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Collection Name DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES

Withdrawer

SJW 2/29/2016

File Folder HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT: ~~NSDD~~-TERRORISM
1984

FOIA

F02-0083/01

Box Number RAC BOX 10

PRADOS

608

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
173422	FOLDER	MEMOS, NOTES		ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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See
National Security Council
The White House

*Held for 1
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 input.*

11/11/53-551

System #

TV

Package #

402042

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin			
Bob Kimmitt	<i>1</i>	<i>IC</i>	
John Poindexter	<i>2</i>	<i>JP</i>	<i>I</i>
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt	<i>3</i>	<i>K</i>	
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			
<i>de Graff</i>	<i>4</i>		<i>A</i>

I = Information *A = Action* *R = Retain* *D = Dispatch* *N = No further Action*

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other

COMMENTS

Should be seen by:

(Date/Time)

*Presentation,
 per staff
 discussion*

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8401044

RECEIVED 03 FEB 84 16

TO KIMMITT

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 03 FEB 84

KEYWORDS TERRORISM

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL

SUBJECT: JUSTICE TESTIMONY RE FBI ROLE IN COMBATING TERRORISM

*file: FBI
(Terrorism)*
*Roy -
Ple see
marked pages.
then to file.*

ACTION: MEMO KIMMITT TO PETERSON

DUE: 06 FEB 84 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

LEHMAN, C

DEGRAFFENREID

FORTIER

THOMPSON

SABLE

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

(MR)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE (C)

1044



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

February 3, 1984

SPECIAL

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer

National Security Council
Department of the Treasury
Central Intelligence Agency
Department of Defense
Department of State

SUBJECT: Department of Justice testimony regarding the role of
the FBI in combating terrorism

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your
agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship
to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular
A-19.

Please provide us with your views no later than

COB MONDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 1984.

Direct your questions to Gregory Jones (395-3856), of this office.

James C. Murr for
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

Enclosures

cc: M. Uhlmann A. Curtis K. Wilson A. Donahue

1

13

TESTIMONY

BY

WILLIAM H. WEBSTER

DIRECTOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE AN

OPEN SESSION OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D. C.

FEBRUARY 8, 1984

*Rec'd 2/2/84
5:25 PM.*

Draft 1
2/2/84

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Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you this morning to discuss the role of the FBI in combating terrorism.

As you know, terrorists hope to achieve many goals when they strike out against society. They may want to make ideological statements or political demands. They may hope to bring about a change in our national policy, or perhaps the policies of another nation. Or they may desire retribution for real or imagined wrongs. Rarely, if ever, do they offer rational or viable alternatives.

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Whatever their intentions, terrorist activities can be reduced to one common denominator: the use of violence. The Soviet dissident and Nobel-prize-winning physicist, Andrei Sakharov, put it this way:

"No matter how high the aims predicated by terrorists...their activities are always criminal, always destructive, throwing humankind back to a time of lawlessness and chaos, provoking...internal and international complications, contradicting the goals of peace and progress."

Responding to terrorist activities is much more difficult for a democratic society than it is for a totalitarian state. Repressive measures are what most terrorist organizations seek to illicit. Our response must be so measured that we do not destroy the openness we enjoy or trample the freedoms we expect.

15

In discussing our response to terrorism, let me begin with our definition of terrorism. Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. The FBI divides terrorism into either domestic or international categories on the basis of the origin of the group. If a terrorist group is one that originates within the United States and has no foreign funding, direction, or influence, it is domestic. If, on the other hand, the group originates outside the United States, is funded or directed from without the United States, or the group's activities transcend national boundaries, it is international.

Our terrorism investigations are based on a very fundamental responsibility of government--the duty to protect the public against terrorism and those who would destroy our political system through criminal violence.

Our international terrorism cases are investigated under the Foreign Counterintelligence Guidelines and the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Although the exact number of these investigations is classified, they far outnumber the cases involving domestic terrorist groups.

