

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library

Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver L.: Files
Folder Title: Terrorism: US-British (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)
Box: 14

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3

Box Number 14

COLLINS

20

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31421	MEMO	COPY OF #29181; OLIVER NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES RE: COMBATTING TERRORISM - WITH ANNOTATIONS R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	5/14/1984	B1
31422	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #29182; TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES COMBATTING TERRORISM	3	ND	B1
31423	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #29184; PAGE 7 ONLY RE: TERRORISM R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	1	ND	B1
31424	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF #29185; ROBERT SAYRE TO MR. SPIERS, RE: MEETING WITH BRITISH ON TERRORISM R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	3	5/9/1984	B1
31425	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #29986; CABLE #191600Z APR 84	1	4/19/1984	B1
31426	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #29187; CABLE #180036Z APR 84 R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	4/18/1984	B1
31427	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #29188; PAGE 4 ONLY - RE: TERRORISM, ETC. R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3

Box Number 14

COLLINS

20

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31428	MEMO	COPY OF #31421 WITH DIFFERENT ANNOTATIONS R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3	2	5/14/1984	B1
31429	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #31422	3	ND	B1
31430	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #31423 R 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3	1	ND	B1
31431	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 31424 R 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3	3	5/9/1984	B1
31432	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #31425	1	4/19/1984	B1
31433	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #31426 R 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3	2	4/18/1984	B1
31434	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #31427 R 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Brian

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90574

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

31421

~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Meeting with British representatives re combatting terrorism

Tomorrow at 12:00 you are scheduled to have lunch, followed by a meeting in the White House Situation, with Patrick Henry Wright (Deputy Under Secretary FCO), Robin J. O'Neill (Chief of Assessment Staff), and Derek Thomas and Andrew F. Green (HMG Embassy Washington). Biographies for Wright, O'Neill, and Green are attached at Tab A.

In your PROFs note of May 10 (Tab B), you asked to have included in your reading material for this meeting the EUR prepared section of the Summit papers for the President. This very small entry is attached at Tab C. Of perhaps more pertinent interest is Bob Sayre's internal paper of May 9 (Tab D). Our own internal talking points for Summit preparation are at Tab E.

Important to this meeting is the fact that the British now appear willing, if not anxious, to have Thatcher raise the issue of terrorism at the Summit. Green has advised both NSC and State that she will use "the privilege of the chair" to include this issue in the political discussions--"regardless of what the French think." This is a significant step in the right direction and, even though we had the help of Qadhafi, we should count it as a victory. They are also actively talking about at least a mention of terrorism in the Summit communique. We should support this initiative, which will also be favorably received by the FRG.

Page 2 of Bob Sayre's memo (Tab D) talks to the specific issues of how and what we would like to achieve at the Summit. The British, for their part, would like to cover the following items during our meeting tomorrow:

- A brief discussion re the nature of the terrorist problem. (The Brits tend to think there is a definitional problem in that they view a terrorist act as a finite event. Thus their perspective on the IRA problem is not one of terrorism but rather a long-term political effort which verges of war. This affects their view of "state-sponsored" terrorism.)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-071/3 #31421

BY LAI NARA DATE 8/4/08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

- Recent developments in USG policy. (According to Green they would like to get "a better feel" for the options we have in mind. He indicated an "awareness" that Casey had been tasked to prepare a prioritized list of "where we would strike." They need to be reassured on this score.)
- Legislation re aid to terrorist. (The Brits are concerned that our efforts to keep U.S. citizens from aiding/abedding terrorists groups/organizations will result in extra-territorial sanctions by U.S. companies based in the UK. They obviously have the Libyan situation very much in mind.)
- Recent developments in UK policy. (It would appear that the recent events in London vis-a-vis Libya have resulted in a significant hardening of attitude. We should try to plumb this for some willingness to impose sanctions on Libya.)
- London Summit. (In addition to indicating Thatcher's willingness to raise the issue, they are obviously anxious to explore with us how we can improve international cooperation on combatting terrorism.)
- Crisis Management. (Green suggested that we might like to have "theoretical" discussion of crisis management process during the luncheon. We might wish to bring them to Room 208 after the meeting for a quick look--or you can refer to our capability during the meeting in the Sit Room.)

Your talking points at Tab I are designed to follow the agenda items above and support what Sayre and North have been saying to their local people, as well as what was said in London during the April meeting of the Bonn Declaration group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I during your meeting.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Talking Points
- Tab A - Biographies
- Tab B - JMP PROFs note of May 10, 1984
- Tab C - State (EUR) paper
- Tab D - Sayre Internal memo
- Tab E - NSC Summit Preparation Paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB

I

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder

TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3

COLLINS

Box Number

14

20

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31422	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #29182; TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES COMBATTING TERRORISM	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Patrick Henry WRIGHT CMC

Born: 28 June 1931

MARRIED WITH 2 SONS AND 1 DAUGHTER
WIFE'S NAME: VIRGINIA

1955	Foreign Office
1956	Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon
1957	Foreign Office
1958	Second Secretary, British Embassy, Beirut
1960	Private Secretary to HM Ambassador, Washington
1963	First Secretary, Washington
1965	Private Secretary to Permanent Under- Secretary, Foreign Office
1968	First Secretary and Head of Chancery, British Embassy, Cairo
1971	Deputy Political Resident, Bahrain
1972	Head of Middle East Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1974	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
1977	HM Ambassador and Consul-General, Luxembourg
1979	HM Ambassador, Damascus
1982	DEPUTY Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1984

Appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Robin J O'NEILL

Chief of Assessments Staff since June 1981.

Born 1932. Foreign Office 1955. Third Secretary. Ankara, 1957. Second Secretary, Dakar, 1961. Foreign Office 1963. First Secretary 1964. Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1966. Private Secretary to the Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1967. First Secretary, Bonn, 1968. Counsellor 1972. On secondment to the Cabinet Office 1972. Head of South Asian Department 1975. Deputy Governor and Political Adviser, Gibraltar, 1978.

Married, with three children (2 daughters both 1959 and 1965; one son born 1962).

Andrew F GREEN

Representative in Washington of Joint Intelligence Committee since August 1982.

Born 1941. 1959-62 Cambridge University - BA in Natural Sciences and Economics; 1962-65 Infantry Officer British Army; 1965-67 School of Arabic; 1968 Second Secretary, Aden; 1970 First Secretary and Head of Chancery, Abu Dhabi; 1972 Eastern European and Soviet Department, FCO; 1975 Private Secretary to Minister of State; 1977 First Secretary UK Delegation to the OECD, Paris; 1979 Economic Relations Department, FCO; 1982 Counsellor in Washington.

