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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name KEMP, GEOFFREY: FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 11/28/2008

File Folder LEBANON-AUGUST-DECEMBER 1981 (1)

FOIA

M2008-098/16

Box Number 90493

STOCKER

7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57054	MEMO	LENZ TO EXECUTIVE SECRETARY <i>D 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #117; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57054</i>	2	12/24/1981	B1 B3
57055	REPORT	RE SYRIA-LEBANON <i>PAR 5/29/2001 F99-024/1 #120; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57055</i>	1	12/24/1981	B1 B3
57056	MEMO	DUPLICATE OF 57054 <i>D 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #122; PAR 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57055</i>	2	ND	B1 B3
57057	MEMO	BAILEY TO ALLEN RE MEETING <i>PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #123; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57057</i>	2	11/25/1981	B1 B3
57058	REPORT	RE LEBANON <i>PAR 5/19/2006 F99-024/1 #125; UPHELD 7/15/2010 M098/16 #57058</i>	2	ND	B1 B3 B6
57059	REPORT	RE LEFTIST ATTACKS <i>PAR 5/29/2001 F99-024/1 #128; UPHELD 7/17/2012 M098/16 #57059</i>	1	10/17/1981	B1 B3

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified Information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Kemp, Geoffrey: Files

OA # ~~90249~~ 90493

File Folder: Lebanon: August - December, 1981 (1 of 3)

Archivist: gcc/bcb

FOIA ID: F99-024/1

Date: 6/2/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Lenz to Executive Secretary, 2p. D 5/19/06 NLSF99-024/1, #117; Par. 7/17/12 MO8-098/16 #57054	12/24/81	P1, F1
2. memo	Tanter to Nance, 1p. R u u #118	12/22/81	P1, F1
3. map	Map, 1p. R 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #119	n.d.	P1, F1
4. report	re Lebanon, 1p. P 3/30/01 " #120; upheld 7/17/12 MO8-098/16 #57055	12/24/81	P1, F1, B3
5. memo	Tanter to Nance, 1p. R 5/19/06 u #121	12/22/81	P1, F1
6. memo	Same Text as Item # 1, 2p. D u u #122; Par. 7/17/12 MO8-098/16 #57056	n.d.	P1, F1
7. memo	Bailey to Allen, 2p. PAR u u #123; Par. " "	11/25/81	P1, F1, B3
8. cable	240350Z, 1p. R 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #124	11/24/81	P1, F1
9. report	re Lebanon, 2p. PAR 5/19/06 u #125; upheld 7/15/200 MO8-14/1 #57058 B6	n.d.	P1, F1, B2, B3
10. memo	Kemp to Allen, 1p. R u u #126	11/13/81	P1, F1
11. memo	Haig to RR, 2p. R 11/16/01 F99-024/1 #127	11/13/81	P1, F1
12. report	re Lebanon, 1p. P 3/30/01 NLSF99-024/1 #128; upheld 7/17/12 MO8-098/16 #57079	10/17/81	P1, F1, B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Date/Time Transmitted	WASHFAX MESSAGE NUMBER	Date/Time Received
REC 3 3 50 PM '81	31 CIA	RECEIVED
	OPERATIONS CENTER	11 3 4:15
	SITE A	
	WASHFAX MESSAGE RECEIPT	

FROM Robertson 351-6119			
SUBJECT Lebanon			
CLASSIFICATION Unclass			Pages 13
Send To	Deliver To	Extension	Room
NSC	Ray Tantner	395-3191	
	NAN COL JP		
	NSC		
	Kemp		

REMARKS

P 1: 34

SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

XX

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Dr. Raymond Tantner		
2	NSC STAFF/NESA		
3	395-3491		
4			
5			
6			

☐ ACTION	☐ DIRECT REPLY	☐ PREPARE REPLY
☐ APPROVAL	☐ DISPATCH	☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ COMMENT	☐ FILE	☐ RETURN
☐ CONCURRENCE	☐ INFORMATION	☐ SIGNATURE

Remarks:

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

NFAC/OPA/NESA/ISL/Robertson/351-6119

3 Aug 81

XX

UNCLASSIFIED

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FORM NO.
1-67

237

Use previous editions

(46)

Lebanon
Aug 3, 1981
Lebanon Crisis Chronology

1975-76

Lebanese civil war between Christians and an alliance of leftist Muslim and Palestinian forces.

October 1976

Riyadh and Cairo Summits of heads of Arab states ended general hostilities in Lebanon and created 30,000-man Arab Deterrent Force to police ceasefire ordered by these summits.

10 Nov 1976

Syrian forces enter Beirut as advance contingents of the Arab peacekeeping force; Saudi Arabia, South Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and the Sudan also send contingents.

February 1976

Rayadiyah affair where Lebanese Army reservists clashed with Syrian forces, prompting Christian militias to join the fighting against the Syrians, was a turning point in relations between Damascus and the Maronites. Originally the ADF intervened on the side of the Christians in 1976.

Fall 1978

Clashes between Syrians and Christians resulted in the ADF leaving Beirut's Christian areas.

Mid-1979

All non-Syrian units out of the ADF.

7 July 1980

Phalange defeats Camille Shamun's National Liberal Party militia; virtual elimination of rival and emergence as the dominant Christian force in Lebanon.

December 1980

Intra-Christian fighting between the Phalange and National Liberal Party militias in the Bekaa Valley town of Zahlah; Syrian ADF intervenes to stop fighting but suffers casualties; Phalange-Syrian clashes result. Ceasefire ends fighting but tensions remain high in the area with Phalange in the city and the Syrians controlling the area around it.

23 Dec 1980

Phalange-dominated Lebanese Front coalition releases "Historic Document" proposing decentralized system to replace present government form and calling for the removal of Syrians and Palestinians from Lebanon.

December 1980

Syria insists entire Bekaa Valley and main Beirut-Damascus Highway are vital to its own national security; claims it has no interest in occupying the city of Zahlah but must control the roads and area around it.

March 31

Firing breaks out along the demarcation lines in Beirut and clashes between Christian militiamen and Syrian troops occur in Zahlah.

Mar-Apr 1981

Syrian ADF statement cites Phalange road-building effort to link Zahlah with the Christian-heartland to the northwest as triggering the latest clashes and posing a direct threat to the ADF; calls for removal of Phalange militiamen from Zahlah.

April 1

Heavy fighting breaks out between Syrian troops and Christian militias in and around Zahlah.

April 2

Serious clashes resume in Zahlah and fighting spreads to Beirut where heavy exchanges of rocket, artillery and mortar fire along the "greenline" involve Lebanese Army and Syrian forces.

April 3

The Lebanese cabinet meets in an extraordinary session at the request of President Sarkis amid fears of a deep national split following heavy clashes in Beirut and Zahlah.

April 4

U.S. Secretary of State Haig travels to the Middle East to visit Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

April 5

Lebanese split over involvement of the Lebanese Army in recent fighting; the leftist National Movement alliance orders a mobilization.

April 5

Bachir Gemayel, Commander of the Lebanese Forces and the Phalange militia, sends a cable to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim asking for UN troop deployment to replace the Syrians.

April 6

France seen favoring UN Security Council meeting over Lebanon.

April 7

Fighting continues unabated in Beirut and Zahlah.

April 7

Syria makes it clear it will not compromise on Zahlah and insists on being in command of any Lebanese Army contingent deployed to the Bekaa Valley town.

April 7

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam confers with Lebanese leaders on the worsening crisis in Lebanon.

April 8

Haig assures Sarkis of US support to his government; Syria refuses to receive US Deputy Assistant Secretary Draper.

April 8

News reports from Paris say France would support the deployment of UN troops in Lebanon if its government would agree.

April 8

A truce ordered by Lebanese President Sarkis takes effect in the afternoon.

April 8

PLO chairman Yasir Arafat says Palestinians will refrain from getting involved in Lebanon's internal events.

April 14

Israel admits helping Christians in latest struggle against Syrians by providing arms and military equipment.