Our domestic security/terrorism investigations are best understood if terrorist organizations are viewed as

16

criminal enterprises. Like other investigations of criminal enterprises, for example in organized crime, these investigations not only entail determining who committed specific criminal acts, but also how those individuals relate to others similarly motivated, how they are financed and supported logistically, and who their leadership is. As in other criminal cases, we gather intelligence and evidence for prosecution. This approach allows us to focus on the total terrorist network rather than on what a particular group decides to call itself.

These investigations are conducted under the Attorney General Guidelines for General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprises and Domestic Security/Terrorism Investigations. In 1976, then Attorney General Levi published a set of guidelines, popularly known as the "Levi Guidelines," that set the parameters for the FBI's investigation of domestic security. These guidelines were in effect until April, 1983, when Attorney General William French Smith issued a revised set of guidelines for these investigations. Viewing terrorist organizations as criminal enterprises under these guidelines, we now open Domestic Security/Terrorism cases when facts or circumstances indicate that two or more persons are engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence in violation of the law.

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Last year's bombings in Beirut and Kuwait and other incidents have aroused fear and concern in Americans. We know that since 1968, approximately 40 percent of all international

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terrorist incidents that occurred outside our borders were aimed at United States officials, property or civilians. Although we have been fortunate enough here at home to escape an atrocity of the magnitude of the two Beirut bombings, we have seen an increased propensity on the part of terrorist groups to plan and carry out terrorist acts in the United States. This is typified by the destruction of \$50 million worth of aircraft in San Juan, Puerto Rico, in January, 1981, by the pro-independence Puerto Rican terrorist group, "Macheteros." The assassination of two Turkish diplomats in 1982 by the Armenian terrorist group, "The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)" is another example.

Here in the United States we experienced 29 terrorist incidents in 1980, 42 in 1981, and 52 in 1982. The 31 terrorist incidents in 1983 represent almost a 40 percent decrease when compared to 1982. During the same period, the number of killed and injured decreased from seven killed and 26 injured in 1982 to six killed and four injured in 1983. These reductions can be attributed in part to the success of the FBI in preventing a number of terrorist incidents in 1983.

As interested as I know you are in our philosophy on these investigations and the statistics, I realize you are most concerned about what we are doing to protect the American people from terrorists. The balance of my remarks will be devoted to this.

18

Until October, 1982, the FBI had three national priority programs--Organized Crime, White-Collar Crime and Foreign Counterintelligence. In October, 1982, I broadened those priorities to include a fourth--Terrorism. In the face of the worldwide threat of terrorism, I wanted to insure that we were doing everything possible to carry out our responsibility as the lead Federal agency in the fight against terrorism in the United States. As the lead agency, the FBI has a dual mission. The first is preventive in nature and the second, reactive. I would like to deal with them in reverse order.

The reactive phase of the FBI's Terrorism Program involves the response to and investigation of criminal acts committed by terrorist groups. Many of the acts committed by known terrorist groups come under the investigative jurisdiction of the FBI, although a local law enforcement entity may have concurrent jurisdiction. This necessitates a close working relationship between the FBI and other Federal and local law enforcement agencies.

While we speak of our Terrorism Program as having two phases, it is often difficult to separate the two. We believe we are able to reduce tomorrow's acts of terrorism by identifying and prosecuting those responsible for today's acts. This is particularly true when group leaders are successfully prosecuted.

19

It is our opinion that the 1983 decline in terrorist incidents can be attributed, in part, to the success of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies in investigating individuals such as the Armenian terrorists and the Puerto Rican pro-independence terrorists. For example, in October, 1982, five members of the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), who were under FBI surveillance, were arrested after attempting to bomb the Turkish Honorary Consulate in Philadelphia. The arrest of these five marks the first time members of the JCAG have been arrested prior to the commission of a terrorist act. Those arrests, along with the arrests and subsequent convictions of three members of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) for attempting to bomb an Air Canada cargo building have discouraged activities by those groups in the United States. Although Armenian terrorist groups were responsible for five attacks in this country in 1982, including two assassinations, in 1983 there were none.

