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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/19/2010

File Folder TERRORISM: LIBYA [01/01/1986-04/08/1986]

FOIA

F95-023/9

Box Number 105

WILLS

24

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100880	PAPER	QS AND AS ON ECONOMIC SANCTIONS <i>R 2/21/2017 M1105/1</i>	3	1/5/1986	B1
100881	PAPER	SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS: SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA <i>R 2/21/2017 M1105/1</i>	4	1/8/1986	B1
100882	MEMO	PLATT TO POINDEXTER RE LIBYAN SANCTIONS <i>R 2/21/2017 M1105/1</i>	1	1/9/1986	B1
100883	PAPER	SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS: SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA <i>R 2/21/2017 M1105/1</i>	3	1/9/1986	B1
100884	MEMO	TO NORTH RE LIBYA	1	3/17/1986	B1 B3
100885	REPORT	RE LIBYA	7	3/17/1986	B1 B3
100886	PROF NOTE	STARK TO PEARSON RE LIBYA NEXT STEPS	1	3/28/1986	B1 B3
100887	MEMO	CANNISTRARO TO FORTIER, ET AL RE LIBYA CURRENT SITUATION AND FUTURE PROSPECTS	5	ND	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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100888	CABLE	080235Z APR 86	1	4/8/1986	B1 B3

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100880

Qs and As on Economic Sanctions

Suggested Questions

1. Doesn't the transaction ban requiring Americans to leave Libya cut across the basic constitutional right of Americans to travel and reside where they want to?
2. With areas of this country still suffering from the effects of the recent recession, aren't we hurting ourselves more than the Libyans by cutting off exports and reducing U.S. jobs?
3. Aren't we just "shooting ourselves in the foot" by preventing our own U.S. oil companies from doing business in Libya? Won't other nations come in and fill the breach?
4. Aren't we overusing economic sanctions? First Nicaragua, then South Africa, now Libya. Isn't this an over-reaction? How can the U.S. business community recover from the image that it is not a reliable supplier?
5. Detailed factual questions:
 - a. How will these new orders specifically affect Americans now in Libya? How long will they have to make their travel arrangements? What is the penalty that they will face if they remain in Libya in violation of the order?
 - b. What will be the impact on pre-existing contracts for trade with Libya?
 - c. What is our current trade relationship with Libya? How much do we now export? What kinds of goods?
 - d. Has the oil ban been effective? How much have we already reduced our imports from Libya?
 - e. What are the extent of Libyan assets in the U.S.? Are they going to be frozen?
 - f. How much do U.S. companies have invested in Libya? What will happen to their physical and financial assets there? What about the financial cost to them and to U.S. banks for defaulting on their performance bonds?
6. What has been the reaction of the U.S. business community to these sanctions? Did they receive any forewarning? Do you expect court challenges?

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7. Are these economic sanctions evidence of a "do-nothing" policy? Shouldn't we be responding with force instead?
8. Are we trying to get our citizens out of Libya because we are about to engage in military action?
9. Isn't this new policy likely to create a hostage situation in Libya? How do we know that Qadhafi will let them leave?
10. Why aren't our NATO allies doing more to cooperate with us? Don't they share our perception of the danger posed by Libyan support of terrorism?
11. Why should we contribute to Western European defense if they will not cooperate with us on sanctions against terrorism?
12. What do we expect the political impact of these sanctions to be in Libya? Won't they simply rally support around the Qadhafi regime?
13. If the regime in Libya does change and a more moderate leader replaces Qadhafi, won't we be harmed by our absence of a "presence" there? Won't it be hard for U.S. companies to reenter the Libyan market?
14. How do these economic sanctions fit with reported plans to destabilize the Qadhafi regime?
15. What reaction do you anticipate in the Arab world? Won't there be some sympathy for a fellow Arab absorbing punishment from the West as a result of his support for the Palestinian cause?
16. Won't Qadhafi simply retaliate with an acceleration of his terrorist activities? Haven't we simply given another twist to the cycle of violence in the region -- even though economic sanctions are "peaceful" in nature?
17. Aren't we running risks to our citizens here in the U.S. by provoking Qadhafi with economic sanctions? What about his threat to bring terrorism to the streets of America? Haven't we made it more likely that U.S. airports will suffer attacks like the ones in Rome and Vienna?
18. Isn't there a touch of chauvinism in our foreign policy? Aren't we reacting differently to the deaths at the airports compared to the deaths in the Tunis raid and the deaths in the Palestinian camps in Lebanon?
19. Isn't what we call terrorism merely the method forced on

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groups that lack conventional military power? Aren't the Palestinians and Abu Nidal's group using methods that were glorified during our own Revolution and by partisan groups in occupied territories during World War II?

20. Aren't we meddling in the internal affairs of another sovereign state when we mete out punishment for supporting groups we don't like. Don't the radical Palestinians and the Moro guerrillas in the Philippines merit support from patrons like Qadhafi just as much as do the groups that we choose to support with overt and covert aid?

21. Where is the "smoking gun"? Aren't you proceeding on only flimsy and circumstantial evidence of Libyan complicity in the Rome and Vienna incidents?

22. Aren't these sanctions and other actions the Reagan Administration has taken toward Libya evidence that the U.S. has a double standard and will not tolerate a developing country, like Libya, deviating from the U.S. in its definition of foreign policy goals?

23. Isn't the terrorism that comes from Iran and from Syria a greater threat to U.S. interests? Why did you single out Libya? Because it was an easy target? Why aren't you doing more to punish the regimes of Syria and Iran?

24. Why are you acting now when you let the major terrorist incidents of the bombing of the U.S. marine barracks in Lebanon and our Embassy there go unpunished?

25. Exactly which U.S. interests have been threatened by Libya's alleged support of international terrorism? Isn't it true that, with the exception of the sacking of the U.S. Embassy there in 1979, every intended Libyan terrorist action against a U.S. target has been thwarted in advance?

