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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

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6/6/2005

File Folder

NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (4 OF 13)

**FOIA** F99-008/2

Box Number 34

WILLS

	- •		48	·—·
ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages		Restrictions
13242 PAPER	DRAFT OF NOTIONAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM <i>R</i> 10/1/2008 <i>NLRRF99-008/2</i>	2	7/3/1985	B1
13245 MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE ENTITLED CIVIL AVIATION ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM  R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2	1	ND	B1
13248 MEMO	MCFARLANE TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: STATE/TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENTS' PLANS FOR ENHANCING AVIATION SECURITY AND COMBATTING TERRORISM  R 2/2/2012 F1999-008/2	2	6/28/1985	B1
13251 MEMO	AL KEEL TO MCFARLANE, RE: DRAFT NSDD ON CIVIL AVIATION ANTI- TERRORISM PROGRAM	1	7/10/1985	B1
13253 MEMO	NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH ADM JIM HOLLOWAY (ANNOTATED)  R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2	1	7/19/1985	B1
13256 TALKING POINTS	MEETING WITH AMD JIM HOLLOWAY (ANNOTATED)	2	ND	B1
	R 10/1/2008 NLRRF99-008/2			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (4 OF 13)

**FOIA** 

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ID Doc Type	Doo	ument Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions	
13259 TALKING POINTS	DUP	LICATE OF #13256		2	ND	B1
	R	10/1/2008	NLRRF99-008/2			

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NAME: James H. Critchfield

EMPLOYER: Tetra Tech International, Inc.

TITLE: President

1911 North Fort Myer Drive Arlington, Virginia 22209 Telephone: (703) 525-2335

MARITAL STATUS: Married

HOME ADDRESS: 4200 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.

Apartment 902

Washington, D.C. 20016

EDUCATION: BS North Dakota State University, 1935-39

Columbia University Graduate School, 1945-46 U.S. Armed Forces: Cavalry School, 1939-40 Command and General Staff College, 1941-42

Advanced Armored, 1948

### EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE:

President of Tetra Tech International, Inc. 1975-present Consultant to Office of SECSTATE and private U.S. industry on international energy affairs, 1974-75

Retired from Government Service, 1974

Intermittent Assignments on White House International Energy Staff, 1973-74

National Intelligence Officer for International Energy Affairs, 1974

Special Assignment CIA in Field of Economics with Emphasis on International Energy, Food and Water, 1968-74 Chief of the Near East and South Asian Division; Foreign

Chief of the Near East and South Asian Division; Foreign Operation/CIA, 1960-68

Chief of the Eastern European Division, Foreign Operations/CIA 1956-59

Central Intelligence Agency Germany, 1948-56

Staff Assignment U.S. Occupation Forces Europe, 1946-48

Regular Army Combat WWII North Africa, Mediterranean, Europe

Military Service - Regular Army Officer 1939 to 1948; 2nd Lt. to Lt. Colonel. Active Reserve 1948-66, Colonel



### DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

CNO EXECUTIVE PANEL

WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

1 July 1985

### MEMORANDUM FOR OLLIE NORTH

Subj: VICE PRESIDENT'S TERRORISM TASK FORCE

Encl: (1) Jim Critchfield's curriculum vitae

- 1. Pursuant to our conversation this morning, enclosed is Jim Critchfield's curriculum vitae. You will note that Jim was with the Agency for nearly 30 years and was National Intelligence Officer for International Energy Affairs when he retired in 1974. He also headed President Nixon's International Energy Office. Since his retirement, he has headed TETRATECH International which has extensive contacts in the MIDEAST—the locus of the majority of terrorist activities directed against the United States. Jim is a frequent traveler to the region and deals personally with heads of state in the Persian Gulf.
- 2. Jim was a key member of the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel Terrorism Task Force, has a firm, balanced grasp of the issues, and would make an outstanding member of the Vice President's Task Force.

