KGB chief, Andropov has supplied intelligence information from the special KGB channel directly to the Politburo without going through the Secretariat; no other Politburo member has had such a privilege. Since the newly appointed KGB chief, Vitaliy Fedorchuk, is not and probably will not soon become a Politburo member, there is now some doubt about how KGB information will be funneled into Politburo deliberations. If Andropov remains the KGB spokesman on the Politburo, he may retain his special information channel, which is a significant element in that body's deliberations on foreign and domestic affairs.

Prepared by Donald Graves
x29204

Approved by Martha Mautner
x29536

Senior Secretaries (with full membership on the Politburo)

BREZHNEV, Leonid Il'ich	General Secretary, overall responsibility
ANDROPOV, Yuriy Vladimirovich	Responsibilities not yet clear
GORBACHEV, Mikhail Sergeyevich	Agriculture
KIRILENKO, Andrey Pavlovich	Heavy industry, RSFSR, personnel
CHERNENKO, Konstantin Ustinovich	Chief of Secretariat General Department

Junior Secretaries

DOLGIKH, Vladimir Ivanovich	Candidate Politburo member, fuels and minerals
PONOMAREV, Boris Nikolayevich	Candidate Politburo member, chief of Secretariat International Department
KAPITONOV, Ivan Vasil'yevich	Chief of Secretariat, Party-Organizational Work Department, personnel
ZIMYANIN, Mikhail Vasil'yevich	Chief Editor of <u>Pravda</u> , propaganda
RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich	Chief of Bloc Parties Department of CPSU Secretariat

Department Chiefs

PAVLOV, Georgiy Sergeyevich	Administration of Affairs
SAVINKIN, Nikolay Ivanovich	Administrative Organs
SAKHNYUK, Ivan Ivanovich	Agricultural Machine Building
KARLOV, Vladimir Alekseyevich	Agriculture
PEGOV, Nikolay Mikhaylovich	Cadres Abroad
DMITRIYEV, Ivan Nikolayevich	Chemical Industry
SHAURO, Vasiliy Filimonovich	Construction
	Culture
	Defense Industry
CHERNENKO, Konstantin Ustinovich	General
DOLGIKH, Vladimir Ivanovich	Heavy Industry
PONOMAREV, Boris Nikolayevich	International
ZAMYATIN, Leonid Mitrofanovich	International Information
YAKOVLEV, Boris Pavlovich	Letters
RUSAKOV, Konstantin Viktorovich	Liaison with Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Countries
MOCHALIN, Fedor Ivanovich	Light and Food Industry
FROLOV, Vasiliy Semenovich	Machine Building
KAPITONOV, Ivan Vasil'yevich	Organizational Party Work
GOSTEV, Boris Ivanovich	Planning and Finance Organs
TYAZHEL'NIKOV, Yevgeniy Mikhaylovich	Propaganda
TRAPEZNIKOV, Sergey Pavlovich	Science and Educational Institutions
KABKOV, Yakov Ivanovich	Trade and Domestic Services
SIMONOV, Kirill Stepanovich	Transport and Communications

Bailey

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CONFIDENTIAL

June 2, 1982

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: RICHARD PIPES *WP*

SUBJECT: Routing of Action Memoranda

I am puzzled why action on a purely political matter involving U.S.-Soviet relations should be sent to the military rather than political cluster. The question of renegotiating (or refusing to renegotiate) the U.S.-USSR Young Political Leaders Exchange is so clearly a political issue involving the Soviet Union that rather than have the material sent to me for information it is I who should be preparing a memo for the President. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you reassign action on the proposed renegotiation of U.S.-Soviet Young Political Leaders Exchange to me. (C)

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Pkg. No. 3632

cc: Norman Bailey

CONFIDENTIAL

Review June 2, 1988.

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *RW* DATE *2/11/13*

RECEIVED 28 MAY 82 17

TO MCFARLANE

FROM KRAEMER

DOCDATE 28 MAY 82

TEAGUE, R

27 MAY 82

KEYWORDS: USSR

SUBJECT: ACYPL US - USSR EXCHANGE RENEGOTIATION

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE:

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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MCFARLANE

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		<i>Pres</i>		

ISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *ul* (C) *ms*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: SVEN KRAEMER

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *Bob*

SUBJECT: Proposed Renegotiation of US-USSR
(ACYPL-Komsomol) Young Political
Leaders Exchange

Every now and then we get a chance to do something in government that produces a result we can see. This strikes me as such an opportunity. If you agree, could I ask you to pick up the bureaucratic ball on this and push it to a resolution.

Specifically, two courses of action seem feasible. On the one hand we might rely upon ICA with State clearance to come forward with a memo recommending renegotiation of the ACYPL exchange. Alternatively, after a verbal check with both agencies at the Assistant Secretary/Administrator level, you might initiate a memorandum to the President yourself in which he could approve renegotiation. An implementing decision paper for his signature could be attached.