April 15

Begin admits publicly Israel is aiding the Christians in the north.

April 16-15

Father Boufous Na'aman, confidant of Bashir Jumayyil, to Damascus for talks with Syrian officials.

April 17

Phalange Party head Pierre Gemayel says he is prepared to negotiate with the Syrians.

April 17

Libyans offers to install surface-to-air missiles in southern Lebanon.

April 18

Fighting along Beirut's dividing "greenline" resumes.

April 19

Christian militia commander Major Sa'ad Haddad's forces in southern Lebanon shell Sidon.

April 20

Pierce fighting breaks out in Beirut and its suburbs as well as in southern Lebanon. Shells fall as far north as Juniyah.

April 20

National Movement head and Druze leader Walid Jumblatt rejects Algerian mediation offers and a proposal by Kuwait for a round-table conference of the warring factions in Lebanon.

April 21

PLO Chief Arafat announces acceptance of Kuwaiti offer to host a round-table conference on Lebanon.

April 21

Fighting escalates in Beirut, closing the international airport.

April 22

Lebanese President Elias Sarkis orders another truce.

April 22

Eight people are killed in Zahlah as the town comes under shelling.

April 23

Palestine Liberation Organization issues general mobilization order calling to duty all males aged 16-49.

April 24

Agreement reportedly reached for consolidating ceasefire in Zahlah.

April 25

Syrian ADF forces mount an operation to clear Phalange forces from the Sannin ridges around Zahlah.

April 26

SSNP and Syrian forces mount an offensive against Phalange in the Sannin ridge.

April 28

Khaddam returns to Beirut for further talks with government, political and militia leaders.

April 28

Israeli Air Force shoots down two Syrian helicopters in the Bekaa Valley.

April 29

Syrians move SA-6 surface-to-air missiles into the Bekaa Valley around Zahlah. Israel accuses Syria of violating the tacitly agreed upon "tactical red line" which Israel claims does not permit either the use of the Syria air force against Lebanese Christians or the installation of missiles in Lebanon.

April 30

Israel threatens to take action if the missiles are not withdrawn.

May 2

100-man Lebanese Army unit sent to southern Lebanon to serve with UNIPIL.

May 4

Habib named as special US Presidential emissary with mission to visit the Middle East to attempt to defuse the crisis.

May 6-8

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kornienko in Damascus.

May 7-9

Habib in Beirut for talks with Lebanese leaders.

May 9-10

Habib in Damascus to meet with President Assad.

May 9

Heavy shelling in Beirut along the confrontation line.

May 10-11

Habib in Jerusalem for talks with Prime Minister Begin.

May 11

Begin in Knesset speech reveals attack ordered on SA-6's for 30 April but cancelled because of weather.

May 12

Habib visits Damascus for further discussions.

May 13

Beirut International Airport resumes operations; Habib arrives in Beirut.

May 13

Lebanese Government publicizes details of Sarkis' call to Syrian President Assad expressing "sympathy and solidarity in the face of current challenge."

May 14 Habib returns to Jerusalem for further discussions.

May 14 Syrian SA-6 missiles in Lebanon down Israeli reconnaissance drone.

May 15 National Movement calls for general national mobilization in anticipation of Israeli military action.

May 16 Habib travels to Saudi Arabia for official talks on the Lebanese crisis; Saudi Deputy Commander of the National Guard dispatched to Damascus.

May 17 Saudi Foreign Ministry statement reaffirms government's support for the Lebanese government and Syrian ADF forces stationed in Lebanon.

May 17 President Reagan meets with Saudi Prince Turki in Washington.

May 18 Habib meets with Assad in Damascus.

May 18 Lebanese Army company sent to serve with UNIPIL in south Lebanon.

May 19 Habib travels to Israel. Begin announces Israel will not go to war unless attacked.

May 20 Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference announced for 22 May in Tunis.

May 22 Habib arrives in Beirut; the Arab League Foreign Ministers' Conference opens in Tunis; dependents of Soviet diplomatic staff leaving the Lebanese capital.

May 22 Israeli frogmen sink a merchant ship in Sidon harbor.

May 23-27 Habib in Israel for discussions.

May 23 Syrians shoot down an Israeli remotely piloted reconnaissance vehicle (drone) over Lebanon.

May 24 Israeli Prime Minister's office statement that Israel would use its air force to defend the Lebanese Christians if the

Syrian Air Force attacked them; reference to commitment made to Christians on August 22, 1978 and reaffirmation of that commitment—"consider severely and sympathetically a request for IAF inducement if Syrian planes attacked Christians and would probably reply positive."

May 27

President Reagan says Habib has made progress and will return to the area following consultations in Washington.

May 28

Habib enroute to Washington

May 28

Israeli air strikes on Palestinian targets south of Damur; Israelis claim they are in response to firing of Libyan-manned SA-9 missiles at Israeli reconnaissance aircraft; first strikes since April 29.

May 28

Syrian and Lebanese foreign ministers meet in Shtawah to discuss the security situation in Zahlah and preparations for the upcoming Bayt ad-Din meeting of the Arab League conciliation committee.

May 29

Israel seaborne raid against Palestinian targets near Damur. Assad receives second message from Saudi King Khalid over "missile crisis"; Israeli press reports of Syrian military preparations in Golan Heights against possible Israeli attack.

May 31

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam publicly confirms that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have resumed their payments to the Arab Deterrent Force. Beaches in both east and west Beirut are shelled; numerous casualties.

June 1

Reagan names Robert Dillon as new US Ambassador to Beirut. Lebanese Front and National Movement agree not to shell residential areas anymore.

June 2

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam to Saudi Arabia; Israeli airstrike near Tyre on Fatah targets.

June 2-3

Israeli air and sea strikes against Palestinian targets north of Tripoli around the Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp.

June 2

Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam visits Saudi Arabia and delivers a message from President Assad to King Khalid.

June 3-4

President Sadat meets with Prime Minister Begin in Sharm al-Sheikh.

June 4

Sadat-Begin meeting at Sharm al-Sheikh.

June 5

Habib departs for the Middle East, stops in Paris and Geneva. Israeli Hawk Missiles reported in southern Lebanon; IDF officials deny this.

June 6

Bayt ad-Din meeting pushed back a day.

June 7-8

Arab League conciliation committee, consisting of the Kuwaiti, Saudi, Syrian and Lebanese foreign ministers and the Arab League secretary general, meets at Bayt ad-Din; President Sarkis chairs the session called to discuss national reconciliation and the security situation in Lebanon.

June 7

Israelis bomb the Iraqi nuclear facility at Tuwaitha outside Baghdad.

June 8

Israelis publicly announce their successful raid on Iraq's nuclear facility.

June 9

Habib returns to Beirut to meet Lebanese government, political and militia leaders in a second round of discussions aimed at defusing the Lebanese crisis.

June 12

UN Security Council meets on the Israeli attack on the Iraqi nuclear facility at Tuwaitha.

June 13

Syrian MIG-21s down Israeli remotely piloted reconnaissance vehicle northeast of Damascus.

June 13-15

Habib meets with Saudi leaders in Riyadh.

June 14

Jerusalem Radio claims Syria in the past few weeks has completed deployment in Lebanon and reinforcement of troops including building a defense line based on infantry posts and tank positions from southern Lebanon through the Bekaa toward Syria.

June 15

Phalange party leader Pierre Jumayyil publicly denies party ties to Israel, expresses party willingness to sign with other Lebanese parties agreement rejecting ties with Israel.

June 15

Israeli Prime Minister Begin renews threat to take military action against Syrian missiles in Lebanon if Habib makes no progress in getting them removed.

June 15-16

Habib in Damascus for talks with President Assad.

June 17

Habib travels to Israel for talks with Israeli leaders.

June 18

Lebanese Parliament meets for first time since later fighting began April 2.

June 19

UNIFIL mandate renewed for another six months.

June 19-22

Habib in Saudi Arabia for meetings with Saudi leaders.

June 22

Habib returns to Beirut.

June 25

Habib departs area enroute to Washington.

