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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 3, 1983

TO:

KEN DE GRAFFENREID

FROM: CARY LORD

You should be aware of this piece (from <u>Military Deception and</u> <u>Surprise</u>, ed. John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, London: Frank Cass, 1982). I read it through quickly, but it seems quite good.

Soviet Strategic Deception, 1955-1981

Michael Mihalka

An evaluation of Soviet strategic deception must compare the stated objectives of Soviet policy with the development and deployment of weapons that the Soviets consider strategic. Unlike the information that has become available on Nazi Germany, little direct material has appeared on the strategic objectives that the Soviets have pursued in the post-war period. Therefore, we must infer Soviet strategic intentions by evaluating not only their statements, but also their actions and their preparations. In the strategic arena, we need to compare their actual forces and their deployment with public claims about their numbers and capabilities.

The debate over the pursuit of strategic superiority provides the backdrop for examining Soviet procurement of and claims about nuclear weapons and their accompanying delivery systems. Strategic superiority implies that one side can assure victory in a nuclear conflict. The Soviets have traditionally characterized the West and particularly the US as pursuing the chimera of superiority. Soviet claims about superiority seem to vary inversely with their capability (or with Western intelligence about that capability) and provide an important piece of evidence supporting the argument that the Soviets have engaged in systematic strategic deception since the end of the Stalin era.

Strategic Deception as Policy

Strategic deception occurs whenever a country continues over a period of time deliberately to mislead another regarding its strategic objectives or the forces designed to achieve those objectives. Deceptions of intent leave much less of a trace than deceptions about capabilities. Evidence that a country indicated that it intended one thing when it subsequently did another may simply reflect a shift in policy. Often statesmen disguise their true intent from others and memoirs after the fact often betray greater vision than the confusion of the actual moment suggested. Actual plans or programs for deception should have limited circulation and thus should rarely enter the public domain.

Limited evidence that the Soviets have engaged in or encouraged systematic strategic deception has appeared in the memoirs of a former head of the Czechoslovakian disinformation section, Ladislav Bittman:

For disinformation campaigns to be successful, they must at least partially correspond to reality or generally accepted views. A rational core is especially important when the recipient enemy or victim is a seasoned veteran in such matters, because without a considerable degree

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of plausible, verifiable information and facts it is impossible to gain his confidence. Not until this rational skeleton has been established is it fleshed with the relevant disinformation. In 1963 for example, the general staff of the Czechoslovak army, with the help of the intelligence and counter-intelligence services, developed a long-range military disinformation operation in order to deceive NATO countries about the military strength of the Czechoslovak army. It was in fact a part of the Warsaw Pact disinformation program, and it can be assumed that similar techniques have been used by other members of the pact as well.

The general staff supplied Czechoslovak media with purposely distorted information on the Czechoslovak military, assuming that NATO analysts would pick it up. At the same time hundreds of double agents on Czechoslovak territory working both for Czechoslovak counter-intelligence and Western intelligence services were supplied with disinformation material on the Czechoslovak military that would fit with the published information. It was a very costly operation because the general staff had to finance the construction of deceptive missile ramps and organize a false transfer of army units in order to support the correct mixture of disinformation.

After 1964, the Czechoslovak disinformation service helped to develop this long-range project further, without knowing, however, whether or not the desired effects had been achieved. The NATO military command had not reacted, but our department had at least one indication of success: the Russians insisted that we continue. it is quite possible that this operation is still being conducted [Bittman:20-21].

This episode remains one of the few that directly implicates the Soviet Union in a plan systematically to deceive the West. The Soviet forgery offensive and the current disinformation efforts over the location of long-range theater nuclear weapons provide more tangible evidence of Soviet deception. However strong the evidence that the Soviets use deception to support their foreign policy, little has appeared to connect their strategic deployments and pronouncements directly to a program of deception. Nevertheless, a clear pattern of systematic deception emerges. The Soviets have consistently disguised the true strength of their strategic nuclear intercontinental forces: when weak, feigning strength; when strong, feigning parity.

Depending on the context, deception can serve a number of purposes. Hitler sowed confusion about the size of his military forces. Deception allowed Hitler to achieve what his rearmament program had not succeeded in doing, deterring intervention by third parties in his succession of diplomatic coups in the mid- to late 1930s. Deception may also serve peaceful purposes by deterring attack. Exaggeration can lead to reaction as the target feels a need to meet the threat posed by the enemy. In the late 1930s, the Germans, realizing that the inflated figures about German forces appearing in the British press were exerting pressure on the British to rearm, initiated a deception that indicated that the rate of German rearmament would just match the current British program. Thus, a deception campaign must not only succeed in achieving short-term goals, but it must also prevent a response which defeats the policy in the long run. Soviet strategic deception since 1955 shares the features of both boasting when weak and downplaying when strong.

THE CORE OF RATIONALITY, EVIDENCE AND DECEPTION

As Bittman notes, all deception must possess a kernel of truth. Any discussion of Soviet deception generally turns on protestations of US self-deception. Many seem more inclined to admit that the US has fooled itself than the Soviets have fooled the US. Such an attitude, of course, facilitates Soviet deception by providing a ready explanation for any Soviet behavior that appears deceptive. Reinforcing preconceived notions represents one of the easier tactics of deception. Homilies and half-truths about Soviet behavior also provide a ready basis for deception (for example, Soviet technological inferiority, Soviet 'defensive' posture, etc.). The pluralist nature of the American political process provides a ready market for virtually any Soviet deception, just as Churchill became an unwitting agent of exaggerated German claims in the mid-1930s. The leak and counter-leak system of bureaucratic infighting provides additional fertile ground for Soviet manipulation. Soviet attempts to disrupt the American political process may not necessarily reflect any conscious program other than confusion.

The true test of Soviet deception lies in their deployments and their public statements of intent and capabilities. Unfortunately much of the information about Soviet deployments must come from US public assessments of the threat posed by the Soviets, in part discredited by repeated Soviet attempts to fool US intelligence resources and by the many uses to which parts of the government put intelligence. Thus, the internal consistency of Soviet claims and military demonstrations must bear close scrutiny. Because the Soviets betray little about their strategic intentions (other than the general desire to deter an attack on their homeland, and Russian and Soviet historic expansionism), claims that they have made for their forces and their rationale in justifying them provide the best basis for evaluating Soviet deception.

Some deceptions possess elements that do not allow an easy distinction between strategic and operational. A government may disguise its forces to complicate the military planning of its opponents. For example, a country may construct dummy missile sites in an attempt to divert attacks on actual missiles. Such an operational deception assumes strategic implications if the country then argues that the number of missiles it has deployed conveys some advantage. If that country has engaged in some process with its major opponent in which quantity or quality, per se, has attained strategic significance, then that country need not even draw attention to the number of missiles in order for the deception to assume strategic status. The dialogue between the US and the Soviet Union has placed extraordinary importance on the quantity and quality of nuclear intercontinental systems. Thus, any attempt to disguise the quantity or quality of those systems, even without drawing attention to that disguise, represents strategic deception. Before the SALT process began, Soviet operational deceptions involving their nuclear

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intercontinental systems did not, ipso facto, constitute strategic deception. Now they do.

Some operational deceptions do not assume strategic importance because they have failed to enter the US-Soviet dialogue. For example, if the Soviets constructed dummy SAM sites or prepared camouflaged airfields for their interceptors to complicate US bomber route planning, they would not have engaged in a strategic deception. If the Soviets then made claims about the capability of their strategic air defenses that they did not believe, then they would have perpetrated a strategic deception. Sophisticated analyses have not appeared about the effectiveness of Soviet air defenses and even within the US controversy surrounds assessments because of the need to evaluate weapons programs. Unfortunately, the nature of the procurement process (at least in the United States) lends itself to deception directed more internally than externally. Occasionally, a vested interest will point with pride at (and exaggerate) current capabilities and view with alarm (and understate) future capabilities.

The controversy over major weapons decisions does not play itself out in the Soviet popular press as it does in the US. Nevertheless the Soviets may cite capabilities in vitro. Boasts in isolation may reflect the give and take of justifying a particular weapons program or the pride of technological development. Repeated references to a capability yet to appear indicate more than simply pride of parenthood; they reflect a conscious desire to trade prestige on that capability. Goebbels understood the dangers of boasting about untried capabilities in wartime. He threatened the British with the V-1 long before it had achieved an operational status. His propaganda backfired as the German people wondered why the state did not use the weapon and the British launched a counter campaign to embarrass the German government. In Soviet practice claims about future capabilities fade away as they fail to materialize or fail to strike a resonating chord in the West. (Johnson apparently asserted that the US possessed an ASAT capability at the time development began.)

Shifts in the capabilities of systems also pose a problem for identifying strategic deception, especially in the light of initial claims that later testing proves false or when the opponent adopts measures which effectively nullify the initial advantages of the system. For example, the Soviets may boast that no planes can effectively penetrate their air defense, as they did when they shot down the U-2. Tactics such as low-flying penetration may defeat an air defense designed to counter the high-flying threat. Similarly, a ballistic missile defense may succeed against a small number of re-entry vehicles which have low ballistic coefficients (that is, high drag so that the RV remains in the atmosphere longer) but become quickly saturated with large-scale attacks. As the threat changes so should claims about the capability of defenses. Isolated claims probably mean little. Claims sustained over a number of years without a corresponding capability suggest strategic deception.

Just as a system may fail owing to countermeasures, it may succeed owing to incremental technological improvement. Thus, a defense originally designed to cope with low beta RVs in small numbers may fail against high

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beta RVs in large numbers and beome relegated to a high altitude defense against aircraft. Gradual technological improvement may gain some capability against the high beta RV threat. In the absence of an arms control agreement that identifies ABM systems, a country need not tout its recently acquired capability and thus not perpetrate a strategic deception. If the arms control agreement does outlaw upgrades, then the upgrade does qualify as a strategic deception, especially because silence identifies a system as an air defense.

Preparations for breakout from an arms control agreement pose a special problem in identifying strategic deception. The Soviet Union presumably wishes to do as little as possible to limit its war-fighting capability. Therefore, the Soviets should design agreements that allow them maximum flexibility with respect to breakout. If the Soviets view war as inevitable, then the arms control agreement means little (since it was designed to manage the peace). To enhance their ability to achieve breakout does not violate the spirit of the agreement, per se. Unilateral statements about breakout by the other party to the agreement represent more naiveté and self-deception than Soviet strategic deception. Nevertheless, if the Soviets adopt measures that aid in the breakout process and also violate the letter of the agreement, then they engage in strategic deception.

OPPORTUNITIES FOR DECEPTION

The German pattern suggests that the Soviets should exaggerate their capabilities when low and downplay them when high. The specifics of the deception should depend on the dynamic between Soviet and US capabilities. Thus, the Soviets should pursue an overall program of deception with the specifics left to the interplay of technological progress and policy of the moment. The preconceptions of the US strategists and military should provide the most fruitful ground for deception.

I: Exaggeration to 1962

After the death of Stalin, the Soviets found themselves at a distinct strategic disadvantage. Stalin had left the Soviet military with a military doctrine illsuited to the technological changes already underway with nuclear weapons and the prospects of intercontinental ballistic missiles. Their major opponent possessed weapons and bases with which to strike deeply within the heart of the Soviet Union and yet remain unscathed itself. Apparent Soviet weakness could little serve a forward policy in Europe. Two paths seemed open: one, to forsake a capability against the United States, per se, and concentrate on the pressure that the Soviets could exert on Europe with local forces; the other, to expand the arena of conflict by pushing the new missile technology, realizing that geography and the massive industrial base of the US for producing bombers would lead the Soviets to the short end of the strategic competition.

Two doctrines presented themselves, one more consistent with the diversion of heavy industrial resources to broader economic purposes than simply

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military. The belief that nuclear war meant the end of mankind and that each side need possess only enough weapons to assure that destruction appeared early. The other view that technology did not fundamentally change the nature of warfare (and by extension, the class struggle) required forces sufficient to defeat the enemy. A minimalist approach to nuclear weapons would require merely that the Soviets guarantee that the US suffer if it should attack. Exaggeration of limited Soviet forces would help, but convincing the US of the need to restrict its nuclear capability would help even more. The maximalist approach required that the Soviets exaggerate their forces, because it admits that superiority conveys strategic advantage. Thus, the weakness of Soviet forces necessitated that Khrushchev pursue a policy of strategic deception to achieve his global forward policy. Hitler, faced with similar choices in the early 1930s, adopted a very similar policy-deception to compensate for strategic weakness.

MALENKOV AND HIS REPUDIATION

On 12 March 1954, Premier Malenkov argued that nuclear war would mean 'the destruction of world civilization' [H&R:25]. Such a view leaves little room for the pursuit of 'military-technological superiority' and Malenkov moved to reduce military expenditures. Opposed by the views of Bulganin that only imperialism faced destruction, Malenkov reversed his position the next month. Addressing the Supreme Soviet in late April, Malenkov claimed:

The Soviet Armed Forces have at their disposal and will have at their disposal everything that is necessary for carrying out their lofty mission — to stand guard over the defense of the motherland and be ready always to deliver a crushing rebuff to an aggressor who would want to disrupt the peaceful toil of the peoples of our country! [H&R:20-21].

Nevertheless, the Malenkov faction continued to downplay the need for greater military effort, but lost the struggle finally with the ouster of Malenkov in February 1955. Khrushchev argued that a call for more consumer goods was 'particularly intolerable ... when the imperialist powers are stepping up wild preparations for war'. The journal *Kommunist* disparaged the notion that the imperialists would not initiate a nuclear war. Such a view would lull one side into complacency and being ripe for a surprise attack. After Malenkov's purge, the Soviets moved quickly to increase military expenditures [H&R:27].

THE BOMBER DECEPTION

During their Aviation Day display in July, the Soviets resorted to an old trick to impress Western visitors about the size of their intercontinental bomber force. Twenty-nine planes, in three flights, passed the reviewing stand. Later estimates indicated that the Soviets possessed only ten operational bombers at the time [H&R:27-28; F:65-66]. This display reinforced Western projections that the Soviets would invest heavily in a intercontinental bomber force.

Despite their display, the Soviet leaders said little about the size and

capability of their bomber force. Neither before nor after the Aviation Day display did the Soviets advance any claims that linked the Soviet strategic capability to bombers, preferring instead to emphasize the still unproven ballistic missiles.

When General Twining visited the Soviet Union in 1956, the Soviets tried to disabuse him of Western inflated estimates of Soviet bombers. In fact, the Twining visit seemed designed to impress upon the US the defensive and peaceful nature of Soviet aviation. The single Soviet aerial demonstration contained just seven heavy bombers, three Bison jets and four Bear turboprops. The Soviets took the Twining group (which included the Deputy Chiefs of Staff for Operations, Development, and Material) to an obsolescent air engine facility and a transport plant. Unlike the Germans in the 1930s, the Soviets showed their older plants and none which displayed the production of combat aircraft. To a query about why the Soviets showed so few bombers, Marshal Zhukov responded, 'Oh, they are in production, but we are a peaceful people. We do not want to boast about our offensive weapons and offensive capability' [AF, July 1956:60].

The Soviets clearly wished to undermine the impression created by the Bison flyby during the 1955 Aviation Day displays. They intended with the Twining visit to undercut the impressions of a massive program for bomber production. Thus, they either wished to correct the impression created by the earlier visit or their overall policy had changed with the success of the Khrushchev faction. Their continuing emphasis on rockets in their public pronouncements and their failure to harvest the fruit of the 1955 display would suggest that the Bison flyby did not reflect overall Soviet policy and that they deliberately designed the Twining visit to affect US projections of Soviet strategic capabilities. From the misguided bomber deception (and indeed their own experience with the Germans in the 1930s) the Soviets had learned the power of military demonstrations.

