

# Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** North, Oliver: Files  
**Folder Title:** Responses to Issue Papers (4)  
**Box:** 38

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

**Withdrawer**

DLB 6/8/2005

**File Folder** RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

**FOIA**

F99-008/2

**Box Number** 38

WILLS

60

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
13888 PAPER	COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 11	1	ND	B1
13889 PAPER	ISSUE PAPER NO. 45	1	ND	B1
13890 MEMO	J. ROBERT MCBRIAN TO ADM. J.L. HOLLOWAY, RE: ADDITIONAL ISSUE PAPERS	2	11/27/1985	B1
13891 PAPER	ISSUE 6	1	ND	B1
13892 PAPER	ISSUE 9.	1	ND	B1
13893 PAPER	ISSUE 11	1	ND	B1
13894 PAPER	ISSUE 14	1	ND	B1
13895 PAPER	ISSUE 16	1	ND	B1
13896 PAPER	ISSUE 17	1	ND	B1
13897 PAPER	ISSUE 19.	1	ND	B1
13898 PAPER	ISSUE 20.	1	ND	B1
13899 PAPER	ISSUE 21.	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON

November 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: Admiral J. L. Holloway, III  
Executive Director  
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

FROM: J. Robert McBrien *[Signature]*  
Senior Review Group  
Treasury Representative

SUBJECT: Response to Issue Papers

Attached are Treasury's comments on 21 of the 45 Issue Papers presented for our review. We are substantially in accord with most of the proposals although we have made suggestions on several of them.

We do have objections on two Issue Papers: No. 27 and No. 45. Our views on No. 27 are conceptual. Our position on No. 45 reflects Treasury's strong concern that the protective responsibilities of the Secret Service not be diluted or degraded.

Our responses on the issues are attached.

Attachments

Regarded Unclassified When Separated  
from Classified Attachments.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

~~SECRET~~

COMMENTS ON ISSUES

Issue Papers No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18,  
24, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, 44, 45



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 1

Subject: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

The Treasury Department concurs in the proposal for assembling a programming document for combatting terrorism. However, we strongly caution all participants in the Task Force and in the USG's efforts against terrorism that a conceptual approach to combatting terrorism that defines the USG's efforts exclusively in terms of dedicated resource requirements and their concomitant dedicated budget requests will fail to identify how the USG truly combats terrorism. That would result in an artificial, incomplete statement of the national program.

Much of the United States activities to combat terrorism are inextricably woven into other activities carried out by law enforcement and security agencies as well as by the intelligence community, the foreign service and the military services. We should seek to establish a comprehensive understanding of the integrated USG program that goes beyond wiring diagram boxes and budget lines that are identified as "antiterrorism."

We are also concerned that a programming document not become a foundation for interagency resource and jurisdictional competition under the magic rubric "anti/counterterrorism." The program objective should be to have all relevant Federal entities contribute within the scope of their missions to a comprehensive, cohesive, coherent, cooperative and coordinated antiterrorism effort, the "C<sup>5</sup>A" program.

The programming document, particularly the initial baseline document, should be treated as a foundation, not as a comprehensive program description, and should not become the exclusive measurement of shortfalls, redundancies, resource requirements, and legislative needs. Equal concern in the program's management must be given to the quality and consequences of different agencies' contributions.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 2

Subject: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

Treasury concurs in the need for an expressed national policy on terrorism and agrees that there is utility in having both public declarations and classified policy.

Currently, our policy is a composite of not only formal declarations (NSDDs) but also official speeches, testimony and, in some cases, statements to the press during times of crisis. Policy has been declared and elaborated upon by the President and Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President's National Security Adviser and others.

Mutuality of support for the policies announced has not always been apparent to either foreign governments, the public, the Congress or the agencies which should execute those policies. Consequently, our national policy may be described from a positive perspective as still evolving in some areas or, in a negative sense, as being contradictory or unsettled on particular issues (e.g., use of military force).