June 27

Habib in Washington for consultations.

June 30

End of seige of Zahlah; implementation of security agreement at Zahlah and withdrawal of non-resident Phalange militia from the city. Butrus to Damascus for talks with Syrian Foreign Minister Kahddam.

July 2

Saudi and Kuwaiti Ambassadors to Beirut for preparatory talks on Conciliation Committee Meeting scheduled for Saturday (4 July).

July 4

Arab Conciliation Committee members--
Saudi, Kuwaiti and Syrian Foreign
Ministers--meet with former President
Franjiyah.

July 4-5

Bayt ad-Din Conciliation Committee meets
under Sarkis; announces next meeting
scheduled for 25 July.

July 6

Dashir Jumayyil sends letter rejecting
ties to Israel to President Sarkis.

July 7

Israeli drone downed over Lebanon; Syria
claims its ADF units shot it down while
Israel claims drone was lost because of
"technical failures."

July 8-9

Habib stops in Paris enroute to the
Middle East.

July 9

Habib arrives in Beirut, meets with
Sarkis.

July 10

Israeli aircraft strikes Palestinian
targets in Southern Lebanon; Palestinians
respond to Israeli airstrikes by
rocketing Qiryat Shimona in northern
Israel.

July 12

Habib visits Tel Aviv/Israel; Israeli
planes strike Palestinian targets at
Damur and Naomah in southern Lebanon in
retaliation for earlier Palestinian
rocket attack on northern Israel.

July 13

Habib travels to Saudi Arabia for talks
with Saudi leaders.

July 13-14

Israeli airstrike against Palestinian
targets in southern Lebanon, south of the
Litani; shoot down of Syrian MiG-23 by
Israeli aircraft.

July 15

Palestinians rocket Nabariyya and Qiryat
Shimona in northern Israel; Israelis
shell Palestinian targets in southern
Lebanon in retaliation for Palestinian
rocket attack.

July 16

Israelis again shell Palestinian targets
in southern Lebanon as fighter aircraft
strike Palestinian positions and destroy

bridges over the Litani and Zahran
rivers; Palestinians respond by rocketing
northern Israel.

July 17

Israeli airstrikes against Palestinians
targets including Patah's headquarters in
Beirut, bridges over the Zahran and
Litani rivers and Palestinian positions
in southern Lebanon; Palestinians
responded by firing rockets into northern
Israel.

July 18

Habib in Israel to meet government
leaders.

July 19

Israelis shell and carry out airstrikes
against Palestinian targets in southern
Lebanon; the Palestinians shell northern
Israel, including Nahariyya, Qiryat
Shimona, Metulia, Bet Hillel and Misgav
'Am.

July 20

Lebanon asks UN Security Council to order
an immediate ceasefire in Lebanon; Israel
conducts commando raid, naval shelling
and air attacks against Palestinian
targets in southern Lebanon; Palestinians
rocket northern Israel in retaliation.

July 21

Palestinians shell and rocket northern
Israel including Nahariyya and Qiryat
Shimona area; Israel shells Palestinian
targets in southern Lebanon, including
the Zahran/Medreco refinery, and Israeli
aircraft strike the Nabatiyah area and
the Qasimiyah Bridge.

July 22

Arab Deterrent Force mandate renewed by
Arab League for additional six months.

July 23

Saudi Arabia offers Lebanon \$125 million
to pay for damage to its oil
installations caused by Israeli air
raids.

July 23-24

Israel shells Palestinian positions in
southern Lebanon and carries out commando
raid near Jiyah; Palestinians rocket
northern Israel.

July 23-24

Arab Defense Council meeting in Tunis to
discuss Lebanon; concluding statement

promises support for the Lebanese Government, assistance for the PLO, and future action against countries supporting Israel if its aggression continues.

July 24 Ceasefire announced by Habib in Israel.

July 25-26 Conciliation Committee, consisting of the Saudi, Kuwaiti and Syrian foreign ministers and the Arab League secretary general and chaired by President Sarkis meets in Beirut; accepts letter submitted by Bashir Jumayyil opposing ties to Israel and announces next committee session for 3-4 September; Habib departs area enroute to Washington D.C.

July 25-27 Rockets sporadically fired at the Haddad enclave despite the ceasefire.

July 26 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command refuses to accept ceasefire.

July 28 Lebanon asks for Arab League summit to deal with issue of southern Lebanon; PFLP-GC agrees to ceasefire, ending Palestinian opposition to the agreement.

July 29 Israel continues its reconnaissance activity and an Israeli aircraft downs a Syrian MIG-25 in dogfight over northern Lebanon; Palestinians claim credit for attack on Israeli bus north of Jerusalem.

August 3 Israelis fly reconnaissance flights over Beirut for first time since 29 July.

RECEIVED 07 JAN 82 08

TO PRES

FROM KHORAICHE, ANTOINE P DOCDATE 06 JAN 82

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

AP

SUBJECT: THANK YOU LTR FOR MTG W/ PRES ON SEP 16

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TANTER

FEITH

TYSON

COMMENTS

REF# 8137461

LOG 8105639

NSCIFID

(C / C)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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DISPATCH	_____	W/ATTCH	FILE	_____ (C)
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S/S # 8137461 CR5639
Date January 6, 1982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

FOR: Mr. William P. Clark
National Security Council
The White House

SIT
ROOM

REFERENCE:

TO: The President FROM: Antoine Pierre Khoraiche
DATE: December 11, 1981 SUBJECT: Thank you for receiving
Patriarch

WHITE HOUSE REFERRAL DATED: _____ NSC # _____
(if any)

THE ATTACHED ITEM WAS SENT DIRECTLY
TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION TAKEN:

- _____ A draft reply is attached.
_____ A draft reply will be forwarded.
_____ A translation is attached.
_____ An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
X We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
_____ Other.

REMARKS:

The Patriarch's letter thanks the President for having received him at the White House during his visit last Fall. Due to the ceremonial nature of this correspondence, we feel it requires no reply.

Mary M. Bremer for
L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary



8137461

PATRIARCHATUS MARONITARUM ANTIOCHIAE TOTIUSQUE ORIENTIS

December 11, 1981.

Esteemed President,

My fellow Bishops and, I can truthfully say, all the Lebanese people were most pleased at your gracious reception of "my advocate", His Eminence Cardinal Cooke and myself at the White House when, recently, I visited the United States as the guest of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops there.

Your patient hearing of the proposals I put before you, and your sincere interest in finding a solution to our problems here were indeed heartening, and I have conveyed to the many leaders, national and parochial alike, who have visited me since my return, my firm impression that your Government under your committed guidance will be of paramount influence in bringing about a lasting peace here. Indeed, the bringing of Peace to the land blessed by the footsteps of the Lord Jesus, Himself, may well prove to be "the crowning jewel" of your efforts, and those of your Government, to establish peace in the world.

Permit me to offer you my sincere greetings on the occasion of our celebration of Christ's Birthday. May your wife, your family and yourself be especially blessed by the "Prince of Peace" these days, and may the New Year be one of prosperity for all your people. You are constantly in our prayers.

Very sincerely yours,

+Antoine Pierre Khoraiiche

Antoine Pierre Khoraiiche,
Maronite Patriarch of Antioch
and All the East.

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
U. S. A.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

8131711 *L. Paul Bremer**11/25/81*~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

November 25, 1981

91 11/25 P10: 55

WORLD
SITUATION*Transfer:*MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Letter to the President from Bashir Gemayel

The President has received a letter from Mr. Gemayel, who is not a Lebanese government official. In the past, letters such as this coming from a non-official Lebanese have been acknowledged informally, and Ambassador Dillon has now done so in this case as well.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

26 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: ED THOMAS *Ent*
SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Lebanese Forces

Ed Meese handed me the attached letter to the President and asked that you evaluate what action needs to be taken. Should the letter go to the President?

LEBANESE FORCES



August 12, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
Washington D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

I wish to express my profound thanks to you for the opportunity of holding discussions on Lebanon with senior officials of your Administration.