26. Libya has targetted U.S. personnel and interests before, under previous administrations. Isn't the private, diplomatic approach the best one to follow? Doesn't the attention accorded Qadhafi by sanctions and Administration rhetoric merely make him more important -- in his own eyes and in the region?

27. Qadhafi has been reported to be mentally off-balance. Aren't you running the risk of provoking even more dangerous behavior by publicly punishing him with these sanctions?

28. With all of the tough statements that came out of your Administration -- officially and unofficially -- isn't this final response a rather weak-kneed one? Won't perceptions of U.S. power be affected adversely?

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SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:
SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

JANUARY 8. 1986

o Government Reactions

Australia: Foreign Minister advised that the GOA will seriously consider the President's message, including the decision to impose an economic boycott of Libya.

Canada: Although GOC spokesman initially said Canada would not join an economic boycott, political level retracted statement. Now Canada has "significantly restricted trade with Libya for several reasons, including Libya's support of extremists...(and) will be considering whether further steps by Canada are necessary." We understand that the Prime Minister may leaning further toward to our position than is reflected in official statement.

UK: Foreign Minister Howe issued public statement after meeting with Ambassador Price saying UK "fully understood and sympathized with the American wish to take firm action over terrorism...and would not take any steps which would undercut the American measures."

Italy: Badini, Prime Minister Craxi's diplomatic advisor, said Craxi is reviewing Italy's relationship with Libya. While not thinking of sanctions, Craxi wants to analyze Italian interests in Libya in terms of trade, petroleum, investments, arms, and residents. Badini left impression that once analysis completed, Craxi will seek to reduce Italian-Libyan relationship.

Greece: Foreign Minister Papoulias summoned U.S. Ambassador to express concern over increasing tensions in Mediterranean and called for an EC meeting to discuss our new sanctions. GOG indicated that it would not impose sanctions against Libya, noting that sanctions will be very difficult to implement.

USSR: Soviet MFA USA Division Chief Bessmertnykh said Libya is right to bolster its defenses in light of U.S. threat and further U.S. action could have "serious consequences" in and beyond the region.

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PRC: The Foreign Ministry strongly condemned the Rome and Vienna terrorist attacks, but expressed concern over what it perceives as a combined U.S.-Israeli threat of military action against Libya.

GDR: Foreign Office rep told us GDR believes that "threats against a state which distances itself from terrorism (i.e. apparently crediting Libya in this category) do not contribute to a healthy international situation."

Switzerland: MFA told us that since Switzerland maintains diplomatic relations with Libya and represents interests of several countries in Tripoli, Switzerland wants to avoid a confrontation with Qadhafi.

Malta: Maltese Prime Minister Bonnici disapproved publicly any U.S. military action against Libya.

Jordan: Prime Minister Rifai advised Charge that Libya had formally notified the GOJ that it would use Jordanian air space, in event of an attack by America or Israel, to strike at "American installations." Libyans also disclaimed any connection with Abu Nidal. Rifai added wryly that Jordan was not concerned about the Libyan threat to violate Jordanian airspace.

Sudan: Prime Minister issued a militant public statement claiming Sudan will support Libya if it is attacked by US. Gizouli later privately advised that his statement was pan-Arab rhetoric and should not be taken seriously.

Saudi Arabia: Embassy reports that despite media warnings against U.S./Israel retaliation against Libya, many senior Saudis privately are enjoying Qadhafi's present difficulty.

Yemen Arab Republic: Prime Minister condemned terrorism, but expressed support for Libya in event of U.S. attack.

India: Foreign Ministry advised Embassy that GOI may make a public statement condemning terrorism; absent contrary evidence, GOI accepts Libyan government statement that it had nothing to do with terrorism. GOI may later assist U.S. with counter-terrorism measures, and welcomes further discussions about recent events in North Africa.

Syria: Foreign Ministry said that Syria did not support Abu Nidal terrorist operations, but as a matter of principle provided hospitality to Palestinian organizations.

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Kuwait: Embassy Kuwait believes that GOK will not support our sanctions.

Islamic Conference Organization: Meeting at Fez, Morocco, OIC issued a declaration apparently generally supportive of Libya. Consensus document speaks of "provocation from world imperialism and from Zionism..." Libyan Government expressed "satisfaction". US Congress up in arms, may signal dissatisfaction in some form.

Morocco: King Hassan summoned Ambassador Nassif to Marrakesh. Termed our sanctions understandable, justifiable, but questioned prospects for impact in face of European, Arab reactions/lack of support. Hassan said he wants to "be helpful."

o Business Reaction:

Department Task Force fielded about 25 calls from business representatives. Most sought information on implementation; were told to await regulations (published in Federal Register this afternoon). Among foremost concerns:

--Can we ship before Feb 1? (Answer: yes)

--Effect on future dealings by/through foreign subsidiaries? (Answer: Still subject to license procedures if U.S. components involved.)

--Validity of previously issued licenses if shipment after Feb 1? (Answer: annulled.)

--Will USG compensate for penalties incurred for non-performance of contracts? (Answer: no.)

--Can medicine be sold to Libya? (Answer: no, only donated.)

o Briefing Diplomatic Representatives:

NEA/Assistant Secretary Murphy briefed Arab League Ambassadors and Charges. Session was friendly, but theme of questions was querulous -- e.g. U.S. double standard in reacting to loss of innocent lives in 10/1 Israeli raid on Tunis vs. Rome/Vienna incidents; USG not addressing "core cause" (Palestinian rights); Libya is "Arab-Islamic state" and as such will receive Arab League support, etc.

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Department officer briefed OAU Ambassadors and Charges. Tone was uncontentious, essentially confined to appeals for additional information.

o Effect of Freeze on Libyan Government Assets:

Initial estimates are that measure froze approximately \$700 million, much of it in branches of American banks in London.

o Libyan Reaction:

Government of Libya attempted to withdraw assets from U.S. banks.

Tripoli was unnaturally quiet, with the airport closed intermittently, a normal security precaution when Qadhafi's plane lands.

