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Foreign
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Center

K de Graffenried

International Terrorism in 1979

A Research Paper

2

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International Terrorism in 1979

A Research Paper

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on 6 January 1980.*

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International Terrorism in 1979


Overview

Most patterns of international terrorist behavior recorded in 1978 continued into 1979: attacks on diplomatic and business facilities, simplicity in operations, and a preference for targets in industrialized democracies. The number of attacks declined worldwide, however, as did the number and proportion of attacks against US citizens.

Several terrorist groups stepped up their operations, however, to publicize their respective causes. Intergovernmental cooperation in combating terrorism was spearheaded by a West European agreement on extradition and prosecution and by the passage of a UN convention against the taking of hostages.

Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks*
1968-79

Figure 1



*Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents.

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International Terrorism in 1979

Trends

For the year as a whole, there was a decrease in the number of international terrorist incidents (see table 1, page 14 and figure 2). There has been, however, no noncommittant decrease in casualties from international terrorist attacks (see figure 1). These attacks caused more deaths and more casualties in 1979 than during any previous year since we began keeping statistics in 1968.

The proportion of terrorist incidents apparently aimed at causing casualties—most notably assassination attempts—increased, while incendiary bombings, which generally involve only property damage, fell from second to sixth place in frequency among terrorist attacks. This change in targeting patterns accounts in part for the rise in casualties and deaths. As has been noted in our previous surveys, most terrorist incidents are not intended to cause casualties, and only one-fourth of all attacks between 1968 and 1979 resulted in casualties.¹

Terrorists continue to prefer operations in the industrialized democracies of Western Europe and North America (see figure 3). Nearly half of all incidents were recorded in Western Europe alone, both by indigenous organizations and by groups that have chosen to export their grievances. Perhaps due in part to increased governmental countermeasures, terrorism in Latin America and the Middle East has lagged far below the levels recorded in 1978.


There have been fewer attacks than the previous year (see table 2, page 14) on US citizens and property in both relative and absolute terms, but many more Americans were killed this year than before. At least 12 Americans—including an ambassador—represent-

¹ Of the 353 international terrorist incidents recorded in 1978, 62 incidents (17.1 percent) involved deaths and 57 (16.1 percent) involved injuries. Of the 293 incidents recorded in 1979, 64 (21.8 percent) involved deaths and 71 (24.2 percent) involved injuries. While these proportions are slightly up over 1978 figures, the dramatic increase in total casualties appears to be accounted for by more casualties per incident than in 1978.

**International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79**

Figure 2

Total Incidents: 3,336



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ing diplomatic, military, business, and private interest (in Afghanistan, Rhodesia, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey), were victims of anti-US attacks.² Infrequent though deadly operations appear to have replaced the formerly more common firebombings of American vehicles.


Officials and businessmen—especially individuals who are symbols of Western power and wealth—are still the primary targets (see figure 4). Tourists and other private citizens are victimized only incidentally (for example, as passengers on a hijacked airliner). West

² This figure does not include political violence by domestic groups within the United States against American citizens.

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-79

Figure 3

Total: 3,336



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
European nationals were victimized in 47 percent of all reported incidents; North Americans were the second most frequent targets. Among US victims, businessmen continued to be the most numerous, although the absolute number of attacks against corporations has dramatically decreased. Attacks against American diplomatic installations—fueled by false rumors of US orchestration of the attack on the Grand Mosque in Mecca—increased at year's end.

Despite the publicity given to occasional sophisticated operations, most terrorist attacks continue to be simple in conception and operation (see table 6, page 16). Bombings remained by far the most preferred type of attacks, accounting for nearly 40 percent of all terrorist operations. Despite preboarding security precautions that made the smuggling of weapons on board airliners highly improbable, aerial hijackers have discovered that pilots generally assume that their claims of being armed are true and have thus acquiesced to their demands. Hence, although few

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks Directed Against US Targets, 1968-79

Figure 4

Total: 1,348



Unclassified

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hijackers have been armed, hijackings—by terrorists and nonterrorists—have increased somewhat over 1978 totals.

Fortunes of Major Groups³

Western Europe. The Provisional Wing of the Irish Republican Army, as well as the Irish National Liberation Army, has generated substantial international publicity with several major operations during the year, particularly those aimed at symbols of the British Government and the Crown.

They assassinated Airey Neave, would-be Conservative Secretary for Northern Ireland; Sir Richard Sykes, Ambassador to the Netherlands; and Lord Mountbatten, a member of the British royal family. The IRA also continued to inflict mass casualties, injuring 18 persons in a bombing in Brussels and killing at least 18 soldiers and wounding another eight in an ambush near the Irish border at Warrenpoint.

³ Coverage of this topic necessarily touches on acts of domestic as well as international terrorism involving these groups.

According to a recent British Army assessment of the IRA, the group has adopted a more clandestine cellular structure, making it much more difficult to combat. While this reorganization has increased the clandestine security of IRA units and thus permitted successful major operations without leaks to the authorities, compartmentation may lead to operational errors. Many observers believed the IRA's successful assassination of a Belgian banker and the near-successful assassination attempt on SHAPE Commander Alexander Haig were both cases of mistaken identity. The IRA's Christmas letterbombing campaign against prominent Britons failed when the group mailed their deadly packages to the wrong addresses. Despite popular outcry in the wake of these attacks, and a papal plea for a cease-fire, IRA operations are expected to continue to be successful in the near term.


On the European continent, the ETA, a Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organization in Spain, met with successes similar to those of the IRA. Factions of the group assassinated several important military officials, leading to increased pressures on the government to adopt repressive measures that the ETA believes would result in increased popular support for an independent Basque state.

Hoping to combat French-Spanish cooperation against Basque terrorists who slip across the border, the ETA temporarily declared war on French business and tourist interests in Spain. They conducted a vigorous bombing campaign which in one weekend claimed five deaths and 113 injuries at an airport and two rail stations. Spanish rightists, despairing of a firm governmental response to this wave of terrorism, conducted a series of vigilante raids against Basque leaders in France. Despite the positive outcome of the 25 October referendum on Basque autonomy, some members of the ETA have vowed to continue to use terrorism to press for complete independence.

Spanish authorities suffered a setback when five members of Spain's other major terrorist group, the Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1 (GRAPO), tunneled to freedom from a prison in Zamora. Earlier in the year the group was apparently planning to kidnap a high-ranking US military official.

**Nationality of Victims
of International Terrorist Attacks,*
1968-79**

Figure 5



*The percentage of the total number of incidents around the world appears under the total number of incidents involving victims from that region. Percentages sum to more than 100 due to incidents in which victims were from several regions.

1979 proportions are represented by red sections of bars.

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West German terrorists had a second consecutive unsuccessful year, failing to carry out any major actions and presumably conducting only some support activities, such as robbing banks and maintaining hideouts. The Red Army Faction was one of several groups that claimed responsibility for the assassination attempt against General Haig. Police discovered several terrorist safe houses and arrested several well-known terrorist leaders, which will significantly hamper terrorist planning and operational capabilities.

Terrorism by both the left and the right in Turkey resulted in an average of four deaths per day, despite the imposition of martial law in several provinces and increased pressure by the military on the new government for more effective measures. The leftist Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front was responsible for most of the seven assassinations of US citizens in Turkey last year. On the international front, Armenian exiles, still seeking revenge for Turkish massacres in 1915, expanded the range of their targets. Whereas they had previously attacked only Turkish personnel and facilities, numerous non-Turkish airline offices were bombed throughout Western Europe by individuals claiming to belong to Armenian organizations.

In Italy, there were some noteworthy police successes against the major groups. Individuals believed responsible for the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro in 1978 were arrested in Italy and France. Other individuals responsible for major rightwing terrorist attacks were detained in Latin America during the year. Fissures within the Red Brigade, Italy's well-known leftist terrorist group, appeared to be growing, as its factions carried an ideological battle of words in the country's newspapers.

Despite such reverses, Italian terrorists do not seem to have been operationally hampered, and terrorist attacks continue at their record-setting rate. Some operations showed particular daring; the Front Line's seizure of 200 hostages at a Turin business school ended with 10 of the victims being shot in the leg. Such raids led the Italian Government to institute several stern measures to aid antiterrorist efforts.

Middle East. Anti-US sentiment in Iran reached a peak in 1979 with the second takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran. Beyond its unique political

ramifications this takeover also differed operationally from previous barricade and hostage episodes in several ways. Usually, the environment around the site is hostile to the terrorist; in Tehran, the captors had the support of the host government in defiance of all rules of customary and codified international legal practice. After the takeover, security forces, acting in concert with the terrorists, guarded the hostages and restricted communications. Rather than actively negotiating for the release of the hostages, government authorities reinforced the demands of the terrorists. Outside Iran, the few planned terrorist attacks in support of this operation were thwarted by police.

The seizure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca led Saudi Government officials to reexamine the extent of the threat posed by domestic dissidents, including their foreign contacts and organizational capabilities. Several attacks on US facilities were made by Muslims who believed the charges of US involvement in the Mecca attack. These incidents do not appear to have been orchestrated by any government or organization as part of a coordinated campaign.

Disunity continues to beleaguer the Palestinian movement. Several radical Arab governments have taken advantage of these differences by sponsoring guerrilla organizations to further their own ends. Bickering within and among organizations has thus in part prevented Arab terrorist attacks from reaching the levels of the early 1970s. Moreover, radical Arab governments have realized that their previous extensive support of Palestinian terrorism often proved counterproductive in their dealings with the West. At least for the time being, there has been a notable decline in government patronage of international terrorist attacks.

Fatah held off international terrorist activity pending the outcome of Yasir Arafat's diplomatic offensive to obtain Western recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Moreover, Fatah's ability to conduct international terrorist exploits was restricted by the assassination in Beirut in January of Ali Hassan Salameh, reputed planner of Black September's attack on the 1972 Munich Olympics.

10

Saiqa, a Syrian-sponsored Palestinian group that had not conducted any international terrorist attacks since 1973, made headlines through a series of attacks under the name of the Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution, a fictitious name used to mask Saiqa's attacks against Egyptian interests in Europe and the Middle East. Its most spectacular operation was the takeover of the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara, Turkey. After the takeover ended, Turkish authorities granted permission for the opening of a PLO office in Ankara, reputedly in return for PLO mediation with the terrorists. Saiqa's terrorist activities were halted, if only temporarily, with the assassination in France of its leader, Zuhayr Muhsin.

Other Palestinian groups met with similar mixed success. The Black March Organization, believed by some observers to be either the Black September Organization or a cover name for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), underscored its opposition to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty with a bloody attack on the Brussels airport.⁴ West German authorities thwarted possible similar operations by arresting several would-be Palestinian terrorists entering West Germany in late April.

Latin America. Several Salvadoran leftist formations conducted the most noteworthy international terrorist operations in Latin America. They seized several foreign embassies and private installations, assassinated several diplomats and businessmen and kidnaped others, including Americans, Britons, and the South African Ambassador to El Salvador. These organizations hope to be as successful as the Sandinistas in Nicaragua in toppling the government.

Terrorism farther south has been virtually halted in some countries because of aggressive crackdowns by police forces. Although Argentine terrorists have

⁴ The PFLP has decreased its international terrorist operations since the 1978 death of its foreign operations chief, Wadi Haddad. The organization has apparently been unable to replace him with an individual with similar organizational and governmental contacts or terrorist planning skills. However, one of the PFLP's most infamous operatives, Venezuelan-born Carlos, recently surfaced for the first time since he led the 1975 raid on an OPEC summit to tell the press that he would return to prominence.

suffered massive losses, the Montoneros showed a continued capability for at least sporadically mounting dramatic incidents. And there were continuing indications that bilateral cooperative arrangements exist among some Latin American terrorists.

Antiterrorist Countermeasures

Businesses continue to search for defensive methods tailored to their own needs. Several multinational corporations preferred to comply with terrorist ransom and publicity demands rather than cooperate in government-declared "no concessions" policies. Many consultative organizations were formed solely to advise executives on how to cope with political violence. Others conduct ransom negotiations and payoffs as part of the services offered to their kidnap insurance customers.

The growing popularity of these insurance policies increases the likelihood that terrorist kidnapers will achieve their monetary goals. These ransoms will, in turn, fund further terrorist operations. Hence, while kidnap insurance increases the chances of a victim being freed safely, its existence is counterproductive in the long run, defeating deterrence policies.

Regional cooperation against terrorism was especially evident among European countries. In May, police chiefs of 17 major West European cities met to discuss means to combat terrorism and other violent crimes. In December, members of the European Community signed a convention designed to resolve some technical legal difficulties in implementing the Council of Europe's Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism. The latest convention calls for extradition or prosecution of individuals suspected of certain offenses—including hijacking, kidnaping, use of bombs and automatic firearms, and attacks on diplomats—whatever the motivation. The agreement will come into effect when all nine members of the EC have passed necessary ratification legislation.

