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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 6/6/2005

File Folder NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (1 OF 13)

FOIA

F99-008/2

Box Number 34

WILLS

45

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13079	MEMO	NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: RESPONSE TO MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	1	2/27/1985	B1
13080	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: RESPONSE TO MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	2	ND	B1
13081	MEMO	BILL CASEY TO THE PRESIDENT, ET AL, RE: MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: THE THREAT AND POSSIBLE US RESPONSES PAR 3/24/2008 F99-008/2	1	2/25/1985	B1 B3
13082	REPORT	MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM PAR 7/11/2006 F99-008/2 DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233	15	2/15/1985	B1 B3
13083	EMAIL	JOHN POINDEXTER TO NORTH, RE: CASEY PAPER ON TERRORISM	1	2/26/1985	B1
13084	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY TO THE SECRETARY, RE: DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM AT THE SUMMIT R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2	2	4/24/1985	B1

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13085	PAPER	RE: TERRORISM <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	6	ND	B1
13086	PAPER	RE: 1985 BONN DECLARATION ON TERRORISM <i>R 3/5/2007 F99-008/2</i>	1	ND	B1
13087	PAPER	DRAFT NSDD RE: NATIONAL POLICY ON COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE	7	5/9/1985	B1
13088	PAPER	ATTACHEMENT 1 RE: COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE	9	ND	B1
13089	PAPER	TERMS OF REFERENCE, RE: TERRORISM	1	ND	B1
13090	MEMO	K.HITCHO, D. VAURIO RE: STATUS OF TERRORISM PROJECT	3	6/13/1985	B1

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13080	MEMO MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: RESPONSE TO MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	2	ND	B1

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13079	MEMO NORTH TO ROBERT MCFARLANE, RE: RESPONSE TO MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	1	2/27/1985	B1

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The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

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North

25 February 1985


2/26

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
✓ Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT: Middle East Terrorism: The Threat and Possible
US Responses

You may find useful this comprehensive review of the relative implications of counterterrorism steps taken with respect to each of the major Middle East sponsors of terrorism and different types of targets.




William J. Casey

Attachment:



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NLS 199-008/2013081
By ADJ, NARA, Date 3/24/08

Washington, D.C. 20505

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NLS 79-008/2 #13082

By SM, NARA, Date 7/11/06

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

FOIA(b) (1)

15 February 1985

FOIA(b) (3)

Middle East Terrorism: The Threat and Possible US Responses

Summary

Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the greatest threat to US personnel and facilities in the Middle East. Islamic radicals in Iran view Washington's presence and influence in The Middle East as major impediments to successful export of their revolution and regard terrorism as a legitimate and effective method of attacking the US. Iranian-sponsored terrorism will continue and possibly increase so long as the clerics in Tehran do not perceive any significant costs in launching such operations. [REDACTED]

Syria, Libya, and Palestinian radicals also are major Middle East sponsors of terrorism. Libya regards US involvement in the region as the primary obstacle to promoting Arab military action against Israel, but is reluctant to target the US directly because it fears US retaliation. Unlike the Iranians and Libyans, Syria and the Palestinian radicals do not focus on the US as their major target, and most of their attacks are directed against their exiled political opponents, moderate Arab states, or other Palestinian groups. Syria and Libya, like Iran, use terrorism as an instrument of state policy and provide extensive support for terrorists. [REDACTED]

This paper was prepared by the [REDACTED] Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with contributions from analysts in NESA, Office of Global Issues, and Office of Soviet Analysis. It has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officers for Counterterrorism, Near East-South Asia, and the USSR. [REDACTED]

NESA M 85-10040X

Iran. Radicals in the Khomeini regime are committed to spreading their Islamic ideology, and many clerics view terrorism as a legitimate, effective tool of state policy, particularly against the US position in the Middle East. Iranian-backed attacks increased by about 30 percent in 1984, and the numbers killed in Iranian-sponsored attacks outpace fatalities in strikes by all other terrorist sponsors. Senior Iranian leaders such as Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's heir-apparent, Prime Minister Musavi, and Consultative Assembly speaker Rafsanjani are implicated in Iranian terrorism.

