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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re El Salvador ³⁸ (38 pp., including annex I, II, and III) <i>P 7/11/85 M1402 #3</i>	n.d.	F2, P1
2. memo	Robert Sayre to Malmborg re use by the U.S. government of private American citizens to discharge official duties (2 pp.)	7/1/85	F2, P5 B2
3. memo	Malmborg to Sayre re policy on dependents at high threat risk posts (2 pp.)	7/31/85	F2, P5 B2
4. annex	annex IV to report in item #1 (4 pp.) <i>R 9/13/97 NLSF96-004/1 #71</i>	n.d.	P1
5. memo for record	re Marine casualties in San Salvador (1 pp.) <i>P 6/20/01 NLSF96-004/1 #72</i>	6/85	P1 B2 B6
6. memo	re terrorist attack in El Salvador (1 pp.) <i>R 7/11/85 M1402 #5</i>	n.d.	P1
7. cable	260343 (2 pp.) <i>R 7/11/85 M1402 #6</i>	6/26/85	P1, P5
8. summary	of Reagan telephone conversation with Duarte (1 pp.) <i>R 9/13/97 NLSF96-004/1 #74</i>	6/21/85	P1
9. memcon	of Reagan conversation with Duarte (2 pp.) <i>R 9/13/97 NLSF96-004/1 #75</i>	6/21/85	P1
10. memo	re terrorist attack in El Salvador (1 pp.) <i>P 7/11/85 M1402 #7</i>	n.d.	P1 B1
11. memo	North and Burghardt to McFarlane re presidential telephone call from President Duarte (1 pp.) <i>R 9/13/97 NLSF96-004/1 #77</i>	6/21/85	P1
12. memo	attachment to item # 11 from McFarlane re recommended telephone call to Duarte (1 pp.) <i>R 9/13/97 NLSF96-004/1 #78</i>	n.d.	P1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. memo	North to McFarlane re response to terrorist acts (3 pp.) P 2/11/05 M1402 #8	n.d.	P1, P5 B1
14. cable	200306 (3 pp.) D 9/16/99 NLSF 96-004/1 #79 D 7/11/05 M1402 #9	6/20/85	P1 B1

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- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

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Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

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File Folder TERRORISM: EL SALVADOR (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F96-004/1

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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
1 REPORT	RE EL SALVADOR (M1402 #3)	38	ND
7 CABLE	260343Z JUN 85 (M1402 #6)	2	6/26/1985
13 MEMO	NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE RESPONSE TO TERRORIST ACTS (M1402 #8)	3	ND

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS M1402 #3
By smf, NARA, Date 7/11/05

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

PREFACE

The Secretary of State on June 20 instructed the Inspector General to conduct a Special Inquiry under the provisions of Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 into the facts and circumstances surrounding the death on June 19, 1985 of four members of the U.S. Marine Security Guard Detachment assigned to the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador, El Salvador. The Marines were killed at a public place by Salvadorean leftist guerrillas. The objective of this Special Inquiry was to determine whether any U.S. Government official or officials had been negligent in the discharge of their official duties in protecting employees of the U.S. Government at a diplomatic mission overseas.

The members of the Special Inquiry team were Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, Senior Inspector, and Inspector Daniel R. Reilly, of the Office of the Inspector General, Department of State, and Colonel H. Murphy McCloy, from the Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Marine Corps. The team proceeded to San Salvador on June 21 and departed on June 24. While there it conducted interviews with all appropriate members of the U.S. diplomatic mission. The team was assisted by George H. Larson, Associate Director of Security from the U.S. Embassy at Panama City, Panama, and Victor G. Dewindt, Jr., Office of Security, Department of State. The latter two were in San Salvador to determine the precise facts regarding the murder of the four Marines and to assist in evaluating security procedures of the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador.

The Special Inquiry team also reviewed the incident and the security program of the Department of State with appropriate officials in Washington, D. C.

A draft report of the Special Inquiry was distributed for comment to appropriate officials on July 19 and a final report was submitted to the Inspector General on August 5.

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CLASSIFIED BY: SAYRE, ROBERT M.
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
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SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
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ON JUNE 19, 1985

OVERVIEW

Four members of the U.S. Marine Security Guard (MSG) Detachment stationed at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador were killed by leftist guerrillas on June 19 at about 9 p.m. while eating at an outdoor restaurant in the Zona Rosa area in the city of San Salvador, El Salvador. Also killed were two American business representatives and seven non-Americans.* There were at least eight other members of the U.S. mission staff and three dependents in the restaurant area at the time.

The four Marines who were later killed took seats on the sidewalk at Chili's cafe, an exposure which a U.S. Embassy security guideline cautioned against, but which was still common practice among mission personnel. They and other members of the mission staff had established a regular pattern of eating at these restaurants, which permitted hostile surveillance. Available evidence strongly suggests that the Marines were directly targeted. There has been some suggestion that the failure to observe mission security advisories against eating at tables on the sidewalk at these restaurants was the probable cause of the murder of the Marines. The Special Inquiry team finds that the regular pattern of going to open air restaurants by mission members, including the Marines, was more likely the probable cause for the incident than the regular pattern of mission members eating at tables on the sidewalks.

The mission has a fairly extensive security program directed primarily at the "hardening" of office buildings and providing protective security for the movement of key mission officials. The mission also had a rather comprehensive program with the objective of advising mission members about off-duty security measures. This program was originally mounted in response to the civil war situation in El Salvador and, more

*Although there were conflicting reports in the press as to the total killed in the cafe by the terrorists, 13 victims actually died in the attack.

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recently, tightened following intelligence estimates which indicated that the guerrillas seeking to take over the Government of El Salvador had set up operations in San Salvador and planned to attack American mission personnel.

The pleasant atmosphere and accommodations in San Salvador coupled with the fact that there had not been a direct attack against mission personnel since May 1983 "conspired" to lull mission personnel into a false sense of security. It was post policy to disrupt substantive activities as little as possible and to maintain life as normal as possible at the post.

Specifically, the Special Inquiry team finds that, at the time the incident occurred, mission management in San Salvador had a security program in effect for the employees of the mission which was reasonably related to the security threat and the pattern of terrorism and violence in El Salvador. The MSG Detachment was equated to the civilian staff, which is common practice in the Foreign Service, and thus there is no basis for distinguishing between civilian management and the MSG command structure in assessing responsibility. In hindsight, this equation was an error in judgment in the circumstances in San Salvador. All military personnel attached to the mission should have been considered equally threatened and security guidelines applied accordingly.

More generally, the facts and circumstances of the San Salvador case underline the need for the Department of State and the Foreign Service to change their approach to security. The present approach is to avoid to the maximum extent possible disrupting normal activities at a post and to carry out security programs with this in mind. A much higher security awareness is required at Critical and Serious High Threat posts. The Department should take immediate steps to develop the criteria for such posts called for in its own statement on "General Principles on Security of USG Personnel at Overseas Missions" (A-1225, October 14, 1982). In addition, a major deficiency has been, and continues to be, inadequate resources to provide security consistent with the threat and to back up the security program with a strong and clear command structure. The team considers that Washington's priority on and awareness toward the security needs and concerns of the field have been significant factors in the field's approach and its ability to deal effectively with security. The Department recently acted on resource needs, and has under active consideration recommendations on security organization. The team, therefore, makes no recommendations on these two points.

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In assessing responsibility of mission management, the inspectors find that chiefs of mission have been charged with responsibility for the direction, supervision, and coordination of all U.S. Government employees at diplomatic missions but have not been given commensurate authority. Prompt steps are needed to remedy this major deficiency. The team also makes recommendations on other deficiencies, including the administration of danger pay allowances, that were encountered in conducting this Special Inquiry.

Taking into account all the facts and circumstances in this case, the team does not find a basis for the Secretary of State to convene a Board of Inquiry to fix responsibility on any official in San Salvador, either civilian or military under the operational control of the Secretary of State, for negligence in connection with this incident.

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SPECIAL INQUIRY
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I. INCIDENT

On June 19, 1985 at about 9 p.m. in the Zona Rosa cafe district of San Salvador, El Salvador, guerrilla terrorists shot and killed four members of the MSG Detachment stationed at the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador.* Also killed in this incident were two American business representatives and seven persons of other nationalities. Also present in the restaurant area were at least two other Marines, three members of the U.S. Navy Construction Battalion (SeaBee) Detachment, a member of the U.S. Military Group (MILGP) with a dependent, and at least three other members of the Embassy staff, one with two dependents.

The six MSG's had arrived at the restaurant area in an armored mission vehicle at about 8:30 p.m. The Marines debarked and the mission vehicle departed. The four Marines who were later killed took seats on the sidewalk at Chili's cafe, an exposure which a mission security guideline cautioned against, but which was still common practice among mission personnel. At about 9 p.m. a truck arrived on the scene and parked in front of the restaurant. Patrons did not pay particular attention to the truck as this type of vehicle is normally used by the Salvadorean military in checking for drugs or when involved in other law enforcement activities. Six to 10 armed persons dressed in uniforms similar to those worn by the Salvadorean military got out of the truck and headed straight for the table at which the four Marines were seated. When within about five or 10 feet of the table, the group, armed with automatic weapons, knelt and opened fire on the Marines, killing the four.

*The four U.S. Marines who died in the incident were Sergeants Thomas T. Handwork and Bobby J. Dickson, and Corporals Patrick R. Kwiatkowski and Gregory Howard Weber.

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Available evidence indicates this was a leftist guerrilla group engaged in a deception operation. After the attack, the armed group turned its guns on the crowd. It is alleged that shots were fired from inside the restaurant and the group's response was to use suppressing fire to escape. Investigators have found no basis for this allegation. There were also allegations that there was fire from the Salvadorean national policeman stationed across the street at the Brazilian Ambassador's residence, but this has been determined to be incorrect. A vehicle of the local airline (TACA) that passed by at the time was fired upon by the guerrillas; the presence of this vehicle may have prompted the firing into the restaurant. The guerrilla group which committed the murders escaped, but it is believed at least one of them may have been killed, and possibly two injured by fire from the guerrilla group itself. The investigation is continuing.

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II. SETTING IN SAN SALVADOR

Environment: Members of the diplomatic mission in San Salvador describe the post as a very pleasant, tropical paradise. It provides excellent climate, beaches, and many recreational activities. The population is well disposed toward the United States, except for guerrilla and terrorist activity. Embassy personnel in general live in three higher income neighborhoods in some 178 separate family dwellings. Senior level personnel have housing described as similar to that along Foxhall Road in Washington; lower ranking personnel live in quarters described as similar to the better neighborhoods in Vienna, Virginia. The Zona Rosa, where the incident occurred, is near the U.S. Ambassador's Residence in a higher income neighborhood and, although on a smaller scale, performs much the same social function in San Salvador as Georgetown does in Washington. In sum, mission personnel say that the total atmosphere is seductive and makes one forget there are security threats.

Threat: Because of the state of civil war in the countryside and the terrorist threats against military personnel, the mission is on the Critical Threat list of the Department of State. Civilian members of the mission receive both a hardship differential of 15 percent and danger pay of 25 percent for a total of 40 percent additional salary. As a result of congressionally approved changes in the standards for civilian danger pay, the Department authorized dependents, including children, to be at the post. (See Annex I for a discussion of danger pay allowances at Critical Threat posts.)

The mission's intelligence estimate since the fall of 1984 has been that the guerrillas would shift to urban terrorism, having pretty much lost the fight in the countryside, and would directly target American personnel, most particularly the Ambassador, deputy chief of mission (DCM), [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Because of cultural attitudes in El Salvador, the mission does not consider that dependents are threatened, but that they could be victims if mission housing were attacked or if dependents were in the wrong place at the wrong time, as occurred on June 19.*

*The chief of mission, who departed post June 7, considered the threat to dependents significant based on available intelligence but not high enough for them to be evacuated.

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Assassinations of Salvadoreans and Americans during the first six months of 1985 would tend to confirm the mission's intelligence estimate, the guerrillas stated intentions, and the Department's decision (reviewed quarterly) that San Salvador is a Critical Threat post.

There was no intelligence that would have provided the mission any specific forewarning of a possible attack against the U.S. Marines on June 19.

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III. POST SECURITY POLICY AND PROGRAM

Policy: As stated to the Special Inquiry team by mission staff, it was Embassy policy to avoid any disruption in the normal life style of the mission and to implement security in a manner consistent with that overall policy. The chief of mission considered that substantive activities should be disrupted as little as possible, that priorities should reflect foreign policy interests, and that there were instances in which security took precedence over normal life in San Salvador, such as restrictions on where in the city personnel could live and engage in recreation, and heavy restrictions on travel outside San Salvador.

