

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: North, Oliver L.: Files
Folder Title: Terrorism – Public Diplomacy
(January 1986) (3)
Box: 106

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name NORTH, OLIVER: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 5/21/2012

File Folder TERRORISM - PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (JANUARY 1986) (3 OF 3)

FOIA

M11-442

Box Number 106

HAENNI

12

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
137087	MEMO	FOR WILLIAM MARTIN RE WHITE PAPER PAR 9/22/2017 M442/1	1	1/3/1986	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

UNEDITED

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BACKGROUND BRIEFING

ON
TERRORISM

WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1985, 3:40 P.M.

SS
WR
JM

NORTH

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Here I am.

Q What I find missing is something that I thought had been promised by various spokesmen here which is instead of a listing of the events some evidence.

Do you have anything to not only convince us but to convince the Europeans that these allegations are, in fact, supported by direct evidence available to the United States?

A Evidence of what?

Q Of these charges, of 58 charges that you list at the end of this paper?

A Our contention is that Abu Nidal is perpetrating terrorism and killing people. We think the evidence is pretty strong. His signature is all over the acts, particularly the recent one of the airports, and, also previous, the Egypt airliner and others before that. They're listed here.

The second linkage that we assert is that there is a linkage between Libya and Abu Nidal. The two taken in concert, or what has disturbed us, that a state -- Libya -- supporting a group -- Abu Nidal -- has through its encouragement and its help and its access to resources and sharing of resources has enabled Abu Nidal to perpetrate terrorism worldwide, and more recently and particularly in Europe, and that is what has gotten our concern. We think the links are pretty clear.

Q Specifically, on the issue of whether the Libyans provided training for Abu Nidal and his group, can you give us the location? Can you give us any specific evidence to convince us and to convince the Europeans that you know this set of buildings was used, in fact, for the training of people who later committed international terrorist acts?

A The problem of trying -- this is going to be a long answer to a short question.

I think most people when they viewed that, sort of looked at the subject of camps as sort of--a, you go down a little road with white painted rocks like the British used to do and you come a gate and there's a guy that says Libya Security Services, let me see your badge, drive slow. You drive in and you go and you get trained, and when you've got your certificate you drive out and you go do terrorism.

That's not the way it's done. The emphasis is on training terrorists rather than on the training. For example, there are a lot of things that one needs to do and do rather well to be a terrorist but these are not things that only terrorists must learn to do: Use of firearms, use of explosives, how to handle intelligence, how to gather intelligence, how to do surveill, defensive driving, so forth and so forth.

In fact, we train our law enforcement officers in many, many of those things ourselves. The point is, when we are training our guys, as an example, we are training them as law enforcement officers.

Libya has been training people in the various things that one needs to be a terrorist for the purpose of their carrying out acts of terrorism. So the emphasis is on training to be a terrorist rather than on what training they get specifically, the motive for which they are training.

When you start with that premise and you go from there to, what kind of training does one need and where are they getting it; they're getting the various kinds of training they need in Libya, among other places -- and it's Libya that we're focusing on -- and where they're getting it in Libya depends on where Libya is giving it and depends on the kinds of things that they need to get for the kinds of missions they may do.

So, in effect, this is like painting a moving train. If Abu Nidal is setting up an operation, they have certain requirements for that operation. They want to make sure that the people that are undertaking that operation have the skills to do that operation, and they'll go train them in whatever it is that they need for that. If it's just holding a bag with a bomb in it, you don't need much training for that. You say to the guy, you go over there and you put the bag down and you walk out.

So there is not at any given time sort of Camp Sandy terrorist camp number one. There are a lot of facilities throughout Libya where they train people on a lot of things.

There are in those facilities, depending on the needs of the people being trained for terrorism, potential terrorists being trained.

When you ask our government, which is a legitimate question to our people, go find out where these guys are and they come back and say, well, we found out they're here, here and here and here, and somebody gives the number of 15 or 17, or whatever, as to the locations that we believe we have found where terrorists are in training. Tomorrow it may be different.

Tomorrow they may have finished that and gone somewhere else. But for the purposes of trying to get a handle on where they are at a given time, which our Administration would want to do in the process of addressing this problem. We say, go find them. So they found them, and they found them in these locations, but that is not to characterize these things as sui generis camps for terrorist training as if somehow those are unique skills that can only be found in that camp.

Q Look, when you get to Libya and Nidal, you use something that reporters are very familiar with. When they're not sure of their grounds, they use "reportedly" a lot. You use "reports, reportedly," and despite your lengthy answer, I don't think you told Jim if you have evidence that Abu Nidal, for instance, is in Libya, that Qadhafi is supporting him.

You speak of Libyan reports, you use the adverb "reportedly." What can you do for us to amplify, elaborate on the claimed link between Libya and Abu Nidal?

A It's circumstantial. You're right. There is no smoking gun. In fact, in terrorism, the only time generally you get a smoking gun is after an act is over.

If by "evidence" you mean incontrovertible eyewitness evidence of an eyewitness who is reliable, namely yourself, because you can't count on anyone else, don't count on getting any evidence.

Q How about something you'd go to court with?

A So then you go -- you back down from that to, all right, what is convincing evidence? That depends on who you're trying to convince. Obviously, if you're trying to convince the press -- I hope that you guys are going to be harder to convince than other people.

Q Well, we're very impressionable. If you were trying to convince a court, you wouldn't just hold back incontrovertible evidence?

A There are problems there, too. Because what can be used in a court of law is not necessary what you have as intelligence. The difference between evidence and intelligence, and the rules of evidence and intelligence, they're different.

Even if you had evidence that was gathered by intelligence doesn't mean you could put that into court. This is one of the problems have had in terrorism all along.

For example, in the Achille Lauro we had to get our Justice Department people and CIA people together to see what CIA had that could be used. Not what they had but what they had to be used. So I submit that saying what would stand up in a court of law is also not exactly the best measure.

So to get back to what I was going to say, how is one convinced? We are obviously convinced. What convinces us is circumstantial but we think very strong. That's what this paper is trying to portray.