Iran generally employs radical Lebanese or Iraqi Shia groups in its terrorist operations. These groups include:

- The Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain that was responsible for an unsuccessful coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981.
- The Islamic Call (Dawa) Party, with branches in Iraq, Bahrain, and Kuwait, that has bombed the US Embassy and other targets in Kuwait and is responsible for bombings and assassinations in Iraq.
- Hizballah and Husayn Musawi's Islamic Amal that operate in Lebanon and were behind the attacks on the US Embassy and the US Marine barracks as well as the more recent kidnappings of several US citizens.

Tehran also can call on individual sympathizers worldwide, including some in the US, to mount terrorist attacks. Iran provides its surrogates with money, equipment, training, and intelligence.

The most prominent trademark of Iranian-sponsored terrorism is the willingness of some perpetrators to die in the attempt. Iranian-sponsored Shia terrorists have carried out several car and truck bombings in Lebanon, Iraq, and Kuwait. In nearly every instance, the driver was killed.

Libya and Syria have long used terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Both have used their operatives as well as surrogates to carry out operations. Syria was seriously embarrassed in 1981 when Syrian military personnel sent to Jordan to assassinate the Prime Minister were captured and their confessions televised.

The Syrians provide weapons, travel documents, and intelligence support for operations by their surrogate groups and permit missions by Iranian-sponsored radicals in Lebanon.

Shia radicals associated with the Iranians, and the Armenian terrorist organization ASALA, have received Syrian assistance or training at camps in Syria and Lebanon.

Tripoli provides funds and training to radicals worldwide, but generally avoids using Libyans to carry out operations against targets other than Libyan dissidents and selected pro-US heads of state. Qadhafi hires assassins and thugs when Libyan access to its targets is limited or when he wants to conceal Libyan involvement.

The Palestinian Abu Nidal group--which is not a member of the PLO--remains the primary Palestinian organization responsible for terrorism. The

group once was supported by Iraq, which appears to have abandoned international terrorism over a year ago. Abu Nidal now depends on Syria and may undertake operations at Syrian direction. Several other radical Palestinian groups aligned with Syria also are involved in terrorist operations in Lebanon, Israel, and the West Bank.

[REDACTED]

The eight groups within the PLO have abided by that organization's ban on international terrorism outside Israel and the West Bank since 1974. Yasir Arafat's mainstream Fatah organization is the principal enforcer of the ban and supports diplomatic means to solve the Palestinian problem. Some PLO groups, however, are providing assistance to Lebanese Shia terrorists, and Arafat is under pressure to respond to Syrian-sponsored Palestinian strikes against Fatah officials. The most striking feature of recent Palestinian terrorism has been the attacks of pro-and anti-Arafat groups on each other.

[REDACTED]

Hitting US Targets

We do not believe the Syrians or the Palestinians would deliberately attack US targets unless US actions in Lebanon or on the Arab-Israeli issue were perceived as posing a direct, immediate threat to them. The Syrians, however, have not moved forcefully to prevent Iranian-sponsored terrorism against US targets in Lebanon. Syria condons Iranian transits through Damascus Airport and use of Syrian-controlled territory in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley for terrorist-training activities.

[REDACTED]

During the past 18 months, Libya has tried to sponsor two terrorist operations against US personnel or facilities in Latin America and Africa. Libya also has publicly praised the killing of US personnel by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon.

[REDACTED]

Qadhafi threatened last June that he would "export terrorism" to the US to retaliate for the "US-inspired" attack on his headquarters by dissidents last May. Libyan capabilities will be constrained by Tripoli's generally inept foreign intelligence network, its lack of an official presence in target countries, and fear of US retaliation.

