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# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION



25 September 1986 **TERRORISM** No. 1493

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## PART II OF II

### FEATURES/COLUMNISTS

U.S. ROCKETS TAMED TERRORISTS (Colorado Springs Gazette- Telegraph) Jeffrey Hart	1
TERRORISTS DON'T WEAR INTERCHANGEABLE MASKS (Newark Star- Ledger) William Pfaff	1
THEY'VE NEGOTIATED FOR OTHERS; WHY NOT US? (USA Today) David Jacobsen	2
GIVE THE KIDNAPPERS THE MESSAGE: NO DEAL (USA Today) James Phillips	3
KEEPING COUNT OF TERROR (Washington Times)	3
NEW EXTRADITION TREATY CASTS A LONG SHADOW (Baltimore Sun) Patrick Marshall	4
TIME TO MAKE TRAVEL TERROR-PROOF (Wall Street Journal) William T. Corbett	5
LIBYA RAID BACKLASH MUTED (New York Daily News) Cal Thomas	6
THE LIBYAN RAID, FOUR MONTHS LATER (Christian Science Monitor) Rushworth M. Kidder	7
INTELLIGENCE ISN'T THE ANSWER (Baltimore Sun) Allan E. Goodman	8
COLD-BLOODED KILLERS, NOT FREEDOM FIGHTERS (New York Times) Irving R. Kaufman	8
ARE DEMOCRACIES EQUIPPED TO STOP TERRORISM? (New York City Tribune) Harold W. Rood	9
ANTI-KADAFI DRUMBEAT CAUSES SHUDDERS (Los Angeles Times) Robert E. Hunter	10
MARITIME TERRORISM, 1985 (U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings) Scott C. Truver	12
NOT A FORTRESS (Foreign Service Journal) Thomas Vonier	21
WILL QADDAFI HIT AMERICA? (American Legion) Philip C. Clarke	25
TERRORISM: THE SEARCH FOR WORKING DEFINITIONS (Military Review) Lt Col Donald B. Vought, US Army (Ret.) & Lt Col James H. Fraser Jr., US Army	27

Denise Brown, Editor

Harry Zubkoff, Chief, News Clipping & Analysis Service (SAF/AA), 695-2884

'GERM WAR' (Interview w/Harvey J. McGeorge) (International Combat Arms) Edith Kermit Roosevelt	31
MILLIONS FOR MURDER (Soldier of Fortune) David Segal	35
CATCHING TERRORISTS (Science Digest) Stephen Kindel	40
<b>FOREIGN MEDIA</b>	
MURDERED SIEMENS DIRECTOR ONE OF SEVERAL ON DEATH LIST (German Tribune) Peter Schmalz	46
NEW GENERATION OF BRUTAL KILLERS EMERGES (German Tribune)	47
AIM REMAINS THE SAME: ONLY THE TACTICS ARE NEW (German Tribune) Thomas Meyer	47
TERRORISTS 'PLANNING' TO SABOTAGE ASIAN GAMES (Seoul YONHAP)	49
NORTH MAY BLOCK OLYMPICS WITH IRREGULAR WARFARE (Seoul YONHAP)	49
U.S. INSTALLATIONS ALERT FOR POSSIBLE TERRORISM (Panama City ACAN)	50
FOREIGN MINISTER, FRANCE'S RAIMOND VIEW TERRORISM (Madrid Domestic Service)	51
FRANCE AND SPAIN DISCUSS TERRORISM (Financial Times) Tom Burns	51
DM3 MILLION REWARD OFFERED FOR RAF TERRORISTS (Bonn DIE WELT)	52
LEBANESE 'ACHILLE LAURO' SUSPECT ARRESTED 24 JAN (Hamburg DPA)	52
TERRORISTS' AIM IS TO HOBBLE EUROPE (Toronto Globe & Mail) John Gellner	52
REAGAN IN DILEMMA ON HOSTAGES (Manchester Guardian Weekly) Alex Brummer	53
POLICE ANNOUNCE ARREST OF 2 ACHILLE LAURO HIJACKERS (Paris AFP)	53
LEADING W. GERMAN TERRORIST CAPTURED (Financial Times) Rupert Cornwell	54
ZIMMERMAN INTERVIEWED ON RAF TERRORIST MEMBERS (Bonn DIE WELT)	54
GROUP REPORTED TO FIGHT FRENCH BASQUE TERRORISTS (Madrid Domestic Service)	55

RABIN CITES DECREASE IN ACTS OF TERRORISM (Jerusalem Domestic Service)	55
ARMY SUPPLIERS WITHDRAW AFTER IRA DEATH THREAT (Financial Times) Hugh Carnegy	55
LIBYAN AD PROTESTS TERRORIST ACCUSATIONS (Vienna BEUE AZ)	56
TERRORISTS ROLE IN CYPRUS REFUTED (Tripoli JANA)	56
'TEXT' OF ISLAMIC JIHAD RESPONSE TO SHULTZ STATEMENT (Beirut AL-NAHAR)	56
THE GUNMAN'S SHADOW FALLS ACROSS ULSTER BUSINESS (Financial Times) Hugh Carnegy	57
INTERIOR MINISTER CLARIFIES HOSTAGE STATEMENT (Beirut AL-NAHAR)	57
SUN EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON SIKH, TAMIL 'SIMILARITIES' (Colombo SUN)	58
DEATHS FROM TERRORISM 'DOUBLE IN 1985' (Financial Times) Andrew Whitley	59
SPOKESMAN DENIES EXISTENCE OF TERRORIST 'BASES' (Nicosia CYPRUS)	59
BRITISH SECURITY FORCES ON FULL ALERT (Manchester Guardian Weekly) Gareth Parry & Jim Muir	60
SIGNS OF WEARINESS AMONG ETA'S TERRORIST LEADERS (Manchester Guardian Weekly) Thierry Maliniak	61
THREE TERRORIST SUSPECTS ARRESTED IN WEST BERLIN (Paris AFP)	62
3 SUSPECTED RAF MEMBERS (Paris AFP)	62
3 LEBANESE ARRESTED (Bonn DIE WELT) D.D.	62
ARABS REPORTEDLY PLANNED U.S. ATTACK (Hamburg DPA)	62
NO CASUALTIES IN BLAST NEAR TU OFFICE, U.S. FIRM (Paris AFP)	63
TERRORISTS -- IT DEPENDS WHAT YOU MEAN (Book Reviews) (Manchester Guardian Weekly) Adam Roberts	63
SOUTH'S ANTIHIJACKING EXERCISES CALLED STRATAGEM (Pyongyang Domestic Service)	64
AFTERMATH OF THE TRIPOLI RAID (Financial Times)	65

**EDITORIALS**

BLACK MARKET WEAPONS BAZAAR (Oakland Tribune)	66
TREATY WILL HAMPER ESCAPE OF TERRORISTS (Milwaukee Sentinel)	66
NO REFUGE FOR IRISH TERRORISTS (Colorado Springs Gazette- Telegraph)	67
TERROR IN SPAIN (Los Angeles Times)	67
HIT 'EM AGAIN, HARDER (Washington Times)	68
GIVE KIDNAPPERS MESSAGE: LET'S TALK (USA Today)	68
A HOSTAGE'S RETURN (Washington Post)	69
NO COMPROMISES WITH TERRORISM (San Francisco Chronicle)	69
NEGOTIATIONS DIDN'T FREE THIS HOSTAGE (Long Island Newsday)	70
STILL NO DEALS WITH TERRORISTS (Atlanta Journal)	70
TERRORISM: HANGING TOUGH STILL WORKS (Providence Journal)	71
FREE AT LAST (Newark Star-Ledger)	71
HOSTAGE DILEMMA (Fort Worth Star-Telegram)	72
'NO' TO TERRORISM (Kansas City Times)	72

**BOOK REVIEWS**

THE ELABORATE FABRIC OF TERROR'S GARMENT (Review of "Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations: The Witnesses Speak," eds., Uri Ra'anan, et al) (New York City Tribune) Reviewed by Carl Rapkins	73
ANTI-TERRORISM GAME PLAN (Review of "Terrorism: How the West Can Win," Benjamin Netanyahu, ed.) (Washington Times) Reviewed by Harry G. Summers Jr.	74

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**FEATURES/COLUMNISTS**

COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH 17 July 1986 Pg. 4C

# U.S. rockets tamed terrorists

It seems that there is nothing like a big rocket with his name on it to get the attention of ten-cent Third World dictators. Have you noticed that there has been a marked decrease in Arab terrorism since our air raid on Tripoli?

That attack seems to have accomplished a number of things, one of which has been the disintegration of the always fragile mental faculties of Muammar Gadhafi. After the raid, Gadhafi disappeared into his tent and was entirely silent. When he reappeared, on Libyan television, he was completely incoherent.

In Tripoli today, foreigners get the impression that no one pays any attention to him any more and that the country is really being run by a military junta that does not want its oil fields blown up. I myself understand that U.S. intelligence has intercepted Libyan communications canceling prospective terrorist operations in Europe.

The statistics tell part of the story. In the four months before the attack on Tripoli, 66 Americans were injured by terrorists and six were killed. Since the raid, there have been two injured and two killed. One of those killed represented an immediate reprisal in Beirut. The other was an unconnected incident in Colombia.


**Jeffrey Hart**

At the time of the raid on Tripoli, the conventional wisdom was that it would actually increase terrorism, polarize the Arab world against us, hurt moderate Arabs politically, and split the NATO alliance. Pundits left of center and right warned that Khadafy would go all out for revenge, become a hero to the Arab world, launch terrorist attacks within the United States. None of this has happened. The opposite seems to be happening.

It is my understanding, from sources within the U.S. government, that the attack upon Khadafy was also aimed obliquely at Damascus and Teheran, Syria and Iran being even more important terrorist sponsors than Libya. Khadafy was seen as a kind of chump, geographically

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

NEWARK STAR-LEDGER 20 July 1986 Section 3, Pg. 2

# Terrorists don't wear interchangeable masks

Eight policemen were murdered Monday in Madrid by Basque separatists. In Ulster, the Protestant "marching season" reached its climax during the weekend, with the usual provocative Protestant parades through Catholic communities, and the usual attacks on Catholics by Protestant extremists. Nearly 200 were injured, most of them police.

In Paris, earlier, terrorists blew up a police office, killing one officer and dreadfully injuring four others. Near Munich, other terrorists murdered an executive of the Siemens group. Thus does it go—communal struggle and terrorism, the recurrent efforts of factions to forcibly impose their will on others.

Distinctions nonetheless must be made. The terrorist movements of Basque separatists, and among Catholics as well as Protestants in Ulster, are serious affairs. The terrorism experienced today in France and West Germany is not serious.

Spain's is a conflict between a community which wants to be independent—however senseless this may be in economic and even political terms—and a larger national community which dreads disintegration.

If the Basque provinces became independent, the question of independence would be reopened in the other regions of Spain, above all in Catalonia, where there is a distinct people speaking their own language. Yet the more intransigent of the


**William Pfaff**

Basque separatist parties is growing in strength, and elected five deputies in the national election in June.

Ulster is a story of communal hatred, Protestant hatred of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland—together with Protestant fear of incorporation into Ireland as a whole—and that Catholic fear of Protestant intimidation which has given IRA terrorism its popular support. Here, there is virtually no hope of solution, short of a civil war that exterminates one or another of the two communities.

French terrorism, however bloody, is not serious because

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



USA TODAY 29 July 1986 Pg. 8A

**DAVID JACOBSEN**

Guest columnist

# They've negotiated for others; why not us?

**SOMEWHERE IN LEBANON** — My captors have told me that Father Jenco, like the good Rev. Benjamin Weir, was released as a sign of good faith, but that the American government did not reciprocate when Ben Weir was released. I pray that they will do so now.

My captors tell me that this is the very last sign of their good will, that our release will be by death if the government doesn't negotiate right now.

To date, the American government has refused to negotiate. Several golden opportunities have been missed because they have failed to negotiate.

There are days when I believe the government really doesn't care about me, that we've been abandoned. It seems that my government, or at least my president, might be a prisoner of absurd subservience to the political principle, "we will not negotiate with ter-

*The comments of David Jacobsen, director of American University hospital in Beirut, are excerpted from a videotape made by his captors.*

rorists." A long time has passed, and we are no closer to release than the day we were kidnapped. So much for the effectiveness of quiet diplomacy.

Please forgive me if I give the impression that I feel I'm one of Gen. Custer's men. Or one of the men at the Alamo waiting for help. You know the end of their stories. Pray that ours will be happier. I am very tired, and I'm frustrated and, to tell you the truth, I'm very angry. Why won't the government negotiate for our release?

They have negotiated for other Americans, why not us?

It took them 440 days to se-

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## MASKS...Continued

the terrorists connect with nothing real in contemporary French society. They are a handful of survivors from the romantic revolutionary and anarchist movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. Those French who once sympathized with them have mostly learned by now that it is the murder-minded revolutionary who is the real enemy of the people.

Such groups are dangerous, obviously, but the danger is limited. France's terrorists have nearly all been identified by the police.

The German terrorist phenomenon is much more complex, and the Baader-Meinhof and later Red Army Faction groups did at one point enjoy a significant, if circumscribed, level of support on the West German political left. This was at a time when a conservative "Great Coalition" government had been formed by the mainstream political parties and when the Social Democratic Party itself had become distinctly conservative in outlook.

The terrorists nonetheless remained marginals, cut off from the mainstream of society, and patient police work had broken the back of the movement by the beginning of the 1980s. As in France, those carrying out today's attacks are alienated and isolated survivors, walled up in their own myths.

The Munich murder was justified as an "anti-nuclear" act; the victim was a nuclear specialist and director of research for Siemens. The terrorists are attempting to give

## ROCKETS...Continued

isolated, mentally and politically fragile, mistrusted by Moscow. Why not blow him up as a way of underlining the more serious messages to Syrian dictator Assad and the crazy Ayatollah?

There are indications, since the Tripoli attack, that Assad has cooled Syrian terrorist activities in Europe. He has, evidently sincerely, tried to get captives released in Beirut. He knows that the Soviet SA5 missiles performed badly in Tripoli, and SA5 missiles are what he himself depends upon. Assad is also economically vulnerable, with the falling oil prices. My understanding is that he was quietly warned that economic and military measures against him were on the agenda.

The Ayatollah is crazy but apparently not suicidal. He has a big war on his hands with Iraq. If the Israelis had not blown up the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, the Iraqis would certainly by now have nuked Teheran and the Holy City of Qum. It is more than possible that the word has been passed to the Ayatollah and his cronies that the United States has the capacity to provide Iraq with weapons that can really hurt. The indications are that Teheran, too, is cooling the terrorism.

The Europeans wept and wailed about the Tripoli raid, but the French at the Tokyo summit at last approved a strong anti-terrorist statement and have greatly increased security at key locations in France. Italy is shifting its oil dependency from Libya to Nigeria and has tried the Achille Lauro murderers. The U.S. Senate, despite pressure from wacko Irish-American supporters of the IRA, has finally passed the extradition treaty with England.

So far, so good. A few rockets seem to have been reality therapy.

**Hart is a syndicated columnist and professor of English literature at Dartmouth College in New Hampshire.**

themselves a new lease on life by linking themselves to the anti-nuclear cause, powerful in West Germany. They are trying to reconnect themselves to a political reality which has passed them by.

It is unwise to concentrate, as Americans recently have done, on ideas of "indiscriminate" and "international" terrorism. The terrorists are unscrupulous in what they do, but their targets are chosen with deliberation. These movements are international to the limited extent that cooperation and mutual assistance exist among some of them, and that they can find opportunistic support from sources outside their borders. None, though, would exist outside the special social and political conditions of its own country.

This is as true of the Middle East as of Western Europe. In the Middle East, as in Northern Ireland and Spain, terrorism is directly connected to what important groups of ordinary people think and feel, and to goals for which they long. In France and West Germany today, terrorism expresses private myth and individual alienation, and its goals are those which ordinary people hate and fear. That makes all the difference.

USA TODAY 29 July 1986 Pg. 8A

**JAMES PHILLIPS****An opposing view**

# Give the kidnapers the message: No deal

WASHINGTON — The release of the Rev. Lawrence Jenco from captivity in Lebanon will lead to shortsighted calls for the Reagan administration to bow to the demands of some of the same terrorist forces that murdered 241 Marines in October 1983.

The USA cannot afford to cave in to such naked blackmail. Knuckling under would only reward terrorism and incite future kidnappings of U.S. citizens. Once this gang had been paid off, others would be encouraged to attempt the same gambit to bring the U.S. government to its knees.

The result would be an "open season" for kidnapping U.S. tourists, businessmen, and government officials all around the world. Terrorists

*James Phillips is Middle East analyst with the Heritage Foundation.*

would hold U.S. citizens hostage as insurance against punishment for their crimes.

Moreover, if we should pressure Kuwait to release its prisoners, U.S. citizens traveling abroad would become valuable not only as a means of coercing the U.S. government but as a means of coercing scores of other governments as well. U.S. hostages would become the preferred bargaining chips of terrorists everywhere.

The 17 terrorists imprisoned in Kuwait are not ours to release anyway. They are the charges of the Kuwaiti government, which has steadfastly refused to release them despite

**OTHERS...Continued**

cure the freedom of the Iranian Embassy hostages. It took them about three weeks to free the TWA passenger hostages. Negotiations in both cases. Our government even negotiates to free citizens of Russia and South Africa, so why not us?

What are the conditions for our release? I don't know. But Father Martin has been given the instructions to be relayed to the American government. I ask our government to listen to Father Martin. I ask the American public to listen to Father Martin. He speaks the truth.

It is time the Congress investigate the handling of this. A

year and a half of quiet diplomacy should be exposed to hard public questions. It's far better to have an investigation than to have a post-mortem in the very near future. I ask also that the public contact the White House, ask the president and the State Department to negotiate for our release.

I remember, early in my captivity, hearing on the radio that Vice President Bush told our families that negotiations would be conducted if we were in danger. The time to negotiate is now. The danger is real.

In this game of life, we're in the overtime period, and ties are not permitted to end this game. Please act now without further delay.

numerous terrorist outrages, including a car-bomb attack on the Kuwaiti ruler. If the USA bows to terrorist demands that little Kuwait has resolutely rejected, our credibility as a superpower would be shattered.

The issue at hand is not merely how to gain the release of the remaining U.S. hostages in Lebanon, but how to do so without rewarding terrorism, undermining our national interests and jeopardizing the future safety of all U.S. citizens.

Terrorists seek to take U.S. foreign policy hostage, not merely hapless U.S. citizens.

The administration cannot afford to permit its sympathy for innocent hostages to outweigh its determination to conduct a foreign policy free from blackmail. While it has an obligation to seek release of the hostages, the administration also has an obligation to millions of potential hostages to

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NEXT PAGE

WASHINGTON TIMES 29 July 1986 Pg. 1D

**THE ECONOMIST/on terrorism**

# Keeping count of terror

Three months after the bombing of Libya, the temptation is growing to call it a success. Was it?

So far, almost certainly. European opposition to the American action has faded into silence. Col. Qaddafi looks groggy. He has not, directly or indirectly, done much noticeable punching back, despite a small flurry of retaliatory brutalities by some of his Middle East admirers in the immediate aftermath of the bombing. The Russians keep him at arm's length. His fellow Arabs have lifted neither a finger to help him

nor an arm to comfort him. And Western Europe has begun to tighten up its security and reduce its economic and diplomatic ties with Libya. The American raid did not provoke the instant dire reaction so widely predicted in Western Europe.

None of which means that international terrorism has been defeated. A breakdown of terror-related deaths and incidents shows a steady hum of terrorist activity. In the world as a whole, the rate of anti-American terrorism looks little different from last year, which produced the highest number of lethal anti-American attacks for many years. In 1985 about a third of the 28 Americans killed by terrorists lost their lives in Middle East-related incidents. This year the numbers

could be much the same, perhaps dropping off after April.

There have been about 18 anti-American terrorist incidents in Western Europe and the Middle East in the three months since the Libyan raid, compared with about 15 during the 3½ months before it. Not all the actions after April 15 were connected to the raid, nor have many Americans actually been killed in them.

According to Robert Oakley, the Reagan administration's chief counterterrorist and terrorist-counter, the number of anti-American incidents as a proportion of worldwide terrorist actions has fallen over the past three years from 40 percent to 25 percent. Purely national terror-

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*Prepared by the news and features service of The Economist of London.*

BALTIMORE SUN 30 July 1986 Pg. 15

# New Extradition Treaty Casts a Long Shadow

Oakland, Calif.

**T**HE SENATE on July 17 broke more than 100 years of precedent when it ratified a new treaty with Great Britain designed to make it easier to extradite suspected

By Patrick Marshall

terrorists for trial. Unfortunately, approval of the treaty creates a dangerous double standard that may return to haunt the United States.

Approved 87-10, the treaty puts new limits on the rights of persons accused of crimes they claim were politically motivated. Until now, all U.S. extradition treaties have forbidden extradition if the charges are "of a political character."

Under the new accord, such

crimes as murder, kidnapping and bombing would no longer qualify for the political exemption whatever the motives of the perpetrators.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had made the issue a test of Anglo-American friendship, and of the Reagan administration's resolve to combat terrorism. Her most immediate concern is that, since 1979, U.S. courts have refused four times to extradite Irish Republican Army members accused of terrorist acts, on the ground that the acts were politically motivated.

"What is the point," Mrs. Thatcher asked, "of the United States taking a foremost part against terrorism and then not being as strict as they can against Irish terrorism, which afflicts one of their allies?"

The pressure seems to have

worked, for the treaty is tailor-made to fit Mrs. Thatcher's desires, and appears to be targeted specifically at the IRA. This is clear in one of the most precedent-breaking aspects of the treaty — that in specifying murder, kidnapping and bombings as extraditable crimes, the treaty makes no distinctions between acts directed at civilian targets and those directed at military targets.

Sen. Jesse Helms, R-N.C., in proposing an amendment to the agreement while it was before the Foreign Relations Committee, noted that "This treaty makes no legal distinction between terrorists who kill and maim innocent men, women and children on the one hand, and freedom fighters who are engaged in military or paramilitary actions in just

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## COUNT...Continued

ism committed by the likes of the Irish Republican Army and the Basque separatist ETA is far more widespread than anti-American terror.

The global total of terrorist incidents, according to American officials, has risen steadily over the past four years, from an average of 500 a year from 1979 to 1983 to 600 in 1984 and 800 last year. That figure does not include attacks by Afghan rebels, Nicaraguan "contras," or Angola's anti-government UNITA guerrillas.

The Middle East is not, anyway, the worst part of the world for Americans. The number of Latin American acts of terrorism in which Americans have been killed over the past five years is, on average, 40 percent higher than the number of Middle Eastern acts. In 1985 there were some 86 terrorist acts in Latin America involving U.S. citizens, compared with 16 similar incidents in the Middle East. Contrary to popular American belief, relatively little Middle East terrorism is directed against Americans.

Col. Qaddafi helps some of the nastiest terrorist groups in the world, but the number of American and Western European deaths that can be directly attributed to him is rather small. By far the largest number of Col. Qaddafi's victims are fellow Libyans, or "stray dogs." By far the largest number of all Middle

East terrorist victims — those who get killed in Europe through some Middle East connection as well as those who die in Arab countries — are Arabs killed by other Arabs.

Of 75 Arab attacks in Western Europe last year, 62 percent were aimed at fellow Arabs, 17 percent at Israeli or Jewish targets, 16 percent at European ones, and only 5 percent at Americans.

Terrorism in Europe, according to U.S. statistics, accounted for a fifth of all terrorist deaths last year. Europe's own groups killed 118 people, with the IRA and ETA being by far the highest scorers. Middle Easterners working in Western Europe killed 65, not counting the victims of the Egyptian airliner hijacked to Malta last autumn. Of the Arab killers, Abu Nidal and Ahmed Jibril, both outcasts from the Palestine Liberation Organization, were responsible for two-thirds of the victims.

**T**he worst place in the world for terrorism is undoubtedly Beirut, where killings are so frequent that the statisticians have no hope of keeping up with them. [Wire service reports said that at least 26 people were killed and 90 wounded yesterday in a car-bomb attack in Christian east Beirut.]

The most cynical manipulator of terrorist groups has almost certainly been President Hafez Assad of Syria, the chief protector of Abu Nidal, whose main targets have been

## NO DEAL...Continued

deter future kidnappings by convincing terrorists they gain nothing but risk retribution when they seize U.S. citizens.

The president has correctly instructed the State Department to make no concessions that reward terrorism. Jenco's release is proof this approach is working. The April air strike in retaliation for Libyan terrorism has also strengthened our position, putting pressure on Syria to work for release of the hostages. The administration should put Syria and Iran on notice that they will be held responsible for the safety of the remaining hostages. It should also continue its policy of underlining the costs and reducing the benefits of terrorism.

The remaining U.S. hostages are POWs in the war on terrorism. We should seek their release without losing that war.

Jordanians and members of Yasser Arafat's wing of the PLO. President Reagan preferred to make Col. Qaddafi his target in April, and the thump he gave the Libyan leader seems to have given him pause. No bad thing, if the pause lasts. Whether it will make other terrorist organizers hesitate remains unproven.

# Time to Make Travel Terror-Proof

By WILLIAM T. CORBETT

Trans World Airlines, Pan American World Airways and American Airlines have all imposed a \$5 anti-terrorist security surcharge, each way, on international air routes. In addition, all have publicized stepped-up anti-hijack and in-flight bombing security programs. Reports indicate that Americans are responding by willingly paying the surcharge, and are returning to international air travel. Now the airlines must produce as advertised.

It is false to contend that security cannot completely prevent the smuggling of explosives or weapons aboard aircraft. Passengers and baggage must pass through controlled checkpoints in the airport and when entering the aircraft. Also, there are but few ways explosives and weapons can be smuggled aboard aircraft. Maintenance, cleaning and catering crews have frequent access to planes. Baggage handlers and loaders have possibly the best chance to plant explosives. And crew members can be unsuspecting carriers of bombs or weapons. They follow absolute routines. They always stay in selected hotels near airports, allow their baggage to be picked up by hotel service personnel

and transported to the airport by courtesy transportation. Then, crews proceed around security and stow their baggage in the passenger compartment.

## Bombs in Baggage

Crew members must, at a minimum, be required to clear pre-boarding security. Maintenance personnel, cleaning crews, caterers and baggage handlers must work under security supervision. Much to-do has been made recently of conducting background checks of airport service personnel, thereby ensuring their reliability. While that is a good initial effort, reliability is ensured only by supervision. More significant, the danger points have made themselves obvious: airports in Egypt, Italy, Greece and Canada. This should allow air carriers to establish priorities for their security efforts.

The most likely method of placing explosives aboard an aircraft is with checked baggage. The simple fact is that air carriers do not systematically inspect all checked baggage. On June 23, 1985, an airliner exploded over the North Atlantic, killing all 329 people aboard. After raising wreckage from the ocean, an investigation

found the "crash was caused by a bomb stowed in the front cargo hold of the Boeing 747."

Also on June 23, 1985, at Tokyo's Narita Airport, a bag being transferred from a Vancouver flight to a Bombay-bound airliner exploded, killing two Japanese baggage handlers. Had that explosion taken place 40 minutes earlier, while the plane was still airborne, all 374 passengers could have been killed.

In this case, investigators found that two Sikhs had purchased tickets from Vancouver, via Tokyo, to Bombay. They checked baggage but *did not board the flight*. Anyone who purchases an international airline ticket, checks baggage and then decides not to make the flight is somewhat suspicious. Airline security experts say that in the vast majority of such cases the missing passenger is soon discovered to be somewhere in the airport. If he or she is not, would passengers really wish to fly overseas in a plane that is carrying luggage whose owner is nowhere to be found? Surveys of international airline passengers have repeatedly shown that most

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## TREATY...Continued

wars for the re-establishment of traditional moral, cultural and religious values. . . . Although it is easy to stir emotions with accounts of IRA terrorists who attack the civilian population at large, the ratification of the treaty as it stands would abolish the distinction between terrorists and genuine freedom fighters."

The amendment was defeated.

Abraham Sofaer, legal adviser to the State Department and a witness at committee hearings, countered that allowing the political exemption for attacks on military targets would "declare open season" on military personnel. By Mr. Sofaer's reasoning, however, current treaties already have declared such an open season, since attacks on foreign military installations have always been considered political acts.

Accordingly, in refusing to extradite a member of the Provisional Wing of the IRA, Joseph Patrick Dougherty, accused of killing a British army officer during an ambush, U.S. District Judge John E. Sprizzo in 1984 held that the killing, while "a most tragic event," was a political offense "in its most classic form."

The British government called it murder, saying "the political-offense

exemption is limited to actual armed insurrection." Judge Sprizzo rejected the claim, noting that "political struggles have been commenced and effectively carried out by armed guerrillas long before they were able to mount armies in the field."

If the United States were to commit itself to extradite individuals accused of acts against foreign military targets, we would essentially be declaring ourselves in opposition to any and all current and potential revolutionary movements — including those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, South Africa and the Soviet Union. In an effort to get around this implication, the treaty declares that the Senate will not approve treaties that would narrow the political-offense exception with totalitarian or non-democratic regimes.

The most glaring problem is that the treaty sets a double standard — differentiating between terrorists and freedom fighters not by the nature of the acts committed but by which country the acts were committed against. This raises several problems for future foreign policy.

To begin with, it puts the United States in the awkward position of deciding which countries are sufficiently democratic to deserve extra-

dition of suspects in politically motivated crimes. Why should the United States send someone accused of killing a soldier to stand trial in Britain, but refuse to send someone accused of killing civilians back to Nicaragua? If the Philippines imposes martial law, temporarily suspending its constitution, does an extradition treaty of the type with Britain automatically become suspended as well?


Such a double standard also assumes that constitutional democracies do provide sufficient avenues of change, a debatable point at best, and that stable allies whose governments we approve of will remain worthy of the trust implied in such a treaty. Finally, in spite of the treaty's language that it sets no precedent for future pacts, it invites pressure from somewhat less stable democratic allies for similar treaties.

In bending to pressure from Great Britain and the Reagan administration, Congress has made it a great deal more likely the United States could find itself in the future bound by law to extradite true freedom fighters to a repressive government we do not approve of.

Patrick Marshall edits the opinion page at the Oakland Tribune.

NEW YORK DAILY NEWS  
10 August 1986 Pg. 42

# Libya raid backlash muted



**CAL  
THOMAS**

**T**HE T-SHIRT of choice for those relatively few Americans who have traveled to and returned from Europe this summer is to be found at New York's Kennedy Airport. It says "I survived Europe 1986."

While a terrorist attack could come at any time, we have come more than halfway through the summer and the soothsayers who predicted the worst imaginable cataclysms following last April's bombing run on Libya have been proved wrong—again.

It is useful to recount the gloom-and-doom visions of some of the columnists and "experts" just four months ago.

On April 20, New York Times columnist James Reston wrote: "At no time in recent memory has the U.S. been condemned by *informed opinion* (emphasis mine) across the world as it has been for this bombing raid on the Libyan capital."

Lisa Anderson, a visiting professor of political science at Columbia University, called the raid "a miscalculation that could weaken America's influence in Libya, indeed perhaps in the Middle East for years to come."

Was that Vice President Bush with a smiling King Hussein aboard the Jordanian monarch's yacht last week? So much for weakened influence in the Middle East.

In another column subtitled "How wise was the raid on Libya?" Reston asked, "Had the President considered the effect of the bombing raid on allied, congressional and Soviet relations?"

Apparently he had, and the summit is on course, congressional relations are pretty much the same as they have been and even the allies seem to be coming around. Western Europe has expelled more than 100 Libyan "diplomats" and severely impaired the terrorist infrastructure of the Libyan People's Bureau.

## TRAVEL...Continued

opt for increased security over convenience when given the choice.

On two recent occasions, traveling in Europe, I have seen examples of how the above problem can be solved. In Brussels and Bonn, some passengers with checked baggage didn't report for departure. In each case, after repeated paging failed to locate the missing traveler, other passengers were informed baggage was being unloaded from the aircraft and placed at the exit door. Each passenger then identified his baggage. Needless to say, unclaimed bags didn't make the flights.

The equipment, techniques and expertise to solve problems are at hand. Until more sophisticated mechanical or chemical devices are developed, detecting explosives is a simple procedure for sniffing dogs. Turned loose in a room of checked baggage, trained dogs will find any explosives present. Used at X-ray security stations, dogs will sniff out explosives regardless of how well hidden they are. Airlines' objections that passengers are intimidated by "German shepherds" sniffing around doesn't hold water. Small dogs of gentle breeds have proved as effective as their larger, intimidating brethren. Also, these miniature canines can be lifted into a cargo hold to explore every cranny. They're ideal for sniffing between and under every passenger seat between flights.

If trained dogs should sniff something suspicious in a piece of luggage about to be put in a plane's cargo hold, the flight may still leave—as long as the suspicious luggage stays behind. Passengers would have signed waivers allowing security personnel to open such a bag. If the bag is found harmless, it can be sent on the very next flight. While this would inconvenience one individual, would other passengers really prefer that a suspicious bag be placed in the plane's cargo hold?

There is another practical solution for the "all-plastic" gun. It is not necessary to outlaw its manufacture. There are practical reasons for a lightweight handgun. Security objectives can be met by requiring the manufacturer to embed X-ray-detectable metal wire that outlines a profile in the plastic parts of the gun.

The most recent in-flight bombing occurred on an air carrier bound from Rome

A spokesman in the State Department's office of counterterrorism says that in addition to the apparent disarray in Khadafy's government, a situation that appears to have strengthened the hand of Libyan moderates, the allies are at last cooperating. Not only has every Western European country now expelled at least some Libyan "diplomats" suspected of aiding terrorist attacks, the Italians, who have had strong economic ties to Libya, have reduced the number of their citizens in that country

to Athens. The bomb exploded in midair, in the passenger compartment, killing four people and injuring seven. The bomb had apparently been smuggled aboard in Cairo by a known terrorist, then secreted under a passenger seat. The passenger had gotten off in Athens, apparently leaving the deadly cargo aboard.

The flying public was told that a repeat of the above incident is improbable because all aircraft are inspected between long-haul flights, and a bomb left aboard would be discovered. Actually, most aircraft are only *cleaned* between flights, and security inspections aren't made. A sniffing dog could have swept the airliner for explosives in a matter of minutes.

The airlines regale people with promises that technological advances will soon ensure air-travel security. But a security program is only as good as the people who implement it.

### Adjustment Problems

The first thing I check when conducting security surveys is the ratio of funds present for equipment vs. funds spent on training and supervision of security personnel. As one would suspect, those ratios are overwhelmingly equipment-heavy. Security-equipment manufacturers correctly note that in the long term, equipment-intensive security is cheaper than personnel-intensive security. But the point is security itself. A good program requires a proper mix of equipment, personnel, training and supervision.

Many of the delays experienced by international passengers in recent months stem from the adjustment problems that undermanned security teams have encountered when they have tightened procedures. Over time, a \$5 security surcharge levied by the major airlines should permit the hiring of greater numbers of security personnel and lead to improvements in processing procedures.

U.S. air carriers will convince customers to return to international travel if the airlines provide assurances of better anti-terrorist security. The ball is in their court.

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from 17,000 to 2,000.

Europeans are especially mindful of the loss of American tourist dollars which will run into the billions this summer. While there has been a moderate increase in U.S. tourism in Europe, it is mostly among the young who do not spend much money. Older, higher-spending Americans have decided to stay home or go elsewhere this summer.

There is a bigger lesson than econo-

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER

# The Libyan raid, four months later



**Santa Monica, Calif.**  
Four months ago this Friday, American planes bombed Libya.  
What's been the result?

During an interview in his office here last week, I put that question to Rand Corporation analyst Brian M. Jenkins, one of the world's leading experts on international terrorism.

His answer was cogent, lucid — and thoroughly paradoxical.

Mr. Jenkins readily concedes that the last four months have brought "a perception that there is a lull in terrorism." He also points out that the statistics show no lull at all.

Why this cleavage of fact and appearance? The answer is as complex as it is fascinating.

In the nine months preceding the bombing, notes Jenkins, public frustration had been escalating. The surge began with the 17-day hostage-taking aboard TWA Flight 847 on June 14. It was further fueled by the Achille Lauro seajacking Oct. 7, the EgyptAir hijacking on Oct. 10, the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports on Dec. 27, and the explosion aboard TWA Flight 840 as it approached Athens airport April 2. The targets, in the main, had been ordinary citizens. Americans responded with a new fierceness of mood: In the week before the air raid, a private poll Jenkins helped to prepare showed Americans favoring military action against terrorists and their state sponsors by a margin of 2 to 1.

As pressure for action built, so the

choice of possible targets — nations that aided and abetted terrorists — narrowed. The Libyan-American contretemps grew into "a personal verbal duel between President Reagan and [Colonel Muammar] Qaddafi" that in its name-calling took on, quips Jenkins, "the kind of hype that precedes a professional wrestling match on TV."

In that game of hype and counter-hype, he notes, Qaddafi provided the "perfect villain [with] his threats, his one-liners, his kaffiyeh, his sunglasses, his jump-suits. If Hollywood [had] invented a villain, it could not have done better than Muammar Qaddafi." And, as Jenkins notes wryly, "All drama requires a villain."

## PERSPECTIVES

That sounds facetious. In fact, it's wholly serious. What made the attack possible was the force of public opinion. And public opinion seemed to need for its target not an abstraction but a specific person — however fictionalized that person might be. In the months preceding the bombing, Jenkins recalls, "People didn't talk much about combating terrorism. People talked about smacking Qaddafi."

The colonel, then, was a ripe target. But was he really a culprit or just an overbearing blowhard? Could his hand really be seen behind the recent spate of terrorist incidents? The links are fuzzy at best. But that's not the point. What mattered, in the administration's view, was the principle that America could and would defend itself.

What's been the result? For one thing, the equation has been changed, perhaps permanently. "No government in the future," says Jenkins, "is going to be able to think about [sponsoring terrorism] without taking into account the possibility [of military reprisal]." The raid also served to "galvanize the Europeans into action" — partly out of solidarity, partly out of alarm that the United States might repeat such actions. On the negative side, the raid provoked widespread resentment in Europe, fostered the image of an America sending billions of dollars of equipment

to blast a tiny third-world country, and further radicalized some elements in the Middle East — as evidenced in last week's carefully orchestrated attack on a British airbase in Cyprus by a previously unknown pro-Libyan terrorist group. So, says Jenkins, it's still too early to count the final results. It's not, however, too early to look at some numbers. And they tell a fascinating tale — one sure to disappoint those who favored the raid.

"If I compare the first six months of 1986 to the first six months of 1985," says Jenkins, "I have trouble discerning the difference." For that period in 1986, Rand figures show 227 incidents (a provisional figure that could rise slightly) compared with 243 for 1985. Nor, says Jenkins, does any slackening of the pace show up when the 10 weeks prior to April 15 are compared with the 10 weeks after.

There has, however, been a shift in the nature of the incidents — away from kidnappings and hijackings and toward armed assaults and bombings. And that may help account for the appearance of a lull. Hostage-takings, after all, can drag out into long-term dramas, while bombings flash into the news and disappear.

Jenkins also notes another important shift: a decline in incidents in Europe and the Mideast and a rise in events in South America. Terrorism is still with us, but "it's not taking place in the places that we watch carefully," he says. He notes that to much of the US news media, especially TV, "South America's invisible."

The overall result? "There is less terrorism because we are perceiving less terrorism," says Jenkins. Paradoxical? Not really. Terrorism only works if it terrorizes — and to do so, it has to be noticed.

That raises the age-old philosophical question. Does a tree falling in a forest make a sound if no one hears it? Can a terrorist event be said to occur if no one reports it? In terrorism's political theater, is there only as much terrorism as we agree to recognize?

In the long term, the raid on Libya may have accomplished much or little. One thing it has done is to remind us that terrorism is not just something that exists

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## BACKLASH...Continued

tics to be drawn from the decisive action taken by the United States against Libya last April.

The British magazine *The Economist* correctly identified it in a July 12 editorial titled "When Firmness Works." The editorial noted that standing up to Khadafy has worked so far, as did the refusal by the French to be bullied by Khadafy in Chad and America's resolve to take Soviet verbal abuse over its defense buildup and SDI research while refusing to budge.