Married 1968 to Jane Churchill (1 daughter born 1970; 1 son born 1973).

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Ollie North
To: Ollie North

+05/10/84 14:30:22

~~SECRET~~

NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER
SUBJECT: Terrorism Meeting with British

Please include in your paper for the meeting the terrorism section of the political agenda paper prepared by EUR for the Summit. You can get it from Doug McMinn.

ll

12/28/06

31423

Middle East/Iran-Iraq

Stress our continued interest in promoting reconciliation both in Lebanon and as regards the broader Arab-Israeli problem.

Ensure continued efforts to share information on Iran-Iraq war and to prepare for effective response to any widening of the conflict.

Terrorism

Advance Allied thinking, particularly with regard to state-supported terrorism, including need for close consultations and, where appropriate, coordinated action.

Central America


Deepen understanding of our approach to stability and security in the region, focusing on our efforts to strengthen democracy and local economies, and concomitant necessity of military shield if these efforts are to bear fruit.

Push for more active Allied contribution to achieving shared objectives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-071/3 # 31423BY LOI NARA DATE 8/4/08



Washington, DC 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

31424

May 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: M - Mr. Spiers

FROM: M/CT - Robert M. Sayre

SUBJECT: Meeting with British on Terrorism

The British Embassy has requested an appointment with you for Patrick Wright and Robin O'Neil to discuss increased cooperation against international terrorism. It is set for May 15 at 4:00 p.m.

The Minister of the British Embassy called on me April 16 to discuss US policy and I believe essentially to register British concern that US policy initiatives on international terrorism as expressed publicly by the Secretary of State sounded like they would be contrary to international law and that the US should be on notice that British cooperation would probably not be forthcoming. Moreover, the British thought that an active defense program would probably only make matters worse. (See Tab 1)

The Libyan attacks in England, before and after the meeting of April 12-13 in London of the Summit Seven terrorist experts, seems to have had an affect on British official attitudes. Reports from London suggest that they have moved a little closer to our position.

The specific British suggestions in paragraph 3 of Tab 1 are useful in handling incidents and strengthening preparedness, but they do not get to the problem. It would also be helpful to improve bilateral treaties and agreements on extradition and legal procedures but that is a long and arduous process. We have done about as much as we can on international agreements through the United Nations and we need to implement effectively what is already agreed. That is the purpose of two pieces of legislation we now have pending in the Congress.

What we really need to do is face up to the political challenge of international terrorism. It would be useful to have British thinking on a number of issues:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL. OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-071/3#31424

BY 101 NARA DATE 8/4/08

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-2-

1. How do we improve the international consensus on the threat that terrorism poses to democratic government as well as to fragile governments that are not so democratic but are basically on our side? US efforts to hold quiet multi-lateral meetings at the political level to broaden the consensus have generally been rebuffed by our Summit Seven partners and in NATO. Unless we can create a stronger sense in the international community that state sponsored terrorism and support of terrorism generally is unacceptable, international efforts will not get very far. Trying to write additional international legal instruments without a supportive political atmosphere is putting the cart before the horse. There are several things we might do:

a. The Federal Republic of Germany suggested in the meeting in London that there be a meeting of intelligence experts to agree on what the facts are. We think that an early meeting would be useful. We are not likely to agree among ourselves on what we should do unless we have some consensus on what the problem is. We should not, of course, delay other initiatives while we wait for the results of such a meeting. We have somewhat of a consensus on the general problem and probably a rather broad consensus on the threat Libya poses.

b. Both the British and the FRG seems interested in a declaration at the Summit. If the British are prepared to collaborate on a declaration aimed at state terrorism we should support that. As part of such a declaration we could include specific language aimed at the use by states of their diplomatic missions and other facilities (pouch) to engage in and support international terrorism. We could state the agreement of the Seven that the Vienna Convention is based on the assumption that diplomatic missions are for peaceful diplomatic intercourse among nations. It was never intended that they be used for the conduct of criminal activity against the receiving state or other friendly countries with which the receiving state is at peace. Accordingly, the receiving state has the right to insist that diplomatic missions not engage in criminal and terroristic activities in the country of the receiving state; that they not be used to conspire to conduct such activities in other friendly states and to establish reasonably procedures for that purpose. While such a statement might be politically satisfying to the Thatcher Government that alone would not move the ball very far on the overall problem that concerns us. So we should try to get something for our cooperation.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

-3-

c. Are the British prepared to help develop a consensus that the international community needs to take steps to control Qadhafi's free-wheeling? We would need the help of the FRG, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, etc. Are they prepared to help stop the flow of military equipment and spare parts? We understand, for example, that he keeps his C-130s flying with spare parts from Belgium. Unless we are prepared to do at least that we are not going to do much to stop Libyan activity. This would not stop the Soviets, but at least the world would more clearly see what the Soviets are doing.

d. What is the British view on economic measures? We have taken about all we can and took much criticism from the British and others for doing it. Reports from London indicate that the British have excluded this. In the final analysis, we will probably have to accept that a consensus on economic sanctions is a non-starter. Reports from Rome make it clear that the Italians would not join and without the Italians there could not be an effective program.

e. What is the British view on trying to stop Libya from launching its "hit" teams? Do the British see the opposition mounting anything successful? The events in Tripoli May 7-8 would raise doubts about the opposition. We are only thinking about this and have not reached any conclusions. But it would be useful, without being specific ourselves, to see if the British have even thought about it.

