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SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING - 11/07/1985 (1 OF 3)

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number

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ID Doc Type	Docu	ument Descriptio	on	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
12087 PAPER	ISSUE SUPPO	,	E: INTELLIGENCE	2	ND	B1
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12088 PAPER	ORGA	E PAPER NO. 3, RE ANIZATION FOR C ORISM		2	ND	B1
	R	10/1/2008	NLRRF99-008/2			
12089 PAPER	ISSUE R	E PAPER NO. 5, RE 2/2/2012	E: COORDINATION F1999-008/2	1	ND	B1
12090 PAPER	ISSUE R	E PAPER NO. 6 - A 2/2/2012	CTIVE RESPONSE F1999-008/2	1	ND	B1
12091 PAPER	ISSUE R	E PAPER NO. 7 2/2/2012	F1999-008/2	1	ND	B1
12092 PAPER	ISSU	E PAPER NO. 11		1	ND	B1
12093 PAPER	ISSUI R	E PAPER NO. 13 - 1 2/2/2012	PUBLIC AWARENESS F1999-008/2	2	ND	B1
12094 PAPER	ISSUI R	E PAPER NO. 14 - 1 10/1/2008	MEDIA <i>NLRRF99-008/2</i>	2	ND	B1
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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING - 11/07/1985 (1 OF 3)

FOIA

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12096 PAPER	ISSU	E PAPER NO. 17 - 0	CURRENT POLICY	1	ND	B1
	R	9/7/2007	NLRRF99-008/2			
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12098 PAPER	ISSU	E PAPER NO. 21		1	ND	B1
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12100 PAPER	ISSU	E PAPER #23, PAR	TIAL CLOSURE	1	ND	B1 B3
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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

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1 NOVEMBER 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE COLLEGE OF MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF MR. NOFT FORM MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE - NBP INR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION-NBP MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-NBP LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLRING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF - NBP Red WAR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION -NSP VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL-NSP MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE -NSP DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET -A/S/ SUBJECT: Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

A meeting of the Senior Review Group for the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism will be held on November 7, 1985 from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the draft recommendations prepared by the Staff Working Group after reviewing the responses to the initial issue papers. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 179, Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, July 20, 1985, and The Issue Book will be the operative documents for the meeting.

Participation is limited to principal or designated substitute. Please provide your intention to attend to Craig Coy (395-4950) by 3:00 p.m. November 6, 1985.

> J. L. Holloway, III Admiral, USN (Retired) Executive Director Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Mc Brien - Freasing - advised of mlg & will attend Stapleton - 7B1-advised of mlg & w.c.b. well attend Vincent - 7AA - " will attend Donahue - OMB - 9 9 4 4 w.c.b. Bowinger-Justice - " 9 9 4 with - will attend



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

Meeting with: Senior Review Group for Task Force

Date:

Thursday, November 7, 1985

Time:

3:45 p.m. (15 Minutes)

Location:

Room 208, OEOB

From:

Admiral J. L. Holloway, III

I. PURPOSE

To drop-by the meeting of the Senior Review Group.

BACKGROUND II.

The Senior Review Group will be discussing draft recommendations for the Task Force meeting on November 12.

III. **PARTICIPANTS**

The Vice President Craig Fuller Don Gregg Admiral Holloway Senior Review Group (approximately 15 members)

IV. PRESS PLAN

None

V . SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Drop by meeting (Talking Points - See Tab I)

Tab 1 - Talking Points

Tab 2 - List of SRG Participants

Randcarried matalie 85

<u>Purpose</u>: To express interest and support for the deliberative process of the Task Force.
Talking Points:

- Interested in process and appreciate work.

- Need to raise issues and seek consensus recommendations where possible.

- Task Force members will rely on your judgement, but will resolve any contentious issues.

- The President needs the best we can offer for timely advice and response before, during, and after terrorist incidents.

- You are experts. Confident in your ability and desire to serve our national security needs.

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM 7 NOVEMBER 1985 1500-1630 ROOM 208, OEOB

PARTICIPANTS

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Admiral J. L. Holloway, III, USN (Ret.)