Those talks were highly valuable because they provided special insights into the complexities and realities of Lebanon in the Middle East and the importance of United States-Lebanon relations.

Historically close friends of the United States, Lebanon and her people are strongly desirous of establishing an even closer friendship - that of an alliance. This bond, in my judgement is necessary to achieve a free, pluralist Lebanon, further United States interests in the area, and go far toward attainment of regional peace and stability.

With every good wish to you and your Administration, Mr. President, for peace in the Middle East, I remain

Sincerely yours,

Bashir Gemayel
Head of the Forces of the
Lebanese Resistance

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

8131711

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: GEMAYEL, BASHIR

DATE: 12 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: LEBANON


SUBJ: THANK YOU LTR

REQUIRED ACTION: [DRAFT REPLY]

[RECOMMENDATIONS]

DUE DATE: 05 NOV 81

COMMENTS:



FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

____ FOR NSC USE ONLY ____

FOR INFO

F

O CM C

*Received in 5/5-I
10/30 at 9:41 A.M.
(C-71)*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506~~SECRET~~
Lebanon~~SECRET~~

December 24, 1981

57054

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence AgencySUBJECT: Tasking for a Special National
Intelligence Estimate on Lebanon

[REDACTED] there is a need for a community-wide assessment of mid-term trends that might culminate in renewed fighting in the Spring of 1982.

Two trends concern increasing tensions in Lebanon as well as between Israel and Syria. In this respect, a SNIE would be opportune. The CIA memorandum of December 17, 1981, on "Israel: Military Options in Lebanon" could be the point of departure for the SNIE.

Among other things, the SNIE should include an assessment of the mid-term prospects for:

- 1) breakdown in the cessation of hostilities on the Lebanon-Israel border, particularly in light of a move by Syria to stimulate extremist Palestinian elements to retaliate against Israel's application of its laws to the Golan Heights;
- 2) major terrorist operation within Israel by the PLO;
- 3) large-scale ground incursion into Lebanon by Israel to push the Palestinians north of the Zaharani River (other political military options available to Israel also should be discussed);
- 4) Syrian attempt to interfere with an Israeli ground incursion into Lebanon;
- 5) Israeli strikes against Syrian SAM sites in the Bekka Valley and along the Lebanon-Syria border area;
- 6) Israeli-Syrian fighting within Lebanon expanding to include the Golan Heights;

~~SECRET~~

Review December 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLR 1008-098/116 #57054
BY RW NARA DATE 7/17/12

- 7) other Arab states coming to Syria's aid in the event the fighting in Lebanon escalates and expands;
- 8) role of Palestinian forces in the event of escalation and expansion; and
- 9) Soviet moves in the event of escalation and expansion.

The SNIE should address how prospective outcomes of the Polish situation may affect contingencies regarding Lebanon, the impact of weather conditions on these contingencies, and expected casualties that would be expected on the part of the belligerents under various contingencies.

Any further questions regarding this tasking request could be made directly to Mr. Raymond Tanter of the NSC staff (395-5697).


Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SIGNED

~~SECRET~~ACTION

December 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Tasking CIA for a Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
on Lebanon

At Tab I is a request to the Central Intelligence Agency to make a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Lebanon.

This request has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

SL
Geoffrey Kemp, Norman Bailey, *nb* and Chris Shoemaker concur. *W*

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE *SL* DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memo from Allen Lenz to CIA re SNIE on Lebanon

cc: Don Gregg
Robert Kimmitt
Richard Pipes

~~SECRET~~

Review December 22, 1987

NLS 99-0241 4/18

37 *QIN* NARA, DATE 5/19/06

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEAVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

SIGNED

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

SHOW CC

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

December 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*

SUBJECT: Request for an Appointment from
World Lebanese League and World
Lebanese Cultural Union

At Tab I for your signature is a letter to the subject organizations. The letter declines their request (Tab II) for an appointment. Your letter also recommends that they contact me in order to arrange a meeting and to receive their memorandum on Lebanon.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter at Tab I declining the request for an appointment with you and suggesting that I am available.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments:

Tab I Letter to Messrs. Assam and Elkhoury
Tab II Mailgram from Messrs. Assam and Elkhoury dated
12/26/81

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Assam and Mr. Elkhoury:

Thank you for the mailgram of December 26, 1981 requesting an appointment. Unfortunately, however, my schedule will not permit us to meet. On the other hand, the National Security Council staff person who deals with Lebanon would be happy to meet with you and to receive your memorandum for me. Please contact Mr. Raymond Tanter at (202) 395-5697.

The opportunity to benefit from your views is an occasion to which we look forward.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

James W. Nance
Acting Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. Said Assam, President
World Lebanese League and
Mr. Sami Elkhoury, President
World Lebanese Cultural Union
Room 136-402
Philadelphia Street
Mexico City 18 D.F.
Mexico

Ray Tarter -

What should I
do. Bud

FAYEZ NAHAS
5118 DELONGPRE, APT 301
LOS ANGELES CA 90027



4-016544S360 12/26/81 ICS IPMRNCZ CSP WSHB
2136646229 MGM TDRN LOS ANGELES, CA 179 12-26 0456P EST

ADMIRAL JAMES LANCE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE BLDG
WASHINGTON DC 20502

THE UNDERSIGNER, LEADERS OF THE WORLD LEBANESE COUNCIL, THE PRESIDENTS OF THE WORLD LEBANESE LEAGUE AND THE WORLD LEBANESE CULTURAL UNION PRESENT EIGHT MILLION LEBANESE IMMIGRANTS OVERSEAS AND THREE MILLION IN THE U.S. UPON THE REQUEST OF THE CHRISTIAN LEBANESE LEAGUE FEDERATION IN BEIRUT AND OUR WORLD COUNCIL. WE ASK IF POSSIBLE A PRIVATE APPOINTMENT FOR ATTORNEY GEORGES JABRE WITH YOUR EXCELLENCY ANY DATE DURING FEBRUARY 1982.

ATTORNEY JABRE VERY IMPORTANT LEADING PERSONALITY IN LEBANON IS BEING DELEGATED AS A SPECIAL ENVOY TO MEET WITH YOU TO PRESENT A VERY IMPORTANT AND CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ON THE LEBANESE PROBLEM.

IN OUR BEHALF MR NABIL HARFOUCHE AUTHORIZED TO CALL YOUR SECRETARY TO ASK FOR THE APPOINTMENT IF YOU KINDLY APPROVE IT. WE ARE LOOKING FORWARD TO YOUR POSITIVE ANSWER REGARDING THIS MEETING. OUR HEADQUARTERS TELEX IN MEXICO CITY 017-72625 RAC-ME. THE TELEPHONE 536-37-66. ADDRESS PHILADELPHIA STREET ROOM 136-402, MEXICO CITY 18 D.F. WE WISH YOU THE BEST AND GOD BLESS AMERICA AND HELP LEBANON.


PRESIDENT WORLD LEBANESE LEAGUE, SAID ASSAM AND PRESIDENT WORLD LEBANESE CULTURAL UNION-SAMI ELKHOORY

16:55 EST

MGMCOMP

file

Syrian Forces in Lebanon and Surface-to-Air Missile Sites



DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F99-024/1 #119

BY LOJ NARA, DATE 5/29/01

Secret NOFORN

630852 12-81

SYRIA-LEBANON: Annual Troop Rotation

Damascus has used the annual troop rotation in Lebanon, which was completed shortly before Israel annexed the Golan Heights, to return additional regular Army troops to Syria to strengthen its strategic posture against Israel. (S)

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F99-024/1#120

By LOS, NARA, Date 5/29/01

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ACTION

December 22, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES W. NANCE

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*SUBJECT: Tasking CIA for a Special National
Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
on Lebanon

At Tab I is a request to the Central Intelligence Agency to make a Special National Intelligence Estimate on Lebanon.

This request has been coordinated with the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and South Asia of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asia, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

SL Geoffrey Kemp, *nb* Norman Bailey, and *CD* Chris Shoemaker concur..