2. How do we maintain an on-going dialogue on this very troublesome subject? Given the responsibilities that you and I have, we should probably encourage the British to come back to one of us depending upon what they have to say. Obviously we would have to broaden the circle within the US depending on the issue and what we may be thinking about doing. But we need to assure a contact point so that we can be confident that our mutual efforts are being coordinated.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - State Cable 114915 to London
- Tab 2 - State EXDIS Cable 112403

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder

TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3
COLLINS

Box Number

14

20

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

31425 CABLE

1 4/19/1984 B1

DUPLICATE OF #29986; CABLE #191600Z APR 84

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR F02-071/3 #31426

NOT NARA DATE 8/4/08

Department of State

S/S-O
OUTGOING

PAGE 1 OF 1 STATE 112403

EPRP BP0735 500532P

PAGE 1 OF 1 STATE 112403

EPRP BP0735 500532P

ORIGIN OFFICE EUP-B:

INFO SSO-B: SS-B /DB: AS ATG

INFO A-B: /DB: AG GAC

ORIGIN SS-BP

INFO OCT-BP COPY-B: ADS-BP SSO-BP /DB: R

EPRP:

DRAFTED BY EUR:JMKELLY

APPROVED BY EUR:JMKELLY

S/S-O JBOGUE

-----B34251 1021112 /63

C 102030Z APR 84

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

INFO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 112403

EXDIS, FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT/TOM WINDMULLER

FOLLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION BONN LONDON ROME OTTAWA PARIS
TOKYO APRIL 10

QUOTE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 112403

EXDIS

E C 102030Z DECL: CADR

PAGE 1 PTEF

SUBJECT MEETING IN LONDON (APRIL 12-13) OF SUMMIT
SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. MEETING WAS HELD IN LONDON, APRIL 12-13, OF REPRESENTATIVES OF SUMMIT SEVEN COUNTRIES TO REVIEW IMPLEMENTATION OF BONN (1978) AND VENICE (1981) DECLARATIONS ON AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS RESPECTIVELY. AGENDA INCLUDED (A) GENERAL STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM, (B) BONN DECLARATION AND (C) VENICE DECLARATION. THERE WERE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS ON TECHNICAL MEASURES OF COOPERATION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COOPERATION AT DIPLOMATIC POSTS.

3. SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF THE PLENARY MEETING FOLLOWED. THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO REPORTS FROM THE SUBCOMMITTEES AT THE INSTIGENCE OF FRANCE BUT FOLLOWING SUMMARY REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS FROM SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS.

4. TERRORISM IN 1983

THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE PROBLEM WORSENEED IN 1983. ON CIVIL AVIATION THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE BONN DECLARATION HAD BEEN USEFUL AND HIJACKING PROBLEMS HAD DIMINISHED. AT THE SAME TIME THERE WAS HIGH CONCERN ABOUT NEW THREATS--BOMBING OF AIRCRAFT. ON DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION, PROBLEMS HAD GROWN NOTABLY WORSE AND THERE IS A NEED FOR EVEN STRONGER COOPERATION.

THE EUROPEANS STILL EXPRESS A STRONG DESIRE FOR A PRAGMATIC, BILATERAL APPROACH. THE FRENCH UNDERLINED THE MORE "DISCRETE" IN DISCUSSIONS AMONG COUNTRIES AND RESPONDING TO TERRORIST PROBLEMS. THE BRITISH AND ITALIANS WERE CLOSE TO THE FRENCH POSITION.

THERE IS NOT A STRONG CONSENSUS ON STATE TERRORISM

ALTHOUGH THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT STATES HAVE BEEN ACTIVE IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM. THE US, THE FRG, AND CANADA ARE PROBABLY CLOSEST TOGETHER. THE UK, FOR ITS PART, SAID THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT REPEAT NOT IN SOVIET INTEREST. FRANCE, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, QUESTIONED THE US INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AND ATTRIBUTED THEM TO POLICY FAILURES OF FRANCE, US AND OTHERS IN WHICH IRANIAN AND SYRIAN USE OF TERRORISM PLAYED LITTLE PART. THE FRENCH VIEW WOULD NOT DENY THAT THE IRANIS AND SYRIANS WERE ENGAGED IN TERRORISM, BUT THAT SUCH USE HAD LITTLE TO DO WITH THE OUTCOME. THE US VIEW THAT TERRORISM WAS USED AT A CRITICAL MOMENT TO HELP DETERMINE THE OUTCOME TO GIVEN LITTLE WEIGHT IN THE FRENCH VIEW. THE BRITISH VIEW WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE US AND FRANCE WERE DEEPLY AFFECTED BY STATE USE OF TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY BUT THE UK IS VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE. THE BRITISH ALSO CONSIDER EVENTS IN LEBANON MORE A PRODUCT OF THE CIVIL WAR THAN A DELIBERATE EFFORT BY IRAN OF SYRIA TO USE TERRORISM TO PROMOTE THEIR NATIONAL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. ITALY EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THAT. THE US TODAY ISSUE NOTING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT TERRORISM AGAINST THE US AND FRANCE IN LEBANON WAS HARDLY THE RESULT OF "CROSSFIRE" BUT DELIBERATE PLANNING BY GROUPS ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN AND SYRIA AND THE BOMBINGS WERE FACILITATED BY THOSE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF INFLUENCING US AND WESTERN POLICY.

THE BRITISH TEST FOR ACTING AGAINST STATE TERRORISM IS VERY LIKELY TO BE "PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT" RATHER THAN THE "WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."

IN SUM, ON STATE-TERRORISM, THERE IS A RECOGNITION OF THE PROBLEM AND AGREEMENT THAT IT SURFACED AS A MAJOR FACTOR IN 1983, BUT CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE AMONG OUR CLOSEST ALLIES TO FACE THAT BECAUSE OF WHAT THAT MAY MEAN IN TERMS OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, IRAN, SYRIA AND LIBYA. THERE IS A STRONG DISPOSITION ON THEIR PART TO ACCEPT STATE TERRORISM AS TOLERABLE IN THE SHORT RUN WITH LITTLE DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS THE CUMULATIVE OF LONG RUN EFFECTS OF SUCH WARFARE. THE BRITISH RECOGNIZE HOWEVER THAT THE US WAS MOST ADVERSELY AFFECTED AND MAY TAKE A LESS TOLERANT VIEW.

(B) BONN DECLARATION

A REVIEW OF THE CASES CONFIRMED THAT HIJACKING HAD DIMINISHED CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE BONN DECLARATION WAS ADOPTED IN 1978 WITH A CONSENSUS THAT COORDINATED INTERNATIONAL ACTION INCLUDING THE BONN DECLARATION HAD BEEN EFFECTIVE. A STRONG CONCERN ABOUT AIRCRAFT BOMBINGS AND ATTEMPTS TO SABOTAGE AIRCRAFT EMERGED.

