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Terrorism 01/01/1982-03/31/1982
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name DEGRAFFENREID, KENNETH: FILES

Withdrawer

SJW 2/26/2016

File Folder HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE THREAT: TERRORISM 1/1/82-3/31/82

FOIA

F02-0083/01

Box Number RAC BOX 9

PRADOS

601

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
173377	FOLDER	PROFILE SHEET, MEMOS, PAPER	7	2/8/1982	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8106736

RECEIVED 17 NOV 81 12

TO PRES

FROM GLENN, JOHN

DOCDATE 03 NOV 81

FRIEDERSDORF, M

12 NOV 81

BREMER

13 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CO

Terrorism

SUBJECT: PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FORM ASSISTANCE ACT TO PREVENT INVOLVEMENT OF
US CITIZENS IN INTL TERRORISM

ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY DUE: 27 NOV 81 STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

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COMMENTS

REF#

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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- 1/14 Recd & Direct Reply

same

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

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2

UNCLASSIFIED
CLASSIFICATION

S/S # 8133665

Date January 13, 1982

62 13 P 8: 35

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. William P. Clark
National Security Council
The White House

REFERENCE:

TO: President Reagan FROM: Senator John Glenn

DATE: 11/3/81 SUBJECT: Amendment to Foreign

Assistance Act to prevent U.S. involvement in terrorism


WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: 11/17/81 NSC # 8106736

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- ☐ A draft reply is attached
- ☐ A draft reply will be forwarded
- ☐ A translation is attached
- ☒ An information copy of a direct reply is attached
- ☐ We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below
- ☐ Other

REMARKS:

for 
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

DEC 10 1981

Dear Senator Glenn:

The President has referred to the Department of State a copy of your November 3 letter relating to your amendment on terrorism to the Foreign Assistance bill.

We share your concerns about U.S. citizen involvement in support of acts of international terrorism. Accordingly, over the next few months we will be conducting the review you propose in coordination with the agencies whose duty it is to enforce U.S. laws applicable to terrorism. This review will be conducted through the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, an existing body for interagency policy coordination.

Thank you for your interest in this subject. As the President and the Secretary of State have made clear since the beginning of this Administration, our efforts to deal with international terrorism carry the highest priority. We greatly appreciate your support of our efforts.

The Office of Management and Budget has advised that from the standpoint of the Administration's program there is no objection to the submission of these views.

Sincerely,

Richard Fairbanks
Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations

The Honorable
John Glenn,
United States Senate.

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 NOV 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

8133655

SOURCE: GLENN, JOHN

DATE: 03 NOV 81

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

CO

SUBJ: AMENDMENT TO FORN ASSISTANCE ACT TO PREVENT US INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIS

REQUIRED ACTION: DIRECT REPLY FURNISH INFO COPY

DUE DATE: 27 NOV 81

COMMENTS:

Cathy Millison
FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO SHOEMAKER

DEGRAFFENREID

NAU

F WH

O CM C CM

KIMMITT

BAILEY

Received in S/S-I
11 - 1013/004 (20)

November 12, 1981

8133655

Dear Senator Glenn:

This is to thank you for your November 3 letter to the President regarding your amendment to the Foreign Assistance bill. We appreciate the concerns you have underscored in regard to participation by U.S. citizens in activities supporting international terrorism or terrorist activities.

I have taken the liberty of sharing a copy of your letter with the President's national security staff to ensure that your comments and recommendations receive full consideration and review. We look forward to working with you and your colleagues in addressing this very important issue.

With cordial regard, I am

Sincerely,

Max L. Friedersdorf
Assistant to the President

The Honorable John Glenn
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

MLF:CMF:asr

cc: w/copy of inc, NSC Secretariat - for DIRECT response
(with copy to MLFriedersdorf).

cc: Powell Moore - FYI. ✓

WH RECORDS MGMT WILL RETAIN ORIGINAL INCOMING.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

November 3, 1981

8133655

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

006503

Dear Mr. President:

I fully agree with the words of State Department spokesman Dean Fischer, who yesterday labeled as "reprehensible" the involvement of U.S. citizens in the escalating and destabilizing activities of the Libyan government.

