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Date: 1/15/97

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Nicholas Platt to John Poindexter (2 pp) R 11/4/03 NLSMO2-021 #19	1/2/86	P1
2. checklist	attachment to item #1 (3 pp) PART. 11/4/03 NLSMO2-021 #20	n.d.	P1
3. memo	Poindexter to Shultz et al [91257] A 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #173	12/11/85	P1
4. report	attachment to item #3 (2 pp) [91257] P 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #174	n.d.	P1
5. memo	Caspar Weinberger to APNSA, re terrorist attacks (partial page 3, pages 1-2 closed)	12/31/85	P1 B6
6. memo	William Crowe to Secretary of Defense, re Libya (3 pp)	12/31/85	P1 B6
7. list	re Libya (10 pp)	n.d.	P1 B6
8. memo	Platt to Poindexter, re Libya (2 pp)	n.d.	P1
9. EO	draft, re Libya (4 pp) R 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #176	n.d.	P1
10. analysis	draft, re EO (5 pp) R 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #177	n.d.	P1
11. paper	re approaches (2 pp) A 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #178	n.d.	P1
12. Q and As	re Libya (3 pp) R 1/11/05 F95-023/1 #179	n.d.	P1
13. graphic	copy, re Libya D 7/11/05 F95-023/1 #180	1/5/86	PT B1, B3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Chronology of Press Reports,
U.S. Actions Against Libya
Sunday, 29 December 1985 - Friday, 3 January 1985

29 December

- Pentagon officials continued to monitor events today. The aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea, part of the Sixth Fleet, remained anchored in Naples rather than steaming toward trouble spots in the Mediterranean as it has in other crises, officials said. (WPost)
- A senior Administration official, explaining the rationale of those urging U.S. military reprisal, said it is less important to punish the terrorists responsible for the attack than the countries that harbor and train them, such as Syria, Libya and Iran. (WPost)

31 December

- In addition to [diplomatic and economic] pressures, Reagan is reported to have authorized covert CIA actions aimed at undermining the Libyan regime. (WPost)
- White House spokesman Speakes said that although military options were always a possibility, he could not say whether they were under consideration. (NYTimes)
- A high Administration official said tonight that President Regan was awaiting delivery of a list of military options prepared by the Pentagon. The officials said, however, that it was unclear if the options involved direct military action against Libya or were more general. (NYTimes)
- [The officials] did not rule out American military intelligence support for allies in the region. Such support has been offered after previous Middle East terrorist incidents. (NYTimes)

1 January

- In Washington today, Defense Department officials continued to review possible retaliatory targets in Libya with the idea of making a recommendation to Reagan later this week about the advisability of a bombing strike, according to Pentagon officials. (WPost)
- Defense Department officials have prepared a list requested by the White House of military strikes that could be made against Libya for its role in last week's terrorist attacks. (WTimes, NYTimes)

- Pentagon officials declined to comment on the preparation of contingency plans...[but] said there was no preparation under way of U.S. forces for any actions against Libya. (WTimes)
- Administration sources, who spoke on the condition they not be identified, said an option paper of possible military responses was being prepared and scheduled to go to the President yesterday. (WTimes)
- Administration sources challenged [a report on Libyan Sa-5s, saying] U.S. intelligence shows none of the missiles are operational, or are being manned by Soviets. Estimates indicate the missiles will not be operational for another five or six months. (WTimes)

3 January

- The call for increased measures against Libya came as the U.S. aircraft carrier Coral Sea ended a holiday stop in Naples to cruise the central Mediterranean close to the Gulf of Sidra and the Libyan coast. (WTimes)
- The Pentagon refused to comment on televised reports last night that U.S. forces in the Med have been built up and that a Soviet intelligence ship is providing information on U.S. movements to Soviet advisers in Libya. (WTimes)
- ✓ - [The President's rejection of a threat by Qadhaffi] came as his military advisers sifted through a Defense Department contingency list of bombing targets in Libya ranging from a government facility to antiaircraft sites, which could be reached by Navy and Air Force carrier planes and fighter bombers based in Britain. (WPost)
- Fearing an attack, Libya sent its ships to sea yesterday and dispersed its aircraft around the country, U.S. officials disclosed last night. (WPost)
- The contingency list...is intended to pinpoint targets against which the President could retaliate without killing innocent civilians, according to informed sources. (WPost)
- [JCS] have recommended against attacking targets not directly linked to terrorists from Abu Nidal's group. (WPost)

- The military contingency planning has looked at the use of FA18 bombers on the carrier USS Coral Sea, scheduled to leave Naples early today; F-111 fighter bombers in Britain and B-52 bombers based in the U.S., officials said. (WPost)
- The B-52s were considered an option earlier in the week, in part because Libya would not have known they were coming, whereas the U.S. would have tipped its hand if it had ordered the Coral Sea to cut short its port call. But now that the Coral Sea is leaving Naples on schedule, its bombers and the F-111s in Britain have emerged as the favored military option if Reagan should order a military strike. (WPost)
- A senior State Department official said no no thought was being given to joint military action with Israel against Libya because the U.S. did not want to seem in collusion with Israel against an Arab country. (NYTimes)

**National Security Council
The White House**

System # _____

Package # _____

DOCLOG _____ A/O _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	<u>1</u>	<u>P</u>	
William Martin			
Don Fortier	<u>2</u>		<u>2</u>
Paul Thompson			
Florence Gantt			
John Poindexter			
William Martin			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Am
State report on EST - original Yanked
to Ollie. Dr.
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Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Operational Procedures for Emergency
Support Team (EST) Deployments

In response to your December 11 memorandum, we have sent a cable sent to all diplomatic posts describing in general terms the capabilities and services offered by the Emergency Support Team (EST). Enclosed you will find a copy of the Department's EST incident response preparation and execution checklist. Bob Oakley, our TIWG representative, will serve as the Department's point of contact for all EST matters.

At several recent meetings of the EST Working Group we have developed plans to provide detailed briefings on our various capabilities to respond to terrorist attacks and to assist other governments in doing so, including training, intelligence, technology and the actual use of US military forces. We have tentative plans to brief some 30 embassies and host governments over the next several months. Six interagency briefing teams will be formed and each team will be led by a senior State Department representative. The teams will include single representatives from CIA, JSOC and the appropriate theater military commander. Current plans envision dispatching the first briefing team to the Middle East in mid to late February depending upon the availability of posts and host governments to receive the team. Subsequent teams plan to visit the Persian Gulf, Central America, South America and the Pacific. Special arrangements are being considered for key Western European governments, with whom we wish to discuss cooperation in assisting third countries, and possible advance deployment of US personnel and forces.