SANCTIONS AGAINST ARIANA EMERGED AS A DIVISIVE ISSUE. THE UK IS PRESSING STRONGLY TO REMOVE SANCTIONS BECAUSE AFGHANISTAN HAD THREATENED THE UK WITH DENIAL OF OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS. THIS REASON WAS SUBMERGED IN OTHER LEGAL AND PRACTICAL UK ARGUMENTS. THE UK HAD SOUGHT TO LINE UP SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION BEFORE THE MEETING AND OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THE FRG ON A POSITION. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH CANADA AND ITALY. FRANCE IS ANXIOUS TO ABOLISH THE BONN DECLARATION AND IN EFFECT SAID THAT THE UK CONCERNS SUPPORTED THE FRENCH VIEW THAT SANCTIONS UNDER THE BONN DECLARATION WERE NOT USEFUL. THE US DEJECTED TO THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF SANCTIONS AND WAS ISOLATED. THE BRITISH SAID SEPARATELY THEY WOULD LIFT THE SANCTIONS IN ANY EVENT, BUT HOPED THE US WOULD FIND SOME WAY TO CHANGE ITS MIND.

BRITISH ARGUMENTS NOTED NO ACTION AGAINST PANAMA,

SIS-151 EXDIS FILES

31426

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Department of State

S/S-O
OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 01 STATE 112482

ESPR 000735 SS05320

MONGOLIA AND OTHERS THAT HAD IN THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING CASES LET HIJACKERS ESCAPE PUNISHMENT. THE FACT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD SIDED WITH HIJACKERS AND LIES ABOUT ITS ACTIONS AFTERWARDS NO LONGER SEEMED DETERMINING IN THE BRITISH VIEW. THE UK DID NOT CONSIDER THE POLITICAL ISSUE (USSR/AFGHANISTAN) AS A FACTOR. SANCTIONS WERE RELATED ONLY TO THE EVENT IN QUESTION. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS EXCLUDED POLITICAL ARGUMENTS IN DEALING WITH HIJACKING CASES IN THE BRITISH VIEW.

(C) VENICE DECLARATION

THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT TERRORISM AGAINST DIPLOMATS HAD GROWN WORSE AND MORE DEADLY AND THAT COOPERATION HAD TO BE STRENGTHENED. ALTHOUGH BOTH THE UK AND FRANCE REITERATED PREVIOUS VIEWS THAT THE COOPERATION SHOULD BE BILATERAL AND AT POSTS.

ALL AGREED ON THE NEED FOR COOPERATING ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNIQUES AND DEVICES BOTH FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AVIATION AND DIPLOMATS. AGREEMENT ON COORDINATION OF TRAINING OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS WAS LESS EXPLICIT WITH CANADA, THE UK AND THE FRG MAKING POSITIVE COMMENTS AND FRANCE SAYING NOTHING ON THIS POINT.

(D) FUTURE MEETINGS

AS THE NEXT CHAIRMAN OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN, THE FRG CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THREE EXPERT GROUPS:

- (1) PHYSICAL SECURITY OF DIPLOMATS
- (2) COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO CAPITALS AS WELL AS AT POSTS
- (3) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS TO DISCUSS TERRORIST GROUPS, THREATS, METHODS OF OPERATION, ETC.

ALL SPOKE IN FAVOR, EXCEPT FRANCE AND ITALY WHICH EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON THIRD GROUP. SEPARATELY THE UK AS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE THIRD GROUP. THE US EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON TIMING, FAVORING THE MEETINGS IN LATE MAY OF EARLY 1985 WITH THE RESULTS TO BE AVAILABLE TO US AS CURRENT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDNA AND VENICE DECLARATIONS IN THE SPRING OF 1985.

THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT FOR EXTENDING COOPERATION BEYOND DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS TO RELATED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS AND SCHOOLS.

THE US APPEARS TO HAVE A MIDDLE POSITION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS WITH SOME COUNTRIES (ITALY AND JAPAN) WANTING TO GO EVEN FURTHER THAN THE US. ITALY, FOR EXAMPLE, REQUESTED FOR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AT EACH POST WITH ONE OF THE SUMMIT PARTNERS ACTING AS OPERATOR OF THE NETWORK. THE UK INTRODUCED THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL CENTERS AND SCHOOLS BUT DID NOT PRESS IT.

THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT COOPERATION ON DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION SHOULD EXTEND BEYOND THE SEVEN, E.G., FRANCE MAINTAINED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE EC-12.

IN THE CLOSING SESSION, US NOTED CONSENSUS ON THE PROBLEM THAT CONFRONTS US AND THAT IT HAD GROWN MORE SEVERE AND ACUTE IN 1983. WE ALSO MENTIONED THE STRONG DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE ON PRACTICAL MEASURES WITHIN THE EDNA AND VENICE DECLARATIONS. THE US ALSO HAD TO NOTE OUTSIDE THESE DECLARATIONS AND THE AGREED AGENDA, THAT STATES LIKE USING TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY AND THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE.

PAGE 01 STATE 112482

ESPR 000735 SS05320

THIS WAS A SERIOUS AND VERY TROUBLESOME DEVELOPMENT WHICH THE WESTERN ALLIES COULD NOT IGNORE AND ONE THAT THE US WOULD BE ADDRESSING IN THE DAYS AHEAD. SHOULD UNQUOTE SHOULD

ORIG DIST: SC-25/ADS,SSD,DOTE.

31427

-- In the Gulf, we must continue to share information, conduct appropriate contingency planning, and dampen conflict.

-- Continued consultations in IEA are necessary to ensure we are prepared to act in coordinated way in event of oil disruption.

Terrorism

-- Nature and methods of terrorism changing and we must develop effective measures to deal with this threat.

-- Must take into account severity of threat to life and national interests and increasing evidence of state support for terrorist acts against West.

-- U.S. prepared to take appropriate actions to counter this threat.

-- Our efforts will of course be consonant with our basic values and principles.

Central America

-- Allies must understand seriousness with which we take situation in Caribbean/Central America.

-- This is potentially direct threat not only to security of immediate neighbors, but to U.S. and our ability in a crisis to support friends and Allies.

-- We seek to strengthen security, stability and prospects for peaceful change in Central America through balanced program of political support, economic assistance, and military cooperation.

-- Welcome fuller Allied understanding of our efforts and objectives and greater role in working for consolidation of moderate, democratic governments which can provide structure for peaceful progress and popular sovereignty.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-071/3 #31427BY LOT NARA DATE 8/4/08

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90574

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

31428

~~SECRET~~

May 14, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Meeting with British representatives re combatting terrorism

Tomorrow at 12:00 you are scheduled to have lunch, followed by a meeting in the White House Situation Room, with Patrick Henry Wright (Deputy Under Secretary FCO), Robin J. O'Neill (Chief of Assessment Staff), and ~~Robert B. Stammers~~ and Andrew F. Green (HMG Embassy Washington). Biographies for Wright, O'Neill, and Green are attached at Tab A.