Very respectfully,

R. ROBINSON HARRIS

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name

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**FOIA** 

NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (4 OF 13)

F99-008/2

**WILLS** 

Box Number

34

48

ID	Document Type	No of D	oc Date	Restric-
	Document Description	pages		tions

**13242 PAPER** 

2 7/3/1985

B1

DRAFT OF NOTIONAL TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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# POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND CONSULTATIVE GROUP OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM

### (Candidates are listed alphabetically)

Lloyd Cutler

Lawrence Eagleburger

Andrew Goodpastor

GEN Paul Gorman

Alexander Haig

Richard Helms

ADM James Holloway

ADM Bobby Inman

Jeane Kirkpatrick

Henry Kissinger

GEN Frederick Kroesen

Melvin Laird

Donald Rumsfeld

William Rogers

Richard S. Schweiker

Brent Scowcroft

William E. Simon

John Tower

# POSSIBLE CANDIDATES FOR EXPERT CONSULTANTS TO THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM

### (Candidates are listed alphabetically)

Dr. Yonah Alexander - CSIS

Dr. J. Bowyer Bell

Howard T. Bayne

Dr. Ray S. Cline - CSIS

Dr. Martha Crenshaw - Wesleyan University

Senator Jeremiah Denton

Raphael Eitan - Israel

William F. Farrell - Naval War College

Dr. Franco Ferracuti - Italy

AMB Louis G. Fields, Jr.

ADM Bobby Inman

Brian Jenkins - Rand Corporation

Dr. Robert H. Kupperman - CSIS

Dr. Michael Ledeen - CSIS

Dr. Neil C. Livingstone

Edward Luttwak

Dr. Ariel Merari - Israel

Jeff Record

J. Kenneth Robinson

Shaul Rosolio - Israel

Dr. Stephen J. Sloan - CADRE, Maxwell AFB

Dr. William J. Taylor, Jr. - CSIS

John Thomas - Assistant Secretary of State for Administration

Dr. Steven Van Cleave

William Whitehurst

Prof. Paul Wilkinson - UK, Aberdeen University

Bob Woodward

month

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Craig Fuller,

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prepare a non
committed insue.

John

# CONFIDENTIAL

### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1985

## CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

A Letter of "Suggestions" from the United States

Strategic Institute

Attached at Tab A is a letter from Arthur Metcalf, Chairman of the United States Strategic Institute. His letter forwards suggestions on how the USG might better handle terrorism learned during an earlier official exercise.

### RECOMMENDATION

That	your	task	force	on	terrorism	review	the	letter	at	Tab	A.	-
		Appro	ove			Disapp	rove					

Attachment

Tab A - Metcalf ltr to the President of June 19, 1985

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By NARA, Data 5 3105

CONFIDENTIAL Declassify: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

1

ARTHUR G. B METCALF CHAIRMAN

GEN IRA C. EAKER, USAF (RET.) VICE CHAIRMAN

LT. GEN. VICTOR H. KRULAK, USMC (RET.) VICE CHAIRMAN GEN. BRUCE K. HOLLOWAY, USAF (RET.) PRESIDENT

RICHARD R. GLENDON SECRETARY AND TREASURER

VICE PRESIDENTS
WALTER F. HAHN
VICE ADM. RUTHYEN E. LIBBY, USN (RET.)
HON. CLARE BOOTHE LUCE
GEN. T. ROSS MILTON, USAF (RET.)
GEN. JAMES H. POLK, USA (RET.)
JOHN R. SILBER



DIRECTORS
RICHARD Y ALLEN
ADM THOMAS H MODRER USN RET ,
GEN F MICHAEL ROGERS, USAF RET ,
GEN FRED C WEYAND, USA RET ,

### UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INSTITUTE

WASHINGTON, D.C.

PUBLISHING OFFICE 265 WINTER STREET WALTHAM. MA 02154 (617) 890 - 5030

June 19, 1985

. . . .

The Honorable Ronald W. Reagan The White House 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

The thoughts presented here prepared by the writer responsive to an official exercise in a different and earlier terrorism simulation may be of some use to you in positioning our country better to cope with possible future acts of terrorism which are likely to occur with increasing frequency.

The extreme delicacy and frustration attendent to a situation where acts of terrorism put the lives of hostages at risk are the overriding attributes. In this situation two circumstances can be distinguished. One, in which the country in which the act of terrorism takes place, has a poorly defined government - or no government at all - and where the environment is hostile to the United States; and, one in which the government is well-defined, friendly to the United States, and where the rule of law prevails.

It may be that the frustration due to inability to apply force or indeed to take action is greater in the second case.

The application of force, either by the host country alone or in concert with the forces of the target country - if that can be envisaged - presents formidable and frustrating difficulties.

The vulnerability of society to terrorist assaults is patent - and the more civilized the society, the more vulnerable. Increasingly, this is becoming a Hobbesian world characterized by "continual fear and danger of violent death; and [wherein] the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short."

If such acts of barbarism are to be an expected phenomenon on the international scene, it would seem that the remedy to discourage such acts should in principle, in law, and in the exercise of force and the imposing of punishment, take on an international dimension.