BALTIMORE SUN 17 August 1986 Pg. 3B

# Intelligence isn't the answer

By Allan E. Goodman

**R**ecently, terrorists in France, West Germany, Spain, Portugal and Lebanon have intensified their war against governments and civilians with devastating effect. In the wake of these attacks, government spokesmen here and in Europe have called for close cooperation between national intelligence agencies to prevent what they fear will be an upsurge of terrorism, especially by small, newly formed groups of extremists.

In theory, the full and timely sharing of information that these organizations have should help both to ferret out terrorists and to prevent them from striking. In fact, the United States and most free world leaders have called since 1980 for such cooperation to combat the apparent rise in the number of terrorist groups and the lethality of their attacks.

The public cannot know how much information sharing has actually taken place or whether it has made a difference. White House sources, for example, have consistently maintained that intelligence sharing even among the most closely allied countries has been inadequate. But the theory is wrong. National intelligence agencies are poorly organized and ill-equipped to go after terrorists.

By their nature, intelligence organizations do not encourage a free flow or wide sharing of information. These organizations operate on the basis of the compartmentalization of information where dissemination is restricted to those with "a need to know." But what is needed in the war against terrorists is a base of extensive information about why such groups form and how they operate. This information will come from many sources and needs to be available to those involved in all phases of counterterrorism, ranging from analysis to prediction to arrest.

Intelligence agencies are also reluctant to share their information and sources with other countries. This aversion stems from the fear that the other countries' services have been penetrated by "moles" — double agents working for hostile countries. In light of the recent and multiple penetrations of the British, French and West German services, such fears are well founded and create

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RAID...Continued

"out there" in the world. It exists "in here" in our response to it — and raises some probing philosophical questions.

Mulling over those questions, we should remind ourselves that, when illusion exclaims, "The raid worked — look at the lull it produced!" we just might want to wait for some hard facts.

NEW YORK TIMES 22 August 1986 Pg. 23

# Cold-Blooded Killers, Not Freedom Fighters

By Irving R. Kaufman

I would venture to guess that there are few who could say with precision what we mean by "terrorism." One might well ask why we should spend our time quibbling about definitions when what is really needed is a plan of action. I submit that the issue is not simply one of semantics. Having a clear idea of the evil we seek to eradicate is, in many respects, a prerequisite to any meaningful response. Before we enact legislation to punish the political terrorist, we must know what category he fits.

The most urgent reason to develop a working definition of terrorism, however, is not to bring the terrorist to justice in a court of law, but to obtain a verdict against him in the forum of world opinion. Once it is universally accepted that the terrorist is not a heroic idealist but a moral outlaw who expresses his political grievances by slaughtering innocent civilians, perhaps the terrorist will come to realize that his actions are a liability to his cause, even if he cannot appreciate their immorality.

Terrorism is a word coined by society to deplore a particular kind of political violence that lies wholly outside of accepted conventions of warfare. The term is most frequently used to describe revolutionary violence, but established governments are certainly no strangers to the systematic terrorizing of entire populations.

The aim is to destroy the morale of a nation; the method the random murder of innocent people. Randomness is the distinctive trait. Harm

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must come by chance to unremarkable men and women, whether Americans or Britons or Jews, simply because of their nationality, religion or political affiliation. They must feel themselves fatally exposed and demand that their governments negotiate for their safety.

Since medieval times, philosophers have recognized the distinction between *jus ad bellum*, the justice of war, and *jus in bello*, justice in war. Terrorism is more a civilian strategy than what we commonly call war, but the distinction remains meaningful in this area as well. The moral reality of war is divided into two logically independent parts. We make judgments about the broader issues of aggression and self-defense; but, employing a separate calculus, we make judgments about the observance or violation of the customary and positive rules of engagement.

By the same token, we must keep distinct our feelings about the terrorist's cause, on the one hand, and the illegitimate means that he uses to advance that cause, on the other. Simply put, the random murder of innocent people is always terrorism, even when it is perpetrated by representatives of the most oppressed peoples on the face of the earth.

That this simple precept is not universally accepted was a point driven home several weeks ago when the hijackers of the Achille Lauro were sentenced by an Italian jury. By rejecting a life term for the coldblooded killer of Leon Klinghoffer, and similarly imposing relatively modest penalties on the other defendants, the jury appeared to accept the defense's arguments that the Palestinians were "soldiers fighting for their ideals" rather than terrorists. If indeed the jurors believed this, then they have sadly lost their way in the moral universe. Their veiled apology for the

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

**HAROLD W. ROOD**

NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE

25 August 1986

Pg. 9

## Are Democracies Equipped to Stop Terrorism?

Governments in constitutional democracies are ill-equipped to act against those enemies of the people or the government who hide among the general population. Constitutional governments are, by their nature, governments of limited powers. Those powers are hedged about with procedural and traditional safeguards to protect the citizen from the unwarranted exercise of authority. The safeguards that promote the freedom of the ordinary citizen shield the terrorist as well. Using that shield, the terrorist wages his war to discredit the government and to terrorize the citizen by his demonstration that the government is incapable of carrying out its obligation to provide good order and to protect the citizenry.

One group of terrorists operated in the United States for nine years. Between 1975 and 1984, in six East Coast states, the group committed 19 bombings or attempted bombings, ten bank robberies (to support their activi-

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ties), two attempted murders and one murder. The group, called the United Freedom Front, had as its stated aim the overthrow of the government of the United States.

When the United Freedom Front members are brought to trial, they will claim that they committed no crimes, but are being persecuted for acts that should be considered "political," without reference to the pain and suffering inflicted on the innocent victims of their terrorism. The robbing, killing and maiming were only means, they will say, to call to the attention of the world certain iniquities of government and society that no moderate protest could alleviate. The nine years that it has taken to bring the members of the United Freedom Front to justice are a measure of how difficult it is for democratic peoples to deal with terrorism.

In the Netherlands, in June 1977, South Moluccan terrorists seized a passenger train and a school near the town of Assen. To demonstrate goodwill and humanness, the terrorists set free the schoolchildren, but they held hostage the passengers on the train and the

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### INTELLIGENCE...Continued

an atmosphere that discourages information sharing on a truly international basis.

And because intelligence agencies are secret governmental organizations, they tend to restrict the dissemination of reports to a limited number of government officials. This means that the most vulnerable targets of the terrorists — the private businessman or traveler against whom the threat has risen over the past three years — are least likely to be warned by their governments in time to take countermeasures.

Finally, countering terrorism requires a substantial budget. But within present intelligence agencies, there are many other competing priorities that get the lion's share of resources. The units responsible for working on the problem of terrorism do not have the clout to demand more or to take away money from those units involved, for example, in high-tech collection efforts.

So while I think there is a need for an international effort to counter terrorism, I have increasing doubt that intelligence is the right discipline on which it should be based.

A better model is that of a police force.

By their nature, police departments are pro-active. They aim at explicitly deterring and catching criminals and do so by warning the civilian population of suspected threats and then by working within the populace for leads once a crime has been committed. Intelligence agencies shun working

### KILLERS...Continued

terrorists is precisely the type of thinking that we need to correct.

Terrorism has been defended on the ground that there is no alternative if oppressed peoples are to be liberated. Such assertions erase all moral distinctions. Certainly, there have been moments in history when armed struggle was necessary for the sake

in the public view and are not prepared or authorized to apprehend or pre-empt suspected terrorists.

If the experts are right about the upsurge of small-group terrorism ahead, what is needed to combat it is an "Interpol" — an international organization of police departments designed to promote and facilitate reciprocal cooperation and the exchange of information. Currently, the police forces of some 125 nations are members of Interpol.

As a first step, in fact, government leaders should consider changing Interpol's constitution to permit anti-terrorist intelligence activities. This would capitalize on the tendency for police departments to work in cooperation with one another, as they did in safeguarding the athletes and spectators at the 1984 Los Angeles Olympics and at the recent celebration of the restoration of the Statue of Liberty. Such police actions should now be greatly expanded across international boundaries if we are going to make any real progress in containing the current epidemic of terrorism.

of human freedom. But if dignity and self-respect are purported to be the outcomes of the struggle, it cannot consist of terrorist attacks upon defenseless children.

This was the principle that animated Albert Camus's powerful play, "The Just Assassins." Early in this century, a group of Russian revolutionaries decide to kill a czarist official, the Grand Duke Sergei, a man directly involved in political repression. They plan to blow up his carriage, and a young revolutionary is in place on the appointed day with a bomb hidden beneath his coat. But as the carriage approaches, he notices that the intended victim holds two small children in his lap. The would-be assassin hesitates, then walks quickly away, for he has decided to wait for another occasion. One of his comrades, accepting his decision, says, "Even in destruction, there is a right way and a wrong way — and there are limits."

In the final analysis, only the acceptance of this principle will unleash the wrath of the world upon the terrorist, and, ultimately, score a moral victory for the champions of order and civilization. He will be exposed as a killer and not as a hero fighting for the cause of freedom. □



# Anti-Kadafi Drumbeat Causes Shudders

## Lacking Broader Strategy, We Could Have Our Bluff Called

By ROBERT E. HUNTER

Throughout the week, the Reagan Administration has renewed its verbal pressure on Libya's terror-sponsoring strongman, Col. Moammar Kadafi. The tactic is variously described as a shot across the bow, a deterrent to expected terrorist acts or a means to get him to do something "irrational." Presumably the last-named would justify a U.S. response like the air raid on Libya last April 15.

That attack was supposed to teach Kadafi that crime does not pay. Strikingly, there has been no terrorism against Americans since then. This week Administration spokesmen have been telling contradictory tales about Kadafi's current intentions, but so far no "smoking gun" has been introduced in evidence. We can't know, therefore, whether the Libyan leader learned the lesson intended by the U.S. air raid.

The West European allies were also supposed to be taught that condoning the bully on the block will eventually hurt everyone. Indeed, since April there has been a bit more European cooperation. And Gen. Vernon Walters, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is being dispatched to allied nations to stimulate more support in the struggle against Libya.

Walters' trip highlights another lesson of the U.S. air raid that should have been learned but apparently wasn't. It demonstrated clearly that unilateral U.S. military action can set off a firestorm in the

Western alliance. The only ally that openly provided help was Great Britain, and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is still suffering the political aftershocks. The next time, if there is one, the United States should plan on using military resources unencumbered by allied decision—the U.S. 6th Fleet or bombers flying round trip from the United States.

Walters' visit and the Administration's new rhetorical offensive against Kadafi were thus backwards. The ambassador will arrive in Western Europe amid rekindled fears of U.S. military action against Libya that could provoke retaliation on European soil. Allied leaders recall that Walters' last mission, just before the April air raid, was ostensibly for consultations. It later transpired that critical decisions had already been taken. The United States thereby gained tactical surprise against Libya, but left many Europeans thinking that they'd been had.

The anti-Kadafi drumbeat will also affect Egypt. U.S. military relations with that country are vital if we are to be able, in a crisis, to move forces to the Persian Gulf. Survival of the government of President Hosni Mubarak is critical to hopes for Arab-Israeli peacemaking. Yet Egypt has been made vulnerable by U.S.-Egyptian joint naval exercises, even if their being held now is only a coincidence. Little love is lost on Kadafi in most of the Arab

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### DEMOCRACIES...Continued

schoolteachers for 20 days. The Dutch government attempted to negotiate for the release of the hostages. Finally, after 20 days, Royal Dutch Marines stormed the train and the schoolhouse to free the hostages. In a short, intense struggle, six terrorists were killed, two hostages were murdered by the terrorists, and seven hostages were wounded during the rescue. Eleven terrorists were captured and prosecuted.

The prime minister of the Netherlands appealed to the Dutch public for understanding of the difficult decision that the government had had to make. The Dutch minister of justice said, "I beseech you to believe there was no other way. We tried everything. . . . That violence proved necessary to put an end to the hostage seizure is something that we feel as a defeat."

The fact that the leaders of the government felt it necessary to apologize for having used force to free the

hostages illustrates the difficulty that democratic governments have in dealing with terrorism. South Molucans in the Netherlands were outraged that the government had acted so forcibly in dealing with the situation; the Dutch public held the government accountable for not having continued negotiations to achieve a peaceful settlement, for not having acted sooner, or for letting the South Moluccan community into the Netherlands in the first place.

The moment the rescue took place, attention was focused on the government and on what it should or should not have done. The terrorists and their atrocities were largely forgotten or had become irrelevant.

The essence of government in a constitutional democracy is the protection of the citizen, his rights and his property from any usurpation of freedom or property, whether by government, fellow citizens, or foreigners sent into the country for that purpose. That the citizen exercises his freedom is more important than the pres-

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DRUMBEAT...Continued

**Middle East.** But the Mubarak government is perceived as complicit in U.S. strategy against an Arab state, to no gain for Cairo and potential loss in terms of anti-American and anti-Mubarak feelings.

The Reagan Administration does face a serious problem. Because of its marriage with television, terrorism rivets American attention. This potential is shown in statistics on American travel to Europe. In part because the President has failed to put the problem into perspective—only five Americans have been killed this year—the potential for panic lies just beneath the surface.

The initiative thus continues to reside with Kadafi and other terror-sponsors, such as Syria, that have historically been more active. And the Administration risks having its bluff called by the next terrorist act: Will it use military force or leave pledges unredeemed?

Some Administration strategists apparently believe that there is value in always having a villain to distract attention, whether it be the Soviet "evil empire" until that went out of style, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Daniel Ortega and the Sandinistas, or Kadafi. But the last named can and does strike at Americans. Countering his role demands broader U.S. efforts that can eventually deny him the political initiative.

In the meantime there could be occasions when military force is needed, either to blunt a terrorist action or to exact a penalty. But the dilemmas must be faced foursquare. It is rarely easy to collect and present evidence. Military action often kills civilians and thus undercuts its own purpose. The American people in general are reluctant to condone preemptive attack. And U.S. diplomacy, especially in Europe, can be damaged if action appears either rash or disproportionate. In short, any saber-rattling must be part of a clear, conscious, coordinated strategy for dealing with Kadafi and his ilk.

The slipshod way in which the anti-Kadafi campaign has been conducted this week raises doubts that such a strategy exists or that its execution is under effective control. Nor is there evidence of commitment to a longer-range policy to take the political initiative away from the terrorists. No effort is being made to keep the threat in perspective. Cooperation with allies, essential for lasting success, is obviously not top priority. And the Reagan Administration still refuses to play the key U.S. role in Arab-Israeli peacemaking. That role is essential to help eradicate a

DEMOCRACIES...Continued

ervation of perfect order within the community. In fact, the best order possible is that enforced by the citizens themselves, who, jealous of their own rights, see good reason to protect the rights of others.

The intention of the terrorist is to disrupt order, to demonstrate that the rights of citizens and the upholding of the law are of no account when measured against that which the terrorist sets out to accomplish. Typically, the terrorist will commit some atrocity to show his contempt for humanity and his willingness to be brutal; then he will demand that the government do something that it may not lawfully do or that it is powerless to do.

What terrifies is the pure ruthlessness with which victims are treated and the evident fearlessness of the terrorist to kill and to accept death himself. Thus is demonstrated both the power of the terrorist and the weakness of the government. If the government accedes to the terrorist's demands in order to gain release of hostages, the government is weak; if the government uses major force to rescue hostages, and some are injured or killed, the government has harmed those whom it is supposed to protect. The terrorist is careless of the outcome, because government is discredited either way; good order is shattered and fear comes to rule rather than reason.

Fear is the stock-in-trade of terrorists. Fear renders its victims helpless and submissive. Governments that suffer terrorization of their citizens, fearful of what folks will say if they do otherwise, render the terrorist successful. Terrorists are not nice chaps somewhat overenthusiastic in support of a cause; they are the precursors of barbarism, and they must be treated as such. Ordinary citizens are the fount of courage and defiance in democratic societies, and they must be copy to those who rule in their name. Only courage and defiance can render the terrorist innocuous and frustrate his ambitions and those of his masters.

**primary cause of Middle East terrorism and to ensure that the United States is taken seriously in the region.**

The Administration's current offensive against Kadafi may be based on hard intelligence about impending terrorist acts. If so, the difficulties in orchestrating its actions are even more baffling. The anti-terrorism campaign must be seen as more than an effort, episodically, to deal with domestic fears. Only a comprehensive strategy applied coherently can build credibility abroad when force is called for.

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# Maritime Terrorism, 1985

By Scott C. Truver

Terrorism struck on the high seas in 1985 with a heightened degree of brutality and senselessness. Adding a new twist to the persistent problem, there even was a new kind of terrorist act which appeared to be sanctioned, and perhaps even sponsored, by a democratic government. Two limpet mines were exploded on 10 July in the anti-nuclear protest ship *Rainbow Warrior*, in Auckland, New Zealand, harbor (opposite page, top) by terrorists who later were found to be agents of the French Government acting under orders. One man was killed in the incident. On 7 October, four men seized the passenger liner *Achille Lauro*, shown opposite moored in Genoa, Italy; they wounded two passengers and later killed and threw overboard a wheelchair confined American passenger, Leon Klinghoffer. The four later were apprehended after a cross-Mediterranean chase and force-down by F-14 fighter planes from the U. S. Sixth Fleet carrier *Saratoga*.

Nearly 182 years after Lieutenant Stephen Decatur and his men burned the captured frigate *Philadelphia* in Tripoli harbor, a much later generation of U. S. Navy men clandestinely approached an EgyptAir Boeing 737 carrying four modern pirates from the Palestine Liberation Front.<sup>1</sup> These four members of the PLF-Abul Abbas faction had seajacked the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, terrorized 438 passengers and crew, and brutally killed Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly, disabled New Yorker. At about 2330 on Thursday, 10 October 1985, four F-14 Tomcats from the carrier *Saratoga* (CV-60) pounced on the Egyptian aircraft over the Mediterranean, south of Crete. The American pilots ordered the astonished EgyptAir pilot to follow them to Sigonella Naval Air Station in Sicily, putting an abrupt end to the previously jubilant Palestinians' thoughts of freedom.

"WE BAG THE BUMS!" exclaimed the banner headline of the New York *Daily News*. Senator Gary Hart, who often had been a vociferous critic of large-deck aircraft carriers, commended the President for ordering the operation, calling the capture a "good example of an appropriate use of our military force."<sup>2</sup> President Reagan praised the *Saratoga's* pilots and crew and stated that they had "sent a message to terrorists everywhere" that "you can run but you can't hide."

Yet, as quickly as America's elation began, it subsided. The Italian Government had permitted—over the strenuous objections of U. S. officials—Abul Abbas, the alleged "mastermind" of the seajacking of the *Achille Lauro*, and who was also traveling on the Egyptian 737, to slip out of Italy to Yugoslavia. He then disappeared into the terrorist netherworld of the Middle East. Italian leaders rejected American criticisms of their handling of the crisis; meanwhile, Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak complained bitterly about high-handed American actions and the U. S. Navy's "piracy" of the Egyptian aircraft.

The *Achille Lauro* crisis graphically dramatized the continuing problem of terrorism along the Mediterranean littorals. It also culminated a year of maritime attacks and anti-shipping activities which included pirate assaults on Vietnamese boat people and a U. S. Military Sealift Command tanker, the almost desultory "tanker war" in the Persian Gulf that by year's end had expanded to Iranian Navy visits and searches of foreign shipping in the Gulf of Oman, and the bizarre sinking of the Greenpeace ship *Rainbow Warrior* by French military personnel. These events, especially the attack on the *Achille Lauro*, brought strident cries for increased governmental action to safeguard maritime transportation. Most fundamentally, however, these assaults illuminated the great vulnerability of ships on the high seas, in coastal areas,

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## MARITIME...Continued



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and in ports to new and ancient scourges against all civilized nations.

#### 1985—A "Banner Year" for Terrorism

The State Department reported that in 1985 there were nearly 700 international terrorist incidents, a 33% increase over the average level of the previous five years.<sup>3</sup> More than 150 Americans were killed or wounded, U. S. Navy Steelworker Second Class Robert Stethem in Beirut, on the hijacked TWA flight 847, and Leon Klinghoffer perhaps most brutally. The State Department's data, however, do not break out *maritime* incidents, those directed against ships, offshore facilities, ports, and other maritime assets.

The Defense Mapping Agency's Anti-Shipping Activity Message (ASAM) system lists 15 incidents directed against ships in 1985.<sup>4</sup> The variety of the different cases points up problems of definition and imprecision of language. Not all actions taken against ships constitute "piracy," in a strict sense, while "terrorism"—which suffers from political overtones and emotional baggage—does not satisfactorily describe the circumstances of certain incidents. Was the capture of the *Achille Lauro* piracy, or merely bungled terrorism? The attack on the MSC-chartered *Falcon Countess*: *piracy jure gentium* for which all civilized nations have a responsibility to apprehend the perpetrators, or a municipal problem to be resolved by the flag state of the ship and the coastal state in whose jurisdiction the crime took place? The sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior* by French agents—was this "state-supported terrorism" or something else?

#### Blackbeard Lives!

Modern "piracy" in the waters of Southeast Asia has risen dramatically in the past few years. The International Maritime Bureau in London noted in mid-1985 that between 1981 and 1984 there were 179 attacks on merchant ships in the Strait of Malacca. Many more attacks—453 in

1984—were made against refugees in Thai and Malaysian waters. These trends continued into 1985. The International Maritime Organization in December 1985 reported that 15 acts of piracy and armed robbery had been committed against West German-, Greek-, and Swiss-flag ships. Many more attacks were suspected to have occurred worldwide against the ships of far more countries than just these three. In one particularly grisly incident in the South China Sea, pirates killed 50 Vietnamese boat people in a savage murder and rape attack in mid-December 1985.<sup>5</sup> Thirty survivors recalled how a "friendly" fishing crew offered to tow the refugees to Malaysia, and, after they were joined by a second fishing boat, 20 armed men boarded the Vietnamese craft and began searching for gold and other valuables. All the Vietnamese men were thrown overboard, most drowned, and all the women were raped.

Few attacks like these have been made against U. S.-flag or owned ships, even fewer against American government vessels. Yet, as "targets of opportunity," U. S. shipping is not immune to piracy and armed attack. Near midnight on 29 January 1985, for instance, the Military Sealift Command-chartered tanker *Falcon Countess* was boarded by six "pirates" brandishing knives and bayonets.<sup>6</sup> The ship was in transit from Bahrain to Guam at 13 knots when the pirates boarded from a small speedboat. Since the ship already had left the "known pirate zone," the standard MSC "pirate watch" had been secured, permitting the armed attackers to come on board unnoticed. The "pirates" rifled the ship's safe, taking nearly \$19,500, then threatened and tied up the master before fleeing. No injuries were reported, and the *Falcon Countess* continued on to Guam.

The only other armed attack against an MSC ship occurred on 10 January 1983, when the USNS *Sealift Arctic* (T-AOT-175) was boarded in the Singapore Strait. Attacking at midnight, the pirates ransacked the ship, making off with money, credit cards, clothing, and typewriters. These "seagoing muggers" look for anything of value that can be quickly turned into cash, according to an MSC spokesman.

Because of political instabilities and regional animosities in this and other "pirate-prone" areas, there are very few coordinated, official coastal-state anti-piracy activities. Proposals founder on questions of who has responsibility and who pays for the protection. For example, the government of Singapore has assumed some responsibility for policing its coastal waters by installing better radio equipment in the port to receive messages of attacks and to warn other ships. Yet, the raids are usually so quick that any information is useless by the time it is received by the authorities; the attackers have disappeared long before a response can be mounted. Singapore also has rejected calls for it to conduct "anti-pirate" patrols in the Phillip Channel in the Strait of Malacca—the biggest trouble spot, as it is only 1,400 yards wide and ships must slow to make the passage. Singapore has noted that the channel is outside its jurisdiction and that responsibility lies with the Indonesian Government.<sup>7</sup>

The answer in these instances seems to be self-help. Although all states have an obligation under international

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

MARITIME...Continued

law to apprehend pirates as criminals against mankind, widespread unwillingness to do so has made unilateral action perhaps the only means to ensure safe transits of dangerous waters. The Military Sealift Command and the U. S. Maritime Administration (MarAd) have prepared guidelines for anti-pirate plans. MarAd's "Piracy Countermeasures" pamphlet warns: (1) Anticipate Trouble, (2) Be Vigilant, and (3) Don't be Heroic. MarAd advises that countermeasures should be designed to keep boarders off the ship, rather than repelling armed attackers already on the deck, and that high-pressure water hoses should be ready at likely boarding places when at sea and in port. The use of bright searchlights to illuminate sides, bows, and quarters, and to dazzle suspects, is another of several practical measures to be implemented.


Rainbow Terrorism and the State

The Maritime Administration chose not to define "political terrorism" in its "Piracy Countermeasures" pamphlet, perhaps because the authors believed that acts which are "clearly political terrorism" would be unambiguous to all observers.

That, *clearly*, is not the case. Depending on perspective, a "terrorist" act either could be praised as a legitimate attack by "freedom fighters," intent on furthering their just cause, or condemned as a cowardly act by murderers and criminals. A description of terrorism as the threat or actual use of criminal violence against persons or property with the goal of furthering a political or ideological objective often is confused by such popular terms as "low-intensity conflict," "war without fronts," "undeclared war," and "unconventional warfare." The confusion is compounded by official government definitions that seek to include the concept of state support of terrorist activities. Libya's Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi charged in late January 1986 that the exercises of the Sixth Fleet near the Gulf of Sidra "... proved that America is practicing state-organized terrorism against a small, stable and peaceful country like Libya and is threatening the peace in the Mediterranean."<sup>8</sup> Such an accusation is, from an American perspective, outrageous on several counts, not the least of which is Qaddafi's curious conception of state-sponsored terrorism.

Nevertheless, as the State Department's Director of the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, Ambassador Robert Oakley, commented in September 1985, international terrorism will persist because "... in an age when weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare too costly, terrorism is viewed by certain countries as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies with little or no retaliatory action."<sup>9</sup>

So, apparently, the planners of the attack on the *Rainbow Warrior* thought. As the London journal *The Economist* described the events leading up to the 10 July 1985 mining of the Greenpeace ship—during which a crewman/photographer was killed—and the political maneuvering in Paris that came after it:



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"By its blundering violence in New Zealand, France's secret service has damaged both the political standing of its president and the good name of its country. The hit-persons from Corsica who did the murder on the *Rainbow Warrior* put France in the same squalid category as Libya, Bulgaria, and the [Palestinians] who killed the yachts people in Larnaca. . . . Can more reasonable Frenchmen do anything to put their country back where it belongs, among the democracies whose armed agents are under due discipline?"<sup>10</sup>

France had been testing nuclear weapons on its Pacific territory of Mururoa Atoll since 1966, without incident. However, in 1985 eight South Pacific countries, including New Zealand and Australia, signed a treaty declaring the region a nuclear-free zone. Exacerbating French sensitivities to regional issues, including the independence movement on New Caledonia, the leaders of the eight states vocally denounced France's policy of conducting tests in their backyards.

Later, the environmentalist group Greenpeace sent its flagship, the *Rainbow Warrior*, to New Zealand to lead a protest flotilla to the French test site. While the ship was fitting out in Auckland harbor, on 10 July two limpet mines exploded, sinking the ship and killing Fernando Pereira, a Dutch citizen. Five days later, two members of France's foreign intelligence service, *Direction Generale de la Securite Exterieur*e (DGSE), Captain Dominique Prieur and Major Alain Mafart, were arrested and charged with murder. New Zealand accused France of masterminding the attack and, on 21 September, French Prime Minister Laurent Fabius admitted that French agents were responsible and had acted "on orders."<sup>11</sup>

Although President François Mitterand learned on 17 July that the two French agents had been taken into custody, the government took no official action to learn more about the affair—dubbed "Rainbowgate," "UnderWater-

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## MARITIME...Continued

gate" and "Watergate on the Seine" by the French press—until early August, when the government's initial investigation by Bernard Tricot was launched. In his 25 August report, Tricot concluded that five DGSE agents in two separate teams had been dispatched to Auckland, but only for "surveillance" and not for sabotage. This interpretation was widely rejected, because four of the five captive or fugitive agents were veteran combat divers in the DGSE. If only "surveillance" was intended, why employ these specialists? The Tricot report also revealed that the Army Chief of Staff, General Jean Saulnier, had authorized \$219,000 for the *surveillance* operation while he was President Mitterand's personal military advisor.

The influential Paris journal *Le Monde* indicated that other, even more senior French officials knew of, and may even have authorized, the operation. *Le Monde* reported that a third team of two French divers actually carried out the attack, placing the limpets on the *Rainbow Warrior's* hull in the early morning on 10 July, then leaving by commercial airliner the next day. The explosives had been smuggled into New Zealand on board the yacht *Ouvea*, which arrived in Auckland harbor sometime after 22 June but left on 9 July. The two DGSE agents arrested were providing surveillance and logistics support to the other teams, and, after the sinking, disposed of the attack team's diving gear. Based on several leaks from within the French military and the Interior Ministry, *Le Monde* suggested that Defense Minister Charles Hernu, DGSE Chief Admiral Pierre Lacoste, and General Saulnier were the originators of, or at least authorized, the attack.

The government did not deny *Le Monde's* articles. More news of the affair then came from New Zealand, where police named yet another DGSE officer, Commander Louis-Pierre Dillais, as the apparent overall tactical leader of the attack. The commandant of the DGSE combat divers' school in Corisca, Dillais was said to have arrived in Auckland in early July and stayed, under the pseudonym "Dormond," in a hotel room with a clear view of the *Rainbow Warrior*. "Dormond" checked out and left the country on the day of the sinking.

President Mitterand could take no more. He ordered Prime Minister Fabius to undertake a full-scale shake-up of the intelligence services. Admiral Lacoste was fired by Hernu, who immediately resigned "under pressure," protesting that he did not give the order to sink the ship, although he privately indicated he had opposed the entire concept as a "stupid idea," but was "overridden by a higher authority." The housecleaning continued by Hernu's successor, Paul Quiles, who on 23 September announced that key documents on the Greenpeace affair were missing from Defense Ministry files, implying that Hernu could have been involved in a cover-up. Meanwhile, five DGSE agents were arrested for leaking classified information to the newspapers; they were likely to be the only people to go to trial in France. In late September, Roland Dumas, the Foreign Minister, summed up the government's view of further investigations when he said the quest for the truth must not be allowed to harm France's security. Official efforts then turned to persuading New Zealand to release Prieur and Mafart.

The two French agents, who earlier had been charged with the murder of Pereira, on 4 November pleaded guilty to manslaughter. New Zealand's Solicitor General, Paul Neazor, allowed the charges to be reduced because Prieur and Mafart were not personally responsible for placing the explosives on the ship and had no intention to kill. Neazor noted, however, that the guilty pleas meant a "significant acceptance of the consequences of the sabotage."

Those consequences were announced on 22 November when New Zealand Chief Justice Sir Roland Davidson sentenced the DGSE officers to ten years' imprisonment. Davidson stated that the lengthy terms—levied in the face of intense French pressure for the agents' early release—were intended "to give clear warning to persons such as the defendants and their masters that terrorist-style actions will provoke stern reaction and severe punishment."<sup>12</sup>

"And their masters" is the key phrase. In France the questions were asked, "What did the President know, and when did he know it?" Public opinion polls showed that even though most French citizens believed Mitterand knew about "l'affaire Greenpeace" from the outset, only 20% thought he should resign because of personal culpability. While 78% of those polled described the sinking of the ship as "unacceptable," only one in five believed the entire controversy would have any lasting domestic political effect like that of Watergate in the United States. Although France did promise immediately to pay compensation to the family of the man killed in the attack, and in late December agreed to enter into negotiations with Greenpeace for the sinking of the *Rainbow Warrior* (which was repaired and refloated at the end of September), much of the public response in France, aside from the press, was muted. Nearly two-thirds of the people admitted to a "weak" interest in the story.

The concept of *raison d'etat*—that the state has the right to resort to any measures to protect its own interests and those of the nation—certainly came into play. Major opposition parties refrained from exploiting the scandal partly out of concern that they might weaken and demoralize the military establishment. They also worried that attacking Mitterand's government on this issue—linked as it was to nuclear testing—could indirectly undermine broad public support for the *force de frappe*, France's independent nuclear deterrent, with which the President was strongly identified. Former President Valery Giscard d'Estaing explained his silence by the comment, "right or wrong, it's my country;" the Neo-Gaullist Party headed by Jacques Chirac issued a statement saying it "had no intention of lending itself to a domestic political polemic in an area involving the national interest, France's position in the world and its defense."<sup>13</sup> Many seemed to regard the objective of "surveillance" of the Greenpeace group thoroughly justified, in light of its well-publicized intent to disrupt nuclear tests on Mururoa; most condemned the "overzealous" action of employing limpet mines to thwart the protest.

Yet, even that analysis begs the principal question. In terms of *state* support of the attack, whether Mitterand himself knew of the plans beforehand, or learned about them only during the crisis, does not absolve the govern-

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## MARITIME...Continued

ment from blame. After all, \$219,000 of government money was allocated to the scheme, and all involved were public officials and active-duty military personnel. Perhaps the agents were guilty of going beyond their original orders of mere surveillance, as some observers in France suggested. They still were acting "on orders" from the top, and that should have required some greater degree of control from their political superiors than evidently was the case. Or perhaps something more than simply surveillance was intended.

The original objective may not have been "state-terrorism," but in the end Greenpeace surely was terrorized by agents of a state which must be appraised as overreacting to the threatened presence of environmentalists at Mururoa. The fact that France was quick to accept responsibility and provide compensation underscored *The Economist's* judgment that, "Punishing guilty individuals is, in this affair of state, less important than seeing that justice is done to the victims of state terrorism, by the state that perpetrated it."<sup>14</sup>

How much more difficult it is to bring to justice those who embrace terrorism and remain outside of the community of nations, but at the same time are given shelter by governments! In the Greenpeace incident—while two high-ranking French government officials lost their jobs (Hernu apparently only temporarily), and five military officers (who may still go to jail for their crime) were charged with divulging state secrets—only two relatively low-level people involved in the attack itself were convicted for their participation, and this by another democratic state. In one other case of maritime terrorism in 1985, only by the most fortuitous of circumstances, including quick and thorough planning, and a flawless execution of the trap, were four international terrorists brought to justice.

Cruise to Terror

Everything seemed in order at Genoa's *duomo* the morning of 3 October; the passports of four of the men looked good, and who cared if they did not appear to be Canadian, Norwegian, or Argentine? They were orderly and patient, and seemed to look for guidance to a fifth man, a "Greek," who had taken several trips on the *Achille Lauro* earlier in the year, purportedly on behalf of his Athens travel agency.<sup>15</sup>

As it turned out, the men, who "didn't act like tourists," according to some of their fellow-passengers, had managed easily to bring aboard several AK-47s, handguns, and hand grenades. There were no metal detectors or equipment to X-ray the luggage, and no port official seems personally to have inspected their bags in Genoa. The *Achille Lauro* then sailed for Naples, with the five men staying largely to themselves in cabin 82. After steaming from Naples to Syracuse, the Italian cruise ship headed for Alexandria, Egypt, where about 625 of the 748 passengers disembarked. At each port, security was nonexistent; people freely came on board without any attempt by the ship's officers or port officials to screen them. The Greek, "Omar" as he was known to some of the Ameri-

cans on board, left the ship in Alexandria while his four friends continued on their voyage. The *Achille Lauro* set course for Port Said.

At about 1330 on Monday, 7 October, a waiter entered cabin 82, found the four men cleaning their weapons, and all hell broke loose. Grabbing the waiter, the four bolted from their cabin and made their way into the ship's dining room, spraying bullets and injuring two passengers. All passengers except one, who remained hidden, were herded into the dining room and then to the salon. American and British passengers were separated from the rest of the hostages, but a hunt for Israeli citizens turned up no one. The terrorists then stormed the bridge, taking command of the ship from her captain, Gerardo de Rosa, who remained at gunpoint throughout the ordeal. The ship headed toward Syria.

Back in Washington, early morning reports of the seizure were sketchy. Almost immediately, however, plans were set in motion to dispatch to the Mediterranean a Navy SEAL team and commandos from Delta Force, while a "Burning Wind" RC-135 intelligence-gathering aircraft began monitoring communications between the seajackers and the shore. The United States contacted the governments of all likely sanctuaries—Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus—and requested them not to permit the *Achille Lauro* to dock at their ports; Cyprus reportedly extinguished Larnaca's harbor lights when the ship was thought to be offshore. Italian and American warships began to follow the seajacked cruise ship. The USS *Scott* (DDG-995) cut short a port visit to Haifa to trail her, and the *Saratoga's* air wing was put on alert as she steamed in the northern Ionian Sea.

Shortly after taking control of the *Achille Lauro*, the terrorists made demands for the release of 50 Palestinians held in Israel. These included members of the Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) "elite" terrorist group, Force 17. Another was Samir Sami Kurtar, the "Hero of Nahariya," a particularly bloody attack mounted against Israel by the pro-Arafat faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) headed by Muhammad Zaidan Abbas, better known as Abul Abbas.

By the early afternoon of Tuesday, 8 October, the seajackers were becoming impatient with their negotiations with Damascus, as the terrorists had tried to dock at the Syrian port of Tartus, but were refused. At around 1430 (local), the seajackers demanded sanctuary, warning: "We cannot wait any longer; we will start killing." A half-hour later there was still no word from Syrian authorities, and the ship's radio broadcast, "We threw the first body in the water after shooting him in the head. Minutes from now we will follow up with the second one. Do not worry, Tartus, we have a lot of them here."<sup>16</sup> Leon Klinghoffer apparently had been singled out for murder because he was a Jew and an American. The Syrians were unmoved; "Go back where you came from," a Syrian official radioed the terrorists. Captain de Rosa was ordered to head his ship south toward Egypt.

The United States already had reiterated its long-standing policy toward terrorism—no deals—with the Mediterranean countries principally involved in the crisis: Egypt,

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MARITIME...Continued

Israel, and Italy. Urging area governments not to yield on any point, Washington stated it would participate in "discussions" about the safety of the hostages, so long as they were not linked to any leniency toward the terrorists. All were agreed, moreover, that Cairo was to take the lead in any "discussions" with the four Palestinians, and would place the safety of the hostages foremost. Significant disagreement soon surfaced among Egypt, Italy, and the United States, however, over the question of punishing the "pirates."

Tuesday evening the seajackers established communications with Cairo. PLO leader Yassir Arafat, who early had condemned the "piracy," offered Egypt assistance in talking with the four men on board the *Achille Lauro*. PLO headquarters in Tunis had quickly issued a denunciation of the attack, declaring that the PLO had "no relationship to this operation or to any terrorist group, and we are trying our best to resolve it." Arafat ordered Abul Abbas, a close associate and member of the PLO executive committee in Tunis, to Cairo to join Hani el Hassan, Arafat's political advisor, in helping Mubarak end the crisis. As the leader of the PLF faction to which the terrorists belonged, Abbas already had been in radio contact with the ship, and had ordered the four men to return the *Achille Lauro* to Port Said.

On the morning of Wednesday, 9 October, Abbas' PLF issued a statement from Nicosia, confirming Israeli conjectures that the "aim of the operation was not to hijack the ship or its passengers." Rather, the real aim was a "specified Israeli military target . . . to avenge the martyrs of the [1 October] Israeli raid on Tunis." Several days after the seajacking ended and he had given the Americans the slip, Abbas told reporters in Belgrade that the gunmen had not intended to take over the *Achille Lauro*, but that the "real target" was Ashdod, Israel, the ship's original port of call after Alexandria and Port Said. The four terrorists had planned to stay on board the ship while the other passengers disembarked for tours. The "suicide operation inside occupied territory" called for the four to wait until night, leave the ship surreptitiously, and attack oil storage facilities and a munitions depot in the port. Only when they were discovered did they panic and commandeer the *Achille Lauro*. Their demands for the release of Palestinians held by Israel were merely an afterthought, a reaction to the new situation facing them, and not part of an original plan to be carried out by capturing the ship.

Gradually the outlines of a deal—resisted strongly by U. S. diplomatic personnel in Cairo—between the seajackers and Egypt, and supported by Italy, became known early Wednesday morning. It called for the terrorists to release the ship and all passengers and crew unharmed, in return for an Egyptian guarantee of safe conduct to wherever they desired to go. Abbas and el Hassan now were negotiating directly with the seajackers, first by radio from the shore, then actually on board the *Achille Lauro*. Captain de Rosa, his ship off Port Said since late Tuesday night, had issued the statement that "everybody is in good health . . . everybody is OK." (He later admitted that he had a gun to his head and already knew at that time about

Klinghoffer's murder.) That was sufficient reassurance for the ambassadors of West Germany and Italy, who signed a document, requested by Egypt's Foreign Minister, endorsing the deal worked out by Egypt and the PLO/PLF negotiators. U. S. Ambassador Nicholas Veliotos vehemently rejected the agreement.