Cross-regional antiterrorist cooperation—most notably between Western Europe and Israel—nearly backfired. Palestinians charged that West Germany permitted an Israeli intelligence officer to question an

Arab guerrilla arrested trying to smuggle explosives into West Germany last April. The PLO claimed that Israel later forced the guerrilla to attempt to assassinate a prominent Fatah leader, but that the Arab committed suicide instead. The PLO threatened to scuttle its quiet working relationship with West Germany, while more radical Palestinians vowed to take more drastic retaliatory measures. These threats—as well as those directed against the United States for initially granting Israel's request for the extradition of an Arab accused of bombing an Israeli marketplace—did not result in terrorist attacks.

Even certain Communist regimes expressed some interest in cooperating with the West in combating terrorism. China, for example, supported the UN convention on hostages, and Cuba renewed its antihijacking agreements with Canada and Venezuela for another five years. After all, Communist states were not entirely immune to terrorist threats. The Soviets abroad continued to be attacked by militant Jewish groups and anti-Communist Cuban exiles. Soviet official and commercial facilities more recently have been bombed by Ukrainian exiles and individuals protesting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

The most notable attempt to combat terrorism on a global scale was the UN General Assembly's adoption by consensus of an international convention against the taking of hostages. The convention, which had been in various UN committees for three years, calls for states to prosecute or extradite hostage-takers without exception whatsoever. Language on the rights of national liberation movements, the right of asylum, and the Geneva conventions and protocols on the law of war was included to allow for greater support of the final document. The convention was opened for signature on 18 December and will come into effect when 22 states have ratified it.

Several nations joined the three international conventions on crimes against aviation, as well as the UN convention on internationally protected persons. The new round of demarches by the supporters of these agreements is likely to add further to the list of adherents.

Outlook

Although individual terrorist attacks rely heavily upon the element of surprise, general patterns of terrorist behavior have proven to be predictable. Although there will be several discontinuities, we expect that a number of trends from the 1970s will carry over into the next year:

- While the statistical decreases in the number of terrorist incidents that we have noted are at first impression encouraging, the decline may be only temporary. Terrorist incidents have shown a two-year cyclic pattern during the 1970s, with 1979 predicted as a valley. Several terrorist groups may have been improving operational security and sophistication, recruiting and training new members, and merely waiting out government dragnets. This would allow them to better adapt to government countermeasures, thus increasing the likelihood of more frequent—and occasionally more sophisticated—attacks in the future.
- The increase in casualties and casualty-producing incidents—particularly in light of the notable rise of assassinations—is especially alarming. Although operations deliberately intended to result in mass casualties have been rare, terrorists may believe that a larger number of casualties are now necessary to generate the amount of publicity formerly evoked by less bloody operations.
- The vast majority of incidents will continue to be simple in conception and implementation, posing little risk to the perpetrators. Although added security precautions at sensitive facilities, a business exodus from unstable areas, and paramilitary rescue squads may deter spectacular attacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all potential—if less sensitive—targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
- Regional patterns of victimization and location of operations are likely to remain virtually unchanged. Representatives of affluent countries, particularly government officials and business executives, will remain attractive targets. Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East again are likely to be

the main trouble spots. Americans and US property will continue to be attacked on occasion, although improvements in US official and corporate security should deter many potential attacks by small bands.


New developments expected in the coming year include the following:

- Terrorists will try to adapt their tactics to neutralize the countermeasures adopted by government and private security services. They probably will change target selection, improve planning and trade craft, and, possibly, increase their technological sophistication.
- West German terrorists, having suffered reverses during the past two years, are likely to feel greater pressure to renew their revolutionary credentials by engaging in operations at home or overseas. As has been the case with the PFLP, however, losses of major leaders—through arrest, death, or retirement—has severely cut back their operational capabilities.
- New groups, motivated by hitherto unpublicized goals, are likely to emerge. One such movement may already have come to light in Syria, where Soviets have been attacked for their actions in Afghanistan. Other groups may be formed due to the recent upsurge in nationalism and ethnic consciousness. Improvements in the general level of education and affluence had generally been believed to vitiate parochialism. In several areas, however, such improvements are generating a historical consciousness that results in the pursuit of narrower and more traditional loyalties, such as ethnic and religious ties. Often that pursuit will produce violence both within and across state boundaries.
- The support of terrorists by patron states has become more selective than it had been in previous years, due to almost uniformly unfavorable publicity, diplomatic repercussions, and the inability to control such operations. The recent unwillingness to provide overt aid may be reversed if states do not perceive that their interests are being served by more conventional means; nonetheless, it is more likely that cost-effectiveness will become the determinant of whether to support terrorists.

International Terrorist Incidents by Category, 1968-79

Figure 6

Total: 3,336



1. Includes hijacking of modes of transportation for air, sea, or land, but excludes numerous non-terrorist hijackings.

2. Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

Unclassified

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Appendix A

Interpreting Statistics on International Terrorism

This study uses computerized data based solely on unclassified material published since 1968. While this technique promotes a historical and comparative perspective, the tallies should be treated with caution. This appendix explains the conceptual and analytical issues involved in the development and maintenance of the data set upon which these statistics are based.

Competing Research Methods

Several research approaches have been used in attempts to examine forms of terrorism systematically. One technique is to review the literature of terrorism, focusing on the philosophies of guerrilla theorists and practitioners. While this may yield an idea of possible motivations, such an inquiry is limited only to those groups that have chosen to leave a printed legacy. We might attempt to solve this difficulty by interviewing practicing, jailed, or retired terrorists.¹ Problems of access, as well as reliability of testimony, cast doubt on the utility and practicability of such an approach. Additionally, the terrorist may be unaware of why he really behaves as he does, and interviewing could become an exercise in mutual distortion.

Our research has attempted to deal with these problems by supplementing these methods with an events data approach, which has been employed more generally in academic studies of the structure of the international system. Rather than focusing on individual actors or terrorist groups, such an approach deals with the discrete incident as the unit of analysis. This approach allows us to examine actual behavior, rather than statements by observers and practitioners about such behavior.

¹ The clandestine nature of terrorism, personal predispositions and institutional affiliations of most researchers will continue to limit this area of inquiry to the domain of the courageous handful. Other researchers, however, may profitably attempt to use such data in constructing long-range secondary psychiatric profiles of specific individuals. Care must always be taken, however, to ensure that the terrorist is not using the researcher as another medium of propaganda transmission.

Although the data are collected on individual incidents, descriptive statistics allow us to aggregate these events and investigate long-term trends in terrorist campaigns. This leads to general conclusions about what terrorists do, how they go about it, and where they are most likely to strike. Furthermore, noting the structural characteristics of the incident provides us with an indication of the boundaries within which terrorists operate. Physical, temporal, and self-imposed constraints upon terrorist behavior establish the parameters of their activities. From observing the choices terrorists make within these limits, we can attempt to infer motivations and compare the terrorists' stated rationale for their actions with their target selection. Ideally, knowledge of the range of options open to the terrorists, as well as their most likely choices, can lead to potentially effective counter-measures.

Structural Characteristics of Terrorist Incidents

We have found that intelligence analysis plays several roles in aiding policymakers charged with coping with specific incidents of terrorism. For example, establishing general patterns of terrorist behavior from overt data, while useful in planning protective strategies, must be supplemented with specific tactical data regarding the terrorist group conducting the operation, evidence of what terrorists in similar situations have done, and estimates concerning how this group is likely to react to several possible government responses. To organize our information to meet these needs, we break down our data into a number of categories, related generally to a sequence of phases through which most incidents proceed.

The first phase, common to all incidents, is the *preincident* period, in which the terrorist is planning the operation. This period may include acquisition of operational intelligence through surveillance, informants, and penetrations of the target by agents of

the group. The group is simultaneously obtaining operational paraphernalia, such as arms, documents, disguises, transportation, and other equipment. After planning the operation, training often takes place. This is followed by movement to the scene of the attack. During this period, those aiming at countering the terrorists will concentrate their resources on intelligence operations designed to detect and thereby thwart the group's plans.

The second phase, again common to all incidents, is the *initiation* of the attack, which varies from emplacing a bomb to taking hostages. Compared to the first phase, which can last for months, this phase is measured in seconds or minutes. Those needing intelligence support are the security forces at the scene.

The *negotiation* phase, which is limited to incidents involving the seizure of symbols (usually human) deemed of value to a third party, can range from a matter of hours in most barricade-and-hostage scenarios to years in some marathon kidnappings. Here the intelligence analyst serves the negotiator, who may be a trained psychologist/psychiatrist, government official, individual of symbolic value to the terrorists, or a third-party intermediary.

The *climax* signals the ending of the incident. In some cases, it may be nearly identical in time to the initiation of the incident (for example, a thrown bomb explodes). Those who depend upon intelligence now can include the intermediary from the previous phase, the security forces from phase two, or an armed rescue squad formed to secure the release of the hostages in case negotiations break down.

The *postincident* period closes the description of an event and often brings us full circle to the planning phase for the next incident. Those requiring data and analysis include hospitals and psychiatrists who care for the victims, as well as court systems to handle the proper disposition of the offenders. In this phase, as well as all of the others, government/business policymakers are involved in developing a comprehensive response plan.

The news media, as well as educators, are similarly involved at every step of the incident.

During this sequence, we are most interested in understanding the dynamic relationships between actors and how these interactions can be manipulated to lead to a favorable resolution of the crisis. Our definition of terrorism allows us to identify five major types of actors according to their type and extent of involvement in the incident: terrorists, victims, hosts, targets, and audiences. In many incidents, a given nation-state may assume several of these roles. For example, a country could be a terrorist "breeder" (that is, the home country of the terrorist), as well as provide the location of the attack (host) and be the target of the demands forwarded by the terrorist. Figure 7 sketches a few of the relationships between these actors which might be manipulated, and for which data are readily available.


Further complicating the situation—although allowing additional opportunities for intervention leading to the episode's resolution—are secondary actors. Three subtypes of ancillary actors can be established according to their attitudes toward the nonterrorist actors: malevolent, neutral, or benign. Figure 8 depicts the types of relationships between primary and secondary actors for which we collect information.

Malevolent ancillaries may be other terrorist groups or sympathetic patron states, who provide varying degrees of aid to the terrorist groups before, during, and/or after the event. Such actors may also direct propaganda to specified audiences in support of the terrorists' actions. Some events have also included a third party adding demands to those forwarded by the perpetrator of the incident.

The neutral third party most often mediates between the terrorist and the target. The target may also request the neutral's aid in implementing various face-saving solutions to the incident, such as granting safe

Relationships Between Primary Participants in a Terrorist Incident

Figure 7



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
haven to the perpetrators at the conclusion of an incident or publishing a terrorist manifesto. The neutral, as well as benign ancillaries, may also choose to grant humanitarian assistance to victims. In addition, the benign ancillary may provide technical assistance to the target in the form of intelligence and security information, equipment, or manpower for dealing with the crisis.

Data Collection and Cataloguing

To construct the categories for our data set, we surveyed academic literature and government policy-makers to identify variables considered relevant to the description of each incident phase and actor. To

establish the feasibility of treating incidents quantitatively, this list was treated as preliminary, and only a few sources were employed.

Among the difficulties we initially encountered were the issue of defining terrorism, its international variants, and what constitutes a separate incident. How one emerges from these definitional complexities will affect what is included in the data compilation and, therefore, the substantive conclusions. For example, Risks International's mixing of international and domestic incidents yields a once-interrupted constant rise in terrorism during the 1970s, whereas our



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statistics on only international incidents yields a two-year cyclic pattern during the same period.² A Rand Corporation compilation treated a wave of 40 bombings by one group during one night in the same city as

² Adding foreign local incidents to our data would enormously inflate our statistics. For example, casualty figures for Turkey alone in the 1970s frequently equal or surpass our annual casualty statistics for international attacks. More than 2,000 people have died in terrorist attacks in Northern Ireland since 1969.

The criteria used in the present study are unavoidably arbitrary. The statistics exclude terrorist attacks on US and allied personnel and installations during the Indochina conflict. They also exclude the assassinations and cross-border operations associated with the Arab-Israeli conflict, unless those incidents either victimized non-combatant nationals of states outside the principal area of conflict or became the object of international controversy. The figures also exclude bombings, shellings, and incursions by conventional forces. Related but separately targeted actions undertaken by a single terrorist group are counted as individual incidents, even when they were staged on the same day and in close proximity to one another. Terrorist operations that miscarried (as opposed to those that were abandoned or countered during the planning or staging phases) are counted.

one incident, whereas we logged 40 incidents in this case. The inflationary or deflationary effects of these differing coding conventions are readily apparent.

Increasing the number of sources gives more information on more incidents and fills in missing data on each incident, but it does not necessarily solve problems of erroneous information and conflicting information among sources. Such distortion may result from deliberate falsification or underreporting of data by any of the participants involved in the incident. Governments may seek to establish a favorable image for themselves (as do terrorists). Corporations, on the other hand, tend to remain silent on threats and attacks against their facilities because of insurance and goodwill considerations as well as the fear of unfavorable host government intervention during clandestine

ransom negotiations and payoffs. Firms may also have been intimidated into silence by the terrorists' threat of retaliatory attacks.