In the last analysis it is the world civilized order which is being assaulted - not the target country named in a particular instance.

Where the application of force is considered, in setting up agencies to deal with this new threat to world order, some countries (like our own) may, for organizational purposes, be inclined to place the essential force component under the military establishment. There exist persuasive arguments against doing this. It is suggested that in the long view, all interests involved may be best served, if such agencies, including an appropriate force component were to have an international composition and to come under some sort of international police organization, to which all civilized nations can subscribe.

It can be argued that this work is neither for diplomats nor soldiers whose basic orientations are on a nation to nation basis.

In this way the foreign services of the involved nations can be excused from activities which do not involve diplomacy or foreign policy. And the military establishment can be excused from matters which - however grave - are essentially not military nor addressed to the use of force in any true military context. We are dealing here with a matter of the criminality of individuals which crosses national boundaries; not one of war or even limited war, toward which all military hardware and doctrine are - or should be - vectored.

Neither the military - in the eyes of the world - nor the effective solution to a hostage problem are benefitted by the organizational assignment of such force elements to the military. Moreover, where friendly nations are involved, the use of national military forces touch adversely the pride and sovereign prestige of the interacting nations; more when they are friendly, than when they are otherwise. This clearly points up the central difficulty of involving national armed forces.

Accordingly, there seems to exist the need to create an international committee to study and consider the special character and problems of terrorism in all its aspects, with and without hostages, and particularly in those cases where prompt action and the use of force may be indicated. Its purpose should be to set up an international agency for the purpose of dealing with the problem of terrorism. Such a police force with appropriate jurisdiction and suitably implemented would circumvent the crucial delays attendant to the normal usages of diplomacy and the very real inhibitions which attend the use of military forces across friendly frontiers.

With such a force, belonging to all concerned, and by its international composition, there would then exist no problem arising from national pride or questions of sovereignty to be resolved in a crisis environment. Also, a considerable measure

of experience in dealing with terrorism in the international arena would accrue and be of increasing value and effectiveness. Inasmuch as the proposed structure would be charged with the responsibility of dealing with real violations to world order it should be set up apart from any connection with the United Nations. Something similar to the NATO military organization comes to mind.

Such concerted action by a number of civilized nations and the fact of setting up such an international organization would, in itself, have a dampening effect on terrorism in general.

Respectfully,

Arthur G. B. Metcalf

Chairman

AGBM: mmw

OUTGOING

### THE WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

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*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION *C-COMMENT/RECOM	*A-ANSWERED *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL	*TYPE RESP=INITIALS  * OF SIGNER
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE	*C-COMPLETED	* CODE = A
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET		*COMPLETED = DATE OF

REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE (ROOM 75,0EOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS

\*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC\*

MANAGEMENT.

\*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY

\*S-FOR-SIGNATURE \*X-INTERIM REPLY OF FRANKE

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 27, 1985

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Forwarding of U.S. Strategic Institute's "Suggestions" letter to the Vice President's

Task Force

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the Vice President forwarding a letter from the United States Strategic Institute (Tab A). Their letter offers some thoughts on dealing with terrorism learned in an earlier official exercise. The Vice President's newly formed task force would be a proper entity for reviewing such suggestions.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memo the Vice President at Tab I with Tab A attached.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_

cc: Vince Cannistraro

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the Vice President
Tab A - Metcalf ltr to the President of Jun 19, 1985

By White House Manager August 5 3 16

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CONFIDENTIAL

# SEGRET



### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 12, 1985

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) on the

Vice President's Task Force on Combatting

Terrorism

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President requesting that he sign the NSDD at Tab A regarding the establishment of a task force on combatting terrorism to be chaired by the Vice President.

This NSDD includes input received from the IG/T and reflects interagency agreement on the wording. The Vice President's staff has concurred in the draft.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo the President at Tab I with Tab A attached.

Disapprove

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
Tab A - NSDD: Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

WhiteHouse Guidelines, August 28, 1997

By NAHA, Date 5,31,05

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### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD):

Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

### Issue

National Security Decision Directive regarding the establishment of a task force on combatting terrorism to be chaired by the Vice President (Tab A).

### Facts

In your June 18 press conference, you indicated that the Vice President would chair a government-wide task force on combatting terrorism. The NSDD at Tab A implements your guidance and directs departments/agencies to provide all appropriate support for this endeavor.