Emergency Action: The mission has an Emergency Action Committee (EAC) which is essentially the country team. The Committee met once in 1983, five times in 1984, and three times in 1985 before the incident, i.e., about once every two months in the past 18 months. Security may also be a subject of discussion at weekly country team meetings and was on the agenda on June 18, the day before the incident.

As post policy, security threats were considered immediately in an ad hoc group called for the purpose and attended by the chief of mission, the DCM, the regional security officer (RSO), and usually the MILGP commander, the Defense attache (DAO), and a political analyst. The team was told by the Charge d'Affaires ad interim that the latter group was a formal sub-group of the EAC but none of the other participants so characterized it. There are minutes of the EAC meetings, but otherwise no organized record is kept. There are frequently telegraphic or telephonic reports to the Department on security matters but these are not handled in any organized reporting system. It would have been helpful in this review, and probably to the Department and other agencies, if the Department had some telegraphic identifier for security threats, analyses, program recommendations and actions. (The Office of Security (A/SY) has its "SY Channel" which was established for an entirely different purpose and which is not appropriate for dealing with physical and protective security. Nor does the team understand this to be the purpose of the TERREP key word.)

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Chain of Command: The chain of command for emergency operations was not entirely clear to the participants. Based on a discussion with the chief of mission and the rules of engagement for the MSG Detachment, the team concludes that the chain of command ran from the chief of mission, to the DCM, to the senior officer on duty in the emergency center (if one has been established), to the RSO, to the MSG noncommissioned officer-in-charge (NCOIC), and to the MSG. The administrative counselor was not in the emergency operations chain, but was responsible for normal administrative support of security and emergency operations and participated in all actions of a long-range security or administrative nature. The political counselor was not directly involved in emergencies and did not participate in threat analysis.

The chain of command thus ran from Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, to David Passage (DCM); to Walter Sargent (RSO); to Gunnery Sergeant Robert Gorman (NCOIC); and then to the members of the MSG Detachment. Howard McGowan, administrative counselor, was not in the chain of command for emergencies or security operations. Ambassador Pickering had departed post on transfer on June 7; DCM Sargent on June 14; and Administrative Counselor McGowan on June 1; therefore, all had left post on transfer before the incident occurred, and other officers were filling these positions on an "acting" basis. The "acting" officers were Charge d'Affaires Passage; James F. Mack, Acting DCM; and Lawrence Liptak, Acting RSO. Dora Meeks was acting administrative counselor. For purposes of this Special Inquiry both the group which had departed El Salvador and the "acting" officers have been considered as responsible officials.

It will be readily noted that there was a substantial rotation of personnel at the mission and that most of key positions were filled on an "acting" basis. This may help explain the lack of certainty of key staff members on the chain of command for emergencies. The officer who was acting administrative counselor on the date of the incident left the post on leave prior to the arrival in San Salvador of the Special Inquiry team and, therefore, could not be interviewed. The general services officer (GSO), Byron Barlow, was the acting administrative counselor during the team's visit. San Salvador is a two-year duty post and the high rotation of personnel is driven by that and the normal summer assignment cycle. In addition, the Ambassador had been anticipating departure for some time to assume a new post and both this confirmation and that of a

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successor were being held up by the U.S. Senate. The post was, therefore, in a period of leadership transition. The "acting" management of the mission did not consider that this situation contributed to the incident on June 19. The team found no direct causal relationship, but this situation is a further indication of the difficulty that the system has in responding to the needs of Critical Threat posts, and by default subordinating security to the normal conduct of business.

Security Program: There is physical evidence of considerable progress in hardening the chancery; key personnel (the Ambassador, DCM, DAO, and MILGP) have protective security, and military personnel in these two military units are also authorized to carry personal weapons on and off duty; armored vans with armed guards are available for transport of employees to and from work on a voluntary basis; guards can be provided for social functions; and there is a security patrol for the mission's 178 housing units which are located in the city in an area of roughly six square miles. The emergency communications net is deemed excellent. The threat analysis procedures are thorough. Alert procedures in the chain of command are effective.

Security Briefings: The RSO manages a security briefing program for all employees and dependents, which is comprised essentially of lectures, i. e., the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) video program with graphics is not used. No records are kept of attendance. The chief of mission had made security a key point in the initial meeting with new staff members, and relied on section chiefs for the rapid dissemination of threat information and for followup on adherence to security guidelines by mission employees and their dependents. The team is unable to say how effective this dissemination system was in practice, but there was considerable difficulty in determining from participants the security subjects discussed in the country team meeting on June 18 and what action was taken.

Security Guidelines: Off-duty conduct is said to be the problem area; the incident reviewed in this report occurred during an off-duty period. Security guidelines for off-duty conduct were published in January 1985. An employee must sign a card on which the security guidelines are printed in order to receive an identification (ID) card, but employees do not get a copy of the guidelines and, so far as could be determined, these guidelines are posted only in the ID room. The general

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interpretation of the guidelines by mission staff was that they were advisory in nature. Travel advisories are posted weekly. Mission management relied on the maturity and good judgment of mission personnel for compliance with off-duty security guidelines, i.e., there was no required procedure for followup on compliance as there was on security regulations within the chancery.

Mission personnel describe followup compliance on security guidelines for off-duty conduct as "snitching." The chief of mission relied on the respective agency heads to recommend whether stricter guidelines were needed for employees of their respective agencies. (The Charge d'Affaires described the application of stricter guidelines as a delegation of authority.) Because of the threats against U.S. military personnel, the MILGP commander and the Defense attache had imposed stricter guidelines, e.g., the MILGP commander forbade members of the MILGP to go to the Zona Rosa after duty hours; the Zona Rosa area was off limits to DAO temporary duty helicopter crews; MILGP and DAO officers had bodyguards, carried weapons, etc. The MSG's, although U.S. military personnel and easily identifiable as such by grooming and bearing*, were under the less restrictive mission guidelines.

Supervision of MSG Detachment: Training and physical fitness programs for MSG's away from the chancery were closely supervised before the incident, as were group recreational activities such as beach trips and intramission athletics. Off-duty activities, while monitored, were less constrained. MSG members attended a weekly guard school at which security issues were discussed and security advisories reiterated. Mission management, for example, had denied the Marines jogging and team sports in public as too risky. Mission management made strong efforts to provide alternative exercise facilities, but in general it was left to the NCOIC to develop proposals. Mission management could not furnish information on an overall alternative program to provide safe arrangements especially for team sports and recreational activities. MSG members frequented the Zona Rosa restaurants and cafes at their own discretion, as did civilian mission personnel, except that the

*Given the reiteration of the Commandant of the Marine Corps while this Special Inquiry was in progress on what is permissible under grooming regulations for MSG Detachments, this report contains no recommendations on that subject.

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mission made special efforts to enforce security guidelines during "high threat" periods, such as the presidential elections (March-June 1984) and the assembly elections (March 1985).

Staff Security Practices: Except for senior mission staff, American employees of the mission in general, including MSG's, frequented the Zona Rosa cafés and restaurants, and, along with other mission personnel, established a pattern of eating dinner in this area. The Marine Recall Log, which is used for recalling MSG members off duty, shows this pattern of behavior over many months before the incident. Except for high threat periods, such as during the March 1985 elections, mission personnel, including the MSG's, did not make any distinction between sitting inside the restaurants or sitting in an area where they could be seen from the street. This pattern of conduct was known to the NCOIC and members of the mission security staff, but apparently not to the senior civilian officials of the mission who only infrequently visited the area "after hours."

The environment, and mission policy and practices were regarded by mission personnel as conducive to a relaxed view of off-duty security except when punctuated by a special effort such as during the March 1985 elections or after the June 19 incident.

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IV. ANALYSIS THE SECURITY PROGRAM

General Finding: The Special Inquiry team finds that, at the time the incident occurred, mission management had a security program in effect for the employees of the mission which was reasonably related to the security threat and the pattern of terrorism and violence in El Salvador. The MSG Detachment was equated to the civilian staff, which is common practice in the Foreign Service, and the team thus has no basis for distinguishing between civilian management and the MSG command structure in assessing responsibility. In hindsight, this equation was an error in judgment in the circumstances in San Salvador. All military personnel attached to the mission should have been considered equally threatened and security guidelines applied accordingly, in which case the Marines would not have been permitted to go to the Zona Rosa after duty hours.*

Security Approach and Priorities: But, as discussed below, the team considers that the Department and Foreign Service must change their approach to security. The present policy is to maintain the normal conduct of business and life in general at posts to the maximum extent possible and to carry out security programs with this in mind. When the Department places a post on the Critical Threat list, and probably also those posts on the Serious High Threat list, it requires a special security awareness which reminds all personnel on a daily basis of that threat situation. The Department has not developed the criteria intended to achieve that objective called for in Section VI 3 of its statement on "General Principles on Security of USG Personnel at Overseas Missions", except for office buildings and housing, and it should take immediate steps to do so as guidance to chiefs of mission at such posts. It would have been helpful to this Special Inquiry if such criteria had existed.

*In the absence of security criteria for Critical Threat posts, and to assist in this Special Inquiry, the Inspector General convened the Senior Deputy Inspector General and all available Senior Inspectors for a complete review with the Special Inquiry team of the security situation in San Salvador. The eight senior officials present, seven of whom had been chiefs of mission, agreed with the overall conclusion of this paragraph.

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Compliance: Mission management in San Salvador had promulgated reasonable security guidelines for the conduct of mission personnel off duty, an action which mission staff described as part of a more practical and heightened approach to security over the past two years. The team considers that mission employees should have been furnished a copy of the guidelines for their ready reference. The team did note, however, that the mission reissued the guidelines in an administrative notice in connection with the March 1985 elections. The team does not consider that mission management had an obligation to carry out a compliance program because it had issued advisory guidelines. It was appropriate for management to decide that it could reasonably rely on the maturity and judgment of U.S. Government employees, including members of the military staff, to comply with reasonable and sensible security advice. Given the facts of this particular case, however, it is doubtful that this posture is any longer adequate and prudent in San Salvador or at other posts similarly situated.

Given American cultural attitudes against official observance of private civilian conduct away from the workplace, and the Privacy Act, the team has serious doubts about instituting a compliance program for off-duty security guidelines for civilians similar to that for security violations at the workplace. Rather, the team suggests that it be a work requirement of section chiefs at Critical Threat posts to accept the responsibility for the welfare of employees under their supervision and, on a random basis but at least once a month, determine whether they are following guidelines promulgated for their personal safety. Security officers should as a work requirement check with supervisors at least once a month to determine whether this is being done. The team considers that at Critical Threat posts higher priority should be given to the American view that "we are our brother's keeper" rather than to the view that concern for the welfare of others is "snitching."

The doubts of the Special Inquiry team regarding the practicability of a compliance program are reinforced by the fact that a chief of mission has very limited disciplinary authority. The Congress, in the U.S. Code, 22 USC 3927, gave chiefs of mission responsibility for the direction, supervision and coordination of all U.S. Government employees at a diplomatic mission, but gave no direct disciplinary authority. The authority for disciplining members of the Foreign Service,

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e.g., under the Department of State, rests with the Director General of the Foreign Service. Under Department regulations, chiefs of mission do not have the authority to reprimand an employee (Foreign Affairs Manual, 3 FAM 765). Unless the chiefs of mission are either rating or reviewing officers on employees' efficiency reports, they cannot normally record deficiencies of other personnel under their jurisdiction, even in efficiency ratings. In contrast, military commanders down to and including company commanders, have a broad range of rewards and punishment that they can hand out immediately. Moreover, chiefs of mission have almost no authority over assignments at their post. The team finds the concept of fixing responsibility without authority a very difficult one indeed.

Sidewalk Cafe Guidelines: The failure of mission personnel generally to comply with the advice against sitting outside at cafes was imprudent considering the mission's own intelligence estimates known to mission personnel, but that failure in this case was not determinative and, in fact, would probably have made no difference. Based on all available evidence, the guerrilla group had clearly targeted the members of the MSG Detachment. The cafe was in fact an open area with the "inside" area determined by the presence of a roof, and the difference between "inside" and "outside" is perhaps 15 or 20 feet. Knowing that the Marines were at the cafe, the group would probably have gone "inside" to find them. The pattern of sitting outside, however, probably made surveillance easier.

Patterns of Conduct: Rather, the team considers that the establishment of a general pattern of conduct over many months by mission personnel, including the members of the MSG Detachment, in eating and drinking during evening hours at cafes and restaurants in the Zona Rosa permitted the guerrilla group to conduct surveillance and to plan for an operation against the members of the MSG. Senior mission managers state that they were not aware of this pattern, although it was known to lower level personnel and, with normal due diligence by supervisory security personnel, could easily have been determined through a daily review of the MSG Recall Log.