We have enjoyed similar results against domestic terrorists. As a result of an intensive FBI investigation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), our most violent domestic group, we identified a safehouse in Chicago and arrested four individuals in possession of semiautomatic weapons, homemade silencers and explosives. These arrests prevented the FALN from carrying out planned bombings, armed robberies and prison breaks. This investigation also resulted in the June arrest of FALN leader and bomb maker

Why not mention who they are.

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William Guillermo Morales in Mexico. Morales, who had been a fugitive since his escape from a prison hospital in May, 1979, remains in Mexico pending extradition proceedings.

In 1982, there were 25 acts of terrorism attributable to Puerto Rican terrorist groups. In 1983, there were only three. This reduction in incidents is partially a result of the FBI's investigation of the FALN in Chicago and other cities.

Our efforts to prevent terrorism go beyond investigations of terrorist incidents and attempts to identify and prosecute those who are responsible. The preventive phase of our terrorism program includes aggressive efforts to collect and analyze all legally obtainable intelligence concerning terrorist groups that pose a threat to the United States or its citizens. In 1980, the FBI established a Terrorist Research and Analytical Center at FBI Headquarters to analyze and computerize data on known terrorists and terrorist groups active in the United States. This center consists of analysts and computer experts who review all information received by the FBI concerning terrorist groups or individual terrorists, and who make assessments of the potential threat.

The FBI in its role as the lead Federal agency in combating terrorism is coordinating the Federal law enforcement preparation for a number of special events in 1984. These are the Summer Olympics in Los Angeles; the World's Fair in New Orleans; and the Democratic and Republican National Conventions. The most widely publicized of these is

11

the Olympics. Since the killing of the Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, West Germany, elaborate security measures for these events have become obligatory, and the games in the United States will be no exception.

We are working side by side with other Federal, state and local agencies having security and law enforcement responsibilities at the games. We have not sought, nor do we seek to encroach upon the jurisdictional responsibilities of these agencies. In fact, our successes in counterterrorism investigations have been supported to a great extent by the efforts of law enforcement officers at all levels. Preparing for an event of this magnitude would not be complete without plans to respond to any incident.

At the present time, a memorandum of understanding between the FBI and the Southern California law enforcement agencies involved with security at the games is in the process of being signed. As of January 30, 1984, it had been signed by fifteen agencies, including the FBI. In addition, the FBI and the Los Angeles Police Department are presently drafting a memorandum of understanding between the two agencies that will clearly delineate the responsibilities of each during the Olympics and insure a concerted effort to prevent terrorist attacks.

22

The Los Angeles FBI Office has developed emergency response teams to establish an initial Federal presence and handle routine incidents under FBI jurisdiction. We will also have available in Los Angeles during the Olympics a 50-member Hostage Rescue Team, the first major civilian anti-terrorist team ever assembled in this country. This team will be able to respond to hostage situations anywhere in the country. Although we have well-trained five- to seven-man SWAT teams and hostage negotiators in each of our 59 field offices throughout the United States, that's not enough. Our new Hostage Rescue Team will provide us with the manpower to meet massive emergency situations, yet, will have the training and skill to save lives. The team will provide the President and the Attorney General with an alternative to the use of military force. The Hostage Rescue Team will be a deterrent factor in the future, I'm sure.

We have seriously weakened several of the major domestic terrorist groups in this country. But we won't allow our successes to blind us to the potential for terrorist activity in this country. That will always exist; however, we are confident that we have taken appropriate steps to make sure that terrorists do not succeed in getting even a beachhead such as they have enjoyed for years in other parts of the world.

To avoid the lawlessness and chaos that Andrei Sakharov spoke about requires vigilance. We must be firm, but we must not be repressive. We must do this with the

highest level of professionalism. Otherwise the terrorist wins his objective. The ultimate objective for us is to keep our citizens safe and free. I can tell you the FBI is working very hard to do just that.

