

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Stark, James R.: Files
Folder Title: New Zealand Nuclear Ban
Box: 5

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name STARK, JAMES: FILES

Withdrawer

LM 11/2/2017

File Folder NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR BAN

FOIA

S8587

Box Number 5

REAGAN

536

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
214018	CABLE	STATE 056986	5	2/26/1985	B1
214019	LIST	RE PORT VISITS	4	8/27/1985	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

ble and shortsighted position yet. This proposal threatens to dismantle 50 years of highly successful nationally organized conservation work. It needlessly shakes the morale of dedicated employees with the SCS and member within the partner conservation districts, and is a classic example of being penny-wise and pound-foolish.

Of course, we are facing a serious budget deficit and programs will have to be reduced or eliminated. To be fair, I must note that such actions may be necessary within the budget for SCS. But I feel it is imperative that we maintain a serious commitment toward furthering 50 years of soil and water conservation efforts under the Soil Conservation Service. I urge my colleagues to join us in reiterating our continued support in this resolution commending the Soil Conservation Service for 50 years of work well done.

SENATE RESOLUTION 66—SENSE OF THE SENATE WITH RESPECT TO ANZUS

Mr. COHEN (for himself, Mr. RUDMAN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. GORTON, Mr. SYMONS, Mr. DOLE, Mr. SIMPSON, and Mr. WILSON) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 66

Whereas the governments of United States, Australia, and New Zealand are parties to a trilateral security treaty signed on September 1, 1951, and commonly known as ANZUS;

Whereas the ANZUS alliance was formed "to coordinate their efforts for collective defense" and "to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stands alone in the Pacific Area";

Whereas all partners of the ANZUS alliance benefit from and are expected to bear equally the burdens of the Alliance;

Whereas the need for cooperation among the ANZUS partners has increased with the growth of Soviet military activity in the Pacific and Indian Oceans;

Whereas the free world, including New Zealand, enjoys the benefits of international trade on a scope unparalleled in history;

Whereas the security of this trade depends upon the free world's ability and will to defend the sea lines of communications;

Whereas the Government of New Zealand has officially adopted a policy which precludes many ships of the United States Navy from entering its ports;

Whereas such policy detracts from the security of all partners of the ANZUS Alliance, individually and collectively;

Whereas such policy grossly impairs the ability of the ANZUS partners to "coordinate their efforts for collective defense" and detracts from their "sense of unity";

Whereas the Government of New Zealand will not be in compliance with the Subsidies Code of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs as of April 1, 1985, because of its decision to maintain export subsidies on certain agricultural commodities beyond that date; and

Whereas, after March 31, 1985, as a result of such noncompliance by the Government of New Zealand, the United States will no longer be obligated under such Subsidies Code to extend to New Zealand the benefits

of the injury test provided under section 701(a)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671(a)(2)); Now therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) it would be in the best interests of allied security and unity for each member country of the Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, commonly known as ANZUS, to reinstate the practice of permitting all naval ships of the other member countries access to the ports of such member country; and

(2) the President should—

(A) continue discussions with the Government of New Zealand aimed at resolving the present impasse regarding access of United States naval ships to the ports of New Zealand;

(B) explore with the Government of Australia the desirability and feasibility of a bilateral security treaty;

(C) until the present impasse between the United States and New Zealand is resolved, preclude New Zealand from participating in military and related activities with the United States; and

(D) exercise the right of the United States to withdraw from New Zealand the benefits of the injury test provided under section 701(a)(2) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1671(a)(2)).

Mr. COHEN, Mr. President, for over three decades, the interests of the United States and, I believe, the interests of Australia and New Zealand have been well served by the ANZUS Alliance. ANZUS has been but one manifestation of the close political, security, and economic ties amongst our three nations.

In recent weeks, however, the Government of New Zealand has taken actions which cast into doubt the future course of United States-New Zealand relations and the ANZUS Alliance.

The Government of New Zealand is adhering to a policy prohibiting port calls by nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed ships. For vital security reasons, the United States maintains a policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence or absence of nuclear weapons on board Navy ships.

The viability of the ANZUS Alliance in the face of New Zealand's policy faced its first challenge recently. In connection with the ANZUS Sea Eagle exercise scheduled for March, the United States requested that a U.S. ship be allowed to make a port call in New Zealand. The Government of New Zealand refused that request.