The State Department effort to identify and prepare a suitable number of senior EST team leaders is progressing and several have already been identified. We have also identified the need for some additional communication equipment which, if validated, will require some longer term procurement. As we progress in completing the actions above, we intend to keep you fully informed through the TIWG.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

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NLS Mo2-021#19

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DECL: OADR

BY LOS NARA, DATE 11/4/03

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-2-

Attachments:

1. EST Preparation and Execution Checklist (S/S)
2. White House Memorandum - EST Operations (S)

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**EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM
PREPARATION AND EXECUTION CHECKLIST**

Pre-Incident Actions

- Ensure availability of qualified EST team leaders
 - Provide necessary briefings on mission, policy, capabilities and procedures
 - Up-date the alert and response procedures
- Ensure personnel and equipment status can meet TIWG response requirements
 - 1 - Ensure standing travel orders are available for each team member
 - Ensure GTRs are available to permit immediate airline travel for each team member
 - Ensure advance travel pay is quickly available for each team member
 - Ensure telephone beepers are assigned to each team member
 - Ensure necessary personal gear is available (sleeping bags, cold weather gear etc.)

Execution Actions:

- Upon notification of an overseas terrorist incident - regardless of potential USG involvement
 - Alert interagency EST points of contact of possible EST deployment
 - Alert Department EST team participants of possible EST deployment
 - Determine existing communications at incident and immediately surrounding posts

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NLS MDZ-021 #20

By LAJ, NARA, Date 11/4/03

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- 2 -

- Prepare EST communication packages for possible deployment
- Upon decision to deploy the EST, ask TIWG to provide concept of operations
 - A single or staged deployment
 - Proposed destinations for single and/or follow on elements
 - Possible forward and intermediate staging bases
 - Deployment configuration
 - 1 - Size and composition of team - size of each element
 - Desired special equipment and communications packages
 - Airlift and departure information
 - Type aircraft assigned
 - Place and time of departure
 - Individual reporting information
- Formal deployment of the EST
 - Notify Department EST team to deploy and provide departure information
 - Deploy Department EST communication package
 - Compile roster of EST team members
 - Confirm with DOD [REDACTED] that deploying aircraft are SATCOM equipped
 - Confirm with DOD that EST common SATCOM key is available
 - Initiate efforts to acquire necessary overflight rights, country access and forward bases to support EST operations

E.O. 12958
AS AMENDED
1.5(b)

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- 3 -

- Dispatch Prize Money handling and reporting instructions to appropriate posts
- At the aircraft prior to departure team leader will:
 - Assume lead of the team
 - Account for team participants and their equipment
 - Keep Department advised of the pre-departure status of team, equipment, and aircraft
- En route to the incident site or forward base
 - Department should advise team leader of changes in the terrorist incident situation, particularly as they affect the team
 - Follow up changes in itinerary to ensure that the team will be properly met and billeted.
 - If required, coordinate intra theater airlift to re-deploy elements of or the full EST
- Employment in the theater - embassy, forward base, incident site and combinations thereof
 - Ensure the EST communications network connecting State, JCS, JSOC, [REDACTED] and forward deployed EST/JSOC elements remains operational.
 - Support EST coordination and logistic requirements as dictated by TIWG and Department
- Re-deployment of EST to the States
 - Coordinate with DOD [REDACTED] departure and supporting airlift
 - Identify stay-behind personnel if required
 - Notify, if appropriate, Department member families

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SYSTEM II
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COPIES TO:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 11, 1985

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
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S/S-O

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of StateTHE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of DefenseTHE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. CASEY
The Director of Central IntelligenceADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR.
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of StaffSUBJECT: Operational Procedures for Emergency Support Team
(EST) Deployments (S)

The Emergency Support Team (EST) concept was created as a means of providing specialized support to U.S. missions overseas in resolving terrorist incidents. These interagency teams are designed to be rapidly deployed to assist U.S. and host nation authorities with a wide-range of specialized skills not normally available on-scene. (S)

The operational procedures for Emergency Support Team (EST) deployment (Tab A) are designed to formalize arrangements and responsibilities for the commitment of these assets. These procedures were prepared by an interagency sub-group of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) and should be used as guidance for participating departments and agencies. Please note that each participating department and agency is responsible for designating a point of contact (POC) and preparing checklists for the EST mission. Copies of checklists and POC designees should be forwarded to the NSC by December 30, 1985. (S)



John M. Poindexter

Attachment

Tab A - Operational Procedures for Emergency Support Team
(EST) Deployments

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NLS F95-023/LH173

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OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
FOR EMERGENCY SUPPORT TEAM (EST) DEPLOYMENTS (S)

The mission of the EST will be expanded to read: "The mission of the EST is to provide senior embassy officials, host government leaders, and incident managers guidance about U.S. capabilities to provide crisis management assistance, specialized intelligence and increased secure communications. The secondary mission of the EST is to collect intelligence and make other arrangements for possible direct USG intervention. EST support will be responsive, flexible and tailored to the unique requirements of each incident." (S)

The National Security Advisor, through the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) and with approval of the participating agencies will coordinate the deployment of the various EST elements as required. [REDACTED]
JSOA will coordinate/request military airlift support for the EST when required. (S)

State, [REDACTED] and JSOC will provide the primary assets needed to support the EST mission. State will continue to lead the EST teams. The TIWG can draw on the assets of other agencies and organizations on a case-by-case basis, according to pre-coordinated agreements for support. (S)

The EST will be formed using pre-configured, deployable packages of personnel and equipment. These elements will be configured in terms of access constraints, deployment responsiveness and capabilities required. (An EST working group will ensure that the elements, while separate entities, are mutually supportive and adequately integrated with other mission components. Each agency participating in the EST will establish rosters identifying people and equipment charged to support EST deployments. These rosters should be organized according to the separate elements of the pre-configured packages.) (S)

[REDACTED] DoD [REDACTED] will continue their efforts to establish a forward base concept for the EST in conjunction with planning for forward deployments of other counter-terrorism elements. (S)