[REDACTED]

Iran has amply demonstrated its willingness to hit US personnel and facilities. It is the most likely state to try to strike additional high-profile US targets in the Middle East to demonstrate the inability of the US to protect its interests, and to portray such attacks as actions by local "Islamic patriots." Potential Iranian or Libyan targets include:

- US Embassies and associated facilities, notably in the Persian Gulf states and in Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Khartoum, Athens, and possibly Tunis. The Iranians and their radical Shia allies in particular might want to strike the Embassy in Beirut, to demonstrate US impotence, or Baghdad, to harm US-Iraqi relations.

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Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the smaller Gulf states probably would criticize strongly any US retaliatory strike against Syria or Palestinian elements but might only mildly criticize strikes against Libya and Iran. [REDACTED]

A general reluctance to support any US military action against an Arab or Muslim target, however, would inhibit a public endorsement of the US move.

Soviet Reaction. The Soviets would attempt to capitalize on the propaganda windfall provided by US retaliation. They would probably issue a vague warning against further attacks, seek to claim credit when US strikes ended, and use the attacks to undermine Arab willingness to grant US forces transit or base rights or to deal with the US on the Arab-Israeli dispute.

In Libya, the USSR would try to exploit heightened concern about a US threat. The Soviets probably would offer increased intelligence support and greater aid for Libyan air and coastal defenses while implying that such efforts require greater Soviet access to Libyan military facilities. Moscow might be more willing to sell Qadhafi advanced air defense equipment and fighter aircraft. [REDACTED]

Moscow would hope a US strike would spur the PLO to reconcile its differences and hinder Arafat's pursuit of a joint peace effort with Jordan. The USSR might step up shipments of advanced weaponry to Syria in an effort to signal the Arab world and the US that Moscow solidly backs its primary Arab ally. The Soviets, however, are likely to continue avoiding a specific commitment to intervene militarily if Syria is threatened.

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

13083 EMAIL

1 2/26/1985 B1

JOHN POINDEXTER TO NORTH, RE: CASEY
PAPER ON TERRORISM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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13084
United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

8512375

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INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: M/CTP - Robert B. Oakley **TRO**

SUBJECT: Discussion of Terrorism at the Summit

At the meetings here and in Baltimore April 19, both the FRG Sherpa and the Political Director confirmed that terrorism would be on the Summit agenda for discussion by both Heads and Ministers. A paper has been prepared for the President (TAB A) which explains where we are with cooperation on terrorism at this time, where we want to go next, and which suggests points to be made at the Summit when this topic is discussed.

As preparation for your own discussions on terrorism with the Foreign Ministers, I have prepared somewhat more detailed talking points (TAB B). Pursuant to your desire to discuss state-supported terrorism, we sent to the other six the week of April 22 background papers summarizing recent Libyan and Iranian support for terrorism (TAB C). The more detailed points underscore the need and suggest specific methods for better cooperation on intelligence and security; urge agreement on more positive action with respect to civil aviation, extradition, and control of terrorist movements; and stress the need for firmer action in opposing state-supported terrorism, particularly Iran and Libya.

At TAB D is a draft public statement which the FRG could make separately rather than as part of the formal Summit Declaration. We know that the UK and Canada support this idea, and the UK agrees with the text. Given the priority of getting agreement to put terrorism on the agenda and the other problems we are having with the FRG, this draft has not yet been given to them. You may wish to do so at an appropriate moment.

Attachments:

- Tab A- Setting and Talking Points on Terrorism for the President
- Tab B- Detailed Talking Points on Terrorism for the Secretary
- Tab C- Analyses of Iranian and Libyan Support for Terrorism
- Tab D- Draft Public Statement

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DECL: OADR

NLS F99-008/2 #13084

BY 101 DATE 3/5/07

DRAFTED:M/CTP:RBOakley, M/CTP:ECB Bailey
04/24/85, Ext. 23451, Wang #3169N

Clearance: M/CTP - R.B.Oakley

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~~TERRORISM~~

Setting

--Terrorism, since the last Summit, has clearly become a greater threat to Western interests both in Europe and the Middle East: West-European terrorists are attempting to unify and increasingly are attacking NATO-related targets in an "anti-imperialist" campaign; Shia fanatics supported by Iran are more active against Israel, US, and France; Palestinians and other Arab terrorists supported particularly by Syria, but also Iran and Libya, are more active against Arab moderates in an attempt to paralyze the peace process; Libyan terrorism is increasing, bolder, and seeking close cooperation with Iran and Shia fanatics.