The ramifications of New Zealand's policy became clear yesterday, when the Sea Eagle exercise was canceled by its host, Australia. New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange was quoted in this morning's press reports as acknowledging that he expected his Government's action would have this result. It is my hope that Mr. Lange is also aware that the ramifications of his policy extend beyond the cancellation of the Sea Eagle exercise. New Zealand must be aware that it cannot be a part-time member of the alliance and of the free world, selecting the burdens it will bear while partaking of all the benefits.

Mr. Lange has stated that his policy is antinuclear, not anti-United States

or anti-ANZUS. But as I stated 2 weeks ago from this floor, no person, no group, no nation has a moral corner or monopoly on the fear of nuclear war. Every sane and rational person views the potential for the termination of much, if not all, of life with a horror as absolute as the vision of apocalypse demands.

But to be aware and fearful of nuclear weapons is not enough. Nor is it sufficient to adopt policies which serve notice of one's fear and outrage if those policies do not reduce but, rather, increase the chance of nuclear war. This appears to be the course New Zealand is following.

It is not given to me or any other Member of Congress to lecture the people or leadership of a free and sovereign nation. But as a Member of the U.S. Senate and as chairman of the Sea Power Subcommittee, I have an obligation to point out the consequences that will naturally flow from such an ill-considered action.

If New Zealand chooses to take unilateral action to demonstrate its opposition to the existence of nuclear weapons, then it raises the question of whether it is prepared to defend itself unilaterally—not only its national security but its national economy as well.

It is by virtue of the defense of freedom that nations enjoy the benefits of international trade on a scope unparalleled in history. We in the free world depend upon open access to the global trade routes. Diminish the ability to defend that access and you place in jeopardy the ability to enjoy the benefits of that trade.

New Zealand has a long and special relationship with the United States, manifested in both our security and our economic ties. One of the benefits New Zealand has enjoyed because of this special relationship are the restraints we have placed upon our domestic producers of products that New Zealand places into international markets. Regrettably, New Zealand has chosen to call into question the need for this special relationship.

If New Zealand chooses to reject the burdens of defending freedom, it must understand that it may also be choosing to forfeit the benefit of our and Australia's efforts to defend it for and with them, as well as the economic benefits of our special relationship.

In my view, it would be in the interests of allied security and unity for the ANZUS countries to return the situation that existed a few months ago, when the ANZUS Alliance and United States-New Zealand relations were in good health. The choice, however, is New Zealand's.

Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a resolution that expresses the sense of the Senate that the ANZUS partners should return to the situation of a few months ago. However, I regret that I am not hopeful in this regard and thus am compelled to call

on this body to urge President Reagan to initiate specific responses to New Zealand's actions.

Clearly, the President should continue discussions with the Government of New Zealand aimed at resolving the present impasse.

ANZUS is the only security treaty the United States has in the South Pacific. The need for security cooperation with Australia has increased with the growth of Soviet military activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Yet the ability to carry out this cooperation has been jeopardized by New Zealand's action. Accordingly, the President should explore with the Government of Australia the possible need for a bilateral security treaty.

The United States and New Zealand participate in a variety of military and related activities. So long as New Zealand chooses to exclude the United States from some of these, the President should preclude New Zealand from participating in the others.

As I have noted, New Zealand has called into question the need for our special economic relationship. The President should respond accordingly. He can first do so with a matter that is now before the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Let me briefly explain.

When it became a signatory of the GATT Subsidies Code in 1981, New Zealand agreed to completely phase out its export subsidies by March 31, 1985. As a signatory of the code, the United States agreed to require a showing of injury by domestic petitioners during any countervailing duty investigation on these subsidized New Zealand exports. Under the injury test requirement, domestic petitioners must show not only that New Zealand is subsidizing these exports, but that this has resulted in injury to domestic producers.

It is my understanding that New Zealand will not phase out its export subsidies by the March 31 deadline and has proposed a much longer time frame for eliminating these subsidies. I also understand that New Zealand has asked that we retain the injury test requirement, even though after March 31 we will not be obligated to do so.

Had New Zealand not adopted its policy regarding port calls, some would undoubtedly have argued that the United States, in keeping with its special relationship with New Zealand, should honor that nation's requests for additional time and retention of the injury test. New Zealand, however, seems to have decided that it no longer needs or wants that special relationship. Accordingly, in my view, the President should exercise the United States right to withdraw the benefit of an injury test, effective April 1, 1985.

