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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CANNISTRARO, VINCENT: FILES

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File Folder (AFGHAN RESISTANCE, WORKING GROUP) (7)

FOIA

F06-105/1

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22

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
70310	MEMO	DUPLICATE 70274	1	11/18/1986	B1
70313	PAPER	DUPLICATE 70275	5	ND	B1
70334	PAPER	RE AFGHANISTAN	7	ND	B1 B3
70341	MEMO	RODMAN TO CARLUCCI RE AFGHANISTAN <i>R 3/15/2012 M352/1</i>	2	1/29/1987	B1
70344	MEMO	OAKLEY TO POWELL RE AFGHANISTAN	2	2/2/1987	B1
70346	MEMO	ERMARTH TO OAKLEY RE AFGHANISTAN <i>R 3/15/2012 M352/1</i>	4	2/4/1987	B1
70350	MEMO	DRAFT OAKLEY TO POWELL RE MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN <i>R 2/28/2019 M352/1</i>	2	2/4/1987	B1 B3
70352	MEMO	OAKLEY/KELLY TO POWELL RE MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN <i>D 5/9/2017 M352/1</i>	2	2/5/1987	B1 B3
70353	LIST	ATTENDEES <i>PAR 8/18/2015 M352/1</i>	1	12/5/1986	B1 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
70354	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 70352 W/ANNOTATION <i>D 5/9/2017 M352/1</i>	2	2/5/1987	B1 B3
70355	NOTE	RE AGENDA <i>R 5/9/2017 M352/1</i>	1	ND	B1
70357	PAPER	RE AFGHANISTAN <i>R 3/15/2012 M352/1</i>	2	ND	B1
70359	MEMO	OAKLEY/KELLY TO POWELL RE MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN <i>D 5/9/2017 M352/1</i>	2	2/6/1987	B1

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ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	Jay Taylor		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	FILE
APPROVAL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFORMATION
COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
DISPATCH	SIGNATURE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 28, 1987

TO: FRITZ ERMARTH
BOB OAKLEY

FROM: ^{MD for} BARRY KELLY

Should not send to Frank - need completed staff work, i.e., appropriate people under Bob Oakley's lead review points made here and come, if possible, to an NSC position. Let's not put Frank into this position yet - as an Afghan policy manager until we can give him our best work - leaving ample room for informed dissent.

Okay.

Copies delivered

to B. Oakley

J. Ermarth

by MD

29 Jan

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

MARY
DUE:
22 JAN 87

January 20, 1987

MEMO FOR: BOB OAKLEY
DENNIS ROSS
SHIRIN TAHIR-KHELI
PETER RODMAN
STEVE SESTANOVICH
BARRY KELLY
VINCE CANNISTRARO



FROM: FRITZ ERMARTH

I would like to send this "think piece" to Frank Carlucci, along with an comments, dissents, or agreements you would like me to mention.

Please respond by January 22.

Thanks.

[Handwritten scribbles and marks at the bottom right of the page.]

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70334	PAPER	7	ND	B1
	RE AFGHANISTAN			B3

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
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*for Afghan
file*



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 29th

FOR: FRITZ ERMARTH
BOB OAKLEY
STEVE SESTANOVICH
BARRY KELLY ✓

FROM: PETER RODMAN *PR*

Would appreciate your comments
on the attached memo by noon
Friday (1/30).

Dear Peter R,

this probably

won't go

forward - cause

Bob O is incorporating

*some of this in his
memo*

70341

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90093

January 29, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: PETER W. RODMAN

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

One further thought on Afghanistan, to supplement what Fritz and Bob have written.

We have had a long-running wrangle with the Paks over their treatment of the Resistance Alliance, particularly their reluctance to allow the Alliance a strong independent role and voice in the diplomacy. The Paks claim to fear the Alliance could turn into a "PLO" on their soil; more likely, they just don't welcome an independent player that constrains their own freedom of action in cutting a deal.

This has also been the most contentious issue between us and State, since State (and especially Ambassador Hinton) have been more deferential to Pak sensitivities than we on the NSC would like. Thus, the President's meeting in June with Alliance leader Rabbani -- and the assurances he gave Rabbani about our support for the Alliance's key role -- were NSC initiatives that State was uncomfortable with.

This issue is bound to become more acute, not less, as the diplomacy accelerates and the perception spreads (rightly or wrongly) that we are heading toward end-game. Under the pressure of events the Alliance is showing a healthy new unity and assertiveness in public, even while privately it is increasingly nervous about Pak diplomatic maneuvering from which it is excluded. The Pak Foreign Ministry is leaning on the Alliance to be more flexible in response to the supposed Soviet "flexibility." In the Armacost/Oakley meeting with Junejo, FM Yaqub gave vent to an amazing outburst against the Mujahedin for their intransigence.

