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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV  
IN JOINT STATEMENT

International Press Center  
Geneva, Switzerland

10:10 A.M. (L)

GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV: You've already been handed the joint statement. The President and I have done a huge amount of work. We've gone into great detail; we've really done it in depth. And we've done it totally openly and frankly. We've discussed several most important issues. The relations between our two countries and the situation in the world in general today -- these are issues and problems the solving of which in the most concrete way is of concern both to our countries and to the peoples of other countries in the world.

We discussed these issues basing our discussions on both sides' determination to improve relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America. We decided that we must help to decrease the threat of nuclear war. We must not allow the arms race to move off into space, and we must cut it down on earth.

It goes without saying that discussions of these sort we consider to be very useful, and in its results you find a clear reflection of what the two sides have agreed together. We have to be realistic and straightforward, and therefore the solving of the most important problems concerning the arms race and increasing hopes of peace we didn't succeed in reaching at this meeting.

So of course there are important disagreements on matters of principle that remain between us. However the President and I have agreed that this work of seeking mutually acceptable decisions for these questions will be continued here in Geneva by our representatives.

We're also going to seek new kinds of developing bilateral Soviet-American relations. And also we're going to have further consultations on several important questions where, for the most part, our positions again are completely different. All this, we consider these forthcoming talks to be very, very useful.

But the significance of everything which we have agreed with the President can only, of course, be reflected if we carry it on into concrete measures. If we really want to succeed in something, then both sides are going to have to do an awful lot of work in the spirit of the joint commission -- of the joint statement which we have put out. And in this connection, I would like to announce that the Soviet Union, for its part, will do all it can in this cooperation with the United States of America in order to achieve practical results to cut down the arms race, to cut down the arsenals which we've piled up and give -- produce the conditions which will be necessary for peace on earth and in space.

We make this announcement perfectly aware of our responsibility both to our own people and to the other peoples of the earth. And we would very much hope that we can have the same approach from the administration of the United States of America. If that can be so, then the work that has been done in these days in Geneva will not have been done in vain.

I would like to finish by thanking most profoundly the government of Switzerland for the conditions which they've created for us to be able to work.

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Thank you for your attention. (Applause.)

THE PRESIDENT: President Furgler, General Secretary Gorbachev, May I express Nancy's and my deep personal appreciation and that of all Americans to the people of Switzerland for welcoming us so warmly and preparing the foundations for productive discussions. Yours is a long and honorable tradition of promoting international peace and understanding. You should take pride in being the capitol for international discussions. So, again, to the government of Switzerland and to the citizens of Geneva, many, many thanks.

We've packed a lot into the last two days. I came to Geneva to seek a fresh start in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and we have done this. General Secretary Gorbachev and I have held comprehensive discussions covering all elements of our relationship. I'm convinced that we are heading in the right direction. We've reached some useful interim results which are described in the joint statement that is being issued this morning.

In agreeing to accelerate the work of our nuclear arms negotiators, Mr. Gorbachev and I have addressed our common responsibility to strengthen peace. I believe that we have established a process for more intensive contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union. These two days of talks should inject a certain momentum into our work on the issues between us -- a momentum we can continue at the meeting that we have agreed on for next year.

Before coming to Geneva, I spoke often of the need to build confidence in our dealings with each other. Frank and forthright conversation at the summit are part of this process. But I'm certain General Secretary Gorbachev would agree that real confidence in each other must be built on deeds, not simply words. This is the thought that ties together all the proposals that the United States has put on the table in the past and this is the criteria by which our meetings will be judged in the future.

The real report card on Geneva will not come in for months or even years. But we know the questions that must be answered. Will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to non-nuclear defensive strengths for systems to make our -- make this a safer world? Will we join together to help bring about a peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Central America so that the peoples there can freely determine their own destiny without outside interference? Will the cause of liberty be advanced and will the treaties and agreements signed -- past and future -- be fulfilled? The people of America, the Soviet Union, and throughout the world are ready to answer yes.