In your PROFs note of May 10 (Tab B), you asked to have included in your reading material for this meeting the EUR prepared section of the Summit papers for the President. This very small entry is attached at Tab C. Of perhaps more pertinent interest is Bob Sayre's internal paper of May 9 (Tab D). Our own internal talking points for Summit preparation are at Tab E.

Important to this meeting is the fact that the British now appear willing, if not anxious, to have Thatcher raise the issue of terrorism at the Summit. Green has advised both NSC and State that she will use "the privilege of the chair" to include this issue in the political discussions--"regardless of what the French think." This is a significant step in the right direction and, even though we had the help of Qadhafi, we should count it as a victory. They are also actively talking about at least a mention of terrorism in the Summit communique. We should support this initiative, which will also be favorably received by the FRG.

Page 2 of Bob Sayre's memo (Tab D) talks to the specific issues of how and what we would like to achieve at the Summit. The British, for their part, would like to cover the following items during our meeting tomorrow:

- A brief discussion re the nature of the terrorist problem. (The Brits tend to think there is a definitional problem in that they view a terrorist act as a finite event. Thus their perspective on the IRA problem is not one of terrorism but rather a long-term political effort which verges of war. This affects their view of "state-sponsored" terrorism.)

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

NLRR F02-071/3 #31428
BY LOT NARA DATE 8/4/08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

- Recent developments in USG policy. (According to Green they would like to get "a better feel" for the options we have in mind. He indicated an "awareness" that Casey had been tasked to prepare a prioritized list of "where we would strike." They need to be reassured on this score.)
- Legislation re aid to terrorist. (The Brits are concerned that our efforts to keep U.S. citizens from aiding/abedding terrorists groups/organizations will result in extra-territorial sanctions by U.S. companies based in the UK. They obviously have the Libyan situation very much in mind.)
- Recent developments in UK policy. (It would appear that the recent events in London vis-a-vis Libya have resulted in a significant hardening of attitude. We should try to plumb this for some willingness to impose sanctions on Libya.)
- London Summit. (In addition to indicating Thatcher's willingness to raise the issue, they are obviously anxious to explore with us how we can improve international cooperation on combatting terrorism.)
- Crisis Management. (Green suggested that we might like to have "theoretical" discussion of crisis management process during the luncheon. We might wish to bring them to Room 208 after the meeting for a quick look--or you can refer to our capability during the meeting in the Sit Room.)

Your talking points at Tab I are designed to follow the agenda items above and support what Sayre and North have been saying to their local people, as well as what was said in London during the April meeting of the Bonn Declaration group.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I during your meeting.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - Talking Points
 - Tab A - Biographies
 - Tab B - JMP PROFs note of May 10, 1984
 - Tab C - State (EUR) paper
 - Tab D - Sayre Internal memo
 - Tab E - NSC Summit Preparation Paper

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

TAB

I

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder

TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3

COLLINS

Box Number

14

20

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31429	PAPER DUPLICATE OF #31422	3	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]


B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



Patrick Henry WRIGHT CMO

Born: 28 June 1931 MARRIED WITH 2 SONS AND 1 DAUGHTER
WIFE'S NAME: VIRGINIA

1955	Foreign Office
1956	Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies, Shemlan, Lebanon
1957	Foreign Office
1958	Second Secretary, British Embassy, Beirut
1960	Private Secretary to HM Ambassador, Washington
1963	First Secretary, Washington
1965	Private Secretary to Permanent Under- Secretary, Foreign Office
1968	First Secretary and Head of Chancery, British Embassy, Cairo
1971	Deputy Political Resident, Bahrain
1972	Head of Middle East Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
1974	Private Secretary to the Prime Minister
1977	HM Ambassador and Consul-General, Luxembourg
1979	HM Ambassador, Damascus
1982	<i>DEPUTY</i> Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, and Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

1984

Appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Robin J O'NEILL

Chief of Assessments Staff since June 1981.

Born 1932. Foreign Office 1955. Third Secretary, Ankara, 1957. Second Secretary, Dakar, 1961. Foreign Office 1963. First Secretary 1964. Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1966. Private Secretary to the Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1967. First Secretary, Bonn, 1968. Counsellor 1972. On secondment to the Cabinet Office 1972. Head of South Asian Department 1975. Deputy Governor and Political Adviser, Gibraltar, 1978.

Married, with three children (2 daughters both 1959 and 1965; one son born 1962).

Andrew F GREEN

Representative in Washington of Joint Intelligence Committee since August 1982.

Born 1941. 1959-62 Cambridge University - BA in Natural Sciences and Economics; 1962-65 Infantry Officer British Army; 1965-67 School of Arabic; 1968 Second Secretary, Aden; 1970 First Secretary and Head of Chancery, Abu Dhabi; 1972 Eastern European and Soviet Department, FCO; 1975 Private Secretary to Minister of State; 1977 First Secretary UK Delegation to the OECD, Paris; 1979 Economic Relations Department, FCO; 1982 Counsellor in Washington.

Married 1968 to Jane Churchill (1 daughter born 1970; 1 son born 1973).

MSG FROM: NSJMP --CPUA TO: Ollie North
To: Ollie North

+05/10/84 14:30:22

-- ~~SECRET~~ --


NOTE FROM: JOHN POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Terrorism Meeting with British

Please include in your paper for the meeting the terrorism section of the political agenda paper prepared by EUR for the Summit. You can get it from Doug McMinn.

dlb

12/24/04



31430

Middle East/Iran-Iraq

Stress our continued interest in promoting reconciliation both in Lebanon and as regards the broader Arab-Israeli problem.

Ensure continued efforts to share information on Iran-Iraq war and to prepare for effective response to any widening of the conflict.

Terrorism

Advance Allied thinking, particularly with regard to state-supported terrorism, including need for close consultations and, where appropriate, coordinated action.

Central America

Deepen understanding of our approach to stability and security in the region, focusing on our efforts to strengthen democracy and local economies, and concomitant necessity of military shield if these efforts are to bear fruit.


Push for more active Allied contribution to achieving shared objectives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-07113#31430

BY RW NARA DATE 10/26/11



Washington, D.C. 20520

31431

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

May 9, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: M - Mr. Spiers

FROM: M/CT - Robert M. Sayre

SUBJECT: Meeting with British on Terrorism

The British Embassy has requested an appointment with you for Patrick Wright and Robin O'Neil to discuss increased cooperation against international terrorism. It is set for May 15 at 4:00 p.m.