Errors in reporting by the press and broadcast news media are generally unintentional, due to a "fog of war" that prevails during crisis situations. Unfortunately, terrorist incidents are rarely the subjects of followup press articles which would correct these initial errors. The analyst must determine the credibility of reports by noting access of the source to given details, previous reporting reliability, and possible ulterior motives in distorting, selectively reporting, or falsifying information.

Other problems in coding remain. Subtle biases may be introduced by relying too heavily on variables that require judgmental, rather than enumerative, distinctions. Statistical checks and partial corrections for these errors are available in certain cases but can make analysis and interpretation of results cumbersome. Attribution of terrorist purpose, for example, proved to be generally unreliable in the pilot data set and was subsequently dropped. In addition, incidents that have many of the outward manifestations of terrorist events, such as "quasi-terroristic" criminal or psychopathic attacks, may tend to contaminate the data set if included.

Current Status

After discovering these problems in the preliminary compilation, a second data set has been created which we believe adequately deals with these issues. The current data set includes more sources and has refined the variables. Several variables were deleted because of lack of data (for example, purpose of attack, age of terrorists), their unreliable judgmental nature (for example, degree of discrimination in selection of victim), or lack of discriminable (that is, minimal variance) data. The benefits of including some variables did not justify their data collection costs; these variables were also dropped. New variables have been added based on suggestions made by academic and governmental users of the pilot data set (for example, several variables on the legal issues involved

in the adjudication of the terrorist incident). In addition, the numeric data set is now divided into four separate files (general, hijack, hostage, terrorist fate), resulting in a substantial savings in core storage and statistical package flexibility.

A textual description of each incident is now also available and can be used to create specialized chronologies of incidents with common characteristics, for example, a chronology of attacks against US diplomatic facilities. Intercoder reliability has been substantially improved, because of the nonjudgmental nature of most of the variables, greater care in making coding distinctions explicit in the codebook, and increased supervision by the project director of the coders' work.

This appendix is Unclassified.

Table 1**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-79**

Location	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
North America	35	7	23	24	18	18	38	51	37	23	19	25	318 (11.4)
Latin America	41	71	113	70	49	80	124	48	105	46	61	53	861 (25.8)
Western Europe	16	31	58	38	112	141	151	109	179	129	166	137	1,267 (38.0)
USSR/Eastern Europe	0	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	2	3	3	15 (0.4)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0	7	8	4	4	4	9	18	16	20	24	10	124 (3.7)
Middle East and North Africa	18	32	60	52	35	21	47	56	62	48	61	39	531 (15.9)
Asia	1	12	19	24	43	10	11	13	14	8	16	26	197 (5.9)
Oceania	0	5	1	2	3	1	1	0	0	3	3	0	19 (0.5)
Transregional	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4 (0.1)
Total	111	166	282	216	269	275	382	297	413	279	353	293	3,336

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each region.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 2**International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Target**

Target	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Diplomatic officials or property	12	17	52	51	22	19	12	12	12	21	22	21	273 (20.3)
Military officials or property	4	2	38	36	11	12	12	9	33	40	30	7	204 (15.1)
Other Government officials or property	26	32	57	21	20	10	16	14	2	7	2	10	217 (16.1)
Business facilities or executives	6	35	24	40	44	51	86	42	52	33	47	27	487 (36.2)
Private citizens	3	7	17	5	12	10	13	27	26	13	21	12	166 (12.3)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	122	77	1,347

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of target.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 3**International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	3	32	17	11	37	25	38	30	22	27	20	263 (7.9)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	5	1	3	8	9	14	4	5	11	13	73 (2.2)
Letter bombing	3	4	3	1	92	22	16	3	11	2	5	24	186 (5.5)
Incendiary bombing	12	22	53	30	15	31	37	20	91	57	69	19	456 (13.7)
Explosive bombing	67	97	104	115	106	136	239	169	176	131	133	115	1,588 (47.6)
Armed attack	11	13	8	8	9	10	21	11	21	14	36	26	188 (5.5)
Hijacking ²	3	11	21	9	14	6	8	4	6	8	2	8	100 (3.0)
Assassination	7	4	16	12	10	18	12	20	48	23	29	47	246 (7.4)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	1	0	8	8	5	0	12	2	78 (2.3)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	4	3	3	9	14	6	9	8	71 (2.1)
Other actions ³	1	3	11	10	4	4	4	1	7	11	20	11	87 (2.6)

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 4**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Trans-regional	Total
Kidnaping	3	144	25	0	40	34	15	2	0	263
Barricade-hostage	6	19	24	0	2	19	3	0	0	73
Letter bombing	15	9	100	0	14	7	37	0	4	186
Incendiary bombing	30	72	256	3	4	53	34	4	0	456
Explosive bombing	214	403	641	8	12	250	48	12	0	1,552
Armed attack	3	37	38	1	23	62	24	0	0	188
Hijacking ¹	6	23	19	1	7	28	16	0	0	100
Assassination	17	62	94	0	20	38	14	1	0	246
Theft, break-in	3	45	14	0	0	14	2	0	0	78
Sniping	12	32	9	1	1	13	3	0	0	71
Other actions ²	9	15	47	1	1	13	1	0	0	87
Total	318	861	1,267	15	124	531	197	19	4	3,336

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 5**International Terrorist Attack on US Citizens or Property,
1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	Total ¹
Kidnaping	1	2	17	9	2	20	8	20	7	4	5	5	100 (7.4)
Barricade-hostage	0	0	3	0	1	2	2	1	1	3	0	3	16 (1.2)
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	3	0	1	0	2	1	0	0	12 (0.9)
Incendiary bombing	12	18	40	26	13	19	25	4	36	24	49	39	275 (20.4)
Explosive bombing	30	58	77	93	73	52	90	63	44	35	40	38	693 (51.4)
Armed attack	1	4	3	4	6	6	5	3	8	3	11	7	61 (4.5)
Hijacking ²	0	4	12	3	4	0	0	2	5	4	0	1	35 (2.6)
Assassination	3	2	9	2	2	3	2	7	13	5	6	9	63 (4.7)
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	0	0	3	3	1	0	8	0	41 (3.0)
Sniping	2	1	5	2	2	0	3	1	5	4	3	3	31 (2.3)
Other actions ³	0	0	5	6	3	0	0	0	3	1	1	2	21 (1.6)
Total	51	93	188	153	109	102	139	104	125	84	123	77	1,348

¹ Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

² Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

³ Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 6**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1979, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	1	11	2	0	1	1	4	20
Barricade-hostage	0	8	1	0	0	4	0	13
Letter bombing	1	0	22	0	0	1	0	24
Incendiary bombing	1	3	7	1	0	1	6	19
Explosive bombing	16	15	66	1	2	13	2	115
Armed attack	1	4	4	0	2	4	11	26
Hijacking ¹	1	1	0	1	0	4	1	8
Assassination	2	6	25	0	5	7	2	47
Theft, break-in	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	2
Sniping	1	4	1	0	0	2	0	8
Other ²	1	0	8	0	0	2	0	11
Total	25	53	137	3	10	39	26	293

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

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Table 7

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks
on US Citizens or Property, 1968-79, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Oceania	Total
Kidnaping	0	61	1	0	14	20	4	0	100
Barricade-hostage	3	3	1	0	0	8	1	0	16
Letter bombing	3	2	1	0	2	0	4	0	12
Incendiary bombing	6	61	131	1	3	42	27	4	275
Explosive bombing	77	267	186	0	4	118	38	3	693
Armed attack	0	19	12	0	3	17	10	0	61
Hijacking ¹	6	5	11	0	0	3	10	0	35
Assassination	3	23	11	0	6	14	6	0	63
Theft, break-in	0	28	5	0	0	7	0	0	41
Sniping	0	16	4	1	0	7	3	0	31
Other actions ²	1	7	3	1	0	8	1	0	21
Total	99	492	366	3	32	244	105	7	1,348

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Table 8

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks
on US Citizens or Property, 1979, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Total
Kidnaping	0	3	0	0	0	1	1	5
Barricade-hostage	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	3
Letter bombing	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incendiary bombing	0	1	1	0	0	1	6	9
Explosive bombing	12	10	12	0	0	2	2	38
Armed attack	0	2	0	0	0	3	2	7
Hijacking ¹	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Assassination	1	0	6	0	1	0	1	9
Theft, break-in	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sniping	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	3
Other ²	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
Total	15	18	21	0	1	10	12	77

¹ Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport, but excludes numerous nonterrorist hijackings, many of which involved US aircraft.

² Includes occupation of facilities without hostage seizure, shootouts with police, and sabotage.

This table is Unclassified.

Appendix B

Names and Acronyms Used by Groups Claiming Responsibility for International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-1979

This list includes names of non-US organizations responsible either by claim or attribution for specific international terrorist actions noted in our statistics. The inclusion of any given group should not be interpreted as an evaluation of that organization's goals or motives. Some groups that began as violent organizations may have changed their ideology and tactics or may have disbanded with their members joining other groups. Some attacks may have been carried out without the approval, or even foreknowledge, of that organization's leaders. In still other cases, claims of responsibility may be falsely made by opponents of the organization who are attempting to discredit their enemies.

Many of the groups listed are cover names for organizations wishing to deny responsibility for a particular action that may yield counterproductive results. Some names may have been used by common criminals to throw off police investigators or by psychotics seeking public recognition. No attempt has been made to pierce these covers, and the names provided by the claimants have been accepted.

The list is organized according to the probable nationality of the terrorists or, when ambiguous, by the terrorists' area of operations. This list does not include US organizations that have claimed responsibility for attacks against foreigners on US soil.

Groups With Indeterminate Nationality

Che Guevara Brigade
International Che Guevara Organization
International Revolutionary Front
Islamic Liberation Organization
Moslem International Guerrillas
VFVP LBF (expansion unknown)

Western Hemisphere

Argentina

Argentine Anti-Communist Alliance (AAA)
Argentine Liberation Front (FAL)
Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO)
Argentine National Social Front
Argentine Youth for Sovereignty
Comite Argentino de Lucha Anti-Imperialista
Descamisados Peronistas Montoneros
ERP-August 22
Frente de Liberacion Nacional del Vietnam del Sur
Maximo Mena Command
Montoneros
Movimiento Peronista
Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR)

Bolivia

National Liberation Army (ELN)
Nationalist Commando

Brazil

Action for National Liberation (ALN)
Armed Revolutionary Vanguard-Palmares (VAR-Palmares)
Aurora Maria Nacimiento Furtado Command
Revolutionary Movement of the 8th (MR-8)
Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria (VPR)

Canada

Canadian Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation
Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ)

Chile

Chilean Socialist Party
Proletarian Action Group
Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MIR)

Colombia

Group of Revolutionary Commandos-Operation
Argimiro Gabaldon
Invisible Ones
Military Liberation Front of Colombia
Movement of the 19th (M-19)
National Liberation Armed Forces
National Liberation Army (ELN)
People's Revolutionary Army-Zero Point
Popular Liberation Army (EPL)
Red Flag
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Revolutionary Workers Party
September 14 Workers Self-Defense Command
United Front for Guerrilla Action

Costa Rica

Revolutionary Commandos of Solidarity
Roberto Santucho Revolutionary Group

Cuba

Abdala
Alpha 66
Anti-Castro Commando
Anti-Communist Commandos
Brigade 2506
Condor
Coordination of United Revolutionary Organizations
(CORU)
Cuba Action
Cuba Action Commandos
Cuban Anti-Communist League
Cuban C-4 Movement
Cuban Liberation Front
Cuban National Liberation Front (FLNC)
Cuban Power (el Poder Cubano)
Cuban Power 76
Cuban Representation in Exile
Cuban Revolutionary Directorate
Cuban Revolutionary Organization
Cuban Youth Group
International Secret Revolutionary United Cells
JCN (expansion unknown)
Latin American Anti-Communist Army
Movement of Cuban Justice
Movement of the Seventh (M-7)
National Integration Front (FIN; Cuban Nationalist
Front)

Omega 7

Pedro Luis Boitel Command
Pedro Ruiz Botero Commandos
Pragmatistas
Scorpion (el Alacran)
Second Front of Escambray
Secret Anti-Castro Cuban Army
Secret Cuban Government
Secret Hand Organization
Secret Organization Zero
Young Cubans
Youths of the Star

Dominican Republic

Dominican Popular Movement (MDP)
Twelfth of January Liberation Movement
United Anti-Reelection Command

El Salvador

Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN)
Faribundo Marti Liberation Labor Forces (FPL;
Popular Liberation Forces)
February 28 Popular Leagues (LP-28)
People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (BPR)
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers
(PRTC)
United Popular Action Front (FAPU)
White Warriors Union (UGB)

Guatemala

Guatemalan Anti-Salvadoran Liberating Action
Guerrillas (GALGAS)
Guatemalan Nationalist Commando
National League for the Protection of Guatemala
National Liberation Movement
Peoples Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR; PGT/FAR;
Rebel Armed Forces)
Revolutionary Movement of November 13 (MR-13)

Guyana

People's Temple

Haiti

Coalition of National Liberation Brigades
Haitian Coalition

Mexico

Armed Communist League
 Armed Vanguard of the Proletariat
 Mexican People's Revolutionary Army
 People's Armed Command
 People's Liberation Army
 People's Revolutionary Armed Forces (FRAP)
 23rd of September Communist League
 United Popular Liberation Army of America