On October 22, 1981, during Senate consideration of the Foreign Assistance bill, I gained Senate approval for an amendment aimed at ensuring that Americans are prevented from acting in the service of terrorism or the proponents of terrorist activities. I made note at that time of your Administration's firm and active opposition to the spread of international terrorism and the special attention that has been given to the escalating and destabilizing activities of Colonel Qadaffi's government.

While the Foreign Assistance bill has not yet gained final Congressional approval, I write today to urge that the Administration begin at once to develop a program to ensure against the involvement of Americans in such terrorism by implementing the steps called for in my amendment.

That amendment requires, within six months of enactment, a report to include:

(1) a description of all legislation, currently in force, and of all administrative remedies, presently available, which can be employed to prevent the involvement, service, or participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders;


(2) an assessment of the adequacy of such legislation and remedies, and of the enforcement resources available to carry out such measures, to prevent the involvement, service, or participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders; and

7.
The President
November 3, 1981
Page Two

(3) a description of available legislative and administrative alternatives, together with an assessment of their potential impact and effectiveness, which could be enacted or employed to put an end to the participation by U.S. citizens in activities in support of international terrorism or terrorist leaders.

With best regards.

Sincerely,


John Glenn
United States Senator

JG:ddk

RECEIVED 30 JAN 82 10

TO WHEELER

FROM PETERSON, R

DOCDATE 29 JAN 82

file: Terrorism

KEYWORDS: AVIATION

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: TRANSPORTATION RPT ON HR-530 & HR-1948 RE AVIATION ACT OF 1958 RE
AIRCRAFT PIRACY & COMBATING TERRORISM

ACTION: MEMO WHEELER TO PETERSON

DUE: 24 FEB 82 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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→ DEGRAFFENREID

COMMENTS

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DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

591

January 29, 1982

LEGISLATIVE REFERRAL MEMORANDUM

TO: Legislative Liaison Officer

Department of Justice
Department of State
Department of Defense
Department of the Treasury
National Security Council
Federal Emergency Management Agency



SUBJECT: DOT's proposed report on H.R. 530 and H.R. 1948, bills "To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, relating to aircraft piracy, to provide a method for combating terrorism, and for other purposes."

The Office of Management and Budget requests the views of your agency on the above subject before advising on its relationship to the program of the President, in accordance with OMB Circular A-19.

A response to this request for your views is needed no later than FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1982.

Questions should be referred to Dan Taft (395-3285) or to Tracey Lawler (395-4710), the legislative analyst in this office.

Ronald K. Peterson
Assistant Director for
Legislative Reference

for

Enclosures

cc: B. Bauerlein



Department of Transportation

400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

General Counsel

The Honorable Clement J. Zablocki
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This responds to your request for the views of the Department of Transportation on H.R. 530 and H.R. 1948, bills

"To amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, relating to aircraft piracy, to provide a method for combating terrorism, and for other purposes."

The Department of Transportation defers to the Department of State with regard to the portions of these identical bills dealing with implementation of the Montreal Convention on aircraft sabotage, and we support the Administration bill drafted by the Department of State on this subject, H.R. 4847. Our comments are limited to sections 6 and 8 of the bills.

Section 6 would expand on the existing provisions of section 1115 of the Federal Aviation Act (49 U.S.C. 1515) directing the Department to work to improve the security measures at foreign airports which do not meet minimum security standards of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. A report on deficient airports would be provided to Congress, and failure to correct deficiencies would result in a public listing of deficient airports in addition to imposition of the sanctions contained in present law. Notice would be made in the Federal Register and be "prominently displayed at all United States airports regularly being served by scheduled air carrier operations."