The IG/T will send out a general instruction to all major posts explaining the EST mission and the support it offers. A State [REDACTED] JSOC briefing team will visit high threat posts overseas to explain EST and JSOC capabilities in detail. The Department of State will establish a program to brief new Chiefs of Mission and Deputy Chiefs of Mission on services and support offered by the EST and JSOC. (S)

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By SN NADA, Date 1/11/04

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Each agency will be responsible for planning and executing its portion of the EST mission to include provision of detailed checklists and designated POC to the NSC coordinator of the TIWG. To facilitate coordination, EST agencies will meet regularly in a working group forum. Member agencies will keep the IG/T informed by forwarding the status of their EST preparations through their sitting member. The IG/T will forward this information to the TIWG. (S)

Communications, alerting, and reporting equipment for each element of the EST will be provided by their respective agency. Frequency allocations/assignments will be provided by the Department of Defense and coordinated by the Director, Joint Special Operations Agency, JCS. (S)

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EXECUTIVE ORDER

PROHIBITING TRADE AND CERTAIN TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING LIBYA

By the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), sections 504 and 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code,

I, RONALD REAGAN, President of the United States of America, find that the policies and actions of the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

I hereby order:

Section 1. The following are prohibited except to the extent provided in regulations which may hereafter be issued pursuant to this order:

(a) Any transaction in or relating to property in the United States in which the Government of Libya, including its instrumentalities, owned or controlled entities, or persons acting on its behalf, has any interest of any nature whatsoever;

(b) The import into the United States of any goods or services of Libyan origin, other than publications and materials imported for news publication or news broadcast dissemination;

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NLS F95-023/1 #176

BY AM, NARA, DATE 1/11/05

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(c) The export to Libya of any goods, technology (including technical data or other information) or services from the United States, except publications and donations of articles intended to relieve human suffering, such as food, clothing, medicine and medical supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(d) The provision of transportation services to or from Libya by any U.S. person or any vessel or aircraft of United States registration, or the provision of transportation services to or from the United States by any Libyan person or any vessel or aircraft of Libyan registration;

(e) The engaging by any U.S. person in any service contract in support of an industrial or other commercial or governmental project in Libya, or in any transaction with any non-U.S. person directly related to the performance of any such service contract except for contracts concerned with medical care;

(f) The grant or extension of credits or loans or the transfer of anything of value, except Libyan property held abroad prior to the effective date of this Order, by any U.S. person to the Government of Libya, its instrumentalities and controlled entities, or to any Libyan national or entity owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Libya or Libyan nationals;

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(g) Any transaction by a U.S. person relating to travel by any U.S. citizen to Libya or to activities by any U.S. citizen within Libya after the date of this order, other than transactions necessary to effect any U.S. person's departure from Libya within ____ days of this Order, or travel for journalistic activity by persons regularly employed in such capacity by a newsgathering organization; and

(h) Any transaction by any United States person which evades or avoids, or has the purpose of evading or avoiding, any of the prohibitions set forth in this order.

For purposes of this section, any "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, juridical person organized under the laws of the United States or any person in the United States.

Section 2. In light of the prohibition in section 1(b) of this Order, Section 251 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 as amended (19 U.S.C. 1881), and Section 126 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2136) will have no effect with respect to Libya.

Section 3. The prohibitions set forth in section 2(b), (c) (d) and (e) shall apply as of 12:01 a.m. Eastern Daylight time, _____, 1986. The remainder of the prohibitions of this Order are effective immediately. Except to the extent hereafter provided by regulations, all the prohibitions of this

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Order shall take effect as indicated notwithstanding any contracts entered into before the date of this Order.

Section 4. The Secretary of the Treasury is delegated and authorized to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50. U.S.C. 1701 et seq., to carry out the purposes of this order. The Secretary may redelegate any of these functions to other officers and agencies of the Federal Government. All agencies of the United States Government are directed to take all appropriate measures within their authority to carry out the purposes of this order, including the suspension or termination of licenses or other authorizations.

This Order shall be transmitted to the Congress and published in the Federal Register.

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ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER

Overall Impact

Our current exports of approximately \$300 million per year are primarily of machinery and transportation equipment, manufactured goods for industrial uses and foodstuffs, all of which are available to Libya from non-U.S. sources. We already deny licenses for export of most national security controlled items; for goods or technical data which could contribute directly to the Ras Lanuf petrochemical complex; for aircraft, large off-road vehicles and parts because of the high risk of diversion by Libya for military activities; and for oil and gas technology and equipment not available from third-country sources. On the import side, we recently expanded our 1982 ban on Libyan crude oil to include import of Libyan refined petroleum products. Our remaining imports of just under \$5 million per year consist mainly of alcohols and related products.

The Order would reach this remaining trade, including the large volume of trade in services contracts, with the exception of third-country trade with Libya controlled by U.S. based multinationals. It should also result in the sharp reduction or withdrawal of the remaining American business presence in Libya by banning business transactions motivating travel and transactions for travel to or activities in Libya. The Order also freezes Libyan assets in the United States. Unlike the Iranian situation, where Iranian assets in the United States were greater than U.S. assets in Iran, U.S. business assets in Libya are estimated at about \$450 million (book value), while Libyan assets in this country are estimated at about \$200 million. Action under the Order will probably result in reciprocal restrictions on U.S. business assets in Libya, or outright seizure.

Violations of the Order are subject to civil penalties not to exceed \$10,000 and criminal penalties of not more than \$50,000 and imprisonment for not more than 10 years or both.

Section by Section Analysis

Paragraph One

Although all the actions in the Order may be taken under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the Order also is expressly based upon the President's constitutional authority and on the new export and import sanction authorities provided by the International Security and Development Cooperation Act.

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NLS F95-023/1#177

BY shf, NARA, DATE 1/11/05

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Paragraph Two

The Order finds that the policies and actions in support of international terrorism by the Government of Libya constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and declares a national emergency pursuant to IEEPA to deal with that threat. Invoking two of the three possible grounds provided under IEEPA -- threat to the national security and foreign policy -- follows the Nicaragua precedent. The earlier Iran emergency additionally invoked a threat to the U.S. economy.