### Discussion

The Vice President commenced action on this matter in his meetings with European Heads of State over the last two weeks. The purpose of the task force is to galvanize the efforts of the USG in developing new and better methods for combatting the meance terrorism now poses. The Vice President has named Retired CNO, ADM Jim Halloway, to serve as the senior Executive Director for the task force. The Vice President will report his findings to you by the end of year.

### Recommendation

OK

No

That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.

Prepared by: Oliver North

DECLASSIFIED

Attachment

Tab A - NSDD: Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

SECRET Declassify: OADR

SECRET By White House Guldelines, August 18. 1997



#### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

# SECRET

National Security Decision Directive

### TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM (U)

International terrorism poses an increasing threat to U.S. citizens and our interests. Terrorists are waging a war against, not only the United States, but all civilized society in which innocent civilians are intentional victims and our servicemen are specific targets. (U)

The United States Government has an obligation to protect its citizens and interests against terrorists who have so little regard for human life and the values we cherish. To the extent we can, we should undertake action in concert with other nations which share our democratic institutions to combat the menace of terrorism. We must, however, be prepared to act unilaterally when necessary.

It is, therefore, imperative that we develop a sustained program for combatting terrorism. To ensure that all appropriate resources of the United States Government are dedicated to this task, the Vice President is appointed to convene a government—wide task force on combatting terrorism. (S)

The Vice President's task force will:

- -- review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and programs on combatting terrorism, to include:
  - an assessment of national priorities currently assigned to effectively combat terrorism, especially earlier recommendations regarding organization in NSDD-30 and adequacy of intelligence responsibilities in NSDD-138 and Presidential Executive Order 12333;
  - the assignment of responsibilities and accountabilities for ensuring interagency cooperation and coordination before, during, and after a terrorist incident;
  - a review and evaluation of present laws and law enforcement programs dealing with terrorism;
  - the adequacy of public awareness and support;

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SECRET

- provisions for funding and personnel; and

 an evaluation of current levels of programs of international cooperation and coordination.

-- make recommendations as appropriate to the President by the end of 1985. (%)

The task force on combatting terrorism, chaired by the Vice President, will include the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Transportation; the Attorney General, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief of Staff to the President; the Chief of Staff to the Vice President; the Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs; the Executive Director of the Task Force; and others as appropriate. (2)

The Vice President will appoint a senior Executive Director for the task force who will work under the direct supervision of the Vice President. The Executive Director may task any government department or agency, individual or organization to contribute to the work of the task force. To support the work of the task force, a working group will be established for which members may be drawn from departments/agencies represented on the Interdepartmental Group on Combatting Terrorism, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, and others as appropriate. The working group will prepare substantive recommendations to the task force for consideration.

The task force will select a group of consultants which will provide advice to the task force as necessary. A Secretariat Staff for the task force may be established as appropriate.

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SECRET

# HOP SECTION

# North SYSTEM II 90701 Re-do

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 12, 1985

TOP SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) entitled Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President requesting that he sign the NSDD at Tab A on the proposed civil aviation anti-terrorism program.

In the President's public remarks of June 18 (Tab B), he directed the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate with the Secretary of State on measures to improve our protection against terrorism directed at civil aviation. On June 28, he approved, in principle, plans by Secretaries Shultz and Dole for enhancements to our civil aviation security program (Tab II).

This NSDD reflects input received from State, DOT, CIA, and FAA. It has not been circulated for agency clearance. OMB has reviewed the draft and their comments/recommendations are attached at Tab III.

### RECOMMENDATION

That	you	initial	and	forward	your	memo	the	President	at	Tab	I.
------	-----	---------	-----	---------	------	------	-----	-----------	----	-----	----

Approve	Disapprove	

### Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President

Tab A - NSDD: Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism

Program

Tab B - Presidential Statement of June 18, 1985

Tab II - McFarlane Memo to the President of June 28, 1985

Tab III - Keel Memo to McFarlane of July 10, 1985

By Walla HARA, Day 5 31 05

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SYSTEM II 90701

### THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) entitled Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program

Issue: Should you issue a National Security Decision Directive on enhanced civil aviation security to counter-terrorism (Tab A).

Facts: In your public remarks on June 18 (Tab B), you directed the Secretary of Transportation to coordinate with the Secretary of State on measures to improve our protection against terrorism directed at civil aviation. On June 28, you approved, in principle, plans by Secretaries Shultz and Dole for enhancements to our civil aviation security program.