--After a two month diplomatic battle, the US, UK, and Italy were able to convince France and the FRG to put terrorism on the Summit agenda. This battle was symptomatic of a real problem in forging a cohesive front against terrorism. Cooperation among western intelligence and police services is good and improving, yet there is resistance to close cooperation by Foreign Ministries and at the political level. Foreign Ministries generally shrink from the subject, do not work well with their Interior Ministries, and give higher priority to other issues; there is very limited willingness by the other governments to risk economic, commercial or political relations by taking action against states which support terrorism; and several governments, led by France, are uncomfortable about multilateral action against terrorism.

--Two preparatory meetings on terrorism in March, one chaired by the FRG Interior Ministry and one by the FRG Foreign Ministry, produced a good basis for Summit consideration [the first provides for a series of practical measures to improve common knowledge and intensify existing bilateral cooperation in such fields as identifying terrorists and their movements, physical security, or counter-terrorist technology; the second provides for several steps to strengthen collaboration against terrorism in the field of civil aviation.] Although French reservations and FRG skittishness vitiated attempts to move ahead with follow-up action, it may be possible to regain momentum as a result of Summit discussions.

--Our objective is improved practical cooperation, primarily in existing bilateral channels, rather than creation of multilateral mechanisms; governments at the Summit should not let questions of form block serious consideration of the substance of a dangerous threat.

--We want the governments at the Summit to endorse in principle action to strengthen counter-terrorism in the civil aviation field and to urge appropriate agencies to work more closely together bilaterally on specific measures directed against other kinds of terrorism. Follow-up action is the key to success.

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BY 101, NARA, DATE 3/5/02

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Your Objectives

--Obtain agreement that the terrorist threat really is a serious long-term danger to Western interests and therefore must be countered more vigorously.

--Obtain agreement to strengthen and improve coordination among members of the seven to counter terrorism and by members of the seven with other friendly governments. Form should not stand in the way of serious cooperation which can be bilateral or multilateral.

--Suggest specific areas where cooperation can be improved, bilaterally or by a combination of bilateral and multilateral action, such as: information on identification and movements of terrorists, information on technical devices used by terrorists, exchange of techniques on physical security and technical countermeasures against terrorist attack.

--Obtain agreement in principle to a revitalization of the Bonn Declaration of 1978, which will be elaborated by the experts.

--Suggest there be a common commitment by the governments of the seven not to alter policies or release prisoners or make other concessions to terrorists and states which support them.

--Suggest that the seven agree to take a new look at how to increase the cost to states which support terrorism, and exchange specific ideas either bilaterally or multilaterally within three months.

--Agree, if raised, to a brief public statement highlighting resolve of the seven to counter terrorism, perhaps as an addendum to the political statement or as a separate statement by the chairman.

Watch Out For

--French objections based on form, such as arguing that the Summit can discuss terrorism but is not competent to take action except on economic issues; or that measures agreed to at first Bonn meeting which French did not attend are unacceptable as meeting was not properly arranged.

--Domestic turf problems the French, Germans, Italians, and Japanese have in working to combat international terrorism - their foreign office officials lack authority and knowledge in this area, and work poorly with security and intelligence agencies.

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TERRORISM

Talking Points

--Terrorism directed against the Alliance and that of Middle East origin directed against Western interests has increased greatly since the London Summit. Terrorists and those who support them, particularly Libya, Syria, and Iran, apparently believe they can achieve success. We must cooperate to meet this threat more firmly and support other threatened states or it will continue to grow.

--Possibilities for increased cooperation among the seven have been explored intensively over the past few months. Several specific proposals have been discussed; and there has already been improvement in the exchange of intelligence and in our common understanding of the nature of the several major terrorist threats. We must seek similar progress on specific ways to improve our individual or multilateral action to counter terrorism.

