

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver: Files
Folder Title: Terrorism Actions: Pending (January 1985)
Box: 49

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

Box Number 49

HAENNI

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136516	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO ROBERT MCFARLANE RE FOLLOW-UP R 9/15/2017 M441/1	2	1/2/1985	B1
136517	LIST	OF US COMPANIES OPERATING IN LIBYA R 9/15/2017 M441/1	2	ND	B1
136518	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO ROBERT OAKLEY ET AL RE FOLLOW-UP PAR 9/15/2017 M441/1	5	12/19/1984	B1
136519	SYLLABUS	FOR TERRORISM COURSE (ANNOTATED) PAR 9/15/2017 M441/1	21	ND	B1
136520	NOTE	AL PADDOCK TO PETER R 9/15/2017 M441/1	1	1/15/1985	B1
136521	MEMO	PADDOCK TO PARKER BORG RE DEVELOPMENT	2	1/11/1985	B1
136522	MEMO	FOR JOHN POINDEXTER RE FOLLOW-UP D 9/15/2017 M441/1	4	1/23/1985	B1
136523	CABLE	300020Z JAN 85 D 9/15/2017 M441/1	2	1/30/1985	B1
136524	MEMO	FOR PRINCIPALS RE TERRORISM D 9/15/2017 M441/1	2	1/31/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

Box Number 49

HAENNI

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
136525	PAPER	RE TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 136524) <i>D 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	5	ND	B1
136526	CABLE	311234Z JAN 85 <i>R 9/15/2017 M441/1</i>	1	1/31/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

11 PRELIMINARY DRAFT

DECLARATION OF THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT MEETING
AT THE WORLD ECONOMIC SUMMIT
ON
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

1. THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT DISCUSSED IN DETAIL THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
2. THEY HAVE TAKEN NOTE OF AN EXTENSIVE SURVEY AND ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM PREPARED JOINTLY BY EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF INTERNAL SECURITY OF THE SEVEN SUMMIT COUNTRIES.
3. THEY NOTE THAT
 - TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE DIRECTED AGAINST FREE FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND SOCIAL ORDERS ALL OVER THE WORLD AND, TO AN INCREASING EXTENT, AGAINST PERSONS AND FACILITIES REPRESENTING THE DEFENCE OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.
 - TO AN INCREASING EXTENT, TERRORIST ACTIVITIES ARE ALSO USED AS A MEANS IN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFLICTS OR FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF OPPONENTS OF POLITICAL REGIMES.
 - THE COMBAT OF TERRORISM IN THE INDIVIDUAL REGIONS REQUIRES VARIOUS MEASURES.
4. THEY STRONGLY CONDEMN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND CONFIRM THEIR DETERMINATION TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS JOINTLY AND RESOLUTELY WHERE NECESSARY.
5. THEY INSTRUCT THEIR EXPERTS
 - TO CONTINUE THE INTENSIVE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON THREAT, EMANATING FROM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE IN THE ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL THREATS,
 - TO CONSIDER ON MORE DETAIL THE PRACTICAL AND POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN FROM SUCH ANALYSIS, IN PARTICULAR WITH REGARD TO THE FOLLOWING ISSUES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT FORMER RESOLUTIONS:
 - POSSIBILITIES OF FURTHER IMPROVEMENTS IN THE COOPERATION OF AUTHORITIES AND AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COMBAT OF TERRORISM IN THE SEVEN SUMMIT COUNTRIES.
 - POSSIBILITIES AND NECESSITY OF A COMMON REPRESENTATION OF INTERESTS AND IMPROVED PROTECTIVE MEASURES AT LOCALES (EMBASSIES ETC) IN ORDER TO COUNTER TERRORIST THREATS MORE EFFECTIVELY.
 - MEASURES COUNTERACTING THE ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITIES BY CERTAIN STATES SPONSORING TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
 - ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE NO ADEQUATE MEANS FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM EFFECTIVELY.
 - FURTHER REACTIONS VIS-A-VIS CERTAIN COUNTRIES WHICH DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY SPONSOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES OR TAKE A CON-
DUCIVE OR AT LEAST INDULGENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERNATIONALLY ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS WITHIN THEIR SPHERE OF INFLUENCE.
 - POSSIBILITIES OF INTENSIFYING FURTHER MEASURES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WHICH PROMOTE THE PREVENTION AND PROSECUTION OF TERRORIST ACTS.
6. THEY HAVE AGREED TO TAKE THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE MEASURES:
 - THEY WILL INTENSIFY MEASURES TO PREVENT THE ENTRY INTO THEIR COUNTRIES OF PERSONS SUSPECTED OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
 - THEY WILL MAKE FULL USE OF ALL INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES AND EXCHANGE CURRENT INFORMATION ON TERRORIST THREATS
 - THEY WILL ENTER INTO CONSULTATIONS WITHOUT DELAY IF A JOINT RESPONSE OR HARMONIZED ACTION OF ALL OR PART OF THE SEVEN SUMMIT COUNTRIES APPEARS TO BE NECESSARY IN VIEW OF A SERIOUS ACUTE TERRORIST THREAT OR A SERIOUS TERRORIST INCIDENT.

ITT World Communications Inc.

ITT World Communications Inc.

BRITISH DELEGATION

List of Participants

David LORD	Head of F5 (Counter-terrorism Branch) Security Service
Nigel BRIND	Secretary, Terrorism Policy Committee Cabinet Office
Jim JACK	Principal Aviation Security Adviser Department of Transport
Roy HARRINGTON	Head of F4 Division (Counter-terrorism Policy) Home Office
Sir Lawrence BYFORD	Chief Inspector of Constabulary Home Office
Kenneth OXFORD	Chief Constable, Merseyside Police (Chairman of the Counter- Terrorist and Allied Matters Sub-committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers)
Colin HEWETT	Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Head of Special Branch Metropolitan Police
Robert INNES	Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Head of A8 Department (Public order) Scotland Yard
Mrs. Veronica SUTHERLAND	Head of Security Department Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Graham BURTON	Head of Security Co-ordination Dept., Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Andrew GREEN	Counselor British Embassy
Nicholas ALSTON	Security Service Representative British Embassy