The Department recommends that the mandatory notice requirement be made discretionary to preserve flexibility in its application. Listing of foreign airports with deficient security arrangements could become an invitation to terrorist activities at those airports. More flexibility in this requirement could be important to the Executive Branch in its dealings with foreign nations. Moreover, the criteria to be used by the Secretary to assess the effectiveness of foreign airports should be the security standards of Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation. The recommended practices of the Annex are not binding on States and should not be a required element of the statutorily mandated security assessments.

Section 8 would amend section 315(b) of the Federal Aviation Act to require charter passenger operations to undergo pre-flight screening. This provision is unnecessary since the Federal Aviation Administration has promulgated regulations requiring appropriate security measures for charter operations, which regulations are tailored to the kind of charter operation. Section 8 would treat all charter operations the same and would cause unjustified inconvenience and expense to the travelling public. Accordingly, we oppose the amendment contained in Section 8.

The Office of Management and Budget advises that there is no objection to the submission of this report for the consideration of the Committee.

Sincerely,

John M. Fowler

RECEIVED 15 APR 82 19

TO MEESE, E

FROM PANETTA, LEON E

DOCDATE 26 MAR 82

Tanous

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

CO

SIMPSON, HOWARD R

SUBJECT: ENCLOSED ARTICLE - STRATEGIC REVIEW - RE TERRORISTS ACTIVITY

ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

DUE: 21 APR 82 STATUS D FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STATE

DEGRAFFENREID

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NORTH

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

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*MR 4/15**W/ATTCH*

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(C)

REFERRAL

DATE: 15 APR 82

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: MEESE, E

SOURCE: PANETTA, LEON E

DATE: 26 MAR 82

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

CO

SIMPSON, HOWARD R


SUBJ: ENCLOSED ARTICLE - STRATEGIC REVIEW - RE TERRORISTS ACTIVITY

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY FOR WH SIG

X820421D

DUE DATE: 21 APR 82

COMMENTS:



FOR MICHAEL O WHEELER

STAFF SECRETARY

JV

ID #

070530

JL003

WHITE HOUSE
COUNSELLOR'S OFFICE TRACKING WORKSHEET

2571

☐ O - OUTGOING

☐ H - INTERNAL

☐ I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence

Received (YY/MM/DD) 82104109

Name of Correspondent: LEON E. PANETTA

☒ CN Mail Report

User Codes: (A) _____

(B) _____

(C) _____

Subject: Writer sends an article regarding
the need for unified management in
a Counter-Terrorist office.

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
CNHAMM		O	82104109			1 1
CNCRIB		A	82104109		C	820414
CNMEES		I	82104109		C	820409
NSC		D	82104116			1 1
			For signature of Edwin Meese III			1 1
						1 1
						1 1

ACTION CODES:

A - Appropriate Action
C - Comment/Recommendation
D - Draft Response
F - Furnish Fact Sheet
to be used as Enclosure

I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
R - Direct Reply w/Copy
S - For Signature
X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

A - Answered
B - Non-Special Referral
C - Completed
S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

Type of Response = Initials of Signer
Code = "A"
Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments:

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

LEON E. PANETTA
16TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES:

BUDGET

CHAIRMAN
TASK FORCE ON RECONCILIATION
AND BUDGET ENFORCEMENT
BUDGET COMMITTEE

AGRICULTURE

HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
(ON LEAVE)

MAJORITY REGIONAL WHIP

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

March 26, 1982

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
431 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2861

DISTRICT OFFICES:
380 ALVARADO STREET
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA 93940
(408) 649-3555

HOLLISTER, CALIFORNIA
(408) 637-0500

SALINAS, CALIFORNIA
(408) 424-2229

SAN LUIS OBISPO, CALIFORNIA
(805) 543-0134

SANTA CRUZ, CALIFORNIA
(408) 429-1976

Edwin Meese III
Counselor to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

070530

Dear Mr. Meese:

I would like to draw your attention to the enclosed article, written by a constituent of mine, which appeared in the Winter 1982 edition of the publication, Strategic Review.