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP

STATE: Ambassador Robert Oakley TREASURY: Mr. J. Robert McBrien

DEFENSE: Mr. Noel Koch JUSTICE: Mr. Lowell Jensen

TRANSPORTATION: Mr. Matthew Z. Scocozza

CIA: Mr. Charles Allen

JCS: LtGen John H. Moellring

FBI: Mr. Oliver Reveil
NSC: VAdm John Poindexter
WHITE HOUSE: Mr. Fred F. Fielding
OMB: Mr. Robert Howard

WORKING GROUP

Ambassador Edward L. Peck (Deputy Director)

CAPT Lou H. Boink (USN)
COL David L. Cole (USA)
LCDR Craig P. Coy (USOG)
LTC Patrick F. Daly (USAF)
LTC Robert L. Earl (USMC)
Mr. Burton Hutchings

CAPT David J. McMunn (USN)

LIASION GROUP

FBI: Charles Stapleton
FAA: Billie Vincent
OMB: Arnold Donahue
JUSTICE David Bouvinger



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

1 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WORKING GROUP AND LIAISON GROUP

FROM

CRAIG COY

SUBJECT:

Senior Review Group Meeting

There will be a Senior Review Group meeting on Thursday, 7 November from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. in Room 208, Old Executive Office Building. The purpose of the meeting will be to discuss the draft recommendations based on the response to the initial issue papers.

The Working Group should prepare the consensus proposal for each issue and where appropriate the non-concurring options. These will be prepared for use as overhead projection during the meeting.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 23, RE: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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LIST OF ISSUES FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

Issue Paper No. 1	National Program for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 2	National Policy for Compatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 3	National Organization for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 4	Definition of Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 6	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents
Issue Paper No. 7	International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 11	Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 17	Current Policy regarding the Operational Security of JSOC/DELTA
Issue Paper No. 22	Multilateral Counterterrorist (CT) Strike Force
Issue Paper No. 24	Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas
Issue Paper No. 25	Rewards
Issue Paper No. 27	Terrorism as a Crime
Issue Paper No. 29	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Issue Paper No. 30	Terrorism Intelligence Analysts
Issue Paper No. 42	Deployment Policy of JSOC



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

5 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR:

AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURE

MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLRING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS

VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE

DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT:

Senior Review Group Meeting

At the November 7th meeting of the Senior Review Group we will be discussing draft recommendations based on the issue papers distributed to you. Attached are draft recommendations and where applicable any dissenting views that surfaced from your responses.

The Vice President intends to join us. In order to insure ample time for complete discussion, the time of the meeting has been extended and will be from 3:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. in Room 208, OEOB.

J. L. Holloway, III Admiral, USN (Retired)

Executive Director

Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

Attachment As Stated

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White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 3, RE: NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Agencies

SUBJECT: National Program for Compatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The attached appendix should serve as the interim programming document of the national program for compatting terrorism.

(Note: The appendix is currently being prepared by Adm. Staser Holcomb, Terry Arnold, and members of the Working Group, based on the program element information solicited from all agencies in September. The status of this appendix will be briefed to the Task Force Principals on 12 November.)

DISSENTING VIEWS:

OMB - Informal coordination reveals that OMB may be concerned that this would transfer program-budget responsibility from the agencies to the National Coordinator (EOP).

State - Concur that the program document would be a useful, ready reference document, but that it should be maintained by the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, not a National Coordinator.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The NSC should promulgate a NSDD (with the policy statements along the lines already expressed in Issue Paper No. 2) as the national policy for combatting terrorism, and NSDDs 30, 138, 179, and 180 should be superseded.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Definition of Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The following working definition of terrorism should be adopted by the US Government and promulgated in the NSDD establishing the national program for compatting terrorism proposed in Recommendation No. 2.

Terrorism is the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - A "universal definition" would create problems without any corresponding benefit. The US could be accused or conducting terrorism, according to the long definition proposed. If a definition is necessary in some situations, it should be a shorter definition.

CTA - Non-concur with long definition proposed; recommend the definition be brief and flexible.

NSC - Non-concur. "Terrorism is already defined in the U.S. Code (Title 50 USC)." It is a political problem, best fought with political tools, and therefore not susceptible to clear, precise definition. "...further definition and statements are a political thicket that we would do well to stay out of."

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements During Terrorists Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The basic elements of US policy and response guidelines should be delineated at the initial phase of a crisis situation to all US Government policy makers and spokesmen. The process for issuing specific guidance and the rapidity and coordination required to adjust public diplomacy during an ongoing incident is deficient.