Nicaragua

Sandinist National Liberation Front (FSLN)

Paraguay

Political Military Organization
 Popular Colorado Movement (MoPoCo, dissident
 faction of Colorado Party)

Peru

Armed Nationalist Movement Organization (MANO)
 Condor
 Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)
 MTR (expansion unknown)
 Peruvian Anti-Communist Alliance (AAP)
 Revolutionary Vanguard

Uruguay

Armed Popular Front (FAP)
 National Liberation Movement (MLN; Tupamaros)
 Organization of the Popular Revolutionary-33
 (OPR-33)
 PCU (expansion unknown)
 Raul Sendic International Brigade

Europe

Albania

Anti-Communist Military Council

Austria

Justice Guerrilla

Belgium

Julien Lahaut Brigade
 Revenge and Freedom

Cyprus

Enosis Movement (EOKA-B)
 National Patriotic Front M.P. 14/31

France

Action Front for the Liberation of the Baltic Countries
 Andreas Baader Commando
 Autonomous Intervention Collective Against the
 Zionist Presence in France
 Avengers
 Charles Martel Group
 Committee for Socialist Revolutionary Unity
 Committee of Coordination
 Group for the Defense of Europe
 International Revolutionary Solidarity
 International Solidarity
 Jewish Self-Defense Front
 Masada Action and Defense Movement
 Movement of Youthward Brothers in War of the
 Palestinian People
 New Order
 Organization Delta
 Red Army Faction of Southern France
 6th of March Group
 Solidarity Resistance Front
 Talion Law
 We Must Do Something
 Youth Action Group

Greece

Army Officers Representing the Free Greek Spirit
 ELA (expansion unknown)
 Free Greeks
 Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN)
 Greek Militant Resistance
 Greek People
 Independence-Liberation-Resistance (AAA)
 National Youth Resistance Organization
 Organization of November 17
 Patriotic Front
 Peoples Resistance Organized Army
 Popular Liberation Organized Army
 Popular Resistance Sabotage Group-11 (LAOS 11)
 Popular Resistance Sabotage Group Number 13
 (LAOS Number 13)
 Popular Resistance Sabotage Group People Number
 One (LAOS People Number One)
 Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group
 Union of Officers Struggling for the National Idea

Italy

Armed Communist Formations
 Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)
 Armed Proletarian Power
 Autonomous Workers Movement
 Black Order (Ordine Nero)
 Combatants for Communism
 Proletarian Committee of Subversion for Better Justice
 Proletarian Internationalism
 Proletarian Justice
 Proletarian Squad
 Red Brigades (BR)
 Red Guerrilla
 Revolutionary Action Group

Netherlands

Red Brigades
 Revolutionary Peoples Resistance of the Netherlands

Portugal

Action Group for Communism
 ARA (expansion unknown)
 Portuguese Anti-Communist Movement
 Portuguese Liberation Army
 Revolutionary Internationalist Solidarity

Spain

Anti-Fascist Resistance Group of October 1 (GRAPO)
 Basque Nation and Freedom (ETA; Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna)
 Commando of Solidarity with Euzkadi
 Hammer and Sickle Cooperative
 Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL)
 International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI)
 Juan Paredes Manot International Brigade
 Nationalist Intervention Group
 Popular Revolutionary Armed Front (FRAP)
 Spanish Armed Groups
 Spanish National Association
 Warriors of Christ the King

Sweden

B-26 (expansion unknown)

Switzerland

Les Beliers de Jura
 Petra Kraus Group

Turkey

Acilciler
 Armenian Liberation Army
 Avengers of the Armenian Genocide
 Front for the Liberation of Armenia
 Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide
 Justice of Armenian Genocide
 Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)
 Mayir Cayan Suicide Group
 New Armenian Resistance Group
 Secret Armenian Army for the Liberation of Armenia (Secret Armenian Liberation Army; SALA)
 Slave Korten Yanikiyan Group
 Turkish Peoples Liberation Army (TPLA)
 Turkish Peoples Liberation Party/Front (TPLP/F)
 Turkish Revolutionaries
 Turkish Revolutionary Youth Federation
 28 May Armenian Organization
 Yanikian Commandos

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

October 15 Commando

United Kingdom/Ireland

Black Liberation Army
 Irish Freedom Fighters
 Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)
 Irish Republican Army-Provisional Wing (IRA-Provos)
 Red Flag 74
 Sinn Fein
 Ulster Defense Association (UDA)
 Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)
 Young Militants

West Germany

Andreas Baader Commando of the Red Army Faction
 Baader Solidarity Group
 German Liberation Popular Front, Andreas Baader Brigade
 Holger Meins Brigade
 Holger Meins Kommando, Revolutionary Cell
 International Anti-Terror Organization
 Puig Antich-Ulrike Meinhof Commando
 Red Army Faction (RAF; Baader-Meinhof Gang; BMG)
 Revolutionary Cell Brigade Ulrike Meinhof
 Robert E. D. Straker Commando of the Territorial Resistance Army

Second of June Movement
Socialist Patients Collective
Ulrike Meinhof Commando

Yugoslavia

Croatian Intelligence Service
Croatian National Liberation Forces-Fighters for a
Free Croatia
Croatian National Resistance
Freedom for the Serbian Fatherland (SOPO)
Trotskyist Organization
Young Croatian Army for Freedom
Young Croatian Republican Army

Africa

Angola

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA)
Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
(MPLA)

Cabinda

Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda
(FLEC)

Canary Islands

Canary Islands Independence Movement
Canary Islands Intelligence Service
Movement for Self-Determination and Independence
for the Canary Islands (MPAIAC)

Chad

Chadian National Liberation Front (FROLINAT)

Djibouti

National Independence Union (UNI)
Popular Liberation Movement
Somali Coast Liberation Front (FLCS)

Ethiopia

Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)
ELF-General Command
ELF-Revolutionary Council
Popular Liberation Forces (PLF)
Tigre Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF)

Mozambique

Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO)
Mozambique Revolutionary Council (COREMO)

Rhodesia

Patriotic Front (PF)
Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)
Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)

Somalia

Somali Liberation Front

Spanish Sahara

Mustafa el Wali Bayyid Sayed International Brigade
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra
and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO)

Zaire

Peoples Army of the Oppressed in Zaire (APOZA)
Peoples Revolutionary Party (PRP)

Asia

Afghanistan

Afghan Islamic Society
Afghan National Liberation Front
Afghan National Liberation Movement
Islamic Movement of Afghanistan

Bangladesh

National Socialist Party (JDS)

Burma

Kachin Independence Army

India

Ananda Marg
Kashmiri Liberation Front
Universal Proutist Revolutionary Front

Indonesia

Darul Islam Holy War Command
Free South Moluccan Youth Organization
Front for the Liberation of Aceh-Sumatra

Japan

Anti-Japan Armed Front of East Asia
Japanese Red Army (JRA; Arab Red Army; Army of the Red Star)
Maruseido (Marxist Youth League)
Okinawa Liberation League
Red Army Faction (Sekigun-ha; United Red Army)
VZ 58

Philippines

Kabataang Makabayan
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Peoples Revolutionary Front

Taiwan

People's Liberation Front
World United Formosans for Independence

Thailand

Pattani Liberation Front

Middle East and Northern Africa

Algeria

Soldier of the Algerian Opposition
United Liberation Front of New Algeria

Iran

Fedayeen
Forghan
Iranian Peoples Strugglers (IPS; Mujahiddin e Khalq)
Iranian Students Association (ISA)
Moslem Liberation Front
National Front Forces of Iran
Reza Rezai International Brigades

Iraq

Free Iraq

Israel

Wrath of God

Jordan

Jordanian Free Officers Movement
Jordanian National Liberation Movement

Lebanon

Imam As-Sadr Brigades
Lebanese Revolutionary Guard
Lebanese Revolutionary Socialist Movement
Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary Organization (Shibbu Gang)
Phalange
Phalangist Security Group
Revolutionary Arab Youth Organization
Socialist Labor Party
Standard Bearers of Imam Musa As-Sadr Organization

Oman

Peoples Liberation Army

Palestine

Abdel Nasser Movement
Action Organization for the Liberation of Palestine (AOLP)
Arab Communist Organization (CAO)
Arab Liberation Front (ALF)
Arab People (Ash-Shab al-'Arabi)
Arab Revolutionary Army-Palestinian Commando
Arab Revolutionary Movement
Arm of the Arab Revolution
Black June Organization (BJO)
Black March Organization
Black September-June
Black September Organization (BSO)
Commando Muhammed Boudia
Correct Course of Fatah (Al-Khat as-Sahih Lifatah)
Eagles of the Palestine Revolution (EPR; Red Eagles)
Fatah
Friends of the Arabs
Ghassan Kanafani Commandos
Group of the Fallen Abd al Kadir al Husayni
Mount Carmel Martyrs
National Organization of Arab Youth
Nationalist Youth Group for the Liberation of Palestine
Organization of Arab Nationalist Youth for the Liberation of Palestine (ANYOLP)
Organization for the Victims of Zionist Occupation
Organization of the Struggle Against World Imperialism (SAWIO)
Organization of Avenging Palestinian Youth
Organization of the Sons of Occupied Territories

Organization of the Sons of Palestine
Organization of Victims of Occupied Territories
Palestine Liberation Army (PLA)
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PSF)
Palestine Rejection Front
Palestine Revolutionary Forces
Palestine Revolutionary Movement
Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PDFLP)
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
PFLP-General Command
PFLP-Special Operations
Punishment Squad (al Icab)
Rejection Front of Stateless Palestinian Arabs
Saiqa (Thunderbolt)
Seventh Suicide Squad
Sons of the Occupied Land
Squad of the Martyr Patrick Arguello

Saudi Arabia

Union of the Peoples of the Arabian Peninsula
(UPAP)

Yemen

Eagles of National Unity



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Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980

A Research Paper

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Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980

A Research Paper

*Information available as of 31 December 1980
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**Terrorism**

The threat or use of violence for political purposes by individuals or groups, whether acting for, or in opposition to, established governmental authority, when such actions are intended to shock or intimidate a target group wider than the immediate victims.

**International
Terrorism**

Terrorism conducted with the support of a foreign government or organization and/or directed against foreign nationals, institutions, or governments. Terrorism has involved groups seeking to overthrow specific regimes (for example, Yugoslavia and El Salvador), to rectify national or group grievances (for example, the Palestinians), or to undermine international order as an end in itself (for example, the Japanese Red Army).

These definitions elaborate and clarify the definition of international terrorism used in our previous studies of the phenomenon, but they do not change in any way the criteria used for selecting incidents included in the data base for these studies.

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Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980

Overview

International terrorism resulted in more casualties in 1980 than in any year since the analysis of statistics related to terrorism began in 1968. The total number of events last year was also high—second only to 1978.¹

Established patterns of striking at targets in industrialized democracies and attacking symbols of Western power continued into 1980. Americans remained the primary targets of international terrorism, with nearly two out of every five incidents involving US citizens or property.

Terrorist events aimed at causing casualties, especially assassinations, increased over previous years. Over 30 percent of the attacks in 1980 resulted in at least one casualty.

Last year marked the first year that a large number of deadly terrorist attacks were carried out by national governments. The Libyan Government's assassination campaign against dissidents living in Europe and the exchange of terrorist attacks on diplomats in the Middle East were the most noteworthy examples of government-sponsored terrorism.

There was a sharp increase in right-wing terrorist activity in Europe. The attacks at the Munich Oktoberfest and at the railroad station in Bologna, Italy, rank among the worst terrorist incidents ever recorded.

On the positive side, incidents involving hostages and barricade incidents were more successfully countered in 1980, as governments became better equipped to deal with such situations. Two prominent hostage-takings—the Iranian Embassy in London and a skyjacking in Turkey—were countered successfully by military force, and another two in Latin America were resolved by careful negotiations.

¹ The statistics in this report are based on a computerized file of international terrorist events from 1968 through 1980. New events have been added for all years as we have expanded the sources from which we draw data in order to correct for a previous overemphasis on US sources and as we have completed the validation of previously acquired and coded information. The terrorist event file is now complete and current, and the statistics in this publication replace all statistics in our previous surveys. The only trend reported earlier that is significantly changed by the addition of new material is that the percentage of terrorist events involving Americans since 1968 is reduced from 41 percent to 38 percent. All other reported percentages and rank orders remain about the same.

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
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Figure 1
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks*, 1968-80



*Casualty figures are particularly susceptible to fluctuations due to inclusion of especially bloody incidents.

Patterns of International Terrorism: 1980

Trends

Both the number of international terrorist casualties (figure 1) and incidents (table 1 and figure 2) were higher in 1980 than in 1979. Although there were fewer victims killed than in 1979 and fewer wounded than in 1974, there were more total casualties in 1980 than during any previous year since our data base was begun in 1968.

The number of terrorist incidents apparently aimed at causing casualties—most notably assassination attempts—increased dramatically in 1980. Assassinations and attempted assassinations have increased steadily since 1975; in 1980 almost twice as many such incidents took place as in any previous year. The high number of assassinations in 1980 is due, in part, to well-planned assassination campaigns by:

- The Muslim Brotherhood against the Soviet military in Syria.
- The Libyan Government against expatriates residing in Europe.
- Iran and Iraq, each targeting the other's diplomats in Europe and the Middle East.
- The Armenian terrorists against Turkish diplomats worldwide.