The Special Inquiry team accepts the general view of mission personnel that overall mission policy and the atmosphere and environment in San Salvador contributed to a relaxed atmosphere on security off duty. The "business as usual" approach even at Critical and Serious High Threat posts is common practice in the Foreign Service in general (based on

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the team's review with senior inspection personnel and its own experience) and it does not believe that post management at San Salvador should be held to a higher degree of care than is practiced in the Foreign Service at similiarly threatened posts.

Department Guidance: The Department of State issued general security guidance in October 1982 in its "General Principles on Security of USG Personnel at Overseas Missions" (A-1225, October 14, 1982). These General Principles established security guidelines for chiefs of mission which are related to this Inquiry but which were not adequately implemented. Chiefs of mission are to ensure uniform application of security guidelines (Section III D); to recommend reductions of personnel in high threat situations, and to adopt enclave or cluster housing so that adequate security is feasible (VI A (3) and VII A). The mission's RSO could not recall this instruction. Although the mission established its own basic security policies, elements of the mission were authorized to establish more stringent rules. This led to the distinction between members of the MSG Detachment and other U.S. military personnel even though intelligence estimates indicated that all U.S. military personnel in San Salvador were similarly threatened. Despite heightened threats within the past six months, the staff in San Salvador is actually increasing, and it is expected to expand even more as the United States tries to assist El Salvador economically. This phenomenon at seriously threatened posts is not unique to San Salvador.

Although there has been some housing concentration over the past several years, the team does not consider the housing pattern of American mission employees consistent with the mission's own estimate of the terrorist threat. The presence of dependents also contributes to a housing pattern of 178 high quality single family dwellings which are spread over an area of six square miles, and which are maintained by the mission and lightly protected by a contract guard force. The mission's security program for the housing areas is reasonably adequate to protect against common crime, but, if the guerrillas carry out threats made in the past few weeks to attack the housing of mission employees, the current program is wholly inadequate. It would be imprudent to ignore these threats and to maintain the present security posture in the face of the death of the four U.S. Marines and the two other Americans.

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Threat Estimates: The consensus view of mission personnel, as conveyed to the Special Inquiry team, was that civilian employees of the mission, except key officials such as the chief of mission, the DCM, [REDACTED] are not particularly threatened -- military personnel are. While the Inquiry team was in San Salvador, the mission was adamantly opposed to the departure of civilian dependents but leaning toward the departure of military dependents. (Military personnel are covered by a separate hazardous duty pay system.*) But the mission's considered judgment as stated in its cable (San Salvador 8251, June 29, 1985), sent after the Inquiry team's departure, is that there is no reason to act on dependents until there is a "credible threat" and the danger is "...not unacceptably greater than in many other parts of the world..." It was also argued that withdrawal of dependents would be sending the wrong political signals at this time (a view on which the RSO dissented). Although these views and estimates are attributed to various sections of the mission, the team assumes that mission management quoted them because it agrees and expects the Department to accept them as the mission's consensus view and recommendations. In commenting on this report, the mission reiterated its view that dependents are not threatened but make a positive contribution to security by keeping employees at home and out of public places.

E.O. 129
As Amended
Sec. 1.46

The presence at the post of dependents, including children, in the face of the mission's own intelligence estimate on the direct threat to American employees and their housing areas, coupled with the Department's designation of San Salvador as a Critical Threat post, seems disingenuous. The mission's current estimate of the threat, and its recommendation that there be no change in its security posture are inconsistent. Either the employees and their dependents at the post are under a critical threat or they are not. The team does not consider it appropriate, if there is such a threat, to keep dependents at post to bolster overall policy or management objectives.

*Danger pay for military personnel is \$65 per month regardless of rank, whereas civilian danger pay is 25 percent of salary. For comparison, a colonel receives \$65 monthly, whereas a civilian counterpart (FO-1, Step 1) would receive \$1,088.79.

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(This subject is discussed more fully in Annex III.) If dependents are threatened, then certain decisions have to be made, including whether all employees in the circumstances can continue to perform a useful function, whether employees are entitled to danger pay, and whether the U.S. Government is jeopardizing its own interests and the lives of dependents by running high risks with the lives of persons not in its employ. (As this report neared completion, the Department authorized the voluntary departure of dependents from San Salvador.)

Mission employees are much more likely to pay attention to what the mission and the Department do, than to what they say. So long as mission management seeks to keep the situation as normal as possible at the post (except for minor actions such as a curfew at midnight which mission management acknowledges in San Salvador 8251 is not related to any threat), mission employees cannot be expected to take too seriously the mission's threat estimates, its guidance, and its security program. Both mission management and the Department need to take meaningful steps which stress the security threats and change attitudes at Critical Threat posts like San Salvador.

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V. WASHINGTON BACKSTOPPING OF FIELD OPERATIONS

Any inquiry into the responsibility of a diplomatic field mission must necessarily consider whether there was adequate backstopping from the Department of State in Washington. The team of Special Inquiry has already noted that specific security criteria for Critical Threat posts would have been helpful not only in emphasizing the approach that the Department expected in the field, but also in determining the responsibility of post management. The team also noted the wide discrepancy between the responsibility of a chief of mission and the authority provided to discharge that responsibility. In addition, a major deficiency has been, and continues to be, adequate resources to provide security consistent with the threat, especially at Critical and Serious High Threat posts. As noted above, only after the most strenuous efforts was the mission in San Salvador able to obtain approval for exercise facilities that personnel could use under secure circumstances.

U.S. diplomatic missions have complained strongly about the uncoordinated response to security requirements and, until recently, had doubts that they would get adequate help even if they asked.* These issues are discussed in greater detail in Annex II, but the team concludes that the Department's priority on and awareness toward the security needs and concerns of the field have been major factors in the approach of the field and its ability to deal effectively with security. The Department acted to obtain Presidential and congressional approval for a comprehensive security program in July and October 1984, respectively, and, after the report of an outside expert panel, i.e., the Secretary of State's Advisory Panel on Overseas Security headed by Admiral Inman, in June 1985, to improve organization and backstopping. Accordingly, this team has no recommendations on these two points.

*The Foreign Service Journal (June 1985, pages 32-34) asserts from its sampling of Foreign Service personnel that "Foreign Service personnel have little confidence in the ability of foreign affairs agencies to ensure adequate protection against terrorism for their employees."

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VI. GENERAL CONCLUSION

Taking into account all of the facts and circumstances in this case, the Special Inquiry team does not find a basis for the Secretary of State to convene a Board of Inquiry to fix responsibility on any official in San Salvador, either civilian or military under the operational control of the Secretary of State, for negligence in connection with this incident.

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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The Under Secretary for Management should amend Department regulations, and/or seek legislation, to give chiefs of mission disciplinary authority over all civilian U.S. Government personnel assigned to their missions. This authority should include all the disciplinary actions, except dismissal from the Service, that the Director General may take against members of the Foreign Service assigned to the Department of State, but should also provide for reviewing authority by employing agencies over any such disciplinary action to (a) reduce such action if considered necessary to maintain consistency on a worldwide basis, and (b) overturn such action if it is determined, based on all the facts and circumstances, that the chief of mission acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

2. The Under Secretary for Management should (a) develop and promulgate as expeditiously as possible the security guidelines called for in the statement of General Principles, Section VI A 3, giving priority to the separate guidelines needed for posts classified in the Critical Threat category, and (b) provide resources to implement these guidelines. The guidelines should address the issue of dependents and the off-duty conduct of mission personnel at posts in the Critical Threat category. The guidelines should also include instructions on steps that the Department expects chiefs of mission to take to monitor compliance. The object should be to create a special security awareness at the highest threat posts and to overcome the "business as usual" attitude with respect to such posts. (The team understands that guidelines exist on office buildings and housing, but considers that the housing concentration in San Salvador is wholly inadequate given the current threat.)

3. The Under Secretary for Management should reemphasize to chiefs of mission the need for uniform application of security guidelines to all U.S. Government personnel similarly situated. (In the San Salvador case, the distinction among military elements of the diplomatic mission resulted in less stringent off-duty guidance to members of the Marine Security Guard Detachment.)

4. The Under Secretary for Management should require that Emergency Action Committees at overseas posts review their security briefing programs and establish procedures that will ensure that all personnel and their dependents participate in these programs. Reasons for nonparticipation in these briefings by employees and/or dependents should be documented.

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5. The Under Secretary for Management should require chiefs of mission, at posts where normal physical exercise and recreational activities are denied some or all mission members for security reasons, to develop a positive program that will permit alternative recreational and physical exercise activities. The Department should act to fund such a program, if necessary. The provision of such special programs should, of course, be considered in determining whether a hardship allowance is warranted.

6. The Under Secretary for Management should review protection for Marine Security Guards at Critical Threat posts. In cases similar to San Salvador where military elements of the diplomatic mission are generally targeted, the chief of mission should ensure that adequate off-duty protection is provided and that the members of the Marine Security Guard are consistently treated with other military elements of the mission in granting authority for self-protection in off-duty situations.

7. The Under Secretary for Management should review the information system on security threats, analyses, alerts, and program recommendations, and policy and program actions, with the objective of ensuring that timely distribution of this information is made to those offices and agencies which require such information to discharge their duties.

8. The Under Secretary for Management, before approving danger pay, should send its own team to the field to determine whether danger pay is justified under the criteria prescribed by Congress (see Annex I).

9. The Under Secretary for Management should consider establishing two levels of danger pay:

- a. One level at 15 percent for those instances in which dependents are permitted to remain at post, and
- b. Another level at 25 percent for cases in which the Department determines that the security threat is so severe and specific that dependents should be withdrawn.

10. The Under Secretary for Management's Office for CounterTerrorism and Emergency Planning (M/CTP), in carrying out its emergency action program, should emphasize to chiefs of mission the need for clear understanding of the chain of command for actual and probable participants in emergencies so that no one will be in doubt as to assigned responsibilities.

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11. The Office of Security, Bureau of Administration and Security (A/SY), should establish a schedule of periodic (at least semi-annual) visits to posts on the Critical and Serious High Threat lists by supervisory security officials from either Washington or the regional offices of the Associate Directors for Security (ADS's) to review security programs and to check compliance with security criteria (Recommendation 2 above).

12. A/SY should require its regional security officers (RSO's) to review frequently the Marine Security Guard Recall Log for the purpose of monitoring and altering if necessary the off-duty conduct of members of the Marine Security Guard Detachments at U.S. diplomatic missions.

13. The Under Secretary for Management should review the criteria used by the Threat Analysis Group of the Office of Security (A/SY/TAG) in assigning all diplomatic and consular posts to a threat category for the purpose of:

a. Ensuring that the criteria are adequately precise and consistent with the Department's policies on security, danger pay, evacuation of employees and dependents, and other pertinent security matters, especially for posts in the Serious Threat categories, and

b. Bringing action taken by posts, such as San Salvador, on security threats into closer relationship with the Department's evaluation of the threat (Annex III).

14. The Foreign Service Institute (M/FSI) should include in its training courses and seminars for chiefs and deputy chiefs of mission the opinion of the Office of the Legal Adviser (Annex III) so that these officials will be fully aware of their obligations for the protection of dependents.

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ANNEX I

SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

DANGER PAY IN EL SALVADOR

During the course of the Special Inquiry into the death of the four Marines in San Salvador on June 19, 1985 the issue of danger pay was encountered repeatedly by the team, either directly or indirectly. Danger pay appears to color official reporting to Washington on security matters and tends itself to be a danger to employees and their dependents.*

The current view in San Salvador is that the civilian members of the mission staff, except certain key civilians, are not particularly threatened, and that there is no threat to dependents.** This estimate was made in a meeting of the country team on June 26 (San Salvador 8251 of June 29, 1985) in a security review (following the terrorist incident of June 19, and after the visit of the Special Inquiry team). Consideration of a possible recommendation by the mission to withdraw dependents was also discussed. The mission's recommendation to Washington, in which the security officer (RSO) dissented, was that none of the dependents should be withdrawn from the post. If this is a valid estimate of the threat to the diplomatic mission, its employees and their dependents, the post does not meet the legal criteria for danger pay.

*Danger pay is authorized up to 25 percent of the employee's basic pay when there is "civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism, or wartime conditions which threaten physical harm or imminent danger to the health or well-being of the employee." (U.S. Code, 5 USC 5928)

**The mission's view, conveyed earlier to the Special Inquiry team, was that military members of the mission staff are directly threatened.