A public reiteration of the essential components of USG antiterrorism policy (while it should not be driven by the specter of press or congressional criticism) could be a useful instrument for informing the public, the press, the Congress, government agencies generally, and our foreign friends and adversaries of the USG's "bottom line" on terrorism. While the statements cited in Issue Paper No. 2 are a good base for a new iteration of policy, there should be a reexamination of what essential elements the USG wants and needs to convey in such a message and of how we think the declared policy will be interpreted by its various audiences. If practicable, public resolution of perceived areas of policy contention should be addressed.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 3

Subject: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

The Treasury Department agrees that the existing interagency mechanisms should be retained with some modification. We particularly support the concept of establishing a senior officer of the NSC, supported by a small, full-time staff, who will be responsible for monitoring, coordinating and helping to carry-out the government-wide antiterrorism program.

The disparate government elements involved in the fight against terrorism cannot be coordinated and integrated to the necessary extent without close attention from a central authority, the NSC, that can work with the universe of institutional concerns involved and that can give direction on behalf of the President. Combatting terrorism is not the special domain of any institution or professional discipline within the government, whether in the realm of criminal justice, intelligence, security, diplomacy, or the military.

Terrorism as a phenomenon and its attendant issues, policies, strategies and programs, as well as specific incidents and activities, cut across these boundaries in an unprecedented fashion -- just as they obscure the traditional "foreign" and "domestic" distinctions. Managing them requires a comprehensive, nonparochial perspective not only of how the discrete elements of the government are involved but also of where and how they should be coordinated and integrated and their competing interests balanced. The NSC, which is uniquely situated to manage these efforts without institutional bias and which already shares part of this role through the TIWG during an incident, is the logical repository of this responsibility.

We have also examined the question of whether assigning these responsibilities to the NSC will involve the President prematurely in terrorism incidents or will create unreasonable expectations of the President in dealing with terrorism. We do not believe so.

The mechanism that we now have for dealing with terrorism incidents, the TIWG, is subordinate to and chaired by the NSC. The TIWG automatically involves the White House in an incident at the earliest possible moment with the degree of involvement being the principal variable. We would suggest that the NSC, the White House, and the President have long ceased to have any plausible deniability for the ultimate responsibility in managing terrorism incidents and in formulating and executing policies and programs to combat terrorism. This has been the public, congressional and international perception since at least the 1983 suicide bombing of the Marine Headquarters at Beirut International Airport; and it has been reinforced dramatically by the skyjacking of TWA 847 and the Achille Lauro incident.



The accountability for combatting terrorism is already in the White House; it is time that the instruments to manage the coordination of the national antiterrorism program should be located there and should have authority commensurate with that responsibility.

Our only concern with this proposal is in ensuring that the NSC's assuming of the chairmanship of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (1) will not divest the State Department of responsibility for matters in which it should at least initially have the lead, even if primarily for coordination, and (2) as a concomitant will not burden the National Coordinator and his staff with micromanagement responsibilities.

Avoiding that kind of outcome will be important; and if an alternative to the Task Force Working Group's proposal must be considered, it may be possible to place the program coordination management role in the NSC as an additional function of the TIWG without shifting the IG/T chair from State. The enhanced TIWG could then concentrate its management coordination role on the totality of the antiterrorism program and on special problems that arise.



1924

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 4

Subject: Definition of Terrorism

Treasury believes that the proposed long and short definitions of terrorism are acceptable.

Although we do not object to them, we do not see a pressing need for defining the terms "antiterrorism" and counterterrorism."

However, we do have a problem with introducing the definitions of other forms of low intensity political conflict, i.e., insurgency, into the national policy arena. Although, there is utility in distinguishing between terrorism and friendly insurgencies, we may find that the proposed definition of insurgency raises as many questions as it answers.



1994

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 6

Subject: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist  
Threats and Incidents


The Treasury Department concurs in the proposal.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 7

Subject: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

Treasury concurs with the objective of this proposal although we defer to the Department of State on the likelihood of achieving these parallel goals.