- 1. The TIWG, at its initial meeting in reaction to a terrorist incident, should issue specific guidance to be followed by all US Government spokesmen during the contingency. Legal issues must be carefully considered to ensure that press statements are not made which would jeopardize a criminal investigation or an eventual prosecution.
 - The guidance should be communicated to the President through the Wnite House Press Office.
 - The guidance should be communicated by all members of the TIWG to the applicable responsive activity within each organization. Lead agency responsibility concerning international or domestic terrorist statements should be already delineated.
 - The Deputy White House Press Secretary should be responsible for detailed and timely implementation of the guidance including any restrictions on statements by other agency spokesmen.
 - At each step of the TIWG's deliberations, when further information is received, the situation significantly changes, or new actions are decided upon or planned, the guidance should be reviewed, updated and distributed as outlined above.
- The Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should:
 - With NSC approval, provide updated general US policy guidelines for public diplomacy aspects of dealing with terrorism and insure dissemination to all concerned Government press offices.
 - Initiate a system for real time monitoring and analysis of the media during the incident and insure a rapid distribution of this information to US Government press offices and diplomatic posts abroad.

NLRR F99-008/74/2089

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

SECKET

ISSUE PAPER NO. 6

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and

Incidents

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: A policy for active response to terrorist threats and incidents -- including a set of criteria similar to that proposed in Issue Paper No. 6 -- should be developed by the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (Issue Paper No. 3) and forwarded to the IG/T for interagency coordination prior to submission to the National Security Council for approval.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - Issue is subsumed under Issue Paper No. 9; care should be taken not to break the criteria down too precisely.

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC, CTA, TRANSPORTATION, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: International Agreements for Compatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should pursue a three-track effort regarding international agreements for compatting terrorism.

- 1. A multilateral treaty against terrorism should be sought with a large number of participants in order to attain a broad international expression of condemnation for international terrorism. The objective should be one or wide participation in a general statement, that can be achieved quickly.
- 2. A parallel effort should be undertaken to obtain a series of bilateral agreements with our allied and like-minded nations for the purpose of compatting terrorism. The objective in these bilaterals would be to move quickly to achieve agreements in areas where there is already a concurrence of views on both sides. If where only limited concessions can be gained, these should be accepted and agreements rapidly concluded. This way, a network of bilateral agreements concerning terrorism might be achieved in a relatively short period of time.
- 3. Efforts to ensure compliance with existing treaties should continue to be pursued aggressively with a view to broadening these where appropriate.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

TATE - Does not favor major formal initiatives for either multilateral treaties or for specific bilaterals; prefers to pursue a flexible policy. State feels more systematic, regularized cooperation on an informal basis needed (status reports and agreements on next steps, etc.). Cooperation already taking place without formal treaties. This alternative avoids the need for formal ratifications by Congress and foreign parliaments and avoids attempting to negotiate such tricky questions as intelligence sharing. State counterproposal reads:

"The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Justice, should continue to pursue a flexible policy of international resolutions, agreements, and treaties, bilaterally and multilaterally, as necessary to gain international cooperation in combatting terrorism."

NSC - Generally non-concurred with the draft proposal noting that while there is no doubt we need to do better at developing a proader base of international cooperation, broad agreements are difficult to implement. Because of these constraints, past efforts have been historically based on unwritten "working agreements" on consultation and cooperation (e.g., Summit Seven). No specific counterproposals cited.

NLRRETT-1082#1209

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Extradition Treaties

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department should continue its program of opening negotiations on extradition treaties with countries with democratic regimes and fair judicial systems with a view to limiting the scope of the political offense exception. To achieve this goal, Senate approval of the first such revision (US/UK) to be concluded is a must. The State Department appropriately has the lead in the effort to secure approval. However, assistance from other U.S. Government agencies may be essential to making the Administration's anti-terrorism case.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE NSC

SUBJECT: Response Options to Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Office of the National Coordinator for Compatting Terrorism in the NSC will maintain a list of current options for response to terrorist threats or incidents. The Coordinator will collect the list both through his capacity as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and as Executive Director of the TIWG, and through consultations with the other representatives on both the IG/T and the TIWG. These options should represent the widest range of actions imaginable, covert as well as overt, in order to give our nation the ability to act with a reasonable chance of success when and if required, in an infinite variety of possible scenarios. No options should be excluded because of a low likelihood of employment. This range of capabilities should better prepare the USG to respond appropriately and promptly to terrorist incidents.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State is opposed to the idea of a National Coordinator who would chair the IG/T. They appear to approve the response option list idea, if it were named by the Director of the TIWG.

NSC concurs, but wants CIA to prepare the list, working closely with Delense and State.