I believe the recommendations which Mr. Simpson has made in this essay for improvements in the counter-terrorist efforts of our government have a great deal of merit. He presents a convincing case on behalf of the need for unified management in a Counter-Terrorist Office to insure a prompt and professional response to terrorist attacks on U.S. citizens or those of our allies.

As you will see from the brief biography which precedes his article, Mr. Simpson possesses a very extensive background in the area of counter-terrorist operations. I highly commend his views to your attention.

Thank you for your assistance and attention to the enclosed essay.

Sincerely,


LEON E. PANETTA
Member of Congress

LEP;aml
Enclosure



STRATEGIC REVIEW

WINTER 1982

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC INSTITUTE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ORGANIZING FOR COUNTER-TERRORISM

HOWARD R. SIMPSON



THE AUTHOR: Mr. Simpson served as a U.S. Foreign Service officer from 1951 to 1979. During the Franco-Vietminh War, he was a correspondent for the U.S. Information Agency, covering insurgency operations with the Thai partisans and the Commando d'Indochine in North Vietnam. Following the Algerian War, he was the principal USIA officer in Marseilles during the height of the OAS terrorist campaign against the De Gaulle regime. He returned to Vietnam in 1964 as an adviser to the Prime Minister and the Political Warfare Section of the ARVN. Subsequently he researched terrorist and counter-terrorist operations in Algiers, and in 1974 he returned to Marseilles as American Consul General, with specific responsibilities in the field of narcotics suppression. He is the author of five novels and numerous magazine articles.

IN BRIEF

Despite a dramatic upsurge in international terrorist actions targeted against Americans and U.S. interests, the U.S. Government has made slow headway in putting together the elementary machinery for meeting this mushrooming threat. The needed ingredients of an effective counter-terrorist strategy are a full-time and streamlined decisionmaking body, a permanent and integrated strike force, the methodical training of all concerned in sophisticated counter-terrorist techniques (with emphasis on the psychological dimensions), and the aggressive U.S. pursuit of hard and explicit arrangements of international cooperation against the danger. The time for mustering these ingredients is growing short in the face of a low-cost, low-risk form of shadowy combat that is rapidly substituting for open warfare as "the continuation of politics by other means."

Amid a countrywide dragnet for Libyan assassination squads and the kidnapping of an American general officer by Italian terrorists, the specter of international terrorism has scaled new heights of drama and interest in the United States. This escalation of the problem is bound to accelerate the counter-terrorist planning that already had become a fast-growth industry in Washington. Particularly since President Reagan's warning of "swift and effective retribution" to terrorists, brainpower, expertise and funds have been mobilized to build a viable counter-terrorist structure and develop a workable approach to the problem of international terrorism.

As always in a huge bureaucracy, various agencies and departments have rushed to pro-

duce strategies and theories guaranteeing them a place on the official "turf" of counter-terrorism. The flow of official analyses, background papers and contingency plans on terrorism has been surpassed only by media comment on the subject.

This massive scramble for answers to a frightening problem is understandable. International terrorism resulted in more casualties in 1980 than in any year since 1968. The 760 terrorist acts recorded in 1980 killed 642 people and wounded 1,708. Of the 760 acts, 278, or 38 per cent, were directed against Americans or American property.¹ There is every indication that this bloody record will be surpassed in 1981.

Although the battle against terrorism and the

search for an effective and embrative strategy are imperative, there are two distinct dangers. One is amateurism, a phenomenon that always seems to emerge when a new "interdisciplinary" problem becomes fashionable, attracting a variety of experts whose credentials in their own fields may be solid, but whose relevance to the given problem area is at best tangential. The other danger is overkill, as analyses and interpretations succeed each other, producing data fatigue and the "eye-glaze syndrome" even among those directly involved.

