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RNL Box 8

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	John Poindexter to Bush et al, re NSDD on Libya [90006] R 1/20/05 F95-023/1 #637	1/7/86	P1
2. NSDD	draft, re Libya (2 pp) R 11/28/05 M02-022 #17	n.d.	P1
3. NSDD	draft, annex to item #2 PART ~ #18	n.d.	P1
4. report	re Libya (2 pp) D 7/13/05 F95-023/1 #642 D 18 11/28/05 M02-022 #19	1/5/86	P1 B1, B3
5. graphic	re Libya D 7/13/05 F95-023/1 #643 D	1/5/86	P1 B1, B3
6. graphic	re Libya D 7/13/05 F95-023/1 #644	1/5/86	P1 B1, B3
7. graphic	re Libya D 7/13/05 F95-023/1 #645	1/5/86	P1 B1, B3
8. NSDD	The National Program for Combatting Terrorism (partial pages 3-9) P 1/20/05 F95-023/1 #646	n.d.	P1
9. memo	Nicolas Platt to Poindexter, re Libya (page 1) R 10/28/05 M02-022 #21	1/6/86	P1
10. report	draft, to Congress, re Libya (4 pp) R 1/20/05 F95-023/1 #648	1/86	P1
11. letter	draft of transmittal to Congress, re Libya R 1/20/05 F95-023/1 #649	1/86	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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SYSTEM II
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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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WITH TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

January 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President

THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Secretary of State

THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
The Secretary of the Treasury

THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
Secretary of Defense

THE HONORABLE EDWIN P. MEESE
Attorney General

THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence

THE HONORABLE JAMES C. MILLER
Director, OMB

ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive:
Acting Against Libyan Support of Libyan Terrorism ~~(et)~~

Attached at Tab A is the draft Decision Directive pursuant to yesterday's National Security Council meeting. Please note that the sensitive military and intelligence directive are contained in a Top Secret Annex to the NSDD at Tab B. We need to make a recommendation to the President regarding the bracketed language in the first tick in the Annex. ~~(et)~~

John M. Poindexter

John M. Poindexter

Attachment
Tab A NSDD
Tab B NSDD Annex

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BY anf, NARA, DATE 1/20/05

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTING AGAINST LIBYAN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (C)

The scope and tempo of Libyan-supported terrorist activity against western targets is widening and accelerating. Americans, along with Europeans and Israelis, are increasingly being victimized by this violence. Evidence of Qadhafi's support of terrorism, to include the December 27 attacks in Rome and Vienna, is indisputable. While the objectives of specific terror operations vary, I have determined that the policies and actions in support of international terrorism by the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States. (C)

To counter Qadhafi's behavior, the United States will pursue the following objectives:

- demonstrate resolve in a manner that reverses the perception of U.S. passivity in the face of mounting terrorist activity; and
- isolate Libya and reduce the flow of Western economic resources which help finance Libyan support of international terrorism. (C)

To achieve these objectives, I will issue an Executive Order invoking authorities under the International Economic Emergency Powers Act, the National Emergencies Act, Section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 as amended, and Section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code to terminate American economic activity in and related to Libya. The following economic sanctions shall be imposed:

- a total ban on direct export and import trade with Libya, except for food and medicine and donations of clothing intended to relieve human suffering;
- a ban on service contracts (present and future) in Libya;

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- prohibition of all other transactions with Libya or in which Libya has an interest by American nationals and persons in the United States, including travel-related transactions other than those incident to speedy departure from Libya or for journalistic activity;
- clarification that MFN under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Trade Act of 1974 is inapplicable to Libya; and
- as directed in NSDD 200, vessels under the effective control of or bearing the flag of Libya shall be refused entry to U.S. ports. Vessels suspected of being under the effective control of Libya may be subject to security provisions. (C)

Every effort shall be made to seek Allied implementation of comparable economic sanctions and agreement not to replace U.S. business and personnel. (C)

In addition to these economic measures, the United States will initiate a global diplomatic and public affairs campaign to isolate Libya. To that end the Department of State shall prepare a plan designed to curtail Libyan political activities inimical to western interests. (C)

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ANNEX

ACTING AGAINST LIBYAN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

In support of the stated objectives of NSDD , this annex directs additional military measures and intelligence actions.

(S)

Near-term military deployments shall signal U.S. resolve, reduce the potential risk to American citizens in Libya, heighten the readiness of U.S. forces to conduct military action, and create uncertainty regarding U.S. intentions. To accomplish this mission:

- [The Sixth Fleet Carrier Battle Group will withdraw from current exercises with the French Navy and move immediately to the Central Mediterranean Sea];
- A second Carrier Battle Group shall proceed as soon as possible to the Central Mediterranean Sea;
- These forces shall conduct operations in international waters, to include the Gulf of Sidra, which demonstrate U.S. resolve and capability.
- The Secretary of Defense should submit a plan for these operations for review and approval by January 9, 1986. (TS)

A significant component of U.S. strategy against Libya continues to be [REDACTED] contingency planning. The Secretary of Defense shall submit for review and approval by January 9 a revised terms of reference for the U.S. team that permits expanded roles for U.S. forces in the contingency planning. In order to enhance our [REDACTED] readiness to respond to Libyan aggression, the [REDACTED]

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Our long-term goals in Libya remain unchanged. [REDACTED]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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National Security
Decision Directive

THE NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

The Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism has completed an in-depth review of our current policies, capabilities, and resources for dealing with the terrorist threat. I have reviewed the Task Force Report and accompanying recommendations and concluded that our strategy is sound. I have determined that we must enhance our ability to confront this threat and to do so without compromising our basic democratic and human values. (U)

Terrorists undertake criminal acts that involve the use or threat of violence against innocent persons. These acts are premeditated, intended to achieve a political objective through coercion or intimidation of an audience beyond the immediate victims. U.S. citizens and installations, especially abroad, are increasingly being targeted for terrorist acts. Our policy, programs and responses must be effective in ameliorating this threat to our people, property and interests. (U)