The seajackers surrendered at 1700 Wednesday, leaving the ill-fated ship in triumph. The *Achille Lauro* docked at Port Said about 2000, and several hours later the truth about Klinghoffer was known. Despite PLO/PLF claims that he had died from a heart attack, or even that Mrs. Klinghoffer had pushed him into the sea to collect insurance, his body washed ashore near Tartus on 13 October, and an autopsy revealed he had been shot at close range in the head and back.<sup>17</sup>

Early Thursday morning, Ambassador Veliotos on an open radio circuit from the ship ordered a subordinate to "tell the foreign minister that we demand that they prosecute these sons of bitches!" Meguid stood firm, however, announcing that the seajackers already had left Egypt, but, had they known about Klinghoffer, neither Mubarak nor he would have ever considered releasing the murderers. At 1000 Mubarak confirmed that "they left the country, I don't know where they went . . . maybe Tunisia."

". . . But You Can't Hide"

There were nagging reports, however, that the four terrorists were still in Cairo, in Abbas's company, that Thursday morning, 10 October. Around 0930 (EDT), U. S. intelligence sources indicated that the four were in Egypt, at the Al Maza military airbase east of Cairo and that no decision had yet been made with the PLO as to where the four would be taken. Vice Admiral John Poin-dexter, then deputy director of the National Security Council, notified his boss, Robert McFarlane, that his staff had conceived a plan to divert the Egyptian aircraft to Sicily and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff representative on the U. S. counter-terrorism task force had confirmed that the Sixth Fleet could do the job.<sup>18</sup> Planning for the operation then began in earnest. By 1100 (EDT), intelligence confirmed that the terrorists would use a Boeing 737 from Al Maza—even the plane's tail number and name of its pilot were supplied—to fly to Tunis. The NSC staff had agreed on an operation which would have F-14s from the *Saratoga* intercept and escort the Egyptian plane to Sigonella, where the Navy's SEAL Team Six members would capture the terrorists.

McFarlane briefed President Reagan on the plan about noon, in Chicago. Although he wanted the specific rules of engagement to be clarified before any action was taken, the President agreed in principle with the plan so long as no innocent lives were threatened. Memories of the Soviet destruction of the Korean Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983 were still vivid; there would be no repetition of that disaster.

The *Saratoga* had been ordered to turn south, toward Crete, and at about 2015 (local), the first E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft was launched. Sources in

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**1 THE PLAN****2 SEARCH**

U.S. carrier *Saratoga* launches F14 fighters, E2C control planes, and KA6D tankers. Egyptian civilian airliner takes off from Cairo and is tracked by U.S. radars.

**3 CONTACT**

Navy fighters intercept Egyptian 737 with four hijackers on board 80 miles south of Crete.

**4 CAPTURE**

Four F14s surround Egyptian plane and force it to fly to Sicily. Landing is held up when air traffic controller who had not been alerted refused to let them land. A call from Rome allows landing.

THE WASHINGTON POST JOHNSTONE DUNNAN

MARITIME...Continued

Cairo had indicated that the Egyptian 737 would take off at about 2200, so this allowed sufficient time for the Hawkeye to set an airborne "gate" south of Crete and begin surveying every aircraft taking off from Egypt. Steaming in company with the *Saratoga* was the cruiser *Yorktown* (CG-48), whose SPY-1A radar and Aegis combat system gave the total picture of all air activity over the central Ionian Sea and south beyond the North African coastline. Another Hawkeye was launched, as were seven F-14 Tomcats from the *Saratoga's* VF-74 and VF-103 squadrons, and an EA-6B Prowler electronic-warfare aircraft from VAQ-137. All proceeded south, with the F-14s refueling several times from KA-6D tankers.

At 2215 (local), the Egyptian airliner took off, heading toward Tunisia. President Reagan already had cabled President Habib Bourguiba in Tunis, requesting him to refuse landing privileges for the 737. Similar cables were sent to Athens and Beirut, in the event that the Egyptian pilot would try to land there once Tunis was ruled out. The civilian pilot did request to land in Tunis but was refused, and a similar request to Athens also was turned down, according to communications monitored in the E-2Cs.

At this point, and after several aircraft were investigated by the F-14s, the EgyptAir plane was located and the trap sprung. Four of the Tomcats moved alongside, above and behind the aircraft carrying the *Achille Lauro* seajackers. One of the E-2Cs established voice communications with the Egyptian pilot, who immediately radioed Cairo for instructions, but all his frequencies were being jammed by the Prowler. Accepting the inevitable, he complied with "requests" from the Hawkeye and followed his escorts to

EgyptAir's Boeing 737 passenger plane was en route from Al Maza, Egypt, to Tunis with the four escaping *Achille Lauro* hijackers when it was located, identified, followed and forced by F-14 fighter aircraft from USS *Saratoga* to land at Sigonella, Sicily (page opposite), where U. S. forces and Italian *carabinieri* surrounded the plane and arrested the four. The drama of the pursuit and final capture is shown in the artist's illustration above.

## Sicily.

The security surrounding the operation was so complete that U. S. officials did not tell Italy in advance. Only when the Tomcats and their prey were about to enter Italian airspace was the Italian Government informed of what was going on. "They went crazy" at first, according to a U. S. source, and initially refused permission to land. The Italians finally acquiesced when the Egyptian pilot declared a low-fuel emergency. Once on the ground, at around 0030, the Boeing 737 was surrounded immediately by U. S. forces and Italian *carabinieri*. After several tense moments, during which neither side was willing to relinquish jurisdiction over the aircraft and its contents, the United States finally agreed to allow the Italians to take the lead in prosecuting the four terrorists. Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti assured Secretary of State George Shultz that the "pirates" would be charged with murder, although the United States would still request their extradition to America.

Indeed, the *Achille Lauro* four were charged with numerous counts of weapons violations, kidnapping, and murder. But Abul Abbas, who also was on the EgyptAir flight, was permitted to leave Italy two days later; Italian

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MARITIME...Continued

officials rejected U. S. information tying Abbas to the original plan to attack Ashdod and a warrant for his arrest. Italy and later Yugoslavia, which also spurned U. S. requests to detain and extradite Abbas, cited his carrying an Iraqi diplomatic passport and the fact that he was a member of the PLO executive committee, with which both Italy and Yugoslavia maintain good "state-like" relations, as reasons enough to let him go.

Several weeks later, however, Italian judicial authorities issued 16 arrest warrants for Abbas and several of his top aides, charging them with murder and kidnapping in the capture of the *Achille Lauro*. On 18 November, the four PLF terrorists in Italian custody received prison terms ranging from four to nine years for illegal possession of arms and explosives. Facing another trial on the charges of kidnapping and murder, three of the defendants indicated that Abbas was the "mastermind" behind the operation.<sup>19</sup> The Reagan Administration, moreover, remained adamant that a worldwide manhunt for Abbas would eventually turn him up. Abbas will be hounded until he is captured. Evoking the President's boast, ". . . but you can't hide," one-Reagan aide stated:

"His world will get smaller, travel agents will have a harder time booking him into places where he feels comfortable and, one of these days, he'll turn up in the hands of somebody who owes us one. Sooner or later somebody is going to figure it's easier to do us a favor than play games with him. And we'll be waiting."<sup>20</sup>

Countermeasures

In the wake of the *Achille Lauro* seajacking, hearings were held in the U. S. Congress, numerous resolutions were proposed, and at least five separate bills were introduced to "do something" against future attacks like this. Public opinion on the Navy's reaction to this crisis was roundly favorable—except perhaps in Cairo and the PLO headquarters—but most observers recognized this was a near-unique event. The target was clearly identified, the possibilities for "collateral damage" nearly nonexistent (except for injury to U. S. political relationships with Italy and Egypt), and the probabilities for "surgical precision" so high that such a combination of circumstances may never be encountered again.

The four incidents briefly discussed here—"piratical" attacks on the Vietnamese refugee boat in December and the MSC *Falcon Countess* in January, the state-supported terrorism of the *Rainbow Warrior* in July, and the October seajacking of the *Achille Lauro*—have only one major factor in common: each was an armed attack in a maritime setting. Only two can be considered instances of piracy, and even this judgment is conditional upon the exact locus of the attack. For an act to be piracy, it must:<sup>21</sup>

- ▶ Take place on the high seas or in any place outside the jurisdiction of any state;
- ▶ Be an illegal act of violence, detention, or any act of depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship (or a crew that has mutinied and taken over a public vessel) or aircraft against another

ship or aircraft.

According to these rules, the attack on the Vietnamese refugees or the *Falcon Countess* may not have been an act of piracy if either occurred within the territorial jurisdiction of any coastal state. Clearly, the *Rainbow Warrior* attack was not piracy because it was carried out by public officials, for a public purpose (however despicable), and in the internal waters of another state.

Neither was the *Achille Lauro* takeover piracy, because it was not committed for private ends by a private ship against another ship. The PLF, as an allied organization of the PLO, has a "public status" recognized by some states, although this is extremely controversial. Clearly, the four who commandeered the *Achille Lauro*, even though they were in the end only trying to save their own skins, were acting according to overtly political objectives. In this regard, the *Achille Lauro* seajacking is akin to the 1961 seizure of the *Santa Maria*, a Portuguese cruise ship, by rebels who were later granted political asylum by Brazil. The purposes of the rebels in commandeering the ship could not be described as "private ends" and the attack was not by one vessel against another. Indeed, Italy has explicitly recognized this fact, charging the *Achille Lauro* seajackers with weapons offenses, kidnappings, and murder, but not piracy.

Some observers have argued, nevertheless, that a modern law of piracy should be expanded to cover acts of maritime terrorism that are conducted outside the normal territorial jurisdiction of states and that do not fall neatly within the traditional rule of piracy.<sup>22</sup> In these views, the objective would be to examine the acts of the maritime terrorist, rather than the political causes behind the acts. If these acts are clearly inimical to the safety of ships and the peace and good order of the maritime environment, then the obligation of all states to suppress piracy (itself not universally accepted) becomes the basis for state activities to suppress maritime terrorism. In this manner, whether against pirates or terrorists-at-sea, the high seas would not be allowed to become an "area of anarchy and crime."<sup>23</sup>

An approach of this sort would seem to make a significant contribution to maritime order by mobilizing the power of many states and expanding the areas and persons subject to common rules against maritime terrorism. It would certainly have sanctioned the U. S. Navy's interception of the EgyptAir 737 carrying the maritime terrorists—the legality, but not morality, of which was questioned even by some of America's allies, who still applauded the operation.

Another approach to protecting maritime transportation, against both pirates and terrorists, has been taken by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). At its 13th Assembly in November 1983, the IMO adopted a resolution which recognized the grave danger to life and the navigational risks caused by piracy, and it urged all governments to take "as a matter of the highest priority" measures necessary to "to prevent and suppress acts of piracy and armed robbery from ships," including "strengthening of security measures." The IMO Council kept the matter under review, to take any action necessary in light of "developments."

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MARITIME...Continued

The *Achille Lauro* crisis crystallized opinion within the IMO for additional measures. From the release of the ship in mid-October until the November 1985 IMO assembly, the U. S. State Department and Coast Guard mounted an intensive, three-week effort to convince other IMO member states of the critical need for internationally agreed-upon *technical* measures to protect shipping from armed attacks. At its 14th Assembly in November, the IMO adopted a U. S.-sponsored initiative designed to improve physical security practices on board ships and in ports.<sup>24</sup> The resolution called upon the IMO's Maritime Safety Council (MSC) to prepare detailed and practical security guidelines and measures which may be employed by governments, port administrations, shipowners, ship masters, and crews. Despite the smoldering political row over the handling of the *Achille Lauro* affair, both Italy and Egypt (along with six other states) co-sponsored the resolution drafted by the United States.

The United States took the initiative to prepare the draft technical measures taken up by the IMO/MSC at its 27 January–5 February 1986 meeting in London. This draft was a product of the combined efforts of the U. S. Government—State Department and Coast Guard—U. S. maritime industry—ship owners/operators and terminal/port authorities—and security professionals, to arrive at suitable *technical*, as opposed to political and legal, measures to protect shipping interests against unlawful acts. The focus of these measures is on *prevention*, to control access to vessels whether at sea or in port, and to arrive at internationally agreed-upon measures which can quickly be adopted by member governments.

By taking the IMO/MSC approach it was possible to have these measures approved at the early 1986 meetings of the MSC. They can be implemented as soon as the fall

of 1986. It then will be the responsibility of member states to enact the national legislation to give force to these international standards. An alternate approach, such as an international convention, would require many years to come into force internationally.

Whatever the ultimate fate of these proposals, the control of piracy, maritime terrorism, or, if one prefers, "armed attacks against ships," will be a continuing problem for the United States and the international community. It will undoubtedly be a long, arduous battle. The concept of pirates as the enemy of all mankind can be traced to ancient Greece and Rome. The new scourge of maritime terrorism, a modern form of piracy in a political guise, will certainly be as difficult to combat as the ancient curse has been. But only if these new threats to maritime security and order are recognized, and the challenge is accepted by all civilized nations, will the oceans be prevented from regressing to anarchy and crime.

<sup>1</sup>Nathan Miller, *The U. S. Navy: An Illustrated History* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1977), pages 54, 59.

<sup>2</sup>*Washington Post*, 12 October 1985, page A20.

<sup>3</sup>Data supplied by the Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning, 13 January 1986.

<sup>4</sup>Information supplied by DMAHT, Notice to Mariners Branch, 8 January 1986. The ASAM system is new, and DMA acknowledges it contains only partial data lists.

<sup>5</sup>*Washington Post*, 26 December 1985, page A43.

<sup>6</sup>MSC Press Release, PAO-1-3-85, 30 January 1985; "Fending Off Modern-Day Pirates," *Navy Times & Undersea Technology*, 15 March 1985, pages 1, 4.

<sup>7</sup>*Nautical Magazine*, December 1982, pages 15–16.

<sup>8</sup>*Washington Post*, 25 January 1986, page A18.

<sup>9</sup>Oakley, "Terrorism: Overview and Developments," U. S. Department of State, Current Policy No. 744, October 1985, page 2.

<sup>10</sup>*The Economist*, 28 September 1985, page 17.

<sup>11</sup>See, generally: *Washington Post* 15 September 1985, pages D1, D4; 29 September 1985, pages A22–23; 23 November 1985, pages A15–16; 24 December 1985, page A12; *Newsweek*, 30 September 1985, pages 36–37; 7 October 1985, page 42; 11 November 1985, page 34; *New York Times*, 4 November 1985, page A1, A4; *The Economist*, 7 September 1985, page 41; 21 September 1985, page 45–46; 28 September 1985, pages 44, 47.

## NOT A FORTRESS

*The new diplomatic facilities meant to thwart terrorism need not be unattractive nor interfere with the mission of the Foreign Service*

THOMAS VONIER

**W**ILL THE UNDERSTANDABLE emphasis now being placed on security for U.S. diplomatic missions lead to the construction of fortresses? Will their occupants be perhaps safer from the threats of terrorism, but at the expense of livable work surroundings and the appropriate representation of the United States? Could the State Department's tradition of fostering architectural excellence in its foreign buildings be subverted by well-intentioned security measures?

These are among the pressing questions that confront the foreign affairs agencies as they launch a major initiative to upgrade the security of their diplomatic missions. The secretary of state has wholeheartedly endorsed the recommendations made last year by his Panel on Overseas Security—the Inman commission—and a \$4.4-billion security-enhancement bill based on the panel's report is on its way to congressional approval. A majority of the funds would go toward renovating or replacing existing facilities to protect them from the dual threats of terrorism and espionage. Few would disagree that security needs the attention, but the prospect of constructing hundreds of buildings is daunting. In addition, the strict requirements the facilities will have to meet—as well as any possible restrictions on the activities of the people who will work in them—raise the question of whether the mission building of the future will affect the ability of the United States to conduct its overseas affairs.

There are other aspects of security than the design of the work environment. Residential security will be upgraded by the agencies under the new program, and personal security will receive a large portion of the new funds as well. But because their presence in for-

eign capitals and other cities is so important to the image the United States projects abroad, and because they are the place where Foreign Service personnel spend the majority of their working lives, the possible effect of security enhancement on our overseas buildings has raised a chorus of concern.


Part of the problem may stem from disagreement about priorities; some people are staunchly opposed to allowing the threats of terrorism and espionage to interfere with the sense of openness and pleasant architectural design that has traditionally been an aspect of the official U.S. presence abroad. They worry that the nature of the diplomatic mission could be jeopardized by too great an emphasis on security. "I didn't join the Foreign Service because it's the safest profession, or because I wanted to live and work only with other U.S. citizens," says one veteran of several overseas assignments, expressing sentiments he believes are shared by many colleagues. He frets over the imagined prospect of windowless offices accessible only to U.S. citizens, and over the possibility of American-only residential enclaves. On the other side are those who believe that all necessary steps must be taken to prevent injury to U.S. citizens, the compromise of vital information, or the perceived humbling of a great power that may follow an attack on a foreign post—even if added security against such threats means sacrificing architectural principles.

Each side appears to hold the mistaken view that good architectural design means poor security, or that better security will lead to less attractive buildings. Although few would oppose good architecture, some observers believe too much emphasis has been placed in the past on aesthetic appearances and distinctive design in the agencies' foreign buildings. Perhaps overstating their case, yet not without a certain element of truth, critics say that concerns for design excellence and aesthetics have overridden other issues during the past two decades, including those related to the security of Foreign Service personnel and sensitive information. Architects and other designers are often caught in the middle of this conflict.

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*Thomas Vonier, AIA, served as consulting project director to the Committee on Research for the Security of Future U.S. Embassy Buildings, a group empaneled by the National Academy of Sciences Building Research Board to provide recommendations to the State Department on future embassy design. The opinions expressed in this article are the author's and not necessarily those of the U.S. government.*

Designs for U.S. embassies in Damascus (this page) and Manama (facing page). The plan for the mission in Syria features relatively small exterior windows, a secure perimeter, and substantial setbacks from the edge of the site. Interior courtyards provide light and views in office areas. (Titian Papachristou, architect.) The facility proposed for Bahrain, a relatively small post, uses the same features, including secure perimeter walls and small areas of exterior glass. (ROMA, architects.)



### FORTRESS...Continued

Some architects whose firms have been hired by the department find occasion to complain about what they see as the insensitivity of security personnel to issues of design and appearance. "I don't want to hear about architecture," one agent was said to have insisted recently, in connection with a security upgrade at an embassy in South America. "You just worry about how secure it is," he was reported to have told the architect, "not what it looks like." In recent congressional hearings on budget outlays for the building program recommended by the Inman panel, one subcommittee member scoffed at the claim by an architect that security must be provided within the context of satisfactory functional design and aesthetic appearance. "We're not considering a program of this magnitude to make our buildings prettier," the representative said.


This attitude that good design and good security are mutually exclusive, fortunately, is not based on fact. The challenge of providing both can be met. It is a challenge of balance: How can future embassies be designed to assure that their occupants are secure, without sacrificing the qualities we would prefer to associate with a U.S. presence abroad? While not simple, easy, or even definitive, there are some answers. It is possible to provide attractive buildings that are appropriate to their surroundings, properly representative, and more secure.

**T**HE SEARCH for solutions begins with questions about where embassy buildings are located and how sites are designed. Bomb-laden motor vehicles are a prime concern today, in all parts of the world; employee and visitor parking has already been proscribed at many posts, amidst some grumbling but a consensus that this is a necessary step. One possibility is to provide parking off-site in areas that are physically protected against vehicle tampering and unauthorized access. In such schemes, employees might be shuttled by bus or other means between the parking area and the compound. Yet, even when vehicles are prevented from coming onto a site, or are carefully inspected before they enter, what can be done about attacks launched from outside the perimeter?

The effects of vehicle-bomb blasts and other attacks can be mitigated significantly by larger sites and the consequent increase in distance between occupied embassy buildings and a controlled perimeter. The effects of explosions diminish exponentially as a function of distance, so the first objective is to keep potential trouble away. This is the rationale behind new department standards requiring a standoff distance of at least 100 feet between occupied buildings and a secure perimeter. To many, this appears to be the only vehicle-bomb defense that is both effective and affordable.

Critics charge that the setbacks will dictate suburban settings, well away from the government, cultural, and commercial life found only in the urban center of most foreign capitals. This issue has been raised, occasionally in public forums, also with regard to

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### FORTRESS...Continued

USIA and AID. In an article that appeared recently on the op-ed page of the *Washington Post*, the head of the U.S. Commission on Public Diplomacy, Robert Fuelner, argued that USIA's basic mission would be seriously hampered by a move of its facilities to areas outside the central cities.

There are probably as many views on the subject of who should be in the embassy or chancery compound as there are members of the Foreign Service, but it is clear that State policy will call for security to be enhanced for all official Americans abroad. This includes even the smallest posts and the many agencies whose employees are under the ambassador's authority. To meet the need for greater contact with host-country citizens—as required by AID, USIA, consular officers, and others—complexes can be designed to have highly secure areas, accessible only to U.S. citizens with the requisite security clearances, as well as relatively accessible areas that are open to the general public. The challenge is mainly one of appropriate functional zoning, to remove the areas that are most sensitive from representational and other functions that act as magnets for visitors. Even busy consular sections can be handled in this manner. In all cases, however, basic protection must be extended to U.S. citizen employees, Foreign Service nationals, visitors, and guests. In my opinion, AID missions, consular offices, and USIS facilities should be in the compound, albeit with greater ease of public access. Consular offices in other cities should be held to the same standards.

Though greater security cannot be provided without some compromise in the sense of architectural openness, basic access control can be accomplished

unobtrusively. The best method is to design access control when the building is on the drawing board, not after it has been completed. Fortunately, in today's world most people recognize the need for such measures. Air travelers, for instance, accept and even appreciate airport security measures; visa applicants and visitors to cultural centers will appreciate them no less.

The concerns about forced suburbanization may eventually prove to have been much ado about little. In the first place, sites of the requisite size can be found, even in the most teeming of downtowns. In a large and extensively developed capital like Paris (where, incidentally, nobody appears to be talking seriously about replacing any embassy facilities) it would be difficult and expensive—but not impossible—to assemble a parcel of land that would accommodate a chancery of relatively large scale. And many large cities in the developed world and in the less-developed countries have redevelopment aims similar to those that have reshaped such inner cities as Baltimore's. It should not be too difficult for the United States to fit its construction plans into such schemes.

In some cases, acceptable alternatives to central city sites may exist. For better or worse, many foreign cities are experiencing the same sort of development and urban exodus found in the United States. New residential developments and government and private enterprise centers are springing up around Lisbon, Paris, Athens, and many other foreign cities.

Experience suggests that the presence of a U.S. consulate or embassy tends to attract new development. Some of this may not be desirable, and some people believe that additional measures are needed to control future development adjacent to U.S. installa-

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FORTRESS...Continued

tions. But it also leads to the possibility that, with planning, the agencies can find their facilities in the middle of an important non-central hub. "We can buy sites today that in 10 or 15 years will make us look prescient," says one observer. "We'll have to live with these decisions for a long time. This building program is a big opportunity. Let's not think just about today; for once, let's think about tomorrow."

Future embassy buildings will clearly be characterized by larger sites than are now typical. Once sites large enough to provide the required standoff distance have been found, keeping the perimeter secure becomes the concern. There is little doubt that strong, relatively tall walls and fences—probably used in combination—will be required. Many posts already have attractive fences that are designed to provide both a vehicle barrier at the base and a deterrent to climbing above, while maintaining views into and out of the embassy grounds.

**T**HE FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCIES also need to identify and isolate sources of potential security trouble. Why, for example, should future embassies have such areas as automobile repair and maintenance stations, or furniture painting and storage warehouses, placed within or directly adjacent to buildings housing busy and sensitive offices? Such security nightmares are typical and perhaps necessary arrangements at many posts today but could be eliminated with proper planning in future facilities.

Simple, common-sense planning measures that would be onerous, cumbersome, or impractical to implement in existing buildings can be conceived as part of the original design in a new building. Security-conscious planning, site design, and landscaping can help reduce the easy opportunities. Great care is needed in the layout and design of vehicle Sally ports and pedestrian entryways, to assure that these necessary elements are compatible in appearance and function smoothly.

Vehicle approaches and views to surrounding areas for guards must be taken into account in planning new, more secure access arrangements. Such steps as concealing entrances and walkways from view outside the grounds also can help to diminish opportunities for sniper or drive-by attacks and hostile observation. None of these planning and landscaping measures is objectionable and few are even discernible.

Once sites are designed to maximize safety and security, and plans are sensibly organized to isolate the most hazardous or vulnerable areas, attention must turn to buildings themselves. It is here that people seem most worried about the possible consequences of greater security, but research and recent experience suggest that there are few grounds for concern.

While some new building measures will be required, sensible interior layouts and an integrated

design approach to security should mean little apparent difference. The larger setbacks from local streets, although difficult to arrange, lower the requirements for blast-proofing. Except in extraordinary circumstances, there should be no need to resort to super-thick walls or windowless buildings. It will be necessary, however, to be more judicious about where windows are located, and what they look into and onto. There is no need to expose building occupants to the full brunt of a potential blast or remote sniper fire, when careful planning and design can orient windows and work areas away from such threats. As castle-builders knew centuries ago, various building design approaches are intrinsically more secure from outside attack than others. Contemporary buildings can use sheltered atriums, internal courtyards, and other devices that admit sunlight and air and provide pleasant, open surroundings without presenting easy avenues of attack. There are many everyday examples, both old and recent, of buildings that are highly secure, while remaining inviting and attractive. In Washington, for example, people are intrigued to find out that the original building of the National Gallery of Art—a structure most regard as pleasant, airy and inviting—has no windows. Designs that are still on the drawing boards for new posts show promise of much greater security, with no discernible loss in architectural character or appeal.

Today there are many ballistic-resistant window glazing products available, and even a few (some using films applied over or sandwiched between glazing materials) that will resist the tremendous pressures produced by bomb blasts. But these are very expensive and difficult to install, and they aren't available everywhere in the world. Such glazings have to be used in relatively small areas and they're generally not very good as windows for views or ventilation; they're too thick and lose their protective quality if they're allowed to open. None is known for certain to resist the kind of force with which objects and fragments are hurled in an explosion, although the State Department is carrying out experiments to test various composites. All of these are reasons why there is more promise in design approaches that put windows in locations that are out of harm's way. Entryways too must be strengthened to resist stress and siege. Doors must now resist forced entry attempts by determined intruders using hand tools, for 15 minutes, to provide those inside with valuable time to retreat to safer places. This level of protection is reasonable, although not easy or inexpensive to provide.

Ancient castles and fortifications—and recently more than a few contemporary buildings, including many public high schools—use the concept of concentric circles of security; some employ "impenetrable" gates and doors that drop into place under siege conditions to trap or thwart the progress of intruders or attackers. These principles can be incorporated unobtrusively in building design and could be remotely controlled by security personnel.

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# WILL QADDAFI HIT AMERICA?

By Philip C. Clarke

**E**VEN as U.S. Air Force F-111's were bombing his fortress headquarters, Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi was on the phone to collaborators around the world, calling on them to join in a *jihad*, or holy war, against America.

The man President Reagan has called "the mad dog of the Middle East" had been dealt a staggering blow by the April air raid, his vaunted Soviet-supplied forces impotent against the swift surgical strike of the American warplanes. In revenge—and in desperation—the embittered Libyan

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*Libya's Muammar Qaddafi vows to cast his evil shadow of terrorism over the United States. Do we have the means to dissuade him?*

strongman intended to lash out with deadlier-than-ever terrorist attacks on Americans and U.S. interests wherever they could be targeted.

This time, however, Qaddafi was faced with mounting unrest in the ranks of his own military. There had been numerous coup attempts in the past, and Qaddafi had created a corps of "revolutionary guards" for protection. But they were no match for the 78,000-member regular armed forces and their huge array of weaponry. Also, the Soviet Union, despite shrill verbal attacks on the U.S. air operation, stopped short of rushing to Qaddafi's side. Although Moscow since 1983 had poured an estimated \$20 billion

worth of arms into the desert nation of 3.5 million people, and would like nothing better than to convert Libya's Mediterranean ports into major Soviet naval bases, the Kremlin had long been wary of Qaddafi's irrationality and recklessness. Like other nuclear powers, the USSR had reason for alarm at Qaddafi's repeated attempts to buy, steal or build atomic nuclear weapons.

Similar doubts about Qaddafi were growing among moderate Arab leaders, as well. While publicly denouncing the U.S. air strike, they privately were hoping the Libyan firebrand and his visions of an Arab empire ruled from Tripoli would soon disappear. Significantly, OPEC's foreign ministers declined to act immediately on Qaddafi's demand for an Arab oil boycott against the United States and its allies.

With or without Qaddafi, however, the threat of international terrorism would continue to plague an increas-

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## FORTRESS...Continued

All of this needs to be done in concert with the designation of a safe haven for besieged building occupants. This haven should accommodate all personnel, not just some or a handful of "key" individuals. It should not be the post communications center, which will normally be too small to house all building occupants and should in any case remain an area that is accessible only to persons with suitable security clearances. Meeting rooms, cafeterias, and groups of offices can be designed so that they can be sealed off (with fire-resistant walls and ram-resistant doors, for example) in emergencies, and outfitted with basic emergency provisions and communications equipment.

**N**O BUILDING that is expected also to serve as an essentially public diplomatic building can be designed to thwart all possible terrorist threats. If anything can be said with certainty about terrorism, it is its uncertainty, and surely the stakes are continually growing higher.

This does not, however, mean that we should do little or nothing to make embassy buildings more secure against those attacks that can be reasonably anticipated.

There are many steps that can be taken and, yes, such steps probably ought to be extended also to the places where U.S. citizens abroad live and raise their families. Perhaps residences, too, ought to become a part of the embassy compound; that question is worthy of careful study on a case-by-case basis. Many people in the Foreign Service may resist this notion, and surely most will lament the fact that the step might be seen as necessary. But it has to be considered, and will be.

Extraordinary security measures are called for by the repeated acts of international terrorism directed against U.S. citizens and facilities abroad—acts which, by all accounts, seem likely to grow in number and severity. With careful attention to all aspects of design, these measures need not seem onerous. They will seem only the reasoned and proper response of a country concerned for the welfare of its people serving in foreign lands. □



QADDAFI...Continued

ingly fearful world for the foreseeable future. Controversy over how to deal with the threat also was on the rise. Among America's NATO allies, only Great Britain backed the U.S. military action against Qaddafi. Most Europeans feared the loss of Libyan oil and of trade with the North African nation, which totals about \$12 billion a year. Under increased risk also were thousands of Westerners living or traveling in the turbulent Middle East. Several hundred American oilworkers, who defied President Reagan's order months ago to leave Libya, faced the potential danger of being taken hostage. And despite unprecedented security measures, international terrorist groups linked to Libya lost no time seeking to retaliate with escalating acts of violence against the West.

Among the most dangerous of the groups is that of Abu Nidal, a renegade Palestinian now believed to be operating out of Syria. It was he who masterminded the Rome and Vienna airport massacres last December. Over the past eight years, his vicious killers have staged more than 60 attacks in at least 20 countries on three continents. Two-thirds of Abu Nidal's nearly two dozen major assaults last year occurred in Western Europe.

Although America, along with Israel, is the perceived enemy and chief target of most of the two dozen or more terrorist organizations based in the Middle East, the United States itself had escaped any direct attack by foreign elements. But it was not for lack of trying. In December 1981, seven months after the United States expelled all Libyan diplomats, intelligence sources warned that Qaddafi had ordered five trained assassins to infiltrate the United States, via Canada, to attack President Reagan, Defense Secretary Weinberger and other American officials. The plot never materialized and the FBI won't talk about it. But there's no doubt the threat was taken seriously—as, indeed, are all such warnings of terrorist violence against U.S. citizens at home or abroad.

If international terrorists should try again to penetrate the United States, Abu Nidal would be the logical one to lead the attempt. Asked about Qaddafi's threats to export terrorism to "the heart of America," Abu Nidal, interviewed by the West German publication, *Der Spiegel*, last fall said: "I can assure you of one thing. If we have the chance to inflict the slightest harm to Americans, we will not hesitate to do it. In the

months and years to come, the Americans will think of us."

Although the United States is protected to a large degree by two broad oceans, the freedom of our society undoubtedly appears inviting to international terrorists. Oliver Revell, the FBI's executive assistant director for investigations, in a recent interview drew this picture: "Our borders are relatively open. Once terrorists are in the country, there are no identity checks. They can travel freely. They can enroll in colleges, and the government can pay their way. The United States is a country that is virtually impossible to police." "On the other hand," said Revell, "we're making the United States a very difficult target. We have penetrated and prosecuted virtually every terrorist group that has operated in the United States. That has given rise to (terrorist) concern that we're not such an easy target after all."

Statistics bear this out. Although in recent years more than a third of all terrorist incidents overseas have targeted U.S. citizens or institutions, domestic terrorism has declined—from more than 100 incidents a year in the 1970s, to only seven incidents last year, none of them directed from abroad.

In any case, said Revell, "The untold story is not the number of incidents but the number of preventions." The State Department said that last year more than 90 planned attacks on U.S. citizens and sites overseas were foiled. In the United States, meantime, the FBI prevented 23 terrorist assaults, including a plot to assassinate the visiting prime minister of India. Also, at least 14 bombings planned for the Washington, D.C., area and the Northeast were aborted by timely arrests and the seizure of explosives.

At the same time, the FBI, the Border Patrol and other law enforcement agencies have stepped up their vigilance against foreign terrorists. FBI Director William Webster told Congress in February: "We recognize that the potential for significant domestic violence at the hands of foreign elements is quite real and the motivating factors behind such violence would likely be beyond the ability of the FBI to influence." Currently, the FBI assigns about 500 agents a year to counter-terrorist activities, out of a total complement of about 9,000 agents.

Of special concern are the approximately 3,500 Libyans currently residing in the United States, nearly half of them classified as students with visas valid for up to four years. "Most are law-abiding," said FBI spokesman Bill

Carter. "They like living here and readily cooperate with authorities in helping to identify any suspected terrorists."

All told, since 1980 more than 15 Libyans have been assassinated, most of them in Europe, but at least two in the United States—one in Ogden, Utah, and the other, an anti-Qaddafi student who was gunned down in Colorado in July 1981. Arrested as the "hired gun" in the Colorado killing was a former U.S. Special Forces member.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service has tightened its screening of the relatively few Libyans entering the United States with visas. Most of them are added to the FBI's surveillance list. And with good cause. Since seizing power 17 years ago, the Libyan strongman has intervened in the domestic affairs of no fewer than 45 countries, ranging from Asia and Africa to Latin America. One of the latest countries to complain is tiny Dominica in the Caribbean whose prime minister, Mary Eugenia Charles, blew the whistle on the attempted Cuban and Soviet takeover of neighboring Grenada. Qaddafi was said to be financing a radical opposition movement on Dominica, similar to his bankrolling of the abortive Marxist takeover on Grenada.

Although the recent plunge in world oil prices has cut Libya's hard currency income by two-thirds, Qaddafi still took in some \$3.5 billion a year from petroleum exports to Europe and elsewhere, more than enough to keep the terrorist pot boiling. As the "Daddy Warbucks" of an international terrorist network with branch offices in Syria and Iran, and with an unending stream of eager recruits from the festering Palestinian refugee camps of Lebanon, Qaddafi relies on his checkbook as his most potent weapon.

According to W. Raymond Wannall, former assistant FBI director for intelligence, virtually all of the international terrorist groups currently in operation "have supporters in the United States." "There is further evidence," he declared, "that a terrorist can enter our country with memorized information that can take him to a chain of safe houses and sympathizers. They will provide him or her—terrorism is an 'equal opportunity employer'—with weapons, explosives, operational intelligence, money, documents, a vehicle and a battery of defense lawyers, if needed."

In any event, the task is an urgent and compelling one. Brian M. Jenkins, chief analyst for terrorism studies at the Rand Corp., predicted that terrorist attacks, including airliner hijackings,

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# TERRORISM

## The Search for Working Definitions

Lieutenant Colonel Donald B. Vought, US Army, Retired  
and Lieutenant Colonel James H. Fraser Jr., US Army

*Terrorism is a term that is used by the news media, government spokesmen and private citizens often in today's world. What are we talking about when we use the term? As with so many things today, there is debate on the definition of terrorism. This article looks at several of the definitions in vogue and tries to make some sense of them.*

**T**ERRORISM is a fact of contemporary life. Depending on how we choose to view its genesis, terrorism has been a fact of human social reality for millennia and, by its most restrictive criteria, for the last two centuries. Today, the term terrorism is an "in" term, a fad which inevitably is used in the pejorative sense. For example, Cuba accuses the United States of practicing state terrorism, the United States accuses Cuba of fostering worldwide terrorism and an

industry spokesman labels the February 1986 Tylenol capsule poisoning as terrorism.

Does this mean that anything which causes us to feel fear is terrorism? We may feel fear (or at least elevated anxiety) driving on the Santa Monica freeway or when our airplane encounters extreme turbulence. Yet, we do not hear other drivers or the pilot accused of terrorism, so we can surmise that fear alone is not the determining factor.

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### QADDAFI...Continued

bombings and assassinations, will increase in coming years, no matter what civilized societies do.

"If terrorism persists, and we expect it will, a new generation of terrorists will have taken the field," said Jenkins. They will be a "true second generation of 'Kalashnikov Kids,'" referring to the Soviet assault rifle now carried by

today's young terrorists.

It is to avert such a frightful eventuality that President Reagan ordered U.S. armed forces into action against a primary source of terrorism. In striking at Muammar Qaddafi, the President had the majority support of Congress and the American people. The national consensus was: "Enough is enough!"

Edmund Burke, the 18th century English statesman, in addressing the age-old question of whether to appease or resist aggression, had words of advice appropriate to combating today's terrorists. Said Burke:

"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is for good men to do nothing." □

DEFINITIONS...Continued

Perhaps violence is the key. Most authorities agree that terror is an extreme emotion which results from fear of death or injury caused by violence or the threat of violence. The emotion is heightened by conditions of ambiguity or unpredictability. On the other hand, one can be terrified as a participant in a barroom brawl. Similarly, it is violence when a person is mugged walking alone at night in a part of a city which enjoys a reputation as a high-crime area. In these cases, the victim might be criticized for poor judgment, but no one calls this violence terrorism. It would seem that violence, like fear, is not in and of itself the sufficient basis for labeling it as terrorism.

Could it be that the victim differentiates between violence and terrorism? It seems unlikely when we consider that, by contemporary usage, terrorism is practiced against governments, international organizations (for example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), ethnic groups and other terrorist groups on a worldwide scale. Modern terrorism is equally ecumenical in its victims, ranging from government leaders and diplomats, to police and military personnel, to business leaders, prominent religious figures and ordinary citizens.

Possibly the method of doing violence has a bearing on what terrorism really is. But again, who is to say that the fear of having one's throat slit is more or less intense than the fear of being shot or terminally disassembled by an explosive device? The 1985 machinegun killing of prominent crime figures on a crowded street in New York is remarkably similar to the machinegun killing of four off-duty Marines in San Salvador that same year. Yet, we label one a killing and the other an act of terrorism. It seems that the tactics used to perpetrate the violence have less influence on the label than the other factors.

Recognizing that we are rapidly exhausting the list of possible factors, how about the perpetrator—the doer of the evil deed? Surely the doer must be the determining element. Apparently, if the fear-inducing violence is perpetrated by a terrorist, it is terrorism. If it is done by someone else, it is something else. The flaw in

this thesis is that contemporary terrorists never consider themselves to be terrorists. In fact, since the Zionist Stern Gang of the late 1940s, no group has called itself a terrorist organization.

What is more, terrorism has been engaged in by males and females of all races and all age groups. Agents of various governments have practiced terrorism as have members of political, religious and ethnic groups as well as a fair number of criminals, thrill seekers and psychopaths. Obviously, we cannot define terrorism in such a way as to capture the unique physical or behavioral characteristics in such a disparate sampling of humanity.