We also believe that the Department of Justice and Treasury should be involved in this process particularly in terms of extradition treaties, prosecutions by two or more countries, exchanges of law enforcement information, and international cooperation among law enforcement entities.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 8

Subject: Extradition Treaties

Treasury concurs in this proposal but believes that both the Justice Department and State should be involved and that Treasury should contribute any "lessons learned" by its law enforcement agencies to this review, drafting and negotiating process.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 10

Subject: Counterterrorism Exercises and Simulations

Treasury concurs in the proposal but believes that an effort must be made in some exercises to simulate problems that would be likely to involve Federal law enforcement and other agencies in addition to the FBI. This would include for example: ATF, Customs, the Secret Service, the Park Police, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the Center for Disease Control.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13888	PAPER  COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 11	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 18

Subject: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/  
Mercenary Training Camps

Treasury supports this proposal but believes that Treasury and two of its law enforcement agencies -- the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the U.S. Customs Service -- should be involved in this task with State and Justice.



1991

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 24

Subject: Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement  
Elements Domestically and Overseas

Treasury would support this proposal if it were expanded in two ways:

1. Overseas: The training and accreditation of U.S. counterterrorism specialists should include some Special Agents of the U.S. Customs Service who are being assigned overseas to Customs Attache Offices. Customs attaches often have unique access to and cooperation from foreign customs service and, in some instances, other foreign law enforcement and security agencies. Their more intensive preparation in the area of terrorism would offer an opportunity to contribute significantly to U.S.-foreign liaison and coordination on counterterrorism.

It would also be beneficial if a cadre of ATF and Secret Service agents who engage in foreign liaison and, in the case of the Secret Service, are being assigned overseas were trained and accredited as U.S. counterterrorism specialists. This would expand the U.S. ability to further our CT relationships and would enhance the credibility of the individual agents as well as reinforce the seriousness of U.S. the initiative.

2. Domestic: In coordination with the FBI and the Intelligence Community, select agents of ATF, Customs, and the Secret Service should be indoctrinated in the national CT program in order that their own liaison and working relationships with state and local law enforcement authorities can better contribute to a comprehensive CT program.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 27

Subject: Terrorism as a Crime

The proposal accompanying this issue is in two parts: (1) that Justice seek legislation to make "terrorism" a criminal offense and (2) that the USG not refer to terrorism as war but rather as crime.

With regard to defining "terrorism" as a federal crime, while we have no intrinsic objection to it, we have substantial doubt that doing so will have much impact on the phenomenon (assuming that the Congress could agree to a "terrorism" definition which would be suitable for describing a criminal offense as contrasted with describing a political phenomenon).

More important is that we not adopt a dogmatic conceptual view of the terrorism phenomenon. In the process of attempting to emphasize terrorism's unconventionality and unacceptability -- its inherent wrongfulness -- as a means of conducting political and military affairs, we must take greater care to ensure that we do not establish a philosophical or legalistic impediment to the employment of those means of armed conflict that we may need to combat terrorism. If we exclude terrorism totally from the concept of war and confine it to crime, we may undermine our legal and political predicates for using our own military and paramilitary assets against terrorists and for taking self-defensive actions usually thought of as relating to conduct between nations.

Thus, what is needed is a conceptual treatment of terrorism that views it both as being criminal in nature and as being illegitimate armed conflict, i.e., "outlaw war" or "lawless statecraft." Terrorism's unconventionality, ubiquity, unpredictability and adaptability require that our own traditional views of crime and war be expanded and developed to define and comprehend terrorism in all its dimensions.

Consequently, we believe that limiting the USG's references to terrorism to crime alone would be both naive and highly counterproductive. It is a complex phenomenon, and simple approaches will not be adequate for combatting it.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 29

Subject: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

We support action to amend the FOIA.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

Subject: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

Treasury supports this proposal and would hope to train a few analysts from our enforcement agencies through this process.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 32

Subject: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

Treasury supports a more intensive effort to control the international travel of known or suspected terrorists. We believe that the effort's first priority should be in denying U.S. visas to suspected or known terrorists and, failing that, to provide more timely and detailed look-out information to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service. If improving State's AVLOS is the best way to do that, we should concentrate on that activity.