--The United States does not seek creation of new seven power or other multilateral mechanisms. We continue to believe that existing bilateral, confidential channels are best suited to close cooperation; but this cooperation can be made more effective by our explicit mandate to our governments to work still more closely.

--In conjunction with the possibility of dropping sanctions against Ariana Afghan airways, we see an excellent opportunity to revitalize the Bonn Declaration of 1978, under which those sanctions were applied, and believe strongly our experts should be instructed to elaborate that declaration and agree upon measures to make it more effective and practicable.

--The responsible agencies of our governments concerned with both internal security and intelligence on terrorists should be encouraged to establish common criteria and exchange more information, wherever possible.

--We must agree to reject categorically any demands by terrorists for concessions such as prisoner exchanges, payoffs or other blackmail; the potential political costs to states which support terrorism, such as Libya and Iran, must be impressed upon them. They must know that they will be held liable and subject to counter-action, and that we will not allow our policies to be altered by terrorist pressure.

--Where possible, we should tighten up laws and regulations applicable to terrorists within our countries, without damaging our fundamental commitment to democracy and freedom. As an example, the UK and US are strengthening their bilateral extradition treaty. For another, we have unilaterally imposed tight controls on movements of officials from governments who support terrorism.

--Can we decide upon a means to exchange views and seek common agreement upon specific actions to be taken individually by our respective governments?

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TERRORISM

I. General

--Since we met last year, there has been a resurgence of terrorism by Western European groups against both the Alliance and other Western targets. The apparent increased cooperation of these groups, their choice of targets and their propaganda is intended to weaken the Alliance by exacerbating anti-NATO, anti-INF sentiment; and to capitalize on this sentiment to strengthen the terrorists by gaining adherents from the ranks of the protesters.

--Terrorism in the Middle East, which frequently spills over into Western Europe, is also coming more closely together in a common assault upon moderation in the region and those governments which support it, whether they be Arab or Western. Libya has stepped up attacks on its citizens abroad, including in Europe, and in consultation with Iran and Syria is trying to broaden its targets to include moderate Arab regimes and perhaps western targets. Iran continues to support Shia terrorist actions, including those against France and the U.S., and is building a network for subversion and terrorism in the Gulf, in order to further its objectives in the Middle East. Syria is supporting Palestinian splinter groups in terrorist activities against Jordan, the PLO and the peace process, and is turning a blind eye to Iranian terrorism in Lebanon.

--We need to strengthen our common resolve to resist more firmly than ever the terrorist efforts to intimidate and divide us in Western Europe and to weaken our support for the moderate regimes and the peace effort in the Middle East; weakness or what is seen as weakness by even one of us will only embolden terrorists, encourage further attacks against the Alliance, and weaken moderation in the Middle East.

--By resisting firmly and placing the onus squarely upon the terrorists and their supporters - confronting the issue squarely rather than allowing guilty governments the luxury of feigned innocence - we can blunt their political momentum.

--By taking another look at possible actions to make such governments pay a political price, to tighten controls over movements of their officials, to agree on measures to strengthen civil aviation security, we can deter more effectively terrorist pressures.

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TERRORISM

--By having our intelligence and security services work still more closely and systematically together, through established, confidential, bilateral channels - not creating new machinery - we can improve our respective abilities to identify and monitor the movements of and take action to prevent or respond to terrorists.

--We should also see what more can be done to tighten up our extradition procedures or, where necessary, revise existing treaties. The US is doing this with the U.K. and Italy.

II. Specifics

A. Civil Aviation security

--Hijackings continue - in the Middle East they are up from 5 in 1983 to 15 in 1984. The Bonn Declaration of 1978 helped to deter hijackings, but has not been used by the Seven for almost three years. If we can give the declaration more flexibility along the lines discussed by the experts in March in Bonn, the declaration will be more realistic and more effective as a deterrent, since it would be used.