Having looked at who does it, what is done, how it is done and to whom it is done, there still is not an identifiable, distinctive hook on which to hang a definition. About the only factor left is *why*. Why does the terrorist terrorize? Motivation may have some bearing on differentiating between actions which constitute terrorism and those actions which do not. It is the question of motivation that triggered a decade-long debate in the United Nations over a definition of terrorism.

Motivation is what makes most definitions of terrorism useless. It is also that aspect of terrorism which makes an airtight, universally accepted definition seemingly impossible. Motivation introduces the moral factor and accounts for the ludicrous situation of governments, referring to totally different activities, accusing each other of terrorism and doing so in good faith. It is also the basis for the operationally valid claim that terrorism is violence of which we do not approve.

For example, the Russian Social Revolutionaries who assassinated czarist officials between 1900 and 1911 were heroes. But, when they continued the practice (to include wounding Vladimir I. Lenin) after the 1917 revolution, they became terrorists in Bolshevik eyes. The same applies to various resistance groups in World War II. Ho Chi Minh was a patriot during the Japanese occupation; he only became a terrorist after France reoccupied Indochina.

It seems that any usable definition must have value-neutrality if we are to escape from simply labeling the other fellow's violence as terrorism, while ours, or that of which we approve, is referred to by such

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DEFINITIONS...Continued

euphemisms as "a judicious application of force," or "maintenance of law and order." Value-neutrality is, like so many conditions, easily stated but difficult to achieve. This is particularly true with a subject like terrorism.

Most authorities accept a tripartite composition of a terrorist incident—the act itself, the emotional reaction to the act (on the part of the audience) and, sooner or later, a sociological reaction (behavioral modification). The latter element may or may not be what the terrorist hoped to achieve. If we accept this analytical division, it is immediately evident that the emotional reaction is key to both the study and definition of terrorism.

The following is a definition offered by the US Department of State in 1984: "premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents." Note that, to be terrorism in the Department of State's eyes, the victims must be "noncombatant targets." By this definition, which assumes that combatants are those who are combating the terrorists, actions against police or military personnel could not be labeled terrorism.

Additionally, since the perpetrators must be "subnational groups" or "clandestine state agents," terrorism could not be practiced by overt organs of the state. Under this definition, historical events such as Joseph V. Stalin's terror of the 1930s and Argentina's repression of the late 1970s would have to be labeled something on the order of "ill-advised domestic policies" or "harsh social control measures." By its bias against terror from below—that is, agitational terror—the Department of State definition limits its utility and guarantees rejection by much of the world.

The recently promulgated Department of Defense (DOD) definition is:

*... the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.*

There are several flaws here. First is the matter of property. Property does not fear; therefore, it cannot be terrorized. The second and most significant point is

the use of the adjective "unlawful." By this definition, a state could not be accused of practicing terrorism internally no matter what the government did. By common acceptance, the state is the only legitimate wielder of physical force. Under the DOD definition, not only would Stalin escape the label of terrorism, but the Reign of Terror during the French Revolution would not be terrorism. There is some humor in noting that most scholars attribute the origin of the term "terrorism" to the French experience during 1793-94.

The third point which can be made is the absence of any reference to premeditation. Just as there are degrees of assault and murder in law, so also is there a difference in the violent acts associated with terrorism. Terrorism requires thought. It is systematic, designed and premeditated. Terror is natural. Terrorism is contrived by man. If, for instance, a man were to become enraged by something said in a political speech (hardly an unusual occurrence) and attack the speaker on the spot, the world would label him guilty of assault. By its definition, DOD would label him a terrorist.

By combining these three points and carrying them to a level of absurdity, an individual could be charged with terrorism for physically attacking a soft drink dispensing machine if he or she claimed the act was for political, religious or ideological purposes. On the other hand, an incumbent government could intimidate elements of its society through a systematic application of violence, and the US armed services could not call it terrorism. An unsympathetic observer might be tempted to accuse DOD of the same bias as that of the Department of State. Be that as it may, in neither instance can the definition stand the test of value-neutrality.

In 1983, the Army synthesized several definitions into a concise, usable definition which stands up well under scrutiny as value-neutral:

*... the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals political, religious, or ideological in nature. This is done through intimidation, coercion, or instilling fear. Terrorism involves a criminal act that is often symbolic in nature and intended to influence an audience beyond the immediate victims.*

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DEFINITIONS...Continued

Applying our rules, we find there is no effort to identify the perpetrator. It is as applicable to the Reign of Terror in 18th-century France as it is to Lebanon in 1985. Terrorism from above (repressive or state terror) is accommodated along with that from below (revolutionary or agitational terror). The acts of individual sociopaths are excluded as are spontaneous acts of violence. There is no effort to create non-victims by excluding certain categories from consideration (for example, the Department of State's "noncombatants").

Further, this definition reflects awareness that, since the 1880s, terrorists have been "playing to the audience." That is, those they wish to influence are not the victim but, rather, those who witness (usually vicariously through news media) the act. In short, the Army's definition reflects progress toward creating a functionally useful way to identify terrorism as opposed to simple violence. The fact that it will soon be replaced by the DOD offering does not detract from its value as an aid in understanding terrorism.

Having suggested that the search for a fundamental definition of terrorism has not progressed very far in the last few years, let us turn to a prominent set of terms which categorizes types of terrorism. Over the last decade, three terms have crept into the lexicon of contemporary terrorism:

- International terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by individuals or groups controlled by a sovereign state.

- Transnational terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by basically autonomous nonstate actors in countries other than their country of origin.

- Domestic terrorism—terrorist acts carried out by autonomous nonstate actors against their own nationals.

While these terms were useful in the definitional void of the mid-1970s, their value in the 1980s is questionable. The domestic descriptor will remain popular regardless of official usage. It is simply too convenient as a label for "home-grown" terrorists to even attempt to replace it even though terrorist groups having no contact with kindred spirits from other countries are an endangered species. The descriptors "international"

and "transnational" tend to be confusing. International is explicit in meaning between nations. The prefix "trans" may mean through as well as across, with across being the meaning in this context. The operational utility of these terms to the US military is questionable.

The definitions of the terms international and transnational are burdensome to remember without repeated reinforcement through use, and few in the armed services have occasion to use these terms with any frequency. Another development which adds to the confusion is the universal reference to terrorist activities carried out by someone or some group from a different country as international regardless of state affiliation.

A suggested solution to this semantic problem is to adopt terms which are simultaneously self-explanatory and functionally useful. In 1984, the Army's terrorism counteraction community developed three terms which have proven their utility. The terms state-directed, state-supported and nonstate-supported reflect the condition of the governmental affiliation of the terrorist group and are defined as:

- State-directed—a terrorist group whose activities are primarily at the direction of a government.

- State-supported—a terrorist group which receives substantial support from one or more governments but whose actions are autonomous.

- Nonstate-supported—a terrorist group which does not receive substantial support from any government and whose actions are autonomous.

State affiliation is the quintessential element of identification. The defensive (antiterrorism) planner must know the state affiliation to anticipate probable targets the terrorist will seek and the level of sophistication of the enemy. Recognizing that the logistics to support sophisticated terrorism are available on the open market for those who seek and have substantial financial backing, the resources of a government can still mean a great deal in terms of operational capability.

Offensive (counterterrorism) planners need to know if a terrorist group is affiliated with a state. The nature of that affiliation is paramount. The number of terror-

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# 'GERM WAR'

By Edith Kermit Roosevelt

**E**ditor's note: *International terrorists have struck fear into the hearts of millions all across the world. As each terrorist incident explodes into the headlines, ICA is deluged with requests from the media, in the hope that we might provide some logical explanation for these seemingly random outbursts of violence. One ques-*

*tion is raised again and again: How long before these international terrorists reach U.S. shores?*

*Many experts believe this ugly reality is inevitable; the diligence of state and federal agents and intelligence task forces can only forestall the inevitability for so long. President Reagan himself has detailed the foiling of terrorist plots that were supposed to be*

*perpetrated here in America. To date, we have been lucky. The future, though, may not be as bright.*

*Sooner or later (and perhaps sooner than we think) terrorists will seize upon toxic agents—chemical and biological weapons—to carry out their unholy war against innocent people. As unprepared as we are to*

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## DEFINITIONS...Continued

ist groups which do not enjoy some form of assistance from a government is shrinking rapidly. The assistance may be several times removed (for example, country X provides training to group Y which, in turn, helps train members of group Z), making the relationship less distinct, but the relationship is still a critical factor in planning retaliatory or pre-emptive actions.

The porous borders of democratic nations and the marvels of modern transportation enable anyone to span oceans or

continents in a few hours. Therefore, the earlier terms based largely on geography have lost much of their utility for all but the specialized analyst.

While many would agree that the armed services devote excessive time and effort to developing terminology and definitions, in the field of terrorism, we may not have invested enough thought. For DOD to adopt a definition of terrorism which excludes the event wherein the term originated (that is, the Reign of Terror in the French Revolution) may be imaginative, but will it stand the test of utility and time? *MR*



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Lieutenant Colonel James H. Fraser Jr. is the Department of Defense liaison officer to the 1987 Pan American Games in Indianapolis, Indiana. He received a B.S. from the University of Nebraska and a master's degree from Wichita State University. His previous assignments have included serving as commander of a Ranger company and an assault aviation company, as executive officer of a combat aviation battalion and as the chief of the Terrorism Counteraction Office, USACGSC.

## 'GERM WAR'...Continued

counter conventional terrorists (those who use guns and explosives), we are woefully lacking in our ability to stop terrorists who use chemical and biological agents.

Mr. Harvey J. McGeorge is the chairman of the Institute for Public Safety, a consulting firm that specializes in countering the modern terrorist. While acting as a physical security specialist for the U.S. Secret Service, Mr. McGeorge was actively involved in defending the President of the United States and top government officials from the threat of terrorists wielding biological or chemical weapons.


ICA contributor Edith Kermit Roosevelt recently interviewed Mr. McGeorge. The implications raised in this exclusive interview are frightening, at times even shocking, but this is a subject that must be shown the light of day. For if America is to repel this most egregious threat to its well being, then it must understand the exact nature of that threat.

**ICA:** Developments in modern biochemistry appear to blur the lines between biological and chemical weapons. Can you give us a working definition of biological weapons?

**McGEORGE:** Biological weapons (BW) involve the use of disease-producing organisms, such as bacteria, fungi and viruses, to support military and paramilitary operations including terrorist objectives. Bioweapons include toxins, which, while not living themselves, are products of animal, plant or microbial life.

**ICA:** In 1969 the United States unilaterally abandoned its research into biological weapons, and yet there is evidence that the Soviets have done the opposite. According to "The President's Unclassified Report to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements," dated Feb. 1, 1985: "The Soviet Union has mounted an offensive biological program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972." The Report of the Chemical Warfare Review Commission of June 1985 warned that "the deaths caused by anthrax spread from a Soviet weapons laboratory in 1979 are an example that this country cannot ignore." And there are previous State Department reports of Soviet use of "yellow rain" biological toxins in Afghanistan. In view of these concerns, how big is the BW threat to U.S. security?

**McGEORGE:** It depends what time frame you are talking about. Probably, the chief use of bioweapons in the immediate future will be by terrorists rather than on the battlefield.



A schematic diagram of a high-efficiency particulate air filtration system.

**ICA:** Why would terrorists wish to escalate to biological weapons?

**McGEORGE:** As violence becomes more commonplace and accepted, terrorists may seek to reach greater heights of terror to capture media headlines and to force governments to meet their demands. Future use of chemical or biological agents for sabotage or terrorist purposes is facilitated by their apparent acceptance in the world community. For instance, there was no hue and cry raised for any significant amount of time after the Iraqis used BW weapons in their war with Egypt. Moreover, there is no lack of suitable biological, toxin and chemical agents, and there are suitable dissemination systems that require only a modicum of ability and imagination.

**ICA:** In view of this, is there any evidence that biological weapons are being contemplated by terrorist groups?

**McGEORGE:** There is ample recent and ongoing use of biological or toxin agents by terrorist groups with international connections. I shall recap just a few of these: Between 1978 and 1980, we saw several uses of the natural toxin ricin (a deadly castor bean-based poison) in a ball of iridium and platinum, possibly fired from an umbrella. In two well-publicized cases, the Bulgarian Secret Service used this technique against two Bulgarian defectors. BBC Broadcaster Georgi Markov was assassinated in London, and Vladimir Kostov, former Chief of the Paris Bureau of the Bulgarian State Radio and Television network, was attacked in a Paris metro station.

Later uses of this bioweapon include the alleged assassination of Col. Houari Boumediene, who was president of Algeria (a crime that was not made public), and the case of Boris Korczak, a Lithuanian-Pole who infiltrated the KGB and once worked as a contract agent for the CIA. In the summer of 1979, in a suburban Virginia shopping center, Korczak felt a sting near the kidney area. Then his temperature shot up to 106 degrees, and his heart began pounding irregularly. However, doctors could find no reason for his ailment. A few days later laboratory tests revealed what might have caused his symptoms. According to CT&T (Clandestine Tactics & Technology, an intelligence data service produced by the International Association of Chiefs of Police): "Microscopic analysis indicated that he had excreted a microscopic ball about 1/300 the size of a fingernail." CT&T described the method of attack as "the 'metal ball' technique, a sophisticated KGB assassination tool," which was apparently used for the first time in the United States.

**ICA:** Is there any evidence that the Soviet Union or its proxies are transferring to terrorists abroad biological agents, technologies and training for mounting terrorist attacks on a broader scale in Western countries?

**McGEORGE:** This is certainly an ominous development. Terrorists are attracted to biological weapons and, of course, chemical ones as well, because these weapons are flexible enough to be used against

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**'GERM WAR'...Continued**

almost any target. Not only to assassinate an enemy, as I mentioned, but as a means of political coercion and terror against government or business facilities in the United States, or against American installations abroad.

On Nov. 9, 1980, Le Figaro reported that French police found botulin in a rudimentary laboratory, along with literature on lethal diseases, in an East German Red Army safe house in Paris. Botulin can be used not only for tainting bullets in assassinations, but also as an aerosol BW spray for terrorist attacks on cities and for contaminating food stocks or water supplies.

And closer to home, in 1984 a Cuban defector informed U.S. authorities of the presence of significant stocks of toxic agents in Cuba for use in the United States, as well as for subversive efforts in Latin American countries.

**ICA:** *How effective would bioweapons be in staging terrorist events similar to the TWA hostage situation?*

**McGEORGE:** Very effective because of the odium and horror attached to them. Terrorists would anticipate that the massive media attention could be manipulated to divide and demoralize the American public, whether used against U.S. nationals or other people in a host country.

Some elements of our population would seize upon the use of biological weapons, no matter who initiates their use, and claim it is clear evidence of American involvement in biological warfare. Still others would accuse the Soviets or their surrogates of initiating this biological warfare and demand immediate retaliation in kind. The upshot would be that we would experience a strong division of national unity, as we experienced in the October 1983 terrorist attack against the Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon. The panic and fear of disease that even a small success in biological terrorism would engender might trigger withdrawal of U.S. forces from some strategic location, say in Germany or even the Philippines.

**ICA:** *What sort of people or groups are capable of mounting a BW terrorist attack?*

**McGEORGE:** It could be a lone individual operating as a mercenary or a "crazy" attempting to revenge a personal grievance.

Another threat could be the fanatic, like the religious fanatics in the Middle East. These might well be surrogate groups acting on behalf of some other power. The PLO might be a good example of that, since we know that over 10 percent of all PLO officers have been trained in the Soviet Union.

**ICA:** *You are covering a rather broad group of people with varying skills, aren't you?*

**McGEORGE:** Yes. Biological weapons are cheap and easily acquired. They can be supplied by a patron state, stolen from a medical school or research institution, or acquired on the open market. Some months ago, a well-known firearms publication published an advertisement offering a particularly deadly toxin for sale—ricin.

Another example of the ease with which toxins can be acquired is the case of two Canadians who posed as officers of a research firm and sought to obtain dangerous tetanus and botulism cultures from the American Type Culture Collection, a research firm in Rockville, Maryland, which provides disease strains to scientists. According to the Washington Post of November 24, 1984, an order for an ampule of frozen tetanus was shipped to a Buffalo suburb before ATCC learned that the buyer used a bogus name. The firm then contacted the FBI. Although this case had no connection with terrorist motivation or activities, the method could also be used by saboteurs.

**ICA:** *But in the case of the terrorist, wouldn't it be easy simply to build his own biological weapons?*

**McGEORGE:** That's another option. Compared to the widely feared scenario of a terrorist group acquiring a nuclear bomb, materials for biological weapons are easier to obtain and work with. They are also easier to hide and transport to the point of use. Toxins or biological agents can be made with little trouble, working literally in a kitchen or garage. Manufacturing a lethal bacterial disease agent requires little more than chicken soup, a flat whiskey bottle and an available source of seed culture.

Corn, for example, is an excellent source of Tricothecene mycotoxins, which are used by the Russians in Afghanistan. Afla-

toxin, a potent carcinogen, can be produced from peanuts, and ricin from castor beans. Clostridium botulinum, also a potent carcinogen that produces botulinum toxin, is found in soil everywhere. Since botulin poisoning is an ever-present danger in tinned food, the open literature contains detailed descriptions of research by canning companies on how to culture and test deadly species.

**ICA:** *Do you believe the techniques of genetic engineering might be channeled into terrorist BW?*

**McGEORGE:** That's a strong possibility. Advances in genetic science are giving rise to a generation of "gene hackers," whose work is largely unmonitored. For example, there is the case of Larry Slot, who, while a graduate student at MIT, produced a gene-splicing kit, which he says he intends to market. Slot's "home cloning kit" involves gene transfer between two bacteria found in the mouth—*Streptococcus salivarius* and *Streptococcus mitis*.

**ICA:** *Granted that biological weapons are cheap and easily acquired or developed, what are the means available to the terrorist to get them to the target?*

**McGEORGE:** Dissemination options for biological agents in liquid or dry form include sprays, explosives or injection devices, as in the case of the Bulgarian emigres that I mentioned. One example of a weapon that could be used as a spray device is the Israeli Mark Five hand-held projector. This device, typically filled with tear gas for use as a law enforcement weapon, could instead be filled with a toxic agent. During their short time in the United States, the Symbionese Liberation Army used cyanide-contaminated bullets for their handguns—a method they might have used to disseminate biological agents.

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**Table 1**  
**Infectious Diseases**  
**Candidate Biological Warfare Agents**

Disease	Incubation Period (Days)	Incapacitation Period (Days)	Mortality Rate % *
Antipersonnel			
Botulin	2-3	3-28	95-100
Ricin	1-10	7-21	30-60
VEE	3-6	3-7	0-5
Q-Fever	15-20	7-14	0-1
Anthrax			
Stie Rust	1-4	N.A.	
Wheat Rust	1-45	N.A.	To 85 (Loss of Yield)

\* For projected cases only.



## 'GERM WAR'...Continued

Alternatively, as demonstrated by the IRA, a disseminating device could be a truck-mounted, multi-tube mortar. The IRA truck-mounted mortar system is almost identical to the World War I Livens Project, which was one of the most successful chemical projectors used by the United States and Britain to disseminate phosgene and mustard gas. Had this method been used by the IRA to fire toxic agents rather than explosives, it could have caused a devastating outbreak of disease and perhaps killed thousands of people.

On a still more ambitious scale, effective dissemination of biological warfare agents could be carried out by saboteurs or terrorists using rockets, or from cruise ships. According to Dr. Conrad Chester, Chief of the Emergency Planning Group at Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee, ongoing Soviet efforts to develop just such a cruise missile could result in the ideal delivery system. Cruise missiles can fly at a very low altitude and place a toxic cloud close to the ground.

**ICA:** *If a biological attack is so easy to mount, why haven't terrorists so far struck the mainland United States in a real campaign of terror?*

**McGEORGE:** This could only be a matter of time. Authorities discovered military manuals on biological warfare at one of the safe houses of the Symbionese Liberation Army, and, according to intelligence sources, canisters of ricin were recovered recently from a terrorist group in New England. There is no reason to believe that the Soviet Union or its surrogates are not developing and secretly testing biological weapons right here today in the suburbs of Washington, D.C., Cambridge, Massachusetts, Long Island, New York, or elsewhere in the country.

For example, the recent contamination of Tylenol capsules demonstrates just how vulnerable the general public is to this sort of biological terrorism.

In this framework, we should note that attacks on the food supply—that is, agricultural assets and livestock—can prove disastrous to a war effort. Cattle and a variety of animals can be infected with hoof and mouth disease. The deliberate introduction of such plant diseases as rice blast fungus and wheat rust would guarantee the loss of these crops for a season, if not longer.

**ICA:** *What protective measures are available against a biological terrorist attack?*

**McGEORGE:** An effective intelligence system is our first line of defense. Yet ma-

ior restraints on the FBI and CIA during the mid-1970s have made it almost impossible for U.S. authorities to monitor violence-prone individuals and groups, who might perpetrate future attacks. Access to domestic and foreign informants has been almost entirely eliminated due to the Freedom of Information Act. According to Neil Livingstone, formerly vice president of Joseph J. Cappucci Associates, an international firm specializing in the protection of heads of state, and Joseph Douglass, a defense analyst and author: "The FBI now follows fewer than 500 cases of violence-prone individuals and groups, compared to 50,000 cases before the Levy guidelines were issued." Even the new Smith guidelines do not go far enough in enabling our domestic intelligence agencies to effectively collect information that would allow them to ward off a domestic biological terrorist attack. The situation is especially critical, because, with the unfortunate poor economic health of the bio-tech industry, we can take it for granted that there is no lack of unemployed, highly skilled individuals, who, out of financial desperation might be willing to compromise their ethics in order to feed their families.

**ICA:** *What about protective defenses against biological warfare agents? In 1985 the Pentagon spent about \$163 million on research for its chemical and biological defense program, including medical defenses and protection such as shelters. What do we have or will we have in the future for the money being spent now?*

**McGEORGE:** Very little. The Army last year contracted the National Academy of Sciences Board on Army Science and Technology for a report on the effectiveness of existing means of detecting chemical and biological weapons. The Science and Technology Board determined that none of the sensors available or under development can detect possible biological agents such as anthrax bacteria, or biologically derived chemicals such as mycotoxins. We still have no effective means of detecting biological weapons disseminated as aerosols.

**ICA:** *What about immunization? The Soviets, who take the threat of biological weapons very seriously, have a long-standing program of aerosol vaccine development directed toward mass immunization. They are also apparently deploying masks for their civilian population. On the other hand, as Joe Douglass and Neal Livingstone have observed, the United States is unprepared for almost any epidemic.*

**McGEORGE:** Vaccination would be useful against some biological agents such as yellow fever and anthrax. Yet the United States does not have enough serum for even 500 prophylactic doses, although the International Association of Chiefs of Police calls this agent "perhaps the most toxic substance within the capabilities of a malefactor to employ."

The National Academy of Sciences report to the Army also urged that individual immunoassays for biological agents be developed. As for our modern military gas masks, they have high efficiency filters that can remove particulate matter, including biological carrier aerosols. But we need a stockpile of such masks to be made available to the U.S. civilian work force, as well as the installation of proper filters in government buildings to protect people from a biological attack.

**ICA:** *But if a terrorist group uses a genetically engineered biological weapon, wouldn't it take a long time to identify the organism and prepare a vaccine or antidote for it?*

**McGEORGE:** That is correct. To help guard against that possibility, the specific equipment needed to conduct genetic engineering experiments must be identified and its export and domestic sales monitored.

**ICA:** *But, despite what you bring out, isn't it true that over the years neither Congress nor the executive branch of government have taken the BW threat seriously? As of this conversation, a Federal judge's ruling is delaying construction by the Army of an \$8.4 million aerosol test lab in Utah intended for biological weapons defense research.*

**McGEORGE:** But attitudes appear to be changing. For instance, the Chemical Warfare Review Commission established by President Reagan has urged the United States to "conduct comprehensive research on biological agents and toxins." In view of escalating terrorist attacks worldwide, it would seem only prudent that our defense posture should include protection against the use of biological agents by malevolent groups. ●

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SOLDIER OF FORTUNE

**LIBYA**

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# MILLIONS FOR MURDER

## Khadaffi Bankrolls World Terror

by David Segal

**T**HE mask of terrorism hides many faces, but none more recognizable than that of Muammar Khadaffi, Libya's restless "Duce of the Desert." Since he came to power in a coup on 1 September 1969 Khadaffi's monumental ego forced him to spread his influence on world terrorism like ripples on a pond. He could never be satisfied with being merely a regional menace.

Khadaffi's cash flows from oil wells in his otherwise impoverished nation and this, combined with Libya's strategic position on the Mediterranean Sea, quickly attracted the attention of the Soviet Union. By 1974, with Moscow's aid, Khadaffi transformed his oil-rich domain into a major terrorist den that poses a steadily growing threat to the security of the West and of pro-Western governments around the world.

Today Libya provides money, training and arms to at least 50 extremist groups and nearly 40 radical governments. High on this list are the Abu Nidal, Ahmed Jibril and Naif Hawatmeh factions of the PLO (Fatah — Revolutionary Command; Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command; and Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, respectively) and numerous terrorist groups based in and operating out of Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Nicaragua. Khadaffi has shown a remarkable willingness to loosen his purse strings and training facilities to nearly any terrorist group that asks.

These include terrorist groups operating as far afield as Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Ireland (North and South), Spain, Italy, Germany, France, Turkey, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. It would be nearly impossible to cover all of Khadaffi's antisocial activities, but, according to the authoritative British publication *Foreign Report*, an estimated annual total of 7,000 foreign terrorists pass through a network of at least 15 Libyan training camps, 14 in Libya and one in Libyan-occupied Chad. These camps are:

- Ras al-Hilal, about 250 kilometers west of Tobruk near

the Mediterranean coast.

- Beda, 200 kilometers south of the Gulf of Sidra. Sidi Bilal, south of Tripoli. This was one of the targets hit in America's 15 April air raid.
- Sebha, in central Libya, is said to be a site for the training of assassination hit squads.
- The "April 17th" camp near Benghazi.
- Tajura camp, about 16 kilometers from Tripoli, said to be a training site for members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos).
- Al-Aziziya, 45 kilometers south of Tripoli, bombed during the 15 April U.S. air raid.
- Al-Jadayim, west of Tripoli.
- Al-Jagbub, about 30 kilometers west of the Libyan-Egyptian border.
- Ghadames camp, near where the borders of Libya, Tunisia and Algeria intersect.
- A camp in the town of Surt, proper.
- Kufra camp at an oasis in southeast Libya, said to be the site of special and advanced training.
- Sabaratha camp, west of Tripoli.
- Benina camp outside Benghazi, also bombed during America's 15 April air raid on Khadaffi's bases.
- A camp in the Aozou strip, an area of Chad occupied by Libya.

Very few instructors at these camps are Libyans. Most are hired Palestinian, Syrian, Cuban and East German experts in such subjects as assassination, demolitions, small arms and espionage.

The reason for the massive amount of Libyan support for terrorist groups, extremists and guerrillas all over the globe becomes clear after a brief glance at Khadaffi's philosophy. The man believes himself to be a man of destiny and believes Allah gave him the job of leading the Third World to victory over the West and its allies. And he makes no

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## 'MILLIONS...Continued

secret of this belief. It is openly proclaimed in the pages of *Al-Zahaf al-Akhdar*, the English-language *Jamahiriyah Mail*, various official Libyan government proclamations (such as the *Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People* of 2 March 1977), and Khadafi's own revolutionary Bible, the *Green Book*. Unfortunately, Khadafi's openly stated goals and beliefs, like those of Hitler 50 years ago, are difficult for people to take seriously. Fortunately, more and more people come to their senses with each new Libyan-sponsored terrorist act.

Normally, Khadafi pays non-Libyan professionals like the PLO to do his dirty work, but he makes an exception for "stray dogs" — which is Khadafi-speak for Libyan exiles who still have the courage to oppose his reign of terror. Khadafi prefers to have his own Libyan hit teams hunt his Libyan opponents down and kill them.

By 1980, after systematically crushing all opposition groups within Libya, Khadafi was ready to deal with opponents who had found refuge abroad. From 1981 to the present, Libyan hit men have murdered dozens, if not hundreds, of anti-Khadafi Libyans in Greece, Turkey, Italy, France, Germany, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, the United States, Latin America and the Middle East. They have narrowly missed murdering many more, though not for lack of effort.

This has resulted in tensions between Libya and the host countries of the "stray dogs" Khadafi wants to kill. In April 1984, for example, gunmen in the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in London opened fire on a crowd of anti-Khadafi demonstrators killing a British policewoman and wounding 11 demonstrators. This followed a nasty series of bomb attacks against Libyan dissidents in Britain during the previous month. The British broke diplomatic relations with Libya and after the embassy was vacated, British authorities found weapons and spent shell casings in the building.

In the United States, an anti-Khadafi student was killed in July 1981 in Ogden, Utah, presumably by pro-Khadafi Libyans. In May 1984 the FBI arrested two Libyans in the Philadelphia area for trying to buy silenced handguns — the usual Libyan assassination weapon. One year later, in May 1985, a Libyan diplomat at the United Nations was sent home for his activities in aiding hit teams assigned to terminate anti-Khadafi students, and a suspected Libyan hit team was broken up before it could implement a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in four states.

The United States also witnessed one attempted murder of a Khadafi opponent by a Libyan-hired foreign assassin, rather than the usual native Libyan hit squad — the failed assassination of Faisal Zagallai in October 1980. A student in Fort Collins, Colorado, and an outspoken opponent of the Khadafi regime, Zagallai was shot twice in the head but survived with only the loss of his right eye. His American would-be assassin, Eugene Tafoya, was apparently working for Edwin Wilson, an ex-CIA agent employed by Khadafi. Described by the CIA as a "rogue elephant," Wilson is believed to have trained Libyan and foreign terrorists.

The United States broke diplomatic relations with Libya in 1982, two years before Britain, because Libyan diplomats were engaging in "acts incompatible with their diplomatic status," and Libya was sponsoring "acts hostile to the United States." The straw that broke the American Eagle's forbearance was sensitive intelligence information

indicating that Khadafi had dispatched hit teams to kill the president of the United States, Ronald Reagan. At the time, most influential U.S. news media dismissed the idea as so much Reagan administration paranoia. Today, in retrospect, things look a bit different.

If the alleged hit teams were real they were probably composed of PLO professionals. When Khadafi orders a terrorist action abroad, it is normally carried out by one of the 40 or so Libyan-sponsored terrorist groups (usually by hard-core PLO professionals) that are not readily traceable to Libya.

When Muammar Khadafi began his foreign aid program to the world's developing terrorist groups, he did not deliberately set out to become a major part of the Kremlin's international terror network. As a devout Moslem and fervent nationalist, Khadafi's basic sympathies seemed to lie with the extreme right, rather than with the communists, in the early years of his reign. The first terrorists to receive aid from Khadafi were Italy's most extreme neo-fascists, the spiritual heirs of Libya's repressive colonial masters.

One of Khadafi's early efforts was the Italy-Libya Association, later outlawed as a front for Italian right-wing terrorists. That association was headed by Claudio Mutti, who would later be jailed for his role in the 2 August 1980 bombing of Bologna's railroad station that killed 84 people. Another Khadafi-backed fascist group in those days was the *Avanguardia Nazionale*, whose posters summed up the Arab-fascist alliance with the slogan: "We are with you, heroic Arab-Palestinian People, and not with the Dirty, Fat Jews," to cite one example.

Starting with financial aid to the right wing of the PLO in 1971, Khadafi's taste in terrorists drifted ever leftward until, today, he is supporting PLO factions that are trying to kill Arafat for being overly conservative. The turning point appears to have come in 1974 when Khadafi was nearly ousted by his second-in-command, Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, and a clique of pro-Moscow officers. In return for Jalloud's continued backing, Khadafi agreed to hitch his wagon to Moscow's star. He has never looked back.

Shortly after Jalloud's pro-Moscow coup, Khadafi signed a \$16 billion arms deal with the Russians, and Libya has been a major conduit for Soviet arms to terrorist groups ever since. In short order, Khadafi hooked into the "Carlos" network of European and Latin American leftists headed by Wadi Haddad. Haddad's boss was Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) chief George Habash, a long-time dedicated Marxist-Leninist with close ties to the Soviet Union.

The complex relationships of Khadafi and his new friends are best illustrated by the 27 June 1976 hijacking of an Air France flight to Entebbe, Uganda. The hijackers were Palestinians of the PFLP and Germans of the Red Army Faction (RAF, a.k.a. Baader-Meinhof Gang) who were all members of Wadi Haddad's Carlos network. Financed by Khadafi, they hijacked a French airliner in Greece, refueled in Libya and landed in Uganda. There, reinforced by new PLO arrivals and protected by Idi Amin's Ugandan troops, the hijackers demanded the release of PLO and leftist terrorists held in Israel and Europe. Khadafi's Soviet connection is the only one not instantly obvious in the Entebbe episode, although, given the framework of the Carlos network, it can be strongly inferred.

Today, Libya has moved far beyond merely arming,

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

MILLIONS...Continued

training and financing various PLO factions. Libya and Syria are allied in trying to wrest control from Yasir Arafat, who has headed the PLO since 1968. In December 1983, Libyan- and Syrian-backed PLO factions combined to drive Arafat and his remaining Fatah loyalists out of their last stronghold in Lebanon, the northern port city of Tripoli.

At the moment, Khadafi and Arafat are mortal enemies, but this doesn't stop Libya from backing certain PLO factions, nor does it stop various PLO factions from doing all sorts of odd jobs for Khadafi. Of the nearly 20 Palestinian terrorist organizations, the following have the closest ties to Libya:

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP):** Led by George Habash and headquartered in Damascus, the PFLP has 500-600 men under arms. Despite its small size it is one of the most important groups within the PLO since it is completely independent of any Arab country and advocates the PLO's freedom of action and decision-making.

Aside from the usual advocacy of the destruction of Israel, the PFLP also openly espouses a strident Marxist-Leninist ideology and advocates the establishment of "socialist" regimes throughout the Arab world. The Habash front has the closest ties of any PLO group to the international left, particularly European groups like the Provisional IRA, Action Directe, Communist Combat Cells, Red Brigades, RAF, GRAPO and ETA. Some of PFLP's actions include the 1970 simultaneous hijacking of four planes to Jordan, the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre and the 1976 Entebbe hijacking.

PFLP acts as a kind of elite group of ideological commandos that helps implement Soviet policy within the PLO and elsewhere. Habash's current close association with Syria in the power struggle against Arafat is out of character and is probably being done on Soviet orders. Habash's close allies of the DFLP remain outside the Syrian camp, perhaps in order to give the Soviets the option of a controlled group in the Arafat camp, should they need one.

Khadafi has helped finance the PFLP since at least 1974. That financial support continues, but, while Libya and the PFLP sometimes cooperate with each other, Habash's group is independent of Libyan control.

**Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP):** Naif Hawatmeh's DFLP split off from George Habash's PFLP in 1969, largely over personalities. The two organizations have virtually identical philosophies and work in very close cooperation with each other. There are even terrorist units operating in Lebanon under joint PFLP-DFLP command, coordinated by the leaders of both organizations.

Hawatmeh is an orthodox communist whose loyalty to Moscow exceeds even Habash's, and his organization is more dependent on Libyan money than the PFLP. Basically, the DFLP can be counted on to carry out any operation Khadafi wants them to, provided they are paid for it and Moscow does not object.

DFLP's 900-1,000 men are organized in four "battalions" and one joint DFLP-PFLP artillery unit, and their operational command, under Khaled Abd ar-Rahim, is in Ta'albiye, Lebanon. Headquarters are in Damascus and Lebanon's Bekaa Valley, and training is done in Syria.

DFLP, which is best remembered for its 1974 massacre of Israeli school children at kibbutz Ma'alot, maintains close and regular contact with the Soviet Union.

**Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, General Command (PFLP-GC):** This group, which split off from Habash's PFLP in 1968, currently musters about 800 terrorists. It has no fixed ideology and is built, to a large extent, around the personality of its forceful leader, Ahmad Jibril. The PFLP-GC has close ties to Libya and is almost entirely Libyan financed.

Along with the Syrian-controlled "Sa'iqa," the PFLP-GC furthers the Syrian position within the PLO by armed force. Because of Jibril's active role in throwing Arafat out of Tripoli, Lebanon, in 1983, about 100-150 of his men, led by former security chief Abu Jabar, left the PFLP-GC, but they are not yet actively allied with Arafat.

Based in Syria, PFLP-GC headquarters are at Rehan, near Damascus, and its main training base is "Camp 17th September" at Ein Sahab. Jibril's Lebanon headquarters are at Deir Znun.

Libyan influence on the PFLP-GC is dominant. Jibril's group does whatever the Libyans want, whether or not the Soviets approve. Only if his position with Syria was endangered would Jibril refuse to carry out a job for Khadafi.

**Fatah — the Revolutionary Council (Abu Nidal):** Led by Sabri al-Bana, this faction, with about 500-800 terrorists and activists, is one of the most dangerous terrorist groups in the world. Much of its present strength consists of Arab students in Europe, including non-Palestinians.

The group, which split off from Arafat's Fatah in late 1973 over a disagreement regarding post-Yom Kippur War political tactics, maintains Fatah's organizational structures and claims to be the "real" Fatah. However, it is better known by Sabri al-Bana's nom de guerre, Abu Nidal.

From 1974-1981, Abu Nidal was based in Baghdad with total Iraqi governmental support. This support declined as Iraq's growing concern about the Iran-Iraq War led her to seek better ties with conservative Arab governments and with the West. In November 1983, Abu Nidal was expelled from Iraq as part of an effort to clean up Iraq's image in the West, especially the U.S.

By that time, Abu Nidal had already established operational centers in Syria and has since established similar centers in Libya and Iran. By 1985 Libya reportedly had become Abu Nidal's main base of operations and source of money.

In April 1986, *Bild am Sonntag*, a West German weekly known for its excellent intelligence sources, reported that Khadafi was paying Abu Nidal about \$12 million a year. This works out to about \$24,000 per person for Abu Nidal's active cadre of about 500, and that doesn't count Libyan arms, training or other funding not yet pinpointed. It seems highly probable that the Abu Nidal group will do anything Khadafi is willing to pay for.

Abu Nidal has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to operate wherever it chooses, staging attacks in 20 countries on three continents. Its specialty is acting as an "enforcer" for Libya, Syria and Iran by attacking conservative Arab states and factions. Abu Nidal has been responsible for attacks on Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Egypt and Arafat's supporters in the PLO. The group also attacked Western targets (particularly British ones), Israelis and, recently, Americans. The following are just a few of the major terrorist acts carried out by Abu Nidal in 1985:

**April** — Abu Nidal terrorist fires Soviet-made SA-7 missile at a Jordanian Alia airliner taking off from Athens

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

MILLIONS...Continued

airport. The plane was hit, but the rocket did not explode.

**July** — Abu Nidal thought to be responsible for bombing two restaurants in Kuwait, killing eight and injuring nearly 90. Also, in Madrid, Spain, Abu Nidal attacks the ticket offices of Alia and British Air, killing one and wounding 24.

**August** — Abu Nidal bombs a hotel in Athens, Greece, injuring 13 British tourists.

**September** — A second Athens hotel is bombed, injuring 19 tourists, mostly British. Also, Abu Nidal members throw grenades at the the Cafe de Paris in Rome, injuring 38 tourists, including Americans, Germans, Britons, Italians, Argentines and Brazilians. Shortly thereafter, the British Air office in Rome is bombed and 15 people are injured.

**November** — Abu Nidal hijacks an Egyptair airliner to Malta, killing an Egyptian security guard and shooting three passengers in the head to persuade Egypt to release various extremists from Egyptian prisons. One of these passengers, an Israeli woman, dies, but the other two miraculously survive. A further 58 passengers are killed during a botched rescue attempt by Egyptian army commandos.

**December** — Abu Nidal launches simultaneous attacks on Israeli El Al ticket counters at the Rome and Vienna airports on 27 December. Three of the terrorists in the Vienna attack carried Tunisian passports that have been traced to Libya. Two of the passports were confiscated from Tunisians who were expelled from Libya last summer, while a third was "lost" in Libya by a Tunisian worker in 1977.