THE MISSILE DECEPTION

The lull in Soviet claims between the 1955 aerial display and the announcement of the the ICBM test in 1957, punctuated by the Twining visit in 1956, suggests that the Soviets were applying the lessons of strategic surprise to the international image of their strategic capabilities. In late August 1957, the Soviets claimed that they had successfully launched an ICBM which allowed them to strike any location in the world. After the Sputnik launch in October, Khrushchev claimed: 'We now have all the rockets we need: long-range rockets, intermediate-range rockets and short-range rockets.' Despite launching a public relations campaign directed in part at Western journalists (again reminiscent of Hitler's use of non-German journalists), Khrushchev made claims only about the scientific, technological, and military superiority of the Soviet Union. Instead, Soviet commentary emphasized that the Soviet Union now possessed the means to deny the US the strategic advantages it had previously held [H&R:48–49].

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In November 1958, Khrushchev began making claims about placing ICBMs in production. In his speech to the 21st Party Congress in February 1959, Khrushchev emphasized: 'When we say that we have organized the serial production of intercontinental ballistic missiles, it is not just to hear ourselves talk.' From an intelligence standpoint, claims regarding production capabilities carry much greater weight. Defense Minister Marshal Malinovsky, at the same meeting, thanked those who had 'equipped the armed forces with a whole series of military ballistic missiles, [including] intercontinental'. The Soviets wished to convey the impression that their military had received operational missiles. Nevertheless, the Soviets still did not claim superiority, instead arguing that the Soviet Union possessed 'no less force and capabilities' than the US [H&R:50-53].

In mid-1959, Khrushchev disparaged the claims of some in the US that

... the Soviet Union has few intercontinental rockets ... But this, after all, is what the American military men assert. It should be said, however, that it is always better to count the money in your own pocket than that in the other fellow's. I might say, incidentally, that we have enough rockets for America, too, should war be unleashed against us.

In November 1959, Khrushchev boasted: 'We now have stockpiled so many rockets, so many atomic and hydrogen warheads, that, if we were attacked, we would wipe from the face of the earth all of our probable opponents' [H&R:58]. In January 1960, Khrushchev continued this theme:

I stress once again that we have already enough nuclear weapons — atomic and hydrogen — and the corresponding rockets to deliver these weapons to the territory of a possible aggressor, [so] that if some madman stirred up an attack on our state or on other socialist states we could literally wipe from the face of the earth the country or countries that attacked us [H&R:59].

The Soviets continued to contest the claims made by those in the US who suggested that the Soviets possessed considerably fewer ICBMs:

We declare openly that the 'data' at the disposal of A. Dulles are of little interest to us. To calculate in Washington the number of rockets and other types of Soviet arms is of as little use as counting crows on the fence. Why does the master director bother at all? We are prepared to answer his question. How many rockets do we have? Enough! Enough to wipe out from the face of the earth any country which dares to attack the Soviet Union. N. Khrushchev frankly and openly declared this at the January session of the USSR Supreme Soviet [H&R:62].

To complicate US ability to estimate the size of the Soviet ICBM even further, Malinovsky and Khrushchev argued that they could easily conceal the ICBM locations. Malinovsky claimed: 'The building of large expensive airfields with complicated equipment is not required for launching rockets. It is far easier to camouflage and even completely conceal rocket-launch positions; this guarantees a higher degree of security and invulnerability for rocket weapons." Consistent with earlier practice in World War II and the continuing treatment of deception in the Soviet military literature, we should have also seen in this period dummy mockups of Soviet ICBMs and M/IRBMs. The Soviets emphasize the need to make dummy installations look real and real installations look like dummies. Dummy rockets would have reinforced Soviet claims if they believed that the US would receive only photographic intelligence. Human intelligence would have revealed, albeit in a fragmentary way, the nature of the Soviet deception.

The revelations of the U-2 affair make it appear that the Soviets did not construct dummy ICBMs, either because they felt that the US lacked capability to photograph deep within Soviet territory or the claims at the higher levels did not trickle to actual deceptions at the local levels. Physical deceptions to reinforce verbal claims clearly mark a strategic deception. After the downing of the U-2 in May 1960, Khrushchev began to back off his previous claims of superiority. He began to echo Malenkov's comments, that nuclear war would represent a catastrophe for both sides. General Talensky argued that 'a future war, if the aggressors succeed in unleashing it, will lead to such an increase in human losses on both sides that its consequences for mankind might be a catastrophe' [H&R:79]. Khrushchev instead emphasized the value of the Soviet air defense, asserting that 'not a single bomber could get through to its target' and that the 'whole military concept of attack on the Soviet Union based on the use of bomber planes [has] been shattered' [H&R:80–81]. As he did at the UN in September 1960, Khrushchev continued to claim that the Soviet Union remained 'superior in the most effective means of delivering nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles'.

Kennedy had made much political capital out of the 'missile gap' during the fall 1960 campaign. Once in office, he discovered (as Nixon and the Eisenhower administration knew from the U-2 flights) that the Soviets had decided not to deploy the difficult first-generation SS-6 in great numbers. By October 1961, administration spokesmen and their favored journalists began to reverse the image of Soviet strategic superiority. Soviet reaction became almost defensive. Malinovsky claimed in January 1962:

US President John Kennedy once admitted that our strength is equal. This was a more or less correct acknowledgement, and it is high time that the American military leaders drew appropriate conclusions from it. I hold that today the socialist camp is stronger than these countries [NATO], but let us presume that the forces are equal. We are ready to agree to this so as not to take part in stirring up a war psychosis. But since our forces are equal the American leaders should come to correct conclusions and pursue a reasonable policy [H&R:88].

In May 1962, Khrushchev indirectly alluded to US claims that he had exaggerated Soviet capabilities:

Our strength today is not illusory but is enormous and real. The President of the United States himself said to me that our military forces are equal. I made no objections to this although we are in fact stronger

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than imperialism, because our forces include not only the socialist states but all progressive and peace-loving peoples on earth, all people who hold peace dear. These peace-loving forces are greater than the forces of imperialism [H&R:86].

Soviet superiority no longer rested on its military-technological capabilities but on its ideological purity. Nevertheless, the Soviets did not retreat from their quest for superiority.

The Soviets clearly engaged in a campaign to impress the US with the capability and size of their ICBM force. Claims by some authors recently that the Soviets were merely touting their burgeoning 'strategic' capabilities (which would include the M/IRBMs deployed in this period) do not square with the clear Soviet emphasis on rockets of intercontinental range [Aspin and Lee in *Strategic Review*, Summer 1980]. Presumably, the Soviets lacked a proper appreciation of the reconnaissance capabilities of the U-2. The seemingly slow build-up towards the superiority claims in 1959 suggest the Soviets could, if they had chosen, deploy dummy missiles to support their public claims. They decided not to and reaped the embarrassment of the deflated missile gap and the US strategic build-up.

THE CUBAN MISSILE DECEPTION

The Soviets clearly engaged in dissimulation in the months preceding the Cuban Missile Crisis. The revelations of strategic inferiority had embarrassed Khrushchev and threatened his policy (backed before by claims of strategic superiority). To correct the strategic deficiency quickly, Khrushchev needed to emplace missiles in Cuba before the US discovery to establish a fait accompli. The Soviets apparently had no satisfactory ICBMs in production. The SS-6 had proved an operational nightmare. Thus, Cuba would provide the basis for Soviet forward base systems. The SS-4 and SS-5 would restore the nuclear correlation of forces on Cuban soil.

To plan to emplace missiles in Cuba required elaborate concealment and deception procedures. Khrushchev would announce the presence of the missiles sometime during his planned visit to the US after the US Congressional elections. The Soviets needed to keep the missile deployment secret until they became operational The failure of the Soviet plan suggests that they had not developed a proper appreciation of the U-2 capabilities, revealed to stunning effect when Kennedy announced that the Soviets had begun to place the missiles in Cuba.

Kennedy had come under fire because of the increased Soviet activity in Cuba. During the early days of September, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin gave repeated assurances:

Nothing will be undertaken before the American congressional elections that would complicate the international situation or aggravate the tension in the relations between our two countries ... The Chairman does not wish to become involved in your internal affairs [A:40].

Despite such reassurance, Kennedy explicitly and publicly warned against

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the introduction of offensive missiles in Cuba. He received through back channels a message from Khrushchev that read: 'No missile capable of reaching the United States would be placed in Cuba' [A:40]. To cap these private communications, the Soviets expressed public denials through *Tass* on 11 September 1962:

The Government of the Soviet Union authorized *Tass* to state that there is no need for the Soviet Union to shift its weapons for the repulsion of aggression, for a retaliatory blow, to any other country, for instance Cuba. Our nuclear weapons are so powerful in their explosive force and the Soviet Union has such powerful rockets to carry these nuclear warheads, that there is no need to search for sites for them beyond the boundaries of the Soviet Union [A:40].

The first Soviet ship carrying MRBMs had already arrived, on 8 September. Construction would begin by the 15th [A:103-117].

Thus, the Soviets had given private and public assurances that they would not emplace missiles in Cuba. They claimed that they would make no trouble for the US prior to the elections. Yet the U-2 flights had discovered the missiles, uncamouflaged and deployed with the SAMs in the same four-slice pattern used in the Soviet Union [A:56]. Nevertheless, the Soviets had used great care in transporting the missiles from the Soviet Union and in moving them to the deployment sites. The failure to camouflage the sites (analogous to the Soviet failure to construct dummy missiles to buttress the early missile claims) suggests that the Soviets hadfailed to develop a completely coordinated plan (the deception planners only covered the transportation phase) and/or that the Strategic Rocket Force construction teams had not yet realized the need to alter their practices to fool the U-2 capabilities (probably because, in the segmented world of Soviet intelligence, no one had told the SRF of the U-2's capabilities). The Soviets only began to camouflage the missiles after the US had imposed the blockade.

The Cuban Missile deception continued the general thrust of Soviet strategic deception. The initial missile deception had failed. To redress the balance, Khrushchev decided to emplace missiles in Cuba. Only by deceiving the US could Khrushchev pull off the coup. Perhaps the Soviets failed to appreciate the capabilities of the U-2. But perhaps the Soviets were more impressed by the electoral venality of American politicians. Perhaps they thought that Kennedy would have no stomach for an international crisis immediately before the election and would call off U-2 flights over Cuba. But, such theorizing presumes too much. The failure of the Cuban Missile deception left the Soviets, for the second time but with much more impressive evidence, in a compromising position of clear strategic inferiority.

II: Compensating for Weakness to 1968

The Cuban Missile crisis left Soviet policy in a shambles. The crisis not only confirmed Soviet strategic inferiority but also underscored the political importance of strategic advantage. Khrushchev's bragging had reaped not

ba. He received through back read: 'No missile capable of in Cuba' [A:40]. To cap these public denials through *Tass* on

thorized Tass to state that there ts weapons for the repulsion of ny other country, for instance rful in their explosive force and ockets to carry these nuclear h for sites for them beyond the

eady arrived, on 8 September. -117].

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

only the embarrassment of the crisis but also an invigorated US armament program that included US advancement in both strategic offensive and defensive systems. Mere words would not compensate for Soviet weakness, but they needed a program that would at least give the West pause in some of its more adventurist excesses. The Soviets turned from an emphasis on quantity to quality in their public statements. They launched a massive armament program which would find them with over 1,400 ICBM launchers by 1970.

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Although Khrushchev fell from grace in 1963, the policy pursued by Brezhnev differed more in style than in substance. The qualitative deceptions begun by Khrushchev continued under Brezhnev who realized that he needed to compensate for weakness as the US launched new global offensives in Indochina and the Dominican Republic. At the same time, Brezhnev realized that he could not directly threaten the US as Khrushchev had done. Thus, Brezhnev and Khrushchev before him seized on US statements that emphasized Soviet-US parity. Qualitative comparisons carried the day.

Many of the Soviet attempts to manipulate US perceptions during this period invite two interpretations. The Soviets may have simply been boasting about capabilities that they thought they would have: the ABM, the mobile missile, and the global rocket. Khrushchev had made early claims about the ABM and the global rocket, but only under Brezhnev did they appear in parades. Towards the end of the sixties, the Soviets ceased making claims about both the ABM related capabilities for the SA-5 and the intercontinental features of the mobile missile. They actually tested the operational capability for the global rocket, otherwise known as Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS), but the failure of the US to deploy its ABM left the global rocket without a strategic purpose. For whatever reason, the Soviets did not deploy its first generation mobile systems, the SS-13, SS-14, and SS-15. Nevertheless, the Soviets did exploit the implications of the mobile systems long after they knew that they would not deploy them. They did treat as operational systems such as the global rocket which they had not yet tested. By inference, they later denied with the ABM treaty that the SA-5 system possessed any of the ABM capabilities that they had earlier claimed. They confused the distinction between SSBNs and nuclear attack submarines to enhance perceptions of their capability.

The period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and SALT has the Soviets trying to achieve at least technological parity by leaving the impression that they had deployed systems which they still had in the development phase. They even attempted to convey the impression of equal numbers. Repeated references to systems that had not yet achieved operational status and their appearance in parades combined with the Soviet need to compensate for real and perceived weakness suggest strategic deception not simply a pointing with pride at future capabilities.

THE ABM DECEPTION, PART ONE

The first ABM deception followed closely the exposure of Soviet exaggerated

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claims about the numbers and capabilities of their ICBM force. The second ABM deception forms part of the coordinated effort that parallels and exploits the SALT process. (This section relies heavily on Greenwood.)

The Soviets did little to exploit the extent of their ABM development work until after the collapse of the missile deception. Apparently, the Soviets began work at their range at Sary Shagan in the late 1950s. The U-2 photographed an early prototype of the Hen House radar. The US radar in Turkey, used to cover Soviet ICBM tests, lacked the range to detect any interceptor activity at Sary Shagan. Photographs could not readily distinguish between air and missile defense missiles. A primitive phased array radar like the early Hen House could serve the function of early warning. Even if the Soviets were not working on an ABM, they could have staged an ABM deception in the late 1950s. Instead they chose the missile deception to deter a possible US missile attack (the downing of the U-2 provided the necessary propaganda about the effectiveness of the Soviet air defense). The ABM defense, once deployed, would 'surprise' and thwart the US attack. In fact, Soviet commentators emphasized that nothing could stop a missile attack. In October 1960, Major General Talensky wrote, 'So far there is no practical way of repulsing a nuclear rocket attack' [G:172]. Despite the Soviet low profile on the ABM, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development) concluded in February 1961, 'It is my opinion, based on my information, that the Russians have a large, very large antimissile effort and have had for some time.'

Atmospheric tests in September 1961 led to widespread speculation that the Soviets had substantially increased their understanding of how to manage an ABM system. High-altitude tests provide critical information about the effects of nuclear explosions on radars and radio communications and the kill radius of an antimissile warhead [see NYT, 3/3/62:2]. In justifying the resumption of US tests, Kennedy argued:

We are spending great sums of money on radar to alert our defenses and to develop antimissile systems — on the communications which enable our command and control centers to direct a response — on hardening our missile sites, shielding our missiles and their warheads from defensive actions and providing them with electronic guidance systems to find their targets. But we cannot be certain how much of this preparation will turn out to be useless blacked out, paralyzed or destroyed by the complex effects of nuclear explosions ... [U]ntil we measure the effects of actual explosions in the atmosphere under realistic conditions, we will not know precisely how to equip our future defenses, how best to equip our missiles or penetrate an antimissile system, and whether it is possible to achieve such a system ourselves.

In October 1961, the Soviets claimed that missile defense no longer posed a problem. Marshal Malinovsky, in addressing the Communist party congress, announced: 'I must report to you especially that the problem of destroying missiles in flight has been successfully solved' [NYT, 10/24/61]. During 1961, US intelligence interpreted construction in the Leningrad area as the beginnings of an ABM system. This system never became operational.

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ICBM force. The second effort that parallels and avily on Greenwood.) r ABM development work parently, the Soviets began The U-2 photographed an radar in Turkey, used to any interceptor activity at tinguish between air and radar like the early Hen ven if the Soviets were not ABM deception in the late deter a possible US missile ary propaganda about the defense, once deployed, act, Soviet commentators k. In October 1960, Major ctical way of repulsing a w profile on the ABM, the

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

In July 1962, Khrushchev claimed that the Soviet Union had developed an antimissile missile [NYT, 7/11/62:4] and a 'global' rocket. A week later he claimed that the antimissile missile could 'hit a fly in outer space'. He also disparaged the recent US high altitude tests by claiming that 'we actually have a global rocket that cannot be destroyed by any anti-rocket means and I know, if anybody knows, what anti-rocket means are because we do have them'. [The 'global rocket' eventually appeared as the FOBS system on the SS-9, another example of Soviet deception] [NYT, 7/17/62:1]. In December 1962, following the débâcle of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Marshal Biryuzov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Rocket Forces, claimed: 'The USSR has proved her superiority over the United States in the field of antimisile defenses' [NYT, 12/11/62].