The resolution I am introducing urges the President to take these four actions I have described:

Continue discussions with New Zealand to resolve the present impasse;

Explore with Australia the possible need for a bilateral security treaty;

Until the present impasse is resolved, preclude New Zealand from participating in military and related activities with the United States; and

Exercise our right to withdraw from New Zealand the benefit of the injury test I described.

It is clear from my contacts with the executive branch that these actions are generally consistent with the administration's policy. Several of my colleagues from both sides of the aisle are joining me in sponsoring this measure, and I believe that if it receives sufficient bipartisan support, the administration will act upon it. I therefore urge my colleagues to examine this issue and join in cosponsoring this resolution.

I would prefer to be more delicate and diplomatic in approaching the national and moral sensibilities of an allied nation. But such an ill-considered idea, left unhindered by logic or history, has many waiting votaries. Indeed, there are those in other nations who do not yet live under the shadow of the Soviet state who believe that the only remaining choices are between freedom and annihilation, atomization and abdication.

Mr. President, peace and freedom are in fact possible, but not if we unilaterally undermine the ability to defend that freedom.

Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator COHEN and my other colleagues in sponsoring this resolution. New Zealand's current policy on visits by U.S. ships to its ports threatens the very fabric of the ANZUS Alliance.

We are taking this action today not because we want to rend our alliance with New Zealand, but because we want to see that alliance reinvigorated. An alliance in which one of the parties unilaterally takes an action which undermines the common defense is no alliance at all. We must use every lever available to us to reverse this unilateral action by the New Zealand Government. I hope that our other allies will join us in this effort.

I might note that last month I visited Japan to talk about security and trade issues. This was at the time of Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to New Zealand. I know from my visit that many Japanese are very concerned about New Zealand's policy and I hope that Prime Minister Nakasone raised the issue with Prime Minister Lange during his visit. Unfortunately, whatever demarches which we and our allies have made to the New Zealand Government have not reversed that Government's ill-conceived policy. It is time now to put some bite into our jawboning.

I commend Senator COHEN for having drafted a resolution that does just that. I hope that it will receive wide support among our colleagues in

the Senate, and that our allies abroad who share our concern about this problem will undertake similar initiatives.

SENATE RESOLUTION 67—RELATING TO EMERGENCY CREDIT FOR THE NATION'S FARMERS

Mr. BOREN (for himself, Mr. EXON, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. HARKIN, and Mr. FORD) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry:

S. RES. 67

Whereas agriculture is the Nation's most basic industry, and its associated production, processing, and marketing sectors, together, provide more jobs than any other single industry;

Whereas United States agriculture is the world's most productive and the world's largest exporter;

Whereas it is the Nation's interest to carry out an agricultural policy that will ensure an adequate and dependable supply of food and fiber at reasonable prices;

Whereas producers are the basic element in the food and fiber system and their ability to make a profit and meet their financial obligations is critical to their remaining in business;

Whereas technological developments have greatly increased the capital requirements of agricultural production;

Whereas agricultural-related debt has risen from \$50,000,000,000 in 1970 to \$215,000,000,000 in 1984;

Whereas a general decline in the financial condition of producers, as evidenced by increases in the average debt-to-asset ratio and debt-to-equity ratio, threatens the ability of producers to obtain the credit needed to continue their operations;

Whereas it is essential that producers be able to obtain adequate credit at interest rates conducive to debt servicing and profit-making; and

Whereas the foundation of the Nation's agricultural system will be adversely affected if producers are unable to obtain a return on their investment that enables them to service their debt and continue their operations: Now, therefore be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should—

(1) direct the Secretary of Agriculture to immediately support the enactment of necessary legislation so as to make available not less than \$4,000,000,000 in loan guarantee authority for Farmers Home Administration farm operating and ownership loans;

(2) direct the Secretary of Agriculture to eliminate the administrative requirement that banks agree to write off a part of the loan in exchange for 90 percent loan guarantee under any of the Farmers Home Administration farm programs;

(3) direct the Secretary of Agriculture to permit lenders to write down interest rates on farm loans in exchange for Federal guarantees on the principal;

(4) request a supplemental appropriation of \$600,000,000 for insured farm ownership loans;

(5) direct the Secretary of Agriculture to reduce the interest rates on insured Farmers Home Administration farmer program loans to one half of the Treasury's cost of borrowing;

(6) direct the Secretary of Agriculture to modify the administrative requirement that

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

STARK, JAMES: FILES

Withdrawer

LM 11/2/2017

File Folder

NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR BAN

FOIA

S8587

REAGAN

Box Number

5

536

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
214018	CABLE STATE 056986	5	2/26/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

New Zealand Leader Warns of Retaliation For U.S. Sanctions

Maritime Surveillance May Be Cut

By Jay Mathews
Washington Post Staff Writer

LOS ANGELES, Feb. 26—New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange threatened today to reduce South Pacific maritime surveillance and other activities important to the United States in retaliation for U.S. sanctions against his nation, which has refused to allow nuclear ships to visit there.