Abu Nidal is kicked out of Iraq. He went to Syria. He set up a headquarters there. That office is still there. It's not far from our Embassy, as a matter of fact.

In the last several months, even though activity in that headquarters in Syria is still going on, they're still very much there. The comings and goings of Abu Nidal people presumably -- and I say "presumably" of Abu Nidal himself, because there is a problem eyeballing the fellow; he's very elusive -- have moved from Syria to Libya. Abu Nidal has given several interviews in Libya. He has been commented upon by Qadhafi in Libya. His people are in Libya.

The shift from Syria to Libya by Abu Nidal coinciding with their starting to do things that they hadn't done before, like hit Egyptians, is what we base our case on, in becoming convinced that there is a linkage between Libya and Abu Nidal.

Obviously, in saying this, there is a lot more evidence that we have that we can't give. But that is the framework in which we have come to the conclusion -- that has convinced us -- that there is a linkage.

Q Is he alive, and is he in Libya? Simply that; do you know?

A I personally have not seen him in Libya so I don't know.

Q I don't mean you. Does the U.S. Government, which I assume has some intelligence capabilities of a large superpower, does the United States know because, of course, there have been reports that he isn't alive?

A Right.

Q Near Iraq, Syria, et cetera. He's elusive, he moves around. He's a travelling man. Does the U.S. Government know whether he's alive and whether he's in Libya?

A We can't state that unequivocally. We can just say that we are convinced on the basis of the evidence that we have that he is alive and that he is in Libya.

Q What are you carrying to the allies? It's stronger than this, isn't it? What evidence are you carrying to the allies to try and convince them to join President Reagan in a sanction and a boycott?

A It's the same structure as this with more detail.

Q You got numbers or pictures?

A No. You mean pictures of training basis --

Q Are you talking circumstantial evidence to them?

A Yes, but of a stronger nature.

Q Excuse me. Can you date approximately the arrival of Abu Nidal in Libya?

A Not to the day, but --

Q Or approximately?

A Approximately this summer -- last summer, I mean.

Q Coming back to your explanation of why there aren't any specific bases that are labeled terrorist bases, just to make sure I understand it, isn't what you're saying that you first identify somebody as a terrorist -- Abu Nidal or somebody that you have identified as a follower of Abu Nidal then you see him walk into a Libyan military base and you then draw the conclusion that he is receiving training in terrorism as a result of that?

A Yes, in part.

Q So isn't that different from saying that, as you do in this report, that -- I don't remember where it is now in the report, and it's been repeated many times by your office -- that Libya has training camps for terrorists? Is that a different thing?

A I guess semantically you could say it's a different thing.

Q No, not semantically; politically? Isn't it an effort to --

A No. Libya is training terrorists.

Q But you've said --

A And they're not training them in subways. They're training them in camps. But if you say, are there 15 camps solely dedicated to the training of Abu Nidal terrorists and nothing else, then, no.

Q Are you saying they're using military facilities? I'm confused. So there aren't terrorist training camps, as such, on a given day. But are they using Libyan military facilities? Do you know that for sure?

A In part.

Q Are they mixing with the --

Q What else --

A Sometime they'll have a group for a specific purpose, and they can keep the group together and then train them and everything they need to do to do whatever they have to do. And when they've done it and they go try to do it or fail or whatever they do, then, poof. Okay?

In other cases, they are training people in different things for different aspects of terrorism, but they may train on a military base, they may train wherever they have the resources to train them.

Q So at that moment, that's a terrorist training camp?

A Yes. For that particular purpose and at that particular moment. And that's why I say the emphasis should be on what they're using this for.

Q Where did the figure of 15 come from, the one the President mentioned?

Q The New York Times. That's where.

A Our government asked the question to itself, where are these guys? Then, our people, to the best of their ability, try to find out where they are. And if on a given day they can find 15 places where they think these people are, then they say 15. Unfortunately, numbers got to be sacrosanct because the next day they could be 14 or 17 as training programs phase out or as they move them from one training area to another training area, or so forth.

But when you ask a guy, where are they, he's going to find out and if he finds out they're in 15 places today, he's going to say that. That's where the numbers came from.

Q Can I ask you about the passports? You said Libya provided passports to the Abu Nidal members. On what was that based?

A There are a couple of things. One, the Tunisians have discovered that the Libyans lifted passports which were traced from Tunisians that later turned up in terrorist operations; not in the hands of the original owners.

Q So, in other words, Abu Nidal is incapable of producing his own passports for a certain operation?

A No. I'm saying that there is a case where real Tunisian passports turned up in Abu Nidal-run operation that were lifted by Libyans, which is another aspect of our circumstantial evidence.

When you have a Tunisian who had a passport and it was taken away from a Libyan and it later turns up in the hands of an Abu Nidal operative, to me, that's linkage of collusion.

Q Did that happen more than once? You said "operations." We've heard of one, in the Vienna case?

A One. Okay, one on that particular one.

(continued on next page)

Q But have there been other cases where passports have --

A The whole question of passports is a large question in the general context of terrorism and Abu Nidal terrorism. There's reason to believe that Abu Nidal does manufacture its own passports, fake passports. There's reason to believe that they steal them, and expropriate them in other manners. So the question of the use of passports and travel documents is a major element to which we have gone particularly to the Europeans as a major problem in the whole subject of terrorism.

Mobility that is afforded to terrorists through the use of travel documents is a major aspect of trying to counter terrorism, and Abu Nidal does the gamut, from manufacturing their own, to stealing them, to getting them from other people.

Q So there's only one -- when you said "operations," you meant to say "operation."

A Correct.

Q Who are the trainers in these nomadic camps? Are they American mercenaries, Soviet trainers? What are they? Who are they?

A The kinds of things they're trained on is not high tech necessarily. Well, some aspects of this is high tech as a matter of fact, but terrorist training is so varied and such a broad, broad, broad subject that it covers everything from how to shoot a weapon, to how to carry a bag, to how to forge a document, to how to get through customs, to all sorts of things.

So there is a wide gamut of kinds of training. Who actually does the training, I don't think we can say specifically Joe Doakes does this training in this school for this guy.