The resumption of Soviet testing in early 1963 confirmed earlier conjecture. Hanson Baldwin reported:

In the most recent series of tests in the Arctic, Moscow is believed to have accumulated considerable data on antimissile defenses. A number of high altitude shots were fired, and the effects upon radio and radar noted. In one test a multimegaton thermonuclear warhead, detonated presumably above the atmosphere, destroyed two ballistic missiles [NYT, 4/5/63, 8:1].

In February, Marshal Biryuzov continued the claim that 'the problem of destroying enemy rockets in flight has been successfully solved in our country' [NYT, 2/22/63].

In November, the parade honoring the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution contained a missile that Marshal Biryuzov claimed on radio could destroy 'the enemy's rockets in the air'. Other Soviet commentators indicated that this was the missile that Khrushchev had credited with the ability to hit 'a fly in space'. *Tass* touted the missile as able to thwart 'any modern means of air-space attack'. Nevertheless, Western analysts thought the Griffon interceptor merely a larger variant of other Soviet SAMs [NYT, 11/8/63].

The display of the Griffon in November 1963 seems designed to shore up the reputation of the Leningrad system with which it had been deployed beginning in 1961. In August 1963, Harold Brown, then Director of Defense Research and Engineering, had argued, 'Any deployed system which the Soviets are likely to have now, or in the near future does not appear to be as effective, almost certainly not more effective, than the Nike-Zeus'. His predecessor, Herbert York, went even further, 'Anybody can put some missiles around and say, "I have got an anti-ballistic missile system". It is quite a different thing to have one that would work. I stand on my belief that it won't work' [F:91]. York may have stumbled upon the true purpose of the initial Leningrad system, to deceive the West into believing that the Soviets possessed an operational ABM. By 1964 the Soviets had begun to dismantle the Leningrad system, replacing it with the Tallinn line. The confusion over the Griffon served several purposes, the most important of which was to confuse in the minds of the West the differences between the Soviet air and missile defenses. This confusion carried over into the SALT period.

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The Soviets began constructing an ABM system around Moscow in 1962. The Try Add missile tracking radars followed closely upon construction of the interceptor complexes [G:173]. The Galosh interceptor appeared for the first time in the November 1964 parade. Confusion reigned over whether the Galosh had an endo- or exo-atmospheric mission, but Soviet sources claimed it could hit enemy missiles 'hundreds of miles' from defended targets. The long range of the Galosh suggested an area defense. Construction also began on the Hen House radars designed to provide early warning with some capability to track missiles. Unlike the Tallinn line, the Moscow system seemed clearly designed to perform the ABM mission.

The Soviets continued to claim that they had solved the missile defense problem. In February 1965, Marshal Sokolovsky claimed, 'We have successfully solved the complex and extremely important problem of intercepting and destroying enemy rockets in flight' [NYT, 2/18/65]. In May, the Soviets again displayed the antimissile missile [NYT, 5/10/65]. To reinforce the impression of an effective ABM, the Soviets broadcast a program on television which showed an ABM installation and the intercept of an ICBM [NYT, 5/11/65]. In the Yugoslav army paper, Defense Minister Malinovsky in February 1966 stated that the Soviet Union could bring down enemy missiles 'at great distances from the targets that are being defended'.

The construction of the Tallinn line upon the dismantling of the Leningrad system began in 1963. Construction began at sites originally used for antiaircraft missiles and spread over a broad area, covering the Minuteman access routes to the north and later the Polaris access routes in the south. Despite these locations, the use of a mechanically steered radar for tracking and guidance, the distinctive construction signature of an anti-aircraft site with three launch sites, six launch positions, and one radar, and an assessment that the missile seemed designed for operations within the atmosphere (inconsistent with US notions that the Tallinn system seemed best located for an area defense which would require an exo-atmospheric missile) led McNamara to eventually conclude in 1967 that: 'The weight of the evidence at the moment tends to support the conclusion that the primary mission of the Tallinn system is air defense'. The upgraded Griffon (SA-5) seemed designed to hit targets at medium to high altitude between 12 to 20 miles. The US had already abandoned the high altitude penetrating B-70 bomber in favor of low altitude penetration tactics with the B-52s. The Soviet decision to deploy extensively a system for which the US analysts could find no threat had figured heavily in the conclusion that the SA-5 must possess an antimissile capability [F:90-95]. When the missile finally became operational in 1967, doubts about its capabilities began to decline. In his FY 1969 posture statement, McNamara concluded:

Now, I can tell you that the majority of our intelligence community no longer believes that this so-called 'Tallinn' system [which is being deployed across the northwestern approaches to the Soviet Union and several other places] has any significant ABM capability. This system is apparently designed for use within the atmosphere, most likely against an aerodynamic rather than a ballistic missile threat [G:176].

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The Western perception that the Griffon SA-5 system must deal with aerodynamic threats failed to take into account the earlier US designs for an ABM, the Nike-Zeus. Soviet desire to develop a minimal capability against the warhead designs and tactics of the early 1960s can explain the extensive deployment of the SA-5, especially if the Soviets wished to have an infrastructure available for future technological breakthroughs. US intelligence analysis tends to emphasize the technical characteristics over the accompanying infrastructure. Deployment of the SA-5 may seem stupid in the light of high beta RVs with penetration aids. The SA-5 would still possess limited capability against low-level threats and its infrastructure could provide the basis for a future area ABM system. The US had rejected the Nike-Zeus in favor of the Nike-X (which combined the Nike-Zeus missile with a phased array radar and a high acceleration interceptor, SPRINT). The Nike-Zeus missile had evolved out of the anticraft missile, Nike-Hercules. McNamara decided not to deploy the Nike-Zeus because it would have been obsolete. Nevertheless a description of the Nike-Zeus system resembles the SA-5 system:

From the beginning, the scientists and engineers who manned DDR&E and ARPA questioned the basic feasibility of NIKE-ZEUS. First, they noted the difficulties currently inherent in defending populations. Because of limited interceptor range and acceleration, intercept would necessarily take place close to the interceptor launch site. Each system could protect only a very small area, a 'point', around the ABM. A separate system would be needed for each locus - say a city - to be protected. Either the entire network would be very costly, or some cities would go unprotected. Furthermore, an attacker could defeat the system by aiming the ICBM just outside the protected radius so that fallout would drift in (the 'upwind tactic') - requiring in turn an extensive system of fallout shelters. Second, they argued that the system's slow, mechanically steered radars made it vulnerable to saturation. Third, they noted that the ZEUS interceptors' low acceleration forced the system to fire its interceptors before incoming targets had penetrated the atmosphere very far, rendering the system unable to discriminate decoys [Comm on Org of Gov for con of For Pol, Vol. 4:164].

Administration claims that the Soviets did not deploy the SA-5 with missile defense in mind not only neglect the characteristics of the proposed US firstgeneration system but also the objectives the Soviets may have been pursuing by deploying the system. Soviet design practice often differs from the US. The US used the characteristics of their proposed second-generation system to suggest that the SA-5 possessed only an air defense mission. The US left open the issue of why the Soviets had deployed the system in the first place. The Soviets had claimed in the early 1960s that the system possessed antimissile capability.

The Soviets would see in the Tallinn debate excellent opportunities for deception. They had succeeded in deploying a system for which Western intelligence analysts could find no useful purpose. They had spread real doubts about their strategic intentions and had the opportunity (if they followed Western press accounts) to undermine the impression that the Tallinn system really had an antimissile capability. They had also succeeded (certainly something they had not intended) in stimulating US MIRV development. If the Soviets had intended the Tallinn to have an antimissile capability, they had created a situation where it would be extremely effective if a war should come because the US would discount its effectiveness in planning.

Those advocating a Tallinn ABM capability retreated in 1968 to its potential for a surge ABM capability through a rapid upgrade. To counter McNamara's statements, the Strategic Air Command and the office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering argued:

Rather than start from scratch with a new ABM system, which would be detectable and would involve long lead times, the Soviets might well forego quality in favor of a speedy and possible clandestine upgrade of Tallinn's existing radar and missile infrastructure. This, it was further argued would give them virtually overnight, an ABM network far more extensive than anything the United States would develop over a reasonable period of time [F:94; N:12].

Soviet claims about the effectiveness of their missile defense began to change just as part of the Tallinn system became operational in 1967. In February 1967, the head of the Frunze Military Academy, General Kurochkin said, 'Detecting missiles in time and destroying them in flight is no problem' [NYT, 2/21/67]. He went even further and claimed: 'If enemy missiles fly, they will not arrive in Moscow' [NYT, 2/23/67]. Two days later Marshal Grechko seemed to dispute Kurochkin's claims. Grechko, First Deputy Defense Minister, acknowledged that antimissile systems could not completely prevent enemy missiles from reaching their targets. The head of Soviet civil defense, Marshal Chuikov, claimed on television: 'Unfortunately, there are no means yet that would guarantee the complete security of our cities and the most important objectives from the blows of the enemy's weapons of mass destruction' [NYT, 2/23/67]. Obviously, Chuikov would find himself out of a job if Kurochkin's boasts proved correct. The Soviets now claimed that their defense would thwart most threats. Marshal Zakharov argued in February 1968: 'The country's anti-aircraft defense has undergone huge changes. It has obtained the means which guarantee the reliable destruction of any plane and many of the enemy's rockets.' The confusion over ABM and the Tallinn line stems in part from the Soviet inclusion of both ABM and air defense under the same organization, a fact illustrated by Zakharov's comment.

During the initial phases of SALT, the Soviets maintained a low profile. In February 1970, however, Marshal Grechko, now Minister of Defense, returned to earlier claims for Soviet ABM: 'Great changes have taken place also in the country's air defense forces. We possess weapons capable of reliably hitting enemy aircraft and missiles irrespective of height or speed of their flight, at great distances from the defended targets' [G:177]. Some Western analysts interpreted this claim as a bid by Grechko to gain resources

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for the ABM program in the negotiations over the upcoming five-year plan [G:177].

Extensive claims about the effectiveness of the Soviet ABM program in the early 1960s gave way to virtual silence and disclaimers as SALT approached. Only the Moscow ABM remained unambiguously an ABM system. Western analysts discounted the value of the Tallinn line for ABM, but still failed to explain its true mission.

THE MOBILE MISSILE DECEPTION, PART ONE

Concerned about the vulnerability of their missiles in the mid-1960s, the Soviets decided to deploy a mobile MRBM/ICBM system based on the SS-13 and the JS-3 heavy tank chassis. As in the current controversy over the SS-20 and the SS-16, the Soviets used the top two stages of the SS-13 as a basis for the SS-14, the mobile MRBM. Very little public information has appeared on the SS-15 which shares the same chassis as the SS-14. Claims about these systems began in the early 1960s, but never ranked with the claims made about the ABM system. The Soviets apparently never deployed extensively the SS-14 and SS-13 but they clearly served as the prototypes for the current SS-20 and SS-16 systems. The potential of a mobile missile never excited much attention in the West, in part because, despite claims of its existence, the Soviets never displayed an SS-13 with a transporter, erector, launcher (TEL).

The SS-13 and SS-14 first appeared in the May 1965 parade [NYT, 5/10/65]. Tass had very little to say about these missiles in May. The Soviets again displayed these missiles in November. The first deputy commander-inchief of the Strategic Rocket Forces, General Tolubko, stressed the need to develop such systems because with current reconnaissance capabilities, stationary ICBM sites 'can hardly be concealed'. He went further to say, 'The presence of mobile roving intercontinental rocket complexes precludes the possibility of space and air reconnaissance. No one can know the areas of locality of such launching ramps, which increases the survival capacity of our strategic means' [NYT, 11/18/65:3:2]. Tolubko's need to stress the value of the mobile missile coincides with statements by Brezhnev and Malinovsky in 1965 disputing Western claims about US strategic superiority [see below]. If reconnaissance could not locate the mobile systems (especially the intercontinental SS-13 system which seems never to have reached operational status), then the Soviets obviously could have redressed the balance. The next year, Tolubko made very similar comments, again noting that the SRF possessed 'small-sized solid fuel missiles on self-propelled launching facilities, both of medium and intercontinental range' [Tass, 11/16/66].

An article appearing in the 10 July 1965 issue of Red Star noted:

The launching of strategic rockets can be carried out from various installations — from the surface or underground, from stationary as well as mobile installations, including self-propelled installations which insure the maneuverability and invulnerability of the rocket troops.

At the annual Artillery and Rocket Day in November, the Soviet SRF

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leadership continued to make references to their mobile ICBM throughout the late 1960s. Tolubko in November 1967 in a *Tass* interview claimed:

The power of the nuclear warhead has increased several times in [the last ten] years, while the weight of the head part of the rocket has considerably declined. This has made it possible to have both stationary underground launchers and mobile, small-size launching complexes with an international range of action. 'Such highly maneuverable rocket complexes are practically imperceptible to the enemy's space reconnaissance. It is impossible to strike an armed blow at them' [Tass, 11/17/67].

Tass noted the mobile missiles in the May 1968 parade as 'difficult for the enemy to hit'. Krylov in November 1968 noted, 'The Strategic Rocket Forces have at their disposal the most perfect missile systems, including intercontinental solid-fuel missiles with self-propelled launchers' [FBIS, 11/20/68]. In emphasizing recent advances, Marshal Zakharov noted in April 1969, 'A great number of new, and what is particularly important, mobile launching installations have been built for the Strategic Rocket Forces. These missiles are always ready for immediate action' [FBIS, 5/12/69].

The Soviets were clearly trying to convey the impression that they possessed an operational mobile ICBM, the deployment of which would go undetected by US reconnaissance. They emplaced the SS-13, not on a TEL, but in silos after it reached initial operational capability in 1969. The limited deployment of the SS-13 to 60 suggested that the Soviets did not view their first attempt as a success, a fact confirmed by their failure to deploy the SS-14 and SS-15. The Soviets last displayed the SS-14 in the November 1972 parade. On the other hand, the Soviets may have decided that deploying missiles in silos afforded enough protection with the US CEPs of the late 1960s and early 1970s and delayed deployment of a mobile system (with its logistical complications) until the SS-20. The claims about mobile missiles in the 1960s seemed designed to influence the Western perception of Soviet capabilities and to create the impression that the Soviets possessed greater capability than accorded them by the Western press. Tolubko even went so far as to cite attempts to conceal ICBM sites. In 1966 he described an ICBM site as possessing 'dependably concealed launching ramps [sic] with rockets'. During the Missile Gap period, Malinovsky had also made claims about camouflaging missile sites.

Soviet statements in the mid-1960s seemed designed to undermine the common impression that the Soviets possessed a dramatically inferior number of weapons. In early 1965, Sokolovsky claimed that the Soviet Union had reached parity with the US in atomic submarines [NYT, 2/18/65]. Whatever the veracity of this statement, Sokolovsky neglected to note the Soviet Union possessed no modern SSBN comparable to the Polaris submarines in the US inventory. Instead he said, 'The difference may be one or two. This does not alter the situation.' He characterized the Western comparisons between US and Soviet strategic arsenals as 'juggling' that did little to improve East-West relations.

Brezhnev also contested Western claims. In a speech to the graduates of the

nobile ICBM throughout the s interview claimed:

ased several times in [the last ad part of the rocket has sible to have both stationary Il-size launching complexes highly maneuverable rocket o the enemy's space reconrmed blow at them' [Tass,

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Soviet military academies, Brezhnev warned:

We hate to boast and we do not want to threaten anybody, but we must note that the figures and estimates attributed in the West to Soviet nuclear missile power do no credit at all to the information possessed by their compilers, particularly by the intelligence services of the imperialist states. Any attempt to take aggressive action against our country on the basis of this kind of evaluation of our military potential will prove fatal to its initiators [NYT, 7/4/65].