TENTATIVE PROGRAM SCHEDULE
British Delegation
ANTI-TERRORISM PROGRAM

MONDAY, MARCH 18 - DEPT. OF STATE - RM. 6226

- | | |
|---|--|
| 0915 - Official Welcome | Ambassador Spiers |
| 0925 - Review of US Government
Organization for countering
terrorism | Ambassador Spiers
or Oakley |
| 1000 - Coffee break | |
| 1015 - Joint meeting with Inter-
Departmental Group on
Terrorism | |
| 1230 - Lunch | Natl. Academy of Sciences
Hosted by Amb. Spiers |
| 1430 - Organization and Training for
Physical Security and Crisis
Management Abroad | Mr. Fields and Col. Mabry |
| 1600 - Security Cooperation with US
Business | Mr. Lamb |
| 1700 - End of program | |

TUESDAY, MARCH 19 - DEPT. OF STATE - RM. 7516

- | | |
|---|-----------------------|
| 0915 - Terrorist threat assessment
with USG intelligence com-
munity | INR, CIA, SY/TAG, DIA |
| 1045 - Coffee break | |
| 1100 - Terrorist trends and policy
response including terrorist
threat to NATO personnel and
facilities and specific
terrorist threats (e.g. IRA) | British delegation |
| 1230 - Lunch | To be arranged |
| 1400 - Terrorist psychology | Dr. Blum |
| 1530 - Middle East Terrorism and How
To Combat It | CIA |
| 1700 - End of program | |

(+CIA?)

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 20

0900 - Terrorism in the US FBI
0930 - Tour of FBI Command Center FBI
1000 - Computer data bases FBI
1030 - Handling of terrorist threat FBI
 in the US
1100 - Discussion of lessons learned FBI
 from St. James' Square
 incident (British delegation)
1200 - Lunch (To be determined)
Afternoon - Observation of Hostage Recovery Team FBI Academy
1700 - End of program

THURSDAY, MARCH 21

0830 - Aviation security and tour of FAA
 FAA Command Center
1015 - Depart for Dept. of Treasury
1030 - Measures to prevent terrorism Treasury
 including tracing of funds
 (Customs, ATF, etc.)
1300 - Lunch (To be determined)
1500 - Security measures taken for Dept. of State
 1984 Olympic games with Los Rm. 1205
 Angeles Police Dept. and FBI
1700 - End of program
1900 (Approx.) Depart via shuttle to New York

FRIDAY, MARCH 22

All day - Program with New York City Police Department
1600 - End of program

RECEIVED 04 DEC 84 18

TO POINDEXTER

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
FROM NORTH OF NORTH HILL, C
DATE 30 NOV 84
18 DEC 84
02 JAN 85

AL 5/14/12

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP TO EUROPEAN TALKS ON TERRORISM

ACTION: FOR SIGNATURE

DUE:

STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSC/FID

(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

North	-	1/2/85	Reaper/Reed State memo	
	S	1/2/85	Any action necessary	

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



ES SENSITIVE
8500017
United States Department of State

136516

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II
91210 add-on

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

January 2, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Follow-up to the European Talks
on Terrorism: Reply to NSC Memo of December
19, 1984

The status of those items assigned to the Department of State for action is as follows:

1. Bonn Declaration. The FRG has agreed to call a meeting on terrorism on January 24-25 of experts from the Summit Seven Governments to consider, inter alia, revitalizing the Bonn Declaration on hijacking. Both the FRG and HMG agree with our idea of a sort of sliding scale and a fixed time period for sanctions, and we hope to get an agreement in principal on our ideas at the Summit Seven experts meeting. The UK and FRG are also pressing hard for agreement by the USG at the January 24-25 meeting to allow them to drop sanctions imposed upon Afghan Ariana Airlines three years ago.

2. Public Diplomacy. The State Department is developing plans through the IG/T to improve public understanding of the threats of terrorism and generate increased support for more effective counter-terrorism measures, both at home and abroad. The plans call for close coordination with the CIA and USIA and consultations with friendly governments on foreign programs, as well as with private experts on both foreign and domestic programs.

3. Joint US-UK Paper on PIRA, NORAIID, etc. The UK is completing an initial draft of this paper, to be given to the Department of State for any revisions deemed desirable as well as "translation" into American English in order to remove all traces of the paper's British origin. HMG is particularly insistent that the paper appear as a completely "made in America" product with no reference to a UK connection.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M44111 #136516
BY BW NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

4. Research and Development. Discussions have taken place within the Technical Support Working Group of the IG/T on the aerial terrorist threat, long-delay explosives and other possible joint R&D efforts. We are awaiting a specific response from the UK to our discussions with them on the first two topics, on VIP protection and on a more general exchange program. The UK has designated its Minister of Defense as the preferred channel for R&D exchanges and we are making like arrangements on the US side.

5. Nuclear/Chemical Terrorism is also a R&D item which was discussed within the Technical Support Working Group. It is their recommendation (with which we concur) that a working level team consisting of one officer from M/CTP, NEODF Indian Head, DOE/NEST and DOD/R&D meet with their counterparts in the UK, determine whether we already complement or supplement each other and draw up a realistic assessment of our respective strengths and weaknesses. This first meeting would be strictly at the working level, designed to gather information which, in turn, would be the basis for recommendations for an action program. M/CTP has begun discussions with the Embassy in Washington and is awaiting their reply suggesting dates for the first meeting.

6. US Companies in Libya. On December 13 the Secretary of State issued a statement reaffirming the position of the United States Government that US citizens not travel to Libya. Consideration is being given to what additional economic control measures might be feasible and effective. A preliminary list of companies which have been active in Libya is attached.



Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR

A

136517 3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

US COMPANIES OPERATING IN LIBYA

1. Amerada Hess--\$400 million in assets and 430,000 b/d in oil production.
2. Marathon " " "
3. Conoco " " "
- ****Amerada Hess, Marathon and Conoco are the US members of the OASIS partnership.
4. Occidental--perhaps \$300 million in assets and 100,00 b/d of oil production.
5. Brown and Root--at least \$400 million in contracts as general manager for the GMRP.
6. Price Brothers--\$300-400 million in supply contracts for the GMRP.
7. Bechtel-- via Arabian Bechtel involved in several projects including GMRP.
8. Superior--oil services.
9. Haliburton--oil services.
10. Pool-Intairdril--oil services.
11. Beda--oil services.
12. C. F. Welco--oil services.
13. Boeing--major supplier to Libyan national airlines before 1982.
14. Christian--oil services.
15. IDC--oil services.
16. US Food Development Corporation--agricultural and development.
17. Charter Oil--60,000 b/d oil contract cancelled in June 1984.
18. Coastal Corporation--probably still taking up to 150,00 b/d of oil.
19. Kaiser Engineers and Constructors--a subsidiary of Raymond International.
20. McGaughy, Marshall, McMillan and Holmes & Narver (Consultant Firm Joint Venture)--Housing Development.
21. Stone and Webster
22. US-El Paso Company--oil and gas services.
23. Scientific Design-- (New York)
24. Foster Wheeler Italiana (US owned company based in Milan) oil industry.
25. M W Kellogg Company--mining.
26. Woodward-Clyde Consultants--\$6 million geotechnical work for GMRP.
27. Banker's Trust--a major US correspondent bank for Libya.
28. A number of US banks have loaned money to South Korean firms building the GMRP, including Citicorp, Continental, Illinois and First National Bank of Chicago -- all have loaned at least \$9 million each.
29. General Electric--was to have some dealings in Libya but confirmation is not available.
30. Sofec, Inc.--US subsidiary of British firm Vickers, Ltd., was to supply \$40 million in mooring equipment.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M4411 #136517
BY fw NARA DATE 9/15/17