Inadequate Washington Efforts

The struggle to counter terrorism is not new to Washington. Successive administrations have endeavored to fashion a sound counter-terrorism policy and develop efficient mechanisms for carrying it out. The Nixon Administration relied on an Inter-Agency Working Group. President Ford appointed a Cabinet Committee. President Carter asked the National Security Council, through a Special Coordinating Committee, to supervise two groups dealing with terrorist activities. The first, an Executive Committee on Terrorism, chaired by the State Department, embraced representatives of seven departments or agencies, including the FBI, the CIA and the Department of Defense. The second, a Working Group on Terrorism, was made up of 29 government agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget and the Postal Service. A new Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism in the State Department is currently at work on embassy security, contingency planning, incident management planning, international initiatives and a review of current organizational structure.

Countering a terrorist enemy has never been easy. It can hardly be accomplished by issuing press releases, exhorting the United Nations or staging demonstrative military actions like flights of B-52 bombers or elements of a not-so-ready Rapid Deployment Force. Success in a counter-terrorist operation is sensitively reliant on detailed, up-to-date and accurate intelligence, on prompt evaluation of probable terrorist tactics and goals, and on incisive action by a central, responsible office with the authority to make decisions that will be supported at the highest level.

Even this ideal structure is no guarantee of

success. Modern terrorism has become pervasive because it can capitalize on the manifold vulnerabilities of industrialized societies. The best minds, the best equipment, the best preparation and the best possible decision may not avert disaster. Countering terrorism is a question of meeting a fluid crisis situation with as many odds as possible in your favor.

The first step in this preparation is the establishment of a realistic and workable policy. Contingency plans without a strong policy framework tend to be wobbly. Crisis managers need clear reference points and, if we are to expect effective international cooperation in the war on terrorism, our friends must know our position. Our enemies, who tend to have hearing difficulties where warnings are concerned, must also know where we stand.

The Human Factor in Counter-Terrorism

The release of the American hostages in Iran and the negotiations that made their release possible shattered the previous U.S. government policy of "no ransom" in terrorist situations. The Reagan Administrations' announced policy of no concessions to terrorist blackmail—no ransom or release of prisoners in response to terrorist demands—has repaired some of this damage. But while the State Department has made it clear that there will be no bargaining for the release of hostages, it has also stated that "discussion" and "dialogue" with terrorists will be acceptable.

Unfortunately, today's terrorists are, for the most part, experienced and intelligent. Their planning is precise and founded on a thorough study of their targets. They are not interested in the juggling of political-diplomatic semantics. They deal in realities. If a busload of children from an overseas American school is hijacked by armed terrorists in the full glare of world media coverage, the terrorist planners know very well that their chances of turning "discussions" into "negotiations" are good despite any previously announced policy.

A tough line is essential, but it must have a built-in flexibility to provide decisionmakers with policy options to fit differing situations and varying degrees of crisis intensity. There can be a delicate threshold between dialogue and bargaining. Humanitarian considerations, international political pressures, the weight of

22

national political opinion, the strengths and weaknesses of a terrorist group and the threat it poses can all be important factors affecting a decision that must be made with extreme urgency.

For this reason it is important that our counter-terrorist machinery be simplified, professional and capable of quick decisions. The State Department, as the lead agency for managing responses to overseas acts of terrorism, has done a creditable job despite many difficulties. However, although American diplomats have been the principal victims of terrorist attacks, their background and training hardly prepare them to cope with terrorist assailants or effectively plan counter-terrorist tactics.² One would have to search hard for a more glaring example of opposites. The professional diplomat may be brave, devoted and hard working, but he or she finds it difficult to think like a terrorist—an important prerequisite in counter-terrorist planning. Nor does the self-perpetuating bureaucracy of the State Department, with its long-established tradition of decision by committee, provide the ideal environment for effective counter-terrorist action.