If you run into any difficulties, please let me know. I suppose Carey Lord might have an interest in this program although I believe you mentioned that you have already checked with him.

Attachment



BUREAU OF
INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT
ANALYSES

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

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S.P.

(U) SOVIET TRENDS: MAY 1982

Summary

(S/NF) Brezhnev finally presented his food program at the May 24 plenum, but the details were given later in separate decrees. In essence, the new program emphasizes his old heavy-investment formula rather than more efficient organization. The proposed new bodies seem to be dominated as before by party and state bureaucracies, and the popular reaction to the new units is skeptical. Andropov's promotion to the Secretariat puts him in position for a contest with Chernenko for Brezhnev's party post when it becomes vacant. Dolgikh's promotion improves his chances for eventually replacing Andrey Kirilenko.

(S/NF) Now that Andropov has joined the circle of five who hold the most powerful job combination, the paramount question becomes who chairs the Politburo during Brezhnev's absence. Given Kirilenko's problems and Gorbachev's junior status, it may be either Chernenko or Andropov. The degree of bureaucratic infighting could intensify significantly, given their rivalry.

(S/NF) Ukrainian KGB chief Vitaliy Fedorchuk succeeded Andropov as national KGB chief on May 26, a choice that may have been dictated by Fedorchuk's lack of Central Committee rank. This means that Fedorchuk cannot rise to the Politburo in the near future, giving Andropov the possibility of remaining the KGB's Politburo spokesman.

(LOU) Pravda began in late May to put Mikhail zimyanin, party secretary for propaganda and culture, ahead of Ivan Kapitonov, party secretary for personnel appointments, thus violating the traditional rank order. This anomaly may reflect a view enunciated by Andropov in his Lenin Day speech that

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RDS-1,4 6/24/02 (multiple sources)

Report 421-CA
June 24, 1982

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M452/2 #153909

BY RW NARA DATE 6/2/15

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the party's primary task is political education. Kapitonov and others espouse the traditional generalist role of the party, including guidance of the economy.

(LOU) Brezhnev received the medal issued for Kiev's 1500th anniversary at a Kremlin ceremony but did not visit Kiev, although such a visit may have been planned. Speakers at Kiev stressed Slavic unity, using ancient Kiev as a paradigm. The choice of this year for the Kievan anniversary seems more closely connected with it being the USSR's 60th anniversary than any historical event 1500 years ago.

(LOU) The 19th Komsomol Congress held May 18-21 differed sharply from its predecessor four years ago when optimism was higher. Speakers this year deplored youthful interest in fashion, self-indulgence, and religion at the expense of self-sacrifice for the state and society.

(LOU) The debate between champions of decentralized economic managers and the proponents of the traditional ministerial structure has sharpened lately, in part, no doubt, as preparations begin for the party plenum on economic administration promised by Brezhnev at the November 1981 party plenum.

(LOU) The May 10-14 conference of religious figures against nuclear war displayed Moscow's increased skill at managing such meetings and avoiding pitfalls. Careful handling of guests and neutralization of domestic activists, including religious protesters and unofficial peace strugglers, avoided unwanted incidents during the affair. At the same time the organizers were careful not to smother the delegates with controls, giving them an illusion of freedom.

(C) A formal celebration was held May 12 to inaugurate a new rail and road bridge from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan which makes it possible to ship freight over the Amu Darya River. The new bridge improves freight service to the Soviet staging area in northern Afghanistan. Plans also are afoot to build a 200-kilometer rail line south to Pul-i-Khumri.

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Brezhnev Unveils Farm Program; Andropov Elevated to Secretariat

(LOU) Brezhnev finally presented his long-promised food program at the May 24 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, but the details were only spelled out in six related decrees published sequentially after the plenum. The plenum itself was not an occasion for debate. Brezhnev's 90-minute exposition gave only a general and remarkably defensive exposition of his farm policy. The 21 speakers in the "debates" only had time for brief endorsements of the program, not discussion.

(LOU) The food program appears in essence to be merely a repetition of Brezhnev's previous formula--heavy investment, rather than a new approach to the urgent need for more efficient farm production. This time, however, there is more emphasis on rural infrastructure--roads, storage capacities, and amenities for rural workers. The administrative innovations involved seem to be an unwieldy combination of centralized oblast and rayon-level associations under close party guidance and a companion hierarchical structure of agro-industrial commissions at the republic and Moscow level with strong representation of the state agricultural bureaucracy. The Moscow commission is to be headed by a deputy prime minister, perhaps Z. Nuriyev who is already responsible for agriculture. If the new structures are layered on the existing maze of offices connected with agriculture, the centralization envisaged for the rayon-level associations may be vitiated from the start.

(C) Popular reaction to the food program seems to be skeptical. The announced rise in procurement prices immediately stimulated fears of eventual hikes in retail food prices, and to the average citizen, the rayon associations appear to be just another bureaucracy. In any event, hopes for an improvement in the amount and quality of food this year seems illusory, and this summer's bad weather, visible to all, has already cast doubt on the harvest results.