4

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OTHER FIRMS WHICH HAVE REQUESTED EXPORT LICENCE OR MAY BE
INVOLVED IN LIBYA TO SOME EXTENT

Taylor Instruments
A.D. Smith
Rosemont
Gould Modicon
CATCO
Bristol
Leed and Northrup
Hewlett Packard
ISSC
Research LTD.
Robertshaw Controls
Systronics
Forney Engineering
Honeywell
Fisher Controls
Foxboro
Bailey's Controls
UDP Process Division
Beekman Instruments

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

B

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

4 copies, please

UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Date DEC 18 1984

Subject: TERRORISM TALKS

CLASSIFICATION:

☐ TOP SECRET

☒ SECRET

☐ CONFIDENTIAL

☐ UNCLASSIFIED

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

_____ Judge Clark	_____ Cmdr. Dur	_____ Mr. Lord	_____ Mr. Raymond	_____ Cmdr. Thompson
_____ Mr. McFarlane	_____ Mr. Fontaine	_____ Ltc. Linhard	_____ Ms. Reger	_____ Mr. Tyson
_____ Adm. Poindexter	_____ Mr. Fortier	_____ Mr. Manfredi	_____ Mr. Robinson	_____ Mr. Weiss
_____ Sit. Room	_____ Mr. Helm	_____ Mr. Martin	_____ Gen. Russell	_____ Mr. Wettering
_____ Mr. Bailey	_____ Mr. Kemp	_____ Mr. Matlock	_____ Col. Rye	_____ Exec. Secretary
_____ Mr. Brazil	_____ Mr. Kraemer	_____ Mr. McMinn	_____ Mr. Sapia-Bosch	_____ NSC Secretariat
_____ Mr. Beal	_____ Mr. Laux	_____ Mr. Morris	_____ Mr. Sigur	_____ NSC Registry
_____ Ltc. Childress	_____ Mr. C. Lehman	_____ Col. Myer	_____ Capt. Sims	_____ NSC Admin.
_____ Ltc. Cobb	_____ Mr. R. Lehman	_____ Mr. North	_____ Mr. Shull	_____ NSC MSG Center
_____ Mr. De Graffenreid	_____ Mr. Levine	_____ Mr. Pollock	_____ Mr. Sommer	
_____ Ms. Dobriansky	_____ Col. Lilac	_____ Mr. Poe	_____ Mr. Teicher	

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION:

CYS

Date

Time

Received/Signed For By:

THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
Exec sec/Room 7241
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
Main Bldg/Room 3422
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, ACDA
Room 5933/Dept. of State
CHAIRMAN US START DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
CHAIRMAN US INF DELEGATION
C/o ACDA, 5933 State
DIRECTOR, CIA
Langley, Va/or Pickup
CHAIRMAN, JCS
The Pentagon
DIRECTOR, OMB
Room 252 OEOB
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS
Room 6333, State Dept.
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
14th & Const. Ave. NW, Room 5851
THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY
GA257, Forrestal Bldg
DIRECTOR, AID
Room 5942, Dept. of State
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Dept. of Justice, Room 5119
DIRECTOR, OSTP
Room 360, OEOB
DIRECTOR, USIA
400 C Street, S.W.
THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR
18th & E. Street NW
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
Independence & 14th SW
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Room 209 Winder Bldg 17 & F St NW
THE DIRECTOR, FEMA
500 C Street
DIRECTOR, DMSPA
Room 3E813, Pentagon

ORIGINAL

1

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

Page 1 of 1 Pages

~~SECRET~~SYSTEM II
91210

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 19, 1984

~~SECRET~~

State Dept. review completed

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY
Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism
and Emergency Planning
Department of State

25X1

[REDACTED]
Deputy Chief of Counter-Terrorism, Paramilitary,
Narcotics Staff
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Follow-up to the European Talks on Terrorism (S)

During our talks in London and Paris on November 13 and 14, 1984, several issues were raised which require follow-up action on our part. Others necessitate additional contact with British and/or French counterparts for a further assessment of their views. (S)

From the discussions in both countries, it is obvious that they want expanded [REDACTED] exchanges on terrorism, particularly regarding the Middle East. [REDACTED] should obtain the reaction in both capitals to the papers provided and solicit their specific views on:

25X1

25X1

25X1

- the Soviet role in supporting terrorism; and
- the Eastern European supply of arms to terrorists--Gray Arms market. (S)

Officials in both countries also expressed interest in developing technology on visa control and photographic computerized-identification. The Department of State, through the IG/T should take the lead in working with the appropriate USG agencies to stimulate a bilateral or even multilateral effort in this regard. (C)

The following additional issues are relevant to the discussions in each country. The State Department and CIA should coordinate as indicated on each of the actions and ensure that appropriate USG agencies are responsive to these requirements:

United Kingdom

25X1

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

~~SECRET~~

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2012/01/18 : NLR-753-113-2-2-2

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLR 114411 #136518


BY fw NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

2

- o Bonn Declaration. Both the U.S. and UK agreed that the Bonn anti-hijacking accord would be strengthened if sanctions imposed by the group had a finite limit. Such a fixed period "limit of liability" should improve willingness to use the convention and also offers a means of lifting sanctions imposed upon Ariana airlines in the future. The State Department should take the lead in coordinating this effort. (C)

o



25X1

- o Joint U.S./UK Paper. Both governments agreed to cooperate on producing a paper which will serve as a "baseline" document on Irish terrorism. The objective of the paper is to develop a common understanding of the Irish terror problem in all its dimensions. The formulation of this paper should serve as an opportunity to clarify points raised in the UK Aide Memoire on cooperation with respect to the IRA. The State Department should coordinate with Treasury, FBI, and CIA on terms of reference and serve as the USG coordinating agency for the development of the paper. (S)
- o Research and Development. The UK expressed appreciation for our technical assistance teams and indicated a desire to pursue further joint endeavors and R&D efforts. The State Department should coordinate with the appropriate USG agencies on the following initiatives:
 - aerial terrorist threats;
 - VIP protection (Secret Service/Special Branch exchange); and
 - further work on long-delay explosives (including BATF capabilities).