The Minister of the British Embassy called on me April 16 to discuss US policy and I believe essentially to register British concern that US policy initiatives on international terrorism as expressed publicly by the Secretary of State sounded like they would be contrary to international law and that the US should be on notice that British cooperation would probably not be forthcoming. Moreover, the British thought that an active defense program would probably only make matters worse. (See Tab 1)

The Libyan attacks in England, before and after the meeting of April 12-13 in London of the Summit Seven terrorist experts, seems to have had an affect on British official attitudes. Reports from London suggest that they have moved a little closer to our position.

The specific British suggestions in paragraph 3 of Tab 1 are useful in handling incidents and strengthening preparedness, but they do not get to the problem. It would also be helpful to improve bilateral treaties and agreements on extradition and legal procedures but that is a long and arduous process. We have done about as much as we can on international agreements through the United Nations and we need to implement effectively what is already agreed. That is the purpose of two pieces of legislation we now have pending in the Congress.

What we really need to do is face up to the political challenge of international terrorism. It would be useful to have British thinking on a number of issues:

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF02-071/3#31431
BY RW NARA DATE 10/20/11

1. How do we improve the international consensus on the threat that terrorism poses to democratic government as well as to fragile governments that are not so democratic but are basically on our side? US efforts to hold quiet multi-lateral meetings at the political level to broaden the consensus have generally been rebuffed by our Summit Seven partners and in NATO. Unless we can create a stronger sense in the international community that state sponsored terrorism and support of terrorism generally is unacceptable, international efforts will not get very far. Trying to write additional international legal instruments without a supportive political atmosphere is putting the cart before the horse. There are several things we might do:

a. The Federal Republic of Germany suggested in the meeting in London that there be a meeting of intelligence experts to agree on what the facts are. We think that an early meeting would be useful. We are not likely to agree among ourselves on what we should do unless we have some consensus on what the problem is. We should not, of course, delay other initiatives while we wait for the results of such a meeting. We have somewhat of a consensus on the general problem and probably a rather broad consensus on the threat Libya poses.

b. Both the British and the FRG seems interested in a declaration at the Summit. If the British are prepared to collaborate on a declaration aimed at state terrorism we should support that. As part of such a declaration we could include specific language aimed at the use by states of their diplomatic missions and other facilities (pouch) to engage in and support international terrorism. We could state the agreement of the Seven that the Vienna Convention is based on the assumption that diplomatic missions are for peaceful diplomatic intercourse among nations. It was never intended that they be used for the conduct of criminal activity against the receiving state or other friendly countries with which the receiving state is at peace. Accordingly, the receiving state has the right to insist that diplomatic missions not engage in criminal and terroristic activities in the country of the receiving state; that they not be used to conspire to conduct such activities in other friendly states and to establish reasonable procedures for that purpose. While such a statement might be politically satisfying to the Thatcher Government that alone would not move the ball very far on the overall problem that concerns us. So we should try to get something for our cooperation.

c. Are the British prepared to help develop a consensus that the international community needs to take steps to control Qadhafi's free-wheeling? We would need the help of the FRG, Egypt, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, etc. Are they prepared to help stop the flow of military equipment and spare parts? We understand, for example, that he keeps his C-130s flying with spare parts from Belgium. Unless we are prepared to do at least that we are not going to do much to stop Libyan activity. This would not stop the Soviets, but at least the world would more clearly see what the Soviets are doing.

d. What is the British view on economic measures? We have taken about all we can and took much criticism from the British and others for doing it. Reports from London indicate that the British have excluded this. In the final analysis, we will probably have to accept that a consensus on economic sanctions is a non-starter. Reports from Rome make it clear that the Italians would not join and without the Italians there could not be an effective program.

e. What is the British view on trying to stop Libya from launching its "hit" teams? Do the British see the opposition mounting anything successful? The events in Tripoli May 7-8 would raise doubts about the opposition. We are only thinking about this and have not reached any conclusions. But it would be useful, without being specific ourselves, to see if the British have even thought about it.

2. How do we maintain an on-going dialogue on this very troublesome subject? Given the responsibilities that you and I have, we should probably encourage the British to come back to one of us depending upon what they have to say. Obviously we would have to broaden the circle within the US depending on the issue and what we may be thinking about doing. But we need to assure a contact point so that we can be confident that our mutual efforts are being coordinated.

Attachments:

- Tab 1 - State Cable 114915 to London
- Tab 2 - State EXDIS Cable 112403

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 12/28/2006

File Folder

TERRORISM: UNITED STATES - BRITISH (05/01/1984-05/14/1984)

FOIA

F02-071/3

COLLINS

Box Number

14

20

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

31432 CABLE

1 4/19/1984 B1

DUPLICATE OF #31425

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Department of State

S/S-O
OUTGOING

PAGE 01 OF 01 STATE 112403
ORIGIN OFFICE: EUR-01
INFO: SSD-01 551-01 7001 AS ATS
INFO: D-01 7001 A2 SAC
ORIGIN: SS-01

INFO: OCT-01 COPY-01 ADS-01 SSD-01 7011 R
66011
DRAFTED BY: EUR:JMKELLY
APPROVED BY: EUR:JMKELLY
S/S-O: JBOGUE

1 1000000 APR 84
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO USMISSION USNATE IMMEDIATE

STATE 112403

EXDIS, 901 ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT/TOM WINDMULLER

FOLOWING REPEAT SENT ACTION BONN 10NDON ROME OTTAWA PARIS
TODAY APRIL 17
CITE

STATE 112403

EXDIS

1 1000000: DIEL: DADR
7405 7100
SUBJECT: MEETING IN 10NDON (APRIL 12-13) OF SUMMIT
SEVEN (EXFITS ON TERRORISM)

1 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - NATURAL TEXT

1 MEETING WAS HELD IN 10NDON, APRIL 12-13, OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF SUMMIT SEVEN COUNTRIES TO REVIEW
IMPLEMENTATION OF BONN 11578 AND VENICE 11561
DECLARATIONS ON AIRCRAFT HIJACKING AND PROTECTION OF
DIPLOMATS RESPECTIVELY. AGENDA INCLUDED (A) GENERAL
STATEMENTS ON TERRORISM, (B) BONN DECLARATION AND (C)
VENICE DECLARATION. THERE WERE SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS ON
TECHNICAL MEASURES OF COOPERATION ON PHYSICAL SECURITY OF
DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS COOPERATION AT
DIPLOMATIC POSTS.