I leave Geneva today and our fireside summit determined to pursue every opportunity to build a safer world of peace and freedom. There's hard work ahead, but we're ready for it. General Secretary Gorbachev, we ask you to join us in getting the job done, as I'm sure you will.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 a.m. Local  
4:00 a.m. EST

November 21, 1985

## JOINT STATEMENT

By mutual agreement, President of the United States Ronald Reagan and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev met in Geneva November 19-21. Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Secretary of State George Shultz; Chief of Staff Donald Regan; Assistant to the President Robert McFarlane; Ambassador to the USSR Arthur Hartman; Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Arms Control Paul H. Nitze; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Rozanne Ridgway; Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack Matlock. Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze; First Deputy Foreign Minister G. M. Korniyenko; Ambassador to the United States A. F. Dobrynin; Head of the Department of Propaganda of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. N. Yakovlev; Head of the Department of International Information of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. M. Zamyatin; Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, A. M. Aleksandrov.

These comprehensive discussions covered the basic questions of U.S.-Soviet relations and the current international situation. The meetings were frank and useful. Serious differences remain on a number of critical issues.

While acknowledging the differences in their systems and approaches to international issues, some greater understanding of each side's view was achieved by the two leaders. They agreed about the need to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

In this connection the two sides have confirmed the importance of an ongoing dialogue, reflecting their strong desire to seek common ground on existing problems.

They agreed to meet again in the nearest future. The General Secretary accepted an invitation by the President of the United States to visit the United States of America and the President of the United States accepted an invitation by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU to visit the Soviet Union. Arrangements for and timing of the visits will be agreed upon through diplomatic channels.

In their meetings, agreement was reached on a number of specific issues. Areas of agreement are registered on the following pages.

MORE

## SECURITY

The sides, having discussed key security issues, and conscious of the special responsibility of the USSR and the U.S. for maintaining peace, have agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Recognizing that any conflict between the USSR and the U.S. could have catastrophic consequences, they emphasized the importance of preventing any war between them, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

## NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

They agreed to accelerate the work at these negotiations, with a view to accomplishing the tasks set down in the Joint U.S.-Soviet Agreement of January 8, 1985, namely to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms and enhance strategic stability.

Noting the proposals recently tabled by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, they called for early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the U.S. and the USSR appropriately applied, as well as the idea of an interim INF agreement.

During the negotiation of these agreements, effective measures for verification of compliance with obligations assumed will be agreed upon.

## RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

The sides agreed to study the question at the expert level of centers to reduce nuclear risk taking into account the issues and developments in the Geneva negotiations. They took satisfaction in such recent steps in this direction as the modernization of the Soviet-U.S. hotline.

## NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan reaffirmed the commitment of the USSR and the U.S. to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and their interest in strengthening together with other countries the non-proliferation regime, and in further enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty, inter alia by enlarging its membership.

They note with satisfaction the overall positive results of the recent Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

MORE

The USSR and the U.S. reaffirm their commitment, assumed by them under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to pursue negotiations in good faith on matters of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the Treaty.

The two sides plan to continue to promote the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency and to support the activities of the Agency in implementing safeguards as well as in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

They view positively the practice of regular Soviet-U.S. consultations on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons which have been businesslike and constructive and express their intent to continue this practice in the future.

#### CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In the context of discussing security problems, the two sides reaffirmed that they are in favor of a general and complete prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles of such weapons. They agreed to accelerate efforts to conclude an effective and verifiable international convention on this matter.

The two sides agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on the level of experts on all aspects of such a chemical weapons ban, including the question of verification. They agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

#### MBFR

The two sides emphasized the importance they attach to the Vienna (MBFR) negotiations and expressed their willingness to work for positive results.

#### CDE

Attaching great importance to the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and noting the progress made there, the two sides stated their intention to facilitate, together with the other participating states, an early and successful completion of the work of the conference. To this end, they reaffirmed the need for a document which would include mutually acceptable confidence and security building measures and give concrete expression and effect to the principle of non-use of force.

MORE

### PROCESS OF DIALOGUE

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed on the need to place on a regular basis and intensify dialogue at various levels. Along with meetings between the leaders of the two countries, this envisages regular meetings between the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Secretary of State, as well as between the heads of other Ministries and Agencies. They agree that the recent visits of the heads of Ministries and Departments in such fields as agriculture, housing and protection of the environment have been useful.

Recognizing that exchanges of views on regional issues on the expert level have proven useful, they agreed to continue such exchanges on a regular basis.