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

3

- o Nuclear/Chemical Terrorism. In discussions with Sir Robert Armstrong, he urged that we explore measures that will improve our protection against nuclear, chemical, and biological terrorist attacks. The State Department should take the lead in working with DOD, CIA, and the Center for Disease Control on measures we can take jointly with the British on this matter. (S)

France

- o Security in Beirut. Both Saulnier and Lacoste indicated that the principal security problem in Beirut rests in the unreliability of the LAF and our local hire security force. Lacoste noted that all involved were subject to being bribed by terrorists. CIA, in coordination with the State Department, is requested to evaluate the claims made by the French and propose options. (S)
- o French Information on Terrorists. Bonnet described a number of terrorist organizational relationships and activities which we have not seen previously reported. The CIA is requested to evaluate the following comments made by Bonnet, determine, to the extent feasible, their validity and where appropriate, suggest courses of action:

--

--

--

25X1

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~

4

- o U.S. Paper on Anti-French Terrorism. Bonnet seemed to believe that French citizens property and interests are less threatened today than in the past. This appears to contradict the terrorist threat to the French characterized in the paper on this subject prepared for the trip. The CIA is requested to amplify on the data/conclusions in this paper

25X1

- o Soviet Role in MidEast Terrorism. During discussions with Lacoste, he described several instances of Soviet support for terrorist activity in Lebanon that we have heretofore not seen reported. The CIA is requested to determine, to the extent feasible, the validity of the following allegations made by Lacoste:

25X1


- o U.S. Companies in Libya. Lacoste noted that a major U.S. construction company was still active in a Libyan fresh water project. The Department of State, in cooperation with other appropriate USG agencies, is requested to prepare a list of U.S. companies currently active in Libya. (C)

~~SECRET~~~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

5




25X1



25X1

25X1



A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "J. M. Poindexter".

J. M. Poindexter
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Course Director

COL David J. Andre
Room 145
Phone: ~~693-8587~~
475-1976

Course Secretary

Brenda Allen
Room 132
Phone ~~693-8587~~ new #

Course Librarian

Nancy Jemiola
Room 304
Phone ~~693-8514~~ new #

This document contains educational material designed to promote discussion by students of the National War College. It does not necessarily reflect the views of the National Defense University or the Department of Defense.



DRAFT

136519
C4 for:
Genl Dille North
NSC staff

UNIT V

DEFENSE POLICY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

COURSE FOUR

TERRORISM

15-17 April 1985

SYLLABUS AND READINGS

The National War College

Academic Year 1984-1985

DAVID J. ANDRE
Colonel, USA
Course Director

GEORGE E. THIBAUT
Captain, USN
Chairman, Department
of Military Strategy

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M441/L #136519

BY FW NARA DATE 9/15/17

136519

The morning's events on 17 April would go generally as follows:

0815: MG Rice arrives at Theodore Roosevelt Hall, Fort McNair, and has coffee with the Commandant (MG Perry Smith, USAF) and the other members of the panel.

0830: The group moves to Arnold Auditorium. The panel members take their seats on the platform. About 180 students and faculty are present.

I make introductions and then invite each panel member to make a 15-minute presentation on the subject.

0915: The panel and the audience take a 15-minute coffee break in the rotunda. The students have a chance to meet the panel members.

0930: All return to the auditorium for question and answer period.

1000: Adjournment.


1015: Students go to seminar rooms to discuss the topic and the panel presentation.

We can secure the auditorium for discussion of information up to Top Secret. (Mr. McMahon, the Deputy DCI, found it quite satisfactory recently for his presentation.) Let me know your desires on this.

Olle -
What do
you
think?

I am still refining the syllabus, particularly the issues for discussion. Some of them will come out of the readings, still under development, and some will come out of the panel discussion. If MG Rice can participate, it's his call as to what he can/will say. We don't expect him to address all the issues in the syllabus. In spite of its tentativeness, the draft syllabus will at least give you a sense of where I am in the process of developing this block. I have to go to press with the syllabus in the third week of January, so if you wish to make input for improvements I need to receive them at your earliest convenience. The details on MG Rice's participation, the membership of the panel, etc., can be nailed down later.

Summing up, what I really need is your support in gaining MG Rice's agreement to participate in our program, your advice on the makeup of the panel (or whether you think MG Rice would rather go alone), and a professional's view of the syllabus and overall program content. Your assistance would be greatly appreciated. You can reach me at the following new number: 475-1976.



DAVID J. ANDRE
Colonel, USA
Department of Military
Strategy



NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

NWMS

19 December 1984

Colonel Larry Duggan (USA)
Joint Special Operations Agency
Organization of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff
Room 2C840 Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Colonel ~~Duggan~~ ^{Larry}:

As LTC Lauren Rodway may have mentioned to you, I'm now getting down to cases on fleshing-out a three-day course on terrorism for use in the core curriculum here at the National War College. To that end, I've developed a draft schedule and syllabus, copies of which are enclosed for your information (and comment, if you wish to do so).

Topics 3 and 5 should be of particular interest to you, and they are related in that Topic 3 addresses overall national policy, whereas Topic 5 focuses more directly on anti/counterterrorism.

With respect to Topic 3, I've already been in touch with LTC Tom McHugh and Lynn Rylander in Noel Koch's office, and hope to hear from them by early January. Wayne Gilbert from the FBI is already on board, and I plan to contact AMB Oakley's office in the next day or so. I've already been told that we can expect him to be very supportive.

I've been struggling with Topic 5. Besides the sensitivity of the topic, there are very few people capable of talking to it authoritatively. I'm not interested in bringing the various "experts" from around town and elsewhere who are so far removed from what is going on that they can't have much to say of value. I can't think of anyone better qualified to speak to it than is MG Rice, and he gets very high marks from many people I've spoken with. So I'm writing to ask your support in helping us arrange for a visit by MG Rice.

In the interest of taking some of the heat off him and also giving the students the opportunity to be exposed to still other views and perspectives on the subject, I thought of having MG Rice participate as a member of a two or three person panel. My general concept is to invite MG Rice to share the platform with, say, LTG Leroy Manor and LTG Sam Wilson on the morning of Wednesday 17 April. If you have any other thoughts on possible panel members (in the case that one of these men cannot participate, or even better options), please let me know.