--I am thinking of such flexibility as a time limit for sanctions, of graduated sanctions rather than the current total end of air services, or of diplomatic initiatives we might take as seven, or individually, or with other governments when there is a hijacking. The important thing is for all seven governments to agree at this meeting to find ways to take some concerted action rather than to do nothing.

B. Security and Preparedness for Personnel Abroad

--The shift in recent years from hostage-taking to bombs and armed attacks (over 70% of all terrorist incidents in 1984) is a dangerous new trend. The Department of State is doing a great deal to improve physical security and awareness of our personnel abroad, drawing upon our private sector as well as all parts of the government for better design, technology and materials.

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TERRORISM

--We have already exchanged information on these new measures with some of you. We are ready to augment working-level bilateral or multilateral exchanges, either between Foreign Ministries for general topics or between our Embassies in certain countries where there are serious problems, to share information systematically on physical security and preparedness techniques, counter-terrorism equipment, and methods to counter terrorist techniques and technology. This can be done in an ad hoc manner, but would be more effective if given a common endorsement and some degree of coordination.

C. Intelligence on Terrorist Groups, Actions and Movements

--Recent increased exchanges of intelligence analyses on the terrorist threat, through existing channels, have enhanced our common understanding of the general problems, and of specific terrorist groups and threats; this has been very helpful and should be continued.

--Despite this encouraging progress, we must redouble our efforts to find new, more systematic and speedier ways to collect, analyze and disseminate intelligence within and between our governments. While maintaining and safeguarding existing national techniques and established bilateral arrangements between our intelligence and police services, we must seek ways of refining and extending these efforts. We need closer cooperation, new technology and better training techniques, not only among ourselves but in cooperation with and helping other law abiding countries less able to protect themselves.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: ~~OADR~~

~~SECRET~~

D R A F T

*change
suggested by U.K.*

1985 BONN DECLARATION ON TERRORISM

The following statement on terrorism is suggested for use at the May 1985 Summit meeting in Bonn, Germany:

THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT NOTE THE INCREASE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ^{WHICH ARE FREQUENTLY} DIRECTED ~~PARTICULARLY~~ AGAINST DEMOCRATIC NATIONS; THE INCREASING EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH ATTACKS ARE DIRECTED AGAINST PERSONS AND FACILITIES COMMITTED TO THE DEFENSE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE; THE USE BY STATES OF TERRORISM IN INTER- GOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS OR FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF OPPONENTS OF POLITICAL REGIMES; AND THE RESURGENCE OF TERRORIST ATTACKS INIMICAL TO CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY.

THEY MOST STRONGLY CONDEMN ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; CONFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO COUNTER THESE THREATS JOINTLY AND RESOLUTELY; AND REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO THE BONN DECLARATION OF 1978 ON CIVIL AVIATION. x

IN REFERENCE TO THE DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OF THE LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT OF 7/9 JUNE 1984, THEY HAVE AGREED TO INSTRUCT THE COMPETENT AGENCIES OF THEIR COUNTRIES TO CONTINUE AND INTENSIFY, IF NECESSARY, THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THREATS EMANATING FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND CONTINUE TO COOPERATE IN THE ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREATS.

THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT CALL UPON OTHER LIKE-MINDED NATIONS TO WORK TO THIS SAME END; AND OFFER THE ASSISTANCE OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S EXPERTS TO OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS IN PREVENTING ACTS ENDANGERING CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST THE COMMON WELFARE OF PEOPLES AND NATIONS.

~~SECRET~~
DECL: QADR

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13087 PAPER

7 5/9/1985 B1

DRAFT NSDD RE: NATIONAL POLICY ON
COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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13088	PAPER ATTACHEMENT 1 RE: COUNTERTERRORISM INTELLIGENCE	9	ND	B1

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13089	PAPER TERMS OF REFERENCE, RE: TERRORISM	1	ND	B1

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13090 MEMO

3 6/13/1985 B1

K.HITCHO, D. VAURIO RE: STATUS OF
TERRORISM PROJECT

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