JCS agrees with the concept, but feels each cognizant agency should prepare the list and forward it through the National Coordinator; and only Defense would prepare military options.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, CIA, JCS, FBI, DOT/FAA

SUBJECT: Counterterrorist Exercises and Simulations

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Office of the Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism in the NSC should work with the IG/T and other national elements with exercise programs to coordinate a program of simulating various realistic terrorist problems and conduct interagency exercises that will afford a basis for viable contingency planning. High-level participation should be strongly encouraged, as surrogate role-playing, while useful, does not give either side a true understanding of the likely course of events in a real situation. Post exercise debriefs and lessons learned should be widely circulated and discussed.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State opposes the idea of a National Coordinator, but agrees that the IG/T should work with the TIWG director at the NSC to develop and run exercises. They feel that after-action reports should avoid individual fault-finding.

NSC feels that the present IG/T exercise program is sufficient.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Hostage Family Liaison

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism should be designated as the primary point of contact for liaison with the families of all American hostages who are not USG employees once the hostage situation becomes protracted (e.g. after two weeks).

DISSENTING VIEWS:

State - Retain the Office of Consular Affairs as the point of contact. Evaluate the recent improvements at State -- the creation of a special working group of CA, NE, and M/CTP -- after an appropriate period of time.

NSC - The recently organized nostage family task force at the State Department should be instituted on a permanent basis.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: ALL

SUBJECT: Foreign and Domestic Public Awareness

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: An important facet of the U.S. ability to deal effectively with terrorism is the extent to which the closely interrelated domestic and foreign publics understand the nature of the threat and support the policies necessary to counter it. Concurrently, there is a national requirement to create a sophisticated public understanding of the essence of the threat to the nation posed by terrorism. The Interdepartmental Working Group on Public Diplomacy in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a long-range strategy for approval by the IG/T designed to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. Programs to be considered by the Working Group should include:

- The formation of a high level panel, to include representatives from media organizations, religious and ethnic groups, civic groups, national, state and local legislatures, bar associations, law enforcement agencies and other appropriate interested groups to sensitize the American public to the dangers of terrorism and reinforce public preparedness and will to deal with the risks necessary to compat this threat.
- A precise and sophisticated research project designed to explore in depth the public perception, awareness, and understanding of terrorism and its impact. The results of the project would be utilized to generate a "national credo" of US policy towards terrorism in order to educate the public concerning the range of potential responses to terrorism by the government.
- The monitoring by the State Department of US media and public opinion polls to provide insignts on how the U.S. public perceives and reacts to various aspects of terrorism and the countermeasures taken against it. USIA should conduct a similar monitoring operation abroad. Government statements on terrorism should be tailored to reflect the results of this analysis.
- A study with USIA, as the lead agency in the international information effort, and working in coordination with the Public Diplomacy Working Group and the IG/T, to complement ongoing efforts to influence foreign opinions concerning terrorism.

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Additionally, the State Department should consider creating a Public Diplomacy Office for Terrorism, similar to the Office of the Coordinator for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, which would be charged specifically with explaining our counterterrorism policies at home and abroad.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this draft recommendation.

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 14 - MEDIA

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside of U.S.

<u>DRAFT RECOMMENDATION</u>: The Departments of State and Justice should continue their efforts in support of legislation which makes the murder of U.S. citizens outside our borders a federal crime under U.S. law.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 16

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC

SUBJECT: Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Defense Department, NSC, and State Department should review current deployment criteria and authorization policy with a view toward early deployment of counterterrorist forces. Issues to be considered should include:

- 1. "Decoupling" of the decision to deploy Emergency Support Teams and Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF) components;
- 2. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff authority to deploy CTJTF assets to appropriate overseas Forward Staging Bases (FSB) to facilitate more expeditious response to terrorist incidents;
- 3. Political and legal questions relating to base, access and transit rights, including planning to meet eventual contingencies;
- 4. Forward deployment/prepositioning of CT elements and/or equipment to FSB's near high threat areas. (Note: OJCS currently studying this issue.)

Actual employment of the force would properly remain a decision of the National Command Authority.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

- STATE Generally concurred with original draft but recommended inclusion of "decoupling" of EST and CTJTF for deployment authorization and, recommended consideration of political and legal questions prior to force deployment. (Both comments incorporated.)
- CIA Recommended forward deployment /prepositioning of CT forces to high threat areas while maintaining a high state of readiness. (Comment incorporated.)
- NCS Concurred in the draft proposal with the caveat that, "the proposal for early deployment should be presented as a near-term 'fix' which could be solved long-term by overseas basing of special assets." (Comment incorporated.)