Policy

U.S. policy on terrorism is unequivocal: firm opposition to terrorism in all its forms whether it is domestic terrorism perpetrated within U.S. territory, or international terrorism conducted inside or outside U.S. territory by foreign nationals or groups. The policy is based upon the conviction that to accede to terrorist demands places more American citizens at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best way of protecting the greatest number of people and ensuring their safety. At the same time, every available resource will be used to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage by terrorists. (U)

The U.S. Government considers the practice of terrorism by any person or group a potential threat to our national security and will resist the use of terrorism by all legal means available. The United States is opposed to domestic and international terrorism and is prepared to act in concert with other nations or unilaterally when necessary to prevent or respond to terrorist acts. (U)

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States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence. Whenever we have evidence that a state is mounting or intends to conduct an act of terrorism against us, we have a responsibility to take measures to protect our citizens, property, and interests. The USG will pay no ransoms, nor permit releases of prisoners or agree to other conditions that could serve to encourage additional terrorism. We will make no changes in its policy because of terrorist threats or acts. The United States is determined to act against terrorists without surrendering basic freedoms or endangering democratic principles. We oppose asylum, sanctuary, or safehaven for terrorists and will make every legal effort to extradite and prosecute terrorists. The USG encourages other governments to take similar strong stands against terrorism. (U)

The National Program

The national program to combat terrorism is designed to provide coordinated action before, during, and after terrorist incidents. Our program includes measures to deter, resolve and, when necessary, respond proportionately to terrorist attacks. The implementation of this strategy requires an organization compatible with the overall structure of the U.S. Government, and relies on the authorities and responsibilities of the various departments and agencies. (U)

The coordination of the Federal response to terrorist incidents will normally be the responsibility of the Lead Agency. The Lead Agency will be that agency with the most direct operational role in and responsibility for dealing with the particular terrorist incident at hand. The Lead Agency will coordinate all operational aspects of the incident, including press and intelligence. The Lead Agency will normally be designated as follows:

- The Department of State for international terrorist incidents that take place outside of U.S. territory. (U)
- The Department of Justice for terrorist incidents that take place within U.S. territory. Unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the Lead Agency within the Department of Justice for operational response to such incidents. (U)
- The FAA for aircraft hijackings within the special jurisdiction of the United States. (U)

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs will resolve any uncertainty on the designation of the Lead Agency or on agency responsibilities. (U)

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The entire range of diplomatic, economic, legal, military, para-military, covert action, and informational assets at our disposal must be brought to bear against terrorism. To ensure that these measures are fully integrated and mutually supportive, the following interagency groups will assist the Lead Agencies in the coordination of our national program to combat terrorism. (C)

1. The Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG). To support the Special Situation Group (SSG -- see NSDD-3 and NSDD-30) during a terrorist incident, a Terrorist Incident Working Group has been established. This group consists of representatives from State, Treasury, DOD, Justice, CIA, JCS, FBI, the Office of the Vice President, and the NSC staff, with augmentation from other agencies as required. The TIWG will be activated by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or at the request of any of the members. The NSC staff will provide a senior representative to chair the TIWG, and a staff member to serve as the Executive Director of the TIWG and chair the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG to review ongoing non-crisis operations/activities. The TIWG will normally remain convened for the duration of a terrorist incident. The Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism will serve as the Vice Chairman of the TIWG. (S)
2. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T). The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism, is responsible for the development of overall U.S. policy on terrorism, including, inter alia, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, interagency training activities, coordinated budget/programs, and the administration of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program. Membership will include all departments and agencies supporting the national program to combat terrorism. Vice Chairmen of the IG/T will be the Department of Justice and the Executive Director of the TIWG. (C)
3. The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT). The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the National Intelligence Officer for Counter-Terrorism and Narcotics (NIO/CT-NARC), provides intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG. It focuses and coordinates interagency intelligence efforts to counter international terrorist threats. In anticipation of terrorist incidents, the Committee will concentrate on threat alerts, trend assessments, and required procedural improvements, such as more rapid dissemination of critical information. (S)

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Actions

The Vice President's Task Force affirmed our fundamental approach for dealing with terrorism, however they made numerous recommendations to further improve our capabilities. Accordingly, I have reached the following decisions:

1. The recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism are to be fully and consistently implemented as follows:

A. For Immediate Implementation

- (1) The Secretary of State shall:

- Submit to the NSC a policy framework prepared by the IG/T for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist threats or attacks. (Task Force Recommendation No. 5) (U)
- Expand State Department's outreach program to hostage families. (Task Force Recommendation No. 12) (U)
- Continue efforts to enlist international cooperation in combatting terrorism through both bilateral and multi-lateral agreements. Particular emphasis should be given to concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing and prosecuting known terrorists. (Task Force Recommendations No. 17 and 18) (U)
- Continue a dialogue with media representatives to obtain support for denying terrorists the visibility they seek. (Task Force Recommendation No. 29) (U)
- Monitor abuses of diplomatic immunities in support of terrorists for possible sanctions against violators of the Vienna Convention. (Task Force Recommendation No. 32) (U)
- Provide, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, more extensive publicity regarding the terrorist reward program in order to more effectively integrate it into the overall counterterrorism (CT) effort. (Task Force Recommendation No. 34) (U)
- Through the IG/T and with the concurrence of the DCI, provide policy guidance for terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (S)

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(2) The Attorney General shall:

- Prepare and encourage enactment of legislation that makes the murder of U.S. citizens abroad a Federal crime. (Task Force Recommendation No. 35) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation that permits the death penalty for the murder of U.S. citizens during a hostage-taking. (Task Force Recommendation No. 36) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence (the Hyde proposal). (Task Force Recommendation No. 37) (U)
- Pursue enactment of legislation permitting deportation of aliens from the United States who are suspected of engaging in support for or conspiracy to conduct terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (U)
- Expedite deportation proceedings against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists who have violated their visa status. (Task Force Recommendation No. 40) (U)

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(4) The Director of Central Intelligence shall:

- In conjunction with the Department of State, expand terrorism intelligence exchanges with foreign governments. (Task Force Recommendation No. 22) (U)

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As Amended
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- (5) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall:
- Establish and maintain, in conjunction with the Departments of State and Justice and the NSC, a national programming document that depicts resources dedicated to combatting terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 1) (U)
- (6) The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall:
- Establish a full-time position on the NSC with a small staff dedicated to the national program. Ensure that the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG conducts periodic reviews of CT activities and those operations requiring interagency coordination. (Task Force Recommendation No. 3) ~~(S)~~
 - Provide coordinated public affairs/Congressional guidance to all departments/agencies involved in resolving a terrorist incident. (Task Force Recommendation No. 4) ~~(S)~~
 - Maintain a current list of options for responding to terrorist activity. (Task Force Recommendation No. 6) ~~(S)~~
 - Increase coordination and oversight of research and development (R&D) related to terrorism. (Task Force Recommendation No. 14) ~~(S)~~
 - Ensure senior government participation in NSC-coordinated terrorist incident simulations and exercises. (Task Force Recommendation No. 15) ~~(S)~~

B. For Implementation by May 1, 1986

- (1) The Secretary of State shall:
- Lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high-threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. (Task Force Recommendation No. 9) (U)
 - Review government-wide policies on travel documentation for U.S. employees and promulgate consistent guidelines throughout the Government. (Task Force Recommendation No. 10) (U)

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- Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas. (Task Force Recommendation No. 16) (U)
- Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas. (Task Force Recommendation No. 16) (U)
- Pursue bilateral arrangements for terrorism-related R&D exchanges. (Task Force Recommendation No. 19) (U)
- Develop a long-range strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. (Task Force Recommendation No. 28) (U)
- Under the auspices of the IG/T, review and submit proposals for:
 - New NSC Policy, Planning, and Operations Coordinating Boards. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 2) ~~(S)~~

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4c

- Devise an interagency coordinated plan to expand the current Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program, consistent with the President's budget, for aiding friendly governments in their efforts to combat terrorism. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 5). ~~(S)~~
- (2) The Attorney General shall:
- In conjunction with the Departments of State and Treasury, improve computerized systems for monitoring cross-border travel and visa control of known or suspected terrorists. (Task Force Recommendation No. 20) ~~(S)~~
 - Stimulate private and academic initiatives addressing the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal systems. (Task Force Recommendation No. 31) (U)

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- In conjunction with the Director of Central Intelligence, expand the international terrorist informant program, adding incentives such as immunity from prosecution, parole, citizenship, and residency grants. (Task Force Recommendation No. 33) (U)
- Review the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and determine whether terrorist movements or organizations are abusing its provisions. (Task Force Recommendation No. 38) (U)
- Evaluate whether present activities by some U.S. companies and individuals, such as paying ransoms, buying kidnapping insurance, and purchasing interviews with terrorists, might not be effectively made illegal under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 41) (C)
- Ensure that training and support of terrorists at so-called mercenary camps in the United States are not permitted under U.S. law. (Task Force Recommendation No. 39) (U)
- Pursue legislation to permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files so that individuals can be more thoroughly screened prior to being granted unescorted admission to nuclear reactor facilities. (Task Force Recommendation No. 42) (U)
- Complete review of the proposal to enhance Federal jurisdiction over domestic terrorist incidents. (Task Force Proposed Recommendation No. 3) (U)

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2. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs shall review progress made on the implementation of this directive and report the results to me by July 1, 1986. ~~(c)~~
3. The provisions of NSDD's 30 and 138 are hereby modified in accordance with this directive. ~~(c)~~

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S/S 8600257
United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

UNCLASSIFIED

January 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Press Themes and Questions and Answers for
Presidential Decision on Libyan Restrictions

I am herewith transmitting press themes and suggested
questions and answers relating to sanctions against Libya.

for *Nicholas M. Platt*
Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
Press Themes and Q's and A's

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Themes for Backgrounder

--The President announced tonight that we have taken rigorous steps to underscore our opposition to Qadhafi and his support for international terrorism.

--Nothing can justify terrorism. No political causes or ends can explain or rationalize the brutal murder of civilians.

--The President, by invoking IEEPA, has totally banned direct import and export trade with Libya, except for humanitarian purposes. He has also banned all service contracts with Libya and has prohibited all other transactions with Libya - or in which Libya has an interest - by the U.S. and its citizens. This includes travel other than that needed for the speedy departure of citizens from Libya or for journalistic activity;

--Companies that have continued to deal with Qadhafi's Libya since the imposition of our first sanctions in 1982 have been aware that we have been prepared to increase our sanctions if necessary, and our companies and citizens have been well aware of our opposition to their continued presence in Libya;

--It is useful to review the specific actions which led us to make the decision to impose more draconian economic sanctions on the Qadhafi regime;

--The attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, as well as other recent terrorist incidents, were carried out by individuals clearly belonging to the Abu Nidal terrorist group;

--Abu Nidal is not only based in Libya, but also receives financial support as well as terrorist training in that country. The passports used by his operatives in Vienna had been confiscated from Tunisians expelled from Libya last year. Qadhafi's diplomatic missions have given logistical assistance to Abu Nidal's terrorist assaults;

--Qadhafi's news agency went so far as to term the latest mass murder a "heroic act". Qadhafi himself said the massacres were justified. Abu Nidal in turn has said openly and readily that he admires Qadhafi and welcomes all of his support

--Yet Qadhafi's support for terrorism is not limited to the Abu Nidal group. For over a decade, Qadhafi's agents and terrorist groups based in Libya have carried out acts of terrorism and murder in the Middle East, Europe, East Asia and the United States. Qadhafi has sponsored repeated subversion and violence against his neighbors. He is a major arms supplier to Iran, and his troops remain in Chad;

--The cost of Qadhafi's support for terrorism goes beyond its innocent victims. European and Middle Eastern countries have lost over one billion dollars in tourism this year alone;