While we support a multilateral program to exchange information on terrorists' movements, we are not particularly confident that a computerized international data base would be either politically achievable or sufficiently complete and reliable to have a good probability of success. In any event, we believe that collateral efforts should be made to improve the exchange of information on terrorist border crossings among customs services and border patrol agencies. Those efforts could complement U.S. foreign intelligence activities on terrorism; and, if successful, might be integrated into the proposed data base.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 35

Subject: Country Team Briefings

Treasury believes that Country Team briefings on U.S. counterterrorism capabilities should also include the FBI LEGATs, Customs Attaches, and senior DEA and Secret Service representatives in those countries where they are assigned.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 36

Subject: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

We do not object to the proposed interagency study. However, we believe that the work in this area should be coordinated with that which has already occurred as part of the United States overall emergency mobilization and preparedness efforts and those activities involving the security and survivability of our national telecommunications system.

It may be a cheaper proposition for the NSC to contract with an outside authority which has already done some work on this question, such as Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In terms of resource allocation and budgeting priorities, this issue will nearly always play a minor role unless the private sector, which we believe controls most of the assets threatened, can be persuaded that more needs to be done and that it is in their best economic interests to do it.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPERS NO. 39 and 44

Subject: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism;  
International RD & A Initiatives

We concur that a special effort should be made on R&D through the proposed National Coordinator.

We believe that the initiative proposed in No. 44 should be closely coordinated with the rest of the USG's R&D activity for combatting terrorism.



1994

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 43

Subject: U.S. Presence Abroad

While we do not object to this proposal, we are concerned that a U.S. law enforcement presence in some high threat countries might be eliminated without an adequate balancing of its importance. Since law enforcement work carries with it recognition and acceptance of being at greater risk of serious physical harm or death, the balancing must be to avoid unacceptable risk.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 45

Subject: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

The Department of the Treasury's current policy concerning the protection of visiting dignitaries -- limiting the Secret Service's responsibility to the Head of State or Head of Government -- is based on the terms of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056. The Department believes that it was not the intent of Congress that the Secret Service protect any of the "accompanying party" unless directed to do so by the President of the United States, after a finding of a specific need for protection. The State Department's authority pursuant to Title 22, United States Code, Section 2666, clearly applies to any other foreign dignitary in need of protection.

The Department of the Treasury is in agreement with the assessment that the protection of foreign Heads of State and Government is beneficial to the Secret Service's overall mission. The relationships established during these visits greatly enhance the cooperation the Service receives when the President and Vice President visit the reciprocal country.

However, we strongly disagree that there exists fragmentation or egregious duplication in the protection of a visiting Head of State's "accompanying party." Our experience indicates it is far from clear that there is a substantial duplication in the current situation, since one of these agencies would be supplying people and resources to protect the "accompanying party" of the Head of State.

The overlapping responsibilities that may exist have been managed effectively by the two affected agencies in the past and will not present an insurmountable problem for the future.

Finally, the Department of the Treasury will never allow the Secret Service's major focus of protecting the President and Vice President to be diminished.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13889	PAPER  ISSUE PAPER NO. 45	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

---

13890 MEMO

2 11/27/1985 B1

J. ROBERT MCBRIAN TO ADM. J.L. HOLLOWAY,  
RE: ADDITIONAL ISSUE PAPERS

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DEFENSE



# ~~TOP SECRET~~

DOD INPUT

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

Information attached is classified TOP SECRET  
and as such will be treated according to OSD  
Security Instructions. Writing on this cover sheet  
is prohibited.

TOP SECRET INFORMATION SHALL NOT BE  
REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF  
THE ORIGINATING ACTIVITY OR HIGHER  
AUTHORITY (DOD ISPR 5200.1R).