(S/NF) Andropov's promotion to the Secretariat had been extensively rumored before the plenum and was widely interpreted by Soviet officials as setting the stage for a contest between Chernenko and Andropov for Brezhnev's party post when he leaves office.

(S/NF) The promotion of Vladimir Dolgikh to candidate member suggests that he may be in line to succeed Andrey Kirilenko as the

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party secretary in charge of industry; Kirilenko is now reported to be in poor health and his tenure in doubt.

(LOU) The promotions of three Central Committee candidate members to full membership appear relatively routine. The new trade-union chief S. A. Shalayev rated full membership because of his post, while Brezhnev's cardiologist Yevgeniy Chazov probably was being rewarded for keeping Brezhnev on his feet. The promotion of a coal miner, V. S. Kostin, seems the usual pro forma homage to the fiction of worker supremacy in Soviet society.

Chairing the Politburo During Brezhnev's Absences

(S/NF) Andropov's elevation to the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee on May 24 buttressed earlier rumors that he would be filling Suslov's shoes and thus positioning himself to vie eventually for the job of General Secretary. Andropov's subsequent public appearances did not indicate just what his current portfolio is in the Secretariat, but mid-level officials assert that he is in charge of Suslov's former responsibilities.

(C) Chernenko allegedly had assumed interim responsibility for the ideology field in the period between Suslov's death and the May 24 plenum; he also was said to have been chairing the Politburo and Secretariat in Brezhnev's absence. Now he has reportedly taken over the administrative organs area (police and justice) and party personnel appointments. (His attendance at the Border Guards Day ceremony on May 27 tends to support this notion, although it is not definitive evidence.)

(C) With Andropov joining the exclusive circle of five who hold the most powerful job combination in the Soviet regime--Politburo plus Secretariat membership--the question of who chairs these two bodies during Brezhnev's absence becomes paramount. Kirilenko has the seniority to claim the chair but, in view of his rumored health problems, he may be unable or unavailable on occasion. Gorbachev is too junior in terms of experience and political clout. The choice thus probably lies between Chernenko and Andropov. Chernenko has, of course, Brezhnev's blessings, but Andropov has seniority on the Politburo and probably also the support of other powerful members on that body.

(S/NF) The question of chairmanship would normally be settled according to past procedures for the summer vacation period when Brezhnev was out of town. Then Kirilenko usually took the chair. It is not clear whether he can cope this year. Since the acting chairman determines the agenda of the meeting, but does so on the basis of documentation cleared through Chernenko's General Department of the Secretariat, the bureaucratic infighting could become exceptionally Byzantine with Andropov and Chernenko

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jockeying for position. Officials of Ponomarev's International Department have given Andropov an eventual edge in the rivalry and discounted other possible challengers.

KGB Professional Replaces Yuriy Andropov

(LOU) Yuriy Andropov left the office of KGB chief on May 26; Vitaliy Vasil'yevich Fedorchuk was named his successor. The appointment appears to be a plus for Andropov: although Fedorchuk's political allegiances are not clear, he has worked under Andropov since 1967. The ranking KGB deputy in Moscow, a reputed crony of Brezhnev, was passed over in favor of the little-known Fedorchuk.

(LOU) Fedorchuk is not a CPSU Central Committee member, and the failure of the May plenum to promote him to this body indicates that some time will pass before he works up to the Politburo. (Technically, the Party Statutes require that a Party Congress convene to elect a new Central Committee before Fedorchuk could be chosen.) Indeed, this very situation may have influenced Fedorchuk's selection. In the interim, Andropov may well remain the KGB's spokesman on the Politburo and perhaps also in the CPSU Secretariat.

(S/NF) The 64-year-old Fedorchuk began his KGB service in 1939 with the battle of Khalkin Gol on the Soviet-Mongolian border. His World War II career is not known, but he specialized in military counterintelligence while serving with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany in 1951-54, served as chief of the KGB's military counterintelligence directorate in the 1960s, and published several articles on that subject. During his service as chief of the Ukrainian KGB (he is an ethnic Ukrainian), suppressing local nationalism was a major KGB mission. He presumably was involved in the fall of Ukrainian party leader Petr Shelest in 1973, who was accused of fostering Ukrainian nationalism.

(LOU) Disarray in the Kremlin Pecking Order

Shortly after the May 24 party plenum, signs of jostling between party secretaries Kapitonov and Zimyanin appeared, some of which seemed related to the more important rivalry between Andropov and Chernenko.