Brezhnev may have viewed the humiliation over the Cuban Missile Crisis and the clear inferiority of Soviet strategic weaponry as leading to the actions in Vietnam and the Dominican Republic. To compensate for this impression of inferiority, the Soviets displayed weapons and alluded to weapons that they still had in the development phase, such as the SS-14. Sokolovsky's earlier comments in 1965 obscuring the difference between ballistic missile, cruise missile, and attack nuclear submarines started the campaign punctuated by Brezhnev's speech. Brezhnev's comments clearly demonstrated his awareness of the relationship between deterrence and perceptions of nuclear strength. The display of weapons in 1965 indicated that the Soviets knew they needed tangible evidence of their recent developments.

THE GLOBAL MISSILE DECEPTION

The Soviets made more mileage out of their global than they did their mobile missile. Despite their attempts to portray their antimissile defense as impervious to US countermeasures, they described their global missile as capable of penetrating any defense. Although Khrushchev made the first claims about the global rocket in 1962, the Soviets did not display it until 1965 when Brezhnev feared the consequences of perceived Soviet strategic weakness.

Reacting to the Missile Gap fiasco, Khrushchev touted the 'global' missile for the first time in March 1962 [NYT, 3/17/62]. Claims about extreme accuracy generally accompanied any statement about the global rocket (for a discussion of the accuracy 'deception', see below). Khrushchev apparently viewed the deployment of 'radio location and other warning facilities' across Canada as prefatory to an antimissile system. (His views here may suggest something about the Tallinn deployments across northern Soviet Union):

The United States military wanted to protect themselves by some barrier from the Soviet retaliatory blow. For this purpose they set up a system of radar and other facilities in order to intercept in flight rockets that go approximately across the North Pole, i.e. along the shortest line.

[The US never deployed the antimissile system based on the Nike-Zeus. The Soviets at this time were deploying something around Leningrad based on an air defense missile. Khrushchev may have interpreted US deployments in the same light as his own. If so, the SA-5 subsequently deployed may represent an attempt by Khrushchev to deploy an antimissile and not simply an anti-

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aircraft system]. To counter US ABM technology, Khrushchev had ordered his scientists to build the global missile, which he felt, because it avoided the US ABM system [!], was 'invulnerable to antimissile weapons':

The new global rockets can fly around the world in any direction and strike a blow at any set target. The precision of the calculations is borne out, for instance, by the flights of the Vostok I and Vostok II spaceships.

Global rockets can fly from the oceans or other directions where warning facilities cannot be installed. Given global rockets, the warning system in general has lost its importance.

Global missiles cannot be spotted in due time to prepare any measures against them. In general the money spent in the United States to create antimissile systems is simply wasted ...

Why Khrushchev would worry about the US wasting its money on ABM would make sense only if he thought the US could field such a system. Soviet claims about the global missile contrast sharply with claims about the effectiveness of their own antimissile system. They had a missile invulnerable to countermeasures while no US missile could penetrate to its target in the Soviet Union.

In reacting to claims of US superiority, Khrushchev touted the invincibility of the global rocket. In the talk that contained the 'fly in space' claim in July 1962, Khrushchev argued: 'I am not boasting, but we actually have a global rocket that cannot be destroyed by any anti-rocket means and I know, if anybody knows, what anti-rocket means are because we do have them' [NYT, 7/17/62]. In December 1962 following the Cuban Missile Crisis fiasco, Marshal Biryuzov claimed that Soviet nuclear weapons could be 'delivered by our strategic rockets to any point on earth' [NYT, 12/11/62]. In February 1963, he asserted that the Soviet Union could 'at a command from earth ... launch rockets from satellites'. In November, Marshal Krylov, in an obvious reference to the global missile, contended that the latest Soviet tests demonstrated that they could hit targets with 'super-sniper accuracy' at a distance of over 8000 miles [NYT, 11/17/63].

In May 1965, the Soviets for the first time rolled out their orbital or global missile. Tass described the 110-foot missile as having unlimited range [NYT, 5/10/81]. Aviation Week speculated that the Soviets may have prepared the missile for show, noting that the 'metal-tube truss structure was questioned, particularly whether it could stand bending moments in pitchover' and the opinion of some that the missile may be 'an amalgamation of various stages' [AWST, 5/24/65]. When this missile, now identified as the SS-10, passed the reviewing stand Moscow radio said:

Three-stage intercontinental missiles are passing by. Their design is improved. They are very reliable in use. Their servicing is fully automated. The parade of awesome battle might is being crowned by the gigantic orbital missiles. They are akin to the carrier rockets which put into space our remarkable spaceships like Voskhod 2. For these missiles there is no limit in range. The main property of missiles of this class is

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their ability to hit enemy objectives literally from any direction, which make them virtually invulnerable to antimissile defense means [Soviet Space Programs, 1966-1970:335].

The SS-10 also appeared as an 'orbital rocket' in the May and November parades in 1966. In the November 1967 parade the SS-10 was relegated to intercontinental status: 'They were followed by three-stage intercontinental rockets firing [sic] new, highly efficient kinds of propellant. They need little time to be readied for firing and can be launched from silos and other launching ramps' [SSP, 66-70:337]. Brezhnev would later claim that the Soviet Union possessed intercontinental and orbital missiles 'sufficient to finish off once and for all any aggressor or group of aggressors [NYT, 7/4/65]. Closely following Brezhnev's speech, the 10 July 1965 issue of *Red Star* noted: 'Our rocket troops have a sufficient number of intercontinental, orbital, and other rockets to wipe any aggressor off the face of the earth.'

In November 1966, *Tass* ran an interview with Tolubko in which he claimed: 'Soviet global missiles have unlimited range and can hit a target literally from any direction.'

The November 1967 parade unveiled the SS-9 as the new orbital rocket. *Tass* noted: 'The last to appear were mammoth rockets each of which can deliver to target nuclear warheads of tremendous power. Not a single army has such warheads. These rockets can be used for intercontinental and orbital launchings' [SSP:337-8].

The May 1968 parade merely implied an orbital capability. When the SS-9 arrived in the square, *Tass* reported: 'The last to cross Red Square were the most powerful strategic missiles, whose range of flight is unlimited. They can strike blows on enemy objectives from any direction. The potential might of their warheads is unlimited' [*FBIS*, 5/1/68:B7]. References to 'orbital' missiles continued until the early 1970s, although the term orbital generally was converted into missiles of 'unlimited range'. Discussions of 'orbital' missiles generally contained references to their ability to penetrate effectively missile defenses. For example, the 1967 interview with Tolubko contained the following: 'There are no unreachable areas on the globe for the Soviet intercontinental missiles. Their use by no means depends upon natural or climatic conditions.' Krylov's address for Artillery and Rocket Day in November 1968 claimed:

Strategic missiles, because of their unlimited operational range, are capable of hitting any target on the globe in the shortest time with their powerful nuclear warheads. This weapon is now practically invulnerable to existing antirocket defense systems.

In April 1969, Marshal Zakharov stated, 'Missiles of the global variety have an unlimited firing range'. In November 1969, Krylov seemed to retreat from earlier claims by stating, 'Our strategic missiles have practically unlimited range. They are capable of delivering powerful nuclear warheads in minimal time and with a high degree of accuracy to targets at any point of the globe' [*Pravda*, 11/19/69]. Marshal of the Artillery Kuleshov made a very similar

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claim, 'Modern missiles, which have an almost unlimited range and are capable of carrying nuclear warheads of colossal power and of hitting their targets with startling accuracy, are always on alert' [*TRUD*, 11/19/69].

Krylov in November 1970 did not repeat his earlier claims but instead emphasized the constant readiness of the missiles:

Soviet strategic rockets are remarkable for their practically unlimited range and great accuracy and can carry thermonuclear warheads of tremendous power. They can be fired at any time of the year or day, irrespective of weather conditions and ensure exceptionally high degree of reliability in striking various targets at any distances.

In 1966, the Soviets began an active campaign to test the 'orbital' missile (known in US strategic vernacular as Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems [FOBS]). They launched two unannounced flights in 1966, both of which left considerable debris in orbit. In 1967, they announced their flight test program (although they failed to specify mission) and continued the tests until 1970 [SSP: 334–338;523]. Soviet claims about FOBS eventually led to its development in the late 1960s and presumably to an operational capability. Although the Soviets may have exaggerated the accuracy of the missile and its invulnerability to missile defenses, the extent of their test program indicates that they seriously pursued a FOBS capability. Thus, their 'orbital' missile does not rate as a true strategic deception except insofar as they implied an operational capability when they had not advanced beyond the development stage. The use of the SS-10 in the military parades also suggests part of a campaign to tout Soviet military capabilities when the Western press was emphasizing Soviet strategic inferiority.

Although Soviet claims emphasized the ability of their orbital missiles to avoid those areas covered by US early warning radars, FOBS can defeat missile defenses by following a depressed trajectory. The FOBS would enter radar coverage later and closer to the target than a regular ICBM which would follow a minimum energy trajectory. A depressed trajectory would require more energy and thus lead to a smaller payload. Soviet interest in FOBS declined when it became clear that the US would not deploy its ABM.

THE 'ACCURACY DECEPTION', PART ONE

Controversy over the causes of the US systematic underestimation of the Soviet ICBM buildup in the late 1960s has led some authors to speculate that the Soviets also disguised the missions for their missiles, specifically that they systematically altered their flight tests to suggest lower accuracy. US analysts did underestimate Soviet commitment to an extensive buildup, in part because they failed to divine a purpose for the numbers of SS-11s the Soviets eventually deployed. In 1977, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Albert C. Hall, noted:

Since the USSR deploys more than 1,400 missiles, its nuclear arm has

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

almost inconceivable destructive ability. It is difficult to see why the Soviet Union requires a force of this magnitude, since less than one-fifth the force could destroy the economic structure of the US and there are no defenses to penetrate.

One must conclude that some fraction of the Soviet ballistic missile force is planned to attack the Minuteman force. Major changes now underway in the Soviet land-based force support this view...(quoted in Harris, p. 61).

This passage reveals a number of prejudices sufficient to explain US underestimation, even if the Soviets did not emphasize nuclear threat in their public targeting literature. First, it assumes that the Soviets would strike first with their missiles undamaged and their C3 system intact. A conservative Soviet planner would size his force against the targets he needed to cover should he lack warning sufficient to launch from under a US surprise attack. Second, it assumes that Soviet force sizing depends on some objective evaluation of the targeting requirements as dictated by strategic doctrine and the threat. An objective analyst would be hard pressed to relate US force structure to some 'rational' criteria. We should have as little reason to expect the rationality of Soviet deployments as we do our own. Third, that Soviet decisions to deploy 1,400 ICBMs occurred when the US had an active ABM program clearly pointed towards an operational status. The Soviet FOBS program made sense only in terms of the expected ABM deployment. Fourth, it neglects the sensitivity that the Soviets have displayed about the perception of strategic inferiority. The Soviet interest in SALT stems in part from their need to achieve publicly strategic parity. As Brezhnev warned in 1965, he did not wish the West to attack simply because it incorrectly viewed itself as strategically superior.

William Harris advances another argument, that the Soviets deceived the West regarding the accuracy of their missiles:

Nevertheless, during the 1960s, just as US intelligence analysts were growing confident that the Soviets overrepresented capabilities, and that we could catch them every time, just the opposite happened. With an understanding of the technical indicators and methods of US estimation of ballistic missile accuracy, the Soviets managed to underrepresent the accuracy of intercontinental ballistic missiles. The earlier bluffing upward corresponded to decisions not to invest in nuclear armed rockets early, while seeking silo-killing capabilities. US Defense Secretary Harold Brown has recently indicated that the Soviet SS-9 ICBM was always aimed at the launch control centers of the Minuteman missile complexes. Only systematic biasing of technical indicators would produce the apparently large errors in guidance and the actually quite limited errors needed to justify attack on so hardened a set of military targets [Harris:60].

Harris cites an article which directly relates the US assessments of low accuray and numerical underestimation to a Soviet strategic deception program. and the second second

There had appeared

acute concern ... that ... the KGB may have succeeded over many years in systematically deceiving United States intelligence about Moscow's military capacities and intentions. Prior to the sacking of the key members of the CIA staff at the end of 1974 they were engaged [with the help of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology] in ... assessments of military intelligence culled from Soviet agents recruited by the FBI in New York ... The tentative conclusion reached was that much of the information from these suspect sources — for example, exaggerated accounts of the problems faced by the Russians in constructing missile guidance system[s] — was part of a strategic deception programme which was at least partly responsible for the CIA's notorious undervaluation of the Soviet defense effort in the mid-1970s [Harris:79-80].

Harris concludes that the Soviets may have introduced systematic error into their flight test program. He argues that the time lags involved and the predisposition of intelligence analysts to construe all error as random would undermine any interpretation of part of the error as systematic. Of course, a sufficiently large sample size would reveal, but not explain, systematic error. Harris also believes that the Soviets may not have abandoned radio guidance as quickly as the US. He interprets the Soviet experiments with Doppler communications from satellites in the mid-1960s as indicative of a Doppleraided missile guidance program [H:72–75].

A Soviet strategic deception program in their flight tests of the mid-1960s (for the third-generation missiles) and possibly for the mid-1970s (for the fourth-generation, see below) seems at odds with their public statements about targeting and the accuracy of their missiles. The Soviets continued to claim 'super-sniper' accuracy for their orbital missiles and always listed nuclear threat (and its accompanying command and control) at the top of their target list. The Soviets also claimed to deploy a mobile ICBM in the mid-1960s that reconnaissance could detect only with great difficulty. The Soviets claimed in the mid-1960s that Western analysts were underestimating Soviet capabilities. Thus, it would seem that the Soviets were trying to impress upon the West that they had greater capabilities.

The little specific information on Soviet accuracy also conflicts with Harris's thesis. An East German publication in 1967 generally touts the overall superiority of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Force, but also stresses accuracy improvements:

... the accuracy of the Soviet Rocket forces is extremely high. In the annual tests which the Soviet Union is conducting with its intercontinental rockets, generally covering a range of about 13,000 km, the deviation from the center of the target has been reduced since 1960 from 2,000 m down to 160 m. This kind of very near miss would not influence the accomplishment of the combat mission when a nuclear warhead in the megaton range is used [*Neues Deutschland*, 9/30/67].

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A systematic Soviet program to disguise the accuracy of their thirdgeneration missiles would conflict with the Soviet policy of deterrence which emphasizes defense and damage limitation. The Soviets value high accuracy because it increases their ability to fight and 'win' a nuclear war. Western thought considered high accuracy 'destabilizing' because it undermined the ability to launch an assured second strike. Such thought astounds the Soviet mind. To project an image of low accuracy would threaten deterrence from the Soviet perspective because an opponent need not fear inaccurate weapons.

III: Managing the Transition to Parity, 1968-1974

The tremendous expansion in Soviet strategic offensive programs in the midto late 1960s apparently excited very little interest in the US. Harris explained the lack of reaction by suggesting that the Soviets had deceived the West about the accuracy of their missiles and thus clouded their true counterforce mission. Others suggest that US doctrine pointed towards a sufficient number of missiles needed for deterrence and so long as the number of Soviet missiles did not threaten US second-strike capability, accuracy in estimates did not matter. The failure of the US intelligence to predict the Soviet build-up suggests a poor understanding of the missions that the Soviets expected their ICBMs to perform in war. Alternatively, the Soviets could have used strategic deception to fool US intelligence by disguising the magnitude of the build-up.

Material that Sullivan [1980, in Godson] has produced suggests that the Soviets did not attempt to disguise the magnitude of their build-up. Brezhnev had in 1965 voiced concern over US underestimates. The data on construction starts for silos in the mid- to late 1960s indicates ample evidence for predicting Soviet missile deployments (Sullivan does not reveal the source of the silo start data so any use of it must remain speculative). Perhaps Brezhnev thought that the Vietnam War drained enough US resources not to stimulate a US armament program, especially since the Soviets did not attempt to exploit their arrival at parity. In fact, the US responded by attempting to initiate arms control talks that would limit both offensive and defensive systems. To maintain strategic superiority, the US had decided to fractionate its warheads, a much less expensive proposition than building new missile launchers.