As has been noted in our previous surveys, however, most terrorist incidents do not cause casualties, and only one-fourth of all attacks between 1968 and 1980 resulted in death or personal injury.²

Terrorists continue to prefer to conduct their operations in the industrialized democracies (figure 3). Over 30 percent of the incidents took place in Western Europe alone, both by indigenous organizations against foreign targets and by foreign-based groups. About 20 percent of the incidents occurred in Latin America and another 20 percent in the Middle East.

² Of the 5,955 international terrorist incidents recorded between 1968 and 1979, 673 incidents (11 percent) involved deaths and 867 (15 percent) involved injuries. These proportions are up slightly in 1980. Of the 760 incidents recorded, 122 (16 percent) involved deaths and 145 (19 percent) involved injuries.

Figure 2
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80

Total Incidents: 6,714



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There were 278 attacks on Americans in 1980—the second highest of any year since 1968—and 34 of these incidents caused casualties. Ten Americans, including six in El Salvador, two in Turkey, one in the Philippines, and one on the West Bank, were killed in international terrorist attacks, and 94 Americans were wounded. Damage to US property was recorded in 97 incidents (34 percent).

Between 1968 and 1979 most of the attacks directed against Americans occurred in Latin America and the Middle East (table 2 and figure 4). This pattern did not change in 1980. Thirty-three percent of all attacks

Table 1
**Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total ^a
Total	142 (2.1)	214 (3.2)	391 (5.8)	324 (4.8)	648 (9.7)	564 (8.4)	528 (7.9)	475 (7.1)	599 (8.9)	562 (8.4)	850 (12.7)	657 (9.8)	760 (11.3)	6,714
North America	42	10	28	46	19	42	53	83	60	59	78	63	90	673 (10.0)
Latin America	47	82	163	102	113	122	140	74	143	73	112	97	178	1,446 (21.5)
Western Europe	24	41	86	53	239	243	188	170	252	263	245	198	204	2,206 (32.9)
USSR/Eastern Europe	3	1	3	10	2	3	2	3	6	6	10	6	7	62 (0.9)
Sub-Saharan Africa	1	9	15	6	6	11	14	27	18	31	27	24	29	218 (3.2)
Middle East and North Africa	20	36	61	60	71	89	82	88	92	87	302	199	195	1,382 (20.6)
Asia	1	22	28	40	153	30	22	22	23	21	31	56	46	495 (7.4)
Pacific	1	6	2	3	3	2	1	4	0	7	21	3	3	56 (0.8)
Other	3	7	5	4	42	22	26	4	5	15	24	11	8	176 (2.6)

^a Figures in parentheses are percentages of the totals.

Table 2
**Locations of Terrorist Attacks on
US Citizens or Property, 1968-80, by Category**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Other	Total
Total	282	854	691	29	76	692	245	32	48	2,949
Kidnaping	2	92	3	0	22	27	7	0	1	154
Barricade-hostage	3	10	4	0	0	12	1	0	0	30
Letter bombing	13	6	2	0	2	4	26	0	2	55
Incendiary bombing	42	78	212	1	3	91	27	6	3	463
Explosive bombing	146	334	260	4	8	236	69	4	20	1,081
Armed attack	0	32	13	0	8	26	11	0	0	90
Hijacking ^a	27	6	14	0	0	6	9	0	4	66
Assassination	5	37	6	0	7	26	11	0	1	93
Sabotage	0	1	1	0	2	6	0	0	0	10
Threat	36	167	139	22	13	194	51	20	2	644
Theft, break-in	1	38	6	0	7	9	1	0	0	62
Conspiracy	4	8	4	0	0	8	3	1	3	31
Hoax	0	5	8	0	0	3	10	0	1	27
Other actions	0	6	15	1	1	15	8	0	4	50
Sniping	1	29	2	1	0	25	8	1	0	67
Shootout with police	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
Arms smuggling	0	0	2	0	0	3	0	0	7	12

^a Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport.

Figure 3
Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Attacks, 1968-80





Figure 4
Geographic Distribution of International
Terrorist Attacks Directed Against US Targets,
1968-80



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against Americans occurred in Latin America and 20 percent occurred in the Middle East (figure 5). Attacks against Americans in 1980 were recorded in at least 51 countries; most of the attacks occurred in El Salvador, Turkey, the Philippines, West Germany, and Colombia.

Between 1968 and 1980, US and Canadian nationals were the most victimized; West Europeans were the second most frequent targets (figure 6). US businessmen and diplomats—especially individuals who are symbols of Western power and wealth—are still the primary targets, with at least 38 percent of all events involving US citizens or property (table 3).³ Although businessmen have been the most frequent victims in past years, they were second only to US diplomats in 1980. One hundred and twelve attacks were directed against US diplomats—more than in any previous year. Most of these attacks occurred in Latin

³ The reporting on international terrorist incidents involving Americans is unquestionably more complete than incidents involving nationals of other countries. This is almost unavoidable in collecting terrorist data and should be considered in any analysis.

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America, with one-quarter resulting in damage to US property. About 30 percent of these incidents were telephone or letter threats received at US embassies or consulates. While these threats resulted in no direct damage or casualties, each was disruptive. They caused increased security efforts, personnel alerts, and absorbed time in searching for bombs or evacuating buildings.

Other countries whose nationals have been prominent victims are Israel, the United Kingdom, West Germany, France, Turkey and the Soviet Union. In 1980, the pattern of victims was somewhat different than in previous years. The US remained the primary target, but the order of the other major victims was different. The installations and citizens of the USSR were the second most frequent target followed by those of Turkey, Iraq, France, Iran, and Israel.

Gutted van in which three US nuns and a missionary were riding when kidnaped and assassinated by terrorists in El Salvador.



Wide World ©

Table 3


International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1968-80, by Category

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total ^a
Total	68 (2.4)	124 (4.3)	262 (9.1)	243 (8.5)	248 (8.7)	225 (7.9)	197 (6.9)	179 (6.3)	227 (7.9)	193 (6.7)	386 (13.5)	241 (8.4)	271 (9.5)	2,864
Diplomatic officials or property	21	26	96	97	92	78	27	23	38	42	63	90	112	805 (28.1)
Military officials or property	6	15	44	45	28	29	22	30	63	58	48	38	30	456 (15.9)
Other US Government officials or property	30	37	63	34	43	10	18	20	6	9	23	16	35	344 (12.0)
Business facilities or executives	8	37	38	57	57	89	108	72	90	60	151	68	66	901 (31.5)
Private citizens	3	9	21	10	28	19	22	34	30	24	101	29	27	357 (12.5)


^a Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category.

Figure 5
International Terrorist Attacks on US Personnel and Facilities, 1980


Location of Event



Type of Victim



Type of Attack



Nationality of Terrorist





Figure 6
Nationality of Victims of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968–80

Total Incidents: 6,714



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Despite the publicity given to occasional sophisticated operations, most terrorist attacks continue to be simple in conception and operation (tables 4 and 5). During the 13-year period from 1968 through 1980, bombings were by far the preferred type of attack, accounting for nearly 45 percent of all terrorist operations. Our records for the period, however, also document over 400 kidnappings, about 450 assassinations, and over 100 barricade and hostage situations.

The categories of attacks in 1980 were similar to previous years. Bombings were still the most favored operation. The most noteworthy change was the dramatic rise in the number of assassinations and skyjackings. The security precautions designed to make smuggling of traditional weapons on board airliners more difficult failed to deter skyjackings in 1980. Skyjackers effectively used threats, hoaxes, or nonmetallic weapons, with the result that skyjackings increased for the second consecutive year.

Terrorist Events With Deaths or Injuries

Analyses of the incidents that caused casualties highlight the dangers and broad psychological impact of international terrorism. They provoke a response from governments, attention from the world media, and almost always involve a well-trained and experienced terrorist organization.

Our records show 1,435 terrorist incidents between 1968 and 1980 that caused at least one casualty. The number of such attacks has generally increased each year since 1968 (figure 7). In 1980, there were 213 of these incidents—far more than any in previous years. Bombings and assassinations accounted for over 65 percent of all incidents with casualties. Each of the other categories of attacks—kidnapings, barricade and hostage situations, and skyjackings—accounted for only a small portion of the casualties. Most of the attacks with casualties occurred in Western Europe and the Middle East. US citizens remained the most

Table 4

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1968-80, by Category of Attack**

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Other	Total
Total	674 (10.0)	1,446 (21.5)	2,206 (32.9)	62 (0.9)	218 (3.2)	1,382 (20.6)	495 (7.4)	56 (0.8)	176 (2.6)	6,714
Kidnaping	5	203	47	0	61	57	25	1	2	401
Barricade-hostage	8	51	38	2	2	33	4	0	1	139
Letter bombing	26	17	200	0	15	32	131	0	49	470
Incendiary bombing	85	101	390	3	6	113	36	7	12	753
Explosive bombing	325	496	859	16	28	489	96	16	46	2,371
Armed attack	4	54	52	1	23	122	21	0	1	278
Hijacking ^a	29	35	30	3	11	38	21	0	6	173
Assassination	29	94	140	2	27	111	34	3	3	443
Sabotage	2	3	8	0	2	8	1	0	0	24
Exotic pollution	0	0	21	0	0	1	0	0	0	22
Threat	99	228	275	29	21	240	78	27	11	1,008
Theft, break-in	4	56	19	1	7	17	3	0	0	107
Conspiracy	9	17	36	1	4	30	9	1	14	121
Hoax	18	10	10	0	1	6	11	0	2	58
Other actions	12	10	39	1	5	22	13	0	14	116
Sniping	17	63	15	1	3	42	10	1	0	152
Shootout with police	0	8	6	0	0	1	0	0	1	16
Arms smuggling	2	0	20	2	2	20	2	0	14	62

^a Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport.

victimized of any nationality, but the percentage of events with US victims dropped from 38 percent for all incidents to 28 percent of all incidents with casualties. Citizens of the United Kingdom and Israel were also prominent victims of events with casualties.

There have been 416 attacks involving American citizens during the 13-year statistic-keeping period. US businessmen have been the primary targets of these attacks. Attacks against Americans resulting in casualties have occurred in at least 50 countries over the reporting period, with the most events taking place in Argentina, Iran, and the Philippines. Our records show that over 140 different terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for these attacks. Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or Black September, along with the Argentine Montoneros and the Iranian groups have committed

more attacks against American citizens resulting in casualties than any other groups.

The overall pattern of international terrorist attacks in 1980 involving casualties is generally similar to previous years—that is, assassinations with small arms accounted for over 40 percent, and explosive bombings for 35 percent of the total incidents. Most of the attacks occurred in the Middle East and Western Europe. The most active groups in the attacks with casualties in 1980 were Iranian Government operations, Armenian terrorist groups, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria. The order of the most victimized nationalities was slightly different from that of previous years; the most numerous victims were Americans, Israelis, Soviets, Turks, Iraqis, and Libyans, in that order. In 1979 the most victimized nationalities were Americans, British, and French. In 1978, the US and British were the main victims.

Table 5

International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-80, by Category of Attack

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total ^a
Total	142 (2.1)	214 (3.2)	391 (5.8)	324 (4.8)	648 (9.7)	564 (8.4)	528 (7.9)	475 (7.1)	599 (8.9)	562 (8.4)	850 (12.7)	657 (9.8)	760 (11.3)	6,714
Kidnaping	1	6	43	30	16	45	43	57	34	40	39	30	17	401 (6.0)
Barricade-hostage	1	0	8	1	4	13	13	16	6	11	19	16	31	139 (2.1)
Letter bombing	3	4	5	1	306	58	18	5	15	17	12	23	3	470 (7.0)
Incendiary bombing	12	25	56	46	22	47	48	42	119	110	128	53	45	753 (11.2)
Explosive bombing	79	115	119	129	148	168	274	232	216	210	235	219	227	2,371 (35.3)
Armed attacks	12	13	8	9	13	16	31	21	21	21	40	22	51	278 (4.1)
Hijacking ^b	3	12	24	10	16	7	10	5	6	9	6	29	36	173 (2.6)
Assassination	7	12	22	13	16	25	16	23	53	33	54	61	107	442 (6.6)
Sabotage	1	2	0	4	4	3	4	1	2	0	0	3	0	24 (0.4)
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	17	3	1	22 (0.3)
Threat	12	12	61	53	77	132	32	34	81	67	234	96	117	1,008 (15.0)
Theft, break-in	3	7	22	10	5	3	10	8	6	2	13	4	14	107 (1.6)
Conspiracy	4	4	7	2	3	21	14	9	7	6	16	13	15	121 (1.8)
Hoax	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	5	48	58 (0.9)
Other actions	0	0	4	8	8	3	9	10	7	11	17	20	20	117 (1.7)
Sniping	3	2	7	3	6	4	3	10	18	12	17	44	23	152 (2.3)
Shootout with police	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	1	3	6	0	0	3	16 (0.2)
Arms smuggling	1	0	2	4	4	16	3	1	3	7	3	16	2	62 (0.9)

^a Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category of attack.