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The Special Inquiry team does not agree with the mission's estimate of the threat. The threats of the guerrillas are quite specific. The head of the Salvadorean Communist Party is quoted in the Sunday New York Times (July 14, 1985, Outlook Section, E5) as stating, "They (American advisors) come to areas of combat and return at the end of the day, take a good bath, a nice shower and calmly go to enjoy themselves. But it cannot go on like this." This quote appeared in a more general article in which the theme was that the guerrillas intend to carry out a stepped-up campaign of economic sabotage. The guerrillas are sophisticated enough to know that the United States and its economic assistance program will make the difference between their winning or losing in urban areas, as they know that the United States made the difference in the outcome of guerrilla warfare in the countryside. The team does not think the guerrillas will continue to distinguish between U.S. military personnel and other mission personnel in their urban warfare as has been the case. The Washington Post carried similar reports and statements. The mission's own intelligence estimate has been the same since October 1984 and

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As Amended
Sec. 1.4 (1)

[REDACTED] tend to confirm the mission's estimate and the media reports. The communique issued by the guerrillas after the June 19 incident stated that they intended to attack the housing of mission members. The death of the four Marines, along with nine other persons, clearly underlines that there is an obvious and present danger. The team considers that the U.S. Government would be running unacceptable risks with the lives of dependents if it accepts the recommendations made by the mission in San Salvador in its June 29 cable to Washington (San Salvador 8251).

The Special Inquiry team reviewed the mission's background documents regarding danger pay, when this was an issue in 1982, and also reviewed the mission's recommendations contained in its telegram, 82 San Salvador 5626. Historically, the mission's estimate of the danger in El Salvador has tended to vary with the question put forward.

The system for determining danger pay creates a clear conflict of interest. This is evident from reading the files. The Special Inquiry team suggests two changes in the system:

1. Danger pay should be authorized not on the basis of a paper submission by the mission, but on the basis of an on-the-spot evaluation by a team from Washington, none of the

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members of which have any personal interest in the outcome. (See Section VII, Recommendations.) The U.S. Government is paying about \$1 million annually in danger pay in El Salvador. Therefore, it would be cost effective to have an on-the-spot survey.

2. Danger pay should be authorized (a) at the level of 15 percent if there is a general critical threat, as defined in law, not directed specifically at civilian members of the mission and not involving an undue risk to dependents; and (b) at the level of 25 percent when the threat is directed at civilian U.S. Government personnel and the mission itself, and when there is a decision by the Under Secretary for Management that the security situation is too serious for dependents to be at post.

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ANNEX II

SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

WASHINGTON BACKSTOPPING OF FIELD MISSIONS

The Special Inquiry team was told by mission supervisors in San Salvador that the "Marines were not listening" to security advice. For their part, the surviving Marines insisted (and the team agrees) that a high alert was maintained when there were specific threats, but otherwise the Marines took their cue from the relaxed attitude of mission supervisors and personnel in the pleasant Salvadorean atmosphere -- what might be called a San Salvador syndrome, if this security approach were unique to that post.

The record of the Department of State, since the first Ambassador was gunned down on the streets in Guatemala in 1968, is that it has been slow to give adequate priority to security resources and, as the Inman Panel reported, to organize itself effectively to deal with the problem. The approach to providing security has been reactive and ad hoc: Thus, a counterterrorism program in 1973 including more security personnel to deal with embassy takeovers as occurred in Kuala Lumpur; a security enhancement program in 1980 to protect U.S. embassies against mob violence such as had occurred in Islamabad and Tripoli the previous year (some of which went for security in San Salvador); and a security supplement in 1982 for specific problems in Europe.

As a separate action and in response to the Munich massacre during the 1972 Olympics, the President in 1973 directed the creation of a counterterrorism policy staff in the Department to analyze intelligence on terrorism, to coordinate with other governments on effective counterterrorism policies, and to organize to respond to crises created by terrorist acts against the United States and especially its diplomatic service.*

*The Inman Panel would maintain this counterterrorism staff separate from the overall security effort.

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In 1981, the management of the Department tried to better organize its security function by combining this staff responsible for terrorism policy, policy operations, and crisis management, with the organizational unit responsible for protecting U.S. diplomats, but the effort was so strongly resisted by the security and administrative bureaucracy that management abandoned it. The Department decided instead, in 1982, to improve the overall security effort by emphasizing emergency planning to encourage coordination between the policy and operating staffs and by obtaining approval of a program to train foreign police to better enable them to support the United States in dealing with terrorist acts and their own national terrorist problems.

Efforts to develop an effective overseas security program were also seriously delayed and complicated by a disagreement between personnel and security managers over how to treat security personnel under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. This disagreement continued for several years especially over whether agents of the Office of Security (A/SY), now in the Foreign Service, could be made criminal investigators under the Civil Service. Clearly involved in this disagreement was the priority to be accorded to physical and protective services overseas as opposed to criminal investigation. As the Inman Panel noted, this disagreement also created a serious vacancy rate within A/SY which is only now being corrected.

Reports of the General Accounting Office (GAO) during this period, a comprehensive evaluation of all aspects of security in 1984 by the Department's Inspector General, followed by the Inman Panel report in June 1985, have finally succeeded in promoting action on management of the overall security effort.

On the resource side, for the first time in over a decade, the Department, working through the Inter-Departmental Group on Terrorism, and pursuant to a Presidential directive, submitted a comprehensive program to the National Security Council (NSC) in July 1984 on all aspects of the terrorist problem and, with respect to diplomatic missions overseas, proposed a \$1.8 billion, five-year program. At the same time, the Secretary convened the outside panel of experts (the Inman Panel) to obtain advice on whether the Department's security program was appropriate over the long term. The panel reported in June 1985, subsequent to the incident in San Salvador. The report supports the Department's program but concludes that the need for replacement of overseas office buildings was substantially underestimated. When the team talked to analysts of the

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Office of Management and Budget (OMB), they stated that, although the outlines of the Department's security program are somewhat clearer, the Department still had some way to go in defining its overall long-term requirements; in determining how it proposes to treat those requirements in the budget; and how it plans to manage the program.

The reluctance of the Department to ask for adequate security resources was not entirely unfounded. In October 1984, when the President requested, and Congress approved, a supplemental authorization and appropriation of \$362 million to carry out the first year of the five-year program recommended by the Inter-Departmental Group on Terrorism, OMB quickly identified in the Department's budget for fiscal year (FY) 1986 some \$383 million in "lower priority" items that had to be eliminated to make room for the security program within the budget ceiling. The effect was not only to take away more than 11 percent of the Department's funds for such "low priority" items as passport services for Americans, narcotics control, and emergencies in the diplomatic service, but to impose a 5.0 percent penalty for asking.

Such "signals" are clear to foreign affairs managers who make their living by watching and listening for political signals. If funds are needed to provide security for U.S. Government personnel manning the diplomatic foxholes around the world, the Department of State would have to decide how to cut political, economic, and other functions of the Department to make funds available. This imposes an especially harsh burden on the Department; even though it represents less than one-third of the U.S. Government employees at the diplomatic missions to be protected, it has to pay 100 percent of the security costs out of its budget because it is the housekeeper overseas for U.S. Government missions and is responsible for their security.

Most troubling of all is that this straight-lining of the Department's resource needs over several fiscal years sends clear political signals to the Soviet Union, Libya, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, and international terrorists. They have made the American diplomatic service their primary target for almost two decades with the objective of disrupting U.S. relations with other countries and forcing the United States to retrench diplomatically. It will be clear to them from only a cursory analysis of the U.S. budget that essential diplomatic functions have been sacrificed to pay for security against terrorists.

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The terrorists can easily conclude that, if they make the situation hot enough, the United States will decide the price of protecting its diplomats is too high and take them home, giving terrorists and terrorist states a free hand. Although the team was told by OMB that the budget cuts were simply an economic decision in the normal budget process, the fact remains that the United States will be retrenching overseas in a significant way in response to terrorist pressures.

The United States seems to understand "high technology" warfare and can allocate over \$300 billion annually to deter warfare, and fight if necessary, but it does not seem to be able to cope with the "low technology" war now going on. When it comes to resources, both the legislative and executive branches have treated the Department of State as a domestic agency like the Small Business Administration and the Weather Bureau. When it comes to providing resources to implement policy, there is a tendency to forget that diplomacy is a critical factor in the security of the United States. There seems to be a failure to grasp that the terrorist war is against American foreign policy and that U.S. diplomatic establishments abroad and U.S. diplomats are the most visible target to attack to persuade the United States to change its policies. Nor is it understood that it is the diplomats themselves with the help of the local police that must fight back. The four Marines killed in San Salvador and the 241 killed in Lebanon were on diplomatic assignments and, in both cases, there was an erroneous assumption that, because they were performing a diplomatic mission, security did not have to meet the stringent requirements of a civil war situation. If it is warfare, the U.S. attitude is that the security agencies should fight it -- the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should get the intelligence, and the Department of Defense (DOD) should deal with the problem. There will have to be a change in attitude about who is being attacked, how the war has to be fought, and where the resources are needed, or U.S. diplomats will continue to be killed in surprise attacks by terrorists.

Surely this great republic, which spends over \$300 billion annually to deter aggression, can afford one thousandth of that amount to fight the current terrorist war against it, and also support an effective foreign affairs organization.

The Special Inquiry team does not consider every diplomat overseas essential, or that, with prudent management changes, it would not be possible to move back to the United States some of the functions now performed overseas, thereby cutting

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security costs. Such changes are possible in El Salvador and at other posts. But the team does conclude that resource decisions, which deny that an effective foreign policy is part and parcel of the security of the United States, and which in effect require that personnel overseas responsible for developing the information essential to that policy be sacrificed because of failure to provide security funds to protect them, are responsible for creating signals to U.S. personnel overseas and the terrorists inconsistent with the President's policy.

Washington support must be clear and unequivocal on the resources and organizational backstopping to implement the President's policies and to eliminate any doubts in the field about Washington's commitment and the priority it gives to fighting terrorism.

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ANNEX III

SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

CRITERIA ON EVACUATION OF DEPENDENTS
AT CRITICAL THREAT POSTS

As noted in the report, and especially in Annex I, the Special Inquiry team had difficulty in reconciling the estimate of the U.S. mission in San Salvador on the threat to civilians, with whom the U.S. Marines were equated, and the mission's action on danger pay. A closely related issue is the presence of dependents of mission employees in San Salvador and the reasons given for retaining that presence in the face of public threats against mission housing. Other than general reasons applicable to all posts for the presence of dependents such as morale and representation, mission messages and staff in San Salvador urged retention of dependents because (1) "We would be sending the wrong political signals at this time if dependents were withdrawn," and (2) "...dependents make a positive contribution to the security program by giving employees with families a reason to go home after work instead of out in public." Mission management has made clear in its comments that it does not accept the first point as valid, but that this point is a justification that has been frequently and strongly put forward by mission management at other posts for the retention of dependents.

This rationale assumes that it is appropriate to use dependents for the purpose of achieving specific country policy objectives and to help post management in carrying out its responsibility for an effective security program for mission employees. Both of these objectives are official, whereas dependents are not employees of the U.S. Government.

There are general considerations which make it in the interests of the United States to have dependents present overseas at diplomatic missions. Among these are morale and appropriate conduct, representation, the evidence of normal relations with other countries, and the quality of employees that may be obtained if they are accompanied by their dependents.

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As pointed out in the attached opinion of the Office of the Legal Adviser, it is therefore a given in all cases that the withdrawal of dependents would work against the general interest of the United States. In assessing the negligence of U.S. officials, the legal memorandum concludes that courts are not likely to substitute their judgment if officials attempt systematically and rationally to reach a decision and the application of this decision is not arbitrary and unreasonable.

There has to be a balancing of general considerations against the threat to dependents. In specific cases (such as San Salvador where the threat level has become critical), the sole question is whether the security threat has exceeded the level where leaving dependents at post is warranted. Thus, mixing the achievement of specific policy objectives with the decision to have dependents stay or depart because of critical threat levels would be inappropriate. The Special Inquiry team provided its threat assessment on San Salvador at this time (Annex I). The estimate provided by the regional security officer (RSO) to the Emergency Action Committee (EAC) on June 26 (San Salvador 8251) indicated that the left had threatened to target U.S. Government personnel, even at their homes, which automatically involved dependents.

A key element in the Department's systematic effort to rationalize decision making and establish priorities on security is the quarterly Threat List issued by the Threat Analysis Group of the Office of Security (A/SY/TAG).* The Special Inquiry team has taken special note of the quarterly Threat List as the key indicator of the threat level in San Salvador. Any court, in determining the negligence of the U.S. Government or any of its officials for the death or injury of employees or dependents, would probably do the same. On the one hand, therefore, the category of a post on the Threat List may result in a higher allocation of resources but, on the other, it could also be used by a court to find that officials were negligent if their decisions on dependents, for example, were deemed unreasonable in light of the criteria used in preparing the Threat List and the categories assigned to the post where the incident occurred.

*The Department in 1983 and 1984 also prepared a long-term Threat List by country based on a two-year projection of political stability to be used for decisions and priorities on long-term security projects. This was dropped in 1985, but the Inman Panel recommends that it be reestablished.