Although the Soviets had not initiated SALT, once it became clear that the US would continue with its ABM program, they seized upon SALT as a means to assure at least strategic parity and hopefully strategic superiority. The early phases of the talks would coincide with completion of the seven-year plan begun in 1963 after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Although giving lip-service to the goal of parity (and in that regard perpetrating a deception), the Soviets used SALT to gain a strategic advantage guaranteed by the movement from the third- to the fourth-generation missiles.

The Soviets realized that SALT I could only provide them a temporary breathing space unless they institutionalized the process. The tremendous expansion in US strategic programs in the early 1960s served as a warning that only an astute policy carried on over a number of years would delay a US response. Such a policy would require that the Soviet Union downplay any a Markey and A and a shift with

strategic advantage that the forces of modernization provided.

Blatant Soviet strategic deception during SALT itself would prove counterproductive. Rather the Soviets would agree only to do whatever necessary to assure strategic advantage and not limit their modernization programs. Blatant deception could easily backfire; 'sharp practice' that exploited US preconceptions would ease the way to Soviet advantage.

THE PURSUIT OF SUPERIORITY, SOVIET WRITINGS PRIOR TO SALT

Soviet military writings prior to SALT (and especially the 21st Party Congress held in 1971) provide the context for evaluating Soviet policy during SALT itself. These writings would reflect what objectives the Soviets would pursue in SALT. While some have argued that shifts in Soviet public statements after SALT reflect Soviet learning (or at least an appreciation) about the virtues of assured destruction, these shifts could just as easily represent lip-service to continue the gains of the SALT process itself.

Throughout the 1960s, the Soviets returned to the need to pursue superiority. Talensky argued in 1965: 'In our days there is no more dangerous illusion than the idea that thermonuclear war can still serve as an instrument of politics, that it is possible to achieve political aims by using nuclear weapons and still survive ...' [G:115]. Garthoff argues that critics disavowed Talensky's view because they thought it undermined the argument for weapons procurement not because they found it theoretically unpalatable. However, the passage by Talensky may simply reflect his desire to undercut Western urges towards nuclear war. In 1965, Brezhnev had argued that Western perceptions of their strategic superiority should not lead them to initiate nuclear war. Talensky could be arguing that the West should not try to pursue political objectives through the use of nuclear weapons.

In the 1960s, the Soviets viewed superiority as necessary (but not sufficient) to deter Western aggression. Writing in the restricted circulation General Staff journal, *Military Thought*, in 1964, a Capt. Kulakov argues that 'depriving the enemy of superiority in military technology does not mean depriving him of the capability of starting a new war'. Although Kulakov argues that the 'military potential of the state, its ability to wage war and win victory is now determined by its capability of using [nuclear weapons] in combination with highly effective rocket means of delivery', he cites the need for greater conventional forces:

 \dots in a war against a strong enemy, with extensive territory enabling him to use space and time for the organization of active and passive defense, the maneuver of forces and the mobilization of reserves — a single attack with strategic rocket-nuclear weapons is not enough for a complete victory over such an enemy.

Kulakov is simply acknowledging the tradition of the 'long war' in Soviet military thought, that if socialism fails to achieve its strategic objectives in the initial period of the war (generally comprised of the initial massive nuclear exchanges) then it must continue to fight. His article also carries a warning for

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

the West that reliance on nuclear weapons alone will not suffice (although he is actually quarreling with the conventional cutbacks under Khrushchev).

Writing in the public journal, *Kommunist*, Bondarenko continued Kulakov's theme in 1966. He argued that 'under contemporary conditions, the significance of strictly military factors — alongside moral political factors — and especially of military-technological superiority over the enemy is greater'. Bondarenko defines superiority in the context of war, noting that 'military-technological superiority of one side over the other is not absolute, its truth can actually be tested only in direct armed conflict'. He defines superiority as follows:

military-technological superiority consists in a relation between the quantity and quality of military equipment and weapons, the degree of training of the troops for action with it, and the effectiveness of the organization structure of the army, which gives one side superiority over an actual or potential enemy and make it possible for this side to achieve victory over the enemy.

Bondarenko also makes a revealing comment about the need for technological surprise which explains in part the appearance of the 'mobile ICBM' and the global missile in the parades of the 1960s:

Achievement of quantitative and qualitative superiority over an adversary usually requires lengthy production efforts. At the same time creation of a basically new weapon, secretly nurtured in scientific research offices and design collectives, can abruptly change the relation between forces in a short period of time.

An important factor, especially under present conditions, is the suddenness of the appearance of this or that new type of weapon. Suddenness in this realm not only affects the morale of an adversary but also deprives him for a long time of the possibility of applying defensive means against the new weapon.

Bondarenko cites orbital rockets and the success that the Soviet Union has achieved in 'creating, for the first time in the world, small size intercontinental solid fuel rockets launched from cross-country caterpillar vehicles' as examples of Soviet superiority.

In a December 1967 issue of *Red Star*, Rear Adm Andreyev explained to the troops the meaning of military superiority. He notes: 'The superiority in forces which is so necessary to win victory still does not mean victory itself: It merely creates the opportunity to win it.' Andreyev notes that the introduction of nuclear weapons has qualitatively changed the nature of warfare:

Because the main tasks in a possible rocket-nuclear war will be performed by strategic missiles, attack, as well as defense, implemented to various degrees, will acquire a principally new character.

The question of the deployment and covering of troops is now posed in a completely different manner. This is only logical: Superiority over the enemy is not only achieved by destroying his forces, but also by saving one's own forces.

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Discussions such as Andreyev's indicate that little controversy surrounded the notion that superiority increased the probability of success in war. Andreyev's article clearly indicates that the Soviets intend to fight on after the initial nuclear strikes until they achieve their objectives.

The Soviets also acknowledged that inferior forces could, if properly applied, defeat the enemy. Such reasoning reflects the Soviet strategic disadvantage relative to the US. Grudinin in mid-1968 does not argue that smaller forces will suffice to launch a retaliatory blow. Rather, he emphasizes:

A concentration of superior forces at the decisive moment in selected directions at present presupposes primarily the creation of superiority in rocket and nuclear weapons, in morale, in combat skill and the physical readiness of the personnel, in military arts and in the capability of using the forces and the means available to a commander with maximum effectiveness in a minimum time. Nuclear weapons and the modern delivery systems create the possibility of defeating a more numerous weapon in a short period of time. But it must not be excluded that under the designated conditions it is also possible to be defeated by a relatively small-sized enemy. In other words, the role of the subjective factor in turning an unfavorable situation into a favorable one by skillful use of new weapons has risen [sic] as never before. The correct and prompt use of these weapons — not only on a strategic but also on the operational and tactical scale — is the main problem in military art.

Thus, Grudinin resolves the issue of simple quantitative and technological superiority. Until the Soviets gain such a superiority, they need to rely on their troops and their strategy. This strategy involves in part correct choice about the procurement of weapon systems. For example, Bondarenko, in the article cited earlier argues that the Soviets purposely bypassed procuring an inter-continental bomber fleet:

In our time the strategy of military-technological construction can become a very important element which — if there is correct evaluation of the prospects of the development of military equipment — makes it possible not to follow up all known samples [sic] blindly, but rather to concentrate attention and focus on the more promising types of weapons, skipping some intermediate transitional stages. [The Central Committee has] made it possible for our country, by concentrating efforts on the creation of basically new means of delivery: rockets, to surpass the United States which at that time concentrated its efforts on the development of intercontinental bombers as the only [according to their view at the time] means of delivering nuclear charges.

Even after the debate had begun in Moscow over involvement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Soviet military leaders continued to stress the need to defeat the enemy should a nuclear war occur. The commentary of the head and deputy head of the Strategic Rocket Forces on the annual Artillery and Rocket Day (19 November) provide an indicator of the trends in Soviet attitudes towards the possibility of victory in nuclear war. In his

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address in 1968, the SRF commander, Marshal Krylov stated: 'Missile Forces servicemen see their sacred duty in maintaining every launcher in ever-ready, year-round preparedness for inflicting a resolute defeat on imperialist aggressors.' In a 19 November 1969 *Pravda* interview, Krylov styled the Strategic Rocket Forces as 'the main, decisive force for restraining the aggressor and inflicting defeat on him should he unleash a nuclear missile war'. The phrase 'restrain' in this passage represents the Russian equivalent of the American term 'deter' and occasionally appears in *FBIS* translations as 'contain'. When referring to the US deterrent the Soviets generally use the word 'scare' or 'frighten'. The Strategic Rocket Force Political Director, Col. Gen. Yegorov used a similar formula in the 18 November 1969 issue of *Red Star*: 'The strategic missile forces' combat and technical characteristics have made them one of the main means of restraining the aggressor and, in the eventuality of war, of decisively defeating him.'

The formula apparently began to change in 1970. The SRF chief of staff, Col. Gen. Shevtsov did portray the SRF as 'the main force capable not only of restraining an aggressor, but also of inflicting defeat on him, jointly with the armed forces, should a nuclear missile war break out' [Soviet Russia, 19 November 1970]. Marshal Krylov toned down his earlier comments and viewed the SRF as simply 'the main striking force in the nuclear war, should the aggressors dare unleash it' and that the SRF should always be prepared 'to inflict a crushing blow at the aggressor'.

The shift continued in 1971. In his 19 November 1971 *Pravda* interview, Marshal Krylov argued that the SRF had become 'a reliable means of deterring the aggressor and maintaining peace', that they were always prepared to 'bring down retaliatory blows against the aggressor'. The article by the SRF deputy commander, Col. Gen. Grigoryev, in the 19 November 1971 issue of *Red Star* did not even mention the need to deal an aggressor 'a crushing rebuff'.

In a radio talk on 18 November 1972, Shevtsov repeated his 1970 comment that the SRF had become 'the main strike force of our army, the main factor in the containment [deterrence] of the aggressor and his crushing defeat in the event of war'. None of the written material cited in *FBIS* for the Rocket and Artillery Day contained references even to dealing the aggressor a 'crushing rebuff'. Tolubko had replaced Krylov as SRF commander and his 19 November 1972 *Pravda* interview simply identified the SRF as the 'army's main strike force and the main means of deterring an aggressor'. The deputy SRF commander, Col. Gen. Grigoryev, did cite the ability of the SRF to 'inflict massive retaliatory nuclear strike on the aggressor's most important regions and military targets at any point on the globe'.

With the advent of SALT, the Soviet military had shifted from emphasizing the need to defeat an aggressor to simply dealing him a 'crushing rebuff'. Bellicose statements had virtually disappeared. During the period when the Soviets found themselves accused of strategic weakness they had made their most aggressive statements. As deployment continued on their third generation missiles and SALT codified strategic 'parity', the Soviets moved from victory to retaliation.

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SALT AND SOVIET DECEPTION

Soviet strategic policy under Brezhnev continued the strategic deceptions begun by Khrushchev. The Soviets claimed and touted capabilities such as the mobile ICBM that they had not deployed to compensate for their apparent weakness. As they began to overtake the US in numbers of ballistic missile launchers deployed, the Soviets exploited the opportuity provided them by the SALT process. With SALT, they could achieve the appearance of parity and defuse the pressures that the US would begin to feel towards strategic modernization. SALT would allow the Soviets to modernize without a dramatic US response. The Soviets had learned from Khrushchev's early failures. Bellicose statements when the US felt itself weak would only precipitate US force modernization. The adoption of a public stance for parity, while proceeding with modernization, would allow the Soviets to achieve strategic superiority.

Many of the claims that the Soviets engaged in strategic deception during SALT stem from what individuals have identified as violations of the agreement. Others have argued that the Soviets simply engaged in 'sharp practice', that one should expect a burglar to rob an unlocked room. SALT provided the Soviets with a grand opportunity, but the US initiated the negotiation process and insisted on tying the offensive limitation to ABM treaty. The US insisted on including unilateral declarations, which could only lead to problems later (simply because the Soviets did not accede to the unilateral statements did not mean that they disagreed with them per se; they could have objected to their specific nature). If the Soviets actually lied in SALT, then they either thought that they would not have the lie discovered (that is, they underestimated the capabilities of US technical national means) or they realized that their lie would be discovered in time but that they could successfully gloss over it. Soviet 'violations' could represent clear areas of ambiguity from their perspective. Anything not specifically prohibited may be permitted.

David Sullivan, among others, identifies a number of SALT violations. Some of these violations make more sense in the light of deceptions conducted by the Soviets in the 1960s. Others make sense in the light of what the Soviets did not do, especially their decision not to deploy a MIRV except with the test of the fourth-generation missiles. But all of them make sense in the light of Soviet public statements, in the shift from superiority and victory to parity. As Soviet capabilities to achieve victory in nuclear war increased, their claims about the prospects of victory disappear. The Soviets clearly wished to defuse US modernization.

Cyrus Vance included a number of possible violations in his presentation to Congress:

1) Launch control facilities (special purpose silos); 2) Concealment measures; 3) Modern large ballistic missiles (SS-19 issue); 4) Possible testing of an air defense system (SA-5) in an ABM mode; 5) Soviet reporting of dismantling of excess ABM launchers; 6) Soviet ABM radar

submarines should figure ited the SALT process to et lie occurs when they es operational or under lence for 42. (Collin lists otels. The Soviets did not il late 1975) [Collin:449]. ce of deception, intended to suggest deployments covers over submarine ely, little has appeared in y submarines and about ss of US technical means. mmy appears in Yankee chnical means work. The dummy submarine from l until 1975 when they ubmarine appeared after ditional older ICBMs to he dummy submarine to ior to May 1972. If it did, of what they thought we from national technical

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

readied for testing the SS-N-8 missile designed to compensate for geographical asymmetries suggests that the Soviets did indeed orchestrate the SLBM issue for maximum effect. The Soviet handling of the SLBM issue more convincingly points towards strategic deception than the heavy missile issue. The Smith account of the negotiating history suggests that the US would have accepted a SALT I without SLBMs.

MOBILE ICBMs, PART II

According to Sullivan, the Soviets promised Nixon that they would not deploy a mobile ICBM:

Nixon and Brezhnev recognized the complexity of the problem. After lengthy debate, they promised one another that they would not build land-based mobile ICBMs. But Brezhnev refused to write this promise into the interim agreement. Nixon stressed that the United States would state its own understanding of the prohibition in a separate declaration that would be submitted to Congress; and he warned that if the US caught Russia cheating on this issue, it would immediately abrogate the entire SALT agreement. Brezhnev said that he understood and agreed.

This passage from Kalb and Kalb's book on Kissinger seems odd in light of the fact that the Soviets had claimed a mobile ICBM capability for the SS-13 in the mid-1960s. The Soviets actually deployed the SS-13 in silos when it reached initial operating capability in 1969, but they continued to display the SS-14 on its launcher in the November parades until 1972. Smith devotes little space to the issue of mobile ICBMs, except to note that the SALT team pressed for their ban throughout negotiations after a false start with the Illustrative Elements which included a ban on mobile M/IRBMs but not ICBMs. Even by convoluted standards of the language embedded in the US unilateral statement on mobile ICBMs, the Soviet Union has honored the agreement:

In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the US Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the US would consider the deployment of operational land mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement [Smith:513].

The Soviets may have engaged in strategic deception regarding mobile ICBMs, but this has occurred separately from the SALT process. During SALT I, the Soviets did not mislead the US regarding mobile ICBMs.