Section 1(a)

This section would block all assets in the United States of the Libyan government and its controlled entities. This would not block Libyan deposits in overseas branches of U.S. banks, since such reach of the Iran regulations provoked difficult lawsuits abroad and conflict with the host governments. Assets would be unblocked by license as appropriate to allow the operations of the Libyan UN Mission and other activities we are required or choose to permit. This asset freeze is restricted to government assets to mitigate the serious damage to investor confidence that asset freezes tend to cause.

Section 1(b)

This provides the import element of the Order's comprehensive direct trade ban. Prohibition of import of goods of Libyan origin might reach some trade of Libyan commodities through third countries, as would Section 1(h), which deals with evasion. In some instances, such as Libyan origin petroleum products mixed in European tank farms and included in subsequent reshipment, strict enforcement cannot be realistically contemplated without unacceptably burdening the international trading system. We contemplate that enforcement will be handled as it is under the present import ban on such products. The exception for news material follows the Iran precedent.

Section 1(c)

This provides the export element of the Order's comprehensive direct trade ban. Like the Nicaragua order, but unlike typical earlier controls, this ban will not reach re-exports of U.S. origin goods from third countries if those goods "come to rest", are incorporated in third country products as components or are substantially transformed abroad. This avoids the extraterritoriality problems of U.S. controls over the export of a foreign manufactured product because of a small amount of U.S. componentry. The Order would not, however, supercede the existing system of export controls

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on Libya already in place, e.g., relating to national security controlled items or oil and gas technology, which remain subject to the regular re-export control system of the Export Administration Act. The Order's ban on exports to Libya does not apply to donations of food and medicine and clothing intended to relieve human suffering, in light of the corresponding limitation on the President's authority to do so under IEEPA. This limitation can be removed if militarily required.

Section 1(d)

This provision follows the Iran precedent and is intended to supplement the export and import ban.

Section 1(e)

This section bans service contracts in Libya, such as oil field operation contracts and major construction engineering and management. It deals with one of the major elements of U.S.-Libya trade remaining and a principal source of U.S. citizen presence in Libya. It will also ban U.S. nationals from participating in service contracts of third country companies in Libya.

Section 1(f)

This section imposes a comprehensive freeze on financial transactions benefitting the Libyan government or in which Libya has an interest as well as transactions benefitting Libyan nationals. It is not intended to reach transactions such as withdrawal of Libyan deposits from foreign branches of U.S. banks, ordinary transactions by Libyan students living in the U.S., proper transactions by the Libyan U.N. Mission, donations permitted in accordance with section 1(c), and medical services contracts permitted under 1(e). Regulations will assure that it is administered consistently with this purpose.

Section 1(g)

This section bans transactions for travel to Libya. Under U.S. law, the U.S. cannot directly compel U.S. nationals to cease travel to, through, or in Libya. Nor can we threaten prosecution for the travel itself. Although we can bar the economic activity necessary for travel, and prosecute for violations (subject to difficulties of proof), some Americans may nevertheless remain in Libya either because Qaddhafi may prevent their departure or because they may decide to defy a transaction ban. Nevertheless, this ban, together with the ban

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on the business activities motivating much of the U.S. citizen presence in Libya and further tightening of passport controls should, along with strong Presidential statements, substantially reduce the American presence there. The section makes the exception for journalism which has become our standard practice and was made under the IEEPA controls for Iran during the hostage crisis.

Section 1(h)

This is drawn from the Iran precedent and is intended to facilitate enforcement of the basic prohibitions.

"United States person"

In order to avoid the acute problems arising under other U.S. controls which have applied to "any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States", a term usually defined in U.S. regulations to include foreign companies owned or controlled by U.S. nationals, this Order is drafted to apply its principal prohibitions to "U.S. persons", who are defined to include, in addition to U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens, only those companies and other legal entities which are organized under U.S. law and thus generally recognized by our allies as being subject to U.S. regulation in their overseas activities.

Section 2

Although the MFN tariff treatment automatically granted by U.S. statutes to most countries is meaningless when imports themselves are barred, Section 2 will remove the political issue of Libya theoretically remaining entitled to MFN. The Order does not expressly terminate the theoretical Libyan entitlement to avoid unnecessary departure from our tradition of not withdrawing MFN tariff treatment as a foreign policy sanction.

Section 3

This section allows a transitional period for the export, import, and service contract bans to enter into effect. This will avoid the problems of shipments already en route and provide service organizations and their personnel a brief time to organize their departures. Although the trade ban would apply to pre-existing contracts generally, provision for appropriate exception is provided in order to deal with unusual or hardship cases, where to do so would not undermine the purpose of the control.

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Section 4

This section makes the standard delegation of IEEPA authorities to the Secretary of the Treasury. The Secretary implements these controls in close cooperation with the Secretary of State.

Congress

The Order states that it is to be transmitted to Congress. In addition, IEEPA requires that, wherever possible, the President consult with the Congress prior to using IEEPA authorities. He is also required to report immediately to Congress when he uses them. Both these obligations can readily be satisfied, and the need to act is particularly strong where the result may reduce the number of Americans exposed to Libyan actions.

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Background Paper on Approaches to European Governments

The recent upsurge in Middle East terrorism in Western Europe and its political and economic impact, plus the growing awareness of the Libya/Abu Nidal terrorist role, have begun to generate momentum in Europe for firmer internal actions and closer cooperation with the United States. In time, they should bring the Western Europeans to take tougher actions against Libya, beginning with political and security related measures. However, at present the European reaction has been negative, marked by great nervousness to talk of U.S. economic and military actions. (The FRG and France have publicly opposed economic sanctions; Italy has formally invoked the right to clear all non-NATO flights in or out of Sigonella; the UK has reminded us of our obligation to consult them on use of F-111s based in England.) If we do not move carefully, we can produce a backlash which would tend to isolate the U.S. and harm our broader interests. But if we do not demonstrate determination and strong leadership, the Europeans will not move against Libya.