Official radio said US sanctions were "politically tantamount to a declaration of war."

Foreign Minister Treiki said US workers "are our guests" and implied they are free to leave at any time.

Some U.S. workers in Libya questioned whether the travel sanctions were constitutional, appeared to be disinclined to leave.

Libyan public continued to rally to Qadhafi in public statements.

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN. M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Libyan Sanctions: Significant Reactions on January 9

There were several significant developments January 9 relative to U.S. economic sanctions against Libya. Other governments continue to indicate skepticism about the efficacy of our sanctions. Libya is actively courting Arab and Western European countries to undercut U.S. actions. The Department forwards this resume prepared by the Libyan Working Group.

Enckmley
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Attachment: Summary of Reactions

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SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS
SANCTIONS AGAINST LIBYA

JANUARY 9, 1986

o Libyan Reaction:

Both Qadhafi and Foreign Minister Treiki publicly stated that Americans are "guests", free to leave Libya. We have no confirmation of actual departures.

Qadhafi said that he has put his suicide squads "on hold" and that his lawyers are working on a response to the U.S. assets freeze.

Qadhafi met with Western European Ambassadors, calling for "continuity of relations"; he indicated readiness to exchange members of armed groups in Libya (such as the Italian Red Brigade and the Japanese Red Army) for dissidents "sought by Libyan justice."

Qadhafi reportedly telephoned all the Gulf heads of state (and probably other Arab leaders) to press for collective measures.

Foreign Minister Treiki stated that Islamic nations should boycott American goods; this may be proposed at an emergency meeting of Arab League Foreign and Economic Ministers projected for January 13.

When Belgian Embassy initially presented our note to Libyan government, reaction was muted. However, Ambassador summoned back to Foreign Ministry in about two hours, told that the Libyan Government would "formally" refuse to accept note.

o Government and International Organizations' Reactions

Belgium: Belgian Embassy in Tripoli has had numerous inquiries from Americans resident in Libya. The embassy has advised their earliest departure, but notes that situation of American dependents of Libyan nationals presents particular problems.

South Korea: South Korean officials noted that joining the U.S. boycott would end Korea's second largest construction market, involving \$10 billion of construction work and 21,000 workers in Libya. They noted that Seoul had not received a formal request from the U.S. to boycott Libya.

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UK: In his meeting with Ambassador Price, Foreign Minister Howe was careful to say that Britain shares our view of Libyan complicity in the Rome and Vienna attacks, if not the scope or extent; FCO does not have categoric evidence proving Libyan involvement, however, and would be grateful for additional evidence. FCO officials informally indicated that they do not expect U.S. to get any support for economic sanctions from EC countries (or anywhere else).

FRG: Embassy urged that Libya sanctions questions be raised with FRG Economics Minister Bangemann during his visit to Washington next week. Bangemann's Ministry has policy lead relating to sanctions in trade, energy, and export credits. The FRG has been quick to restate its traditional opposition to economic sanctions, but the Embassy sees a surprising amount of public pressure to "do something" about Libya.

Hungary: Hungary's official daily carried an editorial on January 9 accusing the U.S. of making Libya a scapegoat responsible for terrorism; Washington's concept of a "new globalism" means a U.S. effort to interfere in the affairs of sovereign states. Washington's state level terrorism harms international relations.

Brazil: According to press reports, the Foreign Ministry confirmed that Brazil does not intend to support economic sanctions. Brazil is a major exporter of arms to Libya.

Islamic Conference Organization: ICO's statement on Libya, inter alia, proclaims "solidarity with the Libyan Arab people" and "active support of the defense of its sovereignty". It also "calls the attention of the international community to the constant provocations and escalation of aggression which international imperialism and the Zionist entity" are focusing on Libya and concludes that the "imperialist-Zionist threat extends to all Islamic states."

NATO: The North Atlantic Council has been briefed twice on U.S. measures. NATO representatives asked for a full briefing on the connections between Libya and terrorism.

Japan: Japan has asked for a briefing on Libyan complicity in terrorist actions prior to Foreign Minister Abe's meeting with the Secretary tomorrow.

o Business Reaction:

Department Working Group fielded about 35 calls from firms, primarily from suppliers to Libya. The questions regarded licensing of shipments to Libya and payments for shipments already under contract. Concerns focussed on many of same issues as January 8.

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- 3 -

New issues of particular interest:

Disposition of U.S. owned equipment containing national security controlled components (e.g. computers) in Libya. One firm indicated its options were to abandon the equipment, or sell it to a European bidder for continued use in Libya. Reexport probably will not be permitted by Libyans.

--How will we be paid for sales to Libya? (Answer: Need to await issuance of Treasury regulations on frozen assets)

o Secretary's Press Conference:

Although billed as a general press conference, Secretary Shultz faced mostly questions about Libya and terrorism. Saying Qadhafi "is a terrorist," he noted that the new sanctions are the "latest in a long series" and that they "unfortunately...are likely to continue." He said "those things that can be done economically [by the United States] have been done now" and announced a trip next week to Europe by Deputy Secretary Whitehead.

Asked about Palestinian rights, with an implied connection to the causes of terrorism, he said Palestinians "deserve a better fate than they have" but stressed, "violence and terrorism have never achieved anything for the Palestinian people." He pointed to U.S. support of the "quality of life" program in the occupied territories and termed the general subject "one of the major arguments" for the U.S.-backed peace process.

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SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
LARRY SPEAKES

April 5, 1986

The Cantina Room
Santa Barbara Sheraton

10:03 A.M. PST

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SUBJECT

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FOREIGN

Bombing in West Berlin/Terrorism..... 1-20

10:45 A.M. PST

#1736-04/05

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Santa Barbara, California)

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
LARRY SPEAKES

April 5, 1986

La Cantina Room
Sheraton Santa Barbara

10:03 A.M. PST

MR. SPEAKES: I would like to do just the facts ON THE RECORD and then talk with you a little bit on background. Most of the facts you know.