BREZHNEV'S IGNORANCE AND STRATEGIC DECEPTION Sullivan's contentions about strategic deceptic

Strongly on private assurances that Brezhnev made $(\circ N)$ the Moscow summit. In these sessions, Brezhnev new Nixon (accompanied by Kissinger and later Hal Sonner not have any experts with him. The later repudiation of Position provides some evidence that he was out of his e sessions, Brezhnev did not again appear without techn ensure no further mistakes, the Soviets decided to j

responsible for overseeing the Soviet build-up, Depu Smirnov, to the talks on 25 May [Kissinger: 1233]: ... Smirnov knew everything about weapons an while of Gromyko ... exactly the opposit

diplomacy; his briefing on weapon systems mentary. He could put forward the official Soviet p negotiate it; this task was left to Smirnov

himself in the unusual position of making matters between me and Smirnov threatened To begin with, Gromyko was in a frame or pind standards. For on him fell the painful duty of everything put forward by Brezhnev during his previous day. He handled it masterfully by pa

summed up the alleged state of play on variou variance with Brezhnev's position. Thus, the Soviets had indulged Brezhnev's desire for then the next day repudiated everything he had sa Smirnov involved to ensure that no last-minute con Soviet strategic modernization. They would not repeat fact, despite his penchant for high-level contacts, Smirnov before.

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IV: Preventing the US Response: Parity from 1974

SALT provided an opportunity for Soviets to gain through negotiation what SAL I Provided an opportunity for Soviets to gain through negotiation what they would find difficult to achieve simply through the dynamics of strategic modernization. By freezing offensive levels of 10 p.M. and all outing the Soviet modernization. By freezing offensive levels of ICBMs and all owing the Soviet Source of the Soviet Source of the Soviet Source of the Soviet Source of Sourc modernization, By freezing offensive levels of ICBMs and all Owing uic dovid build-up in SSBNs to continue, SALT guaranteed eventual Soviet superiority as they MIR Ved their fourth-generation miceilee Whether the Soviet build-up as they MIRVed their fourth-generation missiles. Whether the Soviet build-up as they with yeu their tourth-generation missiles. Whether the Soviet build use been even greater, as some have claimed, without SALT matters little SALT constrained a Tic response From the Soviet percentive the would nave been even greater, as some have claimed, without DALL matter little. SALT constrained a US response. From the Soviet perspective, the monotonic of an American political process that could enternal the virtual uncertainties of an American political process that could catapult a virtual and inexperienced unknown like Vimmy Coster to the procidency provided and inexperienced unknown like Jimmy Carter to the presidency provided little comfort that the Tic would not reason (Although the comparison and mexperienced unknown like Jimmy Carter to the presidency provided little comfort that the US would not respond. (Although the comparison seems insulting to the IIs the transformation in German political life from seems insulting to the US, the transformation in German political life from Hitler's Institute according to power in 1022 to his attack on Poland in 1020 Hitler's legitimate accession to power in 1933 to his attack on Poland in 1939

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through negotiation what the dynamics of strategic As and allowing the Soviet ventual Soviet superiority hether the Soviet build-up ed, without SALT matters the Soviet perspective, the t could catapult a virtual the presidency provided lithough the comparison ierman political life from attack on Poland in 1939

SOVIET STRATEGIC DECEPTION 1955-1981

still serves as a lesson to the Soviets.)

The centrality of SALT to the Soviet pursuit of strategic advantage suggests that they did not intend any deception, per se, in the initial negotiations. The Soviet SALT negotiators and even Gromyko and Brezhnev seemed uninformed about the details of the Soviet strategic modernization program. Ignorance, of course, aids deception. The German Foreign Ministry in the early 1930s remained uninformed about the extent of German rearmament and thus could negotiate in good faith with Britain and France. The heavy missile episode suggests sharp practice; the mobile missile claim, ignorance. Deception seems to surround the SSBN negotiations. The delay in testing the SS-N-8 seems good practice to buttress the geographic asymmetry claims (which the Soviets still make). The 48 figure alone seems mysterious, but Soviet practice to that point had been to use US numbers. In any case, the Soviets would not agree to a definition of 'under construction' which they could construe to mean any component of the submarine. The claim of the 48 SSBNs would not undermine the agreement later and in fact would facilitate Soviet compliance by delaying the dismantling of Soviet second-generation ICBMs.

The controversy over the SS-17 and SS-19 may have caught the Soviets unawares. To smooth the SALT process they would need to reiterate Soviet commitment in the interim period while the forces of modernization granted Soviet strategic advantage. The earlier Soviet statements would have to change. As the Soviets displayed that they did not share the spirit of SALT trumpeted in the American press, as they pushed the boundaries of the agreement to test the limits of US tolerance, Brezhnev found that he had a real public relations problem in 1974. He solved that problem by reversing earlier Soviet statements and establishing parity as the goal of Soviet policy. The continuing Soviet build-up, at all levels, seemed incongruous. But Brezhnev had learned from the mistakes of Khrushchev. Soothing words would delay the US response and the SALT process itself would continue to strengthen elements within the US government against modernization.

SOVIET SALT OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIC DECEPTION

The Soviets secured a SALT agreement on offensive arms that did not impinge upon their modernization program and codified Soviet numerical advantage. They achieved their negotiating coups largely through eleventh hour tactics and by isolating an individual predisposed to the agreement per se (Kissinger may have also believed that he knew enough to negotiate about the technical characteristics of strategic weapon systems). By delaying agreement on critical details until the Moscow summit, the Soviets successfully managed to gain the ABM limitation with little effect on their offensive programs.

In the light of the negotiating record, it would seem difficult to refute reports that appeared in late 1973:

According to intelligence reports recently received here, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, has emphasized to East European leaders that the movement toward improving relations with the West is a tactical policy change to permit the Soviet bloc to establish its superiority in the next 12 to 15 years [NYT, 9/17/73:2].

At the end of this period, in about the mid-1980s, the strength of the Soviet bloc will have increased to the point at which the Soviet Union, instead of relying on accords, could establish an independent position in its dealings with the West.

In the light of the current looming window of vulnerability, Brezhnev seems at least partially to have succeeded.

Sullivan, among others, argues that the Soviets clearly intended to engage in strategic deception in SALT. He fails to explain how they intended to succeed in this deception. The deployment of the SS-19 and the SS-N-8 would become evident rather quickly. To defuse US reaction over claimed SALT violations when it did occur, the Soviets first continued the SALT process and secondly launched a public relations campaign designed to convince the US that they pursued parity (see below). The intended ambiguity of the agreement (no numbers) was designed to allow the Soviets maximum flexibility. The Soviets also knew that they would have a staunch defender in Henry Kissinger who would be loathe to admit that the Soviets had deceived him into codifying eventual Soviet superiority in the SALT I agreements. He had already shown himself susceptible to manipulation through his back-channel negotiations culminating in the 20 May 1971 accord.

INTELLIGENCE AND SALT

A number of the alleged violations regarding the ABM treaty suggests that the Soviets were using SALT to test the capabilities of US national technical means. The apparent use of SA-5 radars to track Soviet ballistic missile tests and the Soviet notification that they had dismantled excess ABM test launchers at Sary Shagan when in fact they had not, may have been tests of US intelligence capabilities. The US had argued that it would not conclude a treaty which it could not verify. The openness of US society facilitated Soviet verification of US compliance. The US could verify only through national technical means. Although the US has cloaked its intelligence capabilities in considerable secrecy, the reports on compliance within the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) set up by the SALT agreements would provide the Soviets with a grand opportunity to test the limits of US capabilities. The failure of the Soviets to dismantle fully excess ABM launchers at the Sary Shagan range suggests an attempt to discern US intelligence capabilities:

On July 3, the agreed procedures worked out in the SCC for dismantling excess ABM test launchers entered into force. After the detailed procedures entered into effect, the USSR provided notification in the SCC that the excess ABM launchers at the Soviet test range had been dismantled in accordance with the provisions of the agreed procedures. Our own information was that several of the launchers had not, in fact, been dismantled in complete accordance with these detailed procedures.

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This small episode seems inconsequential and in fact it may be. But why would the Soviets cheat on such a small thing?

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THE ABM DECEPTION, PART TWO

Vance revealed: 'During 1973 and 1974, US observation of Soviet tests of ballistic missiles led us to believe that a radar associated with the SA-5 surfaceto-air missile system had been used to track strategic missiles during flight'. The Soviets soon stopped this activity suggesting that they had been attempting to discover yet again what the limits of US technical means were, especially since this 'observation' would require means other than photographic. A discussion during the SALT negotiations substantiates the view that the Soviets were testing US national technical means:

A Soviet delegate remarked informally that he understood that the United States had once thought this Soviet SAM system [SA-5] was an unsuccessful ABM system which had been converted to anti-aircraft purposes after its inadequacy had been discovered. Though the US was wrong initially, he asserted, it had now concluded correctly that the system had originally been deployed for anti-aircraft purposes. This showed that the purposes of a system could be determined by national means. When his American counterpart commented that it had taken some years to determine whether this system was for ABM defense, the Soviet official said that the necessary sensors to pick up electronic emissions did not exist when this system was built [Smith:314].

The Soviet comment seems startling in the light of subsequent US detection of the Soviet use of the SA-5 radars to track re-entry vehicles into their ABM test range.

The SA-5 system resembles a first-generation ABM system. The Soviets had initially claimed an ABM role for the SA-5. The Soviets' decision to exploit the missile-tracking capabilities of the SA-5 radars suggest an intent to operate the system against incoming ballistic missiles. The failure at SALT to recognize that the SA-5 already was an ABM system, albeit a primitive one, stems from US technological snobbery. The ABM treaty loses much of its meaning if the Soviets intended all along to use the SA-5 as part of their ABM system. Whatever the true role of the SA-5, the Soviets lied either in the early sixties or during SALT.

Other reports have appeared that the Soviets have used 'non-ABM' equipment in an ABM role. In the article cited above, Safire writes:

Soviet deception managers must know our surveillance capacity, but occasionally we get a break: a careless Russian radar operator made it possible for us to discover that enormous radar facilities supposedly to be used only for 'early warning' were really battle-management ABM radar, an egregious treaty violation.

If we assume that Safire has a good piece of information, then the Soviets have internetted their radars and their interceptors, so that the early warning radar can be used to track the incoming missile for the interceptor. Others have mentioned that the Soviets have deployed a number of large phased-array radars 'similar in size [400 feet high and 600-700 feet wide] to the Soviet Hen House radar, which is an ABM radar' [Kemp:22]. If these radars are those referred to by Safire, then US problems increase. This leaves open the question of whether the Soviets have internetted their SA-5 system with their early warning radars and thus circumvented some of the current inadequacies with their mechanical radars. According to Garn [27], General Holloway, then CINCSAC, told Congress in 1971 that 'with predicted intercept data from remote ABM radars [the SA-5] could defend large areas of the Soviet Union from attack'.

During SALT, the US presented the Soviet delegation with a list of ABM test ranges that did not include the Kamchatka impact area. The Soviets made no response, even though they had constructed an older type ABM radar at Kamchatka. In October 1975, the Soviets installed a new ABM radar at Kamchatka. When the US raised this matter, the Soviets replied that the radar instrumentation complex on Kamchatka peninsula had qualified it as a current ABM test range under Article IV of the ABM treaty. The Soviet Union now agrees that Sary Shagan and Kamchatka are the only ABM test ranges. By failing to identify the Kamchatka range as an ABM test range in 1972, the Soviets revealed their unwillingness to share information. They may have also revealed that they thought they could achieve a free ride on whatever 'older type' ABM radar appeared at Kamchatka.

Vance has discredited claims that the Soviets are working on a mobile ABM. Article V of the treaty prohibits either side from developing, testing, or deploying 'ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based'. Vance states that the new Soviet ABM system 'can be installed more rapidly than previous ABM systems, but they are clearly not mobile in the sense of being able to be moved about readily or hidden'. Vance estimates that the Soviets can ready a single operational site in about six months but that a nationwide system would take years. Apparently the Soviets have developed new radars, one of which they can emplace on prepared concrete foundations. This system seems to fall under the 'movable' category in the same sense that a house on its foundations is movable.

The bulk of the evidence suggests that the Soviets are developing a 'surge' ABM capability. Soviet notions regarding the likelihood of nuclear conflict presuppose that a period of tensions would precede nuclear war. If the Soviets viewed a nuclear war as a likely occurrence, they would feel no need to honor the ABM treaty. Moreover, the deployment of even a partially effective nationwide ABM system may deter a US attack.

MOBILE ICBM DECEPTION, PART TWO

Just as the Soviets seem to be developing a 'surge' ABM, they also seem to be developing a 'surge' mobile ICBM capability. The Soviets cloaked their tests of the SS-16 in great secrecy, apparently conducting a night test in 1973. The Soviets had already touted the value of mobile ICBMs in the 1960s but

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presumably decided not to deploy them because of problems with the SS-13 system. The continued and large deployment of the SS-20 suggests that the Soviets have solved the SS-13/SS-14 problems. The Soviets can upgrade the SS-20 to an SS-16:

The SS-20 comprises the first two stages of the three-stage SS-16. By upgrading SS-20 deployment to the SS-16, the Soviets would increase their mobile ICBM capability relatively quickly. This could be accomplished by the addition of a third stage to the two SS-20 stages. Such action could significantly increase the number of ICBMs in Soviet intercontinental forces [Garn].

The Soviet emphasis on modularity may have led them to build the SS-16 third stage as part of another system. If so, then they could mate those missiles with the SS-20. The Soviets could simply build and stockpile these third stages until tensions would mount and they felt it necessary to deploy a mobile ICBM. Violation of the SALT agreement would matter little if the Soviets strongly thought that nuclear war would occur.

COPING WITH US REACTION: THE SOVIET PURSUIT OF PARITY

Awareness of Soviet duplicity began to build after they started tests of their fourth-generation missiles in 1973. By 1975, a number of articles had appeared on Soviet SALT violations. To counter US perceptions about their motives, the Soviets launched a propaganda campaign, beginning in about 1974 that stressed the peacefulness of the Soviet objectives and the horrors of nuclear war. Although some have interpreted this shift in Soviet statements as reflecting an acceptance of the US position on mutual assured deterrence, it seems odd that the Soviets would actively pursue superiority when clearly at a strategic disadvantage relative to the West while they would adopt parity when they had achieved the basis for superiority. Rather, it seems more likely that the Soviets have changed their public position to defuse the US reaction.

An FBIS special analysis published in May 1979 argues that the shift in Soviet statements represents an accommodation of Soviet thinking to the reality of nuclear weapons:

The results of the 1972 and 1973 US-Soviet summits — the agreements on principle of mutual relations, limiting strategic arms, and the prevention of nuclear war — appear to have opened the way to a new push by those advocating a more radical adjustment of Soviet security policy to the reality of nuclear weapons. Evidence of debate on these subjects appeared in the wake of the 1973 summit in Washington. Although the full outline and implications of the debate were obscure at the time, it centered on whether a change in the Soviet Union's traditional approach to military power was appropriate given the emerging strategic balance and the development of detente in relations with the West.

In retrospect, it is apparent that the revisionists in this debate won a

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significant victory. Beginning in 1974, President Brezhnev introduced new concepts and accompanying vocabulary into Soviet strategic discourse, signaling a clear break with the notion that security derives directly from military power. Brezhnev began by describing the world's strategic arsenals as excessively large and already redundant and arguing there was a greater risk in accumulating arms than reducing. He completed the process of adjustment, beginning in 1977, by embracing the concept of military parity with the West and suggesting that the pursuit of anything more was pointless.

The new security posture introduced by President Brezhnev, while in the first instance a recognition of the realities of military balance, was not brought about without controversy; there was evidence of resistance to the idea that security could be enhanced by arms control arrangements that restricted the core elements of Soviet military power. They thus represent a cardinal victory for proponents of change in the USSR who have argued, since early in the nuclear era, that the mutual vulnerability introduced by nuclear weapons required a departure from traditional doctrine on war and peace. The changes establish a more hospitable domestic environment for joint efforts to restrain the strategic arms competition than existed during SALT I or even the early stages of SALT II. They also challenge the traditional dominance of military professionals in the sphere of defense policy by clarifying that the primary goal of strategy in the missile age is to prevent war, not to win it.

While this passage accurately tracks shifts in Soviet statements, it fails to place them in context. The Soviet attitudes towards parity have become more favorable because they have succeeded in preventing a US response. Some Soviets have in fact styled SALT I as a victory for the socialist people. Soviet statements about the advantages of military-technical superiority (while certainly more valid as we move into the 1980s) would hardly coincide with successful negotiations with the West. The Soviet use of arms control to achieve strategic superiority required that they shift their public emphasis on the need to win a nuclear war, a shift that began to appear in the late 1960s as evidenced by the statements of the SRF commander on annual Artillery and Rocket Day.

