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(U) THE EAST GERMAN PEACE MOVEMENT

Summary

A loose grouping of pacifists, dissident Marxists, and alienated youth emerged in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in late 1981. Supported by the Evangelical (Lutheran) Church and inspired by the example of peace activities in West Germany, the GDR movement has become the sole grassroots peace protest in Eastern Europe. Its proposals and views include criticism of both Western and Eastern arms policies.

After an initially tolerant attitude, the East German authorities decided to crack down--a shift signaled by their prohibition on wearing the movement's symbol, the "Swords into Plowshares" peace patch. The GDR leadership apparently fears that an unchecked movement, with anti-regime overtones, could mushroom into a political opposition that would rally the discontented. For its part, the church has supported the movement in principle and given it institutional shelter. But the church has not backed all the activists' beliefs and actions and has tried to moderate developments so as not to jeopardize its earlier hard-won gains from the state.

The Honecker regime's limited clampdown (it has eschewed the use of major force) has been partially successful: since the mid-February demonstration in Dresden, unauthorized peace marches have not occurred. But the possibility of a serious flareup between the authorities and the movement remains real, as peace pressure continues at the local level.

\* \* \* \* \*

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RDS-1,4 5/24/12 (Stoddard, P.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *DDSW/AVR*  
BY *CH* NARA DATE *8/25/16*

Report 393-CA  
May 24, 1982



Emergence of Peace Movement

The East German peace movement has been fueled mainly by politically disillusioned youth and intellectuals. While related to earlier popular agitation against GDR policies perceived as militarizing society, the movement has coopted this protest into a broader range of disarmament concerns. These include, most significantly, criticism of both Western and Eastern arms policies.

The shift from solely GDR-oriented concerns to East-West ones was highlighted at the Magdeburg-Saxon Synod of the Lutheran Church, November 4-8, 1981. The Synod passed an arms reduction resolution that criticized US arms policies but also expressed hope that there might be a cutback in Soviet SS-20 missiles and Warsaw Pact tanks. The same session also resolved to lobby with GDR authorities on behalf of individuals who had written to the church requesting its support for an alternative to military service.<sup>1/</sup> The Synod, in effect, publicly sanctioned a "peace dialogue" that deviated from several basic GDR policies.

The East German Socialist Unity Party (SED), at least initially, acquiesced to such expressions and tried to channel them in ways that might bolster the effectiveness of GDR peace propaganda in the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). The Schmidt-Honecker summit in the GDR, December 11-13, served to reinforce this unusual regime response. In this context, the GDR permitted one of its critics, author Stephan Hermlin, to organize a meeting of East and West German intellectuals to discuss disarmament issues. The East Berlin meeting, which included several East German dissidents now residing in the FRG, was the first officially sanctioned pan-German writers' conference since the late 1940s.

Although the West bore the brunt of criticism at the meeting, East German and Warsaw Pact/Soviet arms policies also came under attack. GDR dissident writers Stephan Heym and Jurek Becker argued the need for an independent East German peace movement; Heym lambasted the Honecker regime for militarizing youth and society. Several West German writers denounced both US and Soviet arms policies. The articulation of such views, unprecedented for

<sup>1/</sup> The GDR does not recognize conscientious objection, but permits religious conscientious objectors to serve in non-combatant "construction brigades" within the army.



a GDR conference, was recorded by the FRG media and duly played back to East German TV audiences.

### Movement Growth

The SED, perhaps nudged by Moscow, saw the nascent East German peace views as giving the GDR's anti-NATO rhetoric greater force in the FRG and among the proliferating West European peace movements. East German President and SED chief Erich Honecker, during his 1981 New Year's address, even praised the convergence of the East German and West European peace movements:

"The swelling of the peace movement beyond ideological frontiers, political differences of opinion, party membership and religious beliefs is evidence of the urge for awareness of responsibility and reason, for real progress toward peace. The masses of the GDR are a firm part of this frontier-crossing peace movement."