The Case for a Full-Time Counter-Terrorist Office

The ponderous official process is reflected in an excerpt from Under Secretary Walter J. Stoessel's testimony of February 25, 1981, before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Stoessel, explaining the State Department's new approach to counter-terrorism, stated that "the newly established Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism is actively reviewing the basic elements of the inter-agency crisis management system, as well as our response capabilities. As the interdepartmental group identifies issues, they are being referred to the Senior Interdepartmental Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, or through the Secretary to the National Security Council." On June 10, 1981, Under Secretary for Management Richard T. Kennedy informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Department was considering alternative organizational arrangements.

When one takes into account the number of agencies or departments involved in counter-terrorist planning, their individual interests and priorities, and the human factors of "turf protection" and conference one-up-manship, it is

surprising that our counter-terrorism effort has done as well as it has.

It could do better. The Administration needs a central, full-time counter-terrorist office staffed by competent, experienced civilian officials and military officers with knowledge of terrorist movements, training in counter-terrorist planning and specialization in terrorist activities and tactics covering specific regions of the world. This office should be staffed primarily by representatives of the agencies, departments and services considered absolutely essential to the counter-terrorist effort.

Manned by experts, a counter-terrorist office could supply senior crisis managers with information and advice gleaned from pertinent in-house data and a constant monitoring of world terrorist developments and trends. The assets of a permanent office could range from the psychological profiles of particular terrorists to estimates of the amount of international support expected following a specific U.S. move, from on-the-ground resources available at a given location to the required air space clearances needed in an emergency rescue operation. During the all-too-rare lulls in terrorist activity, a permanent, independent office could reinforce its expertise, continue its data gathering and assist other government agencies through training programs, briefings and advice.

The concept of "oneness," the organization's existence as an individual unit, would enhance its effectiveness. Members from the State Department, the CIA, the Department of Defense, the FBI and other concerned agencies, working together under the same roof on the same problems, would soon form a compact, mutually supportive team, a team with the professional skill to ensure quick reaction capabilities in crisis situations.

The Director of the Counter-Terrorist Office must be a person with the required experience, rank and prestige to work directly with the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser and the Secretary of Defense. The Director should also be authorized to call on the resources of other government departments, depending on the needs of a specific situation.

An added advantage to establishing a central Counter-Terrorist Office would be its capacity to plan preventive action. International terrorism has profited from two prime assets: the element of surprise and the benefit of offensive

action. Counter-terrorist action has been traditionally reactive and defensive. U.S. counter-terrorist planning based on good intelligence, with a built-in mechanism of international cooperation and diplomatic support, should envisage a "first-strike" capability against terrorist groups or individuals known to be planning an operation or resting in a "safe haven" after an attack. To ensure this capability, aggressive intelligence operations, including the long-term infiltration of terrorist organizations and the increased use of dependable informers, are essential.

A Unitary Counter-Terrorist Force

The organizational principle of a central Counter-Terrorist Office would also apply to the establishment of a permanent, self-sustaining, mobile Counter-Terrorist Force trained and ready for quick deployment under the direction of the Counter-Terrorist Office. A mixed force, no matter how well trained the member units might be individually, has little chance of success on the demanding battlefield of terrorism. The abortive rescue attempt in Iran involving the Special Forces, the Marine Corps, the Air Force and the Navy is an unfortunate example of how difficult it is to meld such varied entities into an effective team on short notice.

Today, in addition to the Special Force's "Delta Team," there are Marine units, Air Force Special Operations Teams, Army Rangers and Navy SEAL teams trained in counter-terrorist operations. But most of these units are assigned other duties and preoccupations, and cannot be expected to concentrate solely on counter-terrorism. The Pentagon maintains an ongoing liaison with British, West German, Italian, Israeli and French counter-terrorist units, but it is interesting to note that these latter organizations are comparatively small, uniquely trained and devoted to the sole task of counter-terrorism.

A special counter-terrorist entity can be drawn from various services and agencies, but it, too, has to be one. Its members must work together, train together, almost live together, in their world of specialization—a world that requires a constant exchange of tactical information and technical dialogue.