This event occurred at 5:50 p.m. last night Pacific Coast Time. We received an almost immediate flash here and were aware of it within minutes. The European command posted us on the initial event. The President was notified and briefed on the details after we began to get numbers and location and so forth around 8:00 p.m. last night.

And the situation today is that a total of 155 injured out of 300 to 400 that were in the LaBelle Club, West Berlin. There are 53 Americans injured not seriously, 10 seriously -- so I believe it is 53 plus 10. And there are two dead, but we are not yet in a position to state whether these are Americans or not. There has been some reporting quoting military sources in Berlin that I would not steer you off of, but we don't want to confirm that yet.

Two groups, as you know, have claimed responsibility. One is a militant fringe of the Baader Meinhof group, and another has described themselves as the Anti-American Arab Group. We can't pass any judgment on whether these are authentic or not.

That's all the facts. Any questions on the record, or do you want to shift to BACKGROUND?

Let's describe this as administration official, period -- not administration official in Santa Barbara or anywhere -- just administration official.

Q The problem there -- dateline --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Dateline doesn't trouble me. I mean, you can't do anything about that, but just don't add that one more sentence.

We have had some discussions in Washington this morning with various officials -- or various officials have had discussions in Washington and I have talked with them from here. Those discussions are ongoing at the moment to make assessments, both on the TWA and the West Berlin discotheque.

We are not yet ready to draw specific conclusions about either who did this definitely or whether -- as your key question is -- whether or not it points to Libya. We are not prepared to draw that conclusion firmly. But it is a consensus that these type incidents do fit a pattern. It seems to be an idea of indiscriminate violence, that you strike out at Americans but whoever else is killed or injured does not matter.

MORE

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We believe this vindicates what we have been saying, that there is a pattern, that there is a master plan that is being instigated in many cases -- and I can't say specifically on this one -- by Qaddafi. We are seeing this time and again.

I point out yesterday -- well, let me say that European countries are now beginning to feel the brunt of this. First of all, it was tourist trade and a loss in U.S. travel dollars there. But they're also affecting European citizens -- citizens of European countries are being killed. And it is the Athens and Rome airports, it's the TWA, it's others. We can -- I can certainly confirm for you here ON BACKGROUND the targeting of well over 30 U.S. diplomatic installations -- Europe and the Middle East -- that we are fully aware of. They have also targeted a number of high-ranking U.S. diplomats and attempted to track them -- trail them -- to deal with the way they operate. Yesterday, as I pointed out, the French expelled two peoples -- what do they call themselves -- People's Front -- the Libyan People's whatever -- Office or whatever.

Q The People's Bureau.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: People's Bureau -- Libyan People's Bureau -- which has offices in a number of European countries, and they expelled them for plotting terrorist acts against Americans.

Q Are these 30 targets -- is that since when? What time frame are you using?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd say in the last -- I'd say since the first of the year, approximately.

Q Have they been thwarted?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Been reported?

Q Are you saying "thwart" -- are you saying you --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We have evidence that agents of the Qaddafi government have targeted a number of American installations and American officials to try to find out -- as potential terrorist targets. We have been aware of that for some time.

Q Did you say well under 40 -- under 30 or over 30?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Over 30.

Q Do these include military as well as diplomatic installations?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think they're mostly diplomatic -- embassy-type locations.

Q And have any of them been carried out?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I think some have been thwarted, but none have been carried out.

Q This 30 is the number of diplomats and facilities, or is it just facilities?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think it's facilities plus a number of additional diplomats.

Q It's 30 facilities plus 50 diplomats?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Now we are going to be calling on private channels for European governments to vigorously pursue and assist us and cooperate with us in the pursuit of potential terrorist activities and doing

what can be done to thwart them. This is clear evidence that they are now being hurt by -- both economically, which is one thing, but in terms of human life -- in human terms.

Q Are you trying to say that the chickens are coming home to roost? Is that the impression you would like to leave by this briefing, that the Europeans have not been as helpful as they might have been?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, no, I think the Europeans are -- what we have been telling the Europeans, what we have been telling the public -- and, you know, sometime over the last couple of years that our claims of Qaddafi's efforts in terrorism have been scoffed at, both publicly in the United States and by inactivity of other governments.

But what we are now doing is indicating that this validates exactly what we have been saying, that it is -- there is a pattern of indiscriminate violence -- indiscriminate terrorist violence on virtually a world-wide basis. And all nations are affected by it and all nations have to work to do something about it.

And one of the ways is the Libyan People's bureaus, which are located in a number of European countries -- capitals.

Pete, was there anything else that you got --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- working with the German government's and investigating --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I can't think of anything else that they want to talk about.

Q So, you're asking -- are you in effect asking European allies to throw out the Peoples' Bureaus?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't want to say that, Ira.

Q You might could leave that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we've just pointed out to them -- throw out the People's -- asking the Europeans to throw out the People's Bureaus. I think we just -- we want to emphasize to them that they're in it as well as we are.

Niles?

Q Are you saying -- just to clarify this -- that in this pattern that you're seeing, that Qaddafi is at the center of this pattern?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's our judgment, yes -- that, not only -- first of all, training and exporting terrorism, and we've uncovered his tracks in a number of areas, but as a senior official said the other day, he's creating the climate where others are -- other acts of terrorism are spawned or people are encouraged to do so.

Niles?

Q There have been a series of reports last week that elements of the Baader Meinhof gang in Libya made contacts with Libya. Are you aware of these --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know that. I surely don't.

Bill?

Q There's a master plan being instigated in many cases by Qaddafi. Can you clarify that?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the master plan idea is that -- there's our Contra man out there. We have one support-the-Contra. He's been out there -- I think he's on 72 hours straight out there. Go interview him.

Q Have him disrupt the briefing.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He ought to come in.

Q Give him \$100 million and I'm sure he'll do it.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The master plan is that these 30 or so installations and a number of diplomats have been targets. So we are seeing the footprints of the Qaddafi terrorist plan all over the Middle East and in Europe.