Secular and church intellectuals seized on the pro-peace mood and regime flexibility to issue a "Berlin Appeal." Authored by a Lutheran minister, Rainer Eppelmann, and initially signed by 35 persons (including longtime GDR dissident Robert Havemann), it called for a de facto all-German neutralization spearheaded by the withdrawal of "occupation troops" from both Germanies. The Appeal also advocated extensive de-militarization of East German society--thus fusing East-West and East German military issues. Eppelmann was arrested after the Appeal was published in the FRG, but was quickly released when the church intervened on his behalf.

In the meantime, movement activists increased in number, with one sympathetic East German estimate putting them at 2,000-5,000. Many had taken to wearing peace badges. One of these--with a depiction of "Swords into Plowshares"--quickly became the symbol of the GDR peace movement. The badge seems to have been procured and distributed by church pastors. Based as it was on the Soviet memorial to peace at UN headquarters in New York, the badge's symbol was viewed as relatively less susceptible to state criticism than others might be. It was soon being displayed by hundreds, perhaps thousands, of school-age youth.

East German peace ferment reached something of a culmination on February 13 in Dresden during ceremonies commemorating the 1945 Allied bombing of the city. Thousands of young people had converged on the city to participate in a church-sponsored forum on disarmament issues; 1,500 youth, however, marched to the ruins of the Frauenkirche, where they lit candles and sang hymns and peace anthems. There were no speeches and the assembly remained orderly. Although rumors of such a gathering had circulated days before the event, GDR authorities made no effort to stop it. The Dresden



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- 3 -

march thus became the first unauthorized peace demonstration in the history of the GDR.

### The State Crackdown

The SED's earlier forbearance toward the peace movement began giving way to a hard line after the Dresden demonstration. By March 1982, unofficial peace activity--even sentiment--was judged to be against state interests. It was growing too fast and taking on too much of a pacifist cast with anti-regime overtones.

At the same time, Lutheran Church involvement with the peace issue was on the rise.<sup>2/</sup> A church leadership meeting in mid-March declared that the "Swords into Plowshares" motto:

"...is not a political instruction for everyday practice, nor is it a simple recipe against nuclear weapons. It is a signpost pointing to the direction which all those should take who desire disarmament....Young men in our congregations are trying before God to find an answer to the question of whether they should do their military service in the National People's Army, whether they should decide for serving in the construction units [of the army] or whether they should generally object to military service....We stand by the young Christians who show by words or deeds that the peace efforts by our state do not make Christian disarmament efforts superfluous."

GDR State Secretary for Church Affairs Klaus Gysi informed Lutheran Church leaders on March 22 that henceforth wearing the "Swords into Plowshares" patch would be viewed by the regime as "the expression of a mentality hostile to the state and proof of membership in an illegal political association." Individuals who persisted in flaunting the badge, Gysi warned, were liable to expulsion from school or their apprenticeship. The church expressed its "dismay" at the attitude of the authorities, but stressed that individuals who sought to disobey could not be protected by the church.

Backing up this tougher line, the East German Government implemented previously planned measures to strengthen military service requirements. Legislation passed by the East German legislature, the Volkskammer, made women subject to conscription

<sup>2/</sup> The Catholic Church in East Germany--much smaller than the Lutheran Church and more vulnerable to state pressure--does not want formal involvement with the movement. Some Catholic youth, however, have cooperated informally with their Lutheran counterparts on peace issues.

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in time of war or general mobilization, while reservists' training was extended from 21 to 24 months. A much-rumored extension of general conscription from 18 to 24 months did not materialize--perhaps for fear that it would give new ammunition to the peace movement. The March 25 session of the Volkskammer also passed a border law that, for the first time, delineated publicly the conditions under which border guards are permitted to shoot persons seeking to escape from the GDR. In presenting the new military legislation, Defense Minister Hoffmann clearly rebuked the peace movement: "As much as we would like to scrap our weapons, we know, one day, socialism and peace will need both our plowshares and our swords."