Q Another thing here, you mentioned -- you didn't say "reportedly" -- you mentioned that Libya -- this is the first time that you mentioned that Libya is involved in mining Red Sea and also giving arms to Iran. This is the first time you said that in an American document. Is that now public that you say that and --

A You read it.

Q You never said that. You never acknowledged that

A It is now public.

Q I mean, do you have evidence that Libya is passing arms to Iran?

A Yes.

Q And there's no numbers here.

A That's right.

Q Can you supply more with numbers?

A No.

Q Other than to say that Libya trains the Abu Nidal group generally and the case of the passport, is there other direct evidence of a direct Libyan role in the airport attack?

A What do you mean by "direct"? Do you mean operational?

Q I mean anything other than the passports, and the fact that, generally speaking, there's training. Is there any evidence that you can cite?

A No. Other than the fact that Abu Nidal has moved its operational headquarters to Libya. I say "operational," because they have headquarters in Syria and presumably a lot of other places. There are Abu Nidal operatives all over the world. But being in Libya, having access to Libyan resources for training other people and for themselves training other people and having a staging ground for starting their operation where they can put it all together and go, that to us is the linkage.

Abu Nidal wrote their prose. They're probably one of the best groups in the world in terrorism. They could teach anyone a few tricks from that point of view, so there wouldn't be any need for them to depend on Libya or Syria or anyone else where they are professionally, highly, highly competent. They do it themselves.

Q Can you compare the help that the Libyans are giving Abu Nidal's group with the help that the Syrians have previously given Abu Nidal's group? Is it different in kind, or is it only different in dates?

A It's different in targets. Nobody can buy anyone in the Middle East. You can rent people for awhile, but you can't buy anybody. And one of the difficult things to try to come to grips with, for you all and us too, is to try to figure out the symbiotic relationship that these groups have with each other.

Abu Nidal is a renegade group kicked out of the mainline PLO, and its leader, al-Banna, is very, very inimical to Arafat and vice-versa. They were running out of Iraq for awhile, which didn't mean they were owned by Iraq, but that they had a confluence of interest with Iraq in the kinds of things they wanted to do and the kinds of things the Iraqis would like them to do, and so there was a mutuality of interests.

The Iraqis changed their policy. They became a liability to Iraq, and Iraq kicked them out, and they went to Syria. Syria has views about the mainline PLO, as you know. They support a rump PLO under groups like Abu Musa's group, and therefore they had a confluence of interest with Abu Nidal in terms of their enmity with Arafat.

And much of Abu Nidal's operations after they were kicked out of Iraq -- i.e., when they were in Syria -- were aimed at mainline PLO, West Bank, Jordan, and those areas where Abu Nidal had its own reason to do it, but where its reasons coincided with Syria's reasons for -- well, not reasons, but Syria's opposition to those groups for different reasons.

As they have moved to Libya, the Egypt Air, for example, is something that is high on Libya's priority because of Libya's enmity to Egypt, and whereas you can't say that Syria and Egypt are bosom buddies, they don't have the kind of enmity that Libya holds for Egypt.

So you see in that not a totally brand new thing, but a slightly different kind of focus that is more in line with the kinds of interests that Libya has, but is also in line with the kinds of interest that Abu Nidal has had all along.

This is the kind of symbiotic relationship that Abu Nidal develops. It's going to do its own thing, and it's not going to do anything that it doesn't really want to do, but because what it wants to do is sort of very broad in terms of many, many people, Arabs and non-Arabs, that it is against, that it isn't that difficult for it to form a symbiotic relationship with a country like Libya.

Q Then why not sanctions against Syria as well as Libya?

A We are right now in the process of trying to persuade Syria that any relationship with Abu Nidal is a bad thing. But these recent events, because they were planned and carried out at a time when the locus of operational leadership in Abu Nidal has shifted from Syria to Libya, puts more of the onus on the Libyan connection than anything else.

Q Do you have any concrete evidence that the Libyans are capable of exporting terrorism to the streets of the United States as Qadhafi brags? You've got a couple of statements in there repeating this.

A Again, "concrete evidence" raises legal, juridical, political and semantic problems. Let us --

Q Substantial, then.

A Yes. They've tried before. Previously most of Libyan-Libyan terrorism, as distinct from the kinds of terrorism that Libya supports, buys, has surrogates do, and so forth, but their own guys were against other Libyans, dissident Libyans, which is reflected in here.

Q Yes.

A They have made efforts to try to get dissident Libyans in this country. We've rounded them up. So if you say, "Do you have evidence that we can stop them?" Yes. "Do you have evidence that they will try?" Yes. "Do you have evidence that can?" Well, they haven't so far, and let's hope that it continues that way.

Q Yes, but some of those instances you cite are in the past, and it was when Libya still had this People's, whatever it was, Office here.

A Yes.

Q Now they don't have that, and there's a discrete number of Libyans in this country, and I wonder if we are capable -- if Libya is capable of exhorting terrorism to the heart of America and -- exporting, excuse me -- and we have the right to export terrorism -- (sic) Do they have the capability -- that's what I wonder -- now?

A There is no foolproof, 100 percent, defense against terrorism by anybody, period, and that includes our

country. We hope that the efforts that we are taking -- and we are taking a lot of efforts -- they have so far been sufficient, and we hope they will continue to be sufficient. But the fact that you have a country who announces publicly that it intends to do such things and has in the past tried to do such things, you have to take that seriously, and you have to conclude if they've tried before, they could very well try again, and you've got to take that threat seriously and try to counter it.

The only time you can prove whether they have the capability or not is when they've actually done it or failed to do it. We're really arguing negative evidence here.

Q Coming back to your explanation again of the training for the terrorists, could you, for the purpose of helping me understand where you draw the distinctions, explain the difference between the kind of training that -- you already explained the differences between the training for law enforcement purposes and training for terrorism which, even though you said many times the training is the same, could you explain that difference between the training for freedom fighters in Angola, for example, and what Qadhafi calls "freedom fighters" in Libya? What Reagan calls "freedom fighters" in Angola, and Qadhafi calls "freedom fighters" in Libya? Aren't the training camps, the kinds of descriptions that you gave, couldn't you really give exactly the same description and call it training camps for terrorists?