Q But you're not willing to make a connection between the TWA 840 incident and this discotheque incident in the master plan?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not yet. But the pattern, the pattern particularly of the discotheque, the La Belle incident is strikingly similar to the type of indiscriminate attacks. Now whether the TWA thing -- initial blush as we've pointed out was that it did not seem to be the type of thing that Qaddafi -- you know, the indiscriminate whatever. But then again, was he -- clearly he was trying to wreck the whole plane. So, I don't know. We're just not prepared to go that far. The evidence is not that far.

Bernie?

Q Does the discotheque incident in any way escalate the prospects of further U.S. retaliation against Libya?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I want to leave that purposely vague. And I think we just go back to the President's statement in New Orleans -- if we do tie him in, we will hold Qaddafi responsible and just leave that out there.

Colonel?

Q Back in the good old days like Sarajevo, when I was just a kid, there used to be something called an ultimatum, in which one country warned another one. Is this in any sense an ultimatum to Qaddafi that the United States knows about his plan and the general details of it and anything that follows?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In other words we'd hold him responsible for anything anywhere?

Q Yes.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think quite that far. One of our -- one of the tenants of our terrorism -- anti-terrorism retaliation policy is we want to be sure and get the right people. Clearly, you can see, our patience is wearing thin on a number of these incidents and, as I say, there is a pattern that's worldwide.

Candy? Oh, let me go to the Colonel.

Q As a follow-up, has the sixth fleet got any more exercises scheduled for the general area of the southern Mediterranean?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I do not know what the plans are there. I'm not aware of any, but I don't know of any specifics. But they're still there.

Candy?

Q I'm a little confused as to what constitutes this pattern that you're seeing? Is it simply indiscriminate violence?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Indiscriminate violence of not caring who is killed or whatever. You know --

Q Isn't terrorist activity by its very nature indiscriminate violence?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not necessarily. There certainly can be very targeted violence against certain individuals. I mean, you go back to the car bombings in Italy and so forth where they got key diplomats. But this is the Qaddafi pattern, as the indiscriminate -- you know, shooting up the airport with five guys in masks.

Q So, the pattern you see is that they're killing innocent people?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. And we're pointing out that it affects Europeans.

Q Is there anything else that's a pattern?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I think the pattern is targeting U.S. people, but not caring who else they kill. And the pattern is geographical in Europe and the Middle East.

George?

Q -- discussions in Washington? Was the President involved in these discussions?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q Has he been in contact with people in Washington today?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No.

Q What's the extent of his involvement -- being briefed last night?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He was briefed last night. He'll be briefed again this morning at the conclusion of these meetings.

Ken?

Q -- indiscriminate terrorist -- in Lebanon -- Iranians and the Syrians. Is it the position of the U.S. government that Iran and Syria no longer play significant roles in national indiscriminate terrorism?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. We -- international indiscriminate -- I wouldn't want to use those words, but we have -- I think Libya is on the list -- or not Libya, but Syria remains on the list. But we haven't -- and of course there are training camps in Lebanon that are Syrian sponsored, Iranian influenced and so forth. So, all that remains, but so much of it traces back to Qaddafi.

Q Is there an attempt, or is it possible to differentiate between Iranian, Syrian or Libyan sponsored terrorism?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Very often it's difficult. This is a shadowy world that you operate in.

Ira, then Joe?

Q Is it still the U.S. policy that if any retaliation is taken against Libya that it would not be aimed at civilians?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, go back to the Shultz B'nai B'rith speech and that's basically the policy. You remember -- what -- 18 months ago or in '84 when Shultz indicated -- and I don't want -- don't try to seize upon things when we're talking about this overall policy, because it's a very complex policy and it will be applied judiciously. But as Shultz pointed out -- don't quote me, refer to Shultz -- that he indicated that in some cases, if we have to go after terrorist camps or so forth, and there are civilians there, that the American public must be prepared for that. I mean, that's just the way it is. But quote Shultz, not me, as a fresh lead on that because there's been no change in policy on that and it would be decided on a case-by-case and it would be judiciously applied.

Joe?

Q Well, what's the purpose of that meeting in Washington? Are they just sorting through incoming cable traffic, or are they trying to set policy?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Joe, I don't want to be more specific than that. They are assessing, I guess, is the best way to put it.

Peter?

Q You say you can't draw a definite link between Qaddafi and the TWA flight 840. What can you tell us about where that investigation --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Peter, I don't really have anything new on that. You know, you've got the claim and counter-claim about Mae what's-her-name, and you've got the technical experts. Seriously, I don't have anything new on that.

Q Liability insurance if he sues you?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Because he's going to sue. How's your liability?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Liability insurance?

By the way, where are we -- on that, we found out The Chili Factory is closed because they couldn't get liability insurance. (Laughter.)

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George?

Q What steps are being considered at U.S. installations in Europe to prevent this sort of crowded gathering last night that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: To prevent what?

Q What steps are going to be taken to prevent instances where large crowds of American servicemen in Europe are gathered in undefended places?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I'm sure that -- I don't know of any Defense Department advisory of -- hey, stay out of large congregated places --

Q Will there will be no steps taken for --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't know whether they do that. I'm sure that people are aware of it, but whether there have been any specific orders, I don't know.

Gerald.

Q Two questions, one is what -- this meeting that you're talking about in Washington is what kind of people?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: An assessment meeting.

Q Of who?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't want to be specific about who's there.

Q In light of what you're saying -- this is some pretty strong stuff -- can you be any more precise on the sourcing --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Of -- you mean our information?

Q No, no, no, of what -- of who you are -- in terms of identifying you, can we say --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: -- that's very deliberate on my part.

Q I know. But, I mean, since you all are saying these things, now --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Pardon?

Q Since you're saying these things for the first time, and they're pretty strong --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: The 30 and 35 been in the press; the French kicking them out's a public announcement; the pattern of violence we're talked about -- we're really saying we're validating what we've been telling you for two years. But you want to have a more precise administration official ID, is that what you're talking about?