Abu Nidal makes no effort to avoid injuring innocent bystanders. In fact, the group appears to go out of its way to find targets with a maximum potential for innocent civilian casualties. As Lenin said, "The purpose of terror is to terrorize," and Abu Nidal seems to be an outstanding student of that school of thought.

Interestingly, the Abu Nidal group almost never uses the name "Abu Nidal," which was pinned on it by the press and foreign governments. It normally calls itself "Fatah — the Revolutionary Council" or, occasionally, "Black June." When it wants to avoid direct responsibility for its acts, Abu Nidal also uses a number of aliases: Arab Revolutionary Brigades (against the Persian Gulf states), Black September (when attacking Jordanian and Palestinian targets), and Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM) when attacking British targets. Given the current tension between Libya and the United States, it would be surprising if Abu Nidal does not carry out some specifically anti-American attacks, perhaps under yet another name.

**Popular Arab Liberation Movement (PALM):** Led by Naji Alush, this small group of under 100 active terrorists broke away from Abu Nidal in 1979 and

lived to tell about it. PALM draws its support from dedicated activists in Lebanon, Syria, Libya and Europe.

According to Israeli Foreign Ministry sources, there are PALM infrastructures in Spain, West Germany and Britain, although actual activity so far is low. Most of the funding appears to be Libyan.

**Palestinian Arab Revolutionary Committees of the Arab Liberation Movement (variously called PARC or ALM):** Despite the fancy title, this recently organized group, headed by Ziad al-Khumsi, is largely a figment of Muammar Khadaffi's imagination. PARC appears to be Khadaffi's attempt to establish a completely Libyan-controlled group within the PLO that will be as subservient to Libya as Sa'iq is to Syria. Virtually all of PARC's facilities are in Libya, but real Palestinian members are few and far between.

So far, PARC hasn't undertaken a single known terrorist operation, but, given Khadaffi's desire to hit American targets, that could easily change.

Palestinian terrorists aren't the only extremists with ready access to Libyan money and/or support. There are even some American groups that maintain close ties with Libya.

For example, I interviewed several members of a large American delegation that attended Khadaffi's Green Book conference in 1983. An annual affair held at Garyounis University in Benghazi, the ostensible purpose of the conference is to bring together people from all over the world to discuss the merits (if any) of Khadaffi's philosophy as expressed in his Green Book. In reality, the conference is a cover for various anti-Western groups to make contact with the Libyan government and/or be contacted by it.

During the 1983 conference from 7-13 April, an American delegation, representing various U.S. extremist groups, met with Khadaffi in his tent to discuss the general situation of "revolutionary groups" in the United States. According to secret sources, a "business meeting" followed the next day. That meeting was presided over by Khadaffi's second-in-command, Major Jalloud.

At that meeting, the Libyans urged the American radicals to form a "united revolutionary force" and offered the Americans Libyan money and assistance. Among the American groups at the meeting were the Nation of Islam, the Republic of New Afrika, the All-African

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

MILLIONS...Continued

People's Revolutionary Party, the American Indian Movement (AIM) and the International Indian Treaty Council.

Two years later on 24 February 1986 Khadaffi gave a live televised speech by satellite to a Nation of Islam convention in Chicago, in which he urged black American servicemen to leave the military and create a separate army because the United States "must be destroyed." There was no noticeable response to Khadaffi's appeal among black American servicemen, and Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan publicly dissociated himself from Khadaffi's appeal. That public disclaimer did not stop Farrakhan from accepting a \$5 million interest-free loan from Khadaffi a week later.

Libya's leader also has ties to Kwame Ture's (a.k.a. Stokely Carmichael's) AAPRP, the Republic of New Afrika and AIM. Khadaffi has tried to forge these groups into a violent "revolutionary force" to be used against the United States, so far without much success.

While a number of American radical groups (not always left-wing) probably would be willing to engage in violence on Libya's behalf, there has been little indication of such activity to date. That should change in the near future, however.

The question of organized domestic violence with Libyan assistance is far from hypothetical in El Salvador, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Britain, Ireland, Spain, Italy, West Germany, France, Turkey, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. A complete listing of all Libyan assistance to over 50 terrorist and guerrilla groups around the world is not possible in the space we have, but a couple of examples will suffice.

Libya has supported Ireland's self-proclaimed Marxists of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (Provos) since the early 1970s. In March 1973, for example, the Irish navy boarded the merchant vessel *Claudia* off Helvick Head, County Waterford, and confiscated five tons of cargo: 250 assault rifles, 246 bayonets, 850 rifle magazines, 243 pistols, 20,000 rounds of ammunition, 500 grenades, 100 anti-tank mines, and large amounts of timers, blasting caps, fuzes, TNT primer and gelignite explosive.

Most of the arms were of Russian origin and had been loaded onboard by Libyan soldiers in Tripoli. Among the six Irishmen arrested aboard the *Claudia* was a Provo leader named Joe Cahill, presently in charge of distributing privately donated NORaid "relief funds" in Ireland.

Since then, both Khadaffi and Libya's state-controlled media have blown hot and cold on the Irish issue, sometimes openly supporting the Provos and sometimes denying any connection with them and even condemning them. In practice, Libyan support for the Provos never stopped.

In April 1975 Khadaffi told an Irish Parliamentary delegation that, in the future, "no aid would be given to any illegal organization in Ireland." In September 1976, he told *Newsweek* "... our relations with London and Dublin are improving rapidly ... the IRA chapter is behind us." He lied.

We may never know how many Libyan arms shipments got through to the Provos. We do, however, know about a recent one that didn't get through. On 26 January 1986, Irish Gardai (police) arrested five men and seized over 100 guns and 20,000 rounds of ammunition in dawn raids on three different sites in counties Roscommon and Sligo in the Republic of Ireland.

The guns included 87 Kalashnikov assault rifles (all new) of East German, Bulgarian and Rumanian origin; 10 West German Heckler & Koch rifles, and 17 Brazilian 9mm Taurus pistols. The ammunition, which came in 20 1,000-round boxes, was all 7.62mm ComBloc, manufactured in Yugoslavia for the Libyan army. Clearly marked on each of the 20 ammunition boxes were the words "Libyan Armed Forces. Cartridges for Weapons." Senior Gardai sources said that the shipment had originated in Libya and international police were working on pinpointing the deadly cargo's route from Libya to Ireland.

Irish terrorists are not the only people to receive massive "Libyan lend-lease." In April 1983, four Libyan planes were forced to land in Manaus, Brazil, for technical reasons. Although the crews claimed they were carrying medical supplies to Colombia, the skeptical Brazilians searched the planes and found they were carrying 84 tons of arms, explosives and other military equipment to Nicaragua.

The ultimate terrorist nightmare could become reality if Khadaffi got his bloody hands on a nuclear device. He hasn't done so yet, though not for lack of trying.

In May 1983, a junkyard owner in Rome was arrested by Italian authorities for trying to sell 10.5 ounces of enriched uranium to "a Middle Eastern country." That Middle Eastern country is reliably reported to have been Libya. As to where and how the junkyard owner got his hands on 10.5 ounces of enriched uranium is still a mystery.

President Reagan certainly hopes Khadaffi will never get The Bomb, but his thoughts and actions are turned more toward Libya's present depredations. The bombing of military targets in Tripoli and Benghazi on 15 April shook Khadaffi out of his complacency and showed American resolve on the question of terrorism. It didn't end Libyan terrorism in a single swipe, but it was a step in the right direction.

More than brute military muscle is needed to tear down Khadaffi's sand castle — the much-debated economic boycott must be made a reality. After all, virtually all the money Khadaffi uses to finance terrorists comes from a single source — oil. In 1980, those revenues reached an all-time high of \$22.6 billion. Even with today's soft oil prices and lowered production, Libya's estimated 1986 revenues of \$7 billion are still more than enough to finance Khadaffi's terrorist activities. Even if America's European allies were to cut their oil imports from Libya by half, the impact on Khadaffi's cash flow would be substantial.

Should that fail, a natural extension of the economic weapon would be the destruction of Libya's oil fields and refineries — without his source of revenue, Khadaffi's terror machine would grind to a halt.

Since the United States is completely independent of Libyan oil, the only consideration standing in the way of our destroying Khadaffi's oil production is the dependence of France and Italy on Libyan oil. Disarray and discord among our allies — combined with the way oil can lose notice of its national origin as it moves through the market — may gut any attempted aggressive use of economic weapons. If we can't mount an effective boycott, Reagan may have to use military muscle yet again. The ball is in the European court now. ✖

# CATCHING TERRORISTS



BY STEPHEN KINDEL

Foiling the bombers isn't hard. The right stuff is on the shelf—stalled there by gun lobbyists and government inertia. Why not use it *now*?

**C**razy as he may appear, the terrorist has a coldly rational purpose—to terrorize innocent people, make them feel helpless, scare them into pressuring their government for safety at any price. Terrorists aim to change official minds and policies by infecting whole countries with the contagion of fear. When government itself fails to allay that fear, terrorism wins. When ordinary people regain courage or refuse to be afraid, terrorism loses.

Which way are we headed?

Right now, the professionals trained to combat terrorism say that legitimate authority is slowly losing control. Eugene Mastrangelo is a senior analyst for Risks International, a security consulting firm in Alexandria, Virginia, that tracks terrorism all over the world and maintains a computerized data base, updated daily, that forms the basis for a series of publications sent to corporate and govern-

ment clients. Of the 25,000 terrorist incidents reported by Risks since 1970, says Mastrangelo, 6,000, or one-quarter, erupted within the past two years.

"Terrorism is increasing not only in quantity but in lethality," adds Bonnie Cordes, a leading contributor to the Rand Corporation's report series, "Trends in International Terrorism."

Once content to hijack planes and hold them for ransom, terrorists now plant bombs among passengers and blow infants out of plane windows, multiplying aerial deaths each time another jetliner explodes aloft.

The terrorist has the upper hand: He can choose his target, his time, his weapon. As Mastrangelo puts it, "Terrorists are always the white pieces on the chessboard, and police forces are always the black. Often we're only playing catch-up."

Not surprisingly, a *New York Times*-CBS poll taken after the Rome and Vienna airport shootings last December showed that 52 percent of all Americans believed they could do nothing as individuals to protect themselves against terrorists.

Is that really true?

Hardly: Most experts insist that more can be done. They view current antiterrorism security efforts as half-hearted at best and, at worst, cynical public relations. Says one Florida-based security consultant: "Regulation notwithstanding, the de facto standard of detectability of weapons in the United States is limited to the level of the worst security guard operating the least efficient machine at the machine's lowest sensitivity setting."

Another source puts it more succinctly: "The security systems are a joke. If any credible law-enforcement agency ever attempted penetration exercises, I would be highly surprised if any were ever detected."

**I**f security is shabby, says Cordes, it is because "there is no official perception that terrorism threatens the stability of the state. One hates to sound callous, but most government response to terrorism is just public relations, generated in response to the media's attention. Commissions are formed, the President mouths some tough words, and then, once the problem dies down, the commissions are disbanded and the issue put on the back burner until it flares up again."

Many security consultants believe that the means to curb terrorism are already at hand. That belief is based on simple principles. The terrorist may pick the target and the time and even the weapon, but within that last category his choices are relatively limited if he is to remain effective. Or, as Cordes puts it, "Terrorists are not very technically oriented. They can be very clever at times, but they'll stick with what

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

*Stephen Kindel, formerly technology editor of Forbes magazine, has had two close calls with terrorism.*

**CATCHING...Continued**

works, what's tried and true." Although many kinds of explosives are available, only a few are suitable for attacks, and terrorists by and large prefer weapons with proven reliability.

Such relative predictability takes terrorism out of the realm of the terrifying and makes it liable to conventional mission or threat analysis. That is, each kind of target implies a particular weapon or weapons most likely to be used and, therefore, a fairly narrow and specific range of deterrents. For example, ANFO, a mixture of ammonium nitrate and fuel oil and the most commonly produced blasting agent in the world, makes a great truck bomb, but C-4, a military plastic explosive that can be molded into a variety of shapes, is the terrorist's choice for blowing up aircraft, since it can easily be concealed.

If the experts are right and terrorist weapons can be readily detected in advance of an attack, why isn't it done? Despite millions of dollars now being spent on research, much of it with the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) funding and under its auspices, cheap and reliable detectors that are independent of human frailty are still in the future; in fact, the principal technology for screening for bombs and metal weapons is now more than 25 years old.

What especially annoys security experts is that the Reagan administration, which has lifted antiterrorist rhetoric to new heights, knows perfectly well that really superb technology already exists that can put law enforcement authorities on a more equal footing with terrorists. In the mid-1970s, when the domestic terrorist threat was rising in the United States, the Treasury Department's Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), along with the U.S. Postal Service and other federal agencies, sponsored research programs that developed highly effective technologies for detection, identification, and deterrence. Those technologies were then abandoned. To illustrate how effective they were, just look at the record.

Start with May 1979. In Baltimore, the night of May 10 was unexpectedly hot and muggy. It was also hot at Bethlehem Steel Corporation's mill at

Sparrows Point, outside the city, where coke ovens belch their waste heat and steam into the atmosphere each time they're quenched. A productive mill almost always has tons of red-hot slabs lying around the millyard, waiting to go into the rolling mills, giving up yet more heat to the surrounding air.

When Nathan Allen, Sr., a 45-year-old mill hand, and Robert Riffe, a co-worker, emerged from a plate-mill building in which glowing slabs are rolled into plate, getting the air-conditioning turned on as fast as possible could have been the main thing on their minds as they climbed into Allen's Dodge pickup truck. They were in such a hurry to get the engine started that they had probably not yet closed the doors when Allen turned the key in the ignition—setting off an explosion that hurled Allen and Riffe from the pickup, and Allen to his death three hours later, of multiple internal injuries, a back injury, and a possible fracture of the pelvis.

The sound of the explosion started everyone at the plant, at first because of its intensity, and later, for its apparent senselessness. The plant police (until recently, Sparrows Point was one of the last true company towns in America, so crimes were investigated by Bethlehem's own security force first) were already worried about local talk of violence. A national independent truckers' strike was imminent; a number of steel haulers had been snipers' targets before. But Allen seemed to be unconnected to any strike activity.

While Allen was being helicoptered to the University of Maryland's famed Institute for Emergency Medical Services in a futile attempt to save his life, Riffe was being questioned at the plant dispensary by the police, as well as by safety officials from the United Steelworkers Union, who had examined the remains of Allen's pickup truck. Riffe said he had smelled gasoline fumes just before entering the pickup. But George Bourne, USWA Local 2610's safety officer, noticed that the truck's gas tank had imploded. So the source of the blast was outside the tank. This could lead to only one conclusion: a bomb.

Because the force of the blast indicated that dynamite or some other high explosive had been used, the investigation was

turned over to ATF. As a result, Nathan Allen's killer was caught almost immediately, instead of after months of dogged police work leading nowhere.

In examining the crash site, ATF agents carefully swept the area, seeking bomb debris—any clue that might tell them what kind of explosive was used. In most cases, analysis of bomb debris is an exhausting and sometimes unsuccessful process. The effects of fire, water, and chemicals used to fight a bomb explosion almost always obliterate or obscure the chemical residues of explosives, which are the clues an investigator seeks. But this time the agents got lucky. Back at their national laboratory in Rockville, Maryland, just outside Washington, D.C., the agents found telltale particles amid the debris. Placed under a microscope, these tiny clues provided all sorts of information about the explosive—what kind it was, who had made it, when it was manufactured, and who had sold it.

The particles were "Microtaggants," tiny chips of multilayered melamine plastic resin laminates made by 3M, the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company. Although the chips are no larger than 800 microns, each contains up to 10 layers. Of these layers, eight are of different colors, the arrangement of which represents a code that indicates manufacturing and batch information. The other two layers, the top and bottom of the chips, are magnetic and fluorescent so as to aid in their location and recovery. With so many different color combinations available, the number of possible codes reaches into the millions.

Developed in the early 1970s by Richard Livesay, a 3M research chemist, and perfected by the company's new business ventures division, "Microtaggants" were essentially a product still in search of a market when terrorist bombings began their ominous increase in 1974. Three years later, 3M and ATF began a testing program, and by 1979 "Microtaggants" had been placed in one percent of all the explosives made in the United States. So when ATF's forensic specialists saw the "Microtaggants" in the explosive residue, they called 3M in St. Paul.

The company checked its records: The color code matched a batch of Tovex 220, a Du Pont-made water gelatin explosive widely used in demolition, quarrying, and road construction, sold to the Jenkins Explosives Company in Martinsburg, West Virginia. A visit there led agents to James McFillin, 56, who had indicated on the mandatory federal registration forms he filled out at the time of purchase that he intended to use the explosives to blow up tree stumps on his property in Martins-

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CATCHING...Continued

burg. When neither blown stumps nor Tovex were found in a search of McFillin's farm on June 18, 1979, barely five weeks after the bombing, he was arrested for the murder of Nathan Allen.

As it turned out, terrorism was not involved. McFillin was Allen's uncle, and the two had fought over the affections of McFillin's wife. Although McFillin had bought the Tovex in West Virginia, he actually spent most of his time in Baltimore and was Allen's neighbor. Even so, a routine crime had created a key precedent. Almost entirely on the basis of the taggant evidence, McFillin was found guilty on three counts of using explosives to cause injury, death, and the destruction of property, and he was sentenced to 30 years in prison. More important, the admissibility of taggants as evidence withstood appeals all the way up through the federal appellate courts, including a denial of permission to further appeal from the U.S. Supreme Court.

Such a vivid demonstration of the effectiveness of tagging explosives ought to have cheered supporters of antiterrorism legislation that was then up for consideration in Congress. Both H.R.2441 and S.333, two bills introduced in February 1979, contained strong, concrete language mandating the use of "identification and detection taggants" on all explosives. While the House bill was meant to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to strengthen the government's hand specifically against air piracy and air terrorism, and the Senate's bill was a more omnibus domestic and international antiterrorism bill, both pieces of proposed legislation made explosives tagging a cornerstone of policy.

Neither ever became law. Even before the bills were introduced, opposition to ATF's taggant testing program arose, in its most organized form from the Institute of Makers of Explosives, the Sporting Arms and Ammunition Manufacturers' Institute, the National Rifle Association (NRA), and the National Muzzle Loaders Association. In general, all the groups objected to the taggants on what they considered to be legitimate safety, economic, and legal grounds. Because the taggants were expensive to fabricate and were made by a proprietary process that could not be easily duplicated, manufacturers feared that mandatory tagging would drive the costs up so high that heavy explosive users, such as the construction industry, might turn to other methods for removing material. This was, remember, the inflation-ridden seventies. Even though a cost-analysis study, prepared by the U.S. Congress's Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) and re-

leased in April 1980, reported that taggants would increase the operating costs of construction and mining by only approximately one percent, that small increase was sufficient to raise howls of protest.

**T**he loudest voice was that of the gun lobby. The NRA and ammunition manufacturers both claimed that tagging black powder would send the cost of hand-loading—wherein sportsmen buy the raw materials and make their own rifle cartridges from casings, powder, and bullets—through the roof. Although both 3M and the OTA argued strenuously that the increase in the cost of tagged powder was negligible and of little real cost when compared with the expense of buying the ammo-loading equipment, the NRA mounted a vigorous lobbying effort to have the taggant portions of both bills—their central core—deleted.

To bolster their arguments, all the munitions makers and user groups launched an intense, active attack on the alleged technical shortcomings of tagging. They questioned ATF's test methodology, and limitations in the thoroughness of the testing, at the same time that they lobbied to keep more taggants from being more extensively tested or used. The explosives industry, in conducting its own test, found it could not guarantee the dispersion of the taggants uniformly through its products, and so raised questions about the legal liability that might result if an explosion were accidentally set off because of high concentrations of taggants. One example, they argued, was a July 15, 1979, explosion and fire at Goex Inc.'s plant in Camden, Arkansas, that caused an estimated \$2 million in damage. Goex was one of a number of companies chosen jointly by ATF and the Institute of Makers of Explosives to test the sensitivity and stability of tagged explosives, and the industry quickly blamed the explosion on the alleged inclusion of 3M's taggants in a batch of scrap explosives that was being melted at temperatures well above average. Although subsequent investigations turned up no evidence of taggants in the explosives, the industry remained convinced that taggants were potentially dangerous and to be avoided at all costs.

But what if the bills had passed and a tagging program was put into effect? Assume that the objections of the lobbyists had been overcome and that both the ANFO made for blasting and the black powder used by gun enthusiasts were exempted, so that only a narrow range of explosives were tagged, such as the military explosives C-4 and TNT and the commercial explosive Tovex 220. Would this tagging have been sufficient to deter terrorists? I put the question to various experts,

including Robert McCrie, editor of the New York-based *Security Letter*. "I have no doubt," said McCrie, "that the terrorists would have been forced away from using the most powerful explosives and into looking for alternatives, which are neither as effective nor as safe to handle as what they now use."

An official at the ATF, who wishes to remain anonymous, because the bureau has been prohibited by Congress from doing any tagging research for the past five years, is even more ardent in his support: "If you were to combine tagging with some kind of international treaty, you wouldn't have to suspect who was behind international terrorism. Evidence would be at every bombing. If it wasn't, you'd know that the explosive was coming from some country not party to the treaty. You'd know who was actively supporting controls."

**P**erhaps the strongest endorsement of the efficacy of tagging comes from President Reagan himself. As a private citizen in 1979, he devoted an entire syndicated newspaper column to the McFillin case and the benefits of tagging. It concluded "Tagging the terrorist's favorite weapon—explosives—may be a law enforcement idea whose time has come."

What does the White House say today? According to an administration spokesperson, President Reagan is still strongly committed to the idea of finding an effective means of identifying explosives, but the political and technical problems of finding something that everyone can agree on have so far defied an appropriate solution. The White House will not comment on the proposed tagging law of 1979 because it never reached the President for signature, but the administration would not be unhappy if a move to revive tagging in some form were to attract significant political support.

After 1980, identification taggants for explosives were nattered virtually out of existence in the United States (3M stopped production in 1983, but it was resumed in 1985 by Microtrace Inc., a Minneapolis firm whose president is Richard Livesay, the original taggant developer). And the idea has been explored by other countries, including Britain, Turkey, and West Germany. Switzerland made tagging the law of the land in July 1980.

Nonetheless, ATF's tagging program has been relegated to oblivion. Richard Rawlins, special agent in charge of explosive technology, laconically explains the demise of the program this way: "I guess, when you look at the small amount of criminal and terrorist bombing in [the United States] in relation to the 4.4 billion

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CATCHING...Continued

pounds of commercial explosives produced annually in the United States, the program just couldn't be justified." Translation: The general public failed to match the political heat from the NRA and the explosives industry.

Another technology examined by ATF and other U.S. government agencies—and perhaps even more comprehensively effective than tagging—met with the same fate at almost the same time. The technology, dielectric analysis, was the brainchild of William Gregory, a physics professor at Georgetown University who in 1966 had earned his doctorate from MIT in low-temperature physics. Gregory had been interested in the dielectric properties of materials for some time when a wave of letter bombs hit the U.S. Postal Service and other government agencies in the mid-seventies.

Gregory knew that every material has dielectric properties, numbers that reflect both its ability to store electrical charge (the dielectric constant) and the ability to move the electrical charge (the conductivity). In theory, differences in materials can be identified by differences in their dielectric constant and conductivity. That's because these dielectric properties change with frequency, forming characteristic curves that are as distinctive as fingerprints or signatures; no two are exactly alike.

By compiling a library of dielectric properties, Gregory says, you can develop a mathematical model of "innocent" materials and compare that with any material coming through a detector. "To make this really work right, you can't be looking for explosives, because there's always the chance that someone will try to sneak something by that your machine isn't trained to detect. Instead, you decide what's normal—clothing, shaving cream, hair dryers in a suitcase, for example. After you get the values for those, you begin looking for minutiae, the tiny changes in the slopes and magnitude of a normal composite curve. Then you pull the suitcase aside and hand-search it. I think of it as the difference between screening and detecting."

**T**he use of waveform signatures is not unique to dielectric analysis. It's also an analytical technique in such laboratory procedures as gas chromatography and mass spectrometry. But unlike those two procedures, which require intensive preparation of materials, dielectric analysis can be done easily and cheaply.

Aiding its viability is the very nature of explosives. Basically unstable molecules that can be easily polarized by an electric

charge, explosives have a fairly high dielectric constant. By one of those weird happenstances of nature, dispersing an explosive in an inert material, such as diatomaceous earth or liquid gels, actually raises the dielectric constant, because it increases the surface area of the explosive substance. That makes field use of dielectric analysis potentially effective against even very small quantities of explosives and incendiaries.

This effectiveness was well proved by the U.S. Customs and the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). In 1975 and 1976, the Postal Service had been plagued by a spate of letter bombs, mostly directed at the USIA. With the support of the Postal Service's Inspection Branch, which is allowed to open mail it suspects of containing explosives or other illegal materials, such as drugs, Gregory developed and set up a dielectric detector in the mailroom of the USIA's Washington headquarters in February 1977. For more than a year, all mail went through the detector, and while no real bombs came through the system—apparently, publicity surrounding it was sufficient to deter would-be bombers—USIA security personnel tested it daily with letters and packets containing bombs. Out of more than 100,000 pieces of mail screened, Gregory's device caught each and every package and incendiary letter. More important, there were no false alarms other than packages that jammed in the system.

So impressed was ATF and the Postal Service with Gregory's results that they underwrote a test using a broader and larger range of explosive devices than the USIA had used. Again, the results were exciting: almost 99 percent accuracy, and false alarms of about 2 percent. That false alarm rate, though high, says Gregory, could have been brought down through the addition of circuitry that would teach the machine to learn from its mistakes. Feeling confident that it was onto something, Georgetown University licensed the technology to an interested manufacturer, Wandel & Goltermann GmbH, of Reutlingen, West Germany. A large telecommunications equipment firm, Wandel & Goltermann believed it could successfully upgrade and market Gregory's test equipment, but after nearly five years of playing with it, in 1983 the company let the device fall by the wayside.

Not that the detector didn't work as promised. Again, in tests conducted by federal police in West Germany, it worked even better than hoped for. "But," says Gregory, who moved to Germany for three years to help the company develop the technology, "Wandel & Goltermann's main business was satellite communications, and this security work was just a

sideline. Each year we had fewer resources to work with. Besides, for a while, terrorism was tapering off, so interest died down."

True. Many members of Germany's feared Red Army Faction and Baader-Meinhof gang were dead or in prison, as were leading members of Italy's Red Brigades. To his chagrin, Gregory, as had Livesay and 3M before him, found that government response to terrorism waxes and wanes with public perception, rather than with the knowledge that terrorism is an ongoing problem that requires long-term responses.

Had Gregory's technology been pushed ahead and put into use, many recent tragedies might never have occurred. Four innocent Americans who were sucked out of TWA flight 840 after explosives ripped a hole in the Athens-bound plane might still be alive. Hundreds of passengers aboard an Air-India Boeing 747 that was blown up in midair over the Irish Sea last November, allegedly by Sikh terrorists, might also still be alive. Detectors installed in the doorways of public buildings and shopping centers might well have prevented the February bombing of a shopping complex along the Champs Elysees in Paris. And on and on.

While the roster of victims grows, Gregory's device is once again under cautious test. Never mind that it has proved itself to the satisfaction of three government agencies. The inexorable imperatives of bureaucracy demand that the device prove itself once again, to the FAA and to satisfy red-tape regulations. Gregory, today a professor at Clarkson University in Potsdam, New York, is planning to turn over the latest version of his device to Customs Canada for a look at its ability to detect drugs, and he is working with the FAA to include it in a test program with other devices soon to come on the market. Meanwhile, private enterprise, less restricted in its approach, is putting the detector into play. A conglomerate of firms involved with airport construction is planning to provide a dielectric-based airport-security system to an unnamed Middle East nation, and Johnson & Johnson is currently evaluating the system as a means of guaranteeing the integrity of its drugs against tampering. Says Gregory, "Right now, companies and governments are very sensitized, so it's easier to get money to move the technology forward. But in general, people find dealing with this stuff to be distasteful, like buying insurance or writing a will."

**W**hile governments dither, the balance of technology (and power) is shifting slowly to the terrorists. New technologies being evaluated by the FAA, though more

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CATCHING...Continued

complicated, more expensive, and in certain ways more sophisticated than current airport-security systems, are no better than what sits on the shelf and are potentially obsolete even before they are fully developed.

Consider, for example, two detectors under development, one by Thermedics Inc., a tiny supplier of biomedical products in Woburn, Massachusetts, and the other by Westinghouse Electric. The Thermedics device is based on the detection of nitrogen, a common denominator throughout almost the entire range of commercial and military explosives. It relies on the principle of chemiluminescence, the ability to excite certain molecules so they give off a glow that is detectable by a common photomultiplier. Nitrogen compounds, such as might exist in explosives, can easily be made to glow. The Westinghouse device uses a procedure called thermal neutron activation, which in effect does a chemical analysis of the contents of the package being screened. The package is interrogated by a gas of low-energy neutrons, which causes the contents to emit gamma rays with energies specific to the elements in the package. A prototype of the Westinghouse detection system will be field-tested next spring, and marketing of early versions has already begun.

Unfortunately, there are several classes of explosive compounds, such as chlorates, that use a different chemistry than nitrates. Unlike the Westinghouse version, the Thermedics device is not designed to deal with these. Then there is this bit of ominous news: There are reports of new nonnitrogen-based explosives, which are said to have turned up in the Middle East. Although the identification of the compound is not known, forensic experts at several government agencies specifically charged with fighting terrorism confirmed that such explosives do indeed exist.

The nitrate problem, however, doesn't faze Gregory's dielectric detector, which is designed to look for anomalies against a background of normality. Says Gregory, "We'd probably pick up all kinds of weird things at first in our secondary inspection, but there's just no way that explosives could get through." In addition, the Gregory device is also booby trap-proof. Even

now, for their time bombs, terrorists are shifting away from traditional blasting cap and clock detonators to transistorized microcircuit electronic detonators. These can easily be rigged to explode if, for example, they are exposed to any kind of high-energy beam, such as X-rays. Gregory's device, however, adds so little energy to any package being screened that it should almost always operate safely below the normal noise level of any electronic booby trap.

Right now, the U.S. government, having wasted opportunities for simple and effective solutions, has had to resort to its most advanced technologies to respond to the relatively primitive but highly organized terror strikes of Abu Nidal and his Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) breakaway faction. According to reliable sources, evidence that Libya and Syria are implicated in the Rome and Vienna bombings, as well as in the bombing of a Berlin discotheque, comes from a careful decoding and reading of enciphered signals pilfered by spy satellites hovering over Europe and the Middle East and relayed to Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, home of the National Security Agency. Says one source, who does not wish to be identified, "Basically, we put on a good show for our allies and our enemies. We proved we could take coded messages in a very heavy data stream, pull them out, decipher them, and use them rapidly. That's the plus. The minus is that this is extremely expensive surveillance, and in the light of Gramm-Rudman [the Balanced Budget Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985], there's going to have to be greater justification for any agency to maintain or increase spending that kind of money on an ongoing basis."

Meantime, the pace of technology marches on. While much has been made of the fact that terrorists, in the main, prefer simple and reliable weapons to high technology, there is no evidence that really good technology cannot provide both. Take the Glock-17, the now notorious plastic pistol developed by Gaston Glock, a well-known Austrian ordnance manufacturer. At \$444, it is considered moderately priced, and its maker has a strong reputation for quality. Although an assembled

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

CATCHING...Continued

Glock-17 can easily be detected by conventional airport-security magnetometers because it contains about a pound of metal in the barrel, slide, and springs, Wayne Hollister, director of Wayne Investigations & Security, based in Virginia and Texas, says, "You can easily evade security by breaking the gun down. But instead of whining about the unfairness of plastic guns, we need to learn how to reset detection devices for high-density plastics."

Glock-17's may be only the beginning of plastic guns. A more advanced design, made almost entirely of high-strength plastics and ceramics and expected to cost about \$400, is under development at Byron Inc. of Casselberry, Florida. To his credit, David Byron, the firm's president, says he won't release the gun until detectors are upgraded so they'll be able to detect the implant that is put into the gun during the injection-molding process. He adds, "I'm looking at passive signaling devices, like the kind that are used against

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The best technology  
is useless if the  
will doesn't exist  
to bring terrorists  
to their knees.

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shoplifters."

Called passive transponders, these devices bounce a radio beam back to its source, where it can be picked up, amplified and tracked. They could not be used effectively in guns as they are now manufactured, however, because a handgun's plastic grips are screwed onto the metal frame and could easily be removed by anyone who wanted to avoid detection. But in an all-plastic gun, the transponder can be molded into the gun in such a way—for example, into the barrel—that any attempt to remove it would destroy the gun. All true, but Byron concedes that because technology doesn't occur in a vacuum, at some point it may be possible

to produce a knockoff version—without the telltale.

In addition to better technology, terrorists are increasingly better organized. As recent events have demonstrated, terrorism has shifted from being an act of dissidence to being an instrument of state policy. With that go improvements in training, techniques, and matériel available to the terrorist. Says the Rand Corporation's Bonnie Cordes: "Some of the terrorist groups have now been around since 1968, which puts them well into their second generation. As a result, they have been able to build an infrastructure of gunrunning, safe houses, and funds that serves terrorists of all stripes. And even among groups that have little in common ideologically, there is an increased pooling of resources and sharing of technical information. What's developing is something akin to criminal networks."

**O**ne example of that infrastructure's sophistication is the PLO's reported takeover of duty-free shops in the secure areas of several African airports. Ostensibly, the purpose of the shops is to help impoverished African countries earn badly needed foreign exchange. But the fact remains that these shops operate on the so-called secure side of airport antiterrorist barriers and are supplied by trucks that may not be subjected to the same scrutiny as passengers and parcels are by the very governments that welcome the money the PLO pays them. Although nobody has linked the shops directly to any specific act of terrorism, their mere existence is frightening enough.

What, then, is to be done? On one thing, all the experts agree: The best technology in the world is useless if the will does not exist to bring terrorists to their knees. Governments in general, and the U.S. government in particular, have to learn to treat the terrorist threat as long-term and to devise solutions that are not merely cosmetic or public relations-oriented. Says Cordes: "Bombing a foreign country is a response, but it isn't viable over the long haul. The U.S. government has to stop looking at terrorism as a blip on the screen and begin looking at it as part of the political landscape. We won't have a real falloff in terrorism until we learn how to deal with it in a foreign-policy context." ■

## FOREIGN MEDIA

GERMAN TRIBUNE 20 July 1986 Pg. 4

# Murdered Siemens director one of several on death list

**Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorists murdered Siemens director Karl Heinz Beckurts and his chauffeur on the outskirts of Munich in the early hours one morning this month, with a remote-controlled 10kg bomb. Police said the bomb was positioned alongside a roadside tree and detonated as the car drove past. Professor Beckurts, 56, and his driver, Eckart Groppler, 42, died immediately. A letter claiming responsibility was found at the scene. It was signed by an RAF Mara Cagol command (named after the wife of the co-founder of Italy's Red Brigades). Professor Beckurts, a nuclear physicist, was one of a number of public figures RAF terrorists are said to be planning to kill.**

**T**he killers struck with terrifying precision. They must have been planning the killing for some time in order to spot weaknesses in his security system.

They knew he could only drive to work in Munich every morning along the one road — a fast, straight trunk road — and it was there they struck.

On the outskirts of Strasslach, the Munich suburb where he lived, there is a road sign warning motorists from Munich that the main road is narrow in the village. There is also a fine old ash tree, and the lethal bomb lay inconspicuously at the foot of the tree.

"They must have been ice-cold professionals," said a police officer. He and his colleagues were shaken as they manned the red rope cordoning off the scene of the crime so Bavarian CID and, later, *Bundeskriminalamt* officers could comb it for clues.

The tree survived the explosion. It was merely stripped of bark by the blast from the ground to a height of one metre.

The top of the road sign was bent and there was a gaping hole at the side of the road. Grass, leaves, soil and splinters of metal lay like a carpet of dirt on the asphalt.

The bomb, estimated by police ballis-

tics experts to have contained about 10kg of explosive, was detonated at just the right moment, to a fraction of a second, either by cable or by wireless.

Eye-witnesses saw a flame shoot 20 metres skywards. The right-hand side of the car, a BMW, was dented like an old tin can. The heavy saloon was catapulted over the road, clearing a grass verge and a metal cycle track and landing in a wire netting fence beneath tall fir trees.

The car's doors and windows were smashed. Professor Beckurts and his driver lay dead, covered in blood and killed instantaneously, in front.

The two Siemens security officers trailing the car in another BMW ground to a halt three metres beyond the scene of the crime. They were unhurt, with only a smashed windscreen.

The police felt it was a miracle no other motorists had come to harm in the early morning rush hour as commuters headed for the Bavarian capital.

A grey tarpaulin was draped over the mangled front end of the wrecked car as it lay in the ditch. The two men had not yet been removed; police were still searching the scene for clues.

They felt they already had a possible clue. A white Volkswagen van with WM (Weilheim) number plates was seen speeding out of the roadside bushes toward Munich immediately after the explosion.

Dark traces of car tyres can clearly be seen on the asphalt. But neither helicopters nor police dogs succeed in finding other tracks or traces.

A letter was found at the scene of the crime. In it the Red Army Faction's Mara Cagol command claimed responsibility.

Mara Cagol, 20, was the wife of the leader and co-founder of the Red Brigades in Italy. She was killed in a shoot-out with the police on 6 June 1975. Three policemen died too.

An RAF killer command adopted the name of a foreign terrorist in February 1985 when a terrorist couple killed in-

dustrialist Ernst Zimmermann in Gauting, only 11km (seven miles) away as the crow flies.

They rang the bell at the door of his bungalow and shot him in cold blood. Zimmermann was managing director of MTU, a turbine manufacturer.

The killers rang a local paper saying they were members of the Patrick O'Hara command. O'Hara was an IRA terrorist who died after a hunger strike at the Maze prison near Belfast in May 1981.

Beckurts is another leading executive to be murdered by terrorists — and another to be murdered near Munich. There are unmistakable similarities between the two cases — and equally clear distinctions.

Zimmermann seemed to have no fear of anything untoward happening. He took no special security precautions, his home wasn't protected and he was driven to work every day in a personalised company Mercedes with the registration number M — TU 5300.

Not so Professor Beckurts, who well knew the RAF were gunning for him. He had taken extensive safety precautions.

His BMW was armour-plated and always accompanied by another car as an escort. In comparison with Zimmermann's house his home on the outskirts of Strasslach was a virtual fortress. The house lay amid extensive grounds. Gates and doors were barred and shuttered. So were windows facing the road, even the dormer window in the roof.

Tall barbed wire fencing protected the grounds to the open fields at the rear. None of his neighbours seem to have been anywhere near as careful.

The murder of Ernst Zimmermann last year seriously upset senior executives in Munich. Professor Beckurts was one of those who clearly took the hint.

But the terrorists were not to be outdone. In Zimmermann's case they had simply rung the door bell. This time they noted the security measures undertaken to protect the house and grounds and decided to use explosives instead.

It was a safe house he lived in with his wife and three children, one son and two daughters. He left it and took his seat in an armour-plated car in which he felt equally safe.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

GERMAN TRIBUNE 20 July 1986 Pg. 4

The murder of Siemens director Karl Heinz Beckurts, a nuclear physicist associated with SDI research, may prove yet again how closely interlinked international terrorist groups are.

National terrorist squads certainly seem to be forging increasingly close international links.

When General René Audran, arms procurement coordinator to the French government, stepped out of his Renault 20 to open the door of his garage on the outskirts of Paris on 25 January 1985 he had only seconds to live.

An Action Directe killer squad emerged from the evening shadows and killed the helpless general in a hail of bullets.

Seven days later the board chairman of Motoren- und Turbinen-Union (MTU), Ernst Zimmermann, was murdered at his home near Munich.

A man and a woman, members of the Red Army Faction's Patrick O'Hara

## New generation of brutal killers emerges

command, took him by surprise early in the morning, bound and gagged him and shot him in the head. By that evening he was dead.

The crimes were committed hundreds of miles apart but the two murders bore the same imprint.

In virtually identical declarations Action Directe and the RAF claimed the murders, carried out by Western European guerrillas, had shaken the imperialist system.

In April the RAF repeated this coordinated procedure, claiming Audran and Zimmermann had both been representatives of the military-industrial complex.

That is far from the only indication of what is clearly growing cooperation in ideology, strategy and tactics between national terrorist groups in Europe.