Beginning with its May 27 issue, Pravda broke with the traditional hierarchical listing of party secretaries and on several occasions put Mikhail Zimyanin, the party secretary in charge of propaganda and culture, above Ivan Kapitonov, the long-time party secretary in charge of personnel appointments. Pravda's signal to elite readers was somewhat ambivalent: on May 27 it used the hierarchical listing valid since the 1981 Party Congress (senior

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Kapitonov before Zimyanin) on page 1, and on page 4 it put Zimyanin ahead of Kapitonov. Since then, usage has alternated with Zimyanin taking precedence in the June 1 and 3 issues, while Kapitonov was returned to his traditional place ahead of Zimyanin in the May 31 obituary of M. Shumauskas (a former "president" of Soviet Lithuania), signed by the entire leadership.

Zimyanin's upgrading was in line with a remark in Andropov's Lenin Day (April 22) speech that "our party considers as its very first task to be concerned ceaselessly about raising the consciousness and political culture of the toiling people." As party secretary for propaganda and culture, Zimyanin was a seeming beneficiary of Andropov's definition of the party's main role in society.

Kapitonov, on the other hand, is closely identified with the view that party officials must not concentrate on educational work lest party political control of the economy be eroded. He reasserted this orthodoxy in the May issue of Kommunist when he used the formula "unity of the ideological-political, educational, organizational and economic activity," which allows for no "very first task." CPSU Secretary Chernenko and Moscow party boss Grishin have taken much the same line in recent months in endorsing full application of the CPSU decree adopted in February calling for tighter party control of the state administration.

(LOU) Kiev Celebrates 1500th Anniversary

On May 26, two days before the official opening of the Kiev ceremonies, Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy presented the official commemorative medal "The 1500th Anniversary of Kiev" to Brezhnev at the Kremlin. All members of the Politburo and Secretariat were present. Brezhnev may have planned to visit Kiev for the festivities as would be normal for such an occasion, but did not do so, perhaps to conserve his strength. As it was, he was able to speak at the Kremlin dinner for Austrian President Kirchschrager on May 27 but did not appear in public May 28 through 30.

During the actual ceremonies on May 28, Shcherbitskiy emphasized the importance of Kiev as the symbol of the ancient Russian people who had rallied together into a unified state, and of the friendship of the present Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples within the framework of the USSR. Delegations from the RSFSR and Belorussia were present, led by Moscow City First Secretary Grishin, Leningrad Oblast First Secretary Romanov, RSFSR Premier Solomontsev, and Belorussian party chief Kiselev.

The significance of selecting 1982 as the alleged year of Kiev's founding is that 1982 also happens to be the 60th anniversary of the USSR. For years the Soviet Government has been

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emphasizing the increased unity of the Russian, Ukrainian, and Belorussian peoples, a major motif of current Soviet historiography and one which is being highlighted at both 1982 anniversaries.

(LOU) Hollow Exhortations at Komsomol Congress

The tone of the speeches heard by delegates to the 19th Komsomol (Youth) Congress in Moscow, May 18-21, differed strikingly from those delivered four years earlier at the previous congress. The difference was a measure of the country's growing malaise and the regime's concern over its inability to arrest the trend.

The congress of April 1978 rode the crest of a positive mood reflected in the 25th Party Congress, the 60th anniversary of the Revolution, and promulgation of a new USSR Constitution. The international scene was then relatively quiet: Secretary of State Vance had just been to Moscow and Brezhnev was preparing to travel to Bonn. Keynote speeches stressed such upbeat topics as the development of Siberia and the Komsomol's participation in the construction of BAM (the northern parallel of the Trans-Siberian Railroad).

This time, speakers exhorted Soviet youth to subordinate their personal interests in order to serve society; to beware of alien ideas, fashions, and imported luxuries; and to show more loyalty, patriotism, and discipline. In his speech to the congress, Brezhnev focused primarily on arms control issues, but Komsomol chief Boris Pastukhov criticized the increasing preoccupation of youth with religion--especially in the Roman Catholic and Muslim areas--and warned his charges about the more aggressive behavior of religious cults. He called upon Komsomol committees to expand atheist programs and focus attention on children of believers, citing Poland as an example of what can happen if Western influence goes unchecked.

Marshal Yepishev, head of the Army's Main Political Directorate, complained about both the growing pacifism and lack of preparedness for military service among youth. Labor chief Shalayev called upon youth to be more concerned with work and productivity than with wasting time on frivolous, personal pursuits.

The self-congratulatory rhetoric at the congress about the "Union of free and equal republics" (by the Ukrainian Komsomol first secretary) and the "close-knit family of brotherly peoples" (by the Kazakh Komsomol first secretary) had been more explicitly targeted in the Komsomol congresses held in the various republics prior to the Moscow session. There the warnings against religion and "chauvinistic" nationalism were even more specific and blunt.

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(LOU) Industrial Management: Time To Cut the Cloth?

The economic slowdown has helped revive controversy over how much control over industry should be exercised from Moscow. Almost everyone seems to agree on the need to give local managers more rights. But some insist it be done only within the framework of the central ministries while others are seeking to whittle down ministerial powers. The longstanding debate may now figure in pre-succession maneuvering, with Chernenko apparently among those encouraging the regionalists against the centralizers.