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- 3 -

The team is aware of the careful and professional manner in which the Threat List is prepared, and that it is given for review and comment to at least eight bureaus before it is issued. Nevertheless, the team notes that over 25 percent of all posts are in the two highest threat categories and considers that this may suggest a need (a) for a more precise statement of criteria, especially for those posts in the Serious Threat categories, and (b) for bringing about a closer relationship between what posts, such as San Salvador, are actually doing about security and the Department's evaluation of the threat.

Attachments:

1. Memorandum to the Legal Adviser
from Ambassador Sayre
2. Reply from the Legal Adviser

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2-2 ES LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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ANNEX IV

SPECIAL INQUIRY
INTO FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
OF INCIDENT IN SAN SALVADOR INVOLVING
DEATH OF FOUR U.S. MARINES
ON JUNE 19, 1985

INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED OR CONSULTED

Embassy San Salvador

Ballēsteros, Robert	Sergeant, USMC, MSG Detachment
Barlow, Byron S.	Acting Administrative Counselor
Bustos, Harold	Sergeant, USMC, MSG Detachment
Castro, Sandra	FSN, Consular Section
Duryea, Lyman	Colonel, U.S. Army, Military Attache
Elliot, Charles	Corporal, USMC, MSG Detachment
Farnell, William	Staff Sergeant, USMC, Assistant NCOIC, MSG Detachment
Fleetwood, Linda K.	Assistant RSO
Gonzalez, Julian	Corporal, USMC, MSG Detachment
Gorman, Robert D.	Gunnery Sergeant, USMC, NCOIC, MSG Detachment
Hamilton, Don Reed	Public Affairs Officer, USIS
Harney, Michael	Staff Sergeant, USMC, MSG Detachment
Kuszuth, Anton	Lance Corporal, USMC, MSG Detachment
Lane, James	Corporal, USMC, MSG Detachment
Liptak, Lawrence	Acting RSO

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BY amf, NARA, DATE 9/13/99

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- 2 -

Embassy San Salvador (Cont.)

Mack, James F.	Acting DCM
McGowan, Howard L.*	Administrative Counselor
Murray, Dan	Contract Supervisor, Contract Guard Force
Niner, Arthur	Economic Research Section
Passage, David D.	Charge d'Affaires, a.i.
Pickering, Thomas R.*	Former U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
Sargent, Walter H.*	RSO
Steele, James	Colonel, U.S. Army, Commander, Military Group
Swicker, George S.	Economic Research Section
Trum, James G.	B&F Officer

*Had departed post prior to incident.

Embassy Panama

Larson, George H.	Associate Director of Security
Stewart, Frank	Major, USMC, Company Commander, Company D, MSG Battalion

Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C.

Barie, James	International Section, OMB
Spevacek, David	International Section, OMB

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- 3 -

Department of State, Washington, D. C.

Abrams, Elliott	Assistant Secretary, ARA
Bouchard, Donald J.	Former Executive Assistant, Office of Under Secretary for Management
Buffalo, Harvey, A.	Senior Inspector, S/IG
Coffman, John D.	International Relations Officer, M/CTP
Crigler, T. Frank	Senior Inspector, S/IG
De Pree, Willard A.	Director, M/MO
Dewindt, Victor G.	Special Agent, A/SY
Edmondson, William B.	Deputy Inspector General, S/IG
Feldman, Roger B.	Comptroller, M/COMP
Fields, David C.	Deputy Assistant Secretary and Director of Security, A/SY
Gettinger, Hugo Carl	Desk Officer, Salvadorean Affairs, ARA
Gonzalez, Raymond E.	Senior Inspector, S/IG
Harrop, William C.	Inspector General
Jurvis, Lorin A.	Associate Comptroller, Office of Budget and Planning, M/COMP
Kozak, Michael G.	Deputy Legal Advisor
Lawrence, Loren E.	Former Senior Inspector, S/IG
Linehan, John A., Jr.	Former Senior Inspector, S/IG
Lupo, Samuel E.	Deputy Assistant Secretary, M/DGP
Mabry, David	Colonel, USMC; Deputy Director, Emergency and Planning, M/CTP

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- 4 -

Department of State, Washington, D.C. (Cont.)

Malmborg, Knute E.	Assistant Legal Adviser for Management, L/M
McQuillan, Thomas R.	Director, Resource planning and Management, M/COMP
Melton, Richard H.	Director, ARA/CEN
Nolan, Robert B.	Special Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary for Management
Roberts, George B., Jr.	Senior Inspector, S/IG
Robinson, Roger H.	Deputy Director, A/SY
Smith, Norman Shaw	Former Director, ARA/CEN
Stauffer, Stefanie C.	Chief, Threat Analysis Group, A/SY/TAGS
Tolson, Jerome F., Jr.	Chief, Allowances Staff, A/ALS
Vest, George S.	Director General of the Foreign Service and Director of Personnel

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BOBBY JOE DICKSON, STAFF SERGEANT (POSTHUMOUS), USMC

Bobby Joe Dickson, age 27, was a 1975 graduate of Tuscaloosa High School, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, who enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1979 and had previously served as an embassy guard in Guatemala City, Guatemala until last month. An all-around athlete, Staff Sergeant Dickson excelled as a baseball pitcher and was particularly fond of the University of Alabama football program. His relatives recall him as an individual with a constant smile on his face who truly enjoyed helping less fortunate people. He loved his country deeply and volunteered for duty in El Salvador. His favorite song, by the way, was Bruce Springsteen's "Born in the USA."

Family members attending today:

Betty Malone	(Natural Mother)
Hayward Malone	(Current Spouse of Betty Malone)
Joe E. Dickson	(Natural Father)
Mama Dickson	(Current Spouse of Joe Dickson)
Tommy Dickson	(Brother)
Todd Malone	(Step-brother)

THOMAS T. HANDWORK, STAFF SERGEANT (POSTHUMOUS), USMC

Thomas T. Handwork, age 24, grew up in Boardman, Ohio, where his parents still reside, and graduated from Boardman High School in 1979. His parents related that his only trouble in high school came when he skipped a class to go to the library to read literature on the Marines, which he entered shortly after graduation. Staff Sergeant Handwork had always wanted to be an embassy security guard and had served in Hamburg, West Germany until this past March. He intensely loved both his country and the Marines. Also interested in fine arts, his family mentioned that he always wanted to write an "Erol Flynn" type screenplay for the President to play. He felt that the President had a special relationship with the members of our armed forces and had always wanted to meet him.

Family members attending today:

John Handwork	(Natural Father)
Trudy Handwork	(Natural Mother)
John Handwork	(Brother)
Charles Handwork	(Brother)
Tammy Handwork	(Sister)
Shannon Handwork	(Sister)
Debbra Trattner	(Fiancee)

PATRICK R. KWIATKOWSKI, SERGEANT (POSTUMOUS), USMC
(kwit-cuss-ski)

Patrick R. Kwiatkowski, age 20, was a Wausau, Wisconsin native where he graduated from East High School in 1982 and joined the Marine Corps immediately. He was an amateur boxer who was remembered throughout his community as a dedicated altar boy at the local Catholic parish who also loved to fish and snow ski. Sergeant Kwiatkowski was a very proud individual who joined the Marines because he wanted to be the best and wanted to attend college upon completing his tour of duty, which had just begun in May.

A somber note, Sergeant Kwiatkowski would have been 21 years old yesterday, June 21. His sister, Mrs. Bobbette Ambriz who is attending today, is nine months pregnant and plans to name the baby after Patrick if it's a boy.

Family members attending today:

Bernard A. Kwiatkowski	(Natural Father)
Phyliss J. Hildebrandt	(Natural Mother)
Phillip Kwiatkowski	(Brother)
Miss Beth Kwiatkowski	(Sister)
Mrs. Brenda Whitt	(Sister)
Mrs. Bobbette Ambriz	(Sister)

GREGORY H. WEBER, SERGEANT (POSTHUMOUS), USMC

Gregory H. Weber, age 22, was a native of Cincinnati, Ohio and graduated from Cincinnati's Elder High School in 1981. He was a member of the National Honor Society and President of the Fellowship of Christian Athletes, having been a cross-country runner. Sergeant Weber also worked extensively with the Big Brother Program for underprivileged children. His family recalled him as an achiever with tremendous drive who set a goal of being number one in his Marine Security Guard School and accomplished that goal this past February. He felt he was needed most in El Salvador and had been stationed there since March.

Family members attending today:

John M. Weber	(Natural Father)
Marlene Weber	(Natural Mother)
John Weber	(Brother)
Mark Weber	(Brother)
Robert Weber	(Brother)
Carolyn Weber	(Sister)
Constance Weber	(Sister)

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NLS F96-0041 #72

By .125, NARA, Date 7/11/01

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NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: MARINE CASUALTIES IN SAN SALVADOR

AS OF: 200215 PDT JUN 85

SOURCE: USDAO SAN SALVADOR MSG 202539Z JUN 85 AND
AMEMB SAN SALVADOR MSG 200535Z JUN 85

REC'D BY: NMCC WHEN DESK

TYPE REPORT: INITIAL: XXXXXXXXXXXX

FOLLOW-UP:

FINAL:

(C) AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS PL SALVADOR TIME ON THE 10TH OF JUN 85, SUSPECTED GUERRILLAS MACHINE-GUNNED CUSTOMERS OF THE RESTAURANT "CHILTS" IN THE ROSA DISTRICT OF SAN SALVADOR. REPORTS STATE THAT EITHER SIX TO TEN OR EIGHT TO TWELVE SUSPECTED GUERRILLAS WEARING CAMOUFLAGE SHIRTS GOT OUT OF A TRUCK, PROBABLY ARMED WITH UZI SUB-MACHINE GUNS AND A G-3 RIFLE.

(C) CONFIRMED RESULTS OF THE ATTACK ARE AS FOLLOWS:

- A. ONE MARINE KILLED IN ACTION
- B. THREE MARINES WOUNDED IN ACTION LATER CONFIRMED DOA AT LOCAL HOSPITAL
- C. SEVEN GUATEMALANS AND SALVADORAN CIVILIANS WERE ALSO KILLED IN THE INCIDENT.

(C) THE DEAD MARINES WERE ASSIGNED TO THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN EL SALVADOR AS SECURITY GUARDS. POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THOSE KILLED HAS BEEN MADE AND NOTIFICATION OF NEXT OF KIN IS IN PROGRESS.

(C) NOTIFICATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE IAW OF 3100.2.

ACTED

REDACTED

REDACTED

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ICTED

REDACTED

SUBJECT: Terrorist Attack in El Salvador

DIA and CIA believe that the four marines were killed by a radical FPL splinter group called the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF). The CERF is a small urban terrorist group, less than 100 members, and has been active in targeting El Salvadoran military officers and officials.

The recent attack may indicate a new tactic has been developed to target Americans in San Salvador in their effort to focus international attention on the insurgency.

No group has yet taken credit for the attack, possibly because the FMLN hopes to avoid the negative reaction to killing innocent civilians.

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✓
1000 TO 1053
1155 EDT
1400-1600 EDT

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 27, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Presidential letter to Survivors of American
Civilians Killed in El Salvador Terrorist Incident

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to the President recommending that he sign a letter of condolence to the wife of each of the Americans who were murdered in the terrorist incident which occurred on June 20, 1985 in San Salvador, El Salvador.

President Reagan attended the ceremony at Andrews AFB on June 22 for the four U.S. Marines who were also killed in this tragic incident. Therefore, it would be appropriate that the President send the letters of condolence to the survivors of the two American civilians killed.

The State Department drafts are attached at Tab II.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward your memo to the President at Tab I with Tabs A and B attached.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

cc: Don Fortier
Howard Teicher
Vince Cannistraro

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President
Tab A - Presidential ltr to Mrs. Alfred G. Viney
Tab B - Presidential ltr to Mrs. Robert Alvdiroz
Tab II - Platt Memo to McFarlane of June 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

5011

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letters of Condolence for the Survivors of the
Two American Civilians Killed in the Terrorist
Incident in El Salvador

Issue

Letters of condolence for Mrs. Alfred Viney and Mrs. Robert Alvidrez.

Facts

On June 20, 1985, two American businessmen employed by WANG, Alfred Viney and Robert Alvidrez, were murdered in the terrorist incident in San Salvador along with four U.S. Marines. On June 22, you attended the ceremony at Andrews AFB for the return of our four dead U.S. Marines.

Discussion

It would be appropriate at this time to send letters of condolence to the wife of each the American civilians killed (Tabs A and B).

Recommendation

OK

No

1. That you sign the letters at
Tabs A and B.

Attachments

Tab A - Letter to Mrs. Alfred Viney
Tab B - Letter to Mrs. Robert Alvidrez

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Viney:

Mrs. Reagan and I feel deeply the loss of your husband, an innocent victim of a senseless attack. In extending our sympathy, we also hope you will let us know if there is some way in which we can be of help.