Their links are so close that Karlsruhe director of public prosecutions Kurt Rebmann feels their threat potential has been intensified.

Heinrich Boge, head of the *Bundeskriminalamt*, fears collaboration between the RAF and terrorist groups in other countries may lead to a new quality of terrorism.

In a 1982 policy document the RAF called for the creation of a Western European Front. This demand was reiterated in subsequent action and strategy papers.

The declared aim was "to establish a Western European guerrilla (organisation) as the politico-military nucleus of a qualitative leap in the international organisation of proletarian struggle in the metropolitan areas."

Early in 1985, a fortnight before the murder of General Audran, Action Directe issued a declaration proclaiming the formation of a terrorist alliance consisting of Action Directe in France, the RAF in Germany and the CCC, or Combatant Communist Cells, in Belgium.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

GERMAN TRIBUNE  
24 July 1986 Pg. 15

## Aim remains the same: only the tactics are new

Three members of the terrorist Red Army Faction (RAF), Eva Sybille Haule-Frimpong, Christian Kluth and Luitgard Hornstein, have been arrested in an ice cream parlour in Rüsselsheim. They were being sought on a variety of counts involving violence. A fourth suspected terrorist, Ursula Barabass, has been arrested on charges of complicity. She is said to have provided the others with shelter. Eighteen years after the first attacks on department stores the heirs of Andreas Baader and Ulrike Meinhof continue to murder and destroy property with increasing brutality.

RAF activists greeted their sympathisers with the repugnant comment "the comrades have become killers" when, at the height of terrorist bloodshed in 1977, they murdered not only "representatives of the system" such as chief public prosecutor Siegfried Buback and employers' leader Hanns-Martin Schleyer, but also Schleyer's chauffeur and three bodyguards.

That all happened a long time ago. RAF supporters never gave a thought to the fact that when Siemens manager Karl Heinz Beckurts was killed so was his chauffeur Eckart Groppler.

The RAF themselves did not name him in their seven-page letter claiming responsibility for the Munich murder.

Within RAF circles the only concern about the shooting of American serviceman Edward Pimental in Wiesbaden, whose identification papers were required for an attack on the Frankfurt military airport, was whether it was a tactical error.

RAF activists of the third generation fight shy of risks and plan acts that present as little danger to themselves personally as possible.

But the RAF has lost none of its danger. There was a period when they kept a low profile and until the end of the 1970s they were isolated.

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### LIST...Continued

The car turned a few corners and headed down the main road toward Munich. The killers lay in wait less than 100 metres along the main road in a clearing amid the fir trees, or so the police feel.

There they detonated a lethal explosive charge against which the best armour plating was powerless.

It is still not clear why the terrorists chose their latest victim. Was he singled out for his own sake as an authority, a leading executive and a man who symbolised the system they rejected?

Or was he merely an executive in an industry they sought to attack — the industry rather than the individual?

So many company executives are potential targets that security experts feel they cannot possibly all be effectively protected.

"All we can do," one expert says, "is constantly remind company staff to keep their eyes open for weak links in the security chain."

Professor Beckurts would, however, seem to be a fine symbol for the enemy as the RAF terrorists see it. They have latched on to fears of atomic energy as part of their struggle and he was clear and firm in his support of atoms for peace.

To dispense with atomic energy, he said, would be self-mutilation an industrial nation.

Peter Schmalz

(Die Welt, Bonn, 10 July 1986)

AIM...Continued

The hard core of the group seemed to have slipped off to the Middle East. But today, according to security force estimates, the commando element is almost totally back in the Federal Republic.

Since the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985 they have increased their armed struggle against the military-industrial complex representing the NATO-US war machine allegedly aimed at suppressing people the world over.

There have been long intervals in this battle but the struggle itself has been systematic.

It was obvious after the murder of Munich company executive Ernst Zimmermann and more recently Professor Beckurts that potential victims of this campaign were people involved in NATO in some way or another, including people in the military and from politics.

Any kind of institution, no matter how far removed from what the terrorists regarded as imperialism, was fair game for RAF bomb attacks.

RAF planning, as developed recently, now includes West German industrial firms involved in the American Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and the European Eureka project.

A note left behind after the murder of Siemens executive Beckurts and his driver Groppler accused Beckurts of having taken part in a secret conference for SDI.

A note acknowledging responsibility for the attack on the Fraunhofer Research Institute laboratories stated that laser technology components had been developed there.

Participation in SDI and Eureka was given as the reason for bomb attacks on Dornier, the aerospace group.

The shift of vague aims from radical changes in Germany to the anti-imperialist world revolution has made no difference in the RAF's attitude towards extreme violence. What is noticeable is that their use of violence has become more indiscriminate.

The RAF hard core is made up, as previously, of 20 terrorists. There is a warrant out for the arrest of every one of them.

They are, as in the past, mainly the sons and daughters of educated people. Women are in the majority.

The new development is that between the members of the commando group and sympathisers another group of 20 has been established. They are the "illegal militants."

Luitgart Hornstein and Christian Kluth, both also arrested in Rüsselsheim, probably belonged to this group.

These militants are made up mainly of old, dropout fighters from the inner circle.

There is a marked difference in the methods used by the commando group and the militants in their mutual anti-imperialist aims. While the hard core kill deliberately, the militants try to avoid endangering other people in their attacks.

Over the years the RAF's attraction has not diminished despite a new ideological approach and the major "offensive" mounted since the end of 1984.

As in the past their is the double circle of sympathisers, the close-knit group made up of about 200 firm supporters, from which the hard core of the RAF

and the militants is recruited, and a wider circle of like-minded people, about 500. They are uncritical and can be roped into RAF aims.

The underground fighters in the hard core live in isolation. They change their living accommodation regularly, and the homes are inconspicuous, found for them by accomplices.

Previously the militants mixed with people, staying the night in youth hostels and boarding houses. They carried stolen or forged papers. Contrary to the members of the hard core the militants are mostly unarmed.

One of the main reasons the security forces believe that Frau Haule-Frimpong is a member of the commando group is that a pistol was found in her handbag.

Although the RAF writes much about the "international front," the much-talked about "International" of terrorism has for many years been nothing more than a paper tiger.

The successors of Baader and Meinhof worked closely with the French Action Directe (AD) and the Belgian Combatant Communist Cells (CCC).

After the murder of French General Audran and the German industrialist Ernst Zimmermann in 1985 a joint communiqué was issued.

A joint statement acknowledging responsibility was issued by the RAF-AD after the bomb attack on the American section of Frankfurt airport in the summer of 1985.

But there are just as few indications that there was foreign participation in these attacks as there is for foreign involvement in the Beckurts murder.

One of the few clues to cooperation between foreign terrorist groups is the theft of explosives in Belgium in June 1984.

The murder of American serviceman Edward Pimental on 7 August 1985 in preparation for an attack on the American Frankfurt air base was a setback for the RAF.

This was heatedly discussed at considerable length at the anti-imperialist congress at the beginning of this year in Frankfurt attended by 1,000.

Sympathisers said in criticism that the shooting of the GI was a betrayal of the revolution. The reasons given for this were not sympathy for the victim but that the RAF had disregarded "revolutionary ideology" with purely military posturing.

The terrorists expressed partial regret and took a new approach to the ide-

GENERATION...Continued

In reality links between the RAF and the CCC are much more longstanding. They date back to 1977 or 1978.

The two underground organisations have since both shared hideouts and organised joint supplies of explosive.

Dynamite stolen in Ecaussines, Belgium, in June 1984 was used in an attempted bombing of the WEU bureau in Paris by Action Directe.

It was also used by the RAF in their attempt to bomb the NATO college in Oberammergau in December 1984 and by "illegal militants" in a bid to bomb the Federal Arms Technology and Procurement Bureau in Koblenz in May 1985. Last but not least, dynamite from Ecaussines was used in a bomb raid on an electronics company in Charleroi,

Belgium, in June 1985.

The murder of Karl Heinz Beckurts was said by Heribert Hellenbroich, former head of the *Verfassungsschutz* in Cologne, to call to mind the modus operandi of the Basque terrorist organisation ETA.

It was certainly in keeping with the strategic and ideological concept of terrorist organisations.

The RAF is keen to step up its attacks on company executives, while Action Directe sees military research and technology projects as the main targets for attack.

"The RAF and Action Directe," says an officer investigating the Beckurts murder in Munich, "are proving to be a new generation of brutal killers."

(Handelsblatt, Düsseldorf, 10 July 1986)

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

TERRORISTS 'PLANNING' TO SABOTAGE ASIAN GAMES

SK240802 Seoul YONHAP in English 0729 GMT 24 Jul 86

[Text] Seoul, July 24 (YONHAP) -- South Korean police have been placed on alert following an information that Palestinian and Libyan terrorists have entered the country and are planning to sabotage the upcoming Asian Games. Acting on a tip from a foreign intelligence agency stationed here, the national police have distributed a list of 13 international terrorist suspects, including seven who are reported to have already entered the country. The list, compiled by the foreign intelligence agency, includes Abdul Rahman, a member of the "Black September" group, which was responsible for the deaths of 11 members of the Israeli 1972 Olympic team in Munich.

Police said they believe that the terrorists have smuggled weapons into Korea for the purpose of sabotaging the Asian Games, scheduled to begin on Sept. 20. Immigration authorities have confirmed that seven of the suspects have entered the country, most of them in early June. One of them left Korea after a nine-day stay.

The National Police headquarters has instructed local police to place the suspects, if located, under special surveillance.

NORTH MAY BLOCK OLYMPICS WITH IRREGULAR WARFARE

SK221157 Seoul YONHAP in English 1151 GMT 22 Jul 86

[Text] Tokyo, July 22 (YONHAP) -- a Japanese defense official has said North Korea is highly likely to provoke an irregular warfare against the South in a bid to obstruct the 1986 Summer Olympic Games set to be held in Seoul. Hideshi Takesada, an instructor at Japan's National Defense College, said that the North may send guerrillas into Seoul

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

AIM...Continued

ological foundations of their actions.

This was produced on a 20-page type-written statement in a magazine entitled "Fighting shoulder to shoulder -- a newspaper for the anti-imperialist front in Western Europe," issue number 5 of January 1986.

This said: "We state here clearly that the shooting of the GI in that particular situation was a mistake. It blocked the effect of the attack on the air base as well as the political-military requirements of the action and the offensive overall."

The shooting was "a step towards escalation that in itself had significance," because the attacks in Wiesbaden and Frankfurt were against soldiers who "massacred people in the Third World."

The "direction of the action" became blurred and "ammunition was given to the security forces' propaganda and any number of idiots on the left trying to split resistance to the shooting of the GI."

It was clear from this statement that much though the terrorists regret the fate of the peoples in need of liberation they don't care a jot about what happens

to their individual victims, whether they are GI Pimental or chauffeur Groppler.

From now on the RAF is pitiless in following the rule that omelettes cannot be made without breaking eggs. In other words, indiscriminate killings will continue.

The RAF took a year after Wiesbaden and Frankfurt to mount their next serious attack. The security forces cannot foresee how things are going to go after the murder of Beckurts and the bombing of research laboratories and firms in July.

The groups endangered by the RAF's aims in its "anti-imperialist struggle" have come to light by arrests and the discovery of "safe" houses. In some instances lists of names have been found.

But no-one can make any rhyme or reason out of their planning.

Potential victims are in the broadest sense representatives of the "military-industrial complex" and, according to the security forces, that does not exclude politicians.

But it is regarded as improbable that there will be an outbreak of attacks against politicians prior to the general election in January next year.

Just how long the nightmare of violence will last no-one knows. Today's

terrorists are cunning, cowardly and cautious for their own persons.

It could also be a question of their internal organisation that they prefer remote-controlled bombs to trying, for example, kidnapping. All this makes it difficult to come to grips with them.

Expert circles regard with misgivings the latest CDU/CSU proposal to combat terrorism with the increased use of undercover agents.

It is regarded as quite impossible to infiltrate the commando group of the RAF. The agent would be in the gravest danger and probably have to commit serious crimes to prove his credentials as an accomplice.

There is not much likelihood that RAF insiders will come forward and give information to gain the millions offered in rewards either. RAF revenge is too much feared and their small circle too powerful.

Then there is a sense of belonging together in the underground that makes it difficult to think in terms of betrayal.

*Thomas Meyer*

(Kölnener Stadt-Anzeiger, Cologne,  
12 August 1986)



U.S. INSTALLATIONS ALERT FOR POSSIBLE TERRORISM

PA271749 Panama City ACAN in Spanish 1636 GMT 27 Jul 86

[Excerpt] Tegucigalpa, 27 Jul (ACAN-EFE) -- Today the Pentagon ordered all U.S. diplomatic offices and civilian and military installations in Honduras to establish a maximum security alert due to the fear of terrorist attacks.

The U.S. Embassy and Consulate, which are located 50 meters from the Honduran Foreign Ministry, have become the most heavily guarded installations in Tegucigalpa.

In addition to the Marines, who guard the U.S. Embassy, there are now private guards armed with revolvers and sawed-off shotguns; they are also equipped with communications equipment. Also guarding the embassy are regular Honduran policemen with automatic rifles. Likewise, civilian agents are discreetly guarding the installations, and the iron doors at both the embassy and the consulate have been closed electronically. These doors are opened only to people who have been fully identified. They are then thoroughly searched and checked with a metal detector.

Other U.S. civilian installations are being guarded in a discreet way, but noticeably, as the Honduran police have patrol cars nearby so that, if necessary, they can carry out a pursuit. Orders have been sent directly from the Pentagon to U.S. military installations in Honduras prohibiting officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers from visiting urban areas, unless they are on a specific mission.

U.S. military personnel stationed in urban areas have received orders to be on the alert at their homes and to not visit night clubs or public events as a precautionary measure. Despite the secrecy of the orders, they have been spread by sources close to the Americans. The sources told ACAN-EFE that "the American military men will be compelled to remain in their quarters until the terrorist attack last Wednesday night in Tegucigalpa has been fully cleared up." [passage omitted]

NORTH...Continued

via sea and underground tunnels dug through the Demilitarized Zone to hold Seoul citizens hostage. At the same time, he said, the North will launch a preemptive attack while sending soldiers over to Seoul on low-flying AN2 light planes.

In his article published Tuesday by the SEKAI SHUBO, an influential weekly magazine, Takesada said that the north does not think the 1983 bombing attack in Rangoon, Burma, as a failure in terms of strategy against the South despite procedural mistake.

Takesada is the first Japanese defense official to make an official mention on the possibility of a North Korean attack on the South.

Saying that none of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China will be able to play a deterrent in the North's Guerrilla warfare strategy, Takesada analyzed that the United States has difficulties with immediate response and China has almost no means to take before or after North Korea's limited military action. He added that the Soviet Union does not oppose North Korea's limited warfare designed to achieve a limited political goal if it can avoid a prolonged all-out war involving itself.

Takesada concluded North Korea cannot "stand idly" in the face of the 1988 Olympics taking place in Seoul, with the communist countries, including the Soviet Union, and non-aligned nations participating, because this will nullify its foreign policy sought for since 1970s and will deliver an irrecoverable setback to the North in its competition with the South.

**Foreign Minister, France's Raimond View Terrorism**  
 LD301941 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish  
 1800 GMT 30 Jul 86

[Text] The joint news conference held by Jean-Bernard Raimond and Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, French and Spanish foreign ministers, ended a few minutes ago. The two ministers described some of their discussions. Paloma Canades reports:

Collaboration in the struggle against terrorism was one of the subjects discussed during the 2-hour meeting this afternoon in Madrid between Spanish Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez and French Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raimond.

This collaboration will continue and may result in further expulsions of suspected ETA members from French territory. Details will be worked out during the visit by Robert Pandraud, French minister-delegate to the minister of the interior, to Madrid next week for talks with his Spanish counterpart Jose Barrionuevo. Foreign Minister Francisco Fernandez Ordonez spoke of this afternoon's discussion on this subject:

[Begin Fernandez Ordonez recording] As my counterpart Jean-Bernard has said, on the subject of terrorism there is firm determination on the part of the French and Spanish Governments to fight terrorism together. This is very clear, and as my

counterpart Mr Raimond has said, the details and form this collaboration will take are being studied and dealt with on a daily basis by the Ministries of the Interior. What we have looked at is the general framework of this collaboration and again there has been reaffirmation of the firm determination of the French and Spanish Governments to fight together, democratically, and with the appropriate means of a democratic state, a state based on law, against this scourge. [end recording]

Other subjects discussed by Raimond and Fernandez Ordonez were community matters which concern the two countries: the budget, Mediterranean policy, and fisheries.

After the meeting the French foreign minister said that although different views do exist they lie within the framework of the excellent relations between France and Spain, and he is sure that the problems will be resolved both in the Community framework of the the Twelve and bilaterally.

They also discussed the forthcoming high-level meetings between the two governments. A seminar will take place in Madrid 4-5 October under the chairmanship of the Spanish and French foreign ministers. Following this, French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac will visit Madrid for talks with Felipe Gonzalez. The date of the summit meeting between the president of the French Republic and the Spanish prime minister will be fixed through diplomatic channels, to take place after the October seminar.

FINANCIAL TIMES 31 July 1986 Pg. 2

## France and Spain discuss terrorism

BY TOM BURNS IN MADRID

FRENCH Foreign Minister Mr Jean-Bernard Raimond held talks in Madrid yesterday with Mr Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, his Spanish counterpart, against a background of strongly improved relations between the two neighbouring governments as a result of recent decisive French action against suspected ETA terrorists.

In just over a week, the French authorities have taken the unprecedented step of expelling three Spanish Basques from south-west France to the Spanish border and to waiting Spanish policemen.

The crackdown has been viewed as signalling the end of the so-called "safe haven" area of the towns of Hendaye, St Jean-de-Luz and Biarritz which were traditionally used by the Basque separatist movement as a rearguard zone where they could plan their terrorist strikes in Spain.

Mr Raimond, whose four-hour

visit to Madrid yesterday was the first since he was appointed Foreign Minister following the centre-right's electoral victory in France last March, arrived in the Spanish capital amid strict security measures.

Aside from cross-border terrorism, the agenda of the meeting included discussion on impending visits to Madrid by President François Mitterrand and by Mr Jacques Chirac, France's Prime Minister, as well as on an inter-ministerial summit involving members of both governments which is scheduled to be held in Madrid in November.

Next week, Mr Charles Pasqua, France's Interior Minister, is due to visit Spain for talks with Mr Jose Barrionuevo, his Spanish opposite number, that will review details of the progress on anti-terrorist co-operation.

Meanwhile, extremist Basque nationalists announced yesterday that they would step up protests against

the French drive on the 800-strong Spanish Basque refugee community in south-west France.

ETA, for its part, admitted responsibility for a weekend bomb attack in the Basque country which killed two members of the civil guard corps and pledged that it would continue its campaign.

● At least 30 Spaniards employed by the Pepsi-Cola company near Madrid were injured yesterday in a clash with police, according to union sources, **Reuter reports from Madrid.**

The police fired rubber bullets and tear gas at 200 workers who set fire to two company delivery trucks and erected barricades on a nearby road, the union sources said.

Police said there were injuries in the clash but did not immediately say how many workers had been hurt. There were no reports of arrests. The workers have been engaged in a prolonged labour dispute with the company.

**DM3 Million Reward Offered for RAF Terrorists**  
*DW310850 Bonn DIE WELT in German 31 Jul 86 p 1*

[Unattributed report: "Rebmann Hopes Some RAF Members Will Quit"]

[Text] Bonn — With a reward of DM3 million, Prosecutor General Kurt Rebmann wants to catch the murderers of Karl-Heinz Beckurts, member of the Siemens executive board, and his driver Eckhard Groppler. Rebmann thus hopes to make persons from the supporting circle of the "Red Army Faction" (RAF) terrorist group, which confessed to the murder, "turn back and quit," said a spokesman of the federal prosecutor's office.

**Lebanese 'Achille Lauro' Suspect Arrested 24 Jan**  
*LD311625 Hamburg DPA in German 1526 GMT 31 Jul 86*

[Text] Viechtach, 31 Jul (DPA) — According to the local police today, a 22-year-old Lebanese, who has been connected with the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro*, was arrested in Viechtach on 24 January at a time when he was living in a home for asylum seekers. The young man, whose name has been given as Malik Ahmad Hamadi, had been committed to a detention center in Straubing as there had been an application for extradition from the Italian legal authorities. It could not be found out this evening from Straubing whether or not he has already been extradited.

TORONTO GLOBE &amp; MAIL 31 July 1986 Pg. 7

# Terrorists' aim is to hobble Europe

**BY JOHN GELLNER**

Mr. Gellner is editor of Canadian Defence Quarterly.

**T**HE CIRCUMSTANCES surrounding the killing earlier this month of Karl Heinz Beckurts, an executive of the giant Siemens electronics firm, underline how great the terrorist menace is in Western Europe, and how much it affects the everyday life of many.

Here was a businessman who left his home in a posh Munich suburb to go to his office, as he did every morning. For this routine journey, he travelled in a chauffeur-driven armored limousine, followed by another car carrying a bodyguard. Despite the precautions, he and his driver were blown up by a remote-controlled bomb.

If any Canadian businessman were reported as regularly going to and from work in this fashion, it would be something of a sensation and doubts would be voiced about his mental stability. In West Germany, the armored car and the bodyguard convoy were accepted without comment as standard procedure.

The fact is that, going by the sheer number of incidents, Western Europe is where most terrorist acts are committed — not, as might be assumed, the Middle East, Africa or Latin America. And these wanton attacks do not include the guerrilla warfare waged by the Irish Republican Army in Northern Ireland or the Basque ETA separatists in Spain, and on a lesser level, the Corsican Liberation Front (FLNC) in Corsica.

The main terrorist groups in Western Europe are the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany, the Direct Action (AD) in France, the Red Brigades (BR) in Italy (though not much has been heard of it of late), the Communist Combat Cells (CCC) in Belgium, the FP-25 and possibly now the Armed Revolutionary Organization (ORA) in Portugal.

The gunmen have this in common: they

are all groupings of the extreme left and their target is the social and political order in the democracies, specifically the institutions that uphold and protect that order.

This was shown in statistics published last year by the Centre of Strategic Studies of Tel Aviv University. The centre's figures maintain that in 1984, 40.5 per cent of all terrorist acts the world over, which could be verified as such, occurred in the Western European democracies. Only 0.2 per cent occurred in Communist Eastern Europe. This could, of course, be attributed to the fact that in a police state such activities are much more effectively deterred and more easily suppressed than in a democracy.

But because the Western European terrorists are in essence Marxist revolutionaries, their attacks are most often directed against U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization installations, U.S. military personnel and individuals and establishments which, to the terrorists, are most visibly representative of capitalism.

Hence the assassinations of leading industrialists, like Mr. Beckurts and the earlier killing of Ernst Zimmermann, chief executive of MTU, Germany's biggest manufacturers of aeroengines, and also of a lowly U.S. army corporal a year ago. The corporal was murdered for no other reason than to get his identity card, which would give a terrorist access to a U.S. airbase targeted for a bomb attack.

The Belgian CCC has launched attacks against such varied objectives as a NATO pipeline and the Antwerp branch of the Bank of America. There has recently been a whole series of bombings in France. Direct Action has admitted setting off some of the blasts and plentiful evidence indicates the group committed others, including an explosion in a large department store that killed and injured ordinary shoppers and sales

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EUROPE...Continued

personnel. At about the same time came a similar series of bombings in Portugal, by either the FP-25 or the ORA.

The terrorist campaign in Western Europe is of such a distinct nature that it has been given a type name: "Euro-terrorism." This calls to mind a similar common designation of past years, "Euro-communism," but there is a great difference. Euro-communism applied to a trend away from doctrinaire Marxism-Leninism, one best described by the Italian Communist Party as a "historic compromise." Euro-terrorism is the opposite of compromise — it typifies a revolutionary drive, the extreme of radicalism.

There is some evidence of a concerted Euro-terrorist movement. Pronouncements to that effect have been made by some of the terrorist organizations. On Jan. 15, 1985, the German Red Army Faction and the French Direct Action announced in twin communiqués that they were forming "a political-military front in Western Europe." Some authorities believe that the Belgian CCC is part of that front. Circumstantial evidence points that way: in June of last year, the CCC raided a Brussels factory and got away with 812 kilograms (more than 1,500 pounds) of plastic explosives, which then kept turning up in terrorist attacks in West Germany and France.

With all their savagery, the Euro-terrorists are no closer to their stated objective, the revolutionary overthrow of the democratic political and social order, than when they started. They can, however, claim at least one victory: they have discouraged some potential visitors from the other side of the Atlantic from spending their holidays in Europe. Thus they have hurt the capitalist tourist industry, though not significantly.

Even for the comparatively few terrorists in the death squads, this is not much of a success after the deaths of so many innocent people and all the wanton material damage. Still, the threat to law and order

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY

3 August 1986 Pg. 6

## Reagan in dilemma on hostages

By Alex Brummer  
in Washington

THE Reagan Administration was forced on to the defensive on Sunday over its refusal to negotiate with terrorists as anxious relatives of remaining hostages in Lebanon responded with fear to the video tape carried by Father Lawrence Jenco, who returned to freedom in the West after 18 months in captivity.

US officials promised to "talk" to release the remaining Western hostages in Beirut, but stood firm against "negotiations with terrorists." There were strong suggestions that Syria had the power to improve its relations with the US by using its influence to bring out the remaining captives.

The joyous return of Father Jenco to a US base in West Germany was marred for many Americans by the haunting video tape he carried with him from a second US hostage, Mr David Jacobsen, who bitterly attacked White House inaction and apparently confirmed the "execution" of

another hostage, William Buckley.

The White House sought to reassure an increasingly doubting and impatient American public that the US is doing all it can to free the remaining American and other captives in Lebanon. "We're working very hard to secure the release," a spokesman told correspondents, "but we're not going to give in". The Islamic fundamentalist captors of the Americans are demanding the release of their brothers imprisoned in Kuwait for terrorism.

Father Jenco's arrival in Germany in the company of the Archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Mr Terry Waite, provoked the relatives of the other hostages including Mr Jacobsen, the head of the medical school at the American University in Beirut, and the Associated Press Bureau chief, Mr Terry Anderson, to renew their pressure on the Reagan Administration. They believe that while the White House waged an all-out effort last year to free hostages, held aboard a TWA airliner in Beirut, it has never made the same effort to secure their relatives' release.

Mr Jacobsen, in his video-taped interview, said: "My captors said this is the very last sign of their goodwill and that our release will be by death if the Government doesn't negotiate right now."

remains. Considering the fanaticism and utter disregard for human life of those from whom it emanates, the threat is not one to be taken lightly.

### Police Announce Arrest of 2 Achille Lauro Hijackers

AU311652 Paris AFP in English 1547 GMT 31 Jul 86

[Text] Rome, July 31 (AFP)— Two Lebanese have been arrested in West Germany in connection with the hijacking of the *Achille Lauro* cruise liner by a Palestinian group last October, Italian police said here Thursday. Yusuf Sa'd, 23, was arrested in West Berlin, and Salih Hamadah was arrested at Viechtach in Bavaria, they said.

No date was given for the arrests. Police in Straubing, Bavaria said that Salih Hamadah had been expelled from West Germany on July 24. He had been put first into the hands of the Swiss

police and subsequently transferred to Italian police custody.

Sa'd was tried in his absence and sentenced to a six-and-half year jail term at the *Achille Lauro* trial in Genoa last month. The prosecution said he played a leading role in the planning of the hijacking, in which a crippled, elderly Jewish-American passenger was shot dead and thrown overboard. Sa'd was said to have financed the operation in Italy and helped the hijack gang when they arrived in Rome from Tunisia, while Salih Hamadah is said to have stolen the passports used by the hijackers.

Police here said the arrests followed cooperation between Italian, West German and Spanish police.

FINANCIAL TIMES 4 August 1986 Pg. 2

## Leading W. German terrorist captured

By Rupert Cornwell in Bonn

WEST GERMAN police have captured the 32-year-old Ms Eva Sybille Haule-Frimpong, believed to be a leading member

of the Red Army Faction (RAF), in what could be a major breakthrough against resurgent left wing terrorism here.

Ms Haule-Frimpong was arrested, along with two other suspected terrorist accomplices, at an ice cream bar in Ruesselsheim near Frankfurt on Saturday afternoon, according to a police spokesman she was in possession of a stolen high-calibre pistol and 80 rounds of ammunition, and of German and Belgian identity cards issued under different names.

The West German authorities have been seeking Ms Haule-Frimpong for more than two years in connection with various terrorist attacks here, including an attempted bombing of a Nato training centre at Oberammergau in Bavaria in December 1984.

But the search took on new urgency after the assassination near Munich three weeks ago of Mr Karl Heinz Beckurts, the senior Siemens executive, and his driver, for which the RAF have claimed responsibility.

Her capture may well be a direct result of the record DM 3m (£968,000) reward offered last week by private sources—almost certainly from West German industry—for information leading to the capture of Mr Beckurt's killers, Mr Friedrich Zimmermann, the Interior Minister, said last night that the "decisive tip-off" came from the general public, although he gave no further details.

The weekend breakthrough follows renewed alarm here that a terrorist "autumn offensive" could be in the offing.

### Zimmermann Interviewed on RAF Terrorist Members DW051331 Bonn DIE WELT in German 5 Aug 86 p 4

[Interview with Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann; date, place, and interviewer's name not given]

[Text] *Welt*: Mr Minister, what has been found from the most recent arrest of the three suspected terrorists?

Zimmermann: The most important finding is that the terrorists are not only abroad, but also in the FRG, and probably feel so secure that they go to public places. Vigilant citizens recognized them. That proves again how important citizens' cooperation in public surveillance is, and how important wanted posters are, because naturally we do not have enough police to control every ice cream parlor or every public place in the Federal Republic. Here police authorities rely on citizens' cooperation, and in that respect it is a very significant success. It shows that terrorism can only be successfully combated through cooperation of the citizens and the security authorities.

*Welt*: Will public pressure for the search continue?

Zimmermann: Quite certainly. The federal prosecutor general and the Federal Office of Criminal Investigation will intensify their efforts. The terrorists must assume that they may be recognized wherever they are in the FRG. I call on all citizens to keep their eyes open, report what is suspicious, and not hesitate in such cases to inform the police.

*Welt*: There are doubts as to whether the arrests in Ruesselsheim were really made on the basis of a lead from citizens...

Zimmermann: I do not want to elaborate publicly on details of the search and the state of the investigation.

*Welt*: Mrs Haule-Frimpong has been a fugitive for a long time. The two other persons had not been known as RAF [Red Army Faction] members. What conclusions can be drawn?

Zimmermann: It is correct that Mrs Haule-Frimpong was among the public fugitives. She was also probably recognized first. However, it is interesting that, in addition, two persons were arrested, who, according to current information, have access to the RAF but had not been associated with the terrorists. However, they did take part in violent demonstrations.

*Welt*: Could you give details?

Zimmermann: Yes, obviously all terrorists who are on the list of wanted persons began their terrorist career in violent demonstrations and squatting. There is not one case where you could say that somebody became a terrorist overnight.

There is no one who would say "today I decided to become a terrorist," but as a conditioned perpetrator [Einstiegsteater] he moves closer and closer to the RAF core, meaning, through demonstrations and selective violent acts, as well as cooperation with the RAF, until he commits terrorist acts, not only against objects, but selectively against persons also.

It ends with murder — for example the murder of Mr Beckurts and his driver.

*Welt*: What do you know about the two persons who were arrested in connection with Mrs Haule-Frimpong's arrest?

Zimmermann: Mrs Haule-Frimpong made herself conspicuous in 1980-81 as a squatter and was substantially fined during that time. That constituted her first step. Then in the early 1980's she came onto the terrorist scene. Luitgard Hornstein, who has now been arrested, made herself conspicuous for the first time at the violent Krefeld demonstration in 1983 when she was arrested in clashes with the police. At the time she was given a fine, and then she established contacts with the RAF. Christian Kluth, who has also been arrested, was temporarily detained in 1983 for suspicion of breach of public peace and preparation of criminal acts.

That also shows that, at first, violent acts are committed in the environment; then they join the RAF. We do not know at this point whether and in what criminal offenses they have taken part. However, the fact that they had forged documents and sat together with a fugitive who was armed — Mrs Haule-Frimpong — seems to suggest they were in contact with the RAF core and must possibly be considered as being members of the group. Further investigations will show that.

*Welt*: Now wanted posters of 18 persons have been prepared for public search in connection with terrorism. Are there also findings from that circle, allowing the conclusion that subsequent RAF memberships begin with participation in violent demonstrations?

Zimmermann: It is a fact that all 18 persons on the wanted posters, all suspected 18 terrorists, in the past made themselves conspicuous in their field of activities by squatting and acts of violence.

Let me mention a few examples of those who have been fugitive for a long time — let me call them "old terrorists" — like Susanne Albercht. She made herself conspicuous by squatting in Hamburg in 1973. Or let me mention Inge Vieth who also belongs

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

**Group Reported To Fight French Basque Terrorists**  
*LD080255 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish*  
 2200 GMT 7 Aug 86

[Text] In France the news concerning terrorism featured an alleged group ready to fight against the terrorist organization of the French Basque country, Iparretarrak. Jorge Collar reports from Paris:

A group unknown until now, whose origins are not clear, and which describes itself as being anti-Iparretarrak, introduced itself by sending a document to several media organizations of the French Basque country. This contains threats against Iparretarrak members and other more veiled threats against members of ETA established in France. The authors of the text say that the future cannot be left in the hands of a 1.86-percent fringe on the wrong side of the law, who are attempting to impose their will on the Basque people. They announce that they will respond to Iparretarrak attacks with other attacks. The text also says that the refuges of the political-military terrorists will be attacked and states that more than 25 years of political-military terrorism have shown the kind of democracy which they would impose on us. The text of the anti-Iparretarrak group could be linked with two attacks carried out in 1985 against people belonging to the French Basque separatist group, for which no one has ever claimed responsibility, the attacks against Xabiere Manterola and (Michel Castagne), the latter later founded the nationalist movement, (?EMA) which stood in the elections.

**Rabin Cites Decrease in Acts of Terrorism**  
*TA051430 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew*  
 1400 GMT 5 Aug 86

[Text] The defense minister has said that over the past 5 months acts of terrorism in Israel decreased by 50 percent and the number of people injured by terrorist acts decreased even more.

This is thanks to the Jordanian anti-PLO policy and our actions against it. Minister Rabin thinks that if Jordan continues with this policy, there is a chance of an even greater decrease in attacks. He was speaking to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

Referring to terrorism from southern Lebanon, the defense minister pointed out that 99 percent of the attacks were committed by Palestinians.

**ZIMMERMAN...Continued**

to the older generation. She was arrested for the first time during a violent demonstration in Berlin in 1971. Wolfgang Grams, who is somewhat younger, made himself repeatedly conspicuous in 1978 by disturbing court proceedings and by squatting at the Protestant church in Frankfurt-Harheim. I also would like to mention Andrea Klump who took part as a squatter of the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation in Frankfurt in 1981. Then there is Birgit Hogefeld, who also took part in squatting at the Protestant church in 1978.

There are connections regarding their actions and careers which suggest that the RAF potential is very selectively recruited from among those violent demonstrators. Naturally not every squatter of a house or a Protestant church and not every violent demonstrator joins the RAF, because he may not be approached or withdraws after a while. However, some of them do follow that road, and it is important for the RAF to be cut off from the young generation.

One thing is sure — that the terrorists who stay in the Federal Republic for some time will eventually be caught. However, our

FINANCIAL TIMES

7 August 1986 Pg. 8

# Army suppliers withdraw after IRA death threat

BY HUGH CARNEY IN DUBLIN

AT LEAST three small companies have withdrawn from contracts to supply goods to the security forces in Northern Ireland following death threats by the Irish Republic Army against all civilians working for the Army and the Royal Ulster Constabulary.

A business supplying the RUC with fuel in Newry, County Armagh, an Enniskillen baker supplying bread to the Army in County Fermanagh and a fruit and vegetable wholesaler supplying barracks in Armagh and Omagh announced they were pulling out of their contracts immediately because of the threat.

They joined two construction companies which terminated contracts last week after the IRA killed a quarry owner who supplied materials to the security forces.

The Police Authority, which handles all RUC civilian contracts, said it had received several inquiries from other companies, mainly small local firms, anxious about their safety. It expected more withdrawals as a result but added that most contractors appeared to be waiting to see how serious the threat turned out to be before taking any action.

Senior government, army and police officers have been meeting to consider how to combat the threat. Officials would not comment on what steps might be taken.

An extra battalion of troops

was flown into the province early in the year during an upsurge in IRA attacks to give added protection to security force bases. Since then army engineers have taken on an increasing proportion of army and police construction work.

Yesterday, the Confederation of British Industry and the Congress of Trades Unions in Northern Ireland both condemned the IRA move, which extended a year-long campaign of threats and shootings against building contractors to thousands of others doing work for the army and the police.

The CBI said it deplored anything that forced businessmen to take trading decisions on anything but commercial grounds. "This latest threat will do nothing to help the urgently-needed regeneration of the province," it said.

Underlining its comment was the latest report on Northern Ireland's economic prospects, issued yesterday by Coopers & Lybrand, the management consultant.

It said manufacturing output in the province was static in the first quarter of 1986, compared with 2 per cent growth in the same period last year.

Redundancies in the first half totalled 2,800 compared with 3,500 in the whole of 1985, taking unemployment to 126,000 — more than 20 per cent of the working population.

Output was set to rise slightly in the second half, but consumer demand was slipping.

problem is that we have caught the first, second, and now the third terrorist generations, whereas the fourth generation is growing up. However, if we really want to put an end to terrorism we must succeed in not only arresting the criminal offenders, but above all prevent the successful recruitment of young people. That is an appeal not only to the state but also to society in general to bar such developments through a change in public awareness and the rejection on principle of violence as a means of political controversy.

That is also the reason the CDU/CSU demands that the rights of demonstration be amended: to protect the right of demonstration in its essence and to prevent the escalation of violence.

**LIBYA**

**Libyan Ad Protests Terrorist Accusations**

*AUI11138 Vienna BEUE AZ in German 9 Aug 86 p 6*

["Paid Advertisement"]

[Text] The People's Committee of the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah [headline]

The American Administration is trying to distort the struggle of the peoples. It describes this struggle as terrorism. It considers liberation movements all over the world terrorist movements. This includes such groups as the PLO and the South West African People's Organization, and the organization for the liberation of South Africa. It also considers everyone a terrorist who supports these people's struggle for freedom.

As long as the Libyan people are the main supporters of the people's struggle for their independence, they are — according to this administration — terrorists. This is a lie and an immoral distortion of the people's struggle and its supporters. The revolutionaries are scientifically better able than other people to distinguish between a struggle of the people for freedom as a normal right, supported by all religions, and terrorism which does not have any political or moral basis.

In order to expose the truth and draw the line on the adulteration and deliberate distortion of the people's struggle for their right to live in peace and freedom, in order to scientifically [as published] challenge the U.S. Administration which distorts the truth, in order to demonstrate the immoral adulteration, and to make the truth clear for the world public, in particular for the United States and Western Europe, the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah calls on the United States and its allies to take their proof to an international court in Europe or in America. It declares itself willing to pay damages to the afflicted persons in the event of a verdict against it. If the court, however, acquits the Jamahiriyah from this accusation, a court will bring to trial the American Administration and Reagan himself for their terrorist, criminal actions carried out against the revolutionary commander and the peace-loving Libyan-Arab people.

The American Administration should pay for the damage done to the Libyan Arab people. With this we want to draw the line to the accusations, and correct the wrong concepts that are determined by the American Administration in the American public opinion. We call on all those who are looking for the truth to join us. Public opinion may draw its own conclusions. We categorically reject accusations of terrorism. We are victims of public, economic, psychological, military, political, and media-disseminated terrorism. We proceed from this premise when we call on the American Administration to accept this challenge. If the American Administration does not want to accept, we will leave it to public opinion, in particular to the damaged, misled American and European public opinion, to form another opinion.

At the same time, we call on the governments, parliaments, parties, organizations, and associations of all democratic social forces, and on intellectuals, writers, and journalists to accept responsibility and to face the truth when condemning the attitudes toward a cause. This cause cannot be detrimental to anyone if it is considered in an objective and courageous way.