The truth is, the Paks simply do not have the freedom of action to cut a deal that the Alliance doesn't go along with. The Paks need a viable settlement that gets the refugees out of Pakistan

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M10-252#70341
BY RW NAR TE3/15/12

~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90093

and the Soviets out of Afghanistan; a deal that doesn't do this doesn't solve the Paks' domestic or strategic problem: The refugees won't go home if the Alliance doesn't bless the deal; if a Communist government remains in power, it is a Soviet victory that only tightens the Soviet-Indian squeeze on Pakistan -- a strategic disaster. Not to mention the disaster Pakistan will face in the U.S. Congress if it is seen as selling out the Resistance.

As we seem to be heading toward end-game, the Alliance's role becomes more and more central whether the Paks like it or not. This is the political reality. The Mujahedin's public posture of total self-confidence and implacability is just right: This is the time to step up the psychological pressures against the puppet regime. Only after the Soviets have bitten the bullet on sacrificing the regime should we all start to be creative in looking for face-saving formulas for them.

Thus the problem of Pak-Muj relations goes beyond the operational issues listed in Bob's paper. It's not just a matter of urging the Paks to help the Alliance with media strategy, setting up offices overseas, and cross-border humanitarian assistance. It's a question of:

- Should we lean on the Paks to lay off the Alliance and recognize that it is now a central player whether they like it or not?
- Should we dissuade the Paks from pushing the Alliance to be more flexible at this point, when the Alliance's ferocity and implacability are just what is needed?
- Should we, in fact, insist that the Soviets talk to the Alliance -- and make this a central theme of our Afghan diplomacy now?

I alert you to this because it is likely to remain a key problem in our posture toward the Paks as well as a persistent point of difference between us and State.

- cc: Fritz Ermarth
- Bob Oakley
- Steve Sestanovich
- Barry Kelly

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70344	MEMO OAKLEY TO POWELL RE AFGHANISTAN	2	2/2/1987	B1

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

February 4, 1987

Just — FYI 18
many —
Comments!

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT OAKLEY

70346

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FWE*

SUBJECT: Increasing Time Pressure on Soviets in
Afghanistan

The PRG charged us to put together a little working group to work this task, namely, to increase the Soviet sense that time is definitely not on their side in Afghanistan and that the longer they tarry in accepting withdrawal and the replacement of the present regime with one that is not communist or communist-dominated, the worse the final result will be for them.

Herewith some ideas on substance and process.

Focusing on this problem is an important improvement in our own mindset. It says we are thinking objectives and strategy, not just turning the crank on a more or less static activity or escalating more or less established activities in response to the other side's actions. We've been too long in the latter mode.

It also says that we are beginning to talk about, as an operational factor in our calculus, the real possibility that the Soviets could lose. That is forward movement too.

The most important time dynamic factors playing in the Afghanistan equation are basic to it and already part of our policy calculus. We just have to think about them ourselves in a time dynamic sense and work them harder.

The most important such factor working for us and against the Soviets is the gradual maturation of the Resistance into a semi-modern national liberation struggle. To wit:

More political unity in Peshawar.

Growing recognition in Peshawar among top leaders and lesser activists that the Resistance must mature politically and operationally and seeks all the help in can get in doing so.

More operational collaboration/unity in the field, e.g., Masood's Alliance of the North.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

BY RW 3/15/12
NLR MID-3521 # 70346

The emergence of a new generation of more modern guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan, e.g., Masood, Ismail Khan, Abdul Hak, but also many lesser figures.

Increasing operational skills in the Resistance.

The Soviets see these things happening. It is of utmost importance that we encourage them and encourage the Paks to encourage them. This is part of our policy now, but we have to press it energetically!

As important as it is, the current preoccupation with anti-air equipment and training may become something of a technological distraction. Stingers will not assure Soviet defeat in Afghanistan any more than helicopters assured our victory in Vietnam.

There are two powerful factors which the Soviets see working for them.

Pakistan's internal instability/vulnerability.

The combination of the nuclear issue and Indian pressure ganging up to crack Pakistan's resolve and ties to the US.

We obviously have to do what we can to work against those dynamic factors. Nuff said.

Beyond these macrofactors, I see at least three issues or gambits that can contribute to an adverse time dynamic for the Soviets. We need to work out what they mean, how to use them, and in what time frame they have impact.

1. A substantial and systematic program to encourage desertion. This would really increase pressure on the Soviets. While it would make them very angry, there is not much they could do about it that would help them except escalate the military pressure on Pakistan, which is an option they have long had but been deterred by cost and risk from taking. We need, through a serious study, to work out whether it is operationally and politically feasible at all. If we decide that it is at least plausibly feasible, we could -- with appropriate echoes from Peshawar and Islamabad -- present the Soviets with the threat that this program would start in earnest at some time certain in the future, unless they have given earnest of their intention to withdraw soon (see below).