--Countries everywhere are spending millions if not more in added security costs, and we will probably never know the full extent of investment opportunities lost because of terrorism;

--Europe has borne the brunt of the latest two outrages, but Arab friends have also been among Qadhafi's victims. Our friends and allies now agree with us that such actions cannot be cost-free;

--After the attack at Rome Airport, Prime Minister Craxi of Italy said that "It is necessary to identify those states that guarantee the terrorists protection and the possibility to arm and organize themselves to carry out their bloody raids";

--We believe that the time has come for more rigorous and directed action to deter Qadhafi, even if we incur a measure of commercial loss. We have taken a first measured and appropriate step on that road;

--We do not contend that this will bring an end to Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorism. Such a goal will require the support and active involvement of a broad range of like-minded states;

--Nevertheless, with this Executive Order, we have made an important and clear statement, one that enjoys the broad support of the Congress and the American people - America and Americans will not do business with Qadhafi's Libya, and he must understand that support for terrorism is not cost-free;

--Further action is needed. We will consult with our friends, gauge the effect of these latest steps, and then decide whether we should pursue additional options which are available to us;

--If such steps are necessary, we will not hesitate to pursue them. Every state has a right to defend itself from terrorism. Meanwhile, we hold Qadhafi responsible for the safety of those Americans still in Libya;

--On the other hand, if this or any other Libyan regime decides to conform to the rules of civilized behavior, we will reassess our position. Our differences are not with the Libyan people, but with their leaders;

--For the moment, we have moved firmly and resolutely. America has made a strong and unequivocal statement that Qadhafi has become a pariah on the international stage and that we will have nothing more to do with him;

--We will build on this foundation to increase his isolation and the price of his support for terrorism. We call on others to work with us as we move toward our goal of bringing an end to Qadhafi's sponsorship of terrorism.

Question 1

Q: Doesn't the transaction ban requiring Americans to leave Libya cut across the basic constitutional right of Americans to travel and reside where they want to?

A: ABSOLUTELY NOT. IN FACT, THE SUPREME COURT HAS REPEATEDLY UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONTROLS ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS, INCLUDING THOSE RELATED TO TRAVEL, LIKE THESE -- MOST RECENTLY IN ITS JUNE 28, 1984 DECISION IN REGAN V. WALD, CHALLENGING THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY TO CURTAIL THE FLOW OF HARD CURRENCY TO CUBA BY RESTRICTING TRANSFERS RELATED TO TRAVEL.

Question 2

Q: With areas of this country still suffering from the effects of the recent recession, aren't we hurting ourselves more than the Libyans by cutting off exports and reducing U.S. jobs?

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A: THE IMPACT ON THE U.S. ECONOMY OF A CUT-OFF IN TRADE WITH LIBYA WILL BE MINIMAL, BUT WHATEVER ITS EFFECT, WE ARE PREPARED TO BEAR IT. NO PRICE TAG CAN BE PLACED ON LIBYA'S CONDEMNABLE ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN THE FACE OF QADHAFI'S CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO INSTIGATE TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST AMERICAN TARGETS OR THOSE OF OUR ALLIES, WE WISH TO UNDERSCORE TO LIBYA, OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES AND OUR CONCERNED FRIENDS EVERYWHERE THE WILLINGNESS OF THE UNITED STATES TO FOREGO ECONOMIC BENEFITS TO DEMONSTRATE OUR TOTAL OPPOSITION AND OPPROBRIUM FOR THOSE WHO SUPPORT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

Question 3

Q: Aren't we just "shooting ourselves in the foot" by preventing our own U.S. oil companies from doing business in Libya? Won't other nations come in and fill the breach?

A: WITHDRAWING U.S. OIL BUSINESS FROM LIBYA WILL CREATE ECONOMIC COSTS FOR LIBYA. ALSO, A KEY PURPOSE OF THESE STEPS IS TO MAKE THE FIRM AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT THAT WE WILL NOT DO BUSINESS WITH A REGIME WHICH PURSUES SUCH AN ACTIVE POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. WE WILL BE ASKING OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES FOR THEIR SUPPORT.

Question 4

Q: Aren't we overusing economic sanctions? First Nicaragua, then South Africa, now Libya. Isn't this an over-reaction? How can the U.S. business community recover from the image that it is not a reliable supplier?

A: THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS EXERCISED EXTREME CAUTION IN IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. IN EACH INSTANCE, WE HAVE FIRST TRIED OTHER MEANS TO SIGNAL OUR UNHAPPINESS WITH THE BEHAVIOR OF THESE COUNTRIES. THE IMPOSITION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IS, HOWEVER, THE MOST POWERFUL PEACETIME PROTEST WE CAN MAKE.

Question 5a

Q: How will these new orders specifically affect Americans now in Libya?

A: SECTION 1(g) OF THE EXECUTIVE ORDER PROHIBITS U.S. NATIONALS FROM ENGAGING IN ANY UNLICENSED TRANSACTIONS IN LIBYA, OTHER THAN THOSE NECESSARY TO EFFECT DEPARTURE FROM THAT COUNTRY.

PERSONS WHO VIOLATE ANY LICENSE, ORDER OR REGULATION ISSUED UNDER THE EXECUTIVE ORDER ARE SUBJECT TO CIVIL PENALTIES OR FINES UP TO \$10,000. MOREOVER, WILLFUL VIOLATIONS CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE UP TO \$50,000 OR IMPRISONMENT FOR NOT MORE THAN 10 YEARS, OR BOTH. (50 U.S.C. 1705)

Question 5b

Q: What will be the impact on pre-existing contracts for trade with Libya?

A: UNITED STATES COMPANIES WILL NO LONGER BE ABLE TO PERFORM UNDER EXISTING CONTRACTS.

Question 5c

Q: What is our current trade relationship with Libya? How much do we now export? What kinds of goods?