**Terrorist Role in Cyprus Refuted**

*LD091745 Tripoli JANA in English 1640 GMT  
9 Aug 86*

[Text] Nicosia. Shahr Hannibal 9, *Jamahiriyah News Agency* — The Cypriot Government has totally refuted the claims and lies by the Cypriot newspaper "*Alithia*" which alleged that the people who attacked the British base Akrotiri in Cyprus last week left the country on board of a Libyan Arab airliner.

The Cypriot Government said in an official statement today the final results of its inquiry into allegations by the paper showed that the claims were untrue, ill-founded, and irresponsible. The Cypriot Government pointed out that such claims would cause massive damage to Cyprus.

**'Text' of Islamic Jihad Response to Shultz Statement**  
*NC121052 Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 10 Aug 86 pp 1,8*

[Text] "The Islamic Jihad Organization" yesterday sent a new statement to *Al-Nahar* with a photo of U.S. hostage David Jacobsen, the director of the American University Hospital. The Islamic Jihad statement attacked U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, who last Tuesday rejected any negotiations with the kidnapers of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon, and called them "killers." The organization promised Shultz that the hostages will reply "in the near future."

In a statement apparently directed to Terry Waite, the envoy of Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Robert Runcie, head of the Anglican Church, "the Islamic Jihad" said: "You know full well what our demands are. Why do you not make radical moves for a solution (...) You must know that fame without substance vanishes with the wind and harms its maker."

In its reply to Yasir 'Arafat, PLO Executive Committee chairman, who last Tuesday offered to help release the French hostages, "the Islamic Jihad organization" blamed him implicitly for siding with President Saddam Husayn and affirmed that he "cannot give anything to mankind."

The following is the text of the statement as received by *Al-Nahar*:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate. Listen not to the unbelievers, but strive against them most strenuously with the Qur'an.

Once again we are confronted by the world oppression of the arch-Satan as conveyed by its Secretary of State Shultz. This did not surprise us as we knew well that the U.S. Government does not value its people. This is not strange. The issue of Vietnam is still deeply embedded in people's minds and shows the value of the U.S. citizen to his government.

They must, however, realize that to continue this policy toward the Third World in general and Lebanon in particular, to describe those who defend their freedom, dignity, and Islam as killers and criminals will prohibit a resolution of the hostage issue. It will also portend grave consequences. The U.S. Government will bear responsibility for their results, as will the American people for remaining silent on this issue.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

FINANCIAL TIMES 11 August 1986 Pg. 11

# The gunman's shadow falls across Ulster business

By Hugh Carnegy in Belfast

"I DON'T think any businessman can understand the effects of fear until he has experienced it personally. Fear has been used extremely cleverly by the IRA and the Protestant paramilitaries.

"Most businessmen fear the bank manager or the VAT man. Imagine every morning having to check under your car, having to double-check all your appointments. Or socialising in the evening, thinking—can I go

there? Then there are simple things like the staff going for petrol, having constantly to change accounts and the times of day they go."

Those comments, by the managing director of a Northern Ireland company which has contracts with the security forces, probably seem over-dramatic even to many businessmen in the province. Nonetheless, in the present climate of IRA death threats

against civilians working for the army or police—and Protestant counter-threats against Catholics linked in the remotest way to the IRA—they reflect a chilling reality.

Over the past decade and a half of sectarian hatred and violence in Northern Ireland, the commercial world has learned to live with "the troubles." Businessmen like to say that their characteristic Ulster grit and stubbornness

have driven them to get on with work regardless of the political and paramilitary chaos swirling around them. They tend to lump all gunmen under the label of gangsters.

Now, however, things are especially bad—worse since the Anglo-Irish agreement was signed last November than they have ever been, according to many. In the past year, the IRA

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NEXT PAGE

## TEXT...Continued

We believe that jihad and struggle against the oppressors is our legitimate duty. We will not be frightened. We will not retreat from this path no matter what difficulties or pain we must face and no matter how much torture, imprisonment, and killing we must experience. On the contrary, this will only increase our determination to persist with our worship by confronting the United States and its agents in the region. It will only strengthen our belief in the inevitability of victory from God, for God's victory is at hand. Therefore, whoever believes that we will be affected by this should realize that we are a people who court martyrdom and hardship for the sake of God. You will only reap defeat, humiliation, and evil consequences.

The hostages themselves have an opinion about the remarks made by Shultz. In the near future we will publish this view as part of a message from the hostages to the American people, to all those who seek to resolve the hostage issue, and to those who repeatedly make media appeals: You know full well what our demands are and how they can be met. Why do you not make radical moves for a solution? Why are all these media appeals, which are devoid of any substance, being made? Do you believe that this will solve any part of the problem? Or are you seeking some personal gains?

You must know that fame without substance vanishes with the wind and harms its maker, as well as those who believe that they are working for it. If you believe in God and human principles and defend human rights, then you must start by removing injustice, as represented by the United States and its agents in the region, from the mujahidin. The release of Weir and Jenco is proof of our good intentions which need no further clarification. It is the starting point for a solution.

To the person whom humane motives have led to offer his help to secure the release of the French hostages, we say: Why has concern only now led you to undertake this humane action? These hostages have been in detention for more than a year. If there must be humane action, then it would be better if it were directed toward the liberation of the mujahidin being detained

## Interior Minister Clarifies Hostage Statement

NC110807 Beirut AL-NAHAR in Arabic 9 Aug 86 p 4

[Text] Interior Minister Dr 'Abdallah al-Rasi yesterday issued a clarification of the statement which he made to the *Associated Press* and which yesterday's newspapers reported concerning the foreign hostages in Lebanon.

The clarification notes: Some newspapers carried the following paragraph: "When I assumed my post we knew where the hostages were being held. Now, however, we do not know where they are." What I actually said was: "Before I assumed my post there was a time when the ministry apparatuses knew where the hostages were being held. This happened only once."

The newspapers said: "Those holding the hostages are moving them from one prison to another." I actually said: "They are moving them from one place to another." Furthermore, my statement was an inference and was not based on fact.

Al-Rasi denied blaming Hizballah for the detention of the hostages. He also denied some newspaper reports that he had given exceptional promotions to the members of the internal security forces. He called on the media to "make sure a report is true before publishing it in order to maintain journalistic accuracy and honesty."

in Israeli, European, and Arab prisons instead of the French hostages.

Whoever stands with the criminal (President) Saddam (Husayn), the enemy of humanity and the region's policeman, cannot give anything to mankind. Taking an interest in the issues of Palestine and its people, escalating the armed struggle, and refraining from any panting after peace [al-sulh] by the reactionary Arab regimes is the greatest human service that can be rendered.

[Signed] Islamic Jihad Organization

(August 1986)



**SUN Editorial Comments on Sikh, Tamil 'Similarities'**  
*BK191149 Colombo SUN in English 12 Aug 86 p 7*

[Editorial: "Striking Similarities"]

[Text] The reign of terror that has been unleashed by the Sikh extremists in India, has apparently snuffed out the life of yet another distinguished personality and underscored the sheer inhumanity and unmitigated brutality of separatism anywhere in the world.

The cold-blooded murder of India's most decorated soldier, Lieutenant General Arun Vaidya, by alleged Sikh terrorists in broad daylight, is a deadly blow, not only to India, but to the whole sub-continent and the South Asian region as well.

Besides his record as one of India's most distinguished soldiers, Lieutenant General Arun Vaidya performed the invaluable task of preserving India's unity and territorial integrity when the bloody hand of Sikh terrorism was strengthening its grip on the Indian body politic and threatening to wrench it apart. In June 1984, Lieutenant General Vaidya masterminded the now-famous, 'Operation Bluestar' on the Sikh's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, and freed it of hordes of terrorists.

India has then lost another distinguished son, and the region a military hero, who symbolised the will to resist the growing horror of separatism.

Yet India is not going to succumb to the terror tactics of the Sikh separatists or adopt a weak-kneed approach in its task of resolving the Punjabi imbroglio. New Delhi is committed to a political solution to the crisis in Punjab. It is for this reason and for no other, that Premier Rajiv Gandhi entered into a peace pact with the late Akali Dal chief, Harchand Singh Longowal. However, for some reason or other, the peace accords have not been implemented, and terrorists are continuing to have a field day, not only in Punjab, but also in numerous other India cities like Delhi and Bombay.

Until a favourable political climate is generated and the peace accords finally implemented, India is going to handle Sikh terrorism with an iron hand and put down all attempts at plunging the Indian union into anarchy, notwithstanding threats to even its national leaders.

This is as it should be because terrorism creates law and order problems and it's the principal duty of the state to preserve a stable security environment.

Despite the substantial differences, between the Sikh problem and the separatist insurgency here, one couldn't help observing certain glaring similarities.

The Sri Lanka government has made it quite plain that it is earnestly pursuing peace. It has finally evolved suitable proposals to end the Tamil problem here, and these have been accepted by many peace-loving nations, including India.

Nevertheless, terrorism is continuing to plague this country. Hundreds of lives are being lost to the forces of anarchy. The extremists in the north, like the Punjabi separatists, don't want peace. Dialogue and negotiations are anathema to them.

The Sri Lanka government and New Delhi are in the same

**SHADOW...Continued**

has killed five people in its campaign against businesses doing work for the security forces. Its threats have steadily mounted until its ultimatum issued last week in which it declared that anyone working on army or police contracts was a "legitimate target." Within days, the so-called Ulster Freedom Fighters, a Protestant group with a grisly record of sectarian killing, announced its counter-threat which included a warning to any Catholics working in loyalist areas.

Since then, at least eight companies have pulled out of security force contracts. These have mainly been small local firms such as milk, bread or fruit and vegetable suppliers. Bigger contractors have tended to bide their time, waiting to see if such broad threats are serious, or more of a propaganda exercise designed to provoke the other side during the emotive season of traditional summer parades.

The agonising fact is that, however overblown the threats may sound, companies cannot afford not to take them seriously. The result, according to the trade unions, has been more than 1,000 job losses over the past year as a result of intimidation, mainly in the building and construction sector.

How, then, does a company under threat conduct its business in this climate? It is a measure of the prevailing atmosphere of terror that those businessmen whose experiences are reported in this article, spoke only on the strict understanding that neither they nor their companies would be in any way identified.

Their accounts reflect the fact that death threats are not new in Northern Ireland. One senior manager told of losing all his Catholic employees as a result of bombings and sectarian killings in Belfast in the early 1970s. The company returned to a mixed workforce only about 10 years later.

The more recent IRA campaign, initially aimed at building contractors working for the army and police, hit a new pitch around the turn of the year when a number of directors or large firms received copies through the post of an IRA

telex warning them to cease security force work within 48 hours. In some cases, these were followed up by letters to their wives at home, including photographs of the executives. The threats were extended to firms outside the building trade. "I got a phone call at the office—they asked for me by name—to tell me we had been in a number of different security force locations, when we'd been in those locations and what work we'd been doing. They were all accurate. We were ordered to stop within 24 hours." (The detailed information possessed by the IRA has led a number of businessmen to suspect it has a "mole" within government agencies handling security force contracts.)

The reaction of that manager, in consultation with the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was to carry on but to increase security measures for his workers and lower his company's profile as much as possible. When the threats were extended last week, additional steps were taken. Staff were advised to vary their routes to work and a 24-hour guard was posted at the padlocked main gate and in the yard. Firms working for the army and police now customarily take all company logos and identification off their vehicles.

"Our feeling was, if we gave in to that threat, what would be next? Would we then be told not to work for any branch of the government?" the manager said.

There was also, of course, the commercial aspect. To abandon his security force contracts might cost him business worth hundreds of thousands of pounds and threaten the jobs of one third of his workforce. Overall, he estimated the extra cost to Northern Ireland firms of special insurance and security precautions at about 10 per cent of normal running costs. The need to keep a low profile means marketing and image promotion, too, suffer.

It is hard to calculate exactly how much police and army work is worth to the local economy but it is estimated that about one-tenth of total public expenditure in the province of

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

predicament. While pursuing a negotiated settlement to the ethnic problem, Colombo has to tackle law and order problems that are created by terrorism everyday.

The peace process will be facilitated if New Delhi denounces Tamil terrorism in more unequivocal terms and co-operates more closely with the Sri Lankan government in cracking down on terrorists, especially those operating from Madras. Uniform standards will not only help Indo-Lanka relations but the entire region as well.

FINANCIAL TIMES 14 August 1986 Pg. 4

# Deaths from terrorism 'double in 1985'

BY ANDREW WHITLEY IN JERUSALEM

THE NUMBER of fatalities resulting from international terrorist attacks nearly doubled in 1985 compared with the previous year, according to an academic research institute in Tel Aviv.

The total number of incidents recorded showed a slight decline, however, to 408 from 412 attacks carried out in 1984.

In its annual review of international terrorism, the Jaffee Centre for Strategic Studies reports that 639 people were killed last year, up from 349. A further 833 were injured.

Most notable, Dr Ariel Merari

of the Jaffee Centre said, was the increase in the number of "spectaculars" such as the bomb explosion on the Air India 747 airliner—believed to have been the work of Sikh extremists—and the attacks by the Abu Nidal terrorist group on Rome and Vienna airports.

While few of the perpetrators of terrorist attacks were caught or killed (only 12 per cent), the degree of "success" achieved was less than might be expected. According to this study, 39.3 per cent of all incidents were wholly successful

vulnerable national category. They were the victims of errorists in 46 incidents last year. The French were next, with 16 reported attacks on their nationals, followed by the British, with 15. Israelis suffered in 10 incidents.

Among types of targets, both human and material, diplomats retained their unenviable position as the category most at risk. They were the targets in nearly 20 per cent of all recorded incidents.

The Israeli Institute, a respected independent body, noted an

overall increase in incidents for which Palestinian and radical Shi'ite groups claimed responsibility. In total, 17.2 per cent of all recorded attacks were said to have been the work of Palestinians.

Contrary to popular image, however, the Middle East was not the scene of most international terrorism, at least as defined by the Israeli researchers. That dubious honour was reserved for Western Europe, which suffered nearly 45 per cent of all incidents,

## SHADOW...Continued

£4.5bn a year (70 per cent of GDP) goes on the security forces.

Undoubtedly, the industry hardest hit down the year by the paramilitaries has been the building and construction trade. Still deep in depression, it can least afford the effects of the latest round of threats and killings. While construction output in the rest of Britain recovered last year to 1980 levels, in Northern Ireland it continued to fall to 30 per cent below its 1980 mark. The number of unemployed in the sector (25,000) exceeds those still in work.

For builders, the recent threats are just another chapter in the bloody story of reluctant embroilment in the murky underworld of the gunman. They have grown used, for example, to participating in army convoys and helicopter drops into exposed bases such as the army-RUC base in Crossmaglen, on the South Armagh border.

Probably the most difficult issue for them has been their exposure to racketeering and extortion on building sites in ghetto areas. Businessmen say that in this respect there is little distinction between the IRA on the Catholic side and the array of groups on the Protestant side, from the legal Ulster Defence Association to the illegal Ulster Volunteer Force.

"Within hours of winning a contract the phone will ring with someone offering 'security' at the new site," explained a construction manager. "Or someone will come to the site. If you say no, you know that during the night the site is likely to be attacked and thousands of pounds worth of equip-

ment and Portacabins destroyed.

"We pay them. We have to," said the manager. It is done through apparently legitimate contracts for site security with front companies controlled by the gunmen.

Extortion is apparently worse than ever because, due to the recession, there are fewer sites for the paramilitaries to pick on and because the tensions stirred by the Anglo-Irish agreement have given the gunmen an added air of legitimacy and confidence within their own communities.

There is some criticism that the RUC, which has an anti-racketeering squad, does not do enough to clamp down on extortion. Companies say the police know who the main culprits are, but they hesitate to act, especially now as the RUC finds itself in conflict with both nationalists and loyalists.

In all this ugly morass, the question of morality becomes blurred. How does one balance the morality of giving in to threats, against the responsibility of protecting the lives of your employees and your family? Not many of those who work on in the face of threats are prepared to condemn those who do not.

"We're in a dreadful situation. How would you like to wake up in the middle of the night every time you hear a noise outside the garage? Those are the kinds of things that go through the minds of my staff," said a builder who recently withdrew from a security force contract.

The question might be better put: why don't they leave Northern Ireland? Strangely, perhaps, businessmen cite the quality of life available in the

## Spokesman Denies Existence of Terrorist 'Bases'

NC120608 Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 12 Aug 86 p 1

[Text] The Cyprus Government emphatically denies suggestions that terrorists have an "operating base" in Cyprus.

The suggestion arose from a claim by the "Unified Nasirite Organisation" which claimed responsibility for the attack on the British Base at Akrotiri and said that all men returned to their "base" and that two only were injured. The organisation also claimed that its men destroyed helicopters, planes and other installations.

But the government spokesman in Nicosia said that the government has no information that there was any gun duel with the attackers and described suggestions about a terrorist "base" in Cyprus as "unfounded."

"No terrorist bases exist in Cyprus nor could they be allowed to exist," the spokesman declared.

province: the golf, the cost of housing, the countryside, the remarkably good industrial relations.

One young Belfast executive puts it this way: "We're inherently a bit stubborn and we don't like being told what to do. If you give into the Mafia and gangsters of all sorts then you give in to the law of the jungle. We've got to make a collective stand."

# British security forces on full alert

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY

17 August 1986 Pg. 5

By Gareth Parry and Jim Muir

BRITISH security services have been put on full alert against the threat of an Arab terrorist attack. Although intelligence reports gathered since the Government gave active support to the American bombing raids on Libya indicate a broad range of targets, including VIPs, it is believed that it is the country's main airports and its airlines which are most threatened.

This fear is reinforced by the fact that airport security devices such as "sniffers" and X-ray scanners are incapable of reliably detecting the latest "state of the art" explosives known to be in the hands of terrorists, including the Gadafy regime.

In an apparent acknowledgment of this gap in security the Government has ordered that all single people belonging to any one of 10 Arab countries, should be carefully searched with their baggage when departing or passing through Heathrow and Gatwick on international flights. The countries involved are Libya, Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia, Syria, Iran and Iraq.

The order came into effect two days before the Commonwealth

Conference was due to open, as intelligence reports stressed that a Libyan-inspired attack on a British person, property or interest was imminent. There had been an uneasy quiet since the failed attempt to place a bomb on an El Al jet at Heathrow on April 18.

But when the attack came it was 2,000 miles away — in Cyprus. Terrorists attacked the British sovereign base at Akrotiri with rockets, mortar and small arms fire. The Government in Nicosia has denied a rightwing newspaper report that six pro-Libyan terrorists had carried out the attack and were smuggled out of Cyprus on an unscheduled Libyan Air flight.

It is now apparent that the attack carried out against the base was considerably more impressive in scale than the authorities at first admitted. A salvo of 60mm mortar rounds hit the married quarters, wounding Eileen Malpass, aged 32, an NCO's wife. Another service wife, 25-year-old Sandra Edwards, was wounded when a barrage of rockets, grenades, and small-arms fire struck the windsurfing club.

Almost as worrying for both the Cypriot and British authorities


was the fact that the assailants were able to deploy such bulky weaponry on an island where security is normally regarded as good.

The dilemma for the military authorities is that, while the strictly military elements of the bases can be fairly well protected, many other facilities and personnel are more vulnerable.

If the bases were to come under a standing terrorist threat and such draconian security measures became necessary, the presence of the bases could become a hot issue for the Cypriot government, which has hitherto — for many good reasons — tolerated what in many ways is an extraordinary anomaly.

Were it not for the heat of the Mediterranean summer, the neat houses lining streets with names like Waterloo Road and Kensington Avenue would look more like an up-market council estate in Aylesbury than part of Cyprus. They have their own shops, schools, churches, cinemas, clubs, beaches, police force and radio stations. They are home to 4,000

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY 17 August 1986 Pg. 11

## Signs of weariness among ETA's terrorist leaders

**BILBAO** — How difficult it is to please both God and Caesar south of the Pyrenees. Once again France is having to learn that bitter truth. Reviled yesterday in Madrid and showered with praise in Bilbao, here it is now showered with praise in Madrid and reviled in Bilbao. While all the political parties in Madrid unreservedly applaud France's tough attitude towards ETA and its sympathisers, in Spain's Basque country on the other hand nationalists — even moderate ones — are protesting or dissociating themselves from Madrid. In one month some 30 cars with French registration plates have been set on fire by a mystery "Refugee Aid Committee".

So here is France once again dragged into a quarrel which has nothing to do with it, a controversy which is in fact Spanish or, to be more precise, Basque-Spanish.

By Thierry Mallinik

Bilbao's political forces are, in fact, using the dispute over France's new attitude towards ETA to air their own disputes: is there a purely police solution to the Basque problem? Or should there be negotiations with ETA? Is the autonomous charter that the region has been given sufficient to socially isolate the most hardline nationalists? These in fact are the real issues of the debate which has been steadily splitting the Basque country for the past ten years, but which has now flared up, via France, more virulently than ever.

Nobody is surprised that ETA sympathisers inveigh against France's new policy. "The French and Spanish States, with their hysterical anti-ETA obsession, are

giving off a malodorous repressive stench," wrote the radical daily Egin, which is widely read in the Basque country and not only by the "fanatics" of the armed struggle. That these same circles consider Paris and Madrid will not crush ETA in this way will come as no surprise either. The leaders of the Herri Batasuna coalition, which is close to ETA, and whose share of the vote rose to ten per cent at the last elections, are sure of this and ask: "How is Madrid going to explain to public opinion that ETA is bringing off its most audacious coups in the capital while France has supposedly neutralised its principal leaders? How is it going to explain that the Socialists are losing votes in the Basque country and Herri Batasuna is gaining them, while they make out that ETA is more and more isolated?"

What the Socialists in Madrid hardly expected to see was the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party), which commands majority support in the region, and the autonomous Basque government of Vitoria which it controls, also backing away sharply from them. José Antonio Ardanza, the president of the Basque government, has openly expressed his "scepticism" about the "repressive line" and published a communique asserting his intention "never to rule out recourse to dialogue and negotiation."

"The Socialists think the French measures will be enough to break up ETA," says Jesus Inxausti, president of the Vizcaya province PNV. "But it is not by creating martyrs in the eyes of some members of the public that you're going to isolate ETA socially. If you don't understand that you fail to understand what's happening here. We maintain what we have always been saying: a political problem means a political solution and a political solution means negotiation."

Negotiating with ETA: that's the bone of contention. The PNV has been calling for such negotiations even more strongly since the last elections which saw the radicals increase their share of the vote at the expense of the moderates in the "big nationalist family". In addition, the internal crisis in the party with a "critical" sector inclined to go even further in its anti-Socialist line can only prompt the PNV to stand publicly aloof from Madrid. Especially as

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

### ALERT...Continued

British servicemen and their families. Unique in the world, they were ceded by treaty as British sovereign territory when Cyprus became independent in 1960.

If the colonial echoes are something Nicosia can live with, the link with today's Western defence system is more of an embarrassment to non-aligned Cyprus at times. Although the bases are supposed to be used for Britain's domestic defence requirements, the lines are not always clear, and the monitoring and base facilities are regarded as an important Nato asset.

They have been used for such worthy purposes as evacuating foreigners from Teheran and Beirut, airlifts to Ethiopia, and ferrying observers to the Zimbabwe elections. More controversially, they currently house two American Blackbird reconnaissance planes monitoring the Sinai disengagement, and US Navy helicopters used on the embassy run to East Beirut shelter there at night since the raid on Libya.

Although the terrorists used conventional weapons in Cyprus, the precautionary measures at British airports have been made to guard against more unusual means. Heading the arsenal now available to the terrorist is the plastic explosive Cyclonite, or RDX — Research Department X. It is light, malleable and devastat-

ing. It would take only a couple of pounds of Cyclonite to blow up a jumbo jet, and in 1978 a renegade CIA agent sold 22 tons of it to Colonel Gadafy.

Intelligence service reasoning now is that that consignment of RDX could be reaching the end of its "shelf life" in Libya. If this is correct, its owners will realise that it has to be used or disposed of.

Mr Malcolm Armstrong, an authority on the explosive, said: "RDX would need to be kept in an air-conditioned store at a regular temperature of between 50 and 60 degrees and, even so, the RDX stolen in 1978 would be reaching the stage beyond which it would start to degenerate."

The RDX explosive comes in sheets which can be moulded into the shape — and hidden under the lining — of a briefcase. On average such a device, weighing only a few ounces, could destroy around five feet of an aircraft. It is invisible to the X-ray machines.

Paul Ellman adds:

Threats against British lives and property in Spain were received last week by the British embassy in Madrid in retaliation for alleged support for the Spanish Government in its campaign against the Basque terrorist group, ETA.

The letter was received just two days before the arrival of the Prince and Princess of Wales and their two children on the Mediterranean island of Majorca as guests of King Juan Carlos and his family at their holiday palace near Palma.

**Three Terrorist Suspects Arrested in West Berlin**  
*AU210835 Paris AFP in English 0832 GMT 21 Aug 86*

[Text] Berlin, Aug 21 (AFP) — Three people were arrested with explosives in West Berlin Wednesday night, and were suspected of preparing anti-American attacks, the Berlin edition of *Bild Zeitung* reported here Thursday. Police declined to confirm the arrests, but said "tighter checks" had been carried out on Wednesday and a statement would be issued on the subject later Thursday.

*Bild-Zeitung* said police had arrested the three thanks to plans seized on the arrest on August 3 outside Frankfurt of suspected Red Army Faction terrorist Eva Haule-Frimpong. The plans were for four men, of unspecified nationality, to enter West Berlin through the East, posing as asylum seekers, and to blow up a cinema and a library for U.S. forces. The paper said the three were held during special controls of asylum-seekers.

**Further on Arrest of Terrorist Suspects**

**3 Suspected RAF Members**  
*AU211340 Paris AFP in English 1334 GMT 21 Aug 86*

[Excerpt] Karlsruhe, West Germany, Aug 21 (AFP) — Three suspected members of the extreme-left Red Army Faction (RAF) have been arrested in connection with two bomb attacks including one against border police barracks, the court in this southern city announced Thursday.

Two suspects were identified as Norbert Hofmeier, 39, and Barbara Perau, 28. Searching their home, police found copies of an RAF claim for a bomb attack last August 11 which damaged communications instruments and buildings at the border police barracks at Swisttal-Heimersheim, near Bonn.

The third person arrested, Thomas Karl-Heinz Thoene, is suspected of having taken part in that attack and in another, against the aeronautics firm Dornier at Immenstaad, last July 25. A photocopy of the letter claiming that attack was found at Mr. Thoene's home.

In Berlin meanwhile, the *Bild-Zeitung* newspaper reported three people arrested with explosives in West Berlin Wednesday night, on suspicion of preparing anti-American attacks. [passage omitted covered]

**ETA...Continued**

the "critics" are only saying out loud what many in the party are secretly thinking when they bluntly point out: "No nationalist will ever be happy to see a Basque, whatever he is, turned over to the Spanish State police."

But electoral competition from the Herri Batasuna and dissent from party "critics" cannot explain why the PNV is pressing so insistently, if not for negotiations, at least to talk to supporters of the armed struggle. The time is considered right. Many in Bilbao, even among them ETA sympathisers, who feel tiredness is beginning to show in ETA's ranks, and that some of its leaders are asking themselves whether they should not break out of the stalemate and have done with this endless and absurd succession of killings.

Given this situation, should the government agree to talk to facilitate a shift away from violence or rather should it really force ETA to surrender unconditionally? This is the question on which Socialists and Basque nationalists cannot agree today. The thumbs-down that Madrid gave the discreet offer of negotiations made by the ETA leader Txomin (who was expelled recently to Gabon by France) has finally convinced the PNV that the Spanish Socialists are definitely banking on bringing the Basque organisation to its knees.

Nor are the Socialists denying this. Ricardo Garcia Damborenea, secretary-general of the Socialist Party in Vizcaya province, says so outright: "The social rehabilitation of terrorists not involved in blood crimes is as far as our political offer goes. . . . If the PNV is arguing for negotiations, it is because it hopes they will help it obtain compensations from Madrid

on the question of autonomy. It's the old ambiguity: the nationalists condemn terrorism, but hope to take advantage of it."

But the fact is, in the final analysis, the PNV's "ambiguity" still seems to mirror that of a substantial segment of the Basque population in this region where the exclusive attachment to its own interests hardly appears to have been weakened eight years after the approval of the Guernica charter granting autonomy to the Basques, the result of a "historic agreement" between the Madrid government and the PNV. More and more nationalist voices are being heard today in Bilbao and Vitoria calling for the agreement to be reviewed.

Those who champion this viewpoint say that the artificial extension throughout Spain of the system of granting autonomy has resulted in levelling down the powers of the two "historic nationalities", the Basque country and Catalonia, the only ones where autonomy really made sense. Why not, they ask, conclude another agreement with Madrid which, while staying within the limits set by the Constitution, would take better cognizance of the individuality of the Basques and Catalans and enable the Basque problem to be settled once and for all.

In Madrid, though, all this is dismissed as irrelevant to the struggle against ETA. Nothing is less certain, retort the nationalists who feel that the degree of autonomy and the elimination of violence always go hand in hand in the Basque country. Behind the controversy over the French attitude towards people pandering to ETA, it is indeed the whole future of the region that is once again being debated in Bilbao.

(August 10/11)

**3 Lebanese Arrested**

*DW221040 Bonn DIE WELT in German 22 Aug p 4*

[Report by "D.D.": "Berlin Police Arrest Lebanese"]

[Text] Berlin — following a dragnet operation in which about 500 policeman were involved, three Lebanese were arrested in Berlin. They are suspected to have planned bomb attacks in the western part of the city, presumably against U.S. facilities.

Another Lebanese, 28-year-old (D'ab Hamdan) is still being sought. Investigations showed that they entered the FRG through border checkpoint Walterdorfer Chaussee which is only a few minutes away from East Berlin's Schoenefeld Airport.

**Arabs Reportedly Planned U.S. Attack**

*LD211556 Hamburg DPA in German 1506 GMT 21 Aug 86*

[Text] Berlin, 21 Aug (DPA) — Three Lebanese, thought to have planned a bombing in Berlin, were arrested by the police. A fourth suspect is still at large, the Berlin police reported today. The men, aged 41, 22, and 19, were apprehended in a hotel in the Schoeneberg area. It is reported that they are suspected of planning a crime involving explosives. The police suspicions are based on "warnings that Arab terrorists intend to travel to Berlin (West) probably to carry out a bombing."

No explosive was found in the search, reports say. According to investigations so far, the men reached West Berlin on Tuesday via the East Berlin Schoenefeld Airport. According to the police, they used the Waltersdorf Chaussee border crossing in the south Berlin district of Rudow and intended to apply for asylum. The newspaper *BILD* reported today that the Arabs intended attacks on U.S. facilities in Berlin.

Bill

No Casualties in Blast Near TU Office, U.S. Firm  
 AU220741 Paris AFP in English 0737 GMT 22 Aug 86

[Text] Antwerp, Belgium, Aug 22 (AFP) — A bomb explosion near the offices of a Belgian trade union and the U.S. company General Motors caused extensive damage but no casualties here early Friday, police said.

Responsibility for the attack has not been claimed, although the BRT Flemish radio station received an anonymous telephone call shortly after the blast saying the offices of the General Federation of Belgian Labour had been blown up.

It was the first bomb attack in Belgium since December, when police rounded up suspected members of the country's Fighting Communist Cells (CCC) extremist group.

MANCHESTER GUARDIAN WEEKLY 24 August 1986 Pg. 22

## Terrorists — it depends what you mean

**WAR WITHOUT END.** *The Terrorists: An Intelligence Dossier*, by Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne (Harrap, £9.95).

**THE FINANCING OF TERROR**, by James Adams (*New English Library*, £12.95).

**THE WORLD HELD HOSTAGE:** *The War Waged by International Terrorism*, by Desmond McForan (*Oak-Tree Books*, £14.95).

THREATS to civilisation as we know it do not seem to produce great literature. Terrorism, however one chooses to define it, is undoubtedly a pernicious threat to civilised relations both within and between states: the chaos of Beirut today is an awful warning of the way in which terrorism can contribute to the destruction of society. Yet the books on terrorism are, with a few shining exceptions, second-rate or worse. Why?

One reason is that a single abstract term is used to cover an extraordinary diverse set of activities. Does the convenient label of "terrorism" really justify talking in the same breath about the African National Congress of South Africa, the Red Brigades in Italy, and the Shi'ite lorry-bombers in Beirut? It is not just that their causes have different kinds and degrees of justification, but also that their methods of struggle vary greatly, as do the cultural milieux in which they operate.

The literature on terrorism is tawdry also because so much reliance has to be placed on information from government intelligence services. Such information is bound, in the nature of things, to be partial and selective. Moreover, some countries' intelligence agencies seem to have an institutional bias in favour of seeing terrorism more as an international conspiracy than as a social disease.

All three of these books discuss terrorism in the 1980s world-wide. The first two — War Without End

and *The Financing of Terror*, both by journalists — are solid and worthwhile whatever flaws they may contain. The third book, *The World Held Hostage*, is by an author with stronger claims to being an academic, and the kindest thing one can say about it is that at £14.95, it is further proof, if proof is needed, that the most expensive is not necessarily the best.

Dobson and Payne, who have worked for the Sunday Telegraph and other papers, have written books on this subject before. Their new book is to some extent an update, attempting "to beat a path through the jungle of sects, communiques and appalling deeds" so that the reader can "master the significance of big events as they develop." There is much useful information here, and some sensible judgments.

The authors do not take an exaggeratedly fearful view of terrorism, which is seldom effective in realising the stated aims of its proponents. They help the reader to understand the complex causes of terrorism, including the suicide-bombings in Lebanon and elsewhere in recent years. They do not think that the Kremlin is behind every bombing, but they do argue

By Adam Roberts

that there is a degree of arms-length Soviet connivance with some terrorist groups.

So far, so good. However, Dobson and Payne avoid a number of difficult questions. They list the African National Congress in their compilation of terrorist organisations, but omit SWAPO in Namibia and UNITA in Angola. They do not mention Afghanistan or the mujaheddin. These inclusions and omissions are for the most part unexplained.

The authors, like most writers on terrorism, often seem to dodge two questions which have to be answered before labelling a group as "terrorist": first, is terror actu-

ally the main means by which the group exercises control? And second, are the forces against which they are fighting also terroristic — as indeed is the case in South Africa?

James Adams has wisely concentrated on one aspect of terrorism: its financial basis. He shows how one terrorist organisation after another, initially set up to support a political cause, has degenerated into criminality. The extent to which the Provisional IRA and the PLO have trodden this path pioneered by the Mafia is shown very convincingly.

Looking at terrorism via its finances gives Adams some interesting insights into the question of supposed Kremlin control. He suggests that the Soviet Union, in this as in other realms of activity, is tight-fisted with hard currency. It does not dish out money to terrorists, and probably therefore can only call the tune to a very limited extent.

Illuminating as his analysis is, Adams rushes to judgment on many points, including the alleged Bulgarian involvement in the plot to kill the Pope. Also he evades some difficult issues by saying, in a facile way, that UNITA in Angola and the Contras in Nicaragua "fall outside my definition of terrorism."

Desmond McForan is described on his dust-jacket as having visited 15 different countries (wow!), as "particularly aware of the Palestinian problem" (see below), as "an acknowledged expert on political options" (what?), and as "a freelance consultant for a State-side university" (which?). His book is about how the Soviet Union, Libya and Cuba are training grounds for terrorism, while the finance is provided by the Western world's self-destructive need for oil.

McForan's writing is that of a true believer who has seen the light and wants others to do so. He suggests that his work is "a clear

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SOUTH'S ANTIHIJACKING EXERCISES CALLED STRATAGEM

SK260908 Pyongyang Domestic Service in Korean 2151 GMT 25 Aug 86

[NODONG SINMUN Aug 26 Commentary: "Stratagem by Initiative"]

[Text] On 23 August at Kimpo airport, the South Korean puppets conducted a so-called exercise for arresting hijackers preparing to hamper the Asian Games and the Olympics. According to a news report, the puppets have kicked up a commotion by mobilizing the puppet special attack unit and armored forces under the pretext of arresting armed hijackers paid by the North. This is another provocation and shameless stratagem opposing us.

The puppets are raving as if we are to blame for the fact that the international sports games, including the Asian Games, set to be held in Seoul are facing a crisis. Can such a nonsensical act work in this world? The present crisis confronting the Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics results from inviting these games into South Korea for a mixed political purpose, and the crisis has become aggravated because of the puppets' having committed all types of criminal maneuvers to enforce these games regardless of opposition at home and abroad.

The puppets have maneuvered to use the Asian Games and the Olympics as a tool to concoct two Koreas and permanently remain in power and as an opportunity to accelerate their war plot of northward invasion. Under the pretext of the international sports games, inspiring hostility and confrontation among countrymen, they are brandishing bayonets before the students and the people, who demand independence and democracy, and they are exploiting the people without discretion. Such acts committed by the puppets have faced justifiable opposition and rejections from the South Korean people and from the broad social and sports circles around the world. The true crisis the puppets face is this.

In addition, the puppets have repeatedly announced that foreign gangs and crime rings are ready to go into action at the Asian Games and that major crimes are assumed to be increasing in South Korea. This consequence was also caused by the puppets themselves.

Anything can happen if an international sports event is held in South Korea, where extreme instability and social disorder continue. The gibberish of the ringleader, who has led the Asian Games and the Olympics to the brink of disaster, about the threat from the North is ridiculous.

The reason the puppets, feeling uneasy and impatient, have recently been kicking up a commotion about hampering and hijacking by someone is clear. It is a pre-emptive stratagem designed to lay on us in advance the responsibility for all that might happen in connection with the Asian Games and the Olympics. At the same time, it is also designed to mobilize the suppressive forces armed with heavy weapons throughout South Korea and to rationalize this mobilization.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

TERRORISTS...Continued

revelation of the facts," but it is far from that. His account of the origins of Palestinian terrorism fails to mention the salient if uncomfortable fact that Israel emerged out of a movement which used terrorist methods. He shows little understanding of the way in which Israel's occupation of Gaza

and the West Bank has legitimized the PLO cause in Arab eyes, and he resorts to the euphemistic term "Israeli administration" which even many Israelis don't bother with.

His ad-man statements about the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 are ludicrous. He is equally euphemistic about the Moroccan role in Western Sahara. He trots

out the standard attack on the United Nations without presenting any of the evidence which might point to a different conclusion.

The war against terrorism is *the final battle*, or so he says in a typical passage in bold type. God help all of us if those fighting against terrorism use McForan as their expert on political options.

# Aftermath of the Tripoli raid

FINANCIAL TIMES 27 August 1986

Pg. 8

THERE WAS never any likelihood that last April's bombing of Libya by US aircraft would have any significant long-term effect on the levels of Middle East sponsored terrorism. The sources of politically-inspired violence are too widespread and individual hatreds too deep-seated for superpower intervention of this type to create more than a tactical reassessment by the principal practitioners.

This week's warning by US officials that Col Gadaffi is planning further attacks on American citizens in Europe demonstrates how relatively little the Administration itself accepts that it has deterred Libya. Col Gadaffi was undoubtedly surprised by the US attack, but there has been no evidence to suggest that the destruction of a few buildings and the death of about 30 people has caused him to abandon causes which he has espoused for so long.

Gadaffi may well have been disappointed by the lack of support forthcoming for him from the rest of the Arab world, but then his revolutionary appeal has always been to the peoples of the region rather than to their governments. What matters most to him is that Western-oriented Arab governments should be made to feel increasingly embarrassed by the closeness of their relations with Washington.

## **Positive outcome**

For the US Administration,

and perhaps for the British Government, it may have been tempting to draw up a short-term profit and loss account dating from the Tripoli raid. Two British hostages held in Lebanon were murdered, but since April there has not been a large-scale terrorist atrocity of the type perpetrated at Rome and Vienna airports or at the West Berlin discotheque. There have, however, been several failed attempts, the most frightening of which was the attempt to smuggle a bomb on board an Israeli aircraft at Heathrow airport. Had the bomb exploded when the aircraft was in flight causing heavy loss of life the political consequences for the Middle East would have been dramatic.

The lesson to be drawn from that near-disaster is that a well-trained security guard, aided by inter-government intelligence co-operation, is far more effective in combating terrorism than F-111 bombers dropping their loads on a Middle Eastern capital.