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)  
dlr 6/3/05

# ~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL THIS DOCUMENT  
BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

In reply refer to:  
I-85/35440

5 NOV 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JAMES L. HOLLOWAY, USN (Ret)  
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,  
TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM

Attached are our comments on the extremely creative and comprehensive proposals of the Vice-President's Task Force. You will note that we concur without comment in the great majority of the proposals offered. We do have reservations in some areas as noted.

The efforts of the Task Force provide an opportune moment to reflect on the relationship between government policy and terrorism, which appears to be absolute and measurable. I commissioned a study of this phenomenon over a year ago, and believe the results of that study merit the consideration of the Task Force, particularly as certain findings seem to run counter to certain of the Task Force's proposals. I include herewith an overview of these findings, and hope that you and your staff will find an early occasion to receive the full briefing.

As you will understand, we have high hopes for the Task Force correcting once and for all the problems which have vexed the efforts of this Administration in dealing with terrorism for more than four years. These have been only peripherally a function of terrorism itself and have had pre-eminently to do with bureaucratic recalcitrance, as well as institutional and personal animosities. Without specifying here the consequences of all this, it should be noted that precedents offer little hope that the latest scramble will correct these problems unless and until we subject ourselves to an assessment of where and why the problems exist in the first place, and so evolve a method of disciplining the management of efforts against terrorism to insure that the current effort doesn't go the way of NSDD 30, the ISA survey of Beirut, the Long Commission Report, NSDD 138 and other "fixes." We should know, for example, how it was possible to labor so long over NSDD 138, only to have it substantially ignored, thereby creating the necessity for the Task Force.

I do not have a specific proposal, but the jockeying and back-stabbing now proceeding in parallel with the efforts of the Task Force illuminate the need for a report to the President

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFICATION  
ENCLOSURE(S)

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL THIS DOCUMENT  
BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL THIS DOCUMENT  
BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

2

that spells out in unequivocal terms not merely what needs to be corrected, but why correction is necessary, and why, so late in the life of this Administration, we are still trying to devise a way to address terrorism.

  
Noel C. Koch

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary  
International Security Affairs

Attachments  
a/s

~~TOP SECRET~~

UPON REMOVAL THIS DOCUMENT  
BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

Issue 1.

Subject: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

Comments: Concur in the establishment of a programming document that incorporates all of the diverse elements and components of the national program for combatting terrorism.

- Difficult to separate security and anti-crime programs from terrorism programs.

- National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism must clearly define elements/components to be incorporated into the national program for combatting terrorism.

- DOD will need to establish a Program Element Code to track terrorism related costs.

Issue 2. '

Subject: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

Comments: It becomes increasingly clear that declarative policy is more frequently than not a substitute for action, and comes with pitfalls of its own. The proposed paragraph two provides one illustration, e.g. are the Contras, UNITA, and the Afghani Mujahadin terrorists, and are they a threat to our national interests? Our position toward these groups is not consistent with the proposed policy, unless we find a definition for terrorism that excludes them.

Defining terrorism appears to be an academic enterprise, except insofar as the absence of an agreed definition confounds our efforts to get extradition and other agreements with other nations.

We should not make statements to the effect that "States that practice terrorism or actively support it, will not be allowed to do so without consequence," unless we intend a change in present practice. If we do intend a change, perhaps the proposed changes should be explored before we enunciate the policy. Iraq is illustrative: she was taken off the list of terrorist-sponsoring nations some time ago. Yet May 15 is still believed to operate there, the head of Force 17 is believed to be there, and the PLO may relocate there.

It is no longer clear that we should have a declarative policy on concessions. First, because it may in time become a target in its own right. Second, because we are frequently prepared to violate it. We have a study showing that a concessionary policy does lead to further terrorism, but there is a gray area in which it is possible to make concessions to end an incident while denying that concessions are being made, and that this does not stimulate further terrorism. At a minimum this area should be studied in greater depth. It is possible that the wiser course is to stand moot on policy, and simply not make concessions or, if we chose to, deny it. In other words, provide room for flexible response.

Issue 3.

Subject: National Organizations for Combatting Terrorism

Comments: Concur with the establishment of a National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism.