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the memorandum at Tab I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachment:

Tab I Memo from Allen Lenz to CIA re SNIE on Lebanon

cc: Don Gregg
Robert Kimmitt
Richard Pipes

~~SECRET~~

Review December 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F99-0241, #121

CU NARA, DATE 5/19/02

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Tasking for a Special National
Intelligence Estimate on Lebanon

[REDACTED] there
is a need for a community-wide assessment of mid-term trends
that might culminate in renewed fighting in the Spring of 1982.

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of its laws to the Golan Heights;
- 2) major terrorist operation within Israel by the
PLO;
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available to Israel also should be discussed);
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incursion into Lebanon;
- 5) Israeli strikes against Syrian SAM sites in the
Bekka Valley and along the Lebanon-Syria border
area;
- 6) Israeli-Syrian fighting within Lebanon expanding
to include the Golan Heights;

~~SECRET~~

Review December 22, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR M08-098/16 #57056

BY RW NARA DATE 7/17/02

- 7) other Arab states coming to Syria's aid in the event the fighting in Lebanon escalates and expands;
- 8) role of Palestinian forces in the event of escalation and expansion; and
- 9) Soviet moves in the event of escalation and expansion.

The SNIE should address how prospective outcomes of the Polish situation may affect contingencies regarding Lebanon, the impact of weather conditions on these contingencies, and expected casualties that would be expected on the part of the belligerents under various contingencies.

Any further questions regarding this tasking request could be made directly to Mr. Raymond Tanter of the NSC staff (395-5697).

Allen J. Lenz
Staff Director

LEBANESE NATIONAL BLOC


ROGER EDDE
Deputy Secretary General

~~PK~~ → file

The following is the complete text of the speech made by M. Jean Francou, Senator of Bouches du Rhones, at the French Senate during the debate on the Foreign Relations budget.

Mr. Francou addressed the French government both on behalf of himself, and on behalf of his group, the Centrist Union for Democracy and Progress, the majority party in the Senate.

His speech appears in the Official Journal, number 88 S, December 4, 1981, page 3578.

QUOTE

"While reviewing your budget for foreign relations, Mr. Secretary, I would like to broach the ever-threatening question of international peace and security of the Free World. It concerns the measures that should be taken to advance the Arab-Israeli peace.

The Camp David agreements will reach their objective next April, as far as the Israeli-Egyptian peace is concerned. But the problem about the Palestinian autonomy still remains.

Even if Egypt and Israel agree upon this point, the main interested parties should be prepared to accept it. Such an evolution is however unlikely, even impossible, as long as the P.L.O., which controls the Palestinian forces under Israeli or other occupation, is not prepared to take the necessary steps towards peace.

The moderate wing of the PLO, represented by Mr. Arafat, is in fact at the mercy of the Syrian Army deployed in Lebanon.

Any initiative which tends to give Mr. Arafat the role of a valid interlocutor in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is confronted by both Syria (through all its forces deployed in Lebanon) and the radical organizations of the Palestinian Resistance.

It is necessary that the Palestinians regain their independence vis a vis Syria, in order to take either the path of the Egyptians (direct negotiation with the Israelis) or that of the Saudis, who negotiate through the intermediary of the international community.

The positive attitude of the P.L.O. leader towards the Fahad plan (implying recognition of Israel) should be stressed. This plan was brought to a standstill by Syria at the Arab summit of Fez, thus inflicting a defeat on Arafat, and was deeply resented by the moderate Arabs.

Syria's occupation of Lebanon, and consequently its control of the P.L.O., place it in a position to outweigh the moderate Arabs' proposals, as well as those of international opinion.

This country in the meantime has isolated itself from its partners, only to join ranks with the Soviet Union during the invasion of Afghanistan, and to support Iran during the Iran-Iraq War.

Consequently, Syria finds itself at odds with the Muslim Sunnite majority, already aggravated by the requisition of power by an Alawite minority.

It is clear that any peace process in the Near East must start with the stabilizing of Lebanon, and its liberation from the Syrian grip.

Now more than ever is the time to put an end to the Lebanese holocaust. It is time for the Lebanese democracy to rise again, time for the liberation of a people to whom we are tied through culture and an infinite web of friendships and affinities. Finally, it is time for Israel to accept a disengagement on the Lebanese borders as it did in 1974-1975 on the Egyptian and Syrian borders.

Mr. Secretary, the time has come in the "step-by-step" policy for the Lebanese step to be taken. The salvation of this people lies -- as all Lebanese know -- in its unity.

But now the unity and resistance of a people manifests itself in a disguised way at all levels, in all milieux, and at every opportunity.

Nevertheless, there is a glimmer of hope: It is the Lebanese presidential elections of 1982. It is absolutely necessary that free elections be held in that country. Elections untampered by any Syrian or foreign tutelage, to allow the election of a historic leader who, throughout the war, symbolized the unity of the Lebanese people and of its legitimate democracy. This man exists. He is Mr. Raymond Edde, whose election Syria prevented in 1976. Only he can personify the unity of Lebanon and save this country.

The consequences of such an election would be considerable: it would lead to the liberation of the Palestinians from the Syrian-Soviet yoke, to the disengagement of Syrian and Israeli armies on Lebanese territory, thus allowing the U.N. forces (UNIFIL) to control South Lebanon up to the Litani River. It would then be impossible for the Palestinian Resistance to use this area for its attacks on Israel, and the latter could no longer justify its retaliation or preventive attacks.

I repeat that this is the one and only condition, i.e. having free elections granting the emergence of a leader, that can avoid an Israeli-Arab war and prepare the Palestino-Israeli peace which is necessary for a definitive solution of the conflict.

My questions are very simple, Mr. Secretary: Considering the position France has in Lebanon's history, and its privileged relations with the Arab world, does France plan to propose initiatives to the United Nations for the simultaneous withdrawal of Israel and Syria from Lebanon? Or proposals to reinforce the UNIFIL in South Lebanon, insisting that they be deployed from the Lebanese-Israeli borders (as defined by the 1949 Agreement) up to the Litani River, and according to the Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426?

Do you intend to engage in negotiations with our Western partners and with our friends in the Arab World to obtain their cooperation from now until 1982? A deadline unanimously recognized as crucial for the fate of this ally.

If there is a domain where the Euro-Arab dialogue can take a particular direction, it is definitely the subject of Lebanon, which contains within it those forces that make it a living democracy in this part of the world.

France has always had particular ties of affection with Lebanon. On December 28 1968, General de Gaulle enacted an arms embargo against Israel, when an Israeli commando attacked Beirut airport.

Our foreign policy would more respected, we believe, if it could obtain Lebanon's free self-administration. This would grant its survival on the Map of the World. "

UNQUOTE

~~SECRET~~

Tantr

MEMORANDUM

6891

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

November 25, 1981

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

file Leb

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*
SUBJECT: Meeting with Roger Eddé

On November 24, 1981, a meeting was held in my office with Roger Eddé, Deputy Secretary General of the Lebanese National Bloc. Mr. Eddé's cousin, Raymond, is a candidate in next year's Presidential election (the President will be elected by the Parliament). Don Goldstein of DOD, Elizabeth Jones of State and Doug Feith were present. [REDACTED] of the CIA, *B1, B3* Kemp and Tanter were invited but for various reasons could not attend. They will all be briefed by me. *(U)*

Mr. Eddé made the following points:

- The Syrian regime is weak and vulnerable and thus influenceable.
- Lebanese Christians and Moslems are now united in their desire for a united and pacified Lebanon.
- The only serious candidates are Raymond Eddé and Suleyman Franjieh. Eddé has Saudi and Iraqi support, Franjieh has Syrian support, but of course the Syrians are in place with troops.
- Either a Franjieh victory or the election of a weak compromise candidate will result in civil and probably regional war.
- All Arab, including Palestinian, moderates now agree on the need for a strong Lebanon.
- The Eddé program would include (1) the UN to occupy all of Lebanon south of the Litani, Palestinian arms limited to their camps and no attacks on Israel; (2) Abrogation of the Cairo Agreement; (3) Evacuation of at least Beirut by the Syrians

~~SECRET~~

Review November 25, 1987

DECLASSIFIED IN *part*
NLS *F99-0241, #123*

~~SECRET~~

CH NARA DATE *5/19/00*

and preferably all of Lebanon; and (4) An eventual permanent U.S. military presence, if desired by the U.S.