A It would be an organization and complexion. I mean, you can have a guerrilla camp which has a semblance of a sort of a military organization with platoons, or however you want to organize, and you can see it in a picture, and there they are.

Terrorist camps, in the kind that I have been describing in Libya, are not cadres of freedom fighters, such as, for example, some of the Palestinian freedom fighters, as they style themselves, or who have paramilitary units, particularly the ones that got driven out of Lebanon or are still in Lebanon or elsewhere. Those were paramilitary and you could see them.

But you don't need a platoon of troops to throw a bomb. We're talking small numbers.

Q How many, in Libya?

A Yes.

Q How many? What size numbers in Libya?

A Of terrorists?

Q Of terrorists or freedom fighters, or however -- whatever, however, you want to --

A When you say "terrorists," you mean paramilitary or you mean people who do terrorist operations?

Q The people you were referring to that you say you're talking small numbers being trained in Libya.

A It's in here, I think. I don't know the exact number. My guess is in the hundreds -- not more than that. Can somebody give me a better number on that? (Indicates staff)

I can't be definitive on that, except that I'm making a distinction between things like battalions and things like cell groups.

Q There are also Cuban and Bulgarian, Soviet, East German military advisers in Libya. Are they involved in any of this training of terrorists, or any East Bloc or Cuban military people involved in training terrorists in Libya?

A I can't give a definitive answer on that. They are providing expertise to Libya, and the expertise that they are supplying to Libya is of value to terrorists.

Q Who are "they"? The people you mentioned.

A East-bloc people. And one can infer that the kinds of things that one needs for specific operations, if the Libyans have that kind of expertise, they'll pass it on. But to make the leap from that to say this guy is training that guy, I can't make.

MR. KALB: We've had about a half hour now. You can take another one or two, and then we can wrap it up.

Q Last night the President said he was going to impose sanctions on Libya because Libyan support of terrorism and Libyan terrorism itself was a threat to the United States security and United States foreign policy. Yet this White Paper, which is distributed to support that case, includes two paragraphs describing Libyan terrorism against the United States, one of which involves what Qadhafi has said, and the others are three failed attempts, I believe, of terrorist acts.

Is there more to this than we have been presented here?

A I know you don't like smart-ass State Department people, but I'm reminded of the street corner where I live out in Burke, Virginia, where we kept screaming to get a traffic light there, and the Department of Transportation, or whatever, in Raleigh says there haven't been any traffic deaths, so we don't need one. And I would hate to wait until the Libyans were successful in an operation before we decided that they were a threat.

What we're trying to say is --

Q I don't dispute that, but the most recent date of this is 1979.

Q And it's only against U.S. interests overseas; it's not against any -- nothing in the United States is mentioned.

A The efforts in the United States that we wrapped up most recently were last summer.

Q And they were targeted against Libyan dissidents, right?

A That's correct. Yes.

Q They weren't mentioned in the White Paper.

Q And the Grand Jury didn't indict, right?

A No.

One more. The last one.

Q The President last night talked about 126 thwarted terrorism attempts, of which we've come to know that 23 were in the U.S. Can you detail any or all of the 126?

A Believe it or not, that number was carefully calculated. It is negative evidence. How can you count up things that didn't happen? Remember Major Bows who had a watering can without 75 holes and one without 50 holes?

It is subjective, because when you try to determine a category of non-incidents that were prevented, and had you not prevented them, they would have been incidents, you try to say, "Well, how far along was the planning when we investigated it

and uncovered it, and did our investigation uncovering it stop it, or did they stop it themselves," and so forth.

Out of all of that, what we were trying to do was given an order of magnitude of plans that we thought were, (a) real enough, and (b) far enough along that we could put into that number. But there is nothing sacrosanct about the number itself except that in looking at all the things that we have been doing, that was a number that came up of incidents that we felt could be put into a category where we stop things from happening.

Q But if we could count them, can you describe to us what some of those incidents were? Like a plot to blow up the Capitol, or a plot to assassinate the Deputy Assistant Secretary of blah-de-blah. I mean, can you offer us some specifics rather than just numbers?

A No. They go over a long period time, and there are a lot of things --

Q That's not just in 1985, 126?

A No.

Q That's over --

A Over --

STAFF MEMBER: Since November '84.

A Yes. It was November '84 when that number started.

Q It started in November of '84.

A Yes.

Q Until yesterday, I assume.

A Yes. Okay?

Q Thank you.

(The briefing concluded at 4:20 p.m.)

North

0196

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: White Paper on Insurgent/Terrorist Involvement in
International Drug Trade

The attached White Paper (Tab A) was prepared by the CIA at the request of the NSC staff and is intended for distribution to the Press and the public in order to illustrate the security threat from narco-terrorism.

The Department of State is requested to print 500 copies of the White Paper. The White House Press Office should receive 200 copies and the Department of Defense Press Office 100 copies, with the remaining 200 copies available at the State Department Press Office. The Department of State should arrange for simultaneous release of the White Paper.

William F. Martin

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Tab A - White Paper

cc: White House Press Office
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

White Paper on Insurgent/Terrorist Involvement in
International Drug Trade

No nation is immune to the dangers of drug abuse, and no government has proven able to fight the problem alone. Narcotics abuse and trafficking have invaded nations around the world. Traditional producing countries like Pakistan, Peru, and Colombia are being transformed into consuming countries as more and more of their citizens become involved with drugs. Similarly, the so-called transit countries through which the drugs move on their way to final market are also becoming infected by drug abuse as traffickers pay off expeditors with some of the product.

In addition to the incalculable health and social costs, the very security of some nations is being undermined by the corrupting influences of the narcotics trade. This profitable trade generates so much money that traffickers can and do bribe customs officials, police and judges wherever necessary. Worse yet, they are becoming even more ruthless in seeking to frustrate narcotics control efforts.

The level of violence is rising. Drug dealers arranged for the assassination of the Colombian Minister of Justice in April 1984 because he was taking a strong stand against narcotics trade. In Peru, coca eradication workers have been killed on several occasions, and in Mexico recently, 21 policemen were ambushed by armed traffickers.