The clampdown dampened the movement's momentum. Activists' hopes for peace marches--planned first for the Easter period and subsequently for Havemann's funeral on April 17--did not materialize. The Lutheran Church clearly was not interested in abetting public demonstrations, while the authorities increased their preemptive surveillance of peace protestors. But neither the moderating influence of the church nor regime repression has squelched peace-oriented pressure from young East Germans.

#### Dilemmas and Prospects

That a grassroots peace movement should exist only in East Germany, among the Warsaw Pact states, is initially explicable in terms of the country's unique status. GDR citizens, as part of a divided nation on the East-West confrontation line, are influenced by political currents in the FRG. The surge of the FRG peace movement, whose activities can be followed in the GDR through TV transmissions, resonated with many young East Germans already alienated from the regime. Peace activity came to be seen as an ideal vehicle for resisting despised GDR policies. Using the institutional shelter of the church and some of the GDR's own peace rhetoric, young people were able to turn disarmament themes into symbolic protests against the regime, the USSR, and East-West competition.

The Lutheran Church gave the movement not only shelter but also moral legitimacy. As the only major institution not controlled by the state, the church has been crucial for the movement's growth. In many instances it has given substantive direction to peace activists, even while trying to hold them back from radical actions that would provoke a confrontation with the government. Church leaders see their support for the movement as a matter of principle, but one that must be tempered by realism: they must balance off fidelity to principle with a need to survive as a "church in socialism." Some of the more radical activists have strongly resented what they see as the church's "career Christian" orientation, but they have no alternative to cooperation with it.



The Honecker regime has its own dilemmas stemming from the peace movement. Paradoxically, the state has responsibility for inadvertently encouraging peace lobbying. Its intense praise for the West German and other West European peace movements and its initially tolerant approach to a "balanced" grassroots disarmament campaign backfired. Young people and intellectuals seized on the opening to widen the scope of their concerns. The SED soon concluded that it had made a tactical error, but in restricting the movement it has tried to avoid the use of major force. A confrontation with the church and/or GDR youth could unravel East Germany's internal stability and weaken relations with the FRG. It would also put the GDR in an awkward position vis-a-vis Moscow and the Warsaw Pact.

State Secretary for Church Affairs Gysi, in an unusually candid conversation with the US Ambassador, admitted that the party leadership, particularly the ideological hardliners, feared an unchecked GDR peace movement could mushroom into a Solidarity-type political opposition. This view indicates the depth of the party's insecurity and the fears generated by the Polish crisis. But the overreaction has been at least partially successful: more public peace demonstrations have not occurred. The authorities, in effect, have let it be known that they will not tolerate peace activities which could serve as a rallying point for the politically discontented.

But aside from using coercion, the SED is also trying to redirect peace activities into acceptable official channels, particularly the Free German Youth (FDJ). While the FDJ is seen by most peace movement enthusiasts as a compromised organization, the SED is trying to improve its image and appeal. Thus, FDJ contacts with FRG leftist and Protestant groups are on the upswing. FDJ-sponsored peace activities are also more prevalent. It is unlikely that the FDJ can coopt grassroots peace sentiment, however, although some youth might be encouraged to participate in order to "infiltrate" the official group and try to win converts.

The heterogeneity of the East German peace movement constitutes both its strength and its weakness. Many otherwise disparate individuals are able to find common cause under the umbrella of peace/disarmament concerns with pan-German and anti-GDR implications. But the movement lacks a systematic program and is highly dependent upon the Lutheran Church for whatever organizational basis it has. The looseness and lack of effective structure facilitate penetration and pressure by the authorities who, at the same time, are quietly trying to buy off the church with promises of more concessions.

Despite these problems, and the movement's loss of momentum, all of the actors in this drama--church, state, and youth--recognize that the skirmishing is far from over. The possibility for a



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- 6 -

serious flareup, a public event getting out of control, remains very real, particularly as the movement's supporters try to devise new tactics to circumvent the state's crackdown. Another surge in the FRG movement, combined with more GDR policies aimed at militarizing the society, could well touch off a more militant demonstration in the GDR. Because of its internal and external ramifications, the East German peace movement represents one of the most complex political problems facing the SED. Furthermore, the longer it persists, the greater the chance that other East European youth might get similar ideas.