A: EXPORTS FROM THE U.S. TO LIBYA ARE PRESENTLY AT APPROXIMATELY \$300 MILLION PER YEAR, AND CONSIST PRIMARILY OF MACHINERY AND TRANSPORTATION EQUIPMENT, MANUFACTURED GOODS FOR INDUSTRIAL USES AND FOODSTUFFS.

Question 5d

Q: Has the oil ban been effective? How much have we already reduced our imports from Libya?

A: THE BAN HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE IN THAT WE NOW IMPORT NO LIBYAN CRUDE OIL OR PETROLEUM PRODUCTS. IN 1981 WE IMPORTED A TOTAL OF 115.6 MILLION BARRELS, OR MORE THAN A QUARTER OF LIBYA'S TOTAL OIL EXPORTS FOR THAT YEAR. OUR BAN ON LIBYAN OIL IMPORTS SERVES TO DEMONSTRATE U.S. OPPOSITION TO QADHAFI'S ACTIVE PURSUIT OF TERRORISM AND HIS ATTEMPTS TO SUBVERT GOVERNMENTS FRIENDLY TO THE U.S.

Question 5e

Q: What are the extent of Libyan assets in the U.S.? Are they going to be frozen?

A: LIBYAN ASSETS IN THE U.S. TOTAL IN THE HUNDREDS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS; THEY ARE NOT FROZEN.

Question 5f

Q: How much do U.S. companies have invested in Libya? What will happen to their assets there? What about the financial cost to them and to U.S. banks for defaulting on their performance bonds?

A: NO PRECISE FIGURES ARE AVAILABLE ON THE LEVEL OF INVESTMENT OF U.S. COMPANIES IN LIBYA. IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE FOR ME TO SPECULATE ON THE FUTURE OF SUCH ASSETS.

Question 6

Q: What has been the reaction of the U.S. business community to these sanctions? Did they receive any forewarning? Do you expect court challenges?

A: THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY STATED ITS POSITION THAT BOTH U.S. CITIZENS AND U.S. COMPANIES SHOULD NOT REMAIN IN LIBYA. WHILE U.S. FIRMS DID NOT RECEIVE SPECIFIC FOREWARNING OF THIS PARTICULAR ACTION, COMPANIES THAT HAVE CONTINUED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE LIBYAN ECONOMY SINCE THE IMPOSITION OF OUR FIRST COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN 1982 HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AWARE THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS BEEN PREPARED TO INCREASE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TOWARDS LIBYA IF NECESSARY.

Question 7

Q: Are these economic sanctions evidence of a "do-nothing" policy? Shouldn't we be responding with force instead?

A: THESE SANCTIONS AND OUR EARLIER ONES HAVE A DEMONSTRABLE EFFECT ON LIBYA'S ECONOMIC WELL-BEING. THEY SIGNAL OUR DETERMINATION TO ISOLATE QADHAFI'S REGIME AND LIMIT HIS ABILITY TO SPREAD TERRORISM. QADHAFI'S LIBYA MERITS SIMILAR TREATMENT BY ALL CIVILIZED STATES. AMERICA NEITHER SHOULD NOR WILL DO BUSINESS WITH QADHAFI. OUR SANCTIONS ARE AN EXAMPLE THAT WE URGE OUR FRIENDS TO FOLLOW.

BEFORE CONSIDERING OTHER OPTIONS, WE FIRST WANTED TO TAKE EVERY POSSIBLE STEP TO SHOW OUR RESOLVE TO CUT OFF ALL AMERICAN COMMERCE WITH THE QADHAFI REGIME. ONCE WE JUDGE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THIS STEP, AND THE SUPPORT WE RECEIVE FROM OTHERS, WE CAN THEN CONSIDER WHICH, IF ANY, OF OUR OTHER OPTIONS WE SHOULD PURSUE.

Question 8

Q: Are we trying to get our citizens out of Libya because we are about to engage in military action?

A: AMERICANS SHOULD NOT DO BUSINESS WITH QADHAFI'S LIBYA.

WE HAVE REPEATEDLY ISSUED STRONG RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMERICANS TO DEPART LIBYA, AND U.S. PASSPORTS HAVE NOT BEEN VALID FOR TRAVEL THERE SINCE 1981. THE REASONS ARE CLEAR: WE CANNOT ENSURE THE WELFARE OF AMERICANS IN THAT COUNTRY, AND THE UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF THE QADHAFI REGIME POSES A REAL THREAT TO THEIR SAFETY. TOGETHER WITH THE ECONOMIC MEASURES WE HAVE ANNOUNCED, THESE FACTS SHOULD ARGUE COMPELLINGLY AGAINST CONTINUED PRESENCE OF AMERICANS IN LIBYA.

Question 9

Q: Isn't this new policy likely to create a hostage situation in Libya? How do we know that Qadhafi will let them leave?

A: WE HOLD QADHAFI FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WELFARE OF THOSE AMERICANS STILL IN LIBYA. I WILL NOT SPECULATE ON THE COURSE WE MAY FOLLOW IF QADHAFI TAKES ANY ACTIONS WHICH THREATEN OUR CITIZENS.

Question 10

Q: Why aren't our NATO allies doing more to cooperate with us? Don't they share our perception of the danger posed by Libyan support of terrorism?

A: WE ARE URGING OUR FRIENDS AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING OUR NATO ALLIES, TO TAKE MEASURES TO REDUCE QADHAFI'S ABILITY TO SPREAD TERRORISM. OBVIOUSLY, THEIR EFFECT WILL BE GREATER IF OTHERS PARTICIPATE. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A GROWING PERCEPTION IN THE CIVILIZED WORLD OF THE DANGER POSED BY QADHAFI, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO ENCOURAGE THE WORLD COMMUNITY TO ACT IN CONCERT TO CONTAIN HIS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.

Question 11

Q: Why should we contribute to Western European defense if they will not cooperate with us on sanctions against terrorism?

A: WE SHARE MANY COMMON INTERESTS AND FACE MANY COMMON DANGERS WITH OUR NATO ALLIES. WE ARE CALLING UPON THEM TO SUPPORT US IN OUR ACTIONS, AND TAKE SIMILAR MEASURES OF THEIR OWN. WE HOPE THEY WILL SEE THE COMMON INTERESTS WE ALL SHARE IN FIGHTING TERRORISM.