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000

FROM: COL David Andre

DATE: 18 Dec 84

TO: COL Larry Duggan

Larry
I think you were called by the War Gaming and Simulation Center people to tell you that the War College decided to go without a simulation exercise on terrorism this year.

The War College Dean and Commandant, after hearing from the gamers that it would be a cliff-hanger in readying a game for this year, decided to go along with a recommendation from my department chairman to forego the game this year.

The gamers and I are at work on a concept for a good game next year. As soon as we think we have enough to make a visit worthwhile, I'll send you whatever I have in writing and set up a time at your convenience to discuss it with you.

Best wishes,

DAVID
DAVID J. ANDRE
COL IN
475-1976



JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

4 January 1985

Colonel David J. Andre (USA)
Department of Military Strategy
National Defense University
National War College
Washington, D.C. 20319

Dear Colonel ^{Dave} Andre:

Appreciate your letter of 19 December giving us an early look at your proposed three day block of study on terrorism. First, let me say that MGen Rice accepts your offer to participate in a panel discussion. He realizes the value of, and fully supports, providing War College students the most up to date information on national policy and initiatives to combat terrorism. We believe, however, that your students would benefit more from a panel of individuals who are currently involved in developing and implementing the national policy on combatting terrorism. ~~_____~~ recommendation is to have the panel comprised of MGen Rice, ~~_____~~ North from the NSC, and a representative from th ~~_____~~ These three individuals would provide a balanced forum fully cognizant of current policy.

Regarding the syllabus we reviewed the five-topic curriculum and believe that it will provide your students with the appropriate level of knowledge necessary to understand the important national policy issues and considerations. I recommend that you preface this block of study on terrorism with a review and discussion of the more general topic: low intensity conflict. - Combating terrorism is really a subset of this special operations mission area. At present we are seeing the Soviets and their surrogates exporting terrorism to achieve their national objectives--one of the most important being subverting our access to the Third World. Leading into the block of study on terrorism with a look at the Soviet threat in low intensity conflict, and our emerging recognition of the importance of a strong US commitment to countering that threat, should give your students a more realistic awareness of the total picture.

will
do in
my
lecture.
A

Thank you once more for turning to us for an input on your proposed syllabus. We appreciate the effort and stand ready to assist whenever you need our help. Please contact LtCol Rodway at 697-8583, to work out the details on MGen Rice's visit once the plans are finalized.

L. W. DUGGAN
Colonel, USA
Chief, Special
Operations Division

NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319-6000

FROM: COL David Andre, NWC

DATE: 15 Jan 85

TO: LTCOL Ollie North, NSC Staff

DJA

Thanks for your willingness to support our program on terrorism.

Attached are the following:

- My letter to Larry Duggan, including a draft of my syllabus (under revision)
- Larry's reply.

This should help in providing you with some context for what we are about here. MG Smith (Commandant) is committed to have a good program, and I'm laboring mightily to do my Infantry best in giving him what he wants. If you have any suggestions for this year or for the future, please let me know.

Thanks again.

Best Wishes,
[Signature]
David J. Andre
COL USA
Dept Military Strategy
475-1976

TERRORISM

15-17 April 1985

Contents

- | | |
|---------|--|
| Topic 1 | Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare |
| Topic 2 | Terrorist Profiles |
| Topic 3 | U.S. Policy Relating to Terrorism |
| Topic 4 | Countering Terrorism |
| Topic 5 | U.S. Requirements and Capabilities for
Combatting Terrorism |

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism was treated as just a nuisance for many years. Now it's clear that it is the new mode of warfare, and worthy of study in strategic terms.

Yonah Alexander
Director, Institute for Studies
in International Terrorism

Of the three major forms of military conflict -- strategic nuclear warfare, conventional warfare, and insurgency -- insurgency is, as we have seen, the most common in today's world. In the most fundamental sense, insurgency involves some sort of crisis of political legitimacy. Notwithstanding its basically political nature, insurgency has its violent aspects, which we can think of as forms of warfare.

Three forms of warfare have been associated with insurgent conflicts: terrorism, guerrilla war, and conventional warfare. During the past decade, the rapid rise of both insurgent- and state-sponsored terrorism from a nuisance to what is now acknowledged to be a growing menace has changed the way countries think about their national security and changed the way informed observers view the study of political/military and international affairs. In view of this change and the unique problems that terrorism poses, special attention will be devoted to a study of the nature of the threat and to efforts aimed at coping with it.

Topic 1
Monday
15 April 1985
0830-1130
(LD)

Lecturer: Col David André

Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare

State sponsored terrorism is an important part of
the spectrum of conflict

Report of the DOD Commission on
Beirut International Airport Terrorist
Act, October 23, 1983
(Report of the Long Commission)

Terrorism is, by its very nature, war in the shadows;
therefore, it is a particularly difficult subject to
shed light upon.

Neil C. Livingstone
The War Against Terrorism

A terrorist is anyone the British do not like.

A Boston Irishman speaking on British
television

There is no excuse for misuse of the term "terrorism,"
which has become of late a synonym for almost every form
of violence short of nuclear war.

Walter Laqueur
Terrorism

A. General:

The conceptual model on the cover of your syllabus suggests the possibility of multiple types of warfare occurring simultaneously, or in a complementary fashion, across the continuum of conflict and intensity. Terrorism, particularly state-sponsored or supported terrorism, must be viewed as an integral component not only of low-intensity warfare but also of other forms of conflict. The reason for this is that terrorism respects no geographical or conceptual boundaries; neither can it be assumed away as an inconsequential threat at any level of conflict intensity. In an age when both nuclear warfare and high-intensity conventional conflict, even between nations not considered major powers, are viewed as potentially so destructive and expensive as to deter ever more effectively their occurrence, low-intensity conflict, including terrorism, is becoming the mode of choice when violent means are resorted to in advancing political aims. The implications for national security policy, military strategy, force structure, and other supporting programs are potentially of great consequence, particularly in a resource-constrained environment, where budgets tend to be viewed in zero-sum terms. Of perhaps even more fundamental importance, there is the likelihood that the distinction between war and peace will become increasingly elusive. In this lesson, then, terrorism is viewed as a special mode of warfare deserving of the studied attention of the national security professional.

B. Learning Objectives:

1. To distinguish terrorism from other forms of violence.
2. To understand terrorism in strategic terms, in particular its place in the spectrum of conflict.
3. To understand global patterns in acts of terrorism, especially those directed against U.S. citizens.

C. Required Readings:

1. Secretary of State George Schultz. "Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies." Address before the Jonathan Institute's Second Conference on International Terrorism, (Washington, D.C., June 24, 1984) (Current Policy, No. 589).
2. William Regis Farrell. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982.) Chapter 2, "Terrorism Is . . .?" pp. 6-18.