Prepared by Robert Farlow  
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(U) THE SOVIET "PEACE MOVEMENT" AND  
ITS TIES ABROAD

(C) Summary

Moscow has mounted a public relations campaign to advertise its own domestic "peace movement," depicting it as a "spontaneous" expression of the Soviet public and part of the larger international movement "against war." Unusually explicit commentaries in recent weeks by Yuriy Zhukov, chairman of the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace (SCDP), and Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, described the history, organization, and membership of the Soviet "peace" structure. They also revealed some heretofore unadvertised aspects of Moscow's efforts to mesh its activities with those of the West European peace and anti-nuclear activists. Zagladin specifically acknowledged that the SCDP, via the Soviet Peace Fund, provides financial support to the communist-dominated Western affiliates of the World Peace Council.

\* \* \* \* \*

(U) SCDP Structure and Personalities

SCDP chairman Zhukov,<sup>1/</sup> in an appearance on Moscow television, May 22, 1982, presented a lengthy account of the functioning of his committee. In the process, he revealed some little-known information about its structure and role in the Soviet Union's longstanding exploitation of the peace issue at home and abroad. He argued that there is no discernible difference between the aims of the SCDP and the "peace-loving" goals of Soviet foreign policy.

<sup>1/</sup> (U) A prominent Soviet commentator, Zhukov is also a CPSU Central Committee member, a member of the USSR Parliamentary Group, and a deputy chairman of the USSR-USA Society.

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GDS 6/24/88 (Mautner, M.)

Report 417-AR  
June 23, 1982

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Authority: DKS/DALES  
DATE: 8/17/11  
BY: [signature]



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According to Zhukov, the SCDP was formed in August 1949, five months after the establishment of its parent organization, the Helsinki-based, Soviet-controlled World Peace Council (WPC). The SCDP purports to be a non-governmental, "public" (as opposed to party-controlled) organization, functioning on behalf of the Soviet people rather than the Soviet state. The present membership of 427 includes prominent scientific, cultural, kolkhoz, and other "workers." One hundred and twenty Soviet republic, oblast, and kray (administrative units) "defense of peace" committees have been set up as local affiliates of the Moscow-based SCDP; all are responsible for organizing and carrying out activities "in support of peace" in Soviet enterprises, kolkhozes, universities, and scientific institutes.

"Working bodies" (also called commissions) of the national committee meet regularly at SCDP headquarters in Moscow to formulate "newer and still newer plans of mass action directed at averting the threat of war," according to Zhukov. The "mass action" plans he referred to presumably include plans for the major communist fronts abroad as well as for indigenous USSR groups.

The various commissions make up the decisionmaking apparatus of the SCDP and are headed by prominent Soviet party and government officials. Vitaliy Zhurkin, deputy director of the Institute for the US and Canada, is in charge of the SCDP "disarmament commission"; Anatoliy Anan'yev, chief editor of Oktyabr (the organ of the RSFSR Union of Writers), heads the "commission for ties with cultural workers taking part in the struggle for peace"; Pavel Naumov, first deputy chairman of the Soviet press agency Novosti, runs the "commission for ties with mass media organs"; Nikolay Inozemtsev, director of the World Economics and International Relations Institute, supervises the "scientific research council on peace and disarmament"; and Sergei Tyulpanov, Leningrad State University Professor, chairs the "commission for problems of developing countries."

The choice of well-known media, academic, literary, and scientific personalities to head the commissions brings both stature and expertise to the SCDP and facilitates its contacts with foreigners in those professions. These same personalities presumably also serve as SCDP contacts with other "special interest" international communist fronts (i.e., the International Organization of Journalists, International Institute for Peace, World Federation of Scientific Workers, and Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization).