In response to this tragic terrorist act, I have directed our government to offer all and every feasible assistance to help the Government of El Salvador to identify and prosecute the murderers who perpetrated this crime.

We cannot allow Americans to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens of this great republic.

In the coming days, Nancy and I want you to know that you are in our prayers.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Alfred George Viney
7875 S.W. 146 Street
Miami, FL 33158

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mrs. Alvidrez:

Mrs. Reagan and I feel deeply the loss of your husband, an innocent victim of a senseless attack. In extending our sympathy, we also hope you will let us know if there is some way in which we can be of help.

In response to this tragic terrorist act, I have directed our government to offer all and every feasible assistance to help the Government of El Salvador to identify and prosecute the murderers who perpetrated this crime.

We cannot allow Americans to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens of this great republic.

In the coming days, Nancy and I want you to know that you are in our prayers.

Sincerely,

Mrs. Robert Alvidrez
Wildwood Road, #3
Lexington, MA 02173



Washington, D.C. 20520

June 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Letter to Survivors of American Civilians
Killed in El Salvador

Attached is a suggested letter from President Reagan to be sent to survivors of the two US civilians killed in El Salvador, Mrs. Alfred George Viney and Mrs. Robert Alvidrez. We believe it would be appropriate for the President to personally express his condolences for their bereavement resulting from an international terrorist attack. By separate memorandum we will provide you the scenario for the ceremony to receive the remains at Andrews Air Force Base of the four Marine Corps members who were tragically murdered in the same instance.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Draft Letters

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mrs. Viney:

Mrs. Reagan and I feel deeply the loss of your husband, an innocent victim of a senseless attack. In extending our sympathy, we also hope you will let us know if there is some way in which we can be of help.

In response to this tragic terrorist act, I have directed our government to offer all and every feasible assistance to help the Government of El Salvador to identify and prosecute the murderers who perpetrated this crime.

We cannot allow Americans to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens of this great republic.

In the coming days Nancy and I want you to know that you are in our prayers.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mrs. Alfred George Viney
7875 S.W. 146 Street
Miami, Florida 33158

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mrs. Alvidrez:

Mrs. Reagan and I feel deeply the loss of your husband, an innocent victim of a senseless attack. In extending our sympathy, we also hope you will let us know if there is some way in which we can be of help.

In response to this tragic terrorist act, I have directed our government to offer all and every feasible assistance to help the Government of El Salvador to identify and prosecute the murderers who perpetrated this crime.

We cannot allow Americans to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens of this great republic.

In the coming days Nancy and I want you to know that you are in our prayers.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

Mrs. Robert Alvidrez
Wildwood Road, #3
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

735 -9 0811 00101 JMA
FBIS 133

EL SALVADOR: PRTC CLAIMS RESPONSIBILITY FOR KILLING MARINES

PY211749 PARIS AFP IN SPANISH 1700 GMT 21 JUN 85

(TEXT) SAN SALVADOR, 21 JUN (AFP) -- ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALLS TODAY REPORTED THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY OF CENTRAL AMERICAN WORKERS (PRTC), ONE OF THE FIVE GROUPS THAT MAKE UP THE FARABUNDO MARTI NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (FMLN), WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE KILLING OF 13 PERSONS, EXECUTED BY AN ARMED GROUP IN SAN SALVADOR ON 19 JUNE.

ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALLS TO VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA REPORTED THAT THE MACHINEGUNNING OF A DOWNTOWN SAN SALVADOR RESTAURANT WHICH KILLED 6 U.S. CITIZENS, INCLUDING 4 MARINES, WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE HARDOQUEO CRUZ COMMANDO GROUP OF THE PRTC AND INDICATED THAT THE GROUP WILL BE ISSUING A COMMUNIQUE SOON.

IF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRTC IS CONFIRMED, IT WILL BE THE FIRST TIME IN ALMOST 6 YEARS THAT SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS HAVE USED INDISCRIMINATE URBAN TERRORISM METHODS.

NONE OF THE FMLN CLANDESTINE RADIO STATIONS, HOWEVER, HAVE CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ATTACK, AS THEY USUALLY DO WHEN MEMBERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION CARRY OUT ATTACKS OR SABOTAGE.

21 JUN 1829Z ULR

Aug 10:00-11:30 Rm 268

- Moreau
- Arintage
- Oakley

OSD

Re

ANONYMOUS TELEPHONE CALLS TO VARIOUS NEWS MEDIA REPORTED THAT AN INVESTIGATION OF A DOWNING BY AIRCRAFT BEING CONDUCTED WITH THE U.S. COAST GUARD, INCLUDING A SEARCH FOR THE AIRCRAFT. THE AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD. THE AIRCRAFT WAS DOWNED BY THE U.S. COAST GUARD.


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THE U.S. COAST GUARD IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. COAST GUARD IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE AIRCRAFT. THE U.S. COAST GUARD IS CURRENTLY INVESTIGATING THE AIRCRAFT.

U.S. COAST GUARD

A Cafe Massacre

Gunmen kill 13—including 6 Americans—as frustrated Salvadoran rebels bring the war to the city.



La Zona Rosa seemed worlds away from El Salvador's civil war. U.S. Marine Sgt. Tom Handwork had just joined a girlfriend at Chili's, an outdoor café in San Salvador's most fashionable district. Three fellow Marines sat nearby, quietly sipping their beers. Shortly before 9 p.m. two vehicles pulled up outside the café, and approximately 10 young men in military camouflage T shirts piled out. "¡Viva El Salvador!" cried the leader of the group as his followers opened fire. They gunned down the four Marines with automatic rifles and fired indiscriminately through the sidewalk restaurants that lined the street. Thirteen people died in the furious attack, and at least 15 more were wounded. According to some survivors, the gunmen returned to the fallen Marines to pump additional rounds into their bodies. Then they disappeared into the depths of the city, leaving behind a gruesome montage of shattered bottles, corpses and blood.

"It was democracy that was attacked last night," declared U.S. Embassy spokesman Don Hamilton. "The United States was among the victims." In addition to the Marines, all of whom served as embassy guards, two American businessmen died in the massacre. The deaths marked the first time that an American serviceman had been killed in El Salvador since the murder of Navy Lt. Cmdr. Albert Schaufelberger in May 1983, and for Ronald Reagan, already living through the agony of the

Mideast hostage crisis, they were a final straw. "This cannot continue," Reagan declared, promising to speed delivery of \$128 million in military aid Congress had already approved for El Salvador. "We must act against those who have so little regard for human life and the values we cherish."

A tiny rebel faction, the Central American Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC), claimed responsibility for the attack. "The first American Marines have begun to fall," it gloated in a communiqué. "The Marines killed in the Zona Rosa were not innocent; no Yankee invader is free of guilt." The assassins professed to "lament profoundly" the fact that some Salvadorans had been killed in the gunfire. Nonetheless, they vowed to treat as "military targets" any restaurants or merchants that serve U.S. military personnel.

Losses: Ironically, Salvadoran officials regarded the Zona Rosa massacre as evidence that the war against the leftist rebels was being won. Earlier this month, government troops launched a major offensive in the northeastern department of Morazán, a stronghold of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN) for the past 5½ years. Air Force planes strafed rebel positions as five Army battalions moved in on the ground—and the FMLN was clearly hurt. Captured documents suggested that the rebels were turning to terrorism to recoup their recent losses in the field. Over the past six months the guerril-

las have been responsible for the kidnapping or killing of numerous Salvadoran mayors, bureaucrats and military officers—and U.S. and Salvadoran officials had been warning of an upsurge in urban violence. "The fact that [the guerrillas] have returned to the city is clear proof of their losses in the countryside," said Maj. Carlos Aviles, chief spokesman for the Salvadoran armed forces.

U.S. officials speculated that the rebels may have hoped to goad the Salvadoran government into a repressive backlash. But one official in Washington said, "I think the Salvadorans have come too far to let it happen." Still last week's massacre represented the first time since 1980 that El Salvador's capital had been hit by a crime of such violent proportions—and military officials doubled San Salvador's police protection. If there are other attacks, it seems likely that the city will return to the repressive police control that had been relaxed only in recent years.

Desertions: Military analysts maintain that while the rebels are far from defeated, they have clearly lost their earlier momentum. According to Napoleón Romero, a former guerrilla leader who defected to the government last April, the five main rebel groups have between 6,000 and 7,000 fighters, down sharply from the 9,000 to 10,000 they had in 1983. And while the rebels have large numbers of weapons buried around the countryside, Romero told his interrogators, they are receiving less than half the ammunition they require each month. As a result, say U.S. officials, rebel morale is suffering; desertions are rampant, and some commanders have been forced to take "extreme measures," including executions, to keep their troops in the field.

Simultaneously, U.S. officials say there has been a marked improvement in the effectiveness of the government troops. In June 1984 the FMLN won a significant psychological victory when 1,000 rebels overran the sentry posts at the Cerrón Grande dam and destroyed enough equipment to shut down El Salvador's largest hydroelectric generating station for a month. But more significant was the way in which the government forces managed to drive the rebels away. "The Salvadoran Army reaction was picture perfect," recalls one American official. Improved training and growing experience with guerrilla warfare have brought new and more capable commanders to the top. American trucks and helicopters have greatly increased the Army's tactical mobility, and the government forces are also benefiting from better intelligence. "Certainly nobody's going to put up a signpost that victory is two miles ahead," says a Defense Department analyst. "But the war has been turned around."

The Salvadoran government also seems



Murder alfresco: A gruesome montage of shattered bottles, blood—and American bodies

to be gaining the upper hand politically—at least against the right. Following his unexpectedly strong victory in the General Assembly elections last March, President José Napoleón Duarte has managed to consolidate power and defuse the threat of such extreme right-wing populists as Roberto D'Aubuisson. But he still faces a strong political challenge from militant left-wing labor unions, many of which the government accuses of being infiltrated by the rebels. Whatever the case, the electoral victory gave Duarte more freedom to negotiate

with the guerrillas. Not that the talks will be easy. "He expects [that] it's going to be a long process," says a State Department official, "and that not all the guerrillas will end up on board."

In Washington the secret hope is that lengthy negotiations against a backdrop of increasing government strength will drive a wedge between the rival rebel factions. Still, U.S. officials planned to provide more support. In addition to expediting the military aid, Reagan promised to make available any "additional military assets" the Duarte

government might need. White House spokesman Larry Speakes suggested that the administration might send a group of FBI agents to El Salvador to provide technical help in finding the killers as well as improving the country's overall intelligence-gathering capacity.

Security: Better intelligence will not be enough to safeguard U.S. lives from more terrorist attacks. As was the case with the Americans hijacked in the Mideast, the slain Marines apparently fell victim to lax security. Following the death of Schaufelberger, who was shot as he sat in a car waiting for a girlfriend, the U.S. Embassy warned its personnel to avoid vulnerable spots, such as the sidewalk cafés of the Zona Rosa. Yet the Marine guards were frequently spotted at restaurants such as Chili's. On the night of the shooting, said one witness, the Marines were approached by a young man who chatted with them briefly and then bicycled away. Ten minutes later, the gunmen appeared and opened fire. State Department officials said they found it hard to understand why the Marines did not take greater precautions, particularly since the most recent intelligence reports indicated that the guerrillas might be stepping up their attacks on American military personnel. The Marines "obviously had . . . some sense that there was some safety in a crowd," said American Embassy spokesman Hamilton. But "against people willing to kill so wantonly, there is obviously no protection in a crowd."

While Salvadoran police and military continued to search for clues to the identities of the killers, President Duarte traveled to the Ilopango military airport in El Salvador late last week to watch the flag-draped Marine coffins depart for the United States. "Like brothers," he said, "we have felt the loss of these four men who had come to our country to serve." Assistant Secretary of State Robert Lamb concluded a tearful eulogy by naming the slain Marines. "Sgt. Bobby Dickson, Sgt. Thomas Handwork, Cpl. Patrick Kwiatkowski, Cpl. Gregory Webber," he said, "we are proud of you and we've come to take you home." Ronald Reagan presided over the Marines' emotional arrival at Andrews Air Force Base. "We know that no words can console," he told their grieving families, "but we thank you for your sons."