Libya's capacity to use diplomatic privilege as a cover for other activities has been reduced by the expulsion of members of the so-called peoples bureaux from several European capitals. If the US has clear evidence that Col Gadaffi is again planning terrorist actions there must be a strong case for EEC members refusing any Libyan diplomatic presence, and for making the sort of political gestures being urged against the South African government by cutting more

deeply into remaining economic links.

## **Swift response**

Mrs Thatcher may remain adamant that economic sanctions do not work, but if part of their purpose is to demonstrate the depth of Western opposition to Col Gadaffi then they could serve to stimulate the domestic opposition to the Libyan regime which already exists. The collapse in the price of oil has had far more impact on the stability of the Gadaffi regime than American bombs. A further tightening of economic pressures coupled with a greater degree of international political isolation could intensify the tensions already within Libya.

The naval and air manoeuvres taking place this week in the area are not, according to US officials, aimed at intimidating Libya. However they brought a swift response from President Hafez al-Assad of Syria, the Soviet Union's most important Arab ally, who visited Tripoli at the weekend and, in conjunction with Moscow, warned against further US action.

The risk of superpower confrontation is still high in the Middle East. The US and the Soviet Union have far meatier issues to contend with than the provocations of Col Gadaffi. The response to such a maverick should be carefully tailored to avoid exaggerating his marginal political importance.

## EXERCISES...Continued

On that day the puppets conducted an exercise on the assumption that the hijackers would land at a South Korean airport to refuel. However, around the world there are no hijackers willing to knowingly enter such a trap. Under the pretext of arresting the hijackers, the puppets surrounded the airport by mobilizing the special attack unit and armored forces and have maneuvered to receive people visiting South Korea. For the same reason, they are plotting to turn all of South Korea into a scene of confusion and to suppress the people's resistance.

Aside from all of this, South Korea has become murderous with the Asian games near at hand.

The more the puppets utter urgent words about someone's hampering, the clearer they reveal that South Korea is a very unstable and dangerous place for international sports games, including the Asian games.



## EDITORIALS

OAKLAND TRIBUNE 14 July 1986

# Black market weapons bazaar

To argue that the Pentagon abets crime and anti-U.S. terrorism would put the case too strongly. But there's no doubt that years of official negligence have helped domestic and foreign criminals amass huge stocks of lethal guns, explosives and other weapons.

A recent study by the General Accounting Office of the Defense Department's \$130 billion supply stocks highlighted the \$2 billion in "inventory adjustments" needed last year to account for materials lost and found. The GAO found consistently lax attention to record keeping, thefts and physical security at military storage facilities.

The potential for large-scale waste is serious enough. But far more frightening is the specter of rampant diversion of deadly weapons to the terrorist black market.

California's Sen. Pete Wilson called for the GAO inquiry after Navy employees and others were caught stealing hundreds of millions of dollars worth of parts for F-14 fighter planes and Phoenix missiles from military warehouses in San Diego and the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk. They diverted much of this booty to the Khomeini regime in Iran.

Federal investigators recently nailed another arms ring at Fort Bragg, N.C., which helped itself to several tons of grenades, land mines, plastic explosives and even artillery over the last few years.

Just last week, authorities in Tampa arrested a former Army supply sergeant who was peddling a truckload of rocket launchers, fragmentation grenades, C-4 high explosives, Claymore mines and blasting caps — enough to equip a small terrorist army.

In a survey of only three military bases last year, the Army Audit Agency located more than two tons of high explosives, 3,000 grenades and 130,000 rounds of ammunition at unauthorized locations — not counting the weaponry it couldn't find.

Stolen munitions don't simply disappear forever into a black hole. The GAO report notes that "military explosives were used in 445 bombings within the United States dur-

MILWAUKEE SENTINEL 21 July 1986

# Treaty will hamper escape of terrorists

Senate passage of a new extradition treaty with Britain is not an abandonment, as alleged, of America's tradition of granting asylum to those fleeing prosecution for political offenses.

It is, however, a clear and long-overdue statement that terrorism cannot escape punishment by existing under the guise of political action.

The treaty places new and necessary limits on the rights of suspects in terrorist acts who claim that their actions were motivated by political considerations.

Specifically, it will make it easier for British authorities to get their hands on terrorists of the outlawed Irish Republican Army who take refuge in the US. For example, the so-called "political exception" will not be granted for such offenses as murder, kidnaping, voluntary manslaughter and the use of explosive devices.

In reality, the Senate vote reflected a growing concern not only with terrorism in Northern Ireland. It is a clear and natural

progression of action, in light of the spread of terrorism internationally.

The treaty had been stalled a year before last week's action.

Opponents, reacting to its passage, termed the treaty the destruction of "a hallowed American tradition dating back to George Washington." Others said passage "was as if the Senate had pulled down the Statue of Liberty."

Such arguments are unbelievable. Liberty does not justify atrocity. And cancer dates back to George Washington, too, but we're still trying to eradicate it.

There is one thing to which critics take fair exception. And that is the political offense exception remains intact for other nations. For this attack on terrorism to have its full impact, consideration must be given immediately to broadening the base.

It may take a case-by-case analysis. But the justification for such a review lies in too many graveyards created by international terrorists.

ing the 10-year period from 1976 through 1985. Moreover, the number of such bombings has been on the increase, rising from 31 in 1983, to 43 in 1984, to 54 in 1985."

Military weapons have also turned up in the hands of drug smugglers who finance

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COLORADO SPRINGS GAZETTE-TELEGRAPH 29 July 1986

## No refuge for Irish terrorists

When the hated British "Black and Tans" brutalized Ireland, the United States was a refuge for millions of Irish. From our shores came the message of freedom — and the freedom to militate for Irish independence.

The Republic of Ireland, a proud and sovereign nation, has passed from militancy to maturity. As equals, Ireland and Britain negotiated the Hillsborough agreement, opening a path to a democratic settlement to the "troubles" in Northern Ireland. Ireland now recognizes that terrorism — the cowardly killing of innocent victims in pubs, of post mistresses in their homes — is an impediment to peace, pluralism and, ultimately, to the hallowed goal of Irish reunification.

So the Irish government signed an extradition treaty with Britain and has extradited suspects accused of terrorism to Northern Ireland.

Yet America long balked at signing such a terrorist extradition treaty with Britain, fearing that it would compromise Irish refugees. Thursday, the Senate ratified the treaty with Britain by an 87-10 margin.

This treaty is not a blow to Irish reunification — it is a blow against terrorists who have tried to disrupt the peace process, terrorists who would hurl Ireland into more violence. It is not a betrayal, as some would claim, of America's principle of political refuge, a singling out of the Irish people. It is a paradigm for future extradition treaties that would deny avowed terrorists a refuge from justice.

Terrorism had a place in Irish history. But that time is now over. People accused of terrorist murders should face those charges in court, and not, as happened in New York City, be feted in the St. Patrick's Day parade. When the leader of a band that sends arms to the IRA led the parade, the Irish

LOS ANGELES TIMES 27 July 1986

## Terror in Spain

Basque folklore has it that Satan once tried to hustle the Basques but finally gave up, frustrated by his inability to learn their difficult language. As the recent Madrid attacks demonstrate, the Basques, and particularly the terrorist gang ETA, are hoping that the Spanish government will similarly pack up and go away. It isn't likely to, nor is the bitter, bloody feud.

Basque nationalism antedates Spanish democracy—indeed, Spain itself. The Basques, ethnically and linguistically distinct from the Spanish, bore the brunt of Francisco Franco's atrocities and were the vanguard against fascism. Since 1975, when Franco and his police state died, Basque nationalists have pushed harder for autonomy. Most Basques view the national police and civil guard as foreign armies, and most want more self-government. Most will use the ballot box to get it.

The ETA (Basque for "Basque Homeland and Liberty") wants independence, and will kill to get

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government refused to march with an Irish terrorist. Ireland supported the extradition treaty. We are proud that the Senate, led by Irish-Americans such as Sen. Patrick Moynihan, D-N.Y., stood up against Irish terrorism.

America musn't be a refuge for those who kill for sectarian causes. It should be an example that Irish people of two traditions — Protestant and Catholic — can live together in peace.

### BAZAAR...Continued

theft rings. In one case traffickers even penetrated the top secret Naval Weapons Center in China Lake, Calif., where state-of-the-art weapons are designed and produced.

Yet the military has little handle on this threat to U.S. security. The Army says it doesn't even know how much ammunition and explosives it loses every year.

"Being worried about internal theft of arms-type items is a fairly new one for us," admitted William Sharkey, a top Pentagon logistics official, last year.

The situation isn't entirely bleak. Jack

Killorin, a spokesman for the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, gives the military high marks in recent years for "working with us to improve our ability to track this material." And he notes that the biggest threat still comes from commercial weapons and explosives stocks.

Sen. Wilson plans to hold hearings next week on the scope and implications of inventory mismanagement in all three services. Congressional scrutiny and public alarm should move the defense bureaucracy to take immediate corrective action in the interest of national security.

WASHINGTON TIMES 27 August 1986

## Hit 'em again, harder

In a battery of official announcements and coordinated leaks, the Reagan administration is signaling the world that it has evidence that Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi is cooking up more terrorism. Never mind the rumors about his lessening grip on the Kalashnikov. The official word is that, weakened or not, he's back.

While terror to come is never good news, let us pick out what good news we can. For one thing, the CIA evidently has been doing a much better job of bird-dogging terrorist networks in Europe. For another, the administration at last is willing to talk tough publicly. Best of all perhaps, the administration now has to be taken seriously, as attested to by the smoldering rubble in Tripoli and Benghazi.

Col. Qaddafi's behavior since the American retaliation, along with intelligence reports, would suggest that the raid may have done serious damage to his power within the regime, even strengthening the opposition. This may account for his response to the raid, so perplexing to Western hand-wringers. Rather than striking back, as they had predicted, the colonel cooled his temper and submerged his blood-lust. The raid, that is to say, was fully vindicated.

But more of the same medicine may be required. If Col. Qaddafi is teetering, another raid might be a marvelously low-cost means, in terms of collateral damage and risk of American casualties, of pushing him over. Perhaps follow-up assistance to opposition

### SPAIN...Continued

it. Since 1968 the ETA has killed more than 600 members of the civil guard, police or military. Some in the ETA want to destroy Spanish democracy; all want to make the costs of maintaining Madrid's rule unacceptable, or to provoke a right-wing backlash like 1981's attempted coup.

The danger of another 1981-style coup is remote. To Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez's credit, he has managed to placate the military and at the same time avoid decreeing martial law in the Basque areas. Gonzalez has rightly refused to negotiate with the ETA until it lays down its arms, and has carried through on a number of reforms that have undercut its support. The Basques now have their own Parliament, collect and invest their own taxes, and run their own schools and courts.

Whatever the merits of Basque nationhood, it is surely a recipe for disorder. Most inhabitants of the region probably do not want it; ethnic Spanish

USA TODAY 29 July 1986

## Give kidnappers message: Let's talk

As word spread that the Rev. Lawrence Jenco had been freed from 19 months' captivity in Lebanon, we felt deep and mixed emotions.

There was joy and thanksgiving because of his liberation.

There was anger and frustration because David Jacobsen, director of Beirut's American University Hospital, Thomas Sutherland, a dean at the university, and Terry Anderson, the AP's Beirut Bureau chief, are still held captive.

There was concern and fear because there still is no word from our government about William Buckley, the embassy official the terrorists say they killed.

And there is sympathy and understanding for the angry relatives of the remaining hostages who want our government to negotiate with the terrorists.

Father Jenco brought with him to freedom a videotaped message from Jacobsen, who said that his captors have warned that unless there are negotiations by our government, he, Sutherland, and Anderson will be slain.

That is a sobering message.

In fairness to our government, there is no room for negotiations on the demand of the terrorists. The Islamic Jihad says that our hostages will be freed only if the USA forces

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factions might be needed, but that can always be arranged.

If Washington has good evidence that Col. Qaddafi is indeed planning to initiate a new wave of terror, then the safety of Americans and other potential victims would suggest the need for another surgical strike on his terrorist bases before the bloodletting can start.

make up half its population. Economically, it would be a disaster. Granting self-rule to the Basques in Spain, moreover, would encourage the French Basques just across the Pyrenees. And it could stoke the secessionist fires that burn in Catalonia and other parts of Spain.

For all his efforts at conciliation, Gonzalez has shown little sympathy for greater Basque autonomy. He has given the civil guard a long leash in order to combat terrorism. Human-rights abuses by the civil guard—detentions without charge, and beatings—are not uncommon. The ETA has fed on the resentment and gained a good deal of unwarranted credibility. Madrid's neglect has strengthened the extremist political parties, which picked up 24% of the Basque vote in last June's national elections.

As the election returns show, nationalism dies hard. And as last week's bombings show, fanaticism dies even harder. For these reasons, Spain's siege with its secessionists will likely go on.

WASHINGTON POST 29 July 1986

## A Hostage's Return

**Y**ET AGAIN Americans feel the special rush and check of emotion that comes from seeing a hostage return to the embraces and good wishes of his fellow citizens and then realizing that others are still in peril. The Rev. Lawrence Jenco of Catholic Relief Services in Beirut is free, 18 months after being kidnapped there. But three other Americans remain held by the group known as Islamic Holy War. Pictured smiling and waving an American flag, Mr. Jenco was described as having been released "unharm-ed." *Unharm-ed!* The word mocks the abuse and pain that terrorists inflict by seizing, holding and intimidating innocents, even if they are then released with limbs intact and no open wounds. The word gives sadistic criminals, who here appear to have "executed" one American, William Buckley, an undeserved moral free pass. The truth is, Mr. Jenco was released alive but harmed, badly harmed, unforgivably harmed.

Americans owe much to Mr. Jenco and the others. Cast involuntarily in a pawn's role, they were snatched up to force an action by their government, in this case evidently to see to Kuwait's release of a group of convicted Shiite terrorists. The question for the United States is how to match its responsibility to these citizens with its responsibility to Kuwait, which is bravely holding out against a deadly terrorist threat, and with its responsibility to other Americans who could be at risk if the impression spread that you can get what you want in international life by grabbing a few Americans. On a tape that Mr. Jenco brought out with him, one American still detained pleaded for Washington to negotiate his and his comrades' release. The painful truth remains that the victims' claim for rescue undercuts any bargaining government's need to be able

SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE 29 Jul 86

## No Compromises With Terrorism

**THE RELEASE** of Father Lawrence Jenco is welcome and gratifying. The appeal of his fellow hostage, David Jacobsen, left behind in captivity with two other kidnaped Americans, is understandable and falls upon sympathetic ears.

But Jacobsen wants the United States to bargain with his captors, members of the extremely militant Islamic Jihad (Moslem Holy War) organization. It is a totally understandable appeal from the dismal captivity he and his two fellow prisoners have suffered for far too long. But negotiations with the Islamic Jihad can not be undertaken. The precedent would be far too grave and would, we believe, be an invitation for a rash of kidnappings of Americans throughout the world.

Political kidnapers must never be encouraged to believe that the random abduction of American citizens will result in attainment of their goals, whatever these be. The Lebanese kidnapers, supporters of the Iranian Moslem movement, want the freedom of 17 of their own who are imprisoned in Kuwait for bombing the French and U.S. embassies there. Freeing those prisoners, it seems obvious, would also be a mistake. It could encourage others to feel that they may bomb with impunity.

to show patience over the long haul.

Mr. Jenco was let go in an area of eastern Lebanon controlled by the Syrians, who are in at best an

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### LET'S TALK...Continued

the government of Kuwait to release 17 convicted terrorists who bombed the embassies of the USA and France in 1983.

Kuwait is no puppet of the USA. We have no right to ask the Kuwaitis to free a gang of bombers. We have no right to intrude into another country's criminal justice system.

But that does not mean that our government is paralyzed.

Just because there is nothing to negotiate doesn't mean that representatives of the USA should not open up talks with anybody who has any contact with the captors.

Just because an airplane or ship-at-sea has not been hijacked doesn't mean that Jacobsen, Sutherland, and Anderson should be forgotten until the next dramatic development pricks our conscience.

Just because Buckley has no close relatives to make demands on the government is no reason for us to be kept in

the dark about him. Is there no intelligence about him?

Our government's periods of silence seem insensitive. We should talk more with Syria, which holds increasing influence in Lebanon. We should ask that government to work harder to help us. We should talk to friendly Arab states that might have lines into Lebanon. We should rely on religious spokesmen who have worked for other hostage releases — the Rev. Terry Waite, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, to mention two.

We should talk to the French and Soviets, both of whom have managed to get their hostages freed. And our government must be willing to talk directly to the captors.

It is callous to speak of these hostages as expendable "prisoners of war." They are not. They are innocent, peace-loving people, kidnapped only because of their citizenship. They must be saved. To rescue them, our government must be willing to talk. And talk. And talk.

As long as they are captives, we are all in chains.

LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY 29 July 1986

# Negotiations Didn't Free This Hostage

ATLANTA JOURNAL 30 July 1986

## Still no deals with terrorists

The joy of seeing the smiling face of Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, released after almost 19 months as a hostage of Islamic terrorists, was tempered by the sober videotaped visage of fellow hostage David Jacobsen warning that "our release will be death" if the United States doesn't negotiate with the people who are holding him and at least two other Americans.

It is a horrible fact that Jacobsen may be right. Terrorists have claimed to have killed one of the hostages already, although his death has not been confirmed. They may yet kill more if they don't get what they are demanding: release of 17 of their Shiites comrades being held in prisons in Kuwait for the bombings of the French and U.S. embassies there three years ago.

Yet, even as we look into the face of a man who we know could soon be dead, we cannot yield to his plea. Doing what he asks might save his life — but it would almost certainly cost many more.

The United States has had a firmly stated policy of refusing to negotiate with terrorists. That doesn't mean American officials won't talk to people who are holding our citizens captive — apparently there was discussion, at least indirectly, that may have helped bring Father Jenco's freedom. But it does mean — and it must continue to mean — that we will not give in to demands or make trades in order to gain the release of hostages.

Small bands of extremists rarely have weapons powerful enough to let them achieve their goals. If we were to negotiate with them and give them anything of value in exchange for hostages, we would be handing them just exactly such a weapon. There are far too many political kidnappings now, in a climate in which they almost never achieve the desired results; imagine how many there would be if they worked.

The Reagan administration says America's no-deals policy is still firmly in force. We are pleased that it is — even as we realize that some people may suffer so that many more will not.

### RETURN...Continued

ambiguous position. Having recently been exposed in the West for plotting to blow up a loaded airliner in flight, the Syrians were pleased in this instance to show solicitude for victims of someone else's terrorism. But as long as Syria maintains its current close association with Iran, the patron of Islamic Holy War, it will be under pressure to coddle this murderous group. It is risky to speculate on what considerations guided Islamic Holy War, Iran and Syria, if they are

One thing seems certain about the release of the Rev. Lawrence Jenco after 19 months of captivity in Lebanon: His terrorist captors got no concessions in return.

That suggests the possibility that frustration led the Islamic Jihad kidnapers to release the Roman Catholic priest.

Purportedly they had already killed one American hostage, William Buckley, because Washington refused to negotiate with them. But Buckley's death, if it actually occurred (his body has never been found), didn't bring the United States to the negotiating table.

So the kidnapers tried releasing Jenco. For them, that at least had the merit of returning flagging public attention to the plight of the American hostages in Lebanon. As if to underline that purpose, the terrorists sent with Jenco a videotaped plea by David Jacobsen, another hostage, for Washington to negotiate with his captors.

From the beginning they have demanded the release of 17 prisoners held in Kuwait for bombing the American and French embassies there. The kidnapers surely hoped that Jenco's emergence from captivity along with public concern generated by the videotape, which got heavy American TV exposure, would put new pressure on the Reagan administration to negotiate for the freedom of the remaining three hostages.

So while Jenco's release was a joy to his family, his friends and Americans in general, it may well reflect a certain desperation on the part of his captors. Holding American hostages for about two years has gotten them absolutely nowhere.

It's not easy for Americans to look into the eyes of a fellow American as he pleads on a videotape for his government to save him from what seems like an endless captivity. But negotiating with the terrorists for the purpose of granting any of their demands would be a tragic mistake that could only lead to more hostage-taking.

Difficult as it is, the Reagan administration should pursue essentially the policy it has followed up to now. It should try assiduously to exert pressure on third parties — notably Syria — that appear to have some influence with the kidnapers. It should even keep open the possibility of talking, directly or indirectly, with those who hold the remaining American hostages. But it should leave no doubt in anyone's mind that it will continue to reject the demands of terrorists.

the relevant parties, in freeing Mr. Jenco. Perhaps it is impolitic to ask the Syrians in particular why they did not see to the release of Mr. Jenco earlier. But certainly there is a purpose in asking Syria, as American officials reportedly have been, to help ensure the safety and liberty of Terry Anderson, David Jacobsen and Thomas Sutherland now.

PROVIDENCE JOURNAL 30 July 1986

## Terrorism: Hanging tough still works

In freeing the Rev. Lawrence M. Jenco, radical Shiites undoubtedly aim to pressure the Reagan administration to negotiate for four other American hostages they still hold in Lebanon. But, while Father Jenco's safe return is heartening, his release should not lead to a change in the U.S. policy against negotiating with terrorists.

That policy exists for very basic reasons: Dealing with terrorists grants them a legitimacy they don't deserve. Any deal struck with them in effect rewards their methods and encourages a repetition. In the Jenco case, refusal to negotiate with his captors did not deter the priest's release nor that of another hostage earlier. It may hasten freedom for the others as terrorists realize their tactics aren't working.

Father Jenco brought with him a tape made by David Anderson, one of

the remaining hostages, imploring the U.S. government to negotiate with the Shiites over 17 radicals held by Kuwait whose release is the Shiites' principal demand. Similar statements have been made by relatives of the hostages, and their anguish can be understood. However, the hostages' freedom cannot be promoted by suggesting, as one relative did on Sunday, that the Syrians "place a value on them that their own government doesn't." His disclaimers notwithstanding, Syrian President Hafez Assad could have them released, just as he did a hijacked TWA planeload of hostages at Beirut a year ago.

However, whatever his reasons then or now, they are not humanitarian, since the Syrian chief himself is part of the terrorist network. His designs are furthered any time he can

don the cloak of respectability, however false. This is solely why he occasionally helps to secure a hostage release, earning a thank-you note as if he had actually exerted himself to do America a favor. That just makes it harder for the West to paint him a terrorist — and easier for him to cover his future terrorist tracks.

Mr. Assad knows the value that Americans place on their countrymen in trouble. He understands that it is easier for the public to remember the value of specific individuals whose pictures we see on television than the value of those unknown and unknowable individuals who will be kidnapped and who may die in the future. The release of Father Jenco should move Americans to outfox Mr. Assad by refusing to urge Mr. Reagan to give in to terrorist demands.

NEWARK STAR-LEDGER 30 July 1986

### Free at last

An American priest has been released by Moslem terrorists who had kidnaped him and held him hostage in Lebanon for 19 months. The Rev. Lawrence Jenco, who had operated the Catholic Relief Services in Beirut, was set free as suddenly as he was taken prisoner by Shiite extremists who call themselves Islamic Jihad or Islamic Holy War.

What prompted the terrorists to liberate Father Jenco at this time is unclear. The immediate explanation was the captors' concern for the health of their 51-year-old prisoner. But that would be uncharacteristic of the terrorists.

More likely scenarios are that the Syrians, despite their protestations that they had little control over the Islamic Jihad, had prevailed upon the extremists to free Father Jenco, or alternately, that the kidnapers released their prisoner to call fresh attention to the fact that three other hostages are still being held. Perhaps each of these theories was at work in bringing about the release.

From the kidnapers' point of view, nothing could be more useless than hostages who were not talked about publicly and who did not focus attention on the terrorists' demands that 17 imprisoned members of their extremist group be freed by Kuwait in exchange for the release of the hostages they held in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

Father Jenco did carry with him to freedom a letter from the other hostages as well as a videotape from one of them imploring the United States to negotiate with his captors—a plea frankly intended to change the Reagan Administration's policy not to negotiate with terrorists.

The White House's tough stand against bartering with extremists has been effective, however. Father Jenco is not the first hostage to be turned loose without any concessions from the United States, and each release has properly been an occasion for celebration.

No toadying to terrorists is a policy that also

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM  
30 July 1986

## Hostage dilemma

The ordeal is over for the Rev. Lawrence Jenco.

That's great for Jenco, his family and for all Americans who have identified with the plight of a fellow citizen held in captivity for many months in a foreign land by unpredictable fanatics.

The painful ordeal of captivity somewhere in strife-ridden Lebanon continues for three other Americans.

All Americans must share their anguish and the sadness and frustration of their loved ones and friends and pray that soon there will be three more reunions.

However, the fanatics who kidnapped those Americans remaining in captivity say they will not be released. Indeed, they say the Americans probably will be killed unless the United States negotiates with them for the release of several terrorists now imprisoned in Kuwait for an attack on the American Embassy in that country.

The threat must be taken seriously. The abductors apparently have already killed one Ameri-

### FREE...Continued

sends a stern message that there is nothing to be gained from criminal assaults on innocent people, and that the crimes will not go unpunished.

Father Jenco's release and the free world's long, trying experience with extremism prove that the only way to deal with the ordeal of terrorism is not to deal with the terrorists.

can hostage. The United States, therefore, must intensify its efforts to arrange for their release. It is quite possible that Syria, which is believed to have played a role in the Jenco release, may be willing to apply leverage to obtain freedom for the others.

This country, however, must never seriously entertain the idea of giving the kidnappers that for which they are asking. There must not even be talk of this country's attempts to persuade Kuwait to release the terrorists imprisoned there.

While all Americans should empathize with the plight of the hostages and their families, the wisdom of the Reagan administration's refusal to deal with the abductors should be readily apparent. Giving the terrorists what they want would simply invite more abductions of Americans abroad.

## 'No' to Terrorism

Terrorists and Syrian officials have engineered another bittersweet hostage experience for the United States. As Americans rejoice in the release of the Rev. Lawrence Jenco, they worry even more about the hostages who were not released.

The terrorists are masters at this game, sending along with Father Jenco a heart-rending videotape of a hostage pleading for his life. When they freed the Rev. Benjamin Weir more than 10 months ago, he warned that his captors were "not willing to wait much longer" before killing the other American hostages.

But the terrorists, even though they hold most of the cards, did wait. Now they have released another hostage, claiming he was in poor health although Father Jenco complained of nothing more than a headache. They say they will release no one else. Given their record so far, who knows?

The administration has a limited number of options, and the best seems to be the one it has followed consistently with the hostages in Lebanon: offering no concessions to the kid-

KANSAS CITY TIMES 30 July 1986

nappers.

It is right to reassert this policy, even in the face of renewed pleas and pressure from those close to the hostages. In their anguish, they blame the administration for what the terrorists have done. The pressure on Washington is exactly what the terrorists need.

Concessions by the U.S. government would guarantee the taking of more American hostages in the future. The terrorists will not abandon a method that works. Nor will they have much trouble finding Americans around the world to kidnap next month or next year. And they will always have demands upon a powerful country like the United States.

The release of Father Jenco has brought another round of a noxious exercise in the Middle East, the bowing and scraping before Syria in gratitude for the release of hostages, as though it could have been arranged by a country that had nothing to do with his captivity. But the Syrians don't brag about their terrorism the way Moammar Gadhafi does. That's one reason — although not the only one — that Syrian terrorism is rewarded with thank-you's rather than bombs.

BOOKS 

NEW YORK CITY TRIBUNE 26 March 1986 Pg.10

BOOKS / CARL RAPKINS

## The Elaborate Fabric of Terror's Garment

**Hydra of Carnage: The International Linkages of Terrorism and Other Low-Intensity Operations: The Witnesses Speak**, eds. Uri Ra'anan, Robert L. Pfalagraft, Jr., Richard H. Shultz, Ernest Halperin and Igor Lukes, Lexington Books, Lexington, Mass., \$22.95, paperback, 638 pp.

"Puerto Rican FALN terrorists have been suspected for years of plotting to blow up a nineteenth century railroad tunnel link to Manhattan. The tunnel, located beneath the Hudson River, is already in poor condition. . . and it would take very little in the way of explosives to drop it on a commuter train filled with hundreds of passengers."

Author Neil C. Livingstone, President of the Institute on Terrorism and Subnational Conflict, in his "The Impact of Technological Innovation," indicates that the plot was foiled through "intelligence obtained in advance." The Italian police, however, were not as lucky: In December 1984 two explosions tore apart a train as it moved through the 11.6 mile-long Apennine Tunnel between Milan and Naples. Almost 70 people were injured or lost their lives in this terrorist act.

Dr. Livingstone's analysis and warning that it can happen here is contained in a brilliant collection of essays, addresses, lectures and extensive primary source documents, entitled *Hydra of Carnage*. The editors, from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, have put together a 638-page study of international terrorism, destabilization, disinformation, propaganda and low-intensity warfare, one which documents Soviet culpability, together with that of Iran, Libya, Syria, Nicaragua, Cuba and other outlaw regimes employing state-sponsored terrorism.

Much of the information is first-hand and almost all of it expert. It includes testimonies by ex-Soviet intelligence officials and the authoritative analyses of leading U.S. experts and enforcement agencies.

It focuses on the international and regional coordination of terrorist networks, infrastructures and operational structures. There is also valuable data on, and analysis of, "Nark-Intern" (Narcotics International), linking big-time drug traffic and terrorists, a sort of perverted version of the legendary American "military-industrial complex."

The Unholy Alliance between international drug bosses and terrorists is described in "The International Linkages — What Do We Know?" by William J. Casey, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. "A symbiotic relationship has grown up between the narcotics dealers

along the Caribbean Coast and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia. . . The drug merchant needs a secure transit point for his goods to reach markets in the United States. One such transit point is Cuba. The Cubans funnel arms and money to the guerrilla groups through drug merchant channels." Casey notes that although Casto routinely denies any involvement in all of this, the evidence is overwhelming. It is an opportunity he can't refuse: through helping the pushers move their illicit merchandise, he gains access to Cuban-Americans in Florida; he increases America's crime and social disorder; he assists the revolution in Colombia.

The Cuban connection to international terrorism is all-pervasive and extremely important in the Soviet attempt to subvert Central America. Acting as Moscow's surrogate, Cubans pop up everywhere in the region. According to Michael A. Ledeen's "Intelligence, Training and Support Components," they provide a base for guerrilla activity in El Salvador; they integrate the activities of these insurgents into an international network; they give the Salvadorean rebels guns, money and training; they contribute advisers and intelligence officials who hold significant positions in the guerrilla hierarchy; they establish transit bases for Nicaraguans and Salvadoreans headed to Soviet-bloc nations for training; they offer transit points for officials from Eastern Europe, PLO members, Libyans and others who are on their way to Central America. Moreover, in Central America, they contribute management, sanctuary, arms and guidance to guerrillas in El Salvador who, by themselves, could not survive. And, as Ledeen emphasizes, behind the Cubans stand the Russians, as they do in support of terrorists throughout the world.

Ledeen's analysis, like that of most contributors to this volume, could shake America out of its lethargy — if it were widely circulated. However, the prestige media will probably label it alarmist and, for the most part, ignore it. Their attitude will be much like that of Sandor Vanocur's, of ABC, whose "The Role of the Media" is unfortunately included in this otherwise important contribution to the literature on terrorism.

Vanocur laments that the media is asked to show any sense of responsibility about anything not related to news gathering. He also pretends, in an act of supreme intellectual dishonesty, that print and electronic journalists of the liberal persuasion do not at least implicitly advocate their pet causes in their news columns and on

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE



WASHINGTON TIMES 20 May 1986 Pg. D1

BOOK REVIEW/Harry G. Summers Jr.

# Anti-terrorism game plan

**B**enjamin Netanyahu is probably an unfamiliar name to most Americans. But they might well know him if they saw him in person, for during the furor over the U.S. raid on Libya his was one of the few friendly foreign faces on television.

Currently serving as Israel's ambassador to the United Nations, Mr. Netanyahu strongly defended America's military actions against Libya as an effective counter to their

*Harry G. Summers Jr. is the author of On Strategy and the Vietnam War Almanac (Facts on File).*

**Terrorism:  
How the West Can Win**  
*Edited  
by Benjamin Netanyahu  
Farrar, Strauss  
\$18.95, 254 pages*

state-sponsored terrorist acts.

Mr. Netanyahu spoke with more than usual authority, for he had just completed editing an especially timely new book, *Terrorism: How the West Can Win*. The book is based on the proceedings of a June 1984 con-

ference at the Jonathan Institute (a private research foundation concentrating on terrorism, and named for Mr. Netanyahu's brother, Lt. Col. Jonathan Netanyahu, who was killed leading the successful Israeli rescue operation at Entebbe) in which some 41 contributors were brought together not only to describe and define terrorism, but also to detail what could be done about it.

An eclectic affair, the conference included such diverse personalities as newsmen Arnaud de Borchgrave of *The Washington Times* and Bob Woodward of *The Washington Post*,

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

## FABRIC...Continued

the air. He whines, "The critics want us... to be: neo-conservatives, terrorist experts, law enforcement officials, government officials, legal scholars, or philosophers. That is really not our function." He drones on about how reporters cannot be expected to be experts on terrorism; yet, according to him, that is what is being expected of them.

That's not true and he knows it. The conservative critics of the way leftist newsmen handled the Iranian hostage crisis, for example, decry not the lack of personal expertise by particular journalists on the subject of terrorism but instead correctly complain of the inordinant amount of coverage, often sympathetic, given the terrorists. They are allowed a world-wide platform for their views and grievances against our country. This is exactly what they want.

Vanocur gives only perfunctory attention to these facts. He really doesn't want to admit them. He also doesn't want to admit anything as fundamental as adversarial, liberal bias in the establishment media.

In contrast to the self-serving claims of Vanocur, other contributors get to the essence of the problem: the basically different mindsets, values and purposes of states sponsoring terrorism. What is the point therefore of endless negotiations with people with whom you do not share a common mental universe or even a common usage of words? How can you trust them?

This is discussed by Douglas J. Feith, in his essay "International Responses." He refers to the history of the Geneva Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict (the Diplomatic Conference), which took place from 1974 to 1977. "The record of the Diplomatic Conference sheds light on how terror-

ism, law and politics tie together. It calls attention to the gulf that divides Western liberal political culture from that of totalitarian and so-called Third World powers with respect to conceptions of law and of human rights. It reveals the pitfalls of dialogue in the absence of common values, common interests, and common usage of words."

Adda B. Bozeman, in his "Political Warfare in Totalitarian and Traditional Societies," makes the same point by contrasting traditional Eastern and Western statecraft. He adds "peace is not the norm in international relations and war is nowhere viewed as either abnormal or immoral except in the rarefied strata of Occidental academe."

How the devout Islamic terrorist must despise us and our eternal quest for peace, human rights and the rule of law!

Along with important conceptual clarifications of terms like "unconventional conflicts," "low-intensity warfare," etc., the authors present significant and massive documentation for their claims. The use of important primary sources lends the book its special authenticity. These include, among many others, the following: highly classified minutes of a meeting between a Shi'ite terrorist movement and top leaders of the Iranian regime, in which they plan terrorist attacks; excerpts from minutes of a 1983 conference between PLO "Foreign Minister" Farouk Kaddoumi and Soviet Foreign Minister Andropov. This documents the close ties between Moscow and the PLO.

In conclusion, this volume is a gem. For anyone concerned with the survival of the West, this is obligatory reading.

*Carl Rapkins is book editor for the New York City Tribune.*

## PLAN...Continued

Rep. Jack Kemp, Republican from New York, and Sen. Alan Cranston, Democrat from California, former U.N. Ambassadors Jeane Kirkpatrick and Arthur Goldberg, and correspondents George Will and Daniel Schorr.

Also included were such government officials as Secretary of State George Shultz, Attorney General Edwin Meese, and FBI director William Webster, as well as representatives from France, Germany, Great Britain, Israel, and Japan.

Mr. Netanyahu has organized their deliberations into eight major categories: the challenge to the democracies, terrorism and totalitarianism, terrorism and the Islamic world, the international network, terrorism and the media, the legal foundations for the war against terrorism, the domestic battle, and the global battle. An appendix contains the transcript of a symposium with ABC News commentator Ted Koppel and others on terrorism and the media.

"The views of the contributors," the introductory chapter acknowledges, "are not always identical. At times, they may even conflict with one another on specific points. But they form an overriding consensus on the urgent need for the West to undertake a broad-based, vigorous campaign against the terrorists and their sponsors."

While most of the essays are from the 1984 conference, the concluding chapter, "Terrorism: How the West Can Win," (from which the book takes its title), was written by Mr. Netanyahu in early 1986 — after the Rome and Vienna airport atrocities but before the Libyan raid. It alone is worth the price of the book, for its 28 pages provide depth and background to his subsequent post-raid television commentaries.

Mr. Netanyahu stood out among the many commentators on American actions against Libya. And he stood out primarily because he placed terrorism in its proper philosophical perspective.

The very word "philosophy" turns most Americans off, but unless one understands the philosophy of a phenomenon — by definition "the theory or logical analysis of the principles underlying conduct, thought [and] knowledge" — one can hardly

make sense of its manifestations.

Many, for example, give lip-service to the idea that terrorism is a form of war, but few understand what that admission entails. Mr. Netanyahu — diplomat, Israeli Special Forces veteran, and (from his writings) an obvious scholar of military science — is among those who do.

He knows, for example, that war is not a senseless act, but is instead the deliberate use of force in order to achieve a political objective. He knows that the objective of offensive war is to break the enemy's will to resist. Conversely, the objective of defensive war is to break the enemy's will to persist in his aggression. In both cases *will*, not military operation *per se*, is the real key. He also knows that the essence of deterrence is to make the inevitable price of aggression higher than the potential benefits aggression might bring. That is as true with terrorism as it is with nuclear war.

While the United States has understood and applied such principles of deterrence to deter both nuclear and major conventional war, it did not seem to understand that the same logic also applies to the lowest level of war — terrorism. CIA Director William Casey's remark after the TWA bombing, that Libya was pursuing a low-cost, low-risk strategy, went to the heart of the problem.

The obvious counter was to make such Libyan aggression *high cost* and *high risk*. As Mr. Netanyahu put it, "Whether it is hit-and-run killings or random bombing, the terrorist *always* considers, and fears, a forceful response from his victims. To the extent that he believes he will be tracked down and punished for his actions, he will curb them. Deterrence works on terrorists just as it does on anyone else." With the bombing raids on Tripoli and Benghazi on April 21, 1986, the United States finally began to apply these basic principles of deterrence.

While American public support was overwhelming, there was also a widespread fear of reprisals. Writing before the raids took place, Mr. Netanyahu warned that, "There are no one-shot solutions. A forceful response against aggression may very well elicit reprisals initially. But over the long run, it is the only way to

make governments stop launching terrorist attacks. They need to know, they *must* know, that the West will not sit back and take it."

But why didn't the "West" support America's forceful response? Again, Mr. Netanyahu anticipated the question. "I believe," he wrote, "it is the persistent effect of two vices. One is greed, or a heedless promotion of economic self-interest, whatever the political or moral consequences. The other is political cowardice, which means sifting it out while your ally is attacked, or responds to an attack, so as not to invoke the wrath of the terrorists."

"Neither cowardice or greed will easily disappear," he goes on to say. "If, however, the United States persists in its firm stance, over time a common policy for the West would eventually emerge, pressuring, even shaming, Western states into compliance."

"The West can win the war against terrorism," Mr. Netanyahu continues. "But it must first win the war against its own inner weaknesses. That will require courage . . . First statesmen and government leaders must have the political courage . . . to make difficult decisions . . . that may involve great risks. . . . Second, the soldiers who may be called upon to combat terrorism will need to show military courage . . . but there is also a third kind of courage: the civic valor that must be shown by an entire people. All citizens in a democracy threatened by terrorism must see themselves, in a certain sense, as soldiers in a common battle."

With the raids on Libya, President Reagan has demonstrated convincingly that he has the political courage to fight back against terrorism. Our armed forces have demonstrated that they have the military courage to take that fight to the enemy. It only remains to be seen whether over the long, difficult, and dangerous road that lies ahead, the American people have the civic valor to live up to their constitutional responsibility "to provide for the common defense."

On that point, as *Terrorism: How the West Can Win* makes abundantly clear, victory in the war against terrorism ultimately depends.

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