-- Eddé has the support of the Chamoun, Jumblatt and Phalange factions in Lebanon.

-- We should join with the Saudis in pressuring Syria to keep hands off the elections. He believes the Syrians do not want to annex Lebanon. They see it as a bargaining chip in negotiations to (1) Get the Saudis to finance their debt to the USSR (\$16 billion); (2) Control the Al Saiqa faction of the PLO; and (3) Make sure the Golan is included in any future West Bank/Gaza/PLO/Israel settlement. (C)

Note that Roger Eddé met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Draper last week (Tab I) -- especially Draper comment ("in strongest terms") that the U.S. will take no position on Lebanese elections. (S)

Query -- if we identify a pro-American candidate with a good chance of winning, supported by the Saudis and acceptable to the Israelis, why not? (U)

I agree -- Why not?
This needs further discussion w/ State, and perhaps with CIA, too

Attachment

Tab I

Reporting Cable on Eddé's Meeting with Draper

cc: G. Kemp
R. Tanter
D. Feith
C. Shoemaker
C. Lord

RECALLED

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

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AMEMBASSY CAIRO 7216
WHITE HOUSE 6972

~~SECRET~~ STATE 312055

EXDIS, WHITE HOUSE FOR NSC - RAY TANTER AND GEOFF KEMP
E.O. 12065: RDS-1,4 11/23/01 (DRAPER, MORRIS)

TAGS: PINT, PGOV, PEPR, LE, PINR

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF RAYMOND EDDE

1. (S- ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. ROGER EDDE, IN MEETING NOVEMBER 19 WITH NEA DAS DRAPES, MADE A LENGTHY AND FORCEFUL REPRESENTATION IN FAVOR OF THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY OF HIS SECOND COUSIN, RAYMOND. IN CATALOGUING THE EXTENT OF SUPPORT FOR RAYMOND'S CANDIDACY, ROGER SAID THAT ASSAD HAD TRIED TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH RAYMOND SOME FOUR MONTHS AGO BY SENDING AN EMISSARY (ASSAD'S FATHER-IN-LAW) TO TRY TO ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK BY WHICH THE SYRIANS COULD AGREE TO HIS BECOMING PRESIDENT. ACCORDING TO ROGER, RAYMOND HAS TOLD THE SYRIANS HE WOULD DO SO ONLY IF SYRIAN TROOPS WERE TO WITHDRAW (OR MADE A -STRONG ADVANCE COMMITMENT SPECIFYING A DATE CERTAIN FOR BEGINNING AT LEAST PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL), BUT THE SYRIANS HAVE PERSISTED IN THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION WITH RAYMOND. HE SAID THAT RAYMOND HAS KEPT THE DIALOGUE OPEN, SOMETHING THAT NO ONE ELSE KNOWS AND WAS BEING REVEALED NOW ONLY VERY CONFIDENTIALLY. ROGER SAID RAYMOND IS CONVINCED THAT THE SYRIANS WILL THROW THEIR FULL SUPPORT ONLY BEHIND SULAIMAN FRANJIYEH, BUT ARE NEGOTIATING

WITH RAYMOND IN THE EVENT THAT "SOMETHING HAPPENS TO FRANJIYEH." ACCORDING TO ROGER, THE SYRIANS HAVE TOLD RAYMOND THEY DO NOT WISH TO REMAIN IN LEBANON FOREVER. THEY WANT TO ESTABLISH A "FRAMEWORK" WITH HIM WHEREBY NO ACTION WOULD BE TAKEN AGAINST THE SYRIAN REGIME AND WHEREBY RAYMOND, AS PRESIDENT, WOULD MAKE THE RIGHT PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND DO THE RIGHT THINGS IN LEBANON FOLLOWING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. ROGER SAID THAT RAYMOND DOES NOT BELIEVE THE SYRIANS, BUT IS NEVERTHELESS CONTINUING HIS CONTACTS WITH THEM.

3. ROGER MAINTAINED THAT THE PHALANGE WOULD SUPPORT RAYMOND'S CANDIDACY, AND LISTED SEVERAL CONTACTS BETWEEN BASHIR'S LIEUTENANTS AND RAYMOND AS EVIDENCE. (DRAPER IMPLIED SOME SKEPTICISM). HE SAID THERE IS STRONG NATIONAL MOVEMENT SUPPORT FOR RAYMOND AND MENTIONED WALID JUMBLATT'S SUPPORT AS KEY.

4. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION FROM DRAPER ABOUT RAYMOND'S CONTACTS WITH ISRAEL, ROGER RESPONDED ONLY IN TERMS OF HIS OWN INSTRUCTIONS. HE NOTED THAT RAYMOND DOES NOT WISH HIM TO BE IN TOUCH WITH THE ISRAELI EMBASSY HERE BUT HAS AGREED TO HIS CONTACTING AMERICANS WHO SUPPORT ISRAEL, SUCH AS AIPAC, CONGRESSMAN SOLARZ, ETC.

5. ACCORDING TO ROGER, RAYMOND BELIEVES THAT ELECTIONS SHOULD TAKE PLACE AFTER JUNE (AFTER THE EXPIRATION OF THE ADF MANDATE) WHEN THERE IS NO LONGER A 'LEGAL SYRIAN PRESENCE' IN LEBANON. HE QUICKLY ACCEPTED DRAPER'S POINT, HOWEVER, THAT FREE ELECTIONS COULD TAKE PLACE IF THE SYRIANS WITHDREW ONLY FROM BEIRUT. ROGER THEN PROPOSED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ENSURE THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT FORCE AN UNACCEPTABLE CANDIDATE ON LEBANON WAS FOR THE SAUDIS AND U.S. TO AGREE AHEAD OF TIME ON WHO THE CANDIDATE SHOULD BE. DRAPER RESPONDED IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE NO POSITION ON WHO THE CANDIDATE SHOULD BE, AND WOULD NOT BACK ANY PARTICULAR CANDIDATE AGAINST ANOTHER. HE STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WANTS TO SEE A FREE ELECTION OF A STRONG PRESIDENT FOR LEBANON, ONE THAT IS NOT UNDER THE CONTROL OF AN OUTSIDE POWER.

6. DRAPER, IN CLOSING, REMINDED ROGER OF THE SERIOUS DIFFERENCES WE HAVE HAD IN THE PAST WITH RAYMOND OVER HIS ALLEGATION THAT FORMER SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD A PLAN TO BREAK LEBANON APART. DRAPER SAID THAT RAYMOND SHOULD KNOW THAT IF THIS ALLEGATION RESURFACED, IT WOULD MEET WITH A FLAT U.S. DENIAL.

7. FYI: ROGER EDDE, A BUSINESSMAN, ARRIVED IN WASHINGTON IN THE FALL AND PLANS TO STAY UNTIL NEXT SUMMER. ALTHOUGH HE DOES NOT SAY SO EXPLICITLY, HE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN CHARGED BY RAYMOND TO ACT AS HIS REPRESENTATIVE IN THE U.S. CLARK

BT

DECLASSIFIED
NLS FCP-024/1 #124
BY CA NARA, DATE 11/16/01

~~SECRET~~

6891

RECEIVED

81 NOV 25 P 8: 48

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

Comments:

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS. FC-024/1 #125 TOP SECRET UMBRA

By 41, NARA, Date 5/19/06

An Evolving Conventional Palestinian Force in Lebanon

The conversion of Lebanon into a confrontation state

(S/NOFORN) As a result of al Fatah's experience in Jordan, from which it was expelled in 1971, and Lebanon, it has established two basic missions for its armed forces. The first is to defend those areas controlled by the Palestinians, since this requirement is a prerequisite for al Fatah/PLO freedom of movement in the Arab political arena. The second is to conduct operations against Israel.