One of the most alarming trends in recent years has been the growing involvement of some insurgent groups with narcotics growers and traffickers.

Insurgent/terrorist links to drug traffickers are probably deepest and most extensive in Colombia, and have been growing stronger in recent years. The group most active in Colombia's extensive narcotics industry has been the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), long identified as the militant arm of the Colombian Communist Party. It is mainly rural-based and divided into a number of small guerrilla "fronts", many of which operate in coca or marijuana growing areas. FARC regularly collects protection money from narcotics growers operating in its territory, uses traffickers' resources to get arms and ammunition, and guarantees the security of a number of clandestine airstrips vital to the traffickers. It also probably engages in coca cultivation and refining. In November 1983, the Colombian army discovered 90 hectares of coca and a processing lab next to an abandoned FARC camp in southern Colombia. Citing an informed source, a leading Colombian newspaper reported in late 1985 that Carlos Lehder, one of the country's leading traffickers, has offered to pay FARC for protection services. Several other militant organizations in Colombia are also connected in one fashion or another with the drug trade. The leftist 19th of April Movement (M-19) cooperated with another major drug trafficker, Jaime Guillot-Lara, who provided them with weapons, with Cuban help, in the early 1980s. The M-19 also carried out the recent bloody siege of the Ministry of Justice in Bogota. Colombian authorities have said that one of the first things they

attacked were the files pertaining to extradition of suspected traffickers to the US. In May 1984, the Colombian press reported that 24 ELN guerrillas (another smaller insurgent group) were in possession of 150 metric tons of marijuana when arrested.

Insurgent groups elsewhere also have the opportunity, motives and capability to participate in the drug trade. For one thing, insurgency and illicit drug cultivation tend to occur in remote regions for the same reasons--the government presence is usually limited, these areas tend to be lightly inhabited and very poor, the local people are often alienated from the national government, and perhaps most importantly, the very remoteness and lack of roads make it hard for police or military forces to control such activity.

Thus, operating in the same or similar regions fosters opportunities for the two types of groups to interact. Drug cultivation or trafficking offer access to large amounts of money which in turn insurgents can use to acquire arms or other supplies. Some insurgent groups tax drug growers and traffickers the way they tax other profitable operations in the areas they control. Others encourage the activity and provide protection from the authorities in return for a share of the profits. A few become full-fledged trafficking operators in their own right. Perhaps the most notorious of such groups is the Burmese Communist Party. Burma is a major producer of opium, and between one-half to two-thirds of it is grown in areas controlled by leftist and ethnic separatists, mainly the BCP, which oversees opium production in its area, collects protection taxes and sometimes extracts or forces deliveries from growers. Over the past two years, the BCP has been establishing refineries to convert opium into heroin and begun selling that drug to middlemen itself. The BCP's moves have brought it into increasing conflict with the Shan United Army (SUA), a sort of "warlord" organization that has dominated such refining. Although once an insurgency, the SUA has become little more than a drug trafficking organization.

Elsewhere, Sri Lankan dissidents have been denounced by Colombo for involvement in international drug smuggling to raise money. In March 1985, Italian authorities issued 100 arrest warrants for Tamil drug traffickers, some of whom were connected with the separatist Tamil movement. In the Middle East, Lebanon is a leading producer of hashish, much of which is processed in the Bekaa valley. Some of the warring factions in Lebanon almost certainly obtain revenue from the drug industry either directly or by providing protection to those who smuggle it.

Moreover, insurgents may pose as protectors of local, drug growing peasants against a national government that seeks to eradicate such cultivation. In some areas in Peru, for example, coca cultivation is by far the most profitable work available to the farmers. When the Peruvian government has tried to move against this activity, the major Peruvian insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso, has sought to exploit peasant unhappiness.

Links between traffickers and insurgent groups are likely to grow over time. Large areas of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Burma, and Pakistan are already nearly beyond the effective reach of national police and military forces. If and when these national governments make even stronger efforts to control and eradicate narcotics trafficking, there will be a greater danger that local

inhabitants will turn to insurgents for help in maintaining their narcotics business. Alliances between traffickers and insurgents or dissidents are thus likely to be forged.

Terrorist involvement in the narcotics business has been less visible than insurgent links to the industry. But terrorists and traffickers also have a lot in common--both operate underground, both are willing to use violence, both want access to easy money, and both are involved in one form or another of smuggling.

Armenian terrorists have operated in many countries, but many seem to be based in Beirut. It seems almost inevitable in that climate of smuggling and violence, that some drug profits make their way into terrorist coffers. In the early 1980s, a number of Armenian narcotics smugglers were linked to various Armenian terrorist groups. Palestinian terrorist groups are also probably involved, at least at low levels, with at least some forms of drug trade, and/or with the common mechanisms used by both types of organization to move illicit goods. [Note: The Peruvian insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso also engages in terrorist tactics as do many other insurgent groups.]

Drug abuse in the Basque region of Spain has grown over the past few years, and so have press allegations that the Basque terrorist group ETA has been involved in the trade. There have also been many press reports that the Italian Red Brigades get at least some of their funding from the drug trade. Similarly, Turkish terrorists of both right and leftist persuasions have been linked to narcotics smuggling.

Since terrorist groups are small and secretive, ties between narcotics traffickers and terrorists are harder to detect. Moreover, terrorists tend to need less money per member for their operations; thus few drug deals, hard to detect amid the welter of traffickers, would suffice to support a terrorist group for some time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0196

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

January 9, 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JAMES R. STARK *JS*

SUBJECT: White Paper on Insurgent/Terrorist Involvement in
International Drug Trade

Attached at Tab II is an unclassified CIA White Paper on insurgent/terrorist involvement in the international drug trade. This piece was directed by NSC in the wake of the M-19 assault on the Colombian Palace of Justice. The paper gives a good overview of the problem and is an excellent summary of the important points in the recent NIE on narcotics and national security.