Q Yes. What you want us to identify you as is an administration official, right?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Period.

Q Not "in Santa Barbara."

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not "in Santa Barbara," not in -- Well, there're not but about two or three of us out here, so I don't want to be described as "a late American official who briefed reporters in Santa Barbara." 

Q How about "he drawled"?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, that'd be all right.

Jackie.

Q What specifically do you want Qaddafi to do? You say that you can't really tie him specifically to these acts, but he's creating a climate. What could he do to take some of the pressure off?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: What he could do is simply act like all the rest of us. And I'm not trying to be facetious, but in reality his whole -- the whole policy of his regime is to cause problems to his neighbors and to -- it's totally a stream of anti-American rhetoric and threats and so forth that have gone on

over the years.

Eleanor.

Q You say all governments must act together to control this or whatever. What is it you would like the European countries to do? I mean --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think I'd rather leave that in the hands of private diplomacy in our discussions with them. We've stressed over a number of years in economic summits, the seven nations, that we need a concerted policy and a sharing of intelligence and a sharing of methods and so forth and -- certainly that. But we have got to go to the people that are causing these problems. The British have had a horrendous experience with the Libyans and --

Q If they joined the U.S. sanctions, would that tighten the screws on Qaddafi any further? Is there anything that they could do --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would, but the sanctions, once again, we've considered as a very long-term approach to it, rather than anything that was going to happen overnight.

Steve.

Q On this reassessment that's going on, is that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not "reassessment," assessment.

Q Or an assessment of -- an assessment of a situation that has occurred up until now, is it also an assessment of what our policy should be if this pattern continues? And can we say that if the pattern does continue that decisions might be made to retaliate for less evidence than we've had in the past, if the pattern is still there?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's a good question, and I just don't think it pays for me to answer any speculative questions about what we may do. I just want to leave it deliberately vague.

Frank.

Q In addition to these 30 or so incidents -- or the evidence of these installations abroad, is there any increased evidence of threats to installations or individuals here in the United States?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I haven't heard it and I don't know whether -- I don't know the names of the individuals targeted. As you know, they increased security on the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy, we probably wouldn't know who they were if they wore a sign on their back, but still --

Dave.

Q If I may follow --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q -- but is there concern -- and is this one of the reasons you're speaking as you're speaking --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Exactly.

Q -- of security problems in this country as a result of this?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know of any specifics

in this country, but, obviously, if they're going to hit in West Berlin, if somebody's going to hit TWA or wherever, the potential is here, but how specific we've seen in intelligence, I don't know.

Dave.

Q Following up on Gerald's question, would it be fair for us to say that among the assessors are those people who work for such agencies as the CIA, DIA, the Pentagon, in general, the State Department, the National Security Council and folks like that? Could you be a little more specific about just who's doing this assessing?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd just say key officials involved in U.S. foreign policy and anti-terrorist planning or policy were involved in a meeting.

Q They know who they are.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They know who they are. They'll stand up.

Q Have we ruled out, by the way, that this Mexicana Airline crash was the work of terrorists?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know about that one, yes. I don't know. I've heard some claims.

Bill.

Q Just to clarify what you were saying earlier, recognizing that you can't get into specifically what you're asking Europeans to do, are you making specific requests of the Europeans through these private channels?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'd rather just leave that. I don't want anybody to hear about anything before we do it.

Q Are you in a situation now where you're just pointing out the situation?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I just don't want to fine tune it anymore. I'd just rather leave it like that.

Pierre.

Q You pointed out the French measure and while you call for cooperation, it seems that you are more satisfied than you were before with the attitude of the Europeans. Is that correct or --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We're seeing some evidence of change in attitude, but this is really being driven home in these recent incidents and the increasing frequency of the incidents. So, I think there's a growing realization in Europe that they're affected in human terms as well as in other terms.

Yes, sir.

Q Did France and Italy have a deal with Libya to allow safe passage for Libyan terrorists?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm trying to figure out how to answer that. I would not steer you off of the report you saw yesterday of the deal that was in -- the way they functioned in the '70's. Our viewpoint of that is that is history. We want to deal with the situation as it is now and encourage cooperation now. So, I don't want to kick them too hard

on that and say it's in the past, but at the same time we want to move ahead with our close relationship on terrorism.

Q What do you mean by "private diplomacy through private channels"? Do you mean American diplomats not speaking about it in public or --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Say what you are referring to.

Q You used the phrase that in Europe we are engaging in private diplomacy and using private channels to get this message across. What does the phrase "private diplomacy" mean?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No different. I mean, it's just the diplomatic channels to convey the message.

Q Diplomatic as opposed to private citizens?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q A week ago, before the Gulf of Sidra naval exercise, was there any recognition in the planning for that that indeed it might provoke the kinds of incidents we have now seen in the last three or four days?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Walter, we approach that as one of a series of exercises. We were well aware that there could be a reaction, and we did not go in with our eyes closed. We were prepared if they did -- if there was a reaction. But our main purpose was to demonstrate that we are going to operate over there and if we -- if Qaddafi doesn't -- if Qaddafi wants to try to prevent us from it, we are prepared to react.

Q Can you tell us if the extra-heavy security that was afforded Shultz on his recent European trip was the result of a direct threat against him that might be one of these several high-ranking diplomats?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm not aware of it, but it could be something that I was not aware of. I did not hear it anywhere.

Q These -- two questions. These 30 or 35 diplomats are targets. Are you saying that there were actually plots uncovered and were -- you're talking about foiled attempts, or are you just saying that generally --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, there were various stages of evidence that we indicated -- that we picked up from intelligence sources that they were attempting to stake out these, figure out how they operated, learn how to get inside of them, or learn who is operating from them or target people that we have abroad that are -- you know, those kind of things.

Q And also, could you make another stab at -- I didn't fully understand your answer to Jerry's question. I didn't understand why, with what you said today, the U.S. would not be holding Qaddafi responsible for any terrorist event in the region that you have described?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, the answer is that one of the basic tenets of our policy is that we want those -- when somebody perpetrates a terrorist act, we want to go to that individual. If it's Qaddafi, that's who we go to. If it's someone else -- Iran, or whatever, then we look at that. But we don't want -- we want to be sure that we're going to the heart of the matter.