^b Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport.

State-Sponsored International Terrorism

Nations support terrorist groups or engage in terrorist activity for a variety of reasons, ranging from the need to carry out their own policies in foreign countries to the desire to establish or strengthen regional or global influence.


Despite increased state support for international conventions and agreements designed to reduce international terrorism, a number of Third World nations are unwilling to back sanctions against states that support international terrorist groups or engage directly in international terrorist attacks.

Our files contain records of almost a hundred terrorist attacks conducted directly by national governments. They occurred in every year since 1972, but the majority of them took place in 1980. Almost half were

assassinations or attempted assassinations. These state-sponsored attacks were more lethal than other terrorist incidents, with over 42 percent of them resulting in casualties. At least 33 victims were injured and another 40 killed in these 100 events. Most of them occurred in the Middle East, were carried out by Middle East nations, and were directed against citizens of other Middle East countries. They were almost always directed against diplomats.

Soviet Union. The Soviets are deeply engaged in support of revolutionary violence, which is a fundamental element of Leninist ideology. Such violence frequently entails acts of international terrorism. The ostensible position of the Soviets that they oppose terrorism while supporting so-called national liberation movements is further compromised by Moscow's close relationship

Figure 7
International Terrorist Incidents That Caused Casualties, 1968-80



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with and aid to a number of governments and organizations which are direct supporters of purely terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for example, the Soviets sell large quantities of arms to Libya—knowing that Libya is a major supporter of terrorist groups—and they back a number of Palestinian groups that have conducted terrorist operations. In Latin America, Moscow relies heavily on Cuba—which provides guerrilla and terrorist groups with training, arms, sanctuary, and advice—to advance Soviet interests. In other parts of the world, particularly Africa, the Soviets have long supported guerrilla movements and national liberation organizations that occasionally engage in terrorism.

Libya. The government of Colonel Qadhafi is the most prominent state sponsor of and participant in international terrorism. Despite Qadhafi's repeated public pronouncements that he does not support terrorist groups, there has been a clear and consistent pattern of Libyan aid to almost every major international terrorist group, from the Provisional Irish Republican Army

(PIRA) to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

One of Qadhafi's stated policies is to silence the Libyan students suspected of opposition activity and Libyan expatriates who have criticized his regime. Early in 1980, he warned Libyan exiles that they should return home, or they would be punished in place. During the remainder of the year, Qadhafi's assassination teams carried out his threats. Our records list 14 attacks by Libyan assassination teams in Europe and the United States. They occurred in seven countries and resulted in 11 Libyan exiles murdered and one wounded. The murder on 19 April 1980 of a well-known Libyan businessman in Rome and the assassination on 25 April last year of a Libyan lawyer in London are two examples of this assassination campaign.

Libya's support for terrorism includes financing for terrorist operations, weapons procurement and supply, the use of training camps and Libyan advisers for guerrilla training, and the use of Libyan diplomatic facilities abroad as support bases for terrorist operations. Libya has trained terrorists from Latin America, Western Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. Qadhafi's major goals involve the Middle East and Africa, particularly the destruction of Israel, the advancement of the Palestinian cause, and the overthrow of conservative and moderate Arab states. Most of his efforts, therefore, are directed toward aiding Middle Eastern terrorism. His second concern is to be recognized as a champion of national liberation movements, especially those of an Islamic cast.

South Yemen. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen provides camps and other training facilities for a number of international terrorist groups. The PFLP maintains a major terrorist training camp there, and members of many different terrorist groups have all benefited from the PFLP training facilities.

In addition to supporting international terrorism through its training camps, South Yemen has in the past provided a refuge for airline hijackers.

Our records from 1968 to 1980 suggest that the Government of South Yemen has not participated directly in international terrorist attacks and show that South Yemeni citizens have been involved in only a few incidents since 1968.

Iraq. During the past two years, the Iraqi Government has reduced its support for most terrorist groups. During the mid-1970s various West European terrorist groups reportedly received Iraqi aid, including training and logistical support. Iraq also provides assistance to some radical Palestinian organizations, including the Arab Liberation Front (ALF).

In 1980, the Iraqi Government conducted terrorist attacks against Iranian diplomats in Europe and the Middle East. These attacks resulted in the deaths of several Iranian diplomats.

Syria. As a major supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Syria has played an increasingly important role in Palestinian activities. It has backed radical elements within the PLO, including the PFLP, the PFLP-General Command, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The Syrian Government also created Sa'iqa, whose Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution have been involved in terrorist attacks.

Syrian intelligence services and Syrian diplomatic facilities abroad have been used to support various terrorist campaigns against the enemies of the Syrian regime, including Jordanian officials.

Iran. Despite its radical, anti-Western policies, the Tehran government is not presently an active supporter of groups practicing international terrorism. Many groups currently seek Iranian support, but internal political upheavals, socioeconomic problems, and the war with Iraq now seem to be Tehran's main preoccupations.

In 1980, however, the Iranian Government itself initiated numerous acts of international terrorism. Our records list international terrorist attacks carried out by Iranian nationals last year—at least half of which were directly carried out by Iranian Government officials. These attacks occurred in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. They included armed



PFLP terrorist training somewhere in the Middle East.

attacks on Iraqi diplomatic facilities and assassinations of Iraqi citizens. Most prominently, the taking of the US hostages in Tehran was a clear act of international terrorism, violating all norms of diplomatic behavior; this incident clearly was approved by the Iranian Government.


Cuba. Havana openly advocates armed revolution as the only means for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America, and the Cubans have played an important role in facilitating the movement of men and weapons into the region. Havana provides direct support in the form of training, arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide variety of guerrilla groups. Many of these groups engage in terrorist operations.

Right-Wing Terrorism

Most right-wing terrorism falls in the category of domestic violence and is not dealt with in this paper. When the attacks cross international boundaries or involve foreign victims such as the Bologna or Munich bombings, however, they are included in the records on international terrorism.

Right-wing terrorism is difficult to categorize and analyze, because it is perpetrated anonymously by groups with few or no articulated goals. Very little information is available on the type and frequency of

Clearing the debris after the bomb attack at the Bologna railroad station.



Wide World ©

the attacks, the group structure, or the personalities involved. Unlike publicity-seeking left-wing terrorist groups who tend to select targets that provide the greatest political impact, right-wing groups tend to be motivated by desire to terrorize or destroy specific enemies. These groups seldom indulge in such spectacular incidents as hostage-taking or hijackings; instead, they most often conduct assassinations and bombings. Some of the bombing attacks, however, have resulted in mass casualties and thus generated intense publicity.

The bombing of the train station in Bologna, Italy, and the explosion during Munich's Oktoberfest produced more casualties than any previous terrorist attacks in Western Europe.

Outlook

Although individual terrorist attacks rely heavily upon the element of surprise, general patterns of terrorist behavior are more predictable. There will be exceptions, but we expect certain trends evident in 1980 to carry over into 1981:

- The increase in casualties and casualty-producing incidents—particularly in light of the dramatic rise of assassinations—is especially significant. Although,

mass casualty operations have been rare, terrorists may now believe that some casualties are necessary to generate the amount of publicity formerly evoked by less bloody operations.

- The vast majority of incidents will continue to be simple in conception and implementation, posing little risk to the perpetrators. Although added security precautions at sensitive facilities and paramilitary rescue squads may deter spectacular confrontational attacks, these measures clearly cannot protect all potential targets from simple hit-and-run operations.
- Regional patterns of victimization and location of operations are likely to remain virtually unchanged. Representatives of affluent countries, particularly US Government officials and business executives, will continue to be attractive targets. Latin America and the Middle East again are likely to be the main trouble spots.
- West German terrorists, having suffered reversals during the past three years, are likely to feel greater pressure to engage in operations in order to remind their domestic and international sympathizers that they remain revolutionary leaders.

- Most terrorist activity by right-wing groups will remain domestic in nature and thus will not be reflected in our statistics. Because rightist groups are often willing to engage in mass-casualty attacks, however, and because their operations are often effective, their activities will pose a significant danger to public order in many countries. We expect right-wing terrorist activity to increase in 1981.
- 1980 marked the first time a large number of terrorist assassinations were directly sponsored by governments. These attacks proved to be an efficient, low-cost method of achieving limited goals. Some Third World nations, especially Middle Eastern countries, are likely to continue this practice. Most notably, Iran and Iraq probably will continue their war of terrorism, and Syria is also likely to engage in terrorist attacks.
- The Palestinian groups continue to have a terrorist capability. Some rejectionist groups may seek to embarrass PLO leader Arafat and the moderate elements of the PLO by renewing their terrorist attacks against Western democracies. If progress is not made on resolving the Palestinian problem, Arafat will find it increasingly difficult to restrain extremist Palestinian groups from conducting international terrorist attacks.
- The Armenian Secret Army's assassination campaign against Turkish diplomats is likely to continue next year at an even greater pace. In addition to the Turks, Armenian terrorists may include Western, especially US, diplomats among their targets.
- International terrorism is a tactic of leftist insurgents in El Salvador and will continue to be a factor affecting political stability in El Salvador as well as Guatemala and, perhaps, Honduras.
- On the positive side, hostage situations were more successfully opposed in 1980, as more governments became better able to deal with hostage-takings. Improved training and equipment will probably enable governments to be even more effective in dealing with hostage situations in the future.
- The development and implementation of more effective international countermeasures will continue to be impeded by differing perspectives among nations, and by a reluctance on the part of many states to commit themselves to a course of action that might invite retribution—either by terrorist groups or by states sympathetic to the terrorists' cause.

Appendix A

Major International Terrorist Groups

This appendix describes the activities of the major international terrorist groups whether they carried out international terrorist attacks in 1980 or not.

Groups such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Basque Fatherland and Liberty Movement (ETA) primarily conduct operations against domestic targets, but they are also active in the international arena. The PIRA has conducted more international terrorist attacks than any other single terrorist group. They routinely attack the British military in Europe. The ETA has not been as active internationally as the PIRA, but they conducted a campaign of terrorism against French nationals in the Basque area of Spain. Some of the attacks described in this section are not included in the statistical totals in this paper because they did not involve more than one nation, but they do provide insight into the activities of these major groups.

Western Europe

Although PIRA was not as active in 1980 as in previous years, the group was able to attack symbols of the British Government and the Crown. The PIRA assassinated a British Army colonel and attempted to kill two other British soldiers stationed in Bielefeld, West Germany. The PIRA also tried to increase pressure on the British by attempting a mass casualty attack. They exploded a bomb on a crowded commuter train as it passed through a tunnel near Belfast, but three people were killed and 10 to 15 were injured.

Attempting to expand their tactics beyond violence, seven PIRA members in Northern Ireland's Maze Prison conducted a two-month hunger strike which captured the headlines in British newspapers. After weeks of negotiations, the British Government refused to grant political status to the prisoners, the PIRA's major demand. As several prisoners neared death, however, the British issued a statement proposing improvements in prison conditions. Perhaps realizing it was the best they could hope to achieve, the PIRA leaders called a halt to the strike. Although the hunger strike received a great deal of attention, it failed to bring about a change in the status of PIRA prisoners



Iranian Embassy in London after British commandos ended six-day siege.

UPI ©

and apparently did little else to affect British policy in Northern Ireland.

The most publicized terrorist attack in the United Kingdom did not involve the PIRA or any other well-established group but was conducted by unknown Arab terrorists from Iran. The event is most notable for the successful counterterrorist attack by the British military.

On 30 April, five armed men seized the Iranian Embassy in London. After capturing 26 hostages, they demanded the release of 91 prisoners and autonomy for

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an Arab province in Iran. They also demanded an aircraft to fly them to an undisclosed location. The terrorists released seven of the hostages and allowed two deadlines to pass without carrying out their threats. On 5 May, however, the terrorists killed two hostages, precipitating the British Government's decision to mount an assault on the Embassy. The Army's antiterrorist commandos stormed the building and rescued the remaining hostages, killing three terrorists and capturing two others. This successful operation was viewed as a major accomplishment by governments that have invested in costly training and elaborate contingency planning for antiterrorist strike forces.

On the European continent, the ETA,⁴ the Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organization, assassinated dozens of police and military officers. They also carried out numerous damaging attacks against a company that is building a controversial nuclear power station in the Basque region. For the first eight months of 1980 the ETA confined itself mainly to killing policemen and alleged informers. Toward the end of the year, it expanded its assassination campaign to include civil servants and military officers. Despite widespread terrorist activities designed to build popular support and to provoke repressive measures from Madrid, the ETA campaign in 1980 was largely unsuccessful. Popular support in the Basque region continued to erode and the government resisted the provocation. During the year, Spanish ultrarightists conducted sporadic attacks against Basque targets because of what they saw as a lack of firm government response to ETA terrorism.

Mainly because of the government's efficient countermeasures, West German terrorists of both the left and right carried out only a few international terrorist attacks during the year. The one major exception and one of the bloodiest attacks recorded in West German history was the bombing by right-wing terrorists at the Munich Oktoberfest. The explosive device could have killed hundreds of people had it not exploded prematurely while being emplaced in a crowded area. Instead, only 12 people were killed and another 200 injured. The terrorist handling the bomb was killed.