The purpose of an unclassified paper is to allow distribution to the media, the public and the Congress. Ed Djerejian suggests that the best approach is to have State release the paper with dissemination at State, Defense and the White House Press Offices. The memorandum at Tab I directs State to print 500 copies of the paper and forward 200 to the White House Press Office and 100 to the Defense Public Affairs Office for simultaneous release.

on travel
Oliver North and Vince Cannistraro concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize Bill Martin to sign the memo at Tab I forwarding the White Paper at Tab A.

Approve *DM*

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Martin Memo to Platt

Tab A - White Paper

Tab II - Rixse Memo to Martin of January 3, 1986

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

Sec 2.4(b) E.O. 12958
Authority: 25 USC 1621
BY NADL *CW* 5/21/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505



0196

3 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: William F. Martin
Executive Secretary
National Security Council

SUBJECT: White Paper on Insurgent/Terrorist Involvement in
International Drug Trade

1. Attached, as requested, is an unclassified report on the growing links between insurgent and terrorist groups and international drug traffickers. This unclassified analysis summarizes what the Intelligence Community knows about these links worldwide. Some insurgent groups are heavily involved in drug trafficking and others have the opportunity, motive, and capability to participate in the drug trade. Evidence of involvement of terrorist organizations with drug traffickers is limited, but the Community considers this an increasingly serious problem.


J. H. Rixse
Executive Secretary

Attachment:
As stated


DECL. OADR~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M4421 #137087
BY HW NARA DATE 9/22/17

White Paper on Insurgent/Terrorist Involvement in
International Drug Trade

No nation is immune to the dangers of drug abuse, and no government has proven able to fight the problem alone. Narcotics abuse and trafficking have invaded nations around the world. Traditional producing countries like Pakistan, Peru, and Colombia are being transformed into consuming countries as more and more of their citizens become involved with drugs. Similarly, the so-called transit countries through which the drugs move on their way to final market are also becoming infected by drug abuse as traffickers pay off expeditors with some of the product.

In addition to the incalculable health and social costs, the very security of some nations is being undermined by the corrupting influences of the narcotics trade. This profitable trade generates so much money that traffickers can and do bribe customs officials, police and judges wherever necessary. Worse yet, they are becoming even more ruthless in seeking to frustrate narcotics control efforts.

The level of violence is rising. Drug dealers arranged for the assassination of the Colombian Minister of Justice in April 1984 because he was taking a strong stand against narcotics trade. In Peru, coca eradication workers have been killed on several occasions, and in Mexico recently, 21 policemen were ambushed by armed traffickers.

One of the most alarming trends in recent years has been the growing involvement of some insurgent groups with narcotics growers and traffickers.

Insurgent/terrorist links to drug traffickers are probably deepest and most extensive in Colombia, and have been growing stronger in recent years. The group most active in Colombia's extensive narcotics industry has been the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), long identified as the militant arm of the Colombian Communist Party. It is mainly rural-based and divided into a number of small guerrilla "fronts", many of which operate in coca or marijuana growing areas. FARC regularly collects protection money from narcotics growers operating in its territory, uses traffickers' resources to get arms and ammunition, and guarantees the security of a number of clandestine airstrips vital to the traffickers. It also probably engages in coca cultivation and refining. In November 1983, the Colombian army discovered 90 hectares of coca and a processing lab next to an abandoned FARC camp in southern Colombia. Citing an informed source, a leading Colombian newspaper reported in late 1985 that Carlos Lehder, one of the country's leading traffickers, has offered to pay FARC for protection services. Several other militant organizations in Colombia are also connected in one fashion or another with the drug trade. The leftist 19th of April Movement (M-19) cooperated with another major drug trafficker, Jaime Guillot-Lara, who provided them with weapons, with Cuban help, in the early 1980s. The M-19 also carried out the recent bloody siege of the Ministry of Justice in Bogota. Colombian authorities have said that one of the first things they

1

attacked were the files pertaining to extradition of suspected traffickers to the US. In May 1984, the Colombian press reported that 24 ELN guerrillas (another smaller insurgent group) were in possession of 150 metric tons of marijuana when arrested.

Insurgent groups elsewhere also have the opportunity, motives and capability to participate in the drug trade. For one thing, insurgency and illicit drug cultivation tend to occur in remote regions for the same reasons--the government presence is usually limited, these areas tend to be lightly inhabited and very poor, the local people are often alienated from the national government, and perhaps most importantly, the very remoteness and lack of roads make it hard for police or military forces to control such activity.

Thus, operating in the same or similar regions fosters opportunities for the two types of groups to interact. Drug cultivation or trafficking offer access to large amounts of money which in turn insurgents can use to acquire arms or other supplies. Some insurgent groups tax drug growers and traffickers the way they tax other profitable operations in the areas they control. Others encourage the activity and provide protection from the authorities in return for a share of the profits. A few become full-fledged trafficking operators in their own right. Perhaps the most notorious of such groups is the Burmese Communist Party. Burma is a major producer of opium, and between one-half to two-thirds of it is grown in areas controlled by leftist and ethnic separatists, mainly the BCP, which oversees opium production in its area, collects protection taxes and sometimes extracts or forces deliveries from growers. Over the past two years, the BCP has been establishing refineries to convert opium into heroin and begun selling that drug to middlemen itself. The BCP's moves have brought it into increasing conflict with the Shan United Army (SUA), a sort of "warlord" organization that has dominated such refining. Although once an insurgency, the SUA has become little more than a drug trafficking organization.

Elsewhere, Sri Lankan dissidents have been denounced by Colombo for involvement in international drug smuggling to raise money. In March 1985, Italian authorities issued 100 arrest warrants for Tamil drug traffickers, some of whom were connected with the separatist Tamil movement. In the Middle East, Lebanon is a leading producer of hashish, much of which is processed in the Bekaa valley. Some of the warring factions in Lebanon almost certainly obtain revenue from the drug industry either directly or by providing protection to those who smuggle it.

Moreover, insurgents may pose as protectors of local, drug growing peasants against a national government that seeks to eradicate such cultivation. In some areas in Peru, for example, coca cultivation is by far the most profitable work available to the farmers. When the Peruvian government has tried to move against this activity, the major Peruvian insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso, has sought to exploit peasant unhappiness.