As far back as the December 1973 plenum, Brezhnev urged a more flexible system of industrial administration. He then said that Moscow-based ministries should continue to direct the affairs of entire industrial sectors but that it was necessary to think about "territorial aspects" and "inter-sector problems." Brezhnev evidently was interested in streamlining the management mechanism and promoting a certain amount of local initiative. He may even have favored proposals to merge the central industrial ministries as one way to reduce their vast authority (Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo, No. 10, 1973).

Brezhnev kept harping on the management issue in party forums during the next few years, clearly trying to shape a consensus among the ruling groups. His keynote report to the 25th Party Congress in 1976 highlighted a case in West Siberia where four departmental river flotillas and a host of building and supply organizations engaging in essentially the same work were subordinated to at least 10 ministries and departments located in Moscow. This fragmentation was said to have caused unwarranted outlays and losses and to have slowed down decisionmaking.

Here, again, Brezhnev restated the need to improve the methods of resolving inter-sector and territorial problems and proposed the creation of systems for managing groups of kindred sectors (for instance, fuel, energy, transport, and output and processing of agricultural produce). Brezhnev rejected "hasty, ill-considered reorganizations of the managerial structure," assuring his audience that it was necessary "to measure the cloth not seven times, as the saying goes, but eight or even ten times before cutting." But, he added, "once we have done the measuring, once we have understood that the existing economic mechanism has become too tight for the developing economy, we must fundamentally improve it."

His advocacy evidently had little effect on entrenched interests--the July 1979 decree setting forth new measures to improve planning and performance of the economy did not affect basic organizational structures. The October 1980 plenum nevertheless heard Brezhnev affirm that everyday questions of industrial management

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had to be decided on the spot. Premier Kosygin's cabinet was told to prepare proposals for improving the structure of management and have them ready before the opening of the 26th Party Congress in February 1981. Obsolete forms, Brezhnev warned, could not be dragged into a new five-year planning period.

Kosygin died in December 1980, and his technocratic heirs evidently did little to carry out Brezhnev's wishes. The 26th Congress delegates learned from Brezhnev's report that only a few small steps had been taken in the direction of harmonizing regional and sectoral interests. (Inter-industry mixed units were created at Gosplan; a commission of the Council of Ministers on the Development of the West Siberian Oil and Gas Complex was formed, as was a Tyumen-based interdepartmental territorial commission under Gosplan.) Brezhnev again called for a system to manage groups of kindred and interrelated industries. He also envisaged greater independence of industrial amalgamations and firms and greater powers for economic managers.

By the end of 1981, Brezhnev had made some headway toward agreement on a transfer of some authority from the central ministries to regional bodies--either that, or he was simply determined to force the issue. In any event, he told the November 1981 plenum that the Politburo had decided to hold a regular plenum devoted to industrial management questions. (The last such meeting had been held in 1965. It restored the structure of Moscow ministries in place of the Khrushchevian regional economic councils, or sovnarkhozes, and gave firms a little more freedom in managing labor and investment.)

A debate has been going on in the press since the 1981 plenum over whether or not to reduce control from the center and thereby risk a growth of local demands or sectional "anarchy." The 1981 participants were aware that within a year after Khrushchev broke up the central ministries and formed more than 90 sovnarkhozes, he had to issue a decree providing for a whole range of penalties for sovnarkhoz chairmen who failed to meet their obligations to keep other regions supplied with goods. And over the course of time, various super-sovnarkhozes had to be set up to bring freewheeling managers to heel.

Nevertheless, the regional interest was reasserted in a Pravda article of February 19, 1982, by V. Pavlyuchenko, research specialist in the State Committee for Science and Technology. He viewed as the "number one problem" in economic administration the central ministries' "departmentalized attitude," i.e., isolation of industrial operations from each other and noncoordination of technological decisions. He also reflected a desire to enhance the role of party and trade union officials in management in his unusual remark that, "It is becoming increasingly urgent to

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develop comprehensively the directly social forms and methods of economic administration" (emphasis supplied).

Brezhnev's anti-ministry line was promoted in an article in the May issue of the journal Kommunist. Yu. Yarkin, chief editor of the magazine Socialist Labor, recommended consolidation of most kindred ministries and elimination of a number of intermediate layers of administration. Central personnel would be mainly concerned with general issues rather than detailed control of production--notably, price formation, wage-setting, standardization of articles, and speeding up scientific-technical progress. (Yarkin's periodical speaks for the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, which since 1976 has been headed by V. G. Lomonosov, who was earlier second secretary of the Uzbek party and before that a Moscow City party secretary under P. N. Demichev.)

The party bosses of Soviet Georgia also advocated less rigorous control of industry from Moscow. An editorial in the May 11 issue of Zarya Vostoka lauded the new integrative bodies in rural areas (RAPO) as "a new step in improving the forms and methods of management not only of branches in the agro-industrial complex, but of the entire economy." E. A. Shevardnadze, first secretary of the Georgian party Central Committee and CPSU Politburo candidate member, elaborated on one such integration scheme in the city of Poti. There, local party and government offices were reportedly participating in the operations of firms under the jurisdiction of Moscow ministries (Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta, No. 21, May 1982).