I repeat the point I made in the PRG: It is not worth the risk of pressuring the Paks for this unless we can open up a fairly serious program. The idea of using the threat of one is a new wrinkle and may help soften up the Paks to this idea.

We need to do the homework immediately so that we are in a position to turn on this threat during the next six months or so.

2. Threatening to encourage and recognize a Resistance government in exile. Everybody knows this is a tricky issue for the Paks and, therefore, for everybody else. But the Resistance is moving toward it. The Paks must be persuaded to see that such movement puts pressure on the Soviets, and their audible complaining about it relaxes that pressure.

So far as I know, up till now, little thought has been given to this and none at all to managing it as a time dynamic factor to pressure the Soviets. First, the Alliance could announce itself to be a provisional government in exile. Second, the Paks could recognize it. Then we. Then Islamic countries, etc.

3. An eroding option for a neutral Afghanistan. The Soviets seem genuinely worried that a post-withdrawal Afghanistan might form up in alliance with Iran and Pakistan, presenting a more challenging political/religious entity than might otherwise be the case. They are probably more worried about this than about a US presence of some sort.

Here the key is to get Pakistan and, if possible, Iran to sing from the right sheet of music: A pledge to respect neutrality if there is an early settlement.

A useful, if not absolutely necessary, part of a strategy that has time-dynamic pressure built into it is our identification of the things the Soviet side must do, first of all to convince us that they are serious about withdrawing. I suggest the following list of actions for the Soviets to take in public:

Agree to a short withdrawal schedule.

Agree that the PDPA will be disbanded, but that communists who have not committed crimes against the people should have political freedoms in post-war Afghanistan.

Agree that no member of the PDPA regime need be part of a government of national reconciliation unless accepted by the Afghans themselves.

Declare an intent to provide political asylum in the USSR to any Afghan communist or others whose lives would be threatened following their withdrawal.

Admittedly, this is tantamount to a declaration of surrender on the Soviet part. But it is less important that the Soviets accept this list than that it becomes implanted in the minds of all as the right framework. We should start with the most demanding list and then perhaps scale back as the Soviets show seriousness.

with
Afghans
here.

0542
Right now we insist only on the first item plus a somewhat vague stipulation about self determination. In effect, we need to fill in the blanks on self determination.

There may be other ideas of this sort around.

I would propose, to start, a strictly inhouse brainstorming session of Oakley, Kelly, Rodman, Sestanovich, Ermarth, Ross to put ideas on the table. Next we should sort those ideas in order of attractiveness, discarding those that are least attractive. This should produce a working paper we can put before other PRG players, i.e., Ikle, Raphael, Twetten/Kerr for comment, from which we can develop a report to the PRG.

It doesn't have to be elaborate. But it should be systematic and it should surface real choices and controversies for the PRG to consider. We should not cook the books beforehand.

Jan. 1

~~SECRET~~

- ✓ 1 - Barry Kelly
- 2 - Fitz Erna
- 3 - Colin Powell

IV
DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED

70350

February 4, 1987

Concurrence

NLRR M35211 #70350

BY fw NARA DATE 2/28/19

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY

SUBJECT: February 3 PRG Meeting on Afghanistan

Bob -
I do not
witness, these
actions will be
handled via
PRG forum and
properly classified.
These items are
system IV and
are improperly declassified here.

Background

The military situation in Afghanistan over the past six months has been bad for the Afghan army (now down to 50,000 men after heavy casualties and desertions), better for the Soviet military (1/3 to 1/2 fewer casualties here to new tactics and less exposure) and a substantial improvement in morale and capability for the Resistance (averaging almost one aircraft kill a day since September, better and more weaponry plus weapons and target training; estimated at 150,000 troops end 1986, goal of 190,000 end 1987). With more stand-off weapons and training Resistance more capable of attacking urban targets and major bases.

Politically there will be Resistance offices opened in several locations, a secretariat in Peshawar and more active public relations, etc. in Europe and elsewhere. Need to support GOP. RDA nervous about "national reconciliation" noises by Soviets, but GOP attracted.

Actions

The follow-up actions agreed upon at the meeting are as follows:

- CIA to assess whether it is possible to increase further the supply of weapons delivered over next six months inside Afghanistan, what limitations are and how they can be overcome.
- CIA and DOD to assess whether more DOD help needed, especially in tactical and leadership training.
- CIA and DOD to look at targetting priorities, intelligence and training; is it more demoralizing to Soviet/RDA effort to put priority upon Soviet or RDA targets? What specific kinds of targets?

A PRG is for policy review
not program review.
Baving

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

-- NSC to organize a study on non-military means of increasing pressure on Soviets: encourage desertion and exfiltration in the 100's from 40th Army; Soviets can get better terms if withdraw soon than later; US signals interest in bases in Afghanistan; increased pressure on Soviets from Moslem states which will grow over time, etc.