2 SUMMARY OF DISCUSSION OF THE PLenary MEETINGS
FOLLOWING: THERE WERE NO REPEAT NO REPORTS FROM THE
SUBCOMMITTEES AT THE INSISTENCE OF FRANCE BUT FOLLOWING
SUMMARY REFLECTS THE CONSENSUS FROM SUBCOMMITTEE MEETINGS.

3 TERRORISM IN 1982

THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT THE PROBLEM WORSENEED IN 1983.
ON CIVIL AVIATION THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT THE BONN
DECLARATION HAD BEEN USEFUL AND HIJACKING PROBLEM HAD
BEEN FINISHED. AT THE SAME TIME THERE WAS HIGH CONCERN
ABOUT NEW THREATS--BOMBING OF AIRCRAFT. ON DIPLOMATIC
PROTECTION, PROBLEMS HAD GROWN NOTABLY WORSE AND THERE IS
A NEED FOR EVEN STRONGER COOPERATION.

THE EUROPEANS STILL EXPRESS A STRONG DESIRE FOR A
FRESH, BILATERAL APPROACH. THE FRENCH UNDERLINED THE
MORE "DISCREET" IN DISCUSSIONS AMONG COUNTRIES AND
RESPONDING TO TERRORIST PROBLEMS. THE BRITISH AND
ITALIANS WERE CLOSE TO THE FRENCH POSITION.

THERE IS NOT A STRONG CONSENSUS ON STATE TERRORISM

PAGE 01 STATE 112403
ALTHOUGH THERE IS AGREEMENT THAT STATES HAVE BEEN ACTIVE
IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM. THE US, THE FRG, AND CANADA ARE
PROBABLY CLOSEST TOGETHER. THE UN, FOR ITS PART, SAID
THAT TERRORISM WAS NOT REPEAT NOT IN SOVIET INTEREST.

FRANCE, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION, QUESTIONED THE US
INTERPRETATION OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AND ATTRIBUTED THEM
TO POLICY FAILURES OF FRANCE, US AND OTHERS IN WHICH
IRANIAN AND SYRIAN USE OF TERRORISM PLAYED LITTLE PART.
THE FRENCH VIEW WOULD NOT DENY THAT THE IRANIS AND
SYRIANS WERE ENGAGED IN TERRORISM, BUT THAT SUCH USE HAD
LITTLE TO DO WITH THE OUTCOME. THE US VIEW THAT
TERRORISM WAS USED AT A CRITICAL MOMENT TO HELP DETERMINE
THE OUTCOME IS GIVEN LITTLE WEIGHT IN THE FRENCH VIEW.
THE BRITISH VIEW WOULD ACCEPT THAT THE US AND FRANCE WERE
SEVERELY AFFECTED BY STATE USE OF TERRORISM AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POLICY BUT THE US IS VERY SKEPTICAL ABOUT
AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE. THE BRITISH ALSO CONSIDER EVENTS
IN LEBANON MORE A PRODUCT OF THE CIVIL WAR THAN A
DELIBERATE EFFORT BY IRAN OR SYRIA TO USE TERRORISM TO
PROMOTE THEIR NATIONAL POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES. ITALY
EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THAT. THE US TODAY ISSUE NOTING
THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT TERRORISM
AGAINST THE US AND FRANCE IN LEBANON WAS HARDLY THE
RESULT OF "CROSSFIRE" BUT DELIBERATE PLANNING BY GROUPS
ASSOCIATED WITH IRAN AND SYRIA AND THE BOMBINGS WERE
FACILITATED BY THOSE TWO COUNTRIES WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF
INFLUENCING US AND WESTERN POLICY.

THE BRITISH TEST FOR ACTION AGAINST STATE TERRORISM IS
VERY LIKELY TO BE "PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT"
RATHER THAN THE "WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE."

IN SUM, ON STATE-TERRORISM, THERE IS A RECOGNITION OF THE
PROBLEM AND AGREEMENT THAT IT SURFACED AS A MAJOR FACTOR
IN 1982, BUT CONSIDERABLE RELUCTANCE AMONG OUR CLOSEST
ALLIES TO FACE THAT BECAUSE OF WHAT THAT MAY MEAN IN
TERMS OF RELATIONS WITH THE USSR, IRAN, SYRIA AND LIBYA.
THERE IS A STRONG DISPOSITION ON THEIR PART TO ACCEPT
STATE TERRORISM AS TOLERABLE IN THE SHORT RUN WITH LITTLE
DISPOSITION TO DISCUSS THE CUMULATIVE OF LONG RUN EFFECTS
OF SUCH OFFENSE. THE BRITISH RECOGNIZE HOWEVER THAT THE
US WAS MOST ADVERSELY AFFECTED AND MAY TAKE A LESS
TOLERANT VIEW.

4 BONN DECLARATION

A REVIEW OF THE RECORD CONFIRMED THAT HIJACKING HAD
LIM I DOWN CONSIDERABLY SINCE THE BONN DECLARATION WAS
APPLIED IN 1978 WITH A CONSENSUS THAT COORDINATED
INTERNATIONAL ACTION INCLUDING THE BONN DECLARATION HAD
BEEN EFFECTIVE. A STRONG CONCERN ABOUT AIRCRAFT BOMBINGS
AND ATTEMPT TO SNEAKAGE AIRCRAFT EMERGED.

SANCTIONS AGAINST ARIANA EMERGED AS A DIVISIVE ISSUE.
THE UN IS PRESSING STRONGLY TO REMOVE SANCTIONS BECAUSE
AFGHANISTAN HAD THREATENED THE UN WITH DENIAL OF
OVERFLIGHT RIGHTS. THIS REASON WAS SUBMERGED IN OTHER
LEGAL AND PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS. THE UN HAD SOUGHT TO
LINE UP SUPPORT FOR ITS POSITION BEFORE THE MEETING AND
OBVIOUSLY COORDINATED WITH THE FRG ON A POSITION. THERE
HAD ALSO BEEN PRIOR CONSULTATION WITH CANADA AND ITALY.
FRANCE IS ANXIOUS TO ABOLISH THE BONN DECLARATION AND IN
EFFECT SAID THAT THE UN CONCERNS SUPPORTED THE FRENCH
VIEW THAT SANCTIONS UNDER THE BONN DECLARATION WERE NOT
USEFUL. THE US OBJECTED TO THE IMMEDIATE LIFTING OF
SANCTIONS AND WAS ISOLATED. THE BRITISH SAID SEPARATELY
THEY WOULD LIFT THE SANCTIONS IN ANY EVENT, BUT HOPED THE
US WOULD FIND SOME WAY TO CHANGE ITS MIND.