<u>Discussion</u>: The NSDD at Tab A implements your guidance to the Departments of State and Transportation. The FAA is prepared to carry-out an improved protection and security program as soon as the directive is signed. The Department of Transportation estimates that full implementation of the program will cost an additional \$8M in FY-85 and \$30M in FY-86. It will also require approximately 217 additional full-time personnel positions.

Once the directive has been approved, DOT will confer with OMB on actions required (reprogramming or supplemental legislation) to obtain the requisite resources.

### Recommendation

OK No

That you sign the NSDD at Tab A.

Prepared by: Oliver North

Attachments

Tab A - NSDD entitled Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program Tab B - Statement of June 18, 1985

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TOP SECRET

NLRR P99-008/2#13245
BY RW NARA DATE 25/12

SYSTEM II 90701

### THE WHITE HOUSE

National Security Decision Directive

WASHINGTON

# CIVIL AVIATION ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM (8)

International civil aviation is becoming a high visibility target for terrorist activities. Numerous terrorist acts directed against U.S. and other air carriers in recent weeks pose a significant threat to international commerce and our national interests. Recent violent terrorist acts have resulted in the murder, torture and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and the death of hundreds of others. It is imperative that the United States expeditiously implement procedures to prevent and/or respond to subsequent terrorist acts. Accordingly, the following extraordinary security and protective measures are directed for implementation:

- -- Expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Program. The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is directed to immediately undertake actions necessary to expand the Federal Aviation Administration Federal Air Marshal Program to the extent necessary to assure safety aboard U.S. air carriers traveling in threatened international areas. At a minimum, the following actions shall be taken:
  - Within 14 days, the existing Federal Air Marshal complement shall provide coverage as determined necessary for those flights serving cities where the threat of hijacking is most severe. (8)
  - Within 30 days, the Federal Air Marshal complement shall be expanded through the addition of Federal law enforcement officers from other Executive Branch agencies to provide coverage as determined necessary at the most threatened locations. (S)
  - Within 60 days, action shall be initiated to fully expand the Federal Air Marshal complement through acquisition of new special agents to the level necessary to provide continuing coverage at the most threatened locations throughout the world. (S)
  - Utilization of the expanded Federal Air Marshal complement shall continue until otherwise determined by the Secretary of Transportation. Each Federal Air Marshal's duties shall include airport and airline security system inspections and functional evaluations in order to fully utilize these highly specialized resources.

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NLS D. Van Tossell NSC, Earss & 10/6/45

NARA, DATE 5/31/05

2

- -- Assessment of Security Effectiveness at Foreign Locations.
  The Secretary of Transportation shall immediately undertake an assessment of the level of security provided at foreign airports for all U.S. air carrier departures and departures of foreign air carriers serving the United States.
  - The existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents shall immediately conduct on-site security evaluations at airports within areas of the highest risk to civil aviation served by U.S. air carriers.
  - Within 30 days, the existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents supplemented by Department of State employees shall conduct on-site security evaluations at all airports where the highest threat to civil aviation exists.
  - Within 60 days, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate action to increase the complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents to the extent necessary to provide continuing, periodic assessment of security levels at all such foreign airports.
  - Not later than July 30, 1985, and every 120 days thereafter, the Secretary of Transportation shall advise me of those airports where security levels do not meet International Civil Aviation Organization Security Standards and shall advise competent foreign government authorities. If the notified government does not undertake expeditious corrective action, the Secretary of Transportation shall notify me and shall apply the appropriate provisions of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (as amended) whenever it is determined that a continuing condition exists that threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew travelling to or from a foreign airport.
- Research and Development. The Department of Transportation, in coordination with the Interagency Working Group on Combatting Terrorism and the Technical Support Working Group, will carry out an expanded research and development program covering detection of explosive and incendiary devices, hijack prevention, and other security system enhancements. Projects presently planned will be accelerated and necessary additional projects will be initiated this fiscal year and thereafter.



(Elliott/North)
June 18, 1985
5:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: NEWS CONFERENCE OPENING STATEMENT TUESDAY, JUNE 18, 1985

Good evening. One hour ago, the body of a young American hero, Navy diver Robert Dean Stethem, was returned to his native soil in a coffin, after being beaten and shot through the head at pointblank range.