That completes my prepared statement. I am now prepared to answer your questions.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
KENNETH E. deGRAFFENREID

SUBJECT: Talking Points on Terrorism

The memo at Tab A tasks talking points for your use at the Heritage Foundation on Wednesday, February 8, 1984.

Talking points are provided at Tab I. These points draw heavily on our plan to submit a package of five bills on terrorism in the next few weeks. The Heritage presentation is a good opportunity to build the support we will need for expeditious passage. No mention is made of activities planned for in the new NSDD.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the points at Tab I in your presentation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I - Talking Points
Tab A - Shull Note of February 6, 1984

SPEAKING ENGAGEMENT FOR MR. MCFARLANE

Date: 2/6

TO: KEN DEGRAFFENREID

FROM: TOM SHULL

REQUESTING GROUP/ORGANIZATION: HERITAGE FOUNDATION

BACKGROUND: MR. MCFARLANE PLANS TO SPEAK TO
A GROUP OF CONSERVATIVES ABOUT TERRORISM.

DATE AND TIME: 2 P.M. WEDNES. FEB 8.

OUTLINE OF EVENT:

REQUIREMENT: PLEASE PREPARE A ONE PAGE MEMO
AND TALKING PTS

MEDIA COVERAGE: NONE

POINTS OF CONTACT: TOM SHULL

LOGISTICS:

DUE DATE: 2/7

PLEASE NOTE: NORTH, NOT DEGRAFFENREID
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORISM.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

file
"terrorism"

July 18, 1984

TO:

KEN DE GRAFFENREID
OLLIE NORTH

FROM:

STEVE STEINER

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

June 1, 1984

① Terrorism
② Narcotics Intelligence

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: PHILIP A. DUR *hil*

SUBJECT: CIA Deputy Director Testimony regarding Narcotics Trafficking

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from CIA which forwards extracts from John McMahon's recent testimony to the SSCI on narcotics threat. The extracts were requested by the SSCI.

The conclusion to be drawn from the extract--as well as from the complete testimony of both the DDCI and Law Enforcement Agencies which are benefitting from the expanded narcotics intelligence effort--is that the trends in production and transshipment of illicit narcotics are worrisome.

Notwithstanding the greatly intensified effort by the Administration to curb trafficking (as manifest in the establishment of the twelve regional task forces under the AG as well as the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System [NNBIS] under the aegis of the Vice President), the demand for narcotics is growing and the availability of drugs is increasing commensurately.

Attachment

Tab I - Rankin Note to McFarlane of May 31, 1984
w/attachment

cc: Constantine Menges
Oliver North
Geoffrey Kemp
Ken deGraffenreid ←

The Illicit Narcotics Threat

The scope of the narcotics problem we face is enormous. According to DEA and the National Institute on Drug Abuse, more than 40 million people in the United States are expected to spend up to \$80 billion this year to consume some 4 tons of heroin, as much as 61 tons of cocaine, and about 14,000 tons of marijuana. Nearly all of these drugs come from crops grown in foreign countries.

Latin America continues to produce most of the marijuana, all of the cocaine, and about a third of the heroin imported into the United States. In spite of heightened US interdiction activity, key segments of the drug industry have found alternate routes around these increased control efforts.

Colombia's cocaine and marijuana traffickers dominate the US market. Last year Colombia produced between 13,000 and 16,000 tons of marijuana and increased domestic coca cultivation to supply the equivalent of 20 percent of the cocaine consumed annually in the United States.

The results of two recent Colombian National Police operations against cocaine processing complexes in Southeast Colombia are unprecedented. The operation conducted 10-12 March in Caqueta Department resulted in the largest cocaine seizure ever, about 10,000 kilograms (with a retail value of more than \$1 billion in the United States), and the destruction of 10 laboratories. On 6 May, the National Police raided a cocaine processing complex in Vaupes Department and seized three kilograms of coca paste and a large quantity of precursor chemicals, including 94 containers of hydrochloric acid and 105 drums of ether.