Q I'm not asking retaliation, I'm just saying in terms of -- you have said today that we think Qaddafi is behind a pattern, and it seems to me from the way the pattern has been described that it

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would cover any terrorist incident in the geographical area that you described.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You know, as others have pointed out -- Ken, I guess -- that Iran, Syria and others are still on our list of terrorist nations. There are a number of freelancing groups, as we thought that that was the pattern of the TWA. So there are a number of groups that could be, but there is a real pattern here.

Q You mentioned one of them in connection with the master plan, and that was the

Bader-Meinhof gang in Germany, which has had a long and active history. Europe is full of organizations of this kind, including the Irish Republican Army, the Basques, the Free Croatia from Yugoslavia and so forth. In the master plan you have mentioned Bader-Meinhof. Are there any others?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I mentioned Bader-Meinhof in that one of these groups claimed credit for this discotheque -- is supposed to be a militant -- if they can be any more militant -- offshoot of the Bader-Meinhof. So, as you mentioned -- you named a lot of groups, and they're there. And maybe it's them operating independently or maybe it's part of the climate or maybe it's -- maybe it's the Qaddafi operation. We don't know.

Q The master plan is Qaddafi's master plan?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Qaddafi -- yes, there is obviously a master plan from Qaddafi to cause terrorist incidents world-wide, and particularly they've targeted Americans. H

Q And that terrorists could be of almost any nationality then, and of any national ideology?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes. I'm not yet prepared to say that there is -- you know, that Qaddafi is pulling strings on Bader-Meinhof or Irish Republican Army or whatever. I'm not that -- you know, we can't go that far, but we certainly -- a number of Qaddafi agents that are operating in European countries that are directly responsive to Qaddafi's orders. There are a number of other groups that may be freelancing or operating in a climate or being encouraged to do so.

Q Does Qaddafi, in this master plan, have operatives in the United States proper?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that. I don't know of it if there are, but there could be that I'm not aware of and just haven't seen it somewhere.

Q Does the timing of these events or anything else about them suggest to you that they were in clear retaliation for the Gulf of Sidra? You seemed to indicate that by saying that --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't think we're prepared to draw that -- yet. I mean, they've been going on before and after the Gulf of Sidra and some just as violent, if not more so. And just as direct.

Pardon?

Q You said we expected a reaction, we didn't go in with our eyes closed. So --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We were expecting -- we were well aware of the possibility of a reaction there in the Gulf if we went in -- not retaliation.

Q Two things. First of all, have either of the two incidents lately changed anything about the security surrounding Bush and his trip to the Middle East?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. You know, I think they were being very careful about what they were saying and I guess when we talk about increased security or not increased security -- we'd just rather not.

Q Okay. The other thing is, can we get something from you on the record in reaction to this other than the President --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes, why don't I drop back and

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trained in Libyan terrorist camps that are not Libyans. But, on the other hand, we've seen a number of Qaddafi agents operating in European capitols trying to target Americans.

Q So, it's actually the Qaddafi agencies -- 30-35 of them, rather than --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q -- some other group --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: He's doing a little of both. He's sending out folks, and on the other hand he's encouraging others -- and on the third hand I guess he's encouraging simply by the climate he's creating.

Ken?

Q Is President Reagan aware of everything you're saying and does he endorse it?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm sure he does. This is directly out of the Washington meeting and it's the thinking at the highest levels in the government, yes.

Q So, in fact you're speaking for the President?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Speaking for the President and all his people that are involved in this because -- talked to the key people that are involved this morning.

Ken?

Q If the pattern continues and Qaddafi in fact is implementing (inaudible) discriminate terrorism, Qaddafi must be removed from office, no?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we've got a body of statements on that. I don't think we can go any further than that.

Bill and Gerald?

Q Just to make sure I understand -- these 30-35 American installations and an unspecified number of America diplomats who you say were targeted, these were all outside the United States?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right.

Q To follow-up on Jerry's question, what has really prompted your decision to come out here and talk about this? Is it the latest attack, or the continuing --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, the continuing pattern of attack and the fact that this is evidence of what we've been telling you. As I say, many have scoffed at the idea that the tentacles of Libyan terrorism reached into European capitols. We're seeing it. The French saw it yesterday and kicked some folks out because they had direct evidence.

Dale?

Q I'm a little confused. From the point at which Candy asked for something on the record, did you go on the record at that point?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No. I'm going to just look for -- come up with some condolences or something on the record.

Sheilah?

Q Can I follow-up on Candy's question? As you just pointed out a few minutes ago, we've always said that we'd go after someone that is responsible. You seem to be indicating that the U.S. government is satisfied that at some level Qaddafi is responsible for at least many of the terrorist incidents. Doesn't that justify going after him?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, no, I didn't say that. We go back to the Rome airport -- was it the Rome or Athens airport -- back last year. I don't think that's ever been 100 percent linked to him. We knew that certain individuals involved, although they came out of Lebanon, I think, the final analysis was that they had had some training in Libya. So, you can't link all of it directly to him, but you can certainly link it in one manner or another. Even if you just have to say it's the climate that inspires these types of individuals.

Q Well, is it the U.S. government standard that it has to link him to a specific incident? Or is it set --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we won't take it on a case-by-case basis. But, once again, we want to -- if we exercise in any

retaliation, we want to retaliate against those directly responsible.

Q Is he directly responsible -- is he subject to retaliation for contributing to the environment --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You're really trying to draw a policy that we -- that evolves and that we deal with on a case-by-case basis, and it's just not possible to do it.

Al.