His murder and the fate of the other American hostages still being held in Beirut underscore an inescapable fact: the United States is tonight a Nation being warred against by international terrorists who wantonly kill and who seize our innocent citizens as their prisoners. As a first in response to this situation, I am directing that the following steps be taken:

- I have directed the Secretary of Transporation, in cooperation with the Secretary of State, to explore immediately an expansion of our armed sky marshall program aboard international flights of U.S. air carriers for better protection of passengers.
- -- I am directing the Secretary of State to issure an immediate travel advisory for U.S. citizens travelling through the Athens International Airport warning them of dangers. This warning shall remain in effect until the Greek government has improved the security situation there, and until it has demonstrated a willingness to comply with the security provisions of the U.S.-Greek Civil Aviation Agreement and the Tokyo, Montreal, and Hague Conventions regarding prosecution and punishment of air pirates. I have asked for

- a full explanation of the events surrounding the takeover of the aircraft in Athens.
- -- I have appealed through the Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration for all U.S. air carriers to review the wisdom of continuing any flights into Athens until the security situation there improves.
- -- Further, I have asked Secretaries Shultz and Dole to report to me on whether we should terminate the service of foreign air carriers which do not honor appropriate International Conventions or provide adequate security at their airports.
- redouble their efforts to improve airport security and take other measures to prevent the hijacking of aircraft. I will also be asking them to take steps together to prevent travel to places where lawlessness is rampant and innocent passengers are unprotected.
- -- And I am urging that no American enter any Middle Eastern country that does not publicly condemn and disassociate itself from this atrocity and call for the immediate, safe release of our citizens.

Let me further make it plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices, wherever they may be, that America will never make concessions to terrorists. To do so would only invite more terrorism. Nor will we ask or pressure any other government to do so. Once we head down that path, there will be no end to it — no end to the suffering of innocent people, no end to the bloody ransom all civilized nations must pay.

This act of terrorism is a stain on Lebanon and particularly on those Lebanese in whose name it has been done. Those in Lebanon who commit these acts damage their country and their cause, and we hold them accountable.

I call upon those holding our people to release them without condition. I call upon the leaders of Lebanon, political and religious, to meet their responsibilities and to do all that is required to end this crime now in the name of the God they worship. And I call on other governments to speak out and use their influence as well.

This attack is an attack on all citizens of the world who seek to live free from the fear and scourge of terrorism.

My thoughts and prayers are, as are those of all Americans, with the prisoners now being held in Lebanon and with their families.

Let me conclude by stating the obvious: We are in the midst of a dangerous and volatile situation. Yes, this subject is foremost in your minds, but please understand that there are many questions I cannot answer here tonight. That said: Mike Putzel of the Associated Press has the first question.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT:

State/Transportation Departments' Plans for Enhancing Aviation Security and Combatting Terrorism Aimed at U.S. Civil Aviation

### Issue

Secretaries Shultz and Dole have forwarded their plans for combatting aviation terrorism.

### Facts

In your press statement on June 18, you directed the Secretaries of State and Transportation to take immediate steps to improve security for U.S. aircraft and airports they serve. You also directed that a travel advisory be issued for Athens, Greece, and asked that other governments take steps to prevent future hijackings/bombings.

### Discussion

In his report (Tab A), Secretary Shultz outlines the steps that the State Department is taking to implement your instructions. He notes that State and Transportation are working together on measures which can be taken with our Western Allies to improve the security of civil aviation against terrorist attacks. Both State and Transportation will be pursuing these matters closely with the international aircarriers themselves and the various international organizations with recognized responsibilities in this area. Both Secretaries Shultz and Dole addressed these issues with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on June 27 in Montreal.

Secretary Dole's memorandum (Tab B) forwards a detailed report on measures being undertaken by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), in concert with the State Department. She notes FAA plans to expand the use of federal air marshals; provide additional security training for airline crew members and ground service personnel; and improve explosives detection, hijack prevention, and baggage screening.

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Both plans will require additional resources (both personnel and dollars), if they are to be fully implemented. Copies have been forwarded to OMB for their review and an assessment of cost. In some cases (the Federal Air Marshal program), personnel will be required on an interim basis from other departments (Justice, Treasury, and Defense). While final approval for full implementation should await a detailed interagency review and the OMB cost assessment, the plans should be approved, in principle, now in order to adequately protect our aircarriers and citizens in the near-term.