The centralizers have gotten equally illustrious figures to argue their case in the court of elite opinion. One was Ye. I. Kapustin, director of the USSR Academy's Economics Institute, who wrote a theoretical article for the February issue of the journal Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSR. Kapustin cited Brezhnev, but only to justify a plea for enlarging the autonomy of firms and their managers. Otherwise, he upheld the principle of centralization on grounds of a need to locate industry with regard for natural and labor resources, and to insure a steady inter-regional exchange of goods. Kapustin's emphatic pro-Moscow slogans were "the process of the further internationalization of all public life" and "strengthening of the centralized planned administration of the national economy."

A second centralizing voice was that of Academician V. A. Trapeznikov, 77-year-old director of the Institute of Control Problems. In the May 7 Pravda he joined the chorus hymning more initiative of managers, but within the ministerial system. Trapeznikov blasted the sovnarkhozes as the cause of a sharp decline between 1958 and 1966 in the indicators for national

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income, return on capital, and rates of scientific-technical progress. He claimed that restoration of the more centralized pattern of administration led to a sudden rise of all these indicators.

The anti-regionalists have obviously rallied support for their cause at a high level, but not in the offices of Brezhnev and his fellow party-control stalwart Chernenko. Aligned with the General Secretary and his deputy are likely to be the party secretary for heavy industry, V. Dolgikh, who is associated with territorial-industrial complexes, i.e., groups of industries in an economic region of the country which have easy access to the USSR Government and Gosplan. The pronouncements of Andrey Kirilenko, Party Secretary for industrial management, and Defense Minister Ustinov mark them as skeptical of de-centralizing gambits. In any event, the central ministers once formed the core of the political constituency of such Politburo members as Malenkov and Kosygin, so it would not be surprising if one of Chernenko's rivals in pre-succession politicking has been canvassing in the same "managerial class."

Which of the contending approaches best serves the interest of efficiency is an open question. F. I. Kushnirsky, an emigre who worked for Gosplan in the Ukraine for almost 14 years, opines that the territorial principle of industrial administration may be the lesser of two evils: although the territorial principle did not bring much improvement in Khrushchev's day, the ministry or sector principle is based on a complete lack of economic responsibility and provides almost no flexibility. Kushnirsky asserts that the sector principle in effect allows only for a redistribution of decisionmaking among the various levels of supervision and control of firms or organizations. The territorial principle, he believes, means the division of decisionmaking among several layers of management. It would also mean a role for local authorities, who know best the local sources of labor, water supply, opportunity cost of lands, sewage systems, transportation, road construction, and pollution problems (Soviet Planning: Evolution in 1965-80. Monograph Series on Soviet Union, sponsored by Delphic Associates, December 1981).

(LOU) "The World Conference of Religious Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe"

The May 10-14 international conference of "religious workers" to discuss the dangers of the nuclear age, organized by the Russian Orthodox Church in Moscow, began as a routine example of how the regime uses the church in the service of Soviet policy. It became, in addition, an example of how Moscow maintains control over an international conference and uses it as a vehicle of Soviet propaganda, providing participants with just enough room for maneuver to create the illusion of freedom. To insure the

success of the conference, its organizers had to cope with three potential problems:

- The possibility of poor attendance and even a boycott by the mainstream Western Christian denominations, as well as by the non-radical Muslim states. (Moscow still had fresh memories of the boycott of its Summer Olympics in 1980 and the failure of the Tashkent Islamic Conference in September 1980 following the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.)
- The danger that Western participants could disrupt the purpose of the conference by raising embarrassing questions about the growth of Soviet military power and the regime's repression of religious believers.
- The possibility that Soviet religious and human rights activists might use the conference for publicizing their own aims and grievances.

Careful planning at preparatory meetings in Moscow and Budapest insured a respectable attendance and a relatively smooth program. The Patriarchate readily covered the cost of the trip for desirable delegates, especially from the Third World, and made a strenuous, though only partially successful, effort to attract prominent Western church leaders. The spectrum of participants ranged from the Church of England's Bishop of Salisbury to Bishop Hilarion Capucci (representing the PLO) and the Grand Mufti of Syria. The Vatican sent only an observer of modest rank, although several Western delegations included Catholic members. The presence of Evangelist Billy Graham tended to overshadow the positive role of a modest but representative and articulate US delegation.

As expected, the conference became a forum for anti-Western rhetoric. It also provided enough flexibility and opportunities for active participation by Western delegates to suggest that the Soviet organizers deliberately avoided overcontrol and skillfully created the appearance of an open conference. When necessary they reined in an unwary participant to keep the proceedings from getting out of hand.