3. Charles Maechling, Jr. "What Terrorism Is and Isn't." New York Times, (June 27, 1984), p. 27.

4. United States Department of State. "Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1983," (September 1984), pp. 2-10 (scan pp. 11-20).

5.
D. Supplementary Readings:

1. Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977). Chapter XII, "Terror and Terrorism: Concepts, Characteristics and Typology," pp. 47-64.

(2.) Jeffrey W. Wright. "Terrorism: A Mode of Warfare." Military Review (October 1984), pp. 35-45.

E. Issues for Discussion:

1. How would you characterize the general pattern of terrorism acts in terms of geographical distribution around the globe; type of incident (e.g., bombing, hijacking), citizenry of the victims, and occupation of the victims (e.g., military, diplomatic)?

2. What kinds of changes in the strategic environment might help explain the rise in terrorist activity? In turn, how might the success of terrorism feed-back to bring about still further changes?

3. To be considered a true mode of warfare, terrorism should have a political objective and a military objective. What are they (or, give some examples)?

4. Why might terrorism be considered a strategic weapon? Why should it be of strategic concern to the United States?

5. Can terrorism, alone, be decisive?

6. International lawyers distinguish between two bodies of law -- laws for peacetime and laws for wartime conditions; thus, the basis for the legitimacy of certain acts in wartime that, in time of peace, could be considered criminal. How is terrorism, particularly international terrorism, to be understood in this regard?

7. What is the future of terrorism?

Topic 2
15 April 1985
1330-1500
(L)



Terrorist Profiles

You think it's absurd that I should go out and shoot a man just because I'm ordered to? That's your bourgeois mentality. Don't you think it's absurd that you're ordered to go out and write an article?

An anonymous member of Italy's Red Brigades, to the Roman weekly, Panorama.

What mattered most was not so much the identity of their corpse as its impact on their audience. . . . to stir an anguished dread. "Kill One, Frighten Ten Thousand" is an elementary premise of guerrilla warfare. "Punish One, Frighten One Hundred" was Lenin's way of putting it.

Claire Sterling, The Terror Network

A. General:

It is a commonplace that in order to deal effectively with a problem -- any problem -- one must first understand its critical dimensions; thus, the need to better understand terrorism as a phenomenon (or, more correctly, as a collage of phenomena) and the terrorist as its practitioner. As with any complex issue -- and terrorism certainly is that, not to say highly politically and emotionally charged as well -- it is helpful to be able to rely on theories, models, or other aids to understanding in order to bring some intellectual order to informational chaos. Unfortunately, the state of the art here as it applies to terrorism and to terrorists is, at present, inadequate to our needs. Although our knowledge of the general subject is expanding rapidly, at least in terms of the amount of information available, much more research needs to be done before we can be confident that we can answer adequately even the most basic questions. This lesson aims at illuminating what we do know, pointing out gaps in our understanding, and considering the relevance of both in trying to come to grips with a security issue of current relevance and growing importance.

B. Learning Objectives:

1. To understand the conditions or factors, beyond changes in the general strategic environment, that seem to contribute to the emergence and growth of terrorism.
2. To understand what is known (and presently unknown, or even unknowable) about the personalities, social and cultural backgrounds, and motivations of terrorists.
3. To develop insights into the modus operandi of a terrorist (individual or organization), the degree of success that has been achieved in executing various missions, and expectations for change in the future.
4. To appreciate the implications of what is known about the psychology of the terrorist and terrorism for developing responses to this threat.

C. Required Reading:

Claire Sterling. The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981). Chapter 8, "Carlos," pp. 131-49.

D. Supplementary Readings:

1. Neil C. Livingstone. The War Against Terrorism. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). Chapter 3, "Terrorist Profile: The Secret Lives of Terrorists," pp. 31-56.

2. Maynard Wolf Shelley and Felix Moos. A Theory of Terrorism for the Late Twentieth Century. (Lawrence, Kansas: University of Kansas, 1984). Chapter 22, "Why Does Terrorism Exist?," pp. 126-31.

3. Claire Sterling. The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981). Chapter 7, "The Palestinians Come to Europe," pp. 113-130.

E. Issues for Consideration:

1. Why is understanding terrorism an historical and philosophical, as well as a scientific, task?

2. What seems to motivate the individual terrorist?

3. Can terrorism be characterized usefully in terms of a "terrorist personality" or "phenotype?" Why?

4. What goal(s) do terrorist groups appear to have in common?

5. What vulnerabilities do terrorists, as individuals and organizations, and terrorism, as a mode of conflict, seem to have?

Topic 3
Tuesday
16 April 1985
0830-1130
(PD)

Panel:

AMB Oakley (tentative)
Noel Koch (confirmed)
Wayne Gilbert (")

U.S. Policy Relating to Terrorism

But the revolution does require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its end by all methods at its disposal -- if necessary by an armed uprising; if required by terrorism.

Leon Trotsky, Terrorism and
Communism

We must reach a consensus in this country that our responses should go beyond passive defense to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation.... The public must understand before the fact that there is potential for loss of life of some of our fighting men and the loss of life of some innocent people.

Secretary of State George Schultz

As soon as men decide tht all means are permitted to fight an evil, then their good becomes indistinguishable from the evil that they set out to destroy. Their subordination of morals to politics, the reign of terror and the technique of propaganda and psychological aggression can be used by any power or party that is bold enough to abandon moral scruples and plunge into the abyss.

Christopher Dawson
The Judgement of Nations

We can get so lost in humanitarian concerns as a nation, we could float off into oblivion.

Nelson Rockefeller

A. General:

As the events of the past year or so have served vividly to remind us, deciding what to do about terrorism -- in substantive terms -- could well serve as a useful generic case study in understanding the functioning of a liberal democratic state, in this case the United States. Given the seriousness of the threat posed by terrorist action, high on the nation's agenda should be the goal of deciding upon an effective national policy for combatting terrorism. Without sound policy to guide action, the finest human qualities, and the best strategems, techniques, and tools, can represent no more than potential capacity. There must be some rational relationship between ends and means. The evidence suggests, however, that we have some distance to travel as a society before the matter is resolved -- if, indeed, it can ever be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. The reasons for this, including an addressal of the forces that must be weighed and balanced in working toward a coherent, workable national policy, and all that flows from it, is the subject of this lesson.