BRITISH ARGUMENTS NOTED NO ACTION AGAINST PANAMA,

31433

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF02-07113 #31433

BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/11

STATE EXDIS FILES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Department of State

S/S-O
OUTGOING

PAGE 2, OF 2: STATE 112422

ESBP 08P735 SS0532P

PONDURAC AND OTHERS THAT HAD IN THE PROCESS OF RESOLVING CASES LET HIJACKERS ESCAPE PUNISHMENT. THE FACT THAT AFGHANISTAN HAD SIDED WITH HIJACKERS AND LIE ABOUT ITS ACTIONS AFTERWARDS NO LONGER SEEMED DETERMINING IN THE BRITISH VIEW. THE UK DID NOT CONSIDER THE POLITICAL ISSUE (US/AFGHANISTAN AS A FACTOR. SANCTIONS WERE RELATED ONLY TO THE EVENT IN QUESTION. THE HAGUE CONVENTION AND OTHER AGREEMENTS EXCLUDED POLITICAL ARGUMENTS IN DEALING WITH HIJACKING CASES IN THE BRITISH VIEW.

(C) VENICE DECLARATION

THERE WAS A CONSENSUS THAT TERRORISM AGAINST DIPLOMATS HAD GROWN WORSE AND MORE DEADLY AND THAT COOPERATION HAD TO BE STRENGTHENED ALTHOUGH BOTH THE UK AND FRANCE REITERATED PREVIOUS VIEWS THAT THE COOPERATION SHOULD BE BILATERAL AND AT POSTS.

ALL AGREED ON THE NEED FOR COOPERATING ON RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TECHNIQUES AND DEVICES BOTH FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL AVIATION AND DIPLOMATS. AGREEMENT ON COORDINATION OF TRAINING OF FOREIGN OFFICIALS WAS LESS EXPLICIT WITH CANADA, THE UK AND THE FR MAKING POSITIVE COMMENTS AND FRANCE SAYING NOTHING ON THIS POINT.

(D) FUTURE MEETINGS

AT THE NEXT ENDEAVOR OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN, THE FRG CALLED FOR A MEETING OF THREE EXPERT GROUPS:

- (1) PHYSICAL SECURITY OF DIPLOMATS
- (2) COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT TO CAPITALS AS WELL AS AT POSTS
- (3) INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS TO DISCUSS TERRORIST GROUPS, TRENDS, METHODS OF OPERATION, ETC.

ALL SPoke IN FAVOR, EXCEPT FRANCE AND ITALY WHICH EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON THIRD GROUP. SEPARATELY THE UK AS RESERVATIONS ABOUT THE THIRD GROUP. THE US EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ON TIMING, FAVORING THE MEETINGS IN LATE 84 OR EARLY 1985 WITH THE RESULTS TO BE AVAILABLE TO BE AS CURRENT AS POSSIBLE FOR THE REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EDNA AND VENICE DECLARATIONS IN THE SPRING OF 1985.

THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE SENTIMENT FOR EXTENDING COOPERATION BEYOND DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION TO RELATED ACTIVITIES SUCH AS CULTURAL INSTITUTES AND SCHOOLS.

THE US APPEARS TO HAVE A MIDDLE POSITION ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS & IF SOME COUNTRIES (ITALY AND JAPAN WANTING TO GO EVEN FURTHER THAN THE US. ITALY, FOR EXAMPLE, REQUESTED FOR COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS AT EACH POST WITH ONE OF THE SUMMIT PARTNERS ACTING AS OPERATOR OF THE NETWORK. THE UK INTRODUCED THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL CENTERS AT POSTS BUT DID NOT PRESS IT.

THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT COOPERATION ON DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION SHOULD EXTEND BEYOND THE SEVEN, E.G., FRANCE MAINTAINED ITS OBLIGATIONS TO THE EC-18.

AT THE CLOSING SESSION, US NOTED CONSENSUS ON THE PROBLEM THAT CONFRONTS US AND THAT IT HAD GROWN MORE SEVERE AND ACUTE IN 1983. WE ALSO MENTIONED THE STRONG DISPOSITION TO COOPERATE ON PRACTICAL MEASURES WITHIN THE EDNA AND VENICE DECLARATIONS. THE US ALSO HAD TO NOTE OUTSIDE THESE DECLARATIONS AND THE AGREED AGENDA, THAT STATES ARE USING TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF POLICY AND THAT THEY HAD ACHIEVED SOME SUCCESS IN LEBANON AND ELSEWHERE.

PAGE 2: STATE 112422

ESBP 08P735 SS0532P

THIS WAS A SERIOUS AND VERY TROUBLESOME DEVELOPMENT WHICH THE WESTERN ALLIES COULD NOT IGNORE AND ONE THAT THE US WOULD BE ADDRESSING IN THE DAYS AHEAD. SHULTZ UNQUOTE SHULTZ

ORIG DIST: SS-25/ADS,SSD,DOE.

-- In the Gulf, we must continue to share information, conduct appropriate contingency planning, and dampen conflict.

-- Continued consultations in IEA are necessary to ensure we are prepared to act in coordinated way in event of oil disruption.

Terrorism

-- Nature and methods of terrorism changing and we must develop effective measures to deal with this threat.

-- Must take into account severity of threat to life and national interests and increasing evidence of state support for terrorist acts against West.

-- U.S. prepared to take appropriate actions to counter this threat.

-- Our efforts will of course be consonant with our basic values and principles.

Central America

-- Allies must understand seriousness with which we take situation in Caribbean/Central America.

-- This is potentially direct threat not only to security of immediate neighbors, but to U.S. and our ability in a crisis to support friends and Allies.

-- We seek to strengthen security, stability and prospects for peaceful change in Central America through balanced program of political support, economic assistance, and military cooperation.

-- Welcome fuller Allied understanding of our efforts and objectives and greater role in working for consolidation of moderate, democratic governments which can provide structure for peaceful progress and popular sovereignty.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F02-D70/3#31434

BY RW NARA DATE 10/26/11