One Dutch delegate walked out when he was not allowed to address a working group of the conference. The text of his statement (which like all of the formal statements had to be submitted to the conference organizers beforehand) had included praise for not only Western pacifists but those of the GDR as well. He also intended to pay tribute to Poland's Solidarity and Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 Movement.

Although Western delegates did moderate somewhat the anti-Western rhetoric of the conference final statement, it nevertheless

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provided Soviet authorities with enough material to claim that the consensus of the conference had demonstrated the unity and strength of the world "peace" movement and its congruence with the USSR position on issues of peace, arms control, and the dangers of nuclear conflict.

Neutralizing the Activists. Tight security measures forestalled efforts by Soviet activists to take advantage of the conference and the presence of foreign delegates in Moscow. Authorities picked up and detained a number of religious activists for the duration of the session, including five women members of the Baptist Relatives' Council of Prisoners of Conscience. Even so, a member of the unofficial group managed to penetrate the Moscow Baptist Church and to display a sign there during the sermon delivered by Billy Graham, reminding him of the repression of religious believers.

Authorities also forestalled possible activism in Chernogorsk by families of the "Embassy Pentecostals" by promises and dilatory tactics regarding their applications for withdrawal of Soviet citizenship and their desire to submit emigration applications. (Later, after the conference ended, the replies were negative.) The absence of any militant public pressure from conference participants--especially in the weeks before the conference--meant that authorities did not feel any compelling need to give way on this issue, even though they were clearly keeping options open and preparing to make concessions if it appeared that public pressure was jeopardizing the success of the conference. Once the conference was under way, authorities could safely disregard private representations by some conference participants.

The psychological atmosphere at the conference seemed to inhibit public criticism of their hosts by participants. Indeed, Soviet believers even heard Billy Graham cite Romans: 13 in his sermons, reminding them that all temporal authority comes from God, and that therefore believers should obey the authorities. His listeners were also aware (if he was not) that two years earlier, Father Dmitriy Dudko had used the same biblical passage in justifying his decision to repudiate his career as an Orthodox activist when he confessed on Soviet television following his arrest on charges of anti-Soviet activity. His statement was subsequently published in Izvestiya to justify the regime's crackdown on religious activists.

A hunger strike begun by a "Group of Separated Spouses" on May 10 and designed to pressure authorities into issuing exit visas did not achieve any results during the conference. Authorities responded by attempting to destroy the unity of the group by handling its members as individual cases and by issuing--or promising to issue--exit visas to several members of the group.

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The appearance of an unofficial Soviet "peace movement" in the wake of the conference briefly recalled the days when the Moscow Helsinki Group attempted to operate under the umbrella of the Helsinki Final Act, but the new group was silenced before it could get under way. The group's announced support--rather than criticism--of the Soviet "peace" campaign did not mollify authorities, whose attitude toward domestic public organizations was based not on the criterion of support or non-support of Soviet policies, but rather on whether the organizations were regime controlled.

The tactic of these latest Soviet "peaceniks" had been tried in the late 1960s by the well-known dissident Andrey Amalrik, who on one occasion confused the authorities when he picketed the American Embassy in Moscow with placards criticizing the US role in Vietnam. The authorities quickly recognized Amalrik's stratagem for what it was: an attempt to assert his civil rights. The coincidence of his independently expressed views with those of the regime was, in that context, quite irrelevant.

(C) New Bridge Links USSR With Afghanistan

On May 12, Uzbek party leader Rashidov and Afghanistan's Babrak Karmal ceremonially opened a combined rail and road bridge over the Amu Darya River, linking Termez with the Afghan port of entry of Jeyretan. The Soviets rushed the bridge to completion ahead of schedule in order to be able to haul freight to Afghanistan without barging it across the Amu Darya. The bridge allegedly is to be linked in the future by a 200-kilometer rail line with the major Soviet military staging area of Pul-i-Khumri in northern Afghanistan. A large complex, including a railroad station, has been built in Jeyretan to facilitate freight car handling on the Afghanistan side, and there are plans to build a new town as well to house workers.

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As the Soviets See Themselves

The Police Inspect the Wine Shop's Books



— Образованность меня погубила, граждане. Прочитала, что древние греки вино водой разбавляли.

"Learning led me astray, citizens. I read that the ancient Greeks mixed water with wine."

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USSR CHRONOLOGY

May 1-31, 1982

May

- 1 Leadership reviewed traditional Red Square march-past; Kirilenko reappeared after two-month absence from public life.
- 3 Pravda published Brezhnev's reply to message from International Physicians for Prevention of Nuclear War.

Izvestiya article disclosed labor cooperation agreement with Vietnam under which 7,000 Vietnamese are now working in the USSR; TASS attacked Western press coverage of the program.
- 4 Brezhnev spoke at Kremlin dinner for visiting Nicaraguan delegation led by Ortega Saavedra.
- 5 Georgian party leader Shevardnadze and Georgian KGB chief Inauri addressed meeting in Akhaltsikhe, Georgia, on security problems and political vigilance.
- 6 Radio Moscow announced completion of new rail and road bridge across Amu Darya River, linking Termez and Afghanistan.
- 7 Kirilenko spoke at ceremony awarding a medal to Tuapse City; Krasnodarskiy Kray party boss S. F. Medunov was featured prominently in media coverage (suggesting he has not been penalized to date for rumored corruption charges).