The recently installed Labor Party leader, speaking to American businessmen here, raised the dispute over New Zealand's ban on U.S. nuclear warships to a new level. He said the United States informed him this morning that it had "drastically scaled down" cooperation with New Zealand—primarily in intelligence sharing and defense—and he suggested this would only hurt the United States.

"We have military assistance programs with South Pacific island states. We have the prime responsibility for maritime surveillance of the vast South Pacific. We have a force stationed in Singapore," Lange said.

"If the United States diminishes defense cooperation under ANZUS, this will in turn diminish our capacity to go on playing a role in South-east Asia and the South Pacific," he said, calling New Zealand's role "a contribution to the safeguarding of United States and Western security as a whole." ANZUS is the Australia-New Zealand-United States defense pact.

Lange said William A. Brown, U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, told him at a one-hour meeting this morning that Washington was canceling joint military exercises with New Zealand and cutting off intelligence "of the raw, military sort." In opening remarks added at the last minute to his luncheon

speech here, Lange called the U.S. actions "a dramatic scaling down of cooperation" that is "serious and . . . to a degree damaging."

"They are not, in my view, the kind of actions which a great power should take against a small, loyal ally which has stood by it, through thick and thin, in war and peace," he said.

Lange made no effort to soften his government's ban on any nuclear-powered or nuclear-armed vessels calling at New Zealand ports. Widespread antinuclear sentiment among New Zealand's 3 million people helped Lange's party return to power last July.

"My point is that the security of the South Pacific does not depend on the occasional deployment of

nuclear weapons in New Zealand ports, and in making an issue of it, the U.S. gives scant regard to its own long-term interests in the region," he told a California business group called the N Z Connection.

Brown said after his morning meeting with the prime minister that their talks had been "frank and candid." He indicated that administration officials felt that the effective ban on all U.S. warships, since policy bars disclosure of which carry nuclear weapons, will hinder U.S. ability to meet any threat in the Pacific.

Although Lange is flying directly to a conference in London after this brief, unofficial visit, Brown said the New Zealand deputy foreign secretary would go to Washington Wednesday for more talks. U.S. and New Zealand officials have indicated that they do not expect to resolve their differences.

Lange said the United States appears bent on curtailing the defense relationship "until such time as a government is elected in New

MX...Continued

Geneva talks to reduce the number of their older missiles, not their newer ones, a White House official said. Reagan added that the United States would then be in a position to reduce the number of its older missiles, and should have the newer MX to counter Soviet strength, the official said.

Asked whether the MX would be used as a bargaining chip in the Geneva talks, Speakes said that term has "such an erroneous connotation. We think that MX is an important part of our defense buildup."

But another White House official said the MX is "a powerful negotiating lever" to offset 600 Soviet SS18 and SS19 missiles in the same class as the MX.

Shultz said U.S. arms control negotiators should be sent to Geneva "with the strongest possible negotiating position . . . and that means not suggesting unilateral concessions that might diminish the incentives the Soviets have to talk."

Weinberger said the missile is "vitally important to our ability to achieve the deep reductions we seek" in Geneva.

"Why should they seek to reduce their arsenals," he asked of the Soviets, "if we have signaled we are going to permit them to maintain—and perhaps even expand—advantages they currently enjoy?"

White House officials said the report Reagan will send to Congress Monday will discuss advances in hardening missile silos and possible basing modes for the "Midgetman" single-warhead mobile missile planned for production after the MX.

Staff writers Helen Dewar, Margaret Shapiro and Michael Weisskopf contributed to this report.

Zealand which will admit American nuclear weapons," a view echoed by Reagan administration officials. He also said he thought the administration sought to warn other allies against a similar prohibition on visits by nuclear ships.

Lange told reporters after the speech that his policy is designed to prevent deaths from nuclear accidents and reduce the likelihood of Soviet nuclear attack, but is principally justified by a state's right to refrain from arming itself with nuclear weapons when not threatened by such weapons.