B. Learning Objectives:

1. To understand current U.S. national policy relating to anti/counterterrorism and develop a critically analytical appreciation for what it seems to imply.
2. To understand the U.S. position on "international terrorism," who is sponsoring it, and what can be done about it in terms of applying the various instruments of statecraft (e.g., economic, diplomatic, military).
3. To appreciate the nature of domestic political, diplomatic, security, legal, and other factors that have impacted and continue to exert influence on the policymaking process.
4. To learn of the extent to which the insights and recommendations from recent studies and commissions empaneled to look into terrorist incidents have been considered in current policy, strategy, and programs, with particular focus on the DOD Commission on the Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983 (Report of the Long Commission).
5. To understand how the United States handles terrorist incidents, whether in the U.S. or on foreign soil.

C. Required Readings:

1. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 20 December 1983 (Report of the Long Commission). Part Nine, "Terrorism," Sections I-III, pp. 122-29.
2. Secretary of State George Schultz. "Terrorism and the Modern World." Address before the Park Avenue Synagogue, (New York, October 25, 1984) (Current Policy, No. 629).
3. Neil C. Livingstone. The War Against Terrorism. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). Chapter 10, "A New U.S. Policy to Control and Suppress Terrorism," pp 241-261.

D. Supplementary Readings:

Claire Sterling. The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism. (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1981). Chapter 13, "The Magnetic Poles (I): Cuba," pp. 247-57; Chapter 14, "Qaddafi, The Daddy Warbucks of Terrorism," pp. 258-71; Chapter 15, "The Magnetic Poles (II): The Palestine Resistance," pp. 272-85; and Chapter 16, "The Beneficiary," pp. 286-97.

E. Issues for Consideration:

1. What is U.S. declaratory policy with respect to dealing with acts of terrorism? What opportunities and risks does our policy imply?
2. Does our current policy adequately reflect the hard lessons learned in various terrorist incidents we have experienced?
3. What factors have contributed to or detracted from our ability as a government and as a nation to support a policy on terrorism that more explicitly embraces active measures for preempting or responding with force to terrorist acts planned or directed against U.S. citizens?
4. How might one characterize the concept of international/transnational terrorism? What are the limitations that impede taking more aggressive action against it in the international arena?

Topic 4
Tuesday
16 April 1985
1330-1500
(DR)

(Reading Only)

Countering Terrorism

A fundamental requirement for an effective policy of internal defense is clarity of objectives. Whom or what is one seeking to defend?

... There are no purely prophylactic measures that can ensure 100 percent protection of a liberal democratic state against terrorism.

... only the lion of superior and resolute force can conquer terrorist movements.

Excerpts from Paul Wilkinson
Terrorism and the Liberal State

... terrorism is a dynamic strategy, predicated on relentless offense, whereas counterterrorism traditionally has been a static, or defensive, strategy and, consequently, often fails for this very reason. Thus, those entrusted with the defense of the state must, in view of the restraints under which they operate, seek ever newer and more imaginative strategies to control terrorism.

Neil C. Livingstone
The War Against Terrorism

A. General:

Having now looked at some of the major policy issues and various of their implications, the principal focus of the previous lesson, we turn now to the telling matter of devising and appraising particular strategies for preventing acts of terrorism and prosecuting the national war against terrorism. An early consideration must be that of determining our nations's primary objective in waging a battle against terrorism. What should it be? How far should we be willing to go in pursuing that objective? And what general means are at our disposal? Also, what risks must we be willing to run in the event that, as with other strategies in the national defense arena, we cannot hope to do everything? Give some thought here to the kinds of criteria one might employ in judging the merits of a range of possible strategies for dealing with terrorism in time ahead. If you find this frustrating -- almost intractable to deal with, you have plenty of company in free society.

B. Learning Objectives:

1. To appreciate the problems democracies face in trying to defend against terrorism.
2. To understand the major components of what might constitute a comprehensive strategy for countering terrorism.
3. To appreciate the relative merits of various strategies for dealing with terrorism.
4. To understand the limitations of even the best of general strategies for combatting terrorism.

C. Required Reading:

Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism and the Liberal State. (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977). Chapter XX, "General Problems of Internal Defense Against Terrorism," pp. 114-121; and Chapter XXI, "General Principles of Counter-Terrorist Strategy," pp. 121-132.

D. Supplementary Reading:

Neil C. Livingstone. The War Against Terrorism. (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982). Chapter 8, "States in Opposition: The War Against Terrorism," pp. 155-202.

E. Issues for Consideration:

1. It is sometimes said that, because every terrorist campaign has unique elements -- some quite substantial in implication, no one strategy will suffice to counter them all. What are the implications of this line of thinking for those charged with developing strategies?

2. What should be our overriding national objective in developing policies and strategies for dealing with terrorism?

3. What are the relative merits of pro-active versus reactive versus purely defensive strategies for combatting terrorism?

4. What specific steps might we as a nation take in preventing and countering terrorism?

5. The Report of the Long Commission commented, "the most important message it can bring to the Secretary of Defense is that the 23 October 1983 attack on the Marine Battalion Landing Team Headquarters in Beirut was tantamount to an act of war using the medium of terrorism." What might this statement suggest in devising policies and strategies for dealing with such serious acts?

Topic 5
 Wednesday
 17 April 1985
 0830-1130
 (PD)

Panel:

Mr W. Rice (Confirmed)
 Lt Col Ollie North

U.S. Requirements and Capabilities
 for Combatting Terrorism

A single factor that sold the future Delta Force more than any other was terrorism.

... General Rogers told me of a note from the President. It had surfaced in the tank earlier in the day and asked, "Do we have the same capability as the West Germans?" Much discussion had ensued before it was decided we did not. One of the generals had said, "Well, I'm not going over to the White House and tell them we don't."

[Responding to Senator Nunn, who asked what could be done to prevent a reoccurrence of what had happened at Desert One in Iran, at Son Tay, and during the Mayaguez incident.] My recommendation is to put together an organization that contains everything it will ever need, an organization which contains Delta, the Rangers, Navy SEALs, Air Force pilots, its own staff, its own support people, its own aircraft and helicopters. Make this organization a permanent military unit. Give it a place to call home. Allocate sufficient funds to run it. And give it sufficient time to recruit, assess, and train its people. Otherwise, we are not serious about combatting terrorism.

Excerpts from Charlie A. Beckwith, USA (Ret.)
Delta Force

The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff to develop a broad range of appropriate military responses to terrorism.... The Commission recommends that the Secretary of Defense direct the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training necessary to defend against and counter terrorism.