Links between traffickers and insurgent groups are likely to grow over time. Large areas of Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Burma, and Pakistan are already nearly beyond the effective reach of national police and military forces. If and when these national governments make even stronger efforts to control and eradicate narcotics trafficking, there will be a greater danger that local

inhabitants will turn to insurgents for help in maintaining their narcotics business. Alliances between traffickers and insurgents or dissidents are thus likely to be forged.

Terrorist involvement in the narcotics business has been less visible than insurgent links to the industry. But terrorists and traffickers also have a lot in common--both operate underground, both are willing to use violence, both want access to easy money, and both are involved in one form or another of smuggling.

Armenian terrorists have operated in many countries, but many seem to be based in Beirut. It seems almost inevitable in that climate of smuggling and violence, that some drug profits make their way into terrorist coffers. In the early 1980s, a number of Armenian narcotics smugglers were linked to various Armenian terrorist groups. Palestinian terrorist groups are also probably involved, at least at low levels, with at least some forms of drug trade, and/or with the common mechanisms used by both types of organization to move illicit goods. [Note: The Peruvian insurgent group, Sendero Luminoso also engages in terrorist tactics as do many other insurgent groups.]

Drug abuse in the Basque region of Spain has grown over the past few years, and so have press allegations that the Basque terrorist group ETA has been involved in the trade. There have also been many press reports that the Italian Red Brigades get at least some of their funding from the drug trade. Similarly, Turkish terrorists of both right and leftist persuasions have been linked to narcotics smuggling.

Since terrorist groups are small and secretive, ties between narcotics traffickers and terrorists are harder to detect. Moreover, terrorists tend to need less money per member for their operations; thus few drug deals, hard to detect amid the welter of traffickers, would suffice to support a terrorist group for some time.

RECEIVED 14 JAN 86 13

TO POINDEXTER FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 13 JAN 86

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

KEYWORDS: LIBYA

TERRORISM

NSDD

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS ACTION PLAN RE NSDD 205

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: STATUS S FILES IFD O

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

TEICHER

COVEY

RAYMOND

EARL
CoyRENo action required.
Recommend File: Libya.

COMMENTS

REF# 8600885

LOG 8690006

NSCIFID NSDD0205 (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

SYSTEM II

90027

January 13, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Terrorism and Libya: Public Affairs Action Plan

Pursuant to NSDD 205, the Department of State hereby submits a proposed Public Affairs Action Plan for dealing with terrorism and Libya.

Nicholas Platt

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

CW

5/21/12

CONFIDENTIAL

Public Affairs Action Plan

A public diplomacy strategy which effectively supports and expands the reach of our diplomatic efforts is imperative to build support for our measures to isolate Libya, and to achieve a more cooperative approach to dealing with terrorism, both now and over the longer term. There is an apparent disparity between public attitudes abroad towards terrorism, as measured by polls, and the unwillingness of most governments to make concrete action to combat this menace.

This disparity was reflected most recently by the initial guarded or negative European reaction to the sanctions we have imposed on Libya, despite the widespread revulsion among European publics and the media to the carnage of December 27 which prompted our action. We also must deal with the media focus upon a U.S. confrontation with Europe, rather than on a united effort against terrorism. A more effective dialogue with the European public on the issue of terrorism and the means available to western democracies in countering this common threat is needed.

This plan sets forth a broad strategy for stimulating increased public understanding of and support for U.S. policy on terrorism in general and specifically with regard to the sanctions imposed on Libya. Short-term and longer-term activities are described.

Short Term Activities

- European trip by Deputy Secretary Whitehead during which he should include, if possible, background interviews with selected top columnists or editors.
- Worldnet broadcast, perhaps by the Secretary, taking our case directly to the European public.
- Suggested themes: (1) the lack of strong international measures against terrorism to date has forced us to move unilaterally; (2) this is a common challenge; (3) Mediterranean Basin economic interests are being hurt e.g. loss of tourism; (4) we invite European and other governments to join with us in acting decisively.

CONFIDENTIAL
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
Dept. of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
BY W
NARA DATE 5/21/12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

-- Presidential interviews have been held with selected European newspapers. Others should be considered by the President or the Secretary. We should focus on the UK, FRG, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Austria.

-- Utilize daily State Department press briefings for volunteered statements.

-- The focus, in the first instance, is Western Europe. This is because we need West European support if our efforts are to be successful in bringing home to Qadhafi the cost of his support for international terrorism.

-- It's also because the success of our efforts in Europe will largely determine how effective a public diplomacy program we can mount in other geographic areas.

-- Similar programs will be devised for the other geographic areas and they are expected to reenforce each other. USIA will instruct its posts to pass laterally all relevant material. This effort will be backstopped in Washington. We plan to distribute the material widely in the various capitals, recognizing that initially little may make its way into the public domain in the third world.

Longer Term Activities

-- European press interviews by Under Secretary Armacost, Assistant Secretaries Ridgway and Murphy, and Ambassador Oakley on international terrorism to keep the topic periodically in the press and before the European public.

-- Careful briefing of Congress and delegations travelling to Europe. Use of Congressional contacts with parliamentary bodies and the North Atlantic Assembly to focus attention on the issue.

-- Transmit Congressional statements and actions to European media in order to spur action by European Governments and reduce the perception that the Reagan Administration seeks confrontation with our allies.

-- Worldnet interactive programs with designated Administration spokesmen addressing terrorism and the Libyan sanctions

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

- USIA media services to carry reports and analyses covering U.S. domestic opinion on terrorism and Libya.
- USIA media services to conduct interviews, draft editorials and prepare talk shows dealing with the specific aspects of the issue.
- Step up production of concise, targeted "White Papers" to publicize information on key terrorist groups.
- Develop a list of knowledgeable experts, both private sector and USG, who would be available immediately for travel as American participants (AMPARTS).
- Topical electronic "teleconferencing", VOA programming, TV or videotape production and analyses for wireless file distribution.
- Briefings of journalists representing mass circulation dailies by senior embassy staffs. At the same time, we should increase dealings with the media on a sustained basis as part of this process.
- Initiate a program (speaking opportunities, participation in seminars, calls, etc.) for embassy officers to focus on target audiences likely to be receptive or where a reservoir of goodwill toward the U.S. already exists. Examples: airline pilots associations, travel agencies and tourist bureaus, ethnic or national friendship societies, church-oriented organizations, police and public security units, Chambers of Commerce and business groups.
- Mobilize American organizations with ties to such groups to help reinforce our concerns.
- Stimulate boycotts, resolutions, etc., by professional associations (e.g. tourism, pilots), trade unions (Teamsters, AFL-CIO) against Libya and other states which support terrorism.
- Public opinion survey research is needed on European attitudes concerning the terrorist threat to Europe itself -- not their reaction to U.S. policy or initiatives.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 4 -

Public Diplomacy Themes and Approaches

-- Current themes deal with the specific issue of terrorism and the Libyan sanctions as well as longer term themes on terrorism trends and targets.