Europe remains vulnerable in its relationships with Libya. With the application of unilateral U.S. sanctions in 1981, Western European involvement in trade, investment, and the furnishing of key technicians to Libya became more important. Trade is significant. Over 75% of Libya's foreign trade is with OECD countries. Italy is now Libya's most important trading partner, followed by the FRG and other European nations. Tens of thousands of Europeans work in Libya and the revenue and the safety of these people is a primary concern of European governments. European countries are also energy-dependent on Libya to varying degrees, although with reserve stocks and an oil glut, this is less of a problem now than previously. Libya has invested extensively in Europe and has the potential to unsettle financial markets. Qadhafi has played skillfully on European vulnerabilities, using threats against Europeans in Libya, and occasionally holding them hostage (FRG, UK and Italy have all had this experience) -- to cynically remind the Europeans that they must put up with his use of terrorism and subversion.

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Europeans, as a matter of principle, wish to avoid economic sanctions. The British have reminded us of their failed sanctions in Rhodesia. Our own experiences in Poland, Afghanistan and Rhodesia have been dissatisfying. The bitter dispute with the U.S. over the Soviet oil pipeline also remains explicit in European memories. To have credibility, we should prepare carefully by first making a maximum effort with U.S. firms to pull the remaining U.S. technicians out of Libya and be clear on what precisely what we want the Europeans to do. Even so, progress will be slow and difficult.

European views of U.S. military actions are equally negative. They do not believe Qadhafi can be deterred in this way, they worry about the safety of their citizens in Libya, they fear that Libya will fall further under Soviet influence, and they worry lest there be Libyan/terrorist retaliation against themselves for real or imagined cooperation with the U.S. European apprehensions are redoubled when they consider that Israeli actions could be, or could appear to be, in conjunction with those of the U.S. Key allies such as the UK and FRG might tacitly accede to our use of military force, preferably not involving their bases. Italy is more exposed to both terrorism and Libyan pressures, and its accession will be more difficult. France will probably be ambivalent, their apprehension over Qadhafi's activities in Black Africa contrasting with their position of independence from the U.S.

Europeans are probably most willing now to take actions of a political or security nature, since they are most directly related to Libya's support of terrorism. Such measures might include restrictions on Libyan diplomats and other officials, more careful screening of all private Libyans, restrictions on the size and use of Libyan diplomatic missions and stepped-up intelligence operations against the Libyans. Over the longer term, we should press the Europeans for limitation on Libya's civil aviation, beginning with more careful screening of aircraft, and hindering Libya's ability to export petroleum.

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Qs and As on Economic Sanctions

Suggested Questions

1. Doesn't the transaction ban requiring Americans to leave Libya cut across the basic constitutional right of Americans to travel and reside where they want to?
2. With areas of this country still suffering from the effects of the recent recession, aren't we hurting ourselves more than the Libyans by cutting off exports and reducing U.S. jobs?
3. Aren't we just "shooting ourselves in the foot" by preventing our own U.S. oil companies from doing business in Libya? Won't other nations come in and fill the breach?
4. Aren't we overusing economic sanctions? First Nicaragua, then South Africa, now Libya. Isn't this an over-reaction? How can the U.S. business community recover from the image that it is not a reliable supplier?
5. Detailed factual questions:
 - a. How will these new orders specifically affect Americans now in Libya? How long will they have to make their travel arrangements? What is the penalty that they will face if they remain in Libya in violation of the order?
 - b. What will be the impact on pre-existing contracts for trade with Libya?
 - c. What is our current trade relationship with Libya? How much do we now export? What kinds of goods?
 - d. Has the oil ban been effective? How much have we already reduced our imports from Libya?
 - e. What are the extent of Libyan assets in the U.S.? Are they going to be frozen?
 - f. How much do U.S. companies have invested in Libya? What will happen to their physical and financial assets there? What about the financial cost to them and to U.S. banks for defaulting on their performance bonds?
6. What has been the reaction of the U.S. business community to these sanctions? Did they receive any forewarning? Do you expect court challenges?

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7. Are these economic sanctions evidence of a "do-nothing" policy? Shouldn't we be responding with force instead?
8. Are we trying to get our citizens out of Libya because we are about to engage in military action?
9. Isn't this new policy likely to create a hostage situation in Libya? How do we know that Qadhafi will let them leave?
10. Why aren't our NATO allies doing more to cooperate with us? Don't they share our perception of the danger posed by Libyan support of terrorism?
11. Why should we contribute to Western European defense if they will not cooperate with us on sanctions against terrorism?
12. What do we expect the political impact of these sanctions to be in Libya? Won't they simply rally support around the Qadhafi regime?
13. If the regime in Libya does change and a more moderate leader replaces Qadhafi, won't we be harmed by our absence of a "presence" there? Won't it be hard for U.S. companies to reenter the Libyan market?
14. How do these economic sanctions fit with reported plans to destabilize the Qadhafi regime?
15. What reaction do you anticipate in the Arab world? Won't there be some sympathy for a fellow Arab absorbing punishment from the West as a result of his support for the Palestinian cause?
16. Won't Qadhafi simply retaliate with an acceleration of his terrorist activities? Haven't we simply given another twist to the cycle of violence in the region -- even though economic sanctions are "peaceful" in nature?
17. Aren't we running risks to our citizens here in the U.S. by provoking Qadhafi with economic sanctions? What about his threat to bring terrorism to the streets of America? Haven't we made it more likely that U.S. airports will suffer attacks like the ones in Rome and Vienna?
18. Isn't there a touch of chauvinism in our foreign policy? Aren't we reacting differently to the deaths at the airports compared to the deaths in the Tunis raid and the deaths in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon?
19. Isn't what we call terrorism merely the method forced on

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groups that lack conventional military power? Aren't the Palestinians and Abu Nidal's group using methods that were glorified during our own Revolution and by partisan groups in occupied territories during World War II?

20. Aren't we meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign state when we mete out punishment for supporting groups we don't like. Don't the radical Palestinians and the Moro guerrillas in the Philippines merit support from patrons like Qadhafi just as much as do the groups that we choose to support with overt and covert aid?

21. Where is the "smoking gun"? Aren't you proceeding on only flimsy and circumstantial evidence of Libyan complicity in the Rome and Vienna incidents?

22. Aren't these sanctions and other actions the Reagan Administration has taken toward Libya evidence that the U.S. has a double standard and will not tolerate a developing country, like Libya, deviating from the U.S. in its definition of foreign policy goals? _

23. Isn't the terrorism that comes from Iran and from Syria a greater threat to U.S. interests? Why did you single out Libya? Because it was an easy target? Why aren't you doing more to punish the regimes of Syria and Iran?