Just as its supervisory organization is not wholly civilian, the Counter-Terrorist Force must not be wholly military. There should be a

minimum representation from the civilian departments and agencies involved. Their representatives could supply a constant link of coordination and personal contact that would ensure understanding of the real problems and facilitate their solution. This would also avoid the "civilian decision-military action" tradition in the United States that fosters compartmentalization, misunderstanding and post-action re-priming. In addition, the Counter-Terrorist Force must have its own dependable logistics and airlift capability. Those who supply these services must be full-time, integrated members of the Force.

While it is essential for the cutting edge of any counter-terrorist unit to have a sound commando-type training, it does not necessarily follow that every Ranger or Special Forces soldier will be an acceptable recruit for counter-terrorist operations. The classic commando capability to attack rapidly, complete a mission and withdraw quickly is often vital in a counter-terrorist operation. But patience, and the intellectual ability to understand more than the immediate tactical situation, can be of equal importance. Volunteer members of the West German Grenzschutzgruppe 9, considered one of the best counter-terrorist units in existence, are selected in part for their above-average intelligence.³ The same applies to the small counter-terrorist teams of Britain's SAS (Special Air Services). Each counter-terrorist combatant must have insight into terrorist psychology and some idea of terrorist strengths and weaknesses. This is of particular importance in siege and hostage situations, where individual judgment is often sensitively at stake.

In the split-second decisions that must be made during a volatile crisis situation, small, seemingly unimportant details can take on particular relevance. Each phrase in reply to a terrorist ultimatum must be weighed and selected for psychological effect. Every move of a counter-terrorist unit, particularly the ultimate decision to use lethal force, must be based on the best knowledge available of the terrorists' motivation and probable reaction. This requires the application of above-average intelligence in addition to finely honed combat skills.

Complex Psychological Dimensions

In the scramble to find a quick answer to terrorism, there is a danger of oversimplifica-

tion—a tendency, for example, to concentrate on the hardware approach where new arms, aircraft, communications equipment and incapacitating chemical weapons receive priority consideration and computers spit out heuristic models, hypothetical situations and data-filled contingency plans. All of these have their place in the counter-terrorist arsenal, but Americans, with a dangerous habit of relying on machinery, must not forget that terrorism is, by its very name, a human, psychological weapon.

It is therefore essential to recognize and correlate the propaganda and psychological aspects of international terrorism as important elements of counter-terrorist planning and decisionmaking. The drama of international terrorism is played on a world stage before an impressionable, captive audience. For the terrorist that audience is as important a target as the on-the-spot victim of his act.

Terrorists aim at an ultimate political goal, but the psychological shockwaves from their actions spread to all segments of society. Their acts can cripple economic development, split political parties, paralyze communities, destroy weak governments and weaken strong regimes. Montaigne said: "He who fears he will suffer already suffers because of that fear." Terrorist effectiveness comes from the selective targeting of the weapon of fear.

Fear not only hits selectively and powerfully, but it can also loosen the cohesion of society. The fiercest devotion to political and societal values and ideals can waver in the face of stark terror, and the terrorist both knows and trades on that fact. Moreover, terrorism may seem an impersonal and irrational act when it is expressed in the random killing of innocent victims. Yet, that very cold-blooded, impersonal action carries a very personal message: "That victim could have been you. And the next victim may well be you."

A Counter-Terrorist Office therefore must give priority to the psychological aspects of terrorism and their effect. Planning has to cover the psychological goals of terrorist movements and the psychological profiles of terrorist organizations and individuals. It must include intensified training programs in withstanding psychological pressures for U.S. personnel and private citizens exposed to attack, kidnapping and hostage situations. At a broader psychological level, techniques and methods must be developed to

preempt and counter terrorist propaganda. This cannot be simply a public relations exercise of expressing horror and condemnation; in many instances this plays into the terrorists' hands by amplifying the fear syndrome. Rather, it is a question of deflating terrorist claims with ready facts, and with speed and clarity.⁴

The Imperative of International Cooperation

At the same time, efforts must obviously be intensified to encourage greater international cooperation in counter-terrorist planning, operations and intelligence-sharing. The State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism has been working hard on these key factors. Yet, collective action is not easy to achieve in a world where terrorists keep constantly on the move, flitting over loosely guarded borders like busy mosquitoes and relying on an international brotherhood for support and cover.