### Recommendation



No

1. That you indicate, by initials, your approval, in principle, of the plans at Tabs A and B.

Prepared by: Oliver North

### Attachments

Tab A - Secretary Shultz' Memo of June 27, 1985 Tab B - Secretary Dole's Memo of June 25, 1985



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NSDD ON VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE (4 OF 13)

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No of Doc Date pages

Restrictions

13251 MEMO

1 7/10/1985 B1

AL KEEL TO MCFARLANE, RE: DRAFT NSDD ON CIVIL AVIATION ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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### THE WHITE HOUSE

National Security Decision Directive WASHINGTON

### CIVIL AVIATION ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM

International civil aviation is becoming a high visibility target for terrorist activities. Numerous terrorist acts directed against U.S. and other air carriers in recent weeks pose a significant threat to international commerce and our national interests. Recent violent terrorist acts have resulted in the murder, torture and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and the death of hundreds of others. It is imperative that the United States expeditiously implement procedures to prevent and/or respond to subsequent terrorist acts. Accordingly, the following extraordinary security and protective measures are directed for implementation:

-- Expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Program. The Secretary of Transportation, in coordination with the Secretary of State, is directed to immediately undertake actions necessary to expand the Federal Aviation Administration Federal Air Marshal Program to the extent necessary to Assist Censure safety aboard U.S. air carriers traveling in threatened international areas. At a minimum, the following actions shall be taken:

- Within 14 days, the existing Federal Air Marshal complement shall provide coverage as determined necessary for those flights serving cities where the threat of hijacking is most severe.

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- Within-30 days, the Federal Air Marshal complement shall be expanded through the addition of Federal law enforcement officers from other Executive Branch agencies to provide coverage as determined necessary at (all threatened locations throughout Europe and the Middle East.(3)
- Within 60 days, action shall be initiated to way

  [permanently] expand the Federal Air Marshal complement
  through acquisition of new special agents to the level
  necessary to provide continuing coverage at the most
  threatened locations throughout the world. (3)
- Utilization of the expanded Federal Air Marshal complement shall continue until otherwise determined by the Secretary of Transportation. Each Federal Air Marshal's duties shall include airport and airline security system inspections and functional evaluations in order to fully utilize these highly specialized resources.


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- Assessment of Security Effectiveness at Foreign Locations.
  The Secretary of Transportation shall immediately undertake an assessment of the level of security provided at foreign airports for all U.S. carrier departures and departures of foreign air carriers serving the United States.
  - The existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents shall immediately conduct on-site security evaluations at airports within areas of the highest risk to civil aviation served by U.S. air carriers.(x)
  - Within 30 days, the existing complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents supplemented by Department of State employees shall conduct on-site security evaluations at all airports within Europe and the Middle East where a threat to civil aviation exists. (5)
  - Within 60 days, the Secretary of Transportation shall initiate action to increase the permanent complement of Federal Aviation Administration special agents to the extent necessary to provide continuing, periodic assessment of security levels at all such foreign airports.
  - Not later than July 30, 1985, and every 120 days thereafter, the Secretary of Transportation shall advise me of those airports where security levels do not meet International Civil Aviation Organization Security Standards and for such cirports and shall advise competent foreign government authorities. That U.S. airline service will be discontinued unless such security levels are raised to meet such standards within 30 days.

Research and Development. The Department of Transportation, in coordination with the Interagency Working Group on Combatting Terrorism and the Technical Support Working Group, will carry out an expanded research and development program covering detection of explosive and incendiary devices, hijack prevention, and other security system enhancements. Projects presently planned will be accelerated and necessary additional projects will be initiated this fiscal year and thereafter.

If the notified government does not undertake expeditions corrective action, the Secretary of Transportation shall notify me and shall apply

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The appropriate provisions of the FA Act whenever it is determined that a continuing condition exists that threatens the safety or security

- Foreign Technical Assistance. In coordination with the Department of State, the FAA training and assistance program for foreign governments will be expanded. The objective of this enhancement is to achieve heightened security for civil aviation worldwide and to prepare other governments to more effectively combat aviation-related terrorism.
- Enhanced Airline Security Training. The Department of Transportation shall ensure that appropriately enhanced security training and threat awareness briefings are provided for all crewmembers of U.S. air carriers who serve on high-risk flights. The FAA shall further require that for such flights a designated security coordinator is responsible for monitoring security systems and advising the pilot in command that all necessary security requirements have been met prior to departure.
- -- Crisis Management. The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is directed to provide all necessary communications required to meet crisis management responsibilities. These shall include, but not be limited to:
  - secure communications for appropriate FAA crisis managers and secure communications between the appropriate FAA offices;
  - command, control, and communications not dependent on the switched public network; and
  - expedited implementation of the connectivity requirements specified in NSDD-95.(5)