In Italy, both leftist and rightist terrorism continued in 1980, almost completely confined to domestic violence. The Red Brigades, although somewhat hampered by government actions, attacked symbols of the Italian establishment, including executives, a prominent newspaperman, a doctor from the prison system, and many policemen and civil servants. On 13 December, the Red Brigades abducted a high-ranking magistrate in the Ministry of Justice, claiming their goal was to force the government to close the maximum security prison at Asinara that held some members of the Red Brigades. This was the first time in approximately two years that the government faced the choice between possibly sacrificing the life of an official or giving in to the terrorists' demand. After weeks of uncertainty, a number of newspapers scorned the government's ban on publicity and printed several communiques explaining the terrorists' demands. The magistrate ultimately was released unharmed. This incident gave the Red Brigades more publicity than any event since the Moro kidnaping and assassination.

Although right-wing terrorism in Italy has been overshadowed by that of far-leftist groups for the past few years, it has continued to be active; the Italian Government credits almost one-half of all casualties from terrorism in Italy to right-wing groups. One of these groups—the neofascist Revolutionary Armed Nuclei—first claimed and then denied responsibility for the most lethal incident in 1980, a bomb attack at the Bologna railroad station on 2 August. Holiday travelers crowded the station and the explosion killed over 80 people and injured at least 200. Although right-wing terrorist groups are small and offer little real threat to the Italian Government, they are perfectly willing to cause mass casualties in their single-minded intent to destroy their perceived enemies. These groups are, therefore, particularly disruptive and dangerous.

Despite the imposition of martial law in all of Turkey's 67 provinces during the latter part of the year, the Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Dev Yol, and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU) succeeded in generating mass publicity with a series of international terrorist attacks that

⁴ The ETA consists of the ETA-Political/Military and the ETA-Military. The ETA-M has carried out most of the terrorist attacks in recent years.

Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota during 61-day siege by M-19 terrorists.



Wide World ©

caused the deaths of two US servicemen. The Armenian terrorists appeared well trained, well equipped, and efficient as they conducted an assassination campaign against Turkish diplomats worldwide. These attacks occurred in Switzerland, Italy, Greece, France, the United States, and Australia. The Armenians also exploded bombs at Turkish facilities in Europe, the Middle East, and the United States.

The Dev Yol conducted numerous attacks in Turkey against both Turkish and US personnel and facilities. In November, they assassinated a US Air Force sergeant at his home in Adana, Turkey.

The MLAPU assassinated a US Navy chief petty officer and an El Al airport manager and carried out numerous attacks against Turkish and American facilities in Turkey.

Middle East

The US diplomatic hostages continued to be held by Iran through 1980. This operation differed from previous embassy seizures in several significant ways. In Tehran, the captors had the support of the government, which defied all rules of customary and codified international legal practice.


In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) conducted an active and lethal assassination campaign against So-

viet military advisers during the first part of 1980. The MB is a Muslim fundamentalist group that attacked Soviet targets to express a general dislike of the Soviet Union and the Assad regime and specific opposition to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

Palestinian terrorist actions in 1980 did not reach the level experienced during the 1970s. The Iran-Iraq war divided the Arab world, diverting attention from the Palestinian issue and greatly complicating the PLO's attempts at diplomacy. The Syrian and Libyan Governments, along with many rejectionist Palestinian groups, attempted to pressure Arafat into curtailing his diplomacy and keeping his distance from moderate Arab states.

Fatah, the largest group in the PLO, while presumably waiting for the results of Arafat's diplomatic initiatives, restricted its international terrorist attacks to Middle East countries. Fatah also continued to train groups that often use terrorism and maintained contacts with supporters abroad.

Other Palestinian groups met with mixed success. The Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and the Black June Organization continued operations against Israel and carried out attacks in other Middle East countries, especially



Police attempt to oust occupiers of the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala.

Wide World ©

Lebanon. The PFLP was relatively inactive after its leader, George Habbash, was incapacitated following surgery in September.

Latin America

In Colombia the 19th of April Movement (M-19) conducted one of the most publicized terrorist attacks of 1980. On 27 February, armed members of M-19 shot their way into the Dominican Republic Embassy in Bogota. They timed the attack to coincide with a diplomatic reception. After taking 57 people hostage, including the ambassadors of 11 countries, the terrorists demanded the release of 311 prisoners, a \$50 million ransom, and safe passage out of the country. During the course of the protracted negotiations, the terrorists freed a majority of hostages and vastly scaled down their demands. They finally accepted safe pas-

sage to Cuba and a \$2 million private ransom. The entire incident lasted 61 days and illustrated the success of careful, patient negotiation by responsible governments in a hostage situation.

In El Salvador, at least 10,000 people were reported killed by left- and right-wing groups as the nation's domestic strife spread. El Salvador also ranks high among countries affected by international terrorism. The primary targets of attacks in El Salvador included embassies and private facilities from other Central American countries, the United States, and Israel. Several diplomats and business officials were also assassinated. One example of the attacks on embassies was the attack on 11 January 1980 on the Panamanian Embassy in San Salvador, when members of the 28 February Popular League (LP-28) stormed the embassy. They held seven hostages, including the Ambassadors of Panama and Costa Rica, and demanded the release of seven LP-28 members imprisoned in San Salvador. After three days of negotiating, the incident ended on 14 January when the Salvadoran Government bowed to the demands of the terrorists and released the prisoners. The embassy seizure ended with the safe release of the hostages. In addition the US Embassy was seriously damaged by a People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) rocket attack on 16 September 1980.

In Guatemala, international terrorist attacks followed a similar pattern. Leftist terrorist groups attacked facilities of a few foreign countries and kidnaped foreign nationals. The most significant of these incidents occurred on 31 January 1980. Peasants, sponsored and transported by Guatemalan leftist groups, entered the Spanish Embassy and demanded to see the Ambassador. Once inside, they seized hostages, but were unable to make their demands known because Guatemalan police swiftly attacked them. Fire that broke out during the attack caused chaos among terrorists, hostages, and police. Of the more than 30 terrorists and hostages in the embassy, the only survivors were the Spanish Ambassador and one of the attackers. The surviving attacker was kidnaped a few days later and was subsequently killed.

Appendix B

Antiterrorist Measures

The Private Sector

In 1980, multinational corporations continued to search for defensive methods tailored to their own needs. A number of private security firms joined those specializing in executive protection programs, risk analysis, and armored vehicle service. Several victimized corporations hired consultants to advise executives on how to cope with political violence. Specialized consultants were also employed to conduct ransom negotiations and handle payoffs to terrorist groups.

Regional Cooperation

In 1980, cooperation in combating terrorism was a topic of discussion among European countries. In November, the North Atlantic Assembly adopted a resolution on terrorism that urged member governments and parliaments of the North Atlantic Alliance to exchange information on terrorist-related groups. It also sought cooperation on joint measures against subversive groups that may be directly responsible for terrorism or that may be providing financial or logistical support or training for international terrorists. In December, the 15 NATO foreign ministers adopted a Declaration on Terrorism and the US hostages in Iran. That declaration vigorously condemned terrorist acts as particularly odious, regardless of their cause or objectives. The foreign ministers agreed that there is a need for close intergovernmental cooperation and for effective measures to prevent and combat terrorism. In December, the Spanish introduced a resolution at the Conference on Security of Central Europe in Madrid which condemned international terrorism. The resolution was widely supported by the conference participants. To date, however, little measurable action has resulted from any of these meetings, although the meetings continue to serve as a useful forum for exchanging information and reaching tentative agreements on international terrorism.

United Nations

During 1980, four nations ratified the General Assembly's convention against the taking of hostages. The convention, which had been in various UN committees for three years, was adopted by consensus in December 1979. It calls for states to prosecute or extradite hostage-takers without exception. Language on the rights of national liberation movements, the right of asylum, and the Geneva conventions and protocols on the law of war was included, thereby insuring greater support for the final document. Forty states have signed the convention, which will come into effect when it is ratified by 18 more states.

In December, the General Assembly also adopted a consensus resolution sponsored by the Nordic countries calling for effective measures to enhance the protection, security, and safety of diplomatic and consular missions. The resolution reaffirmed the need for all states to ensure the security of diplomatic missions and to prohibit on their territories illegal activities directed against such offices.

The Venice Economic Summit

In June, the Venice Economic Summit of Heads of State and Government of seven of the world's leading industrialized democracies adopted a Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages. The statement called on all governments to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefit from their criminal acts and stated that the seven states would provide resident diplomatic missions their mutual support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic facilities or personnel.

Appendix C

Statistical Data

Table C-1

**Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents,
1980, by Category**


	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	USSR/ Eastern Europe	Sub- Saharan Africa	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Other	Total ^a	
Total	90 (11.8)	178 (23.4)	204 (26.8)	7 (0.9)	29 (3.8)	195 (25.7)	46 (6.1)	3 (0.4)	8 (1.1)	760	
Kidnaping	0	13	0	0	3	1	0	0	0	17	(2.2)
Barricade-hostage	0	22	5	0	0	3	0	0	1	31	(3.9)
Letter bombing	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	(0.4)
Incendiary bombing	3	5	27	0	0	8	1	1	0	45	(5.9)
Explosive bombing	25	33	71	2	6	66	19	1	4	227	(29.9)
Armed attack	0	8	6	0	2	32	3	0	0	51	(6.7)
Hijacking ^b	15	7	3	2	3	4	1	0	1	36	(4.7)
Assassination	6	21	35	0	2	39	2	1	1	107	(14.1)
Exotic pollution	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	(0.1)
Threat	17	39	29	2	3	20	7	0	0	117	(15.4)
Theft, break-in	0	4	2	1	7	0	0	0	0	14	(1.8)
Conspiracy	2	2	2	0	0	8	1	0	0	15	(2.0)
Hoax	17	5	10	0	0	5	10	0	1	48	(6.3)
Other actions	4	1	9	0	3	3	0	0	0	20	(2.6)
Sniping	1	15	2	0	0	3	2	0	0	23	(3.0)
Shootout with police	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	(0.4)
Arms smuggling	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	(0.3)

^a Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category.

^b Includes hijackings by means of air, sea, or land transport.

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Figure 8
International Terrorist Incidents by Category of Attack, 1968-80



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Table C-2

**International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property,
1968-80, by Category**

	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	Total ^a	
Total	71 (2.4)	124 (4.2)	266 (9.0)	243 (8.2)	255 (8.6)	237 (8.0)	216 (7.3)	181 (6.1)	231 (7.8)	195 (6.6)	396 (13.4)	256 (8.7)	278 (9.4)	2,949	
Kidnaping	1	3	25	19	5	23	14	23	8	7	8	8	10	154	(5.2)
Barricade-hostage	1	0	4	0	1	3	2	1	2	3	0	6	7	30	(1.0)
Letter bombing	2	1	2	0	29	3	1	0	4	7	0	4	2	55	(1.9)
Incendiary bombing	12	21	46	42	18	30	31	17	56	58	80	29	23	463	(15.7)
Explosive bombing	35	71	87	100	97	74	127	95	65	70	95	93	72	1,081	(36.7)
Armed attack	1	4	3	5	10	8	6	7	8	5	12	10	11	90	(3.0)
Hijacking ^b	1	5	12	4	4	0	1	2	5	4	3	15	20	76	(2.5)
Assassination	3	3	10	2	4	4	2	8	15	6	7	10	19	93	(3.2)
Sabotage	0	0	0	3	3	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	10	(0.3)
Threat	11	12	51	51	71	77	19	19	53	22	161	47	50	644	(21.8)
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	1	3	4	3	1	0	7	4	13	62	(2.1)
Conspiracy	1	0	2	2	1	2	4	3	1	2	4	3	6	31	(1.1)
Hoax	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	25	27	(0.9)
Other actions	0	0	3	5	7	2	2	1	4	2	11	3	10	50	(1.7)
Sniping	2	1	5	2	3	0	3	1	6	8	7	20	9	67	(2.3)
Shootout with police	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	1	4	(0.1)
Arms smuggling	1	0	0	0	1	7	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	12	(0.4)

^a Figures in parentheses are percentages of the total accounted for by each category.

^b Includes hijacking by means of air, sea, or land transport.

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Table C-3

Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks on US Citizens or Property, 1980, by Category

	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa	Middle East/North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Other	Total
Total	26	94	58	15	47	35	1	2	278
Kidnaping	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0	10
Barricade-hostage	0	5	2	0	0	0	0	0	7
Letter bombing	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
Incendiary bombing	0	1	14	0	7	0	1	0	23
Explosive bombing	6	20	9	1	19	16	0	1	72
Armed attack	0	5	1	1	3	1	0	0	11
Hijacking ^a	15	0	1	3	0	1	0	0	20
Assassination	3	10	0	2	4	0	0	0	19
Threat	2	21	14	0	7	6	0	0	50
Theft, break-in	0	4	2	7	0	0	0	0	13
Conspiracy	0	2	1	0	2	1	0	0	6
Hoax	0	4	8	0	3	9	0	1	25
Other actions	0	1	6	1	2	0	0	0	10
Sniping	0	8	0	0	0	1	0	0	9
Shootout with police	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

^a Includes hijackings by means of air or land transport.