24. Why are you acting now when you let the major terrorist incidents of the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon and our Embassy there go unpunished?

25. Exactly which U.S. interests have been threatened by Libya's alleged support of international terrorism? Isn't it true that, with the exception of the sacking of the U.S. Embassy there in 1979, every intended Libyan terrorist action against a U.S. target has been thwarted in advance?

26. Libya has targetted U.S. personnel and interests before, under previous administrations. Isn't the private, diplomatic approach the best one to follow? Doesn't the attention accorded Qadhafi by sanctions and Administration rhetoric merely make him more important -- in his own eyes and in the region?

27. Qadhafi has been reported to be mentally off-balance. Aren't you running the risk of provoking even more dangerous behavior by publicly punishing him with these sanctions?

28. With all of the tough statements that came out of your Administration -- officially and unofficially -- isn't this final response a rather weak-kneed one? Won't perceptions of U.S. power be affected adversely?

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LIBYA: CONGRESSIONAL/PRESS POINTS TO MAKE

--The attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports, as well as other recent terrorist incidents, were carried out by individuals clearly linked to Libya.

--The leader of the group responsible for these outrages, Abu Nidal, is based in Libya, he has conducted training activities in that country, and Libyan diplomatic missions have given logistical assistance to those involved in terrorist assaults. Qadhafi's news agency has gone so far as to term the latest mass murder a "heroic act", even though his spokesmen more recently and cynically have denounced the incidents.

--For over a decade, Libyan agents, and terrorist groups based in Libya, have carried out acts of terrorism and murder in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. Qadhafi has sponsored repeated subversion and violence against his neighbors. He is a major arms supplier to Iran, and his troops remain in Chad, a major factor in the continuing turmoil in that poor land.

--For too long other nations have declined to join us in using economic, diplomatic, and other pressures to curb Qadhafi's appetite for terrorism and military aggression.

--But, it has become apparent that going along with terrorism is not "good business":

European and Middle Eastern tourism has lost over one billion dollars this year alone;

Countries in the region are spending millions if not billions in added security costs; and,

They will probably never know the full extent of foregone investment opportunities lost as a result of terrorism.

--The Rome and Vienna events of December 27 -- ending a year of horrible terrorist incidents -- have shocked decent men and women around the world. It is time to channel this outrage and shock into action, not out of a sense of revenge, but to deter further terrorist attacks.

--The best way to achieve the coordinated response we seek is to demonstrate that we, ourselves, have taken all possible action to isolate the Qadhafi regime and bring home to that regime the fact that support for terrorism is not cost free.

-- It is for this reason that we seek to close all remaining loopholes in U.S. trade and commercial relations with Libya. We hope our example will encourage others to take similar action. Regardless of the economic loss, the U.S. will not do business with Qadhafi's regime.

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 15 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

Current U.S. Economic Relations with Libya

- o U.S. companies (Amarada Hess, Marathon, Conoco, and Occidental) help lift 50% of Libyan oil and earn profits of close to \$100 million annually
- o U.S. exports to Libya (construction equipment, transportation equipment, and heavy machinery) come to \$304 million annually
- o U.S. service contracts (primarily in engineering field and with companies like Brown and Root, Bechtel, Price Bros.) add another \$200 of business with Libya annually
- o The U.S. has the third highest level of Western trade with Libya (after Italy and the FRG)
- o More than 1000 Americans are still in Libya, about 700 of whom are providing high tech skills to the Libyan oil sector
- o U.S. (book value) assets in Libya are \$450 million; Libyan assets in the U.S. are \$200 million

Impact of Executive Order

- o Prohibits import into U.S. of any goods or services except Libyan news materials
- o Prohibits U.S. export to Libya of any goods, technology (including technical data) or services except donations designed to relieve human suffering and medical supplies for strictly medical purposes
- o Prohibits any transaction by a U.S. citizen relating to transportation to or from Libya
- o Prohibits the purchase by any U.S. citizen of goods for export from Libya to any other country
- o Prohibits the performance by any U.S. citizen of any contract in support of an industrial or other commercial or governmental project in Libya
- o Prohibits credits or loans or the transfer of property by any U.S. citizen to the Government of Libya or any Libyan national entity, except the transfer of property held by Libya or Libyan nationals prior to the effective date of the order
- o Prohibits any transaction by a U.S. citizen within Libya, except for those necessary to effect departure from Libya or journalistic activity by regular journalists
- o Prohibits any transaction by a U.S. citizen which has the purpose of evading the prohibitions described and provides civil and criminal penalties

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

- Qadhafi uses terrorism as a primary instrument of foreign policy to undermine U.S. and other Western interests in the Third World, attack Libyan dissidents, and threaten moderate regimes which oppose his efforts to subvert them.
- Libya operates numerous terrorist training camps -- the number and location vary -- which provide instruction in demolition, sabotage, hijacking, assassination, and various commando and guerrilla techniques.
- Libya abuses diplomatic privilege to smuggle arms and explosives and store them at its diplomatic missions, as occurred during the shoot-out at the Libyan embassy in London in April 1984.
- Libyan diplomats have also been directly involved in several recent terrorist operations, including a plot to kill dissident Libyan students in the U.S. last year.
- Libya has a long history of support for radical Palestinian terrorists, including the notorious Abu Nidal group. Over the past year, Abu Nidal has shifted his base of operations to Libya, and has done so with the active support and knowledge of the Libyan government.
- Abu Nidal has conducted at least 30 terrorist attacks since the beginning of 1984. Over two-thirds of the group's nearly 20 attacks last year took place in Western Europe, and have taken an increasing toll of innocent bystanders.
- Libya was deeply involved in helping Abu Nidal carry out the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, and provided at least three of the Tunisian passports used by the terrorists. Qadhafi's spokesman referred to these attacks as "heroic actions."
- Abu Nidal was also responsible for the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner last November which resulted in the deaths of 59 passengers, including one American. Libya is suspected of providing assistance in this attack.
- Qadhafi's agents are particularly active in the Arab world, where they have been involved in assassination attempts, provision of weapons to radical groups, and plots to destabilize and undermine neighboring governments.
- Qadhafi's activities are not limited to the Middle East. He provides money, training, and technical support to revolutionary and terrorist groups as disparate as the Sandinistas, Colombian M-19 guerrillas, Caribbean leftist movements, the Irish Republican Army, rebel movements throughout Africa, and muslim insurgents in Thailand and the Philippines.

LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

Libyan leader Mu'ammarr Qadhafi has used terrorism as one of the primary instruments of his foreign policy. The main targets have been expatriate Libyan dissidents and leading officials of moderate Arab and African governments. In addition, Tripoli has provided encouragement, funding, training, and arms to insurgents and dissidents from many countries whose government policies or leaders displease Qadhafi.

The level and types of Libyan terrorism as well as the mix between terrorism and other kinds of subversion have varied considerably over the years, but the goals it is designed to achieve have remained constant:

- to neutralize Qadhafi's domestic opponents abroad.
- to make Qadhafi a recognized leader of the Arab world.
- to make Libya the dominant state in North Africa.
- To establish Libyan political leadership in black Africa, eliminating the French position and influence there.
- to strike at Israel.
- to spread Qadhafi's vision of Islam as a weapon for the Third World in its struggle against colonialism and imperialism.

Attacks Against Exiles

Regime exiles are Qadhafi's leading target. The Libyan Government in 1980 began a concerted effort to assassinate anti-Qadhafi exiles. By the time the first phase ended in 1981, 11 Libyan dissidents living abroad had been murdered. Since then, Qadhafi has alternated between urging the exiles to return home to Libya and ordering new liquidation campaigns against the dissidents among them.

Libya in 1985 sponsored five attacks against exiled Libyan dissidents. Qadhafi maintains a "hit list" of exiles and pursues these individuals whenever the opportunity presents itself. In almost all cases, the assassins use handguns to kill their victims. Qadhafi generally uses Libyans for antiexile operations; for other types of attacks he tends to employ surrogates or mercenaries.

- Libyan exiles were attacked in five different European countries in 1985--Greece, West Germany, Cyprus, Italy and Austria.
- The Libyan exile community in Egypt has also been a frequent target, but Egyptian authorities have been effective in thwarting attacks. A four-man Libyan team was arrested in November during an attempted attack against a gathering of exiles near Cairo.
- Libya also plotted antiexile attacks in the United States. In May 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata and 16 nonofficial Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a US grand jury in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four different states.

Plots Against Moderate Arab Officials

Qadhafi also targets moderate Arab governments for their refusal to continue the military struggle against Israel and for their links to the West. Terrorism supplements military threats, vitriolic press attacks, the sponsoring of dissidents, and other types of subversion--interspersed with occasional periods of diplomatic courting.

There have been persistent rumors of assassination plots against such Arab leaders as President Mubarak of Egypt and former President Nimeiri of Sudan. In November 1984, Egyptian security forces arrested four Libyan-hired mercenaries for plotting to kill a prominent Libyan exile. The arrestees stated that Libya's target list for assassinations included President Mubarak as well as prominent Libyan exiles in Egypt.

Qadhafi's primary targets in 1985 were the governments of Egypt and Tunisia.

- Egypt during the year captured several teams of Libyan-supported Egyptian dissidents who reportedly planned to destabilize the government by sabotage and other disturbances.
- Tripoli expelled more than 30,000 Tunisian workers from Libya in August 1985, probably hoping to destabilize Tunisia's shaky economy. Soon thereafter, a Libyan diplomat used the diplomatic pouch to smuggle letter bombs addressed to Tunisian journalists into the country. After two postal workers were injured when several of these bombs exploded, Tunisia severed relations.

Support to Radical Palestinians

The recent attacks against the El Al Airline counters in Rome and Vienna have focused attention on the alarming links between Libya and radical Palestinians.

- Tunisian authorities announced that the passports used by the Abu Nidal terrorists in the El Al attacks were confiscated from Tunisians when Libya expelled Tunisian workers. The passport link is the first concrete evidence of operational support by Libya.
- Abu Nidal reportedly has bases in Libya.
- Libya reportedly provides financial support and training to several radical Palestinian groups.

Support for African Insurgents and Terrorists

Tripoli provides arms, training, and money to insurgents in the Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic and Zaire, and encourages them to conduct terrorist attacks. Qadhafi usually prefers to ensure plausible denial in acts of terrorism which Libya sponsors. The use of surrogates is one way in which he distances Libya from attacks; many of the surrogates belong to dissident groups whom Libya supports. Libya is particularly active in supporting these groups in sub-Saharan Africa.

- In February 1985, Chad complained to the UN that Libya had attempted to assassinate President Habre in September 1984. Photographs of the Libyan-made attache case bomb that was to be used in the attack were provided as evidence.
- Tripoli funds, trains, and arms Zairian dissidents and then sends them home on terrorist and subversive missions. Zairian officials claim to have thwarted a Libyan-sponsored plot against President Mobutu in September 1985.
- Libya has conducted extensive subversive activity in Sudan since the April 1985 coup that overthrew the Nimeiri regime. No terrorist incidents have occurred to date, but a terrorist network is in place and could be activated at any time.

Activities in Latin America and Asia

Qadhafi appears increasingly intent on extending his revolution to areas far removed from Libya. He has provided funding and arms to dissident groups in Asia and Latin America.

In the Caribbean, Libya hopes to gain political influence and undermine US and French interests. According to local press,

Tripoli offered dissident support on the condition that they perform acts of violence. According to Colombian authorities the M-19 in Colombia receives support--including money and arms--from Libya.

The Libyan effort in Asia and the Pacific is less substantial but growing. Most Libyan activity is subversive--the provision of funds and training to dissidents--but Tripoli occasionally offers support for specific events.