In the real world, each nation tends to approach the problem of terrorism from its own vantagepoint, weighing its willingness to cooperate internationally against an array of political and economic considerations, including prominently its own vulnerabilities to retributive terrorist action. Promises of cooperation from other nations therefore cannot be taken at face value, but must be based rather on solid, explicit and detailed commitments of action.

While the U.S. Government's characterization of terrorism as a flagrant violation of international human rights is justified, we must realize that the judgment of nations even basically friendly to us will vary considerably depending on the terrorist organization in question, its political history and goals, and the extent of the threat it poses to their own societies. Nevertheless, to the extent that terrorism is truly international in scope and operation, international cooperation is imperative to make any headway against it. The value of shared intelligence data alone justifies intensified effort. Seemingly innocuous information on a suspect's movements or a group's activities may mean little to one national recipient, but could provide invaluable data to a cooperating ally for preventive action.

Improved international cooperation calls for priority attention by U.S. diplomatic posts, including the personal intervention of the head-of-mission to break bureaucratic logjams and

impress reluctant allies with U.S. seriousness and purpose. This effort would be supplemental to continued direct contact between the Counter-Terrorist Office and its equivalent organizations in cooperating nations.

The Hard Requirements

There is currently a difference of opinion in Washington over the proper emphasis to be placed on international terrorism. Some members of the U.S. military and the intelligence community feel that an over-concentration on terrorism will divert resources needed for what they deem more important defense and intelligence programs. They describe terrorism as an "irritant," which accomplishes one of its major purposes when it ties down massive resources of the target country. This is held to apply particularly to the degree that terrorism is deliberately wielded or exploited as a diversionary tool by enemies of the United States.

This attitude ignores the fact that "over-concentration" on a problem area as important as the fight against terrorism is probably necessary to move the cumbersome machinery of government toward viable solutions. Moreover, it is a myopic view in face of the palpable prospect that the terrorist of the future may gain access to nuclear, chemical and germ weapons. Today's "irritant" may well turn into tomorrow's massive disaster.

The notion of establishing an independent government office to deal with international terrorism will doubtlessly send negative signals through the economy-minded official establishment. But revolutionary situations require revolutionary—and practical—responses. Terrorism is a growing threat, and the United States, its citizens and interests are prime targets. Clausewitz's description of war as politics by other means has become limited in its application. In the age of nuclear weapons, war has become inordinately expensive and dangerous. Terrorism is taking its place as a minimum-investment, low-loss strategy promising high returns.

We are entering the age of terrorism with a counter-terrorist structure of official groups and committees designed more for diplomatic initiatives and bureaucratic procedures than for swift, effective action. What is needed by the United States is a central, independent office manned by qualified civilian officials and military officers with the authority to make decisions and the integrated, ready force to carry them out. The staff of this office and its strike force will have to be broad-gauged and intelligent, as well as tough and decisive. To achieve this the White House may have to deal arbitrarily with a hide-bound bureaucracy. It must be done. Time is short and the next terrorist attack is always scheduled for tomorrow.

NOTES

1. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *International Terrorism*, Current Policy, No. 285. June 10, 1981.

2. Central Intelligence Agency, National Foreign Assessment Center, "Patterns of International Terrorism," research paper, 1980.

3. Robert Kupperman and Darrell Trent, *Terrorism:*

Threat, Reality, Response (Stanford, CA.: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1979).

4. The worldwide facilities of the U.S. International Communication Agency (formerly USIA) should support this effort. Qualified USICA officers should be on the staff of a central Counter-Terrorist Office.



5 Apr 82

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TO: Ker

FROM:

Chris

Shoemaker