Terrorist Target: The Diplomat

June 10, 1982



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Frank H. Perez, Deputy Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism, before the Conference on Terrorism sponsored by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales, Madrid, Spain, June 10, 1982.

The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of the past decade and a half has impacted most severely on our Western democratic societies. The brutal tactics of terrorist groups, whether from the far left or right, have served to erode democratic institutions and civil liberties in many parts of the world. Democracies have found it difficult to cope with the tactics of terrorism and in some cases have been tempted to respond by a turn to authoritarian political structures. Terrorism also has adversely impacted diplomatic relations between nations—even friendly ones. It is this growing phenomenon of attacks against diplomats that I wish to address today.

Attacks on the Rise

In Beirut the French Ambassador is gunned down by terrorists. Several months later a French employee of the Embassy and his pregnant wife are found shot to death in their apartment. A car bomb explodes in the French Embassy compound killing 12 and injuring 25. Turkish officials are killed in Los Angeles and Boston and another is wounded in Ottawa. The Turkish consulate in Paris is seized. The American Charge in Paris narrowly escapes assassination. An Israeli attache is assassi-

nated in Paris only 3 months after an American military attache is shot to death while on his way to the Embassy. In London, the Israeli Ambassador lies critically wounded in the hospital after being shot through the head by a terrorist. In Guatemala the Brazilian Embassy is seized. These are only some of the more recent examples of growing terrorist attacks against diplomats.

The dramatic worldwide increase in both the number and seriousness of terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities during the past decade has adversely affected the conduct of diplomacy. In 1970 there were 213 attacks on diplomats from 31 countries. By 1980 this number had risen to 409 attacks on diplomats from 60 countries—an increase of almost 100%. The number of attacks on diplomats as a percentage of total terrorist attacks has also increased from 30% in 1975 to 54% in 1980. Unfortunately this trend exhibits no sign of abating.

World attention has focused on the fact that diplomacy has become a high-risk profession. Some 20 ambassadors from 12 countries have been assassinated (including five U.S. ambassadors—more than the number of U.S. generals killed in the Vietnam war). Between 1968 and mid-1981 there were 370 international terrorist attacks which caused death or personal injury. During 1980 alone, there were 50 such incidents, more than in any previous year. All together, 381 diplomats have been killed and 824 wounded between 1968 and

1982. Even more ominously, assassination attempts, which have been increasing steadily over the past 10 years, reached an all-time high in 1980. The number of kidnappings and hostage barricade situations has also increased. Bombings are still the most frequent form of attack, however, since they involve little risk to the terrorist of capture and explosives can be acquired fairly easily.

The number of groups carrying out terrorist attacks has also grown almost every year. Since 1968 a total of 102 terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks. In all, diplomats from 108 countries have been victims of attacks and the embassies of 38 countries have been seized by terrorists. The level of violence of attacks has also increased.

During the early years of the 1970s the terrorist threat to diplomats was primarily from low-level, small-scale violence. In recent years we have also witnessed an increase in mob violence. Between 1970 and 1980 there were some 70 forcible incursions into diplomatic facilities. However, more than 50% of these occurred after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggests that the success achieved in that incident created a model for other terrorist groups to emulate. The potential dangers of such acts were borne out when 39 people, including several Spanish diplomats, were killed when the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala was seized in 1980.

Why the Diplomat?

All terrorist attacks involve the use of violence for purposes of political extortion, coercion, and publicity for a political cause. The terrorist uses his victims as tools to achieve these goals, regardless of the fact that those targeted are rarely directly associated with the area of political conflict. Although some may argue that attacks against diplomats are senseless, in the mind of the terrorist it is a calculated act with deliberate political goals and objectives.

Diplomats are highly visible and desirable targets for several reasons, including their symbolic value and the psychological impact created. Attacks against diplomats evoke a response from the highest levels of two governments—that of the diplomat attacked and that of the host country. Terrorists are also able to command worldwide media attention for the duration of the incident. Terrorist groups single out diplomats perhaps because they perceive that in order to obtain the publicity they seek, they must

strike at increasingly more visible and symbolic targets.

Terrorist attacks on diplomats almost always are perpetrated by well-trained and experienced terrorist organizations. These groups are well organized and are seeking specific political goals. For example, two Armenian terrorist groups have conducted a campaign of terror directed against Turkish diplomats in revenge for alleged atrocities which were committed over 60 years ago. Some 20 Turkish diplomats and members of their families have been killed in recent years by Armenian terrorists in numerous countries, for example in Spain, where in 1978 the Turkish Ambassador's wife, her brother, and their chauffeur were killed. We in the United States have not been immune to the violence perpetrated by Armenian terrorist organizations. In January of this year the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles was gunned down and the Honorary Turkish Consul in Boston was murdered in a similar fashion in early May. Earlier a car bomb was detonated in front of the Turkish U.N. mission injuring several people.

An Increasing Toll

Terrorism unfortunately has taken its toll on state-to-state relations. Relations between countries can be adversely affected if one country believes that another is failing to provide adequate protection to its diplomats or to live up to its responsibilities. For example, Franco-Turkish and Franco-Spanish relations have suffered because of a perceived laxity in French prosecution and extradition of terrorists. The Dominican Republic Embassy seizure in Bogota in 1980, by the April 19th Movement (M-19) in which 15 senior diplomats were held for 61 days, caused considerable strains in relations between the Government of Colombia and some of the countries whose ambassadors were held hostage. The recent slayings of Turkish officials in the United States interjects strain in an otherwise close U.S.-Turkish relationship.

Also, sponsorship of terrorist acts by one country against another can seriously disrupt diplomatic intercourse and normal relations. Last year, for example, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba because of its training in Cuba of Colombian M-19 terrorists. One of the principal reasons for expelling Libyan representatives from Washington was the continuing support by the Qadhafi regime to international terrorist activities, including those directed against U.S. officials. U.S. relations with

other countries and groups have been adversely affected by their sponsorship of acts of international terrorism, such as the Letelier assassination in Washington carried out by Chilean agents and the continued resort to international terrorism by various elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The disastrous effects of the seizure of American diplomats on U.S.-Iranian relations need no further elaboration.

Countries whose diplomats have been victimized represent a wide range of ideologies, geographic locations, sizes, and wealth. However, all attacks on diplomats have one element in common: All terrorist attacks are acts of political violence. The terrorist is seeking to redress a political grievance, overthrow a political system, or publicize a political point of view. I was a firsthand witness to the events in Bogota which occurred when the M-19 held diplomats from 15 countries hostage in the Embassy of the Dominican Republic for 61 days, demanding publicity for their cause, freedom for imprisoned members of their organization, and ransom. Although the Government of Colombia did not accede to the major terrorist demands, the terrorists did obtain widespread publicity for their cause. A relatively obscure terrorist organization was suddenly catapulted into the international spotlight and thereby increased greatly its prominence within Colombia and internationally.

It is the symbolism of the individual terrorist act, and not necessarily the act itself, which gives it significance. The terrorist uses the act to make a political statement to the target (which is not the victim) and to the world at large. Thus, U.S. diplomats who were held in Tehran for 444 days were used as pawns to advance political objectives internally of the group that held them as well as to achieve objectives with regard to the U.S. Government and to the rest of the world.

While the functions of representation, negotiation, and intelligence gathering continue, embassies are now conducting diplomacy in the face of an increasingly violent environment under conditions never before experienced. The level of security surrounding diplomatic personnel and facilities has been increased to unprecedented levels in an attempt to deter terrorist attacks. As embassy security has become more stringent, it has become more difficult to conduct diplomatic business in a normal fashion. Many embassies now resemble military installations, surrounded by high walls and barbed wire. Buildings are equipped with automatic tear gas

dispensers, ballistic glass, and closed-circuit TV. Visitors are searched and made to pass through metal detectors under the scrutiny of armed guards. Embassy personnel are often transported in armored vehicles.

The cost of protecting diplomats abroad has also soared. The Department of State now spends annually about 14% (around \$140 million) of its entire budget on security, and this figure has been rising steadily. This is in addition to protection provided to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas by host governments which would cost us an additional \$200 million annually if the U.S. Government had to provide it.

While precautions are certainly necessary, the effect has been a reduction in access and a corresponding reduction in the level of communications between diplomats and the host country, in particular, the people of the country. Diplomats are finding it increasingly difficult to function well in this environment.

Enhanced Security Measures

In 1980, for the first time since 1968 when the U.S. Government first began keeping statistics on terrorism, U.S. diplomats surpassed U.S. businessmen as the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks overseas, in spite of the fact that U.S. businessmen greatly outnumber U.S. diplomats. To deal with this problem, the United States has undertaken a rigorous campaign to enhance the security of our personnel and facilities overseas. Primarily we are attempting to reduce the vulnerability of our diplomatic missions by constructing perimeter defenses, building secure safe-havens to which staff can retreat in the event of an attack, improving access controls, and installing nonlethal entry denial systems. Other protective measures involve added guards, armored cars, and the like. All State Department employees are also required to attend a seminar on "Coping with Violence Abroad" in order to make them aware of security problems and educate them on how to reduce their vulnerability. Intelligence collection and analysis on terrorist groups has been accorded a much higher priority and has paid off in terms of alerting us to possible attacks against our diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Need for International Cooperation

If we are to deal more effectively with this problem over the long run, better international cooperation will be required. While diplomats from the United States, Israel, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Cuba, and Turkey have been the most frequent targets, terrorism is a complex and universal problem shared by all nations of the world. Virtually no state has been left unaffected by terrorism. Nations must work together to take steps to deter and prevent terrorist violence from escalating. Such necessary steps include a greater exchange of information on terrorists and their movements, tighter controls on the movement of weapons and explosives, and more efficient extradition procedures for accused terrorists.

The international community must also develop a consensus that acts of terrorism should be outlawed and that those who commit them should be brought to justice. The international community took a major step in this regard in 1973 when it adopted the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, commonly referred to as the New York convention. Adhering states must either extradite or prosecute persons alleged to have committed violations of the convention. The convention's effectiveness, however, has been hampered by the fact that only 53 nations have ratified it.

Recognition of the problem has continued with the adoption of the 1979 U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which now has been ratified by 17 nations; 22 ratifications are required before the convention enters into force. In 1980 the General Assembly adopted a Resolution on Measures to Enhance the Protection, Security and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions and Representatives, which was reaffirmed last year.

The New York convention and other international agreements relating to the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises are steps in the right direction of establishing an international consensus and body of law outlawing crimes against diplomats. However, they must

be strengthened and built on to establish norms of behavior by seeking to discourage nations who would condone and support terrorists and terrorism and to encourage nations to take more seriously their obligations to protect diplomats.

Obligation of Nations

All nations have an obligation to provide protection for diplomats accredited to them. The universally accepted Vienna convention requires states to "take all appropriate steps to prevent attack" on the "person, freedom or dignity" of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel. A violation of this obligation, regardless of the cause, is always disturbing. Of particular concern, however, is state complicity or acquiescence in acts of terrorism directed against diplomatic personnel and facilities. State-sponsored and -supported terrorism, whatever the target, is the most egregious form of terrorism. But when the target is the representative of another country, the act takes on an entirely new dimension and we see an erosion of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.

The Libyan Government is one which has engaged in targeting for violence the diplomats of other countries, specifically the United States. For example, the Government of Libya was behind the sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Last November, Sudanese authorities successfully thwarted a Libyan plot to plant explosive devices in the American Club in Khartoum. The bombs, consisting of two stereo speakers each packed with 20 kilograms of plastic explosives, were intended to explode on a weekend evening when the club would be filled with the families of U.S. Embassy staff and other Americans. Bombs of this size could have completely destroyed the club, killing or maiming scores of people, including third-country diplomats who use the club. We know that these devices were prepared by Libyan intelligence officers assigned to a Libyan People's Bureau in a neighboring country and that a Libyan intelligence officer personally insured that the bombs were loaded on a flight to Khartoum.

Outlook

I realize that I have painted a bleak picture of the current situation regarding diplomats and terrorism. What, you may ask, can be done to alleviate this problem? The problem is one of increasing intensity and the future, unfortunately, does not look any brighter. Attacks on diplomats have proven to be extremely cost effective for the amount of worldwide attention they generate and for that reason they are likely to continue.

Obviously, we will have to continue to do more of what we have been doing

(e.g., more and better intelligence and more effective security measures and procedures), although one eventually reaches the point of diminishing returns. At the same time, like-minded nations must intensify ways of improving cooperation among themselves with a view to reducing the disruption caused by terrorism to international relations and stability, particularly with regard to the protection of diplomatic premises and staff.

Governments which sponsor or condone acts of terrorism against diplomats must be made to understand that such conduct will not be tolerated by the

international community. Likewise, everything possible must be done to bring to justice swiftly those perpetrators of heinous crimes against the civilized world. The challenge of preventing attacks against diplomats and the disruption of diplomatic intercourse must be a topic high on the agenda of the world community. ■

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