31 December 1985

Chronology of Libyan Troublemaking 1980-85

1985

December	Italy/Austria	Passports used by Abu Nidal terrorists in attack on El Al counter provided by Libya.
November	Malta:	Hijacking of Egyptair airliner by Abu Nidal supporters may have involved Libyan support.
October	Greece	Libyan merchant wounded in Athens by two gunmen the victim had left Libya five years earlier.
September	Tunisia	Libyan diplomat smuggles about 100 letter bombs addressed to journalists into Tunisia. Several explode injuring two postal workers and causing Tunisia to sever diplomatic relations.
May	United States:	A Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was declared persona non grata, and 16 non-official Libyans were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in connection with a plot to kill dissidents in several different states.
April	West Germany:	Moroccan citizen resident in the FRG since 1960 killed by Libyan, who was arrested at the scene.
	West Germany:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed in Bonn by Libyan gunman who was arrested. The assassin also wounded two German passersby, one seriously. The victim had been a target of the Libyan regime for at least two years.
	Cyprus:	Libyan businessman assassinated in downtown Nicosia by an unidentified gunman. The victim was the director of an offshore holding company and was believed to be an opponent of the Libyan regime.
March	Italy:	Libyan jeweler murdered in his shop in Rome. A silencer-equipped pistol was left at the scene by the assassin.
February	Austria:	Former Libyan Ambassador to Austria severely wounded by two shots fired from a car outside his home in Vienna. The victim had supported Qadhafi's seizure of power in 1969, but he quit his post in disgust at the regime in 1980.

1984

November	Egypt:	President Mubarak announces that four assassins sent to Egypt by Libya to kill former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush had been arrested and forced to send fake pictures to the Libyan Embassy in Malta showing Bakoush apparently dead. Official Libyan press sources then claimed Bakoush had been executed by suicide squads sent abroad "to liquidate enemies of the revolution."
September	Italy:	A Libyan exile was found gagged and strangled in a hotel in Rome. The victim had been the subject of Libyan requests for deportation to Libya.
	Chad:	Chadians discover plot to assassinate President Habre with an attache case bomb. Evidence of the plot, including photographs of the bomb, was provided to the United Nations the following February when Chad lodged a complaint against Libya.
August	United Kingdom:	One of six Libyans awaiting trial for bomb attacks in London in March, 1983 found shot to death in a London apartment. The victim may have been silenced by the Libyan government.
	Belgium:	A bomb wrecks a car parked in front of the Zairian Embassy in Brussels.
July	Belgium:	A bomb exploded in the Brussels office of Air Zaire.
	Red Sea:	Libya mined the Red Sea, damaging 18 merchant ships of varying nationalities.
	Greece:	Two Libyan students found murdered in their apartment in a crime reminiscent of Libyan killings of anti-Qadhafi students in 1980 and 1981. The two were beaten, strangled, and gagged before being shot twice in the back.
June	Greece:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan editor of an Arab newspaper in Athens killed by two men on a motorbike.
	Greece:	A Libyan-born citizen known to distribute anti-Qadhafi literature at his store shot by a Libyan employee of Libyan Arab Airlines.
May	Libya:	Jana, the official Libyan news agency, announces "the Libyan masses have decided to form suicide commandos to chase traitors and stray dogs wherever they are and liquidate them physically."

1982

No incidents known.

1981

November	Sudan:	Several bombs explode near government installations in Khartoum.
October	Sudan:	Planned assassination of visiting Chadian official, Hussein Habre, failed when those sent to conduct the operation surrendered.
	Egypt:	Two bombs explode in luggage being unloaded from a plane coming from Libya via Malta.
August	Libya:	Two Libyan SU-22s that fired at US Navy F-14s over Gulf of Sidra shot down.
July	United States:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student killed Ogden, Utah.
June	Sudan:	Bomb explodes in front of Chadian Embassy in Khartoum.
February	Italy:	Libyan gunmen open fire on passengers arriving at Rome's airport on a flight from Algiers. Prominent anti-Qadhafi exile was the target.

1980

November	United Kingdom:	Anti-Qadhafi Libyan student brutally murdered in London.
	United Kingdom:	Two children of an anti-Qadhafi Libyan poisoned by eating peanuts containing thalium.
October	Chad:	Libyan forces occupied Chad. Qadhafi attempted to force a Libya-Chad union.
	Gambia:	Libyan subversion in Gambia caused break in relations. Senegalese troops intervene under a mutual defense treaty.
June	Italy:	Anti-Qadhafi exile wounded in Rome.
	Italy:	Libyan exile killed in Milan within hours after expiration of a deadline set by Qadhafi for all Libyan exiles to return home.
May	Italy:	Libyan exile shot at in Rome. The arrested Libyan gunman says he was sent by Libya "to kill an enemy of the people."

April	United Kingdom:	A bomb hidden in an unclaimed suitcase probably unloaded from a Libyan airliner explodes at London's Heathrow Airport, injuring 25.
	Libya:	A number of British subjects in Libya arrested on trumped-up charges as hostages in order to pressure British government during siege of Libyan People's Bureau in London.
	United Kingdom:	British policewoman killed and 11 anti-Qadhafi demonstrators wounded by gunfire from London Libyan People's Bureau. After a siege, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the vacated embassy.
March	United Kingdom:	Four bombs explode in London and Manchester near homes of Libyan exiles or at businesses frequented by them. Over 25 people injured. Three other bombs defused. Nine Libyan suspects arrested.
	Sudan:	One Libyan TU-22 bomber drops bombs on Omdurman, Sudan, site of a radio transmitter used by anti-Qadhafi oppositionists.
February	Libya:	Following annual Libyan General People's Congress, the Libyan Revolutionary Committees announce that all Libyan exiles must return to Libya or face "the death penalty."
	Libya:	Libyan authorities take no action while a mob burned the Jordanian Embassy in Tripoli.
	Congo:	Chadian dissidents ready to negotiate with Government of Chad threatened in Brazzaville, Congo.

1983

August	Upper Volta:	Libya gave material support to coup in Upper Volta.
July	Chad:	Libya invaded Chad for the second time. Occupation continues into 1985.
June	West Germany:	Eight Libyan students in West Germany, all members of an anti-Qadhafi group, complain Libyan agents are harassing and threatening them.
February	Libya:	Libyan General People's Congress warn all Libyans in exile to return home or face the "anger of the Libyan people."

	Greece:	Libyan exile killed in Athens. His throat was slit.
	Italy:	Libyan businessman found strangled to death in Rome.
	West Germany:	Libyan exile gunned down in Bonn.
	Italy:	Libyan exile killed in Rome by two gunshots to the head.
April	United Kingdom:	Libyan lawyer shot and killed in London.
	Italy:	Well known Libyan businessman killed. The arrested assassin said he was an enemy of Colonel Qadhafi.
	United Kingdom:	Two gunmen kill an anti-Qadhafi Libyan journalist.
February	Libya:	Tunisian and French Embassies in Tripoli sacked and burned by a mob while Libyan authorities took no action.