- Coordinator must have more authority than to "provide management coordination". He should have directive authority over the various federal agencies on terrorism issues.

The designation of a coordinator must take into account certain institutional realities, however. The difficulty with the current organizational arrangement has been that State is, at best, only first among equals, and lacks any real authority over other agencies. At the same time, the vast majority of those efforts directed to combatting terrorism, both in daily coordination with U.S. agencies, and foreign governments, as well as those involved in managing a crisis, properly rest with the Department of State.

Furthermore, foreign governments place a premium on continuity, not least in terms of the personnel with whom they must deal. Parenthetically, it should be noted that the turf consciousness that has vexed our efforts here in the U.S. is slowly being extended abroad to our dealings with foreign governments.

Ambassador Oakley is the first person with full CT authority in the U.S. government to develop relations with foreign governments in a deliberate and consistent manner, and I would strongly urge that he be the National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism both by virtue of his State Department role, and his personal relationships abroad.

Issue 4.

Subject: Definition of Terrorism.

Comments: A standardized definition for all federal agencies is urgently required, but every effort to make it comprehensive reveals new difficulties. Not all terrorism has a political objective. It can be religious, criminal, even environmental.

It is suggested that the point of departure for developing a definition should be the legal effect of the definition.



Issue 5.

Subject: Public Statement During Terrorist Incidents

Comments: Concur. Short and long term strategies must be developed for dealing with specific terrorist incidents and with the overall threat of terrorism.

- Public diplomacy strategies need to be developed to gain support for terrorist incident management and for long term programs designed to curb terrorism.

- Strategy must address the U.S. population as well as foreign audiences.

- Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T should be tasked to develop public affairs strategy for review and approved by the TIWG.

- "Off the Cuff" remarks by senior U.S. officials can compromise intelligence resources and create political problems with friends and allies throughout the world.

- An education program, as well as a public diplomacy program, must be developed.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13891	PAPER  ISSUE 6	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Issue 7.

Subject: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

Comments: As noted, the bi-lateral approach holds out the greatest hope, but it should be noted that efforts in this area have not proven to be of great value, and should not be permitted to inhibit forward motion in other areas.

Evidence suggests that the most effective actions in dealing with terrorism are those taken unilaterally, and a close study of Achille Lauro should confirm this, as well as illuminating the problems of bi-lateral action even where close allies are involved.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13892	PAPER  ISSUE 9.	1	ND	B1

---

## Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Issue 8.

Subject: Extradition Treaties.

Comments: Concur.

9361



Issue 10.

Subject: Counterterrorism Exercises and Simulations.

Comments: Concur. CT exercises involving senior level decision makers is essential in formulating a viable national response to terrorism. The absence of a regularized senior-level exercise program is the single most egregious failing in U.S. CT efforts. Implementation of such a program should reveal most other material shortcomings and create the necessary environment for their correction.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13893	PAPER ISSUE 11	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



Issue 12.

Subject: Hostage Family Liaison.

Comments: Concur.

Issue 13.

Subject: Domestic Public Awareness.

Comments: Concur. As has been stated in previous issue papers, it is imperative to develop an aggressive program to focus national and international attention on the actual nature of the terrorist threat. In advance of such a program, it is not clear what is to be achieved by an opinion poll. Attitudes have tended to be incident-specific.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13894	PAPER  ISSUE 14	1	ND	B1

---

## Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Issue 15.

Subject: Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside of U.S.

Comments: Concur.



2891

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
13895	PAPER	1	ND	B1
	ISSUE 16			

---

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13896	PAPER  ISSUE 17	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Issue 18.

Subject: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/  
Mercenary Training Camps.

Comments: Concur.



# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13897	PAPER ISSUE 19.	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
13898	PAPER ISSUE 20.	1	ND	B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

DLB 6/8/2005

*File Folder*

RESPONSES TO ISSUE PAPERS (4 OF 9)

*FOIA*

F99-008/2

WILLS

*Box Number*

38

60

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

---

13899 PAPER  
ISSUE 21.

1 ND B1

---

### Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.