#### (U) SCDP Activities

The SCDP publishes a monthly magazine titled 20th Century and Peace, first issued in 1958 and now translated from Russian into English, French, Spanish, and German editions. The publication is



blatantly anti-US. It regularly features a "photo-panorama" of worldwide protests and anti-nuclear demonstrations aimed at the US, as well as articles describing US and NATO efforts to seek nuclear superiority or picturing the horrors of nuclear war.

Zhukov listed among the accomplishments of the SCDP the fact that 115 million Soviet citizens signed the WPC's 1950 "Stockholm Appeal" on banning atomic weapons--of an alleged total of 500 million worldwide who signed it. The SCDP also figured prominently in the WPC-initiated second Stockholm Appeal in 1975 to ban the "neutron bomb." According to Zhukov, 700 million people eventually signed this petition, 180 million of them Soviet citizens, almost the entire adult population of the USSR.

Zhukov also acknowledged that the SCDP is in regular and frequent contact with foreign "peace champions." He mentioned as recent arrivals at the SCDP's Moscow headquarters "anti-war" parliamentarians from Mexico, Canada, Britain, Nigeria, and India; participants in the May 10-14, 1982, "World Conference of Religious Workers Against Nuclear War"; and representatives of the Swedish, Norwegian, Dutch, and Finnish "Women for Peace" organizations.

In answer to Western charges that Soviet authorities do not permit in the USSR the kind of peace demonstrations that take place in the West, Zhukov claimed that there have been recent "anti-war" demonstrations in Moscow, Leningrad, Brest, Donetsk, Rovno, Dnepropetrovsk, Kiev, Rostov, Astrakhan, Minsk, and Volgograd--all of them distinguished by "anti-war militancy" and "unusual mass character." In addition, Zhukov reported that the editorial office of Komsomolskaya Pravda (the official newspaper of the Soviet youth organization) recently confirmed that some 8.6 million signatures of Soviet youth protesting preparations for nuclear war had been sent to NATO headquarters in Brussels.

#### The Soviet Peace Fund

(U) CPSU International Department<sup>2/</sup> deputy chief Zagladin, in an interview with the Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung published May 21,

<sup>2/</sup> (C) The International Department (ID) maintains liaison with foreign organizations, including pro-Soviet communist parties and international front groups (as well as their local affiliates), and so-called national liberation movements. The ID, in coordination with the CPSU International Information Department and the Committee for State Security (KGB), plays a prominent albeit covert role in Soviet funding, manipulation, and exploitation of the European peace movement. Zagladin, as first deputy chief of the ID and specialist in liaison with European communist parties, occupies a central decisionmaking position in the Soviet "active measures" apparatus.



discussed Moscow's view of the European peace movement and explained how Soviet peace activities are meshed with those in Europe:

"We highly appreciate the [European] peace movement as an expression of the people's will to prevent war. We understand this and we would like to support this cause and this will....We also have a mass peace movement, but it expresses itself in other forms....Our young people are now writing letters to Brussels, to the NATO organizations. Over 6 million youths have written such letters. Although May 9 was an official holiday, several working brigades came to work and collected all the money they had earned for the Soviet Peace Fund."

(U) In response to the question "What did they do with the money?" Zagladin stated:

"You have several peace committees for European security. They are printing newspapers, and all Soviet participants in peace demonstrations here in Vienna, Amsterdam or Brussels are being paid with the money from this fund. I think that we do not inform the public sufficiently about our peace movement...."

(U) According to available information, the Soviet Peace Fund is a type of financial clearinghouse administered by the SCDP. It is organized on a nationwide scale with at least 120 representatives scattered throughout the USSR. Like the SCDP itself, the Peace Fund is a "public" organization, allegedly operating without the involvement of official Soviet organs.