At the 24th Party Congress, Brezhnev stated that the Soviets would seek 'the security of parties considered equally' and renounce efforts to seek unilateral advantage. The inconsistent guidance provided by the leadership led to a debate between Georgiy Arbatov and Aleksandr Bovin, both of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and a number of military writers. Bovin argued in the 11 July 1973 edition of *Izvestiya* that neither side stood to gain by the use of nuclear weapons:

At the basis of the agreements [between the USSR and the United States] lies sober calculation, understanding of the catastrophic nature of a global thermonuclear conflict, awareness that under conditions of a nuclear missile balance further growth of nuclear arsenals loses political.

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meaning and does not increase, but diminishes, the security of the parties.

Bovin found himself under attack by name. But in a 7 February 1974 *Red Star* article, it became clear that the debate was caused by insufficient guidance. Rear Admiral Shelyag disparaged Bovin's argument, characterizing it as oversimplistic:

If arguments about the death of civilization and about no victors in nuclear war are to be presented in an over-simplified manner, they are based on mathematical calculations. The authors of these arguments divide the quantity of accumulated nuclear potential in the world by the number of people living on earth. As a result it emerges that all mankind really could be destroyed. This is an over-simplified one-sided approach to such a complex socio-historical phenomenon as war.

The Arbatov-Bovin view that nuclear war would see no winners conflicted with what Shelyag knew to be current guidance:

Our understanding of the consequences of a possible world war are defined in the CPSU program [approved by the 22d CPSU Congress in 1961]: 'In the event the imperialists nevertheless dare to unleash a new world war, the peoples will no longer be able to tolerate a system which plunges them into devastating wars. They will sweep imperialism away and bury it.'

Shelyag believed that current doctrine argued that the Soviet Union will emerge victorious from a nuclear war no matter how it started. Imperialism would lose. Such ideas led inevitably to arguments for superiority and such notions would threaten Soviet interests in pursuing detente with the West.

To end the debate, Brezhnev opted for the Arbatov-Bovin view in a speech on 21 July 1974:

For centuries mankind, in striving to ensure its security, has been guided by the formula: If you want peace, be ready for war. In our nuclear age this formula conceals particular danger. Man dies only once. However, in recent years a quantity of weapons has already been amassed sufficient to destroy everything living on earth several times. Clearly understanding this, we have put it and continue to put it another way: If you want peace, conduct a policy of peace and fight for that policy. This has been, is, and will continue to be the maxim of our socialist foreign policy.

Brezhnev's last comments on the strategic situation had appeared in 1965 when he warned that the West should not launch a strike because they had failed to correctly assess Soviet strength. At that time, the Soviets significantly increased the number of strategic weapons that they displayed in their parades (see above). From 1971, the Soviets had reduced their military parades from twice to once a year. The Soviets displayed strategic missiles for the last time in the 1974 parade. Brezhnev's comments made themselves felt in his displays of military might.

In his remarks at Tula on 18 January 1977, Brezhnev explicitly renounced superiority as a goal of Soviet policy: 'The Soviet Union's defense potential must be sufficient to deter anyone from taking a risk to violate our peaceful life. Not a course of superiority in armament, but a course of reducing them, at lessening military confrontation — such is our policy.' Significantly, Brezhnev's views had finally made an impression on those who had been arguing forcefully that the Soviet Union should pursue superiority, that the Soviet Union can fight and win a nuclear war. Col. Ye. Rybkin, a veteran of the debates in the mid-1960s and in 1973-4 argued in the lead article of the January 1977 issue of the *Military-Historical Journal*:

The objective necessity of ending the arms race is apparent. In first place because the quantity of nuclear weapons has reached a level whereby further increase will in practice make no change. 'In recent years', noted L.I. Brezhnev in July 1974, 'a quantity of arms has already been amassed sufficient to destroy everything living on earth several times'. In the second place, because 'nuclear parity', as it is called, has been established between the USSR and the United States; that is a definite balance of power, which was officially recognized at the Soviet-American talks in 1972–74 with a mutual agreement not to disturb this balance.

Apparently, Brezhnev had listened to the counsel of Arbatov and Bovin on how to achieve his strategic objectives through arms control and open disavowal of the pursuit of superiority. When Arbatov and Bovin made their claims in the press, they met with resistance because official Soviet policy had not yet changed. After Brezhnev's speeches in 1974 and 1977, official policy became quite clear and even those who had argued forcefully for militarytechnological superiority now joined the chorus for parity. The Soviet principle of democratic centralism had made itself felt.

Other publications have changed. Dmitri Simes has tracked the changes in General Il'in's book, *The Moral Factor in Modern Wars*. In the second edition which appeared in 1969, Il'in stressed on the first page the need for 'strengthening Soviet Army and Navy readiness to wage a victorious war against any aggression'. This sentence failed to appear in the third edition published in 1979. While in the second edition, Il'in argued that 'the Soviet Union is doing everything to ensure military technological superiority of our armed forces over the imperialist armies', in the third edition, he states: 'The Soviet people do everything to ensure a high level of technological equipment for the Soviet armed forces in the spirit of current requirements'.

Other Soviet leaders also adopted the new line. In February 1977, Defense Minister Ustinov, writing in *Kommunist*, argued that the US could not achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union: 'our country's economy, science and technology are now at such a high level that we are capable, within the shortest period, of matching any type of weapon that the enemies of peace create' [NYT, 2/18/77:3:1].

In an interview in May 1978, Brezhnev argued:

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As for the Soviet Union, it believes that an approximate equality and parity is sufficient for defensive needs. We do not set ourselves the goal of achieving military superiority. We know also that this very concept becomes pointless in the presence of today's huge arsenals of already stockpiled nuclear weapons and means for their delivery.

Recently, as SALT II foundered, the Soviets have begun to speak of victory in nuclear war, although they continue to emphasize that the Soviet Union does not seek superiority. In his discussion of military strategy in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* in September 1979, the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Ogarkov does not disavow the possibility that the socialist countries will seek victory should a nuclear war occur:

Soviet military strategy is determined by the policy of the CPSU and the Soviet state, which combines the struggle for peace with preparedness for decisively repelling aggression and reliably protecting the independence and socialist achievements of the Soviet people and the peoples of other friendly socialist nations. Soviet military doctrine as a whole has a particularly defensive focus and does not provide for any sort of preemptive strikes or premeditated attack. Its main task is that of developing methods of repelling an attack by an aggressor and of defeating the aggressor by conducting decisive operations. Unlike the military strategy of the imperialist states, which openly espouses the arms race and the establishment of military-technical superiority, Soviet military strategy is based on the need to provide the Soviet Armed Forces with everything necessary to defend the country and defeat an aggressor and to maintain the armed forces at a level insuring homeland's security. Soviet military strategy takes into account the capability of the USSR and the other socialist countries to prevent a probable enemy from achieving military-technical superiority. At the same time it does not pursue the goal of achieving military-technical superiority over other countries. '... While building up our armed forces, we in no way go beyond what is actually necessary for our security and the security of our socialist friends. We threaten no one and impose our will upon no one' [L. I. Brezhnev].

Except for the comment about military-technical superiority, Ogarkov does not deviate significantly from the statements contained in the Sokolovsky edited volume on military strategy. In other words, victory remains the objective should war start, but the Soviet Union will not pursue, at least publicly, superiority to achieve that objective. Ogarkov is clearly playing games with the concept. Unlike Western writers, he details the campaign after the initial massive nuclear exchanges. Thus, he has not embraced the notion that no side can achieve victory in a nuclear war.

Even in the face of Reagan administration claims that the US needs to catch up on the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders have argued that the US and the Soviet Union remain equal. In a *Pravda* article that appeared on 24 July 1981, Defense Minister Ustinov argues: The United States has no need to upgrade its arms, since it does not lag behind the USSR. Something else is involved: The military-strategic equality which has become established between our countries is not to the liking of the bellicose leaders in the present administration because it hinders the aggressive intentions in the world arena and restricts its expansionist actions. That is why the principle of equality is being sacrificed for a stake on superiority.

Ustinov warns the West with a quote from Brezhnev:

'One could, however, hope', Comrade L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th Party Congress, 'that those who determine the policy of America today will be able to see things in a more realistic way. The military-strategic balance which exists between the United States and the USSR, between the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, objectively serves to preserve peace on our planet. We have never tried and are not trying to achieve military supremacy over the other side. This is not our policy. But we will not allow the creation of such supremacy over ourselves. Such attempts, as well as talks with us from a position of strength, are absolutely hopeless.'

Conclusion

The Soviets have engaged in systematic strategic deception since 1955. When they were weak, the Soviets touted their capability: under Khrushchev to achieve general political objectives; under Brezhnev, to forestall further US adventurism. The Soviets used their military parades and public statements to convince the West that they had an extensive ABM capability, that they alone. possessed the means to thwart an ABM with the orbital missile, and that they had deployed systems, such as the mobile ICBM, unlocated by US reconnaissance systems. They argued in their doctrine that they had achieved and were continually pursuing military-technical superiority. The Soviets seized on SALT as a means to limit US ABM development. They exploited US preoccupation with an offensive limitation to use eleventh hour and isolation tactics to conclude an agreement that they realized would eventually guarantee them strategic superiority. To further defuse US reaction as word appeared of Soviet violations and 'sharp practice' in the early 1970s, Brezhnev took the counsel of Arbatov and Bovin of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and began advocating parity and disparaging superiority. The Soviets had learned from their experience under Khrushchev, that bragging when the US felt weak would precipitate massive US rearmament. A low profile would institutionalize eventual Soviet superiority, much as Brezhnev had argued in 1973.

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SALT AND SOVIET DECEPTION

Soviet strategic policy under Brezhnev continued the strategic deceptions begun by Khrushchev. The Soviets claimed and touted capabilities such as the mobile ICBM that they had not deployed to compensate for their apparent weakness. As they began to overtake the US in numbers of ballistic missile launchers deployed, the Soviets exploited the opportuity provided them by the SALT process. With SALT, they could achieve the appearance of parity and defuse the pressures that the US would begin to feel towards strategic modernization. SALT would allow the Soviets to modernize without a dramatic US response. The Soviets had learned from Khrushchev's early failures. Bellicose statements when the US felt itself weak would only precipitate US force modernization. The adoption of a public stance for parity, while proceeding with modernization, would allow the Soviets to achieve strategic superiority.

Many of the claims that the Soviets engaged in strategic deception during SALT stem from what individuals have identified as violations of the agreement. Others have argued that the Soviets simply engaged in 'sharp practice', that one should expect a burglar to rob an unlocked room. SALT provided the Soviets with a grand opportunity, but the US initiated the negotiation process and insisted on tying the offensive limitation to ABM treaty. The US insisted on including unilateral declarations, which could only lead to problems later (simply because the Soviets did not accede to the unilateral statements did not mean that they disagreed with them per se; they could have objected to their specific nature). If the Soviets actually lied in SALT, then they either thought that they would not have the lie discovered (that is, they underestimated the capabilities of US technical national means) or they realized that their lie would be discovered in time but that they could successfully gloss over it. Soviet 'violations' could represent clear areas of ambiguity from their perspective. Anything not specifically prohibited may be permitted.

David Sullivan, among others, identifies a number of SALT violations. Some of these violations make more sense in the light of deceptions conducted by the Soviets in the 1960s. Others make sense in the light of what the Soviets did not do, especially their decision not to deploy a MIRV except with the test of the fourth-generation missiles. But all of them make sense in the light of Soviet public statements, in the shift from superiority and victory to parity. As Soviet capabilities to achieve victory in nuclear war increased, their claims about the prospects of victory disappear. The Soviets clearly wished to defuse US modernization.

Cyrus Vance included a number of possible violations in his presentation to Congress:

1) Launch control facilities (special purpose silos); 2) Concealment measures; 3) Modern large ballistic missiles (SS-19 issue); 4) Possible testing of an air defense system (SA-5) in an ABM mode; 5) Soviet reporting of dismantling of excess ABM launchers; 6) Soviet ABM radar I the strategic deceptions ted capabilities such as the bensate for their apparent umbers of ballistic missile tuity provided them by the appearance of parity and to feel towards strategic to modernize without a from Khrushchev's early itself weak would only n of a public stance for yuld allow the Soviets to

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silos); 2) Concealment SS-19 issue); 4) Possible n ABM mode; 5) Soviet ers; 6) Soviet ABM radar

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on Kamchatka Peninsula; 7) Soviet dismantling or destruction of replaced ICBM launchers; and 8) Concealment at test range.

Vance also raised some other issues which he indicated did not represent SALT violations largely because the US had not detected these activities:

1) 'Blinding' of US satellites; 2) Mobile ABM; 3) ABM testing of Air Defense Missiles; 4) Mobile ICBMs; 5) Denial of test information; and 6) ASAT.

Vance does not list the specific concealment measures that the Soviets have taken. He does indicate that the Soviets had engaged in concealment practices before the SALT agreements and that these practices increased substantially during 1974. After 1975, the US concluded that 'there no longer appeared to be an expanding pattern of concealment activities'. The wording of the SALT agreement does not prohibit concealment measures if they represented 'current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practice'. The list of concealment measures cited in the press include [Foreign Report, 3/5/81; Laird, 12/77; Garn, Sum/79]:

 disruptive painting; 2) tonal blending; 3) dummy roads and launch sites; 4) satellite warning system; 5) missile covers; 6) submarine tunnels;
 submarine covers; 8) dummy submarines; 9) night tests (SS-16); 10) covered rail sidings; and 11) covered submarine hulls.

Foreign Report indicates that most of these practices began before 1972 and are thus covered under the current practices provisions of the SALT agreement. The satellite warning system ('to stop electronic emissions... from missiles and early warning radars ... when western intelligence satellites' come in range) does not really fit in this group. Most of these activities seem designed to hide Soviet actions or to make the US think that the Soviets are doing something when they are not. Two activities would lead the US to overestimate Soviet capabilities or lead to different tactics: the dummy SAM launch sites and the dummy submarines. The appearance of the dummy submarines seems particularly interesting in the light of claims that the Soviets lied about the number of SSBNs they had deployed in 1972.

The nature of these alleged violations must also be considered in the light of claims by some that the Soviets purposely engaged in questionable activity to test the capability of our national means. The apparent compromises by Kampiles and Boyce of US intelligence assets would lend support to this theory, advanced by, among others, a former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham.

David Sullivan contends that the Soviets actively misled the US in three major areas of the SALT negotiations. First, the Soviets led the US team to believe that they would not deploy a follow-on missile to the SS-11 that significantly exceeded it in volume. Secondly, the Soviets lied about the number of SSBNs they had operational or under construction so that they could delay the dismantling of their second-generation ICBMs. Sullivan claims that the Soviets delayed testing of the SS-N-8 missile so that they could

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continue the charade that they needed more SLBMs because of geographical asymmetries. Thirdly, that Brezhnev agreed not to deploy a mobile ICBM. Each of Sullivan's claims must be considered in the light of Soviet objectives and tactics in SALT.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES AND TACTICS IN SALT

Four days after the US voted to deploy an ABM, the Soviets agreed to participate in SALT. After languishing during the last days of the Johnson administration, SALT began in earnest in 1969. The Soviets initially wanted to limit the talks to defensive systems only, and failing that, to conclude the offensive agreement only after the defensive agreement. The Soviets were not particularly interested in limiting offensive weapons in part because the US had already unilaterally limited itself. Thus, any offensive limitation would apply unequally to the Soviets. Nevertheless, the Soviets did feel the economic burden of strategic forces. In his account of the first session to President Nixon, the US negotiator, Ambassador Gerard Smith, commented that the head of the Soviet delegation, Semenov, in his opening remarks:

spoke of nuclear war as a disaster for both sides — of the decrease in security as the number of weapons increases — of the costly results of rapid obsolescence of weapons — of the dangers of grave miscalculations — of the unauthorized use of weapons — and of hostilities resulting from third power provocation [Smith:84].