HARRY ANDERSON with LIZ BALMASEDA in San Salvador and JANE WHITMORE and JOHN WALCOTT in Washington

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01 SAN SALVADOR 8049 DTG: 260343Z JUN 85 PSN: 012365
EOB208 AN009846 TOR: 177/0431Z CSM: HCE635

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DE RUEHSN #8049/01 1770345
O 260343Z JUN 85
FM AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6258

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 08049

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, PTER, ES
SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO MARINE MURDERS: ROLE OF THE
SIU

1. ~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: I SPENT THREE HOURS TODAY WITH PRESIDENT DUARTE AND HIS KEY ADVISORS REVIEWING WHAT WAS KNOWN ABOUT THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE MURDER OF OUR MARINES LAST WEDNESDAY, JUNE 19TH. THE SALVADOREANS HAVE AMASSED A RELATIVELY IMPRESSIVE AMOUNT OF FACTUAL EVIDENCE, AND DUARTE TODAY FULFILLED HIS PROMISE TO PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PUT THE INVESTIGATIVE UNIT TO WORK ON THIS CASE. WE THEN HAD A FURTHER BRIEF DISCUSSION OF WHAT SORT OF ASSISTANCE EL SALVADOR NEEDS FOR ITS POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES, BEFORE TURNING TO AMBASSADOR SHLAUDEMAN AND CONTADORA (SEPTELS). END SUMMARY.

3. PRESIDENT DUARTE ASSEMBLED KEY MEMBERS OF HIS CABINET INCLUDING VICE PRESIDENT CASTILLO CLARAMOUNT, CLOSE ADVISORS TENORIO AND REY PRENDES, DEFENSE MINISTER GENERAL VIDES CASANOVA, VICE MINISTER FOR PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES COL. LOPEZ NUILA, NATIONAL POLICE CHIEF COL. REVELO, AND THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM WORKING ON THE MURDER OF OUR MARINES TO REVIEW INFORMATION ACQUIRED THUS FAR AND OUTLINE STEPS AHEAD. THE COMPOSITION OF THE GROUP MADE CLEAR THAT DUARTE INTENDS TO PURSUE THIS MATTER TO THE FULLEST, BUT TO DO SO WITHIN THE INCREASINGLY ESTABLISHED NON-MILITARY ROLE OF A STRENGTHENED AND RE-FURBISHED POLICE FORCE.

4. THE INFORMATION LAID OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE BRIEFING IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT WHICH HAS BEEN REPORTED BY US THROUGH OTHER CHANNELS (INCLUDING STATE DEPARTMENT SECURITY CHANNEL) RESULTING FROM CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR OWN INVESTIGATIVE TEAM AND THE SALVADORA GROUP.

5. ONE SIGNIFICANT REQUEST WHICH PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKED OF DUARTE DURING THEIR CONVERSATION IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE DEPARTURE OF THE AIRCRAFT BEARING THE BODIES OF OUR MARINES ON JUNE 21ST WAS THAT PRESIDENT DUARTE INSTRUCT THE AID-TRAINED SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE

UNIT (SIU) TO WORK IMMEDIATELY ON THE MARINE MURDERS AS THEIR HIGHEST PRIORITY. PRESIDENT DUARTE AGREED TO DO SO, AND TODAY SIGNED AN ORDER SO INSTRUCTING. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS ACTING AT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REQUEST AND WANTED TO BE CERTAIN THAT THIS WOULD NOT CAUSE THE U.S. PROBLEMS ON ACCOUNT OF THE SIU WORKING UNDER POLICE SUPERVISION AND DIRECTION

6. THIS RAISES TO THE FORE THE NEED TO RESOLVE, AS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE URGENCY, THE RUBE GOLDBERG CONTRAPTION WHICH WAS COBBLED TOGETHER TO CONFORM TO SECTION 660 RESTRICTIONS AGAINST AID ASSISTANCE TO POLICE FORCES. THE INVESTIGATION OF THIS MURDER AND THE WORK OF THIS TEAM HAS OBVIOUSLY GOT TO BE DONE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE POLICE. IN ELICITING AUTHORITY FOR AID TO FUND SIU TRAINING, THE U.S. MANAGED TO ENGINEER AN UNNATURAL ACT BY AGREEING TO THE SELECTION OF INDIVIDUALS FROM WITHIN THE PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES, ASKING THE SALVADOREANS TO DECREE THAT THEY WERE NOT A "POLICE" ENTITY, BUT RATHER WERE UNDER ARMED FORCES CONTROL (WHICH, TECHNICALLY, THEY ARE, SINCE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL COL. REVELO ANSWERS THROUGH/TO VICE MINISTER OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC SECURITY COL. LOPEZ NUILA).

7. FINALLY, THERE WAS A BRIEF BUT IMPASSIONED REQUEST BY DUARTE FOR MORE GENERALIZED HELP FOR HIS POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES: THE INTENTION OF THE COMMUNIST-BACKED GUERRILLAS TO HIT HARD AT UNDEFENDED AND INDEFENSIBLE URBAN CIVILIAN TARGETS HAS BEEN MADE PAINFULLY AND STARKLY CLEAR THROUGH RECENT INTELLIGENCE

ACQUISITIONS. ALTHOUGH EL SALVADOR'S MILITARY IS NOW DOING WELL IN THE FIELDS AND IN THE HILLS, EL SALVADOR'S URBAN POPULATION REMAINS HOPELESSLY VULNERABLE TO THE INCAPACITY OF THE POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES TO DEFEND THEM AGAINST TERROR OF THE SORT WHICH WAS WITNESSED LAST WEDNESDAY NIGHT. DUARTE AND REVELO IMPOURED US TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ABSURDITY OF A POLICE FORCE TRYING TO ENFORCE THE LAW WHILE HAVING NO MEANS OF COMMUNICATION (EITHER SECURE OR NON-SECURE RADIOS), OR ABILITY TO PATROL ITS TERRITORY (REVELO SAID THERE WERE ONLY 22 POLICE VEHICLES IN OPERATING CONDITION ON THE STREETS OF SAN SALVADOR -- A CITY OF MORE THAN 1.5 MILLION PEOPLE -- ON THE NIGHT THE MARINES WERE MASSACRED, NONE OF THEM WITH IN-CAR RADIOS.) IN
BT

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NLS M1402 #6

BY smf, NARA, DATE 7/11/05

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 SAN SALVADOR 08049

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, PTER, ES
SUBJECT: INVESTIGATION INTO MARINE MURDERS: ROLE OF THE

GUERRILLA WARFARE, PARTICULARLY THE VIRULENT URBAN VARIETY, THE POLICE FORCES HAVE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE ALONGSIDE THE MILITARY: THE MILITARY CANNOT AND MUST NOT TAKE ON THE CIVIL FUNCTIONS OF URBAN POLICE WORK. AND AS THINGS STAND NOW, THE POLICE ARE IMPOTENT.

8. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE WILLING TO BEGIN WORKING IMMEDIATELY WITH POLICE DIRECTOR REVELO TO IDENTIFY MOST URGENTLY NEEDED EQUIPMENT (PRINCIPALLY VEHICLES, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND WEAPONS) AND TRAINING, AND WERE PREPARED TO REQUEST APPROVAL AND FUNDING FOR IMMEDIATE PROCUREMENT (DEPARTMENT SHOULD BE AWARE THAT WE HAVE SUBMITTED A REQUEST FOR DOLS SIX MILLION FOR SUCH EQUIPMENT AS PART OF A FY 85 SUPPLEMENTAL).

9. ACTION REQUESTED: WE CLEARLY NEED TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM OF EL SALVADOR'S ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE TO ITS SECURITY AND POLICE FORCES AS A MATTER OF HIGHEST URGENCY. PRESIDENT DUARTE HAS RESPONDED PROMPTLY AND FAITHFULLY TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REQUEST. IN HAVING DONE SO, HE IS CONCERNED THAT HE MAY HAVE BROUGHT THE SIU PROGRAM AND AID AGREEMENTS INTO CONFLICT WITH U.S. LAW. CAN THIS BE RESOLVED BY THE SIMPLE EXPEDIENT OF IDENTIFYING EL SALVADOR AS A COUNTRY ELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE U.S. ASSISTANCE FOR ITS POLICE AND PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES?

PASSAGE

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June 21, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUMMARY OF THE PRESIDENT'S TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH SALVADORAN
PRESIDENT DUARTE

The President spoke to President Duarte from Air Force One. The President followed his talking points closely, expressing appreciation for Duarte's efforts to solve the recent murder of Americans in San Salvador, and offering our support. Duarte thanked the President, emphasized his intent to successfully conclude the investigation, and said he would accept any aid or technical support the U.S. may provide to assist him.

The President raised the issue of special training provided by the U.S. to Salvadoran officers, but Duarte appeared to have misunderstood. He told the President he could use such a unit, and said he would write a letter to the U.S. Congress asking them to give the President "the possibility of helping El Salvador on this criminalistic effort."

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NLS F96-004/1 #74

BY smf NARA, DATE 9/13/99

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Reagan's Telephone Conversation with
President Duarte of El Salvador

21 June 1985; 2:17 pm - 2:25 pm

Note: President Reagan was returning from Texas aboard Air Force One; the call was conducted over open radio frequencies and Duarte was asked by the radio operator to refer to the President by his radio callsign -- Rawhide.

President Duarte: Rawhide? How are you sir?

President Reagan: President Duarte, I'm just fine sir. How are you?

I wanted to thank you for your expression of concern on this tragic event that occurred down there. Be assured this terrorist act will not affect our relationship. As I said before, the terrorists hope they might weaken our resolve or support for the revitalization of democracy that you've brought about down there, but they can't do that. On the contrary, we will redouble our efforts to support shared goals, and are looking at ways that we can speed up assistance and provide any additional assets necessary.

President Duarte: Thank you very much Rawhide, I wanted to tell you that we feel very sorry about this action; we are very much concerned by the death of your four Marines and the two Americans. We know the terrorists are trying to destroy our efforts -- yours and ours. I know that you and I are strong on this line and we will continue working in that direction. Thank God and thank you for all your efforts.

President Reagan: Jose, I know you will be making a thorough investigation into these murders, and this is awfully important for us too. I just wanted you to know we're standing by ready to assist your government in conducting such an investigation, and are prepared to provide all feasible investigative support including the full resources of the FBI and our other intelligence personnel if we can be of help to you.

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BY snf NARA, DATE 7/13/99

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-2-

President Duarte: Yes Rawhide, I had made the public declaration that we will put everything we have, and I have also said that we will ask all the aid possible to find and try to make a thorough investigation. If you can give us the aid and the technical support on this we will be very much grateful. We want to find out how this happened. I think there are people here who know and who have seen the criminals and maybe we can start by making pictures of these people so that we can identify them.

President Reagan: That's wonderful. Listen, there's one area where you can help us to help you. You recall we provided extensive training in murder investigation for a group of your military officers to solve terrorist crimes, but I understand that the legislation and budget have not yet been approved so they can't go into operation. They are a very well-trained unit that could be operational and could be of great help.

President Duarte: Yes, I think we can use this kind of unit, and I will write a letter to Congress of the United States asking them to give you the possibility of helping us on the "criminalistic" effort that we need. I think you might be able to help us on this.

President Reagan: We'll keep in touch and I'll have our people be in touch. We'll do everything we can. Just know that we're with you. I'm having a little difficulty here, I'm in Air Force One on my way back to Washington from Texas, so I guess we can cut this conversation short. It's been good to talk to you and we'll work together as we have on so many other things to solve this.

President Duarte: Mr. President, let me finish up by saying that, you said it once, "they haven't seen nothing yet" -- so the terrorists haven't seen nothing yet.

President Reagan: Alright, good bye and God bless you my friend.

President Duarte: Okay, thank you very much and God bless you too.

President Reagan: Thank you.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: Terrorist Attack in El Salvador

DIA and CIA believe that the Americans were killed by a radical FPL splinter group called the Clara Elizabeth Ramirez Front (CERF).

- o The CERF is a small urban terrorist group, less than 100 members, and has been active in targeting El Salvadoran military officers and officials. It is probably a front of the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), subordinate to the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN)

- o The CERF has a history of assassination attempts:

- May 83: LCDR Schaufelberger, USN assassinated
- Mar 84: Assassination of Constituent Assembly Deputy
- Mar 84: Attempted Assassination of official of Salvadoran Authentic International Party (PAISA)
- Nov 84: Strafed U.S. embassy in El Salvador. Contract guard assassinated.
- Mar 85: Assassination of Salvadoran Minister of Public Affairs.

E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)

None of the FMLN clandestine radio stations have claimed responsibility of the attack that killed 13 persons. Anonymous callers have claimed that the Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers (PRTC) is responsible, DIA and CIA view the claim as very unlikely.

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NLS M 1402 #7
By smf, NARA, Date 7/11/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4995

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 21, 1985

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
RAYMOND F. BURGHARDTSUBJECT: Presidential Telephone Call from His Excellency
Jose Napoleon Duarte, President of the Republic of
El Salvador

President Duarte plans to call President Reagan aboard Air Force One today regarding the terrorist attack and murder of U.S. Marines in El Salvador. Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President for his use during the call. Your memo contains talking points for the President's use.