Coordination/Resources. The Secretary of Transportation shall coordinate the actions indicated above, as necessary, with the Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice and other concerned departments and agencies of the USG to assure timely implementation. Heads of other departments/agencies shall provide appropriate support and assistance to the Department of Transportation on a temporary basis in order to effect the provisions of this directive. Within 14 days, the Secretary of Transportation shall identify and report on requirements for additional FY-85, FY-86, and FY-87 resources made necessary by this directive. The report shall specify any temporary support required from other agencies.

to the Office of Management and Budget LOR REPROFRAMMED



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7/19/1985 **B**1 13253 MEMO 1

NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: TALKING POINTS FOR YOUR MEETING WITH ADM JIM HOLLOWAY (ANNOTATED)

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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MEETING WITH AMD JIM HOLLOWAY (ANNOTATED)

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### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 19, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

Talking Points for Your Meeting with ADM Jim

Holloway

You are scheduled to meet with ADM Jim Holloway, Senior Executive Director of the Vice President's task force on combatting terrorism, on Friday, July 19, at 2:15 p.m. Talking points for your use are attached at Tab I.

The talking points focus on programmatic and policy issues which it would be useful to have the task force consider (and hopefully endorse) in the course of their review.

### RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I during your meeting.

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Approve

Disapprove \_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab I - Talking Points

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# **National Security Council** The White House System # Package # 8: JUL 18 P5: 22 **SEQUENCE TO** HAS SEEN DISPOSITION **Bob Pearson** William Martin John Poindexter **Paul Thompson** Wilma Hall **Bud McFarlane** William Martin **NSC Secretariat** NORTH I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action VP **Buchanan** cc: Regan Other **COMMENTS** Should be seen by: \_ (Date/Time) Ollie, Please seems on this the

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**DUPLICATE OF #13256** 

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MEMO FOR: Ollie FROM: Bob

Subject: Idea

 Here's an idea for enabling the VP's Task Force to <u>usefully</u> review and evaluate government policy & programs on combatting terrorism:

- 2. Effective immediately, add one member of the Task Force to the TIWG for the next three months for the purpose of real time evaluation of the decisionmaking mechanism as incidents occur. The member would <u>not</u> be an active, contributing member of the TIWG. Rather, he would be an unobtrusive "fly on the wall," dispassionately and objectively observing the <u>process</u> of the TIWG. All other members have a bureaucratic interest in contributing to the TIWG's proceedings or nudging the decision in a certain direction (<u>including</u> the co-chairmen...!). The addition of a Task Force member should not slow down or encumber the TIWG in any way, yet the following advantages would be gained:
  - a. objectivity on results/efficiency of the TIWG mechanism.
- b. realism in the Task Force's report -- i.e. it would reduce the danger that the Task Force's recommendations would be unrealistic and academic, based on NSDD <u>description</u> of the mechanism and second or third-hand accounts of the process, rather than direct observation.
- c. creates an avenue for the Task Force to receive "the real stuff" -- the highly sensitive, compartmented information not shared with most players in the crisis management bureaucracy. (Again, this would ensure that the Task Force findings were not rendered irrelevant because of lack of information.)
- d. establishes a base for a better incident "post-mortem" capability than currently exists. (The lack of interagency post-mortems on terrorist incidents seems to be one of the more glaring shortcomings of the current system. Because of bureaucratic politics, valuable "lessons learned" are being missed.)
- 3. The proposal may be attacked from the viewpoint of security (i.e. the necessity of a non-contributing member of the TIWG having a need to know...) and from the viewpoint of "empire building" (the Task Force or individual members of it seeking an entree into bigger & better or more permanent things...). However, I would counter these bureaucratic arguments with the question whether we are going to be serious or not in enabling the Task Force to make a contribution to the government program to combat terrorism.



physical at 7:30 this date. Accept Ollie my place

OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

September 5, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE

DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT:

Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

The first meeting of the Senior Review Group for the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism will be held on September 11, 1985 from 9:00 to 10:00 a.m. in Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building.

The purpose of the meeting is to discuss the organization, methodology, the tasks and the time schedule of the Staff Working Group. In addition, members of the Staff Working Group will give a short brief on their work to date, potential issues facing the Task Force and any problems encountered during their work effort. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 179, Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, July 20, 1985, will be the operative document for the meeting.

Participation 1s limited to principal or designated substitute. Please provide your intention to attend to Craig Coy (395 4950) by 3:00 p.m. September 10, 1985.

> J. L. Holloway, III, Admiral, USN (Retired) Executive Director/

Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

CONFIDENTIAL DECL: OADR

> ASSIFIED White Hours Guidelines, August, 28, 1987, MARA, DER. 5/21/0