(S/NOFORN) Al Fatah's major conventional elements are five brigades, an artillery corps, a militia, and a fledgling navy and air force. The Yarmuk and Karamah brigades are responsible mainly for the southern Bekaa Valley, while the Qastel Brigade, based at Sidon, controls operations elsewhere in southern Lebanon. The 1st Armored Regiment, Ayn Jallut Brigade; the September Martyrs Battalion, Qastel Brigade; and the mechanized battalion, Karamah Brigade, apparently are principally responsible for coastal defense and supply route security between Nabatiyah, the Litani River, and Beirut.


(S/NOFORN) The artillery corps consists of at least six artillery battalions that are attached to other al Fatah units in a support role. The navy runs coastal patrol in small boats and is responsible for seaborne infiltration operations into Israel. Most of the air force personnel are undergoing training outside Lebanon, but some may man part of the the air defense units. They also reportedly operate two early warning radars in the Tyre area.

(S/NOFORN) In addition, al Fatah has developed several alliances with Lebanese groups that cooperate with the Palestinian forces. Some of these elements, such as Walid Jumblatt's Druze-dominated Progressive Socialist Party, focus their attention in the Druze homeland area east and southeast of Beirut. Others, such as the Arab Lebanese Army, Lebanese Communist Party, and Communist Action Organization, have forces deployed in southern Lebanon along with al Fatah's units.

(S/NOFORN) Al Fatah's second mission—operations against Israel—is handled by the Western Sector Office. It is concerned chiefly with offensive activities and the development of a resistance movement within the occupied territories. The Abu Yusuf al Najjar Battalion, Ajnadin Brigade, which is stationed in Tyre, appears to work closely with the Western Sector Office.

(S/NOFORN) Al Fatah/PLO also coordinates or at least gives tacit approval to many of the operations conducted by other Palestinian fedayeen units. This increases al Fatah's unconventional warfare/terrorist capability and sometimes enables it to support activities Arafat might not want attributed to al Fatah or the PLO. Arafat's efforts to control all operations against Israel, however, have not always been successful, since some of the smaller groups reject his leadership without challenging him directly.

(S/NOFORN) Syria has played a key role in the gradual conversion of al Fatah's units from fedayeen/guer-



Syria helped conversion of Fatah from guerrilla elements into regular units

rilla elements into regular units. Since last year, the Syrians have been supplying al Fatah with T-34 tanks, 130-mm field artillery, 122-mm BM-11/21 multiple rocket launchers, and other weapons, some of which were furnished to Libya. The intent is to upgrade al Fatah's military capability and continue to convert its forces into a regular army. At the same time, however, Syria has been upgrading the Palestine Liberation Army and al Saiqa forces. Syrian officers command these units, and Damascus has moved to increase its control by adding Syrians to the enlisted ranks. Two tank battalions, elements of the Hittin and Qadasiyah brigades, are equipped with T-54/55 tanks. Nevertheless, in the future Syria probably would be reluctant to commit these Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces against al Fatah, since many of the Palestinians probably would desert as they did in 1976.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Yasir Arafat realizes that al Fatah is dependent on Syria, since Damascus controls the land

supply routes to the Palestinians and many of its training bases and supply depots in Syria. Syria's pan-Arab Baath ideology and its skillful linkage of the Golan Heights to a solution of the Palestinian issue make Damascus a sympathetic supporter of the Palestinians. This support probably will continue as long as the Palestinian issue is not addressed before that of the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, Arafat does not trust the Syrians and has no intention of subordinating his organization to Damascus.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Subsidies from the conservative Arab States of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are vital to al Fatah's survival if it is to avoid Syrian domination. Since freedom of action in those areas controlled by the Palestinians in Lebanon is an essential prerequisite for al Fatah to function effectively in the Arab political arena, its military forces become crucial. As a result, al Fatah will continue to strengthen its regular forces, since they bear the burden of defending Palestinian "territory" against Israel, the Christian Phalange, oppo-

sition Palestinian factions, the Lebanese Government, and the Syrians. At the same time, Arafat still will strive to develop the Western Sector's capability in al Fatah's campaign to create a viable resistance movement within the occupied territories.

~~(S/NOFORN)~~ Nonetheless, al Fatah's modernization and "regularization" effort is greatly dependent on the Syrians, who funnel in arms and equipment. It also is affected, to a lesser extent, by Israeli raids designed to undermine Palestinian morale, destroy valuable arms and equipment, and generally intimidate potential recruits. Despite these negative factors, al Fatah appears determined to expand its dual military capability.

Indian Reaction to F-16s for Pakistan

~~(C)~~ Although Indian political rhetoric is heated and very pointed concerning the proposed introduction of F-16 fighter aircraft into Pakistan, there are firm indications that the defense planning elites have a more balanced, less alarmist view. Recent open source publications seem to indicate that the F-16 is

not perceived as posing the potential for increasing the threat to India.

~~(U)~~ The Indian political leadership has reacted in strident fashion to the planned transfer of F-16 fighter-bombers to Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi has declared that because the Indian Air Force possesses no aircraft to offset the F-16, its introduction to the

subcontinent will generate an arms race. Indian Defense Ministry sources, endeavoring to justify (and accelerate) a proposed Mirage 2000 procurement program, state that introduction of two F-16 squadrons will drastically alter the existing Indian-Pakistani air capability equation.

~~(C)~~ This hyperbolic comment is not reflected in the judgments of Indian military professionals. Writing in the journal *Vikrant*, a semiofficial military publication, retired Air Chief

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER *RT*SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Ambassador Philip
Habib re American University of Beirut

At Tab A is a proposed letter Nat Howell at State wishes to send to the American University of Beirut in response to the incoming at Tab B. Howell wants White House clearance for the outgoing at Tab A, especially for the second paragraph concerning what the President said during the July 6 meeting with Habib. State supposedly has no minutes to which reference could be made about what the President said.

RECOMMENDATION:

1. That you clear the letter at Tab A.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

2. That I contact State officials and inform them that the White House has no problem with the letter at Tab A.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____

Attachments

Tab A	Proposed Howell letter to Plimpton
Tab B	Incoming from Plimpton to Clark

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 6, 1981

Mr. Calvin H. Plimpton
Chairman of the Board
American University of Beirut
380 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mr. Plimpton:

I have been asked to respond to your letter of October 9 to Deputy Secretary Clark regarding the need of the American University in Beirut for emergency financial assistance.

As you know, the President expressed the view in July that we should examine what assistance the U.S. Government might provide, in addition to its ongoing support under the American Schools and Hospitals (ASHA) program, to meet AUB's urgent, one-time request for up to \$6 million. We are pleased that we were able, in a time of severe budgetary stringencies, to identify \$1 million from reprogrammed FY 1981 funds.

While we are not in a position at this time to make a commitment from FY 1982 funds, you may be sure that we will keep AUB's needs under active consideration with a view to providing such emergency assistance as resources may permit. You will understand that, at this point, AID does not know whether it will receive an appropriation for FY 1982 or will have to operate on the basis of a continuing resolution. Moreover, since support for AUB above the amounts projected in the ASHA and scholarship program has not been budgeted, any additional support would have to be taken, as was the case in FY 1981, from other programs.

I hope you and your colleagues will feel free to remain in touch with me and with appropriate officials in AID on this matter.

Sincerely,

W. Nathaniel Howell, Jr.
Director
Office for Lebanon, Syria,
Jordan, and Iraq

cc: M. Peter McPherson
Administrator, USAID



American University of Beirut 8130668

NEW YORK OFFICE • 380 MADISON AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017 • (212) 490-8740

October 9, 1981

The Honorable William P. Clark
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Mr. Clark:

We have been informed that following the President's decision on July 5 to provide \$6 million in emergency assistance to the American University of Beirut, the administration has worked out an arrangement whereby \$1 million in reprogrammed FY-81 funds will be made available to the University, as well as \$5 million in FY-82 funds. We are very grateful for this assistance, without which AUB would not have been able to continue its operations. The Board of Trustees will now proceed with its planning on the basis of this commitment.