Question 12

Q: What do we expect the political impact of these sanctions to be in Libya? Won't they simply rally support around the Qadhafi regime?

A: OUR DIFFERENCES ARE NOT WITH THE LIBYAN PEOPLE, BUT WITH QADHAFI AND HIS TERRORISM-SUPPORTING REGIME. WE BELIEVE OUR SANCTIONS WILL MAKE CLEAR TO THAT REGIME THAT THERE IS A PRICE TO BE PAID FOR TERRORISM. WE DO NOT BELIEVE LIBYA'S FURTHER ISOLATION IS LIKELY TO GARNER MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI AND HIS DESTRUCTIVE POLICIES.

Question 13

Q: If the regime in Libya does change and a more moderate leader replaces Qadhafi, won't we be harmed by our absence of a "presence" there? Won't it be hard for U.S. companies to reenter the Libyan market?

A: SHOULD A MODERATE LIBYAN REGIME EMERGE WE WOULD CONSIDER WHAT U.S. ACTIONS WERE APPROPRIATE UNDER THE CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES. WITH RESPECT TO "HARM" TO U.S. BUSINESS INTERESTS IN THE POST-QADHAFI PERIOD, WE FIRMLY BELIEVE AMERICA SHOULD NOT DO BUSINESS WITH QADHAFI, REGARDLESS OF ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS.

Question 14

Q: How do these economic sanctions fit with reported plans to destabilize the Qadhafi regime?

A: THESE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS WERE UNDERTAKEN IN RESPONSE TO QADHAFI'S CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY THE ABU NIDAL GROUP THAT WAS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ATROCITIES IN ROME AND VIENNA. THEY ARE INTENDED TO RAISE THE PRICE QADHAFI MUST PAY FOR HIS SUPPORT OF TERRORISM.

Question 15

Q: What reaction do you anticipate in the Arab world?
Won't there be some sympathy for a fellow Arab absorbing punishment from the West as a result of his support for the Palestinian cause?

A: WE HAVE ENCOURAGED ALL OUR FRIENDS TO CONDEMN QADHAFI FOR HIS SUPPORT OF TERRORISM, NOT FOR HIS CLAIMS OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE. MANY ARAB STATES HAVE SUFFERED THEMSELVES FROM THE SCOURGE OF TERRORISM, AND REALIZE IT MUST BE ENDED.

Question 16

Q: Won't Qadhafi simply retaliate with an acceleration of his terrorist activities? Haven't we simply given another twist to the cycle of violence in the region -- even though economic sanctions are "peaceful" in nature?

A: THE WORLD CANNOT AFFORD TO PERMIT TERRORISTS TO CONTINUE THEIR MURDEROUS ACTIVITIES OR GRANT THEM IMMUNITY FROM RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR ACTIONS. THE PRICE WHICH WOULD ULTIMATELY BE PAID IN TERMS OF VIOLENCE AND LOSS OF INNOCENT LIFE WOULD FAR EXCEED THE COST OF TAKING EFFECTIVE ACTION TO STOP TERRORISM NOW.

Question 17

Q: Aren't we running risks to our citizens here in the U.S. by provoking Qadhafi with economic sanctions? What about his threat to bring terrorism to the streets of America? Haven't we made it more likely that U.S. airports will suffer attacks like the ones in Rome and Vienna?

A: WE HAVE TAKEN A VARIETY OF MEASURES TO REDUCE, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, THE RISK OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES. WITH RESPECT TO QADHAFI'S THREATS, I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER TO ANY ADDITIONAL LIBYAN-BACKED TERRORISM. THE TIME COMES WHEN WE MUST SAY "ENOUGH IS ENOUGH."

Question 18

Q: Isn't there a touch of chauvinism in our foreign policy? Aren't we reacting differently to the deaths at the airports compared to the deaths in the Tunis raid and the deaths in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon?

A: THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CLEAR ITS ABSOLUTE OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM. COUNTRIES SUBJECTED TO CONTINUED TERRORIST ATTACKS HAVE A RIGHT TO RESPOND IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER IN SELF-DEFENSE. INNOCENT PEOPLE EVERYWHERE HAVE THE RIGHT TO LIVE FREE FROM TERRORISM.

Question 19

Q: Isn't what we call terrorism merely the method forced on groups that lack conventional military power? Aren't the Palestinians and Abu Nidal's group using methods that were glorified during our own Revolution and by partisan groups in occupied territories during World War II?

A: THERE IS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR TERRORISM -- PERIOD. WE CATEGORICALLY REJECT ANY ARGUMENTS THAT THERE ARE POLITICAL CAUSES AND ENDS WHICH CAN SOMEHOW EXPLAIN OR RATIONALIZE THE BRUTAL MURDER OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS.

Question 20

Q: Aren't we meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign state when we act against groups we don't like?

A: -- NO, QADHAFI HAS ENGAGED IN UNJUSTIFIABLE ATTACKS ON US CITIZENS THROUGH HIS SUPPORT OF TERRORISTS. THE SITUATION IS NO DIFFERENT IF HE HAD USED HIS REGULAR ARMED FORCES TO DO SO.

-- OUR LATEST RESPONSE IS INTENDED TO CONVINCE QADHAFI THAT THESE ACTIVITIES ARE NOT COST-FREE. THERE ARE NO POLITICAL GOALS WHICH CAN JUSTIFY THE MURDER OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS, INCLUDING AN 11 YEAR OLD CHILD.

Question 21

Q: Where is the "smoking gun"? Aren't you proceeding on only flimsy and circumstantial evidence of Libyan complicity in the Rome and Vienna incidents?

A: --THE ATTACKS AT THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS, AS WELL AS OTHER RECENT TERRORIST INCIDENTS, WERE CARRIED OUT BY THE ABU NIDAL GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN OPENLY SUPPORTED BY QADHAFI.