Other antinarcotics initiatives by the Colombian Government are also encouraging. As you know, the assassination earlier this month of Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla has prompted an unprecedented crackdown on traffickers, but it remains to be seen if the crackdown will last only a few months or continue as a serious effort.

Opium output in Mexico was about 17 tons in 1983, and total 1984 opium production could be substantially more. Mexico's ability to keep up with increasing poppy cultivation has been limited by problems in the eradication program, particularly in the deployment of spray helicopters.

The Jamaican Government's recent crackdown on marijuana smuggling has stalled, in part because the constabulary lacks the manpower and resources to conduct sustained large-scale interdiction operations. Without an effective narcotics control program, marijuana shipments from Jamaica in 1984 could be substantially higher than the 1,750 tons shipped in 1983.

Bolivia and Peru continue to be the primary source countries for coca. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates that 70 to 80 tons of cocaine are produced each year from coca grown in Peru and Bolivia. Although Peru is still a minor exporter of cocaine compared to Colombia and Bolivia, cocaine is now being refined in Peru and smuggled via ship and aircraft to the United States, western Europe, and perhaps Asia and Australia.

In Belize, Prime Minister Price recently suspended a spray eradication program that destroyed 95 percent of last fall's marijuana crop. According to DEA, some 600 hectares of marijuana are currently under cultivation. If spray eradication is not resumed, Belize could overtake Jamaica--which DEA estimates produced about 1,750 tons in 1983--as the second largest supplier to the United States.

18
Southwest Asia's Golden Crescent, which includes Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran, currently accounts for about half the heroin reaching the United States (Southeast Asia supplies about 20 percent and Mexico about 30 percent). Steady reductions in opium production in the Golden Crescent until this year were largely the result of an estimated drop in Pakistan from 530 to 800 tons in 1979 to 45 to 60 tons in 1983. President Zia's ban on opium production in 1979, adverse weather in 1980 and 1981, and a price drop largely due to oversupply contributed to the decline. Iran remains a net importer of opium for local consumption, but increased opium output during the past two years in Afghanistan has enabled traffickers to offset Pakistan's reduction. This will probably result in a net increase this year in regional production.

This year's opium harvest from Southeast Asia's Golden Triangle, where Thailand, Burma, and Laos meet, is expected to be larger than the 600 tons produced in the region last year, perhaps as much as 700 tons. Refineries that convert this opium to heroin are concentrated along the Thai-Burmese border.

Thailand has increased its use of military force during the past two and one-half years against the groups that refine nearly all of the heroin produced in the Golden Triangle. These Thai military initiatives have had an impact on narcotics trafficking in the region: new trafficking routes through India and Burma have been reported, and trafficking groups have begun to relocate refineries deeper inside Burma. Thai actions in the region have had a limited effect on opium production, however, and the continued resiliency of narcotics traffickers will keep Southeast Asia a major supplier of heroin to world markets.

MA

Thailand's limited crop-substitution program continues to be poorly enforced, and Bangkok has been slow to promote wider participation among farmers who find alternate crops financially attractive only when opium prices are severely depressed. Until recently, Thai eradication efforts have been limited, but a small-scale eradication campaign instituted earlier this year may signal a softening of attitudes on this issue.

Burma is estimated to grow more than 80 percent of the opium produced in Southeast Asia. Burma's narcotics control programs, such as its manual crop eradication projects, have had little impact to date; and its plans to expand narcotics control efforts have encountered problems such as high-level government and military corruption. During 1983, Bo Ni, the Minister of Home and Religious Affairs--who was responsible for narcotics suppression programs--and Brigadier General Tin 00 were both convicted of corruption and sentenced to life in prison.

Outlook for the Future--The outlook for the future is troublesome. Although our crop estimates may not be precise, we are confident that worldwide production of opium, coca, and marijuana will increase in 1984 and that large, long-term declines in drug crop harvests are unlikely in most of the key producing countries in the foreseeable future. This will result in a continued increase in the quantity of drugs available for export to the United States. We cannot, however, project the precise impact of these increases on the availability, price, or purity of drugs in the United States.