-- We need to make maximum utilization of information from non-U.S. sources so that a "made in America label" can be avoided. European Governments should be encouraged privately to release to the public terrorist information they have developed.

-- Material demonstrating a decline in European sympathy for the Palestinian cause in the aftermath of specific acts of terrorism should also bring home the point that these acts are hurting that cause.

-- Economically, we intend to focus on the decline in Mediterranean tourism, the escalating costs of attempting to prevent terrorism, and the investment opportunities which have been lost because of this scourge, again drawing primarily from European material.

-- We will stress that the terrorists and the states which support them, notably Libya, seek to destroy the Middle East peace process and create major tensions between the Arab world (including the moderates) and the West (including Europe).

23? ?
-- In relative terms, Americans^s have been the infrequent victims of terrorist attacks. Of the 841 individuals killed last year in terrorist assaults around the world, only 17 were Americans. Similarly, Americans constituted only about 10% of those injured in such attacks. These are facts we have to bring home: terrorism is an international problem and all of us are at risk.

U.S. Policy

-- The United States is not engaged in a unilateral war on terrorists; rather we are working with like-minded countries to meet this threat.

-- This is a long-term effort. Results are not always quick or visible. Initial public reaction by other governments, or even ours, to various proposed steps, is not always their final decision.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 5 -

-- Progress has been made in multilateral efforts, as indicated by the recent United Nations resolutions and the statements by the Security Council President.

-- We are planning stepped-up consultations with our European and other allies on this issue. Deputy Secretary Whitehead will be making a trip to Europe this month. We are determined to work with concerned governments on specific steps.

0258Z

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

U.S. to Set Policy on Terrorism

Reagan to Sidestep Divisive Issue of Military Response

By Lou Cannon
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan, acting on the recommendation of a task force headed by Vice President Bush, soon will issue an executive order declaring terrorism "a potential threat to national security" and pledging to resist it "by all legal means available," senior administration officials said yesterday.

While the directive calls for greater international sharing of intelligence information and increased military contingency planning, it sidesteps the divisive issue in the administration on when it is appropriate to use military force against state-supported terrorism.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz, an outspoken advocate of a firmer antiterrorist policy, said this week that the United States "cannot wait for absolute certainty and clarity" before using force against terrorists or countries that support them. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has repeatedly urged caution in using military force on the basis of circumstantial evidence and this week criticized those who seek "instant gratification from some kind of bombing attack without being too worried about the details."

Reagan's directive will endorse a task force report that is two inches thick and contains some 50 recommendations, the officials said. Many of the recommendations simply formally endorse current administration policy, such as not making concessions to terrorists and pledging to pursue and prosecute those involved in terrorist acts. The document also endorses some measures already taken by the administration, such as improving security at U.S. embassies and military installations overseas.

The report is intended to provide Reagan with a document that will stand as a comprehensive antiter-

Antiterrorism Policy to Be Set

TERRORISM, From A1

rorist policy and refute critics who charge that the administration is indecisive or "lacks a policy" to combat terrorism, said an official familiar with its contents. But it does not resolve the basic issue of defining the circumstances under which the United States should use military force against nations, such as Libya, that the president has identified as sponsoring the Dec. 27 airport attacks in Rome and Vienna.

"The report does what circumstances are already doing—it defines the differences in approaches to the problem," another official said. "Basically, it streamlines the process. But the question of when a military response is appropriate is left for further study."

While the official acknowledged that the recommendations were "not-dazzling," he said that the report would serve the purpose of focusing the dispute in the administration so that "we'll bump up against the fundamental differences more quickly."

In addition to the long-running dispute between Shultz and Weinberger and their subordinates, administration policy toward terrorism has been plagued by difficulties in coordinating the actions of competing agencies. One official familiar with the process said yesterday that it is sometimes difficult for the administration to respond in a timely fashion even when there is not disagreement "because you have to sort through too many details and people, some of whom are not particularly well-versed in what has to be done."

Bush, who has been involved in antiterrorist planning since he was director of central intelligence for President Gerald R. Ford, was described as hoping that the delineation of agency responsibility provided by the report would help produce more rapid decisions in dealing with terrorist acts.

The report, which will have the force of executive order after the president issues his directive, says that the State Department is the lead agency for dealing with international terrorism and that the Defense Department is the action arm for operations in the international arena. But the national security affairs office in the White House, headed by John M. Poindexter, is given responsibility for implementing the recommendations.

These definitions give what one official described as "a delicate push" toward greater control of antiterrorist policy by the White House without withdrawing authority from the Pentagon or State Department.

The task force was appointed by Reagan last June 20 while American passengers on TWA Flight 847 were being held hostage in Beirut and the day after a terrorist attack on a restaurant in El Salvador killed 15 persons, including four U.S. Marines. The 15-person panel presented its report to Reagan Dec. 20, and an unclassified version is scheduled to be made public in mid-February.

The report also includes a section on public attitudes toward terrorism based on a poll commissioned by the task force.

Officials denied several published accounts that they said went beyond the actual conclusions of the task force. In particular, they objected to reports that the task force recommended an international antiterrorist force, saying that it instead urges more "multinational cooperation," primarily through intelligence sharing.

White House spokesman Larry Speakes also denied a report that Reagan, acting on the recommendation of the task force, would ask Congress for a resolution empowering the executive branch to use "whatever force is required" to deal with terrorism.