--ABU NIDAL, THE LEADER OF THE GROUP RESPONSIBLE FOR THESE RECENT OUTRAGES, OPERATES FREELY IN LIBYA. HE HAS CONDUCTED TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THAT COUNTRY, AND LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS HAVE GIVEN LOGISTICAL ASSISTANCE TO THOSE INVOLVED IN TERRORIST ASSAULTS. HE HAS PUBLICLY PRAISED AND THANKED QADHAFI FOR HIS SUPPORT.

--THE TUNISIAN GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY REVEALED THAT THE PASSPORTS USED BY THE VIENNA TERRORISTS WERE SEQUESTERED BY THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT WHEN TUNISIAN WORKERS WERE EXPELLED LAST SUMMER. THESE DOCUMENTS COULD ONLY HAVE COME TO THE TERRORISTS THROUGH LIBYAN GOVERNMENT ACTION.

--AS THE ITALIAN AND AUSTRIAN INVESTIGATIONS HAVE CONCLUDED, THE EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED.

Question 22

Q: Aren't these sanctions and other actions the Reagan Administration has taken toward Libya evidence that the U.S. has a double standard and will not tolerate a developing country, like Libya, deviating from the U.S. in its definition of foreign policy goals?

A: WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT NORMAL ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL ISSUES ON WHICH GOVERNMENTS AND INDIVIDUALS MAY, AND OFTEN DO, DIFFER. AT ISSUE IS INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON WHICH THERE CAN BE NO DOUBLE STANDARD; IT MUST BE ROOTED OUT.

Question 23

Q: Isn't the terrorism that comes from Iran and from Syria a greater threat to U.S. interests? Why did you single out Libya - because it was an easy target? Why aren't you doing more to punish the regimes of Syria and Iran

A: -- LIBYA IS CLEARLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE LATEST INCIDENTS
-- THE EGYPTAIR HIJACKING AND MURDERS IN MALTA AND THE MURDERS IN THE ROME AND VIENNA AIRPORTS. LIBYA PUBLICLY EXPRESSED APPROVAL OF THE AIRPORT MURDERS, CALLING THEM "HEROIC ACTS". SUBSEQUENT LIBYAN STATEMENTS ATTEMPTING TO DISCLAIM ANY CONNECTION RING HOLLOW IN THE FACE OF THEIR PROVEN TRACK RECORD. WE ARE ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM FROM OTHER STATES, AND HAVE SPOKEN ON THIS ISSUE PUBLICLY AND OFTEN- OUR POSITION IS WELL KNOWN._

Question 24

Q: Why are you acting now when you let the major terrorist incidents of the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon and our Embassy there go unpunished?

A: THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE TRAGEDIES SHOULD NOT ASSUME THAT WE HAVE FORGOTTEN THEIR CRIMES. WE WILL CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO BRING THEM TO JUSTICE. THIS WILL NOT BE EASY, BUT OUR EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE.

Question 25

Q: Exactly which U.S. interests have been threatened by Libya's alleged support of international terrorism? Isn't it true that, with the exception of the sacking of the U.S. Embassy there in 1979, every intended Libyan terrorist action against a U.S. target has been thwarted in advance?

A: -- UNFORTUNATELY, WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO THWART ALL TERRORIST ACTIONS IN ADVANCE. WE WILL NOT FORGET THE FIVE AMERICANS WHO WERE MURDERED AT THE AIRPORT IN ROME, INCLUDING NATASHA SIMPSON, AN 11-YEAR-OLD SCHOOLGIRL. NOR WILL WE FORGET SCARLETT MARIE ROGENKAMP, KILLED IN THE HIJACKING OF THE EGYPTAIR PLANE TO MALTA.

-- THE QADHAFI REGIME HAS EVEN EXPORTED TERRORISM TO THE UNITED STATES, AND SEVERAL LIBYANS KNOWN OPPONENTS OF THE QADHAFI REGIME HAVE BEEN KILLED OR WOUNDED. A LIBYAN DIPLOMAT AT THE UNITED NATIONS WAS EXPELLED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN 1985 AFTER THE FBI DETERMINED HE WAS INVOLVED IN A PLOT AGAINST LIBYAN DISSIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES.

-- FROM JANUARY THROUGH NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR THERE WERE 695 INCIDENTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ABOUT 200 OF

WHICH WERE DIRECTED AGAINST AMERICAN INDIVIDUALS OR FACILITIES. NEARLY 2,000 PERSONS WERE KILLED OR INJURED, INCLUDING 17 AMERICAN DEAD AND 122 HURT.

-- THE QADHAFI REGIME IS ONE OF THE MAIN SUPPORTERS. OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. PROOF OF QADHAFI'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE ABU NIDAL GANG AND HIS REGIME'S DIRECT INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM IS CLEAR.

Question 26

Q. Libya has targetted U.S. personnel and interests before, under previous administrations. Isn't the private, diplomatic approach the best one to follow? Doesn't the attention accorded Qadhafi by sanctions and Administration rhetoric merely make him more important-in his own eyes and in the region?

A. LIBYA HAS BEEN STEADILY INTENSIFYING ITS SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM AND ITS TERRORIST ACTIONS POSE GREATER AND GREATER THREAT TO THE WORLD. THE INDISCRIMINATE NATURE OF THE SLAYINGS IN MALTA AND EUROPE HAVE FORCED US TO ADOPT MORE STRINGENT AND PUBLIC MEASURES.

Question 27

Q. Qadhafi has been reported to be mentally off-balance. Aren't you running the risk of provoking even more dangerous behavior by publicly punishing him with these sanctions?

A. QADHAFI CANNOT ESCAPE RESPONSIBILITY THROUGH SOME SORT OF "MAD MAN" THEORY. QADHAFI AND HIS REGIME ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR ACTS AND THEY MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE A PRICE.

-- OUR DIFFERENCES ARE NOT WITH THE LIBYAN PEOPLE AS A WHOLE, BUT WITH THEIR LEADERS. I AM DETERMINED THAT QADHAFI'S INVOLVEMENT WILL NOT BE COST-FREE.