Report of the DOD Commission on
Beirut International Airport
Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983
(Report of the Long Commission)

[When attacked by terrorists] we will have to examine the full range of measures available to us to take. The outcome may be that we will face a choice between doing nothing and employing military force. We now recognize that terrorism is being used by our adversaries as a modern tool of warfare.... To combat it, we must be willing to use military force.

Secretary of State George Schultz
October 25, 1984

A. General

When it comes to doing something about terrorism, the United States has been accused of "speaking loudly while carrying a small stick." And should it ever bring the two into better balance by developing an improved stick, there may be little or no use for it in terms of specific applications, at least not enough use to have made the expenditure of resources worth it. So speak the critics, of which there have been no small number.

As all can appreciate, this is a most serious and sensitive subject. No small amount of time, effort, talent, and other resources has gone into trying to understand the particulars of the assorted terrorist threats that confront us, whether actual or potential, and in developing capabilities for dealing with them that are appropriate to the challenge.

The purpose of this lesson is to better understand the role of the national security community, in particular the National Security Council, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Department of State, as they work to improve our nation's capabilities for combatting terrorism. []

B. Learning Objectives: *Other?*

1. To understand the Department of Defense's mission for anti/counterterrorism and the role of the Joint Special Operations Agency (JSOA) in helping carry it out.

2. To learn of the extent to which general insights and lessons learned, and more formal recommendations from special panels convened to study relevant past operations (e.g., Son Tay, Mayaguez, Iranian hostage rescue, etc.), have been taken into account as the U.S. Government has gone about developing U.S. anti/counterterrorism capabilities.

3. To learn of the general composition and capabilities of U.S. forces, both currently available and planned, for use in anti/counterterrorism operations.

4. To become sensitive to OJCS-level concerns with respect to the planning and execution of anti/counterterrorism operations (e.g., command and control arrangements, etc.).

5. To understand the parameters (e.g., legal, diplomatic, geographic, etc.) that delimit the use of U.S. forces in preventing/countering terrorist incidents both in the U.S. and on foreign soil.

C. Required Readings:

1. Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, 20 December 1983 (Report of the Long Commission). Part Nine, "Terrorism," Section IV, "Military Preparedness," pp. 130-33.

2. Brian Michael Jenkins. The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission. (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, February 1984). (Scan pp. 1-6; concentrate on pp. 6-12).

3. William Regis Farrell. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of An Effective Strategy. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982). Chapter 5, "Aspects of Military Involvement," pp. 49-68.

4. Rick Maze. "Military Paying Increased Attention to Terrorism Now." Navy Times, 22 October 1984, p. 2.

5. "U.S. Military Creates Secret Units for Use in Sensitive Tasks Abroad." New York Times, (8 June 1984), p. 1.

D. Issues for Consideration: *Other?*

1. Taking account of the whole range of likely supports and impediments, what appears to represent the art of the possible in using U.S. military forces to prevent, deter, respond to or preempt terrorist acts against U.S. citizens?

2. In light of your judgment on question #1, and considering the lessons learned from past experiences, does the U.S. appear to be developing the proper size and mix of military capabilities? Are we funding programs and building forces we likely will not use because we cannot use them?

3. What ~~might~~ constitute an appropriate set of guidelines for the various uses of military capabilities in dealing with terrorism, particularly in its reactive and preemptive roles?

136520 31

United States Department of State
Secretary's Policy Planning Council

January 15, 1985

Peter,

As a follow-up to the January 2 IG/T meeting, yesterday Ambassador Borg, MC/T, chaired a meeting to explore further the development of a public diplomacy strategy for counterterrorism. Representatives of State's MC/T and PA, USIA, FAA, DOJ, OSD and the JCS attended. Ambassador Borg asked me to brief the attached proposal, and he provided copies of the memo to attendees. There was agreement among the group that S/P's proposal provided a good initial concept. Ambassador Borg asked that a smaller group - consisting of myself and representatives from PA, MC/T, OSD, JCS, and USIA (we hope to also get a representative from CIA) - prepare a flushed-out version of S/P's memo for further discussion by the larger group and subsequent presentation to the IG/T for approval. This smaller drafting group will meet at USIA next Tuesday afternoon, January 21. Ambassador Borg expressed his appreciation for S/P's contribution. As per our discussion yesterday, I am providing a copy of our memo to Ambassador Helman.

Al

Al Paddock

cc: P - Gerald Helman
S/P - Robert Osgood
Phil Kaplan
Barry Lowenkron

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ Attachment

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M441.1 #136520
BY RW NARA DATE 9/15/17

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

10

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

136521 MEMO

2 1/11/1985 B1

PADDOCK TO PARKER BORG RE DEVELOPMENT

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

10

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

136522 MEMO

4 1/23/1985 B1

FOR JOHN POINDEXTER RE FOLLOW-UP

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

10

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
136523 CABLE		2	1/30/1985	B1
	300020Z JAN 85			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

10

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
-----------	---	------------------------------	-----------------	---------------------------------

136524 MEMO

2 1/31/1985 B1

FOR PRINCIPALS RE TERRORISM

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/14/2012

File Folder

TERRORISM ACTIONS: PENDING (JANUARY 1985)

FOIA

M11-441

HAENNI

Box Number

49

10

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
136525	PAPER RE TERRORISM (ATTACHMENT TO 136524)	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

John

136526

47



PAGE 01
SIT510

CABINET OFFICE LOND 0001
AN002146

DTG: 311234Z JAN 85 PSN: 039910
TOR: 031/1318Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF JP KIMM SIT /007

ROUTINE
DE WTE24 *0001 0311306
R 311234Z JAN 85
FM CABINET OFFICE LONDON

TO THE WHITE HOUSE

~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE FROM SIR ROBERT ARMSTRONG
TO ROBERT MCFARLANE

DEAR BUD,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE RELATING TO TERRORIST
ACTIVITY.

I CONFIRM THAT YOUR PEOPLE HAVE MADE DIRECT CONTACT WITH
OURS THROUGH NORMAL LIAISON CHANNELS. THEY WILL, OF COURSE,
DO EVERYTHING THEY CAN TO BE OF ASSISTANCE. WE HOPE VERY
MUCH THAT THERE WILL EVENTUALLY BE A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME.

I WAS GLAD TO HEAR OF THE PROGRESS THAT HAS BEEN MADE IN
ESTABLISHING A COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM TO HELP CO-ORDINATE OUR
RESPONSE TO TERRORISM. THE SPEED WITH WHICH THIS HAS BEEN
DONE REFLECTS VERY WELL ON ALL THOSE INVOLVED.

WITH WARM REGARDS,
ROBERT ARMSTRONG

BT

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M441/1 #136526
BY FW NARA DATE 9/15/17

~~SECRET~~