An important area where we can be of specific assistance is our continuing support for Salvadoran judicial reform. At the request of the Duarte government, we provided intensive training in homicide investigation late last year to a group of Salvadoran officers. It was our understanding that this group would form the core of a special investigative unit to solve crimes of terrorist violence.

Internal difficulties have prevented the enactment of authorizing legislation for this special unit prior to the Salvadoran election in May. Our embassy has reported that the legislation is still before the Legislative Assembly and that, even after it is enacted, the unit will still not be able to begin to function until it is included in the government's budget and various executive orders and administrative regulations are issued.

The President should urge Duarte to take necessary action to get the investigative unit fielded. He should also indicate that we stand ready to be of all possible assistance in his efforts to enhance Salvadoran capabilities to bring to justice to murderers from the violent left and the violent right who are the enemies of democracy in El Salvador.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to the President

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

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NLS F96-0041 #77
BY snf NARA, DATE 9/13/97

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: His Excellency Jose Napoleon Duarte,
President of the Republic of El Salvador

DATE: Friday, June 21, 1985

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

PURPOSE: President Duarte will call to express his sympathy for the four U.S. Marines and two civilians killed in El Salvador June 20, 1985.

BACKGROUND: On June 20, 1985, four U.S. Marines (CPL Bobby Dickson, SGT Thomas Handwork, CPL Patrick Kwiatkowski, and CPL Gregory Weber) and two civilians (George Viney and Robert Alvidrez) were killed when a terrorist group opened fire in a restaurant in El Salvador.

TOPICS OF DISCUSSION:

1. Thank you for your expression of concern on this tragic event. Be assured this terrorist act will not affect our relationship. As I said on June 20, the terrorists hope that such acts will weaken our resolve or support for the revitalization of democracy in El Salvador is futile.
2. On the contrary, we will redouble our efforts to support shared goals. We are looking at ways that we can speed up assistance and provide any additional assets necessary.
3. I know that you will be making a thorough investigation into these murders. This is extremely important also for us. The U.S. Government stands ready to assist your government in conducting such an investigation. We stand prepared to provide all feasible investigative support including the full resources of the FBI and other intelligence personnel.
4. There is one area where you can help us to help you. We provided extensive training in homicide investigation for a group of Salvadoran officers to solve terrorist crimes. I understand that the legislation and budget for this unit have not yet been approved. I hope you will do what is necessary to make this very well-trained unit operational as soon as possible.

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NLS E 96-004/1 428

BY Amf NARA, DATE 9/13/99

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S/S 8518185
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

June 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Murder of Four Marines and Others in San Salvador

At 8:45 p.m. on June 19, four U.S. Marine Security Guards assigned to our Embassy in San Salvador, two U.S. citizen businessmen and approximately nine others were killed by gunmen at a restaurant in San Salvador. Estimates of the number of injured vary from three to over a dozen. The attack was carried out by six to ten terrorists who were dressed in camouflage uniforms riding in a small truck. The gunmen fired at tables outside the restaurant, first at the Marines, then at other tables where Salvadoran civilians were seated and finally at passing traffic. The civilian U.S. citizens killed were employed by Wang Laboratories and were in San Salvador for a business conference. The other civilians killed include both Salvadorans and Guatemalans.

The Embassy security officer reports that all indications are that the Marines were the primary target of the attack. He has added that, in addition to the four who were killed, two other Marines were at the restaurant but escaped unharmed. None of them was armed and there was no armed escort at the scene. The Marines were all dressed in civilian clothes.

So far no group has claimed responsibility for the attack.

Attached is a coordinated statement on this terrorist incident.

Nicholas Platt
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON KILLINGS IN EL SALVADOR

Yesterday, June 19, gunmen in San Salvador murdered four unarmed U.S. Marine Security Guards assigned to our Embassy, two civilian U.S. citizens and some eight non-U.S. citizen civilians. Estimates of the number injured vary from three to over a dozen. The attack on these defenseless men and women was carried out by six to ten terrorists dressed in camouflage uniforms. They fired at the U.S. Marines at a sidewalk cafe and at other tables where Salvadoran and other civilians were seated, and also at passing traffic. While no one has as yet claimed responsibility, this act has all the appearances of the leftist terrorism that has been on the increase in recent months as the guerrillas have been unsuccessful in the countryside.

We condemn this act of barbarism. We extend our condolences to the families of those killed and injured in this criminal act. We honor those Marines who served in the highest tradition of their Corps. This tragic and senseless act underscores the importance of our support for the elected Government of El Salvador and its efforts to overcome violence and terrorism. We will work closely with the Salvadoran government to identify and bring to justice those who perpetrated this cowardly crime.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS 11402 #8

ACTION

By ~~Amf~~ NARA, Date 7/11/05

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Response To Terrorist Acts

Tonight's murder of four Marine embassy guards is ~~probably just~~ the next in what is likely to become a growing litany of violent acts against American citizens unless we quickly change the dynamic. It is probable that many terrorist groups, hostile to U.S. ~~and~~ interests, perceive that we are powerless to exact a penalty for this kind of activity. Our inability to effect a swift outcome in the current Beirut hostage situation will probably beget more brutality unless we do something, and do it quickly in response to what the media is already calling the San Salvador massacre.

The Presidential statement at Tab I is far more than a statement of sorrow over the death of four more of our servicemen. It calls for actions that will both deter future terrorist acts and appease the growing disaffection of the American people over our handling of terrorist activity. The attached statement indicates that the President will:

- E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(c)
- Immediately provide additional assistance (investigative as well as substantive) support to Duarte to find and punish the perpetrators of the El Salvador murders. This would best include FBI and military intelligence [REDACTED]
 - Use his emergency authorities (614c or 501 AECA) to deliver additional security assistance items to El Salvador -- probably aircraft/helicopters.
 - If necessary to prosecute the anti-terror campaign in El Salvador, exceed our self-imposed 55 man limit. The additional military personnel would be used to expedite anti-terror training for the ESAF or, if desired, conduct operations themselves against terrorists.
 - Offer the direct use of U.S. military assets (aircraft/ helos) to support the conduct of ESAF C/T operations.
 - Appoint Vice President Bush to coordinate improvements to both the unilateral U.S. C/T effort and enhancements for U.S./Allied cooperation. This would include steps (both military and other) we can take in concert against terrorist groups and those who support them (Libya, Iran, etc.)

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- Action against the runways at Beirut International Airport which would prevent the take-off of our seized airliner and send an unequivocal signal to radical elements everywhere that we are going to back up our words with deeds. In short, an attack that will demonstrate our forceful intent as well as prevent the airliner from being used in a suicide mission.
- Send a very clear signal to Iran in both word (verbal threat) and deed (bombing the Beirut runway) that we know they are involved in the current Beirut situation (see Tab II) and that the consequences of harming or not releasing our citizens will be military action against them.

There are obvious liabilities in the courses of action proposed in the statement and risks in carrying them out. The Congress is liable to resist strenuously any expansion of our role in El Salvador--particularly an increase in the number of military personnel in-country. There is also the threat incurred by the additional personnel once they arrive in El Salvador. In short, we could be creating a "target rich" environment for Salvadoran terrorists.

The proposal to assign the Vice President the role of "terrorist coordinator" could create expectations that would be unfulfilled and therefore increase public frustration. Perhaps more importantly, it is a role which the Vice President could find to be a long-term political liability.

The strike against the Beirut International Airport runway could cause the most radical elements of Amal and Hizballah to respond by killing our hostages. It may also create significant international opposition, given that it would have to be carried out without advance notice to our allies.

SUMMARY

Despite the risks and liabilities indicated above, the American people clearly expect us to do something significant in the wake of this week's terrorist events. The cable at Tab A provides sufficient evidence of Iranian complicity in the hijacking that military measures against Iran could easily be justified. This news is sure to become public knowledge in the days ahead and add to criticism of the Administration if we fail to act. By responding in both Beirut and El Salvador, we send a clear signal to terrorists worldwide that our capabilities are far greater than we have used to date and that future acts against us will be met forcefully.

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RECOMMENDATION

That you review the attached press statement with Secretary Shultz and the President and urge that it be issued before noon today.

Approve_____

Disapprove_____

Attachments:

Tab I - Draft Presidential Press Statement
Tab A - Cable DIRNSA 1448

SECRET
W/TSC Attached
DECLASS: OADR

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DRAFT PRESIDENTIAL PRESS STATEMENT

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we expedite
the delivery of
directed
Security assistance items
already ordered by
El Salvador
and
are
prepared
to

Last night senseless terrorism again took its toll on Americans, this time in El Salvador. This most recent brutal and mindless terrorist attack which killed four of our Marine Embassy guards and one of our civilian citizens took place at a crowded restaurant in San Salvador. The cowards who perpetrated this attack not only killed Cpl. Bobby Dickson, Sgt. Thomas Handwork, Cpl. Patrick Kwiatkowski, and Cpl. Gregory Weber, they also killed eight and injured twelve other innocent Salvadoran and Guatemalan civilians. This attack, like the bombing earlier yesterday in Frankfurt, Germany is further evidence that the war which terrorists are waging is not only directed against the United States, it is a war against all of civilized western society. This is a war in which innocent civilians are intentional victims and our servicemen have become a particular target. This cannot continue. We must act against those who have so little regard for human life and the values we cherish. And we must do so in concert with other nations who share our democratic institutions and basic disdain for violence or the use of force. We of the western world must act together -- as we once did over a century ago to wipe piracy from the seas, and as we did forty five years ago against the threat of Nazi tyranny.

In response to the death of our Marines and private citizen in El El Salvador I have directed the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defence, with the help of our intelligence services to immediately provide whatever assistance is necessary to President Duarte's government in order to find and punish the terrorists who perpetrated this act. To this end, I have today used my emergency authorities under the Arms Export Control Act to furnish the Salvadoran Armed Forces with additional military assets which will enable them to better prosecute their campaign against the communist guerrillas. Their hope that terrorism will weaken our resolve or support for the revitalization of democracy in El Salvador is futile. If necessary, and if it will be of help to President Duarte in this effort, I will exceed our self imposed limit of 55 military personnel in El Salvador. If other U.S. military assets can be effective in this regard, then I shall provide them. I expect our Congress to support these measures, and will be consulting with the appropriate committees of the Congress on what additional steps can be taken both in El Salvador and to end the external support the Salvadoran terrorists receive from Nicaragua and the communist bloc.

I have also today appointed Vice President Bush to immediately take the lead within the U.S. government and with our allies to determine what actions, military and otherwise, we and our similarly threatened friends can take to end this increasingly violent and indiscriminate affront to humanity. Vice President Bush will report to me on steps we can take, to include action against states which support terrorism and specific terrorist organizations.

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I have also directed that certain steps be taken to prevent further terrorist action arising from the situation in Beirut. Because we received information that those who hold our citizens and airliner in Beirut were planning to use the aircraft for a suicide attack, I ordered that our military forces render the runways at the Beirut International Airport unusable. I will not hesitate to take further such action to prevent additional terrorist activity. Those who support and exercise influence over these terrorists -- and I include the government of Iran -- shall not be immune from similar action if our people are harmed or if release is not forthcoming. I pray that men of reason will prevail in Lebanon and quickly free our people who are being held without reason.

Finally, I want you, the American people to know that I have not taken these measures in a spate of pointless anger. These are measured responses to lawless actions by those who do not abide by the norms of civilized society. As your President and Commander in Chief, I believe that they are appropriate and proportionate to the criminal acts which have been taken against our citizens. Those who are responsible for such lawlessness and those who support it must know that such acts have just and sure consequences. We are a nation of peace -- a people of justice. We are, by our very nature, slow to anger and magnanimous in helping those in less fortunate circumstances. No nation on earth has done more to help others in need. But we also have our limits -- and our limits have been reached. We cannot allow our people to be placed at risk simply because they are blessed in being citizens or servants of this great Republic.

DRAFT



UNCLASSIFIED

June 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Murder of Four Marines and Others in San Salvador

At 8:45 p.m. on June 19, four U.S. Marine Security Guards assigned to our Embassy in San Salvador, two U.S. citizen businessmen and approximately nine others were killed by gunmen at a restaurant in San Salvador. Estimates of the number of injured vary from three to over a dozen. The attack was carried out by six to ten terrorists who were dressed in camouflage uniforms riding in a small truck. The gunmen fired at tables outside the restaurant, first at the Marines, then at other tables where Salvadoran civilians were seated and finally at passing traffic. The civilian U.S. citizens killed were employed by Wang Laboratories and were in San Salvador for a business conference. The other civilians killed include both Salvadorans and Guatemalans.

The Embassy security officer reports that all indications are that the Marines were the primary target of the attack. He has added that, in addition to the four who were killed, two other Marines were at the restaurant but escaped unharmed. None of them was armed and there was no armed escort at the scene. The Marines were all dressed in civilian clothes.

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