Question 28

Q: With all the tough statements that came out of your Administration-- officially and unofficially-- isn't this final response a rather weak-kneed one? Won't perceptions of U.S. power be affected adversely?

A: --THIS ADMINISTRATION REQUIRES THAT ANY RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BE APPROPRIATE, MEASURED AND FOCUSSED. WHAT I HAVE ANNOUNCED THIS EVENING MEETS THAT REQUIREMENT.

-- IT MAY NOT, HOWEVER, BE A FINAL RESPONSE. IF QADHAFI CONTINUES HIS INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO CONSIDER ADDITIONAL MEASURES.

--WE HOPE THAT OTHER STATES, WHICH HAVE ALSO SUFFERED GRIEVOUSLY FROM THE QADHAFI REGIME'S SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, WILL JOIN US IN OUR EFFORTS. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL PRESS FORWARD REGARDLESS.



Washington, D.C. 20520

January 6, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Transmittal of President's Report to the Congress
with Respect to Economic Sanctions Against Libya

I am transmitting at Tab 1 a report from the President to the Congress with regard to the imposition of economic sanctions against Libya. The report would be submitted pursuant to Section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. Section 1703, Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, and Section 301 of the National Emergency Act, 50 U.S.C. Section 1631.

I am also transmitting at Tab 2 the draft text of a letter transmitting the President's report to the Congressional Leadership. The letter and report should be transmitted to The Honorable Robert Dole, The Honorable Robert C. Byrd, The Honorable Thomas P. O'Neill, and The Honorable Robert H. Michel.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - Report from the President
- Tab 2 - Draft Text of Transmittal Letter

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BY 015, NARA, DATE 10/22/05

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Economic Sanctions Against Libya

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1703, section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, and section 301 of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. section 1631, I hereby report to the Congress that I have exercised my statutory authority to declare a national emergency and to:

- ° prohibit purchases and imports from and exports to Libya;
- ° ban U.S.-Libya maritime and aviation relations;
- ° ban trade in services relating to projects in Libya;
- ° ban credits or loans or the transfer of anything of value to Libya or its nationals, except their property held prior to the effective date of this order or transactions allowed by regulations providing for normal activities by Libyans lawfully in the United States; and
- ° prohibit transactions relating to travel by Americans to or in Libya, other than for commercial activities permitted until February 1, 1986 or those necessary for prompt departure from Libya or for journalistic travel.

These prohibitions are subject to regulation by the Secretary of the Treasury. Certain of the prohibitions in the order will apply as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Standard time, February 1, 1986. The remainder of the prohibitions of the order will become effective immediately.

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BY smf, NAI DATE 1/20/05

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I am enclosing a copy of the Executive order that I have issued making this declaration and exercising these authorities.

I have authorized these steps in response to the emergency situation created by international terrorism, in this instance the actions and policies of the Government of Libya. Its use and support of terrorism against the United States, other countries and innocent persons violates international law and minimum standards of human behavior. These Libyan actions and policies constitute a threat to the security of the the United States as well as the international community. Our nation's security includes the security of its citizens and their right freely to go about their lives at home and abroad. Libyan use of and support for terrorism also constitutes a threat to the vital foreign policy interests of the United States and of all other states dedicated to international peace and security.

Since Libya was officially designated under U.S. law in 1979 as a country that has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism, the United States has taken a number of steps in response to hostile Libyan policies and actions. We have denied licenses for exports that may contribute to Libya's military potential or enhancing its ability to support acts of international terrorism. We have denied export of most national security controlled items; of goods or technical data which could contribute directly to the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex; of aircraft, large off-road vehicles and parts with a

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high risk of diversion by Libya for military activities; and for oil and gas technology and equipment not available from third-country sources. On the import side, we have banned Libyan petroleum and, since November 1985, Libyan refined petroleum products. We have stopped Libyans from coming to the United States for aviation maintenance, flight operations or nuclear related studies. We have taken measures to limit the expansion of Libyan UN Mission facilities. We have also repeatedly called upon corporations to withdraw American citizens from Libya, for their safety, and we have restricted the use of U.S. passports for travel there. All these measures have not deterred Libya from its use and support of terrorism. Moreover, approximately 1500 Americans from remaining in Libya.

The Congress of the United States has repeatedly deplored the Qadhafi regime's use of and support for international terror. Recently, it did so by enacting section 504 of the International Security and Development Act of 1985. Moreover, I have determined that Libya falls within the terms of another statute directed by Congress against those countries which support terrorism against civil aviation, section 1114 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended.

The United States reaffirms its call to Libya and all nations supporting terrorism to turn away from that policy. The United States also calls upon other nations to join with us in isolating the terrorists and their supporters. We must demonstrate by firm political and economic sanctions that the

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international community considers such actions intolerable, that states which engage in such actions cannot expect to be accepted members of the international community.

Failure to call Libya into account for its policy places the civilized world at the mercy of terrorism. This has necessitated the steps I have taken today. The terrible tragedies of Vienna and Rome demonstrate that no nation can be immune, that each nation must bear its fair share of the vital effort against the politics of terror. I call upon every nation to do so now.

Ronald Reagan

The White House,
January __, 1986.

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Draft Text of Transmittal Letter

I am hereby transmitting a report, pursuant to section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and section 505(b) of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, regarding the actions I have taken today with respect to Libya.

I have taken these actions in response to the actions and policies of the Government of Libya. Its use and support of terrorism against the United States, other countries and innocent persons violates international law and minimum standards of human behavior. Since Libya was officially designated under United States Law in 1979 as a country that has repeatedly supported acts of international terrorism, the United States has taken a number of steps in response to hostile Libyan policies and actions. These measures, however, have not deterred Libya from its use and support of terrorism. Failure to call Libya into account for its policy places the civilized world at the mercy of terrorism. This has necessitated the steps I have taken today.

Ronald Reagan

The White House,
January _____, 1986.

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