Academician V. Trapeznikov argued in Pravda that regional decentralization program initiated by Khrushchev contributed significantly to poor performance of economy.
- 9 V-E Day marked by wreath-laying by Defense Minister Ustinov and press articles by military leaders, including Ustinov, in Pravda.
- 9 First Secretary G. I. Chiryayev of Yakutskaya ASSR Party Committee died at age 57.

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May

- 10-14 Russian Orthodox Church hosted world conference of religious representatives in Moscow for discussion of peace and the danger of nuclear conflict.
- 10 Kirgiz decree set fines for persons failing to destroy wild hemp growing on land under their control.
- 11-13 Chernenko conveyed CPSU greetings to All-Army Conference of Primary Party Organization secretaries; Main Political Administration Chief Yepishev gave report; Ustinov gave closing speech; Kapitonov and Zimyanin attended.
- 12 Rashidov and Babrak Karmal ceremonially opened new bridge across Amu Darya River (see May 6).
- Literaturnaya Gazeta article by Zoriy Balayan hit US issuance of invitations to Soviet Armenians in a general critique of Armenian emigration from USSR.
- 13 Soyuz T-5 launched with cosmonauts Anatoliy Berezhovoy and Valentin Lebedev aboard; mission includes docking with Salyut-7 spacecraft.
- Estonian Central Committee plenum released Second Secretary K. V. Lebedev (who returned to the CPSU Central Committee apparatus) and installed I. A. Kudryavtsev (sector head in Party-Organizational Work Department) as second secretary.
- 14 Novoye Vremya interview of Nguyen Co Thach noted "several thousand Vietnamese workers in USSR as well as in Bulgaria, the GDR, and Czechoslovakia."
- Svenska Dagbladet reported fire on Sverdlovsk-class Soviet cruiser west of Liepaya.
- 16 Sovetskaya Belorussia published decree forbidding the raising of fur-bearing animals by private persons.
- 17-18 Rusakov visited Warsaw to check on Polish situation.
- 18-21 Brezhnev and other leaders attended 19th Komsomol Congress; Chernenko held number two position in lineup.

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May

- 19 Literaturnaya Gazeta article by Igor Belyayev accused American diplomats of urging Billy Graham to "behave provocatively" during his Moscow visit.
- 23 Western press reported outlines of one of documents used in drafting new food program--a confidential governmental study of Soviet agriculture's enormous costs and losses; the highly unusual leak to the Western press may have been politically motivated.
- 24 Brezhnev addressed Central Committee plenum on food program; 21 speakers approved report; plenum approved report and 6 related decrees; Yuriy Andropov made Central Committee secretary; Vladimir Dolgikh promoted to candidate member of Politburo; three candidate members promoted to full membership on Central Committee--S. A. Shalayev, Ye. I. Chazov, and V. S. Kostin.
- 25 Unmanned cargo rocket Progress-13 docked with Salyut-7 with fuel and freight.
- 26 Yuriy Andropov released as KGB chairman, replaced by Vitaliy Fedorchuk, Ukrainian KGB chief since 1970.
- Shcherbitskiy presented Brezhnev with medal commemorating 1500th anniversary of Kiev.
- Pravda gave Ideology Secretary Zimyanin higher status than Personnel Secretary Kapitonov, reversing their traditional ranking.
- TASS rebutted Western press coverage of Vietnamese workers in USSR.
- 27 Pravda published food program for period up to 1990 adopted by May plenum.
- Pravda published Brezhnev's reply to disarmament proposals of Olof Palme's disarmament commission.
- Chernenko attended meeting honoring Border Guards Day.
- Two joint party/government decrees authorized new administrative bodies for agricultural management

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May

- 27 and increased procurement prices for key farm products.
- 28 Shcherbitskiy opened festivities for Kiev's 1500th anniversary; Grishin, Romanov, Kiselev, and Solomentsev attended, as did other republic leaders.
- 29 Joint party/government decree outlined procedures for transfer of personnel to farms and program for increased incentives.
- Joint party/government decree set financial incentives for livestock raisers.
- First deputy editor of Pravda Yuriy A. Sklyarov identified by Rude Pravo as new chief editor of World Marxist Review (vice late Konstantin Zarodov).
- 30 Party/government decree outlined program for improving rural standard of living and services.
- 31 Brezhnev addressed Presidium of USSR Supreme Soviet on task of local soviets in carrying out May plenum decisions.
- Brezhnev presented awards to Shcherbitskiy, Kiselev, and Aliyev for farm production successes and to lesser officials for other achievements.
- Le Duan presented Ho Chi Minh medal to Brezhnev.

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