Smith's initial view of Soviet objectives in December 1969 seemed confirmed by subsequent events:

My hunch at this early stage of the talks is that the Soviet purposes are a mix of at least three possible main ingredients: a) To see if an arrangement can be negotiated that would improve their prospects, or stabilize the strategic balance at lower cost; b) To 'cover' their ICBM/SLBM buildup and hopefully to defer, if not defeat, a US reaction; c) To advance their general arms control image as well as their specific non-proliferation interests by appearing to meet the obligations of Article VI (NPT) [Smith:106].

The US had during the first Helsinki session (November-December 1969) tabled a statement of 'Illustrative Elements' that indicated the kind of SALT agreement that the US and Soviet Union might conclude. The Soviets countered with their 'Basic Provisions for Limiting Strategic Armaments' during the Vienna session (April-August 1970):

Although Semenov called it a plan for concrete measures it was simple and in general terms. It called for limitations on strategic offensive armaments, defined as those capable of striking targets within the territory of the other side, regardless of where those armaments were deployed. Forward-based delivery systems in a geographic position to strike such targets should be destroyed or moved out of range. An

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unspecified aggregate total would be established for land-based ICBM launchers, ballistic missile launchers on nuclear submarines, and strategic bombers. Replacement of units of one type by those of another would be permitted. The production [but not testing] of multiple warheads of any kind and their installation in missiles would be banned. Limitations would be placed on ABM launchers and certain associated radars. Verification would be by national means only. No on-site inspection [Smith:123-4].

The Soviet proposal contained no specifics. It represented merely one in a long series of attempts to gain an agreement in principle before hammering out the details. As many who have dealt with the Soviets have noticed they have a tendency to accept the favorable points and ignore the unfavorable, requiring later that all the unfavorable points be renegotiated [Rowny:5]. The JCS representative to SALT II also lists, 'take the raisins out of the cake', the 'red herring technique', complete reversal of position, and eleventh hour tactics in the face of an agreed deadline. A reading of Smith's book reveals that the Soviets clearly used those tactics during SALT I. The use of such tactics across negotiations suggests that what often may appear haphazard and inadvertent, may result from design. The Soviets may have planned to isolate Kissinger and delay agreement on major substantive points until the final phases of SALT I in May 1972.

MODERN LARGE BALLISTIC MISSILES (SS-19)

The missiles that the Soviets began to test in mid-1973 as follow-ons to the SS-11 significantly exceeded its volume. The SS-19 has a throwweight of 7,525 pounds, the SS-17, 6,000 pounds, the SS-11, 2,500 pounds and the SS-9, 12,500 pounds [Collins:446]. The SS-19 thus has a throwweight roughly halfway between an SS-11 and an SS-9. The understanding in the agreement pertaining to ICBM modernization reads: The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased. Smith made a unilateral interpretation of 'significantly increased' as meaning not greater than 10 to 15 per cent in the dimensions of the silo launcher. Semenov apparently 'replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding' [Smith:510]. The Agreement itself states in Article II: 'The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs... into landbased launchers for heavy ICBMs....'

The US wished to limit the number of heavy missiles deployed from the beginning of the talks. In April 1970, the US defined any missile having a volume greater than 70 cubic meters (roughly the size of the SS-11) as a Modern Large Ballistic Missile (MLBM). In August 1970 the US proposed that any silo modified in an externally observable way should count under the MLBM ceiling. The July 1971 draft agreement fell on fallow ground because the Soviet negotiator argued that an agreement between Nixon and Kosygin on 20 May 1971 (worked out by Kissinger and Dobrynin) did not preclude the

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'modernization and replacement' of offensive weapons [Smith:233]. Thus, Semenov's surprise may have been more real than feigned.

As the May 1972 summit approached, the Soviet position on MLBMs softened. On 3 December 1971, the Soviets agreed that the freeze on launchers included both heavy and light missiles and that they would agree to a provision that neither side could convert light launchers to heavies. They did not define a heavy missile and argued that the importance of the issue would lead both sides to respect the accord [Smith:333]. Discussions about MLBMs failed to reach an agreement in the spring of 1972.

In late May 1972, the Soviets tabled a statement on silo upgrades:

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement there will be no substantial increase, observable with the aid of national technical means of verification, in the external dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers currently in their possession [Smith: 388-9].

The Soviets argued that this statement together with a commitment not to convert light launchers into heavies eliminated the need to define light and heavy missiles.

The Soviets indicated that they did not want to foreclose the options available to the design bureaus in developing new missiles. A Soviet indicated that they had developed one or two missiles beyond the design phase to replace the SS-11. He indicated that they did not intend 'to approach the halfway mark between the volume of their current light missiles and heavy missiles' [Smith:390]. The Helsinki round ended without any agreement on the definition of a heavy missile.

The heavy missile issue became quite confusing during the Moscow round. In the second session on 23 May, the Soviets apparently told Nixon that they would not increase the volume of their silos or missiles [Smith:412] and that they were prepared to drop the word 'significant' from the proposed interpretive statement. Smith reported to Kissinger that the change in the Soviet position conflicted with intelligence information that showed the Soviet follow-on missiles as larger. On 24 May Smith received word that the Soviets were considering a statement that defined 'significant' as 10 to 15 per cent to pertain to the missile volume [Smith:415]. Smith objected to this interpretation because it would preclude the replacement of Minuteman I misiles with Minuteman III. By the evening of the 24th, the Politburo apparently discovered [?] that they could not deploy their follow-on missiles with the 10 to 15 per cent limitation on the increase in missile volume. The Soviets then agreed to adopt a resolution that called for no increase in silo dimensions, but for some reason the US in Moscow decided to retain the term 'significant' as it reads in the final statement.

The give and take on the heavy missile issue may suggest a coordinated Soviet deception campaign. The Soviets had initially rejected any constraints on modernization of their missile force. To accommodate the US concern over the proliferation of heavy missiles they agreed to language which said that they would not replace light with heavy missiles and elsewhere defined

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constraints on missile modernization. They refused to define a heavy missile. As was clear to the participants at the time, the Soviets were searching for a formula which would allow them to deploy their fourth-generation missiles and to reach an agreement with the US on ABM. The Soviets did engage in dissimulation by arguing that both sides understood what a heavy missile was and that neither side would take actions to threaten the agreement. The Soviets made several statements about follow-on missiles that clearly suggested that they would not significantly exceed the size of the SS-11. To Smith and the SALT negotiators, they said that the follow-on missile would not approach the half-way point. At Moscow, they told Nixon that they did not intend to increase the size, not only of the silos, but also of the missiles. When Kissinger raised the issue regarding the promise to Nixon about no increases in Soviet missile volume on 25 May, 'Gromyko said that Kissinger had misunderstood' [Smith:431]. These statements, especially those directed at Nixon and Kissinger in Moscow, seem clearly designed to assuage fears about Soviet modernization. We cannot determine whether these statements reflect ignorance about the true size of the follow-on missile or deception. Kemp [79] cites a report by Beecher that Brezhnev himself may have had little command of the technical characteristics of the SS-19:

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... one source noted that in May 1972, in the hours immediately preceding agreement on the SALT I pact in Moscow, a conversation was intercepted in which Soviet Party Chairman Brezhnev check[ed] with a top weapons expert to get an assurance that an about-to-be concluded formula covering permissible silo expansion would allow the Soviets to deploy a bigger new missile then under development. That intercept provided the first solid information that the SS-19 as it is now known, was destined to replace some of the relatively small SS-11 missiles, which comprise the bulk of the Soviet ICBM force. The SS-19 has three to four times the throwweight of the older missile.

Newhouse also reports that Ogarkov, the Soviet military representative to SALT and now Chief of Staff, had chided the US negotiators for revealing state secrets to the civilian members of the Soviet SALT team. Smith comments that he found the Soviet SALT team lacking in technical expertise. The case for deception on the heavy missile at SALT must rest on who said what to whom when, on whether claims regarding the follow-on missiles could have been taken as authoritative and not simply as uninformed or fragmentary opinion.

SLBM CEILINGS

However ambiguous regarding deception about heavy missiles, Soviet tactics on the SLBM suggest coordinated deception, especially in the light of the revelation that the Soviets have deployed dummy submarines (especially if the dummy submarines resemble Yankees or appear in slips where the Yankees would normally dock). Although the US intended to include SLBMs in SALT from the beginning, the Soviets wished to exclude them, in part because they

possessed no clear advantage in the numbers of these systems as they did in ICBMs. The Soviets found quite congenial Kissinger's comment that the US would not insist on including SLBMs in an offensive weapons agreement. Kissinger's comments in February 1971, like those on modernization in the 20 May accord, differ significantly with the objectives being pursued by the negotiators at SALT. The Soviets delayed discussing the inclusion of SLBMs until the Moscow talks. Brezhnev himself had given Kissinger the first Soviet position paper on SLBMs.

The Soviets argued that geography and politics conferred strategic advantages on the US that the Soviets would need to compensate with greater numbers. The US and its allies could possess 50 modern submarines with up to 800 launchers (including 41 US SSBNs) while the Soviets would possess 62 modern submarines with not more than 950 launchers. The Soviets stressed that the issue of the forward basing of US submarines should form part of subsequent negotiations. Smith argues that he did not know the source of this proposal, especially the figures of 62 SSBNs and 950 launchers. The current US intelligence estimate projected for 1977 a high of 62 SSBNs with about 950 launchers. The Soviet offer conflicted with US guidance to include a freeze on further SSBN construction.

Having once secured a commitment by the Soviets to include SLBMs, the US next tried to relate additional SLBM launchers to the replacement of older heavy ICBM launchers (SS-7 and SS-8). The US also wished to include the older Golf and Hotel class boats under the SLBM launcher limit. The Soviets countered with a proposal to defer dismantling of older ICBMs and to exclude the Golf and Hotel class boats. The US position rested on the procedures for replacing older systems for modern SLBMs. The Soviets eventually countered with the following draft:

The Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the interim 'freeze' agreement the USA have 41 modern submarines with a total of 656 ballistic missile launchers on them. The Soviet Union during the same period will have a total number of not more than 950 ballistic missiles on modern submarines. In the Soviet Union this number of launchers will be deployed on modern submarines which are operational or under construction as of the date of the signature of the Interim Agreement, as well as on submarines which will be constructed additionally. In the Soviet Union commissioning of additional launchers on submarines, over and above 48 modern submarines operational or under construction, will be carried out in replacement of ICBM launchers of old types constructed before 1964 [Smith:392].

The Soviet proposal would not allow the US to replace its 54 Titan II missiles with modern submarines, but more importantly it implies that the Soviets had 48 SSBNs operational or under construction when US technical means later determined that they possessed only 42 [Smith:393]. The Soviets contended that the 48 figure had come from US sources. They claimed that the US had agreed to allow them five or six more submarines 'as an offset'. Kissinger had apparently replied that the 950 launchers contained the offset and that he was

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not the source of the 48 figure. Semenov argued that, 'while replacement would begin with the forty-ninth submarine, the proposal did not constitute a claim that the USSR had 48 modern submarines in operation and under construction at that time' [Smith:399].

On the evening before the signing of the agreements, Gromyko proposed a formula for SLBMs that Nixon and Kissinger accepted. The Hotels but not the Golfs would be included in the 740 figure at which replacement would begin. To Kissinger's claim that the Soviet leadership had agreed that replacement would start immediately, Smirnov argued that the US had been given an offset of five or six submarines. Replacement would begin with the deployment of the seven hundred and fortieth launcher [Smith:431]. The Soviets even claimed a right to build additional SSBNs if the French or British increased their fleets.

Smith thought the technical nature of the Nixon negotiations during the Moscow summit inappropriate:

... it seemed out of keeping for President Nixon to negotiate about what constituted a significant increase in the dimensions of a concrete silo, what was the appropriate cutoff point between a light and heavy ballistic missile, or when and what kind of missile launcher must be decommissioned if replaced by a new launcher. These were the main subjects of concern at Moscow. It is hard to avoid a conclusion that there was some pretense about the nature of these Moscow negotiations. They were tense. They lasted well into the night. But they concerned secondary, and not central issues. Kissinger was to say later that most of the Moscow phase was spent on 'esoteric aspects of replacement provisions and not the substance of the agreement'.

Smith's claim that the Moscow negotiations concerned only secondary matters is true only in a strict sense. The major issues of contention regarding SALT surround those last-minute negotiations. The Soviets had delayed any discussion of the heavy missile and the SLBM issues until the last minute. They knew, because of their experience with Kissinger over the 20 May 1971 accord, that they could get a better deal out of Kissinger than they could out of the SALT negotiating team. They also knew that Nixon would not return home empty-handed. On the evening of 23 May, the Tuesday before the Friday on which they would sign the agreements, the Soviet leadership had provided Nixon with private assurances of no increase in silo or missile volume, that the Golf and Hotel submarines would soon be scrapped, and that replacement would begin immediately rather than after 48 submarines were deployed [Smith:412]. Two days later, the day before the signing, Gromyko told Kissinger that Nixon had misunderstood.

Considered alone, the heavy missile issue could have resulted from ignorance. The treatment of SLBMs at SALT clearly suggests deception. The figure 48 represents the only number that the Soviets provided during the negotiating process for estimates of their current capabilities. All other numbers had come from the US. In fact, the interim agreement contains no statement of the deployments on either side.

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The allegation that the Soviets deployed dummy submarines should figure heavily in any estimate of whether the Soviets exploited the SALT process to conduct strategic deception. The only clear Soviet lie occurs when they claimed that they possessed 48 modern submarines operational or under construction when the US could only establish evidence for 42. (Collin lists only 33 SSBNs deployed in 1972, 26 Yankees and 7 Hotels. The Soviets did not reach the 740 figure on modern SLBMs deployed until late 1975) [Collin:449]. A dummy submarine constitutes prima facie evidence of deception, intended to convey the impression of greater numbers or to suggest deployments different than those which actually occur. Soviet covers over submarine construction yards aid in this deception. Unfortunately, little has appeared in the public press about the appearance of these dummy submarines and about reasonable Soviet expectations about the effectiveness of US technical means. If the dummy does not resemble a Yankee but the dummy appears in Yankee slips, then the Soviets may not know how well US technical means work. The Soviets have a strategic rationale for displaying the dummy submarine from 1967, when the Yankees first became operational until 1975 when they deployed over 740 modern SLBMs. If the dummy submarine appeared after 1975, then the Soviets would need to dismantle additional older ICBMs to maintain the facade of greater SLBM strength. For the dummy submarine to figure in a SALT deception, it must have appeared prior to May 1972. If it did, the 48 figure may derive from Soviet perceptions of what they thought we could discern about their number of modern SSBNs from national technical means

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The Soviets did not agree on a definition of 'under construction'. Although the 48 figure may have resulted from a broadened sense of boats under construction, such an argument makes too many excuses for Soviet behavior. Rather, the negotiating record suggests that even the Soviets thought the 48 figure a pretense granted them for including SSBNs.

Sullivan also argues that the Soviets engaged in a deception regarding the geographical asymmetries facing the US and the Soviet Union over the deployment of SSBNs. He argues that the Soviets delayed testing of the SS-N-8 missile until after the May 1972 accords because its 4,800 nm range would weaken the justification for the three to two Soviet preponderance in modern submarines. The Soviets had initially wished to restrict submarine patrols, but immediate US rejection of that proposal leaves us without any idea as to the specific content of the proposal [Smith:102]. The Soviets would have known in 1969 that they had the SS-N-8 under development, so perhaps their proposal does represent a negotiating deception. However, the Soviets continued to argue that SLBM limitations should appear in negotiations after the initial agreement, a fact that the US SALT team had come to accept by April 1972. Thus, the appearance of the Brezhnev SLBM paper in April 1972, barely a month before the summit, came as a surprise. The Soviets had appeared to make a great concession; they would include SLBMs. They justified the three to two disparity by appealing to the strategic 'disbalance' in the location of submarine bases [Smith:371]. The surprise 'concession', the timing of the Brezhnev proposal, and Soviet knowledge that they had already