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BY W NARA DATE 2/2/12



COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, NSC. CIA

SUBJECT: Current Policy Regarding the Operational Security of CTJTF

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The US public, our allies, and our adversaries, including terrorists, are not adequately aware or U.S. competence or resources committed to compatting terrorism. Current policy requires a system of cover, security and classification concerning all aspects of CTJTF/DELTA/Seal Team Six. A public affairs strategy designed to announce U.S. counterterrorist capabilities while stringently protecting missions, tactics and procedures does not currently exist. Additionally, much of the protected information concerning counterterrorist forces has reached the media and the public domain. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) working in conjunction with the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism should develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy for counterterrorist forces. Additionally, a perception management program which incorporates OPSEC, PSYOP and deception should be developed by JCS, in coordination with CTA and State, and forwarded to the NCA for review and approval with subsequent distribution to appropriate agencies.

Care must be taken not to imply targeting the US populace in a PSYOP campaign. The focus of the program must be to preserve US CT capabilities and how and when these forces might be used.

Objectives of the perception management program should be:

- To preserve essential secrecy about US military counterterrorist capabilities and now forces might be deployed and employed during training and exercises.
- To provide options to support crisis resolution short of using force, preserve essential secrecy of force preparations, movement and US intentions; gain the initiative, surprise and superiority when forces are used; and, when necessary, support the security and withdrawal of forces.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None, comments received have been incorporated into this graft recommendation.

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NLRR <u>F99-08</u> | 2 # 12096 BY UI NARA DATE 9/1/07

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, TREASURY, JUSTICE

SUBJECT: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/

Mercenary Training Camps

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: Appropriate government agencies should continue the effort to employ the expanded ITAR to control the provision of defense services, including training in the use of defense articles such as firearms and explosives, to foreign nationals at mercenary camps in this country. The results of this effort should be assessed after the expanded ITAR has been in effect for one year (1 January 1986). This review should determine whether additional legislation is required to ensure that training and support of terrorists is not permitted under U.S. law.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, DEFENSE, JUSTICE, NSC, CIA

SUBJECT: Congressional Oversight of Counterterrorism Operations

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 20

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: CIA

SUBJECT: Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The CIA should undertake an expanded HUMINT collection effort against the terrorism target in the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Latin America.

DISSENTING VIEWS: None.

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ISSUE PAPER #23, PARTIAL CLOSURE

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ISSUE PAPER NO. 24 - INCREASED COORDIANTION

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE

SUBJECT: Rewards

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The Department of State should expedite the authority for payment of rewards authorized under the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, and issue clearly delineated quidance to appropriate U.S. government agencies on how to utilize the provisions of the Act to maximum advantage. Ensure that rewards actually authorized are effectively publicized in both target foreign populations and to the domestic American audience. range of aggressive options to include the creative use of rewards for psy-op efforts should be explored so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment. Finally recommend consideration be given to obtaining Congressional support for increasing the amount that can be authorized in any one case to \$1 million and to an expanded use of the awards authority, recognizing practical political constraints that impact on its implementation.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

- <u>CIA</u> Concurs, so long as the terrorists themselves do not benefit from the payment.
- STATE Non-concurs: This issue paper should be eliminated since its recommendations have been adopted independently. Detailed policy guidance on offering rewards has been promulgated in the Foreign Affairs Manual, with interagency coordination. Rewards have been offered in the TWA 847 and Kuwaiti 221 cases, and are under consideration, according to current policy, for the Achille Lauro and Rhein-Main incidents.
- FBI Non-concur. Rewards already offered for TWA 847 and four Marines in El Salvador.

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE, CIA

SUBJECT: International Informant Incentives

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The State Department, in concert with the Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency, should take the lead in an intercepartmental effort to develop a unilateral and/or bilateral program of informant incentives and, initiate requisite legislative action to support such a program. Examples of incentives which might be offered (in addition to monetary rewards) are: immunity from prosecution for previous offenses; and, granting of U.S. (or other) citizenship to the informant and immediate family.

DISSENTING VIEWS:

NSC - Non-concurred with draft proposal, noting that it is inappropriate for State Department to utilize existing authority for intelligence collection. Further, CIA already has authority and resources to pay for information; additional authorities are unnecessary.

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COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: STATE, JUSTICE, FBI

SUBJECT: Terrorism as a Crime

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The USG should not refer to terrorism as war but rather as crime.

DISSENTING VIEWS: It was the overwhelming opinion that the USG should not seek legislation which makes terrorism itself a crime. There was support for referring to terrorism as criminal activity.