(U) Zhukov observed that some 80 million Soviet citizens participate in "replenishment" of the Fund. "Donations" are mailed to SCDP headquarters or paid through the USSR Gosbank (state bank). The most common method of collecting money for the Fund is for individual factories, plants, and collective farms to hold a one-day "work shift for peace," similar to the activity of the "working brigades" Zagladin cited. Individuals participating in such work shifts then "donate" their day's wages to the Fund. Substantial sums of money are collected over time. According to 20th Century and Peace (December 1981), the Krasnoyarsk Peace Committee alone received 2 million rubles for the Fund in 1981. Actually, such "donations" usually represent levies imposed by the central authorities on the individual local affiliates.

(U) Financing the WPC. According to the English-language weekly Moscow News (No. 19, 1981), the Soviet Peace Fund helps finance some of the WPC's "large public initiatives." Former Peace Fund chairman Boris Polevoi asserted that his clients



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- 5 -

included the "leaders of the international democratic organizations working for peace: the Fund regularly gives them assistance in organizing their undertakings" (20th Century and Peace, April 1980). Polevoi also acknowledged that the Fund worked closely with the SCDP, aiming to "render financial aid to the organizations, movements and personalities fighting for stronger peace, national independence and freedom."

(U) Referring to the October 1973 World Congress of Peace Forces, an event organized jointly by the SCDP and the WPC, the November 1973 edition of the WPC's Peace Courier reported that "Soviet public organizations...covered all the delegates' maintenance expenses in Moscow." It went on to claim that "Soviet citizens donated to the Soviet Peace Fund--which covered the delegates' maintenance expenses--about \$200,000. Moscow's Patriarchate also donated 3 million rubles."

(C) After money has been collected by the Soviet Peace Fund, it is channeled to WPC headquarters in Helsinki either through the International Department or through the SCDP (see chart, over). The various "peace committee" chapters affiliated with the WPC--the Austrian Peace Council, the Belgian Union for the Defense of Peace, the British Peace Assembly, the Norwegian Peace Committee, and 131 others throughout Europe and the rest of the world--are believed to receive Soviet assistance in turn via WPC headquarters or through local communist parties. Most of these national affiliates in any event generally coordinate their activities with those of the local party and include party members in their ranks.

(C) Financing the ICESC. In addition to the WPC-linked "peace" groups, the USSR sponsors several "peace committees for European security" which are national affiliates of the so-called International Committee for European Security and Cooperation (ICESC). The latter committee was set up in Brussels in 1972 following a meeting of the WPC's decisionmaking Presidential Committee, purportedly to promote the work of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Its affiliates are located in 24 East and West European countries, as well as the US, USSR, Canada, and West Berlin. According to an ICESC brochure published in 1979, the purpose of the organization is to "inform large areas of the public" about "everything connected with the CSCE's cause, the process of detente and the extension of peaceful coexistence between states of Europe with different social and economic systems." To achieve this goal, the ICESC "coordinates the action of its own national committees, circles and forums, as well as other gatherings of public opinion...."


(C) Zagladin, himself a member of the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation (SCESC), clearly indicated in his Vienna interview that the Peace Fund provides financial

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40

# PROBABLE SCDP FUNDING MECHANISM



— Probable flow of funds    - - - - Alternate flow of funds

41

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- 7 -

assistance to ICESC affiliates. In addition, personal and institutional ties between the WPC and the ICESC appear to be intricate and strong. Vitaliy Shaposhnikov, a deputy International Department chief who, like Zagladin, is believed to be responsible for liaison with North European communist parties, is a member of the SCESC and serves simultaneously on the WPC's Helsinki-based Presidential Committee. Even more striking is the fact that at least 16 ICESC affiliates include members who belong simultaneously to their national WPC branches. These "dual membership" cases are found in Belgium, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, the German Democratic Republic, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Portugal.

(C) How money from the Soviet Peace Fund is passed to these ICESC affiliates is not precisely known, although probably the arrangement is similar to that for the WPC. What is known is that the money provided by the Fund to WPC (and presumably ICESC) affiliates is used not only for "printing newspapers" as Zagladin suggested, but also for placing pro-Soviet advertisements in local newspapers, purchasing mimeograph machines, and paying the travel expenses incurred by "peace committee" members when they attend WPC-sponsored events.

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