WASHINGTON POST 27 February 1985 Pg. 16

Defense Deputy Taft Sees Somali President

Associated Press

MOGADISHU, Somalia, Feb. 26—The deputy U.S. defense secretary flew to Sudan today after talks with Somali President Mo-

ammed Siad Barre, the official Radio Mogadishu reported. William Howard Taft IV is on an African tour with a 17-member delegation.

The United States has access to Somali ports and airfields under a defense arrangement worked out in 1980 as part of an effort to increase American military capability in the Indian Ocean and Middle East. The

United States provided \$243.9 million in aid to Sudan in fiscal 1984, including \$46.5 million in military assistance, according to State Department figures.

Vice President George Bush is to visit Sudan next week. Taft has stopped in Senegal, Zaire and Kenya and will go to Egypt after calling at Khartoum, the Sudanese capital.

WASHINGTON TIMES 27 February 1985

Paying the price for treachery

Every time Richard Perle goes to the Hill to chat with Congress, it's bad news for the Soviet Union. Last Wednesday was no exception. The formidable Mr. Perle, an assistant secretary of defense, told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, in view of Moscow's demonstrable disregard for arms-control treaties, "we must now create penalties for violations that deny the benefits of the violations to the U.S.S.R."

Failure to act would invite further flouting of the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and SALT I. Already Washington has substantial evidence that the Kremlin violated the ABM treaty by constructing a huge three-dimensional phased-array radar complex at Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia. Under the terms of the ABM agreement, such command-and-control radars cannot be built

so far inland.

This and other Soviet breaches of weapons treaties cast grave doubts on the March 12 arms negotiations in Geneva. The talks are to cover three areas: intercontinental missiles, medium-range missiles, and space weapons. U.S. negotiators must insist that it will be impossible to move ahead on discussions of space-based weapons, so dear to Moscow's heart, until the Soviets satisfactorily resolve the Krasnoyarsk question.

Mr. Perle wisely declined to specify what specific penalties the United States ought to consider. The first order of business is to persuade Congress that penalties are essential if Moscow is to be kept more or less faithful to its treaty obligations, and Mr. Perle moved usefully in that direction last week.

WASHINGTON TIMES 27 February 1985

The latest lunacy from Libya

What are civilized Americans to make of Libya's "strongman," Muammar Qaddafi? Most will agree that he presides over one of modern history's most lunatic political regimes, that the last two syllables of his name seem appropriate. Even the dimmest perceptions appear to have matured since Billy Carter's romance with this fanatical despot, with his dreams of a *Judenrein* Middle East.

If a terrorist act occurs anywhere in the Middle East or Western Europe, chances are passably good that Col. Qaddafi was involved in the training, equipping, financing, or plotting. His most recent escapade — attempting to kidnap an Egyptian official — was wonderfully thwarted by Egyptian intelligence. He doesn't stop.

Now the oil-rich madman hooks up by satellite TV with a Black Muslim gathering in Chicago. His host: Louis Farrakhan, political adviser to the Rev. Jesse Jackson, who has just praised President Reagan as God's gift to blacks, urging the brethren to behave more self-reliantly. He miscues a bit when he questions Mr. Reagan's right to be president, but let's be fair: he learned his logic under

the desert sun.

His most urgent plea is for black soldiers to desert the U.S. Army, form their own military operation, and make war on America. He revives the racist call for a separate black nation, teasing his listeners with pledges of support for the necessary violence. (Mr. Farrakhan praises him as a "fellow struggler in the cause of liberation of our people.")

When, four years ago, administration officials reported that Col. Qaddafi, targeting the president and other officials, had dispatched a "death squad" to this country, members of the press hooted. Some hoot still, adducing a lack of an assassination to prove the nonexistence of a "death squad." When will they take the colonel seriously? When civil war erupts?

To be sure, any such struggle — they always call it "struggle" — would be quelled, but at what cost? Teddy Roosevelt would know what to do, but international law permits no such "bellicosity," and nice people don't target international troublemakers even if it did. Happily, civilized people aren't always nice.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name

STARK, JAMES: FILES

Withdrawer

LM 11/2/2017

File Folder

NEW ZEALAND NUCLEAR BAN

FOIA

S8587

REAGAN

Box Number

5

536

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i>	<i>No of</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i>
	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

214019 LIST

4 8/27/1985 B1

RE PORT VISITS

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.