Q Are you prepared to take specific steps against -- to counter this --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: It would be just in the normal course of events, Al. First of all, you become aware of it and then you try to thwart it. You remain vigilant both in your intelligence areas, with your listening -- with the ear to the ground. And on the other hand, you try to erect means to -- if these things are going on -- to stop them. So, there's a general plan, but I don't know of any specific --

Q Is that part of what the people in Washington are assessing?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They're really assessing the entire picture.

Ira.

Q On this assessment, would it be fair to say they're also assessing possible responses?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been asked that a half a dozen times. I just said, I don't want to say.

Q I'm sorry.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I've been asked that a half dozen times and just don't want to say it.

Frank.

Q -- you said that -- again -- the 30 attacks we've learned of since the first of the year. Is this master plan something that we've learned of since the first of the year? Or is this, again, part of the ongoing picture that we've seen --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: You hear of two or three, then you hear of four or five targetings and then you hear of six or eight, and so then you begin to say there's a master plan.

Q So this is a conclusion that we have reached relatively recently, that there is a master plan by Qaddafi. Is that what --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not that recently. When you begin to see more and more and you see them simultaneous -- virtually simultaneously -- then you think, well, something's going on here.

Q Do you think these latest events are going to make the climate in Europe more conducive to economic sanctions against Libya?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know. I do not know how far their thinking has come on it.

Gerald.

Q Since you are on background, is it too strong to say

that you seem to be preparing the case for retaliation --

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No -- I mean, yes, I think it's a little bit too strong because our case for retaliation, in our opinion, has been laid out, as to how and when we would do it and under what circumstances and so forth. So I think that -- and the President's statement in New Orleans.

Let me do something -- Peter.

Q Is there any physical evidence, per se, that provides a common thread that supports this pattern that you speak of that points to Qaddafi?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Don't know of any physical. In other words, the same bomb in the -- different locations. I don't know of anything like that. But I think it's more the pattern.

Walter.

Q A point of clarification, regarding the TWA incident and this latest bombing last night, are you saying these are or may be part of this pattern?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Yes.

Q They are a part of this pattern?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I say they may be. The pattern is there. Who the individuals are, I don't know.

Let me do one thing before I go on the record and come up with something for you on the record. And I'd like to do it off the record because it concerns all of

us here, if anybody's got any problems with that.

I would like to point out the vulnerability of a press room. I don't think I need to point that out to you. And the fact that we're all involved -- not only me standing here at the podium under the lights, but all of you are involved.

We're consulting with your colleagues and the White House Correspondents Association about what we should do and how to do it. I mean, we've seen evidence of people in the room that could have just as easily used something other than words here this week. We travel all over the world. It's announced where we travel. Our press rooms are public. And we've been in some hot spots around the world. What better -- what better location than a U.S. government official or group of them and the world press, for one who wants to get publicity. We're consulting with how we can deal with it.

I can't tell you what to write or what not to write, but for your own sakes and for ours and for the way we're going to have to operate in this climate, I would encourage you not to try to write about what we're doing. It just simply puts the spotlight on how we're having to deal with it. All of us are involved and we're all in a common boat here about this thing. So, I just don't think it would help you to say that a press room is an ideal place for a terrorist to come and that's what you'd say if you'd write it. We all know it and let's don't advertise it. And we're convinced that we're going to take some security steps, but there's going to have to be stationing on the door and that person -- at your expense, because it's your press room and it's not something -- I don't think we can move the government Secret Service into -- to be involved. But it's got to be at your expense or else we can't run press rooms and have any idea that we're going to be safe up here.

Q Have we had any actual threats since we've been here?

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Not aware of any, but when you're in Bonn or when you're in Geneva, situations like that are -- I mean, those people live in those towns.

Ira?

Q I'd just like to make a point for whatever record is being kept that one of the problems is we would certainly like to have available to us protestors, kooks, people handing out information which happens especially in Los Angeles -- people with legitimate news to hand out -- it seems to me to be reasonable.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, they ought to be outside your press room, though. I mean, if you want to have a press room -- these people -- there are plenty of public forums for people who want to make it. I mean, the poor Contra guy still walking back and forth out there and these people that have been here all week have had plenty exposure. There are South African protestors at UCSB yesterday and today. They had their forum. They got their publicity. They got their point across, but they didn't have to come here in your briefing room and do so.

So, I think you've got access to them. And the question is, when you look around a briefing room like this, you want to know who's here. And particularly when I'm sitting up here with lights in my eyes and can't see past the first row and some dude pops up over there with a -- looked like he came out of a -- don't know where he came out of.

Q First row is the one that's the most dangerous.

ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That's right. Don't worry about the first row.

But, at any rate, I would really like to encourage you not to put the spotlight on what we're doing here and particularly if we're going to have a rent-a-cop on the door that anybody could take out with a knee to the groin and come right on in here.

So, if we can band together, I'd like to do it.

MR. SPEAKES: Okay. ON THE RECORD -- let me think a minute here.

First of all, the President is deeply concerned about the increasing number of terrorist incidents that are affecting Americans in Europe and worldwide. He has instructed his top administration officials to stay on top of it -- to provide him with an early assessment of the latest outbreak this week and to -- I think that's about all we ought to say. Certainly the President expresses his condolences to the families and he wants to see that we do everything possible first to apprehend and prosecute those who are responsible specifically and those who perpetrate these types of incidents.

The second thing he wants to do is to take every measure in concert with the allies in order to prevent terrorist incidents. It is -- he believes that it is a worldwide problem and that every nation has a stake in this and every nation must do its part to prevent terrorism and to isolate those, condemn them and to bring an end to these individuals, groups or nations, in some cases, who sponsor terrorism.

Enough?

Okay -- thanks a lot.

Q Larry, what do you know -- I'm told there was an explosion at an Air Force base in Korea overnight. Is there any indication that that was --

MR. SPEAKES: Joe, I haven't seen that. Was that on the wire, Pete? I did not see that.

Q -- a fuel tank or a fuel -- I think they were Americans --

MR. ROUSSEL: I don't have anything.

MR. SPEAKES: Not in the mood to do any office calls this morning. You've had an hour here.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

10:45 A.M. PST

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