OK -- State to initiate high-level talks with Saudis on support for Pakistan in face of Soviet peace offensive, as signalled in President Reagan's early January letter to King Fahd.

OK -- NSC and White House to organize Congressional briefings of Afghanistan-Pakistan situation in order to maximize support for GOP.

penultimate date

Concern in items indicated.

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70352	MEMO OAKLEY/KELLY TO POWELL RE MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN	2	2/5/1987	B1 B3

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70353

To: Officer-in-charge
Appointments Center
Room 060, OEOB

Please admit the following appointments on December 8, 19 86

for Vincent M. Cannistraro of NSC
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

State

James Bishop	7/21/38
Walter Clarke	12/28/34
E. Michael Ussery	1/20/51
Charles Duelfer	9/18/52
Robert S. Ayling	5/13/48

13526
3.36(1)
3.5c

DOD

Walter Jajko	5/22/36
James L. Woods	2/29/32
LT COL Harold White	4/21/42 ✓

DOD

Jeffery A. Levy	9/22/41 ✓
Donald Lenahan	7/3/42 ✓



OVP

Douglas Menarchik

NSC

Clark Murdock

OMB

Wayne Army

DECLASSIFIED BY
NLT: M352/1 #70353
BY RW 8/18/15

MEETING LOCATION

Building West Wing White House Requested by Kathy Gibbs
 Room No. Situation Room Room No. 300 Telephone x3371
 Time of Meeting 11:00 a.m. Date of request 12/5/86

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to five (5) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOB - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

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70354	MEMO DUPLICATE OF 70352 W/ANNOTATION	2	2/5/1987	B1 B3

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70355	NOTE RE AGENDA	1	ND	B1

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NLR: M10-352 #70357

BY RW

REVISION DATE: 3/15/12

1) Mung H.
2) Barry K. 27

70357

Ermarth's paper on Afghanistan

Some comments:

1. For Openers an organizational note: I question whether the "brainstorming" FE suggests should be done "just in house". At the PRG a task was laid on; it strikes me the kind of ideas FE is looking for are precisely the sort of paper that should be tasked to PRG participant agencies to see what they come up with.

agree!

2. This aside, I have following:

---FE makes several assertions about the state of play in Afghanistan (pp 1-2). Do we all see the picture in such rosy terms?

---This paper makes very light of the Pak concerns about the implications of a unified, politically cohesive, determined resistance. I agree with Rodman's earlier paper which suggested this is a critical element in shaping anything we plan to do with the Afghan situation. The Paks want control over what the resistance does because they see this element as a factor which can affect vital Pak interests. (there is an analogy to the Syria-PLO relationship, though I wouldn't push that too far)

---FE is on the mark in saying a focus on means will not define ends or necessarily bring them closer.

--FE's policy proposals;

--desertion: ~~Thinx~~ I suspect this is a possibility, but its implementation as a program is complex. any program must have a set pipeline for deserters from the desertion through resettlement or it is a non starter. In this connection, we will not just be dealing with the Paks and resistance, but with a variety of countries who might receive deserters. Given the extraordinary effort it took a few months ago to get just half a dozen deserters out and all the sensitivities involved in managing that process, I suggest we must look

very carefully at the question of whether we can deliver on a sizable program. To staff it and have it go wrong would be a disaster.

--Recognizing a resistance government. As a general premise I don't believe it wise to threaten unless one can deliver. Playing the alternative government option is not just tricky for the Paks. It will be tricky for us. We will get little mileage out of a resistance government unless it gets more than our recognition. If we go this route, there will be an inevitable effort to get others to recognize the exiles. That will become an issue between us and practically every government we work with. In a nutshell, we have to determine in advance whether such a move would garner any support or simply become a distracting issue between us and others who now ~~have~~ are comfortable with a resistance movement.

--I personally do not believe the Soviets think they can achieve a "neutral" Afghanistan at this point. They know, in my view, that they have converted a people who were able to live with them in the past into a people who will be hostile for generations. What we could say to the Soviets is something to the effect that we are all going to lose our ability to influence a future Afghan government to be moderate and accept peaceful coexistence. What the Soviets (and I suspect Paks) are going to be worried about is another Iran.

Finally FE suggests we tell the Soviets to go public with four points. One raises the idea no member of the PDPA need be part of a government unless accepted by the "afghans themselves". My question here is who are the Afghans we are talking about and how will we know their decision. This underscores the importance of FE's note that we must "fill in the blanks on selfdetermination.

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
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<i>Document Description</i>				
70359	MEMO	2	2/6/1987	B1
OAKLEY/KELLY TO POWELL RE MEETING ON AFGHANISTAN				

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