With all best wishes, I am

Sincerely,

Calvin Plimpton

Calvin H. Plimpton
Chairman of the Board

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

FROM: GEOFFREY KEMP *gk*

SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission: Interim Report

Attached at Tab I is a memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President on the next Habib mission. In view of the late hour (1630, Friday) and the fact that it contains sensitive and controversial suggestions, I will be providing you with a detailed memorandum for transmittal to the President first thing on Monday morning.

Attachment

Tab I Haig memorandum to the President dated 11/13/81

SECRET/NODIS ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
NLS R99-0241, #126
at CIS NARA, DATE 5/19/06

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

NOV 13 1981

~~SECRET~~NODIS

November 13, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
SUBJECT: The Next Habib Mission

THE ISSUE

Your approval is needed with regard to the timing, scope, and objectives of Phil Habib's next trip to the Middle East.

ESSENTIAL FACTORS

Timing. It would be best to send Phil to the area after the forthcoming Arab Summit in Morocco, November 25-26. While Phil would be ready to travel before the summit, Lebanon and other friends in the area have suggested that a trip before the Arab Summit would be viewed as unwelcome pressure in some quarters. On the other hand, the Israelis have been indicating their impatience with certain area developments and the failure of Habib to return. Assuming you agree to a Habib trip after the summit (and Thanksgiving here), we would want to alert the Israelis to our planning as soon as possible.

Meeting with You. It is important that Phil have a short meeting with you in the period November 23-25, so that he can proceed to the area the day following Thanksgiving (Friday, November 27).

Basic Objectives. It is important that we not raise expectations of any major breakthrough during Habib's visit. Our underlying--but unspoken--objective should be to defuse Israeli interests in exercising the military option in Lebanon while he works on the Saudis and Syrians to help bring about basic changes in the political and security situation. This would supplement efforts we have been making recently to induce the Palestinians--through the help of the UN--to remove their heavy weapons out of range of Israel. The PLO is considering the UN proposal; their acceptance could open the way for future progress.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F99-0241, #07

BY CJ NARA, DATE 11/16/01~~SECRET~~

RDS-1,2,3 11/11/01

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

Public Position. We believe a low-key public position along the following lines would be suitable:

"The U.S. is pleased that the Lebanon-Israel area has remained relatively quiet and stable since the July cessation of hostilities. The U.S. remains committed to reinforcing that situation. For that reason, the President has asked Ambassador Philip Habib to return to the region to determine how the U.S. could be helpful in reducing tensions further and in improving basic conditions in Lebanon."

Possible Complications. The Arab Summit probably will produce statements or resolutions on the Lebanon problem as well as on Fahd's eight-point peace plan. Phil will be in a good position to allay Begin's possible concerns.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you agree to the foregoing planning, as well as to a short meeting with Phil in the period Monday, November 23 through Wednesday, November 25.

Approve _____


Disapprove _____

~~SECRET~~

REFERRAL

DATE: 29 OCT 81

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT



DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRES

SOURCE: GEMAYEL, BASHIR

DATE: 12 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: LEBANON


SUBJ: THANK YOU LTR

REQUIRED ACTION: DRAFT REPLY

RECOMMENDATIONS

DUE DATE: 05 NOV 81

COMMENTS:



FOR ALLEN J LENZ

STAFF DIRECTOR

FOR NSC USE ONLY

FOR INFO

F

O C M C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 29, 1981

TO: NSC/S
FROM: RAYMOND TANTER

TO STATE FOR DRAFT REPLY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS AS DISCUSSED
IN TANTER/DRAPER TELECON 10/29.

RECEIVED

81 OCT 27 PM 2: 48

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

PETER

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

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CY TO DEEVER

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Comments:

To Staffing

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

26 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD ALLEN

FROM: ED THOMAS *Ent*
SUBJECT: Letter to the President from Lebanese Forces

Ed Meese handed me the attached letter to the President and asked that you evaluate what action needs to be taken. Should the letter go to the President?

LEBANESE FORCES



August 12, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
Washington D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:


I wish to express my profound thanks to you for the opportunity of holding discussions on Lebanon with senior officials of your Administration.

Those talks were highly valuable because they provided special insights into the complexities and realities of Lebanon in the Middle East and the importance of United States-Lebanon relations.

Historically close friends of the United States, Lebanon and her people are strongly desirous of establishing an even closer friendship - that of an alliance. This bond, in my judgement is necessary to achieve a free, pluralist Lebanon, further United States interests in the area, and go far toward attainment of regional peace and stability.

With every good wish to you and your Administration, Mr. President, for peace in the Middle East, I remain

Sincerely yours,


Bashir Gemayel
Head of the Forces of the
Lebanese Resistance

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR GEOFFREY KEMP
RAYMOND TANTER
DOUGLAS FEITH

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY *NB*

SUBJECT: Meeting with Roger Eddé

I had dinner 10/23/81 with Roger Eddé, Deputy Secretary General of the Lebanese National Front. His brother, Raymond Eddé, is a candidate for President in the 1982 elections.

Mr. Eddé made a number of interesting points. I believe it would be of interest for us to invite Mr. Eddé to chat with us and other members of the Administration about the Lebanese situation and the Middle East in general. If you agree, let's get together to discuss who, when and where.

V

Lebanon

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

October 29, 1981

NSC/S PROFIL

TO: NSC/S

291

FROM: RAYMOND TANTER

1 11

TO A

1

TO STATE FOR DRAFT REPLY AND
RECOMMENDATIONS AS DISCUSSED
IN TANTER/DRAPER TELECON 10/29.

1

KEYWORDS: I

SUBJECT: FV

AI

ACTION: PI

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COMMENTS

REF#

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(C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

NSC/S PROFILE

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TO AL

81

GEMAYEL, BASHIR

12 AUG 81

KEYWORDS: LEBANON

SUBJECT: FWDS LTR FM HEAD OF LEBANESE FORCES THANKING PRES FOR TALKS W/
ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO ALLEN TO THOMAS DUE: 30 OCT 81 STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

TANTER

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (C /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

~~Top Secret
RUFF UMBRA~~

LEBANON: Leftist Attacks on the Government

The Muslim leftist National Movement is sharpening its attacks on the government in an apparent effort to broaden Muslim support for restructuring the Christian-dominated political system before the presidential election next summer. (S)

The three-week-old campaign initially focused--probably with Syrian collusion--on the government's reluctance to move boldly to implement the declarations of the Arab Conciliation Committee on severing Phalange ties with Israel and opening traffic crossings in Beirut. The principal target of the campaign has been Prime Minister Wazzan, the ranking Muslim in the government, who is especially vulnerable to Muslim criticism. (C)

Movement spokesmen, led by Communist Action Organization chief Muhsin Ibrahim, recently have shifted their attacks to more fundamental Muslim grievances, including Christian dominance of the 23,600-man Army, and have accused the government of siding with the Phalange on key issues. Some observers in Beirut believe, however, that Ibrahim's real goal is to use the attacks to launch the Movement's campaign for fundamental changes in Lebanon's current power-sharing arrangements as the presidential election approaches. (C)

Wazzan has obtained support from several old-line Sunni Muslim figures and Christian leaders. He has sought to deflect leftist criticism with personal statements supporting the reorganization of the Army and defending Palestinian claims that they should be exempt from any implementation of the Conciliation Committee's proposed ban on arms shipments through Lebanese ports. (C)

The National Movement's renewed attack on the government will aggravate longstanding confessional differences. If it continues, other major factions are likely to begin similar campaigns, focusing on their own basic grievances rather than on the more overriding problems of maintaining the cease-fire in Beirut and keeping the Arab conciliation process alive. (S)

████████████████████

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F99-0241#128By LOS, NARA, Date 5/29/01~~Top Secret
TCS 2942/81
17 October 1981~~