The sides intend to expand the programs of bilateral cultural, educational and scientific-technical exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic ties. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields.

They agreed on the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation.

They believe that there should be greater understanding among our peoples and that to this end they will encourage greater travel and people-to-people contact.

### NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and have worked out steps to implement them.

### CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations aimed at resumption of air services. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment -- a global task -- through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

MORE

### EXCHANGE INITIATIVES

The two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields (inter alia, cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school instruction; measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR; the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education; mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences and humanities for the period of an academic year; holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events). The two sides agreed to resume cooperation in combatting cancer diseases.

The relevant agencies in each of the countries are being instructed to develop specific programs for these exchanges. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

### FUSION RESEARCH

The two leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this connection, advocated the widest practicable development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit for all mankind.

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The sides intend to expand the programs of bilateral cultural, educational and scientific-technical exchanges, and also to develop trade and economic ties. The President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU attended the signing of the Agreement on Contacts and Exchanges in Scientific, Educational and Cultural Fields.

They agreed on the importance of resolving humanitarian cases in the spirit of cooperation.

They believe that there should be greater understanding among our peoples and that to this end they will encourage greater travel and people-to-people contact.

### NORTHERN PACIFIC AIR SAFETY

The two leaders also noted with satisfaction that, in cooperation with the Government of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a set of measures to promote safety on air routes in the North Pacific and have worked out steps to implement them.

### CIVIL AVIATION/CONSULATES

They acknowledged that delegations from the United States and the Soviet Union have begun negotiations aimed at resumption of air services. The two leaders expressed their desire to reach a mutually beneficial agreement at an early date. In this regard, an agreement was reached on the simultaneous opening of Consulates General in New York and Kiev.

### ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

Both sides agreed to contribute to the preservation of the environment -- a global task -- through joint research and practical measures. In accordance with the existing U.S.-Soviet agreement in this area, consultations will be held next year in Moscow and Washington on specific programs of cooperation.

MORE

#### EXCHANGE INITIATIVES

The two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts including some of their new forms in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields (inter alia, cooperation in the development of educational exchanges and software for elementary and secondary school instruction; measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR; the annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture and economics at the relevant departments of Soviet and American institutions of higher education; mutual allocation of scholarships for the best students in the natural sciences, technology, social sciences and humanities for the period of an academic year; holding regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports events). The two sides agreed to resume cooperation in combatting cancer diseases.

The relevant agencies in each of the countries are being instructed to develop specific programs for these exchanges. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

#### FUSION RESEARCH

The two leaders emphasized the potential importance of the work aimed at utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes and, in this connection, advocated the widest practicable development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy, which is essentially inexhaustible, for the benefit for all mankind.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

PRESS BRIEFING  
BY  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
GEORGE SHULTZ

Hotel Intercontinental  
Geneva, Switzerland

11:03 A.M. (L)

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Will the meeting please come to order? The President came to Geneva with a constructive approach and with an effort to make a fresh start in our relationship with the Soviet Union, and I think he achieved that fresh start.

All of us who have worked in support of the two leaders who met here this week, I think share the view that perhaps we have a process underway that can lead to a more stable and constructive relationship.

Of course, as both men basically emphasize, that remains to be seen. And we will be looking, over the coming months and years, to see what truly happens. But at any rate, we have made a fresh start.

Questions. Helen.

Q Mr. Secretary, is Star Wars more negotiable now as a result of the summit, or is it still where it stood before the President came where he said it would not be any way a bargaining chip?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The subject of strategic defense was discussed in considerable detail and with great intensity on both sides. Insofar as the President is concerned, he feels as strongly as ever that the research program designed to find the answer: is it possible to defend against ballistic missiles? -- is essential. And he insists upon that. There was no give on that at all.

Q Did Gorbachev go along with the research idea at all?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The General Secretary and Soviets will speak for themselves, but I would say their position did not change.

Q Mr. Secretary, what has this two summit -- the two days of summitry done to curb the nuclear arms race?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It has not produced anything by way of a further agreement. It has produced, perhaps, a -- some political impulse to the negotiators in Geneva, which will undoubtedly be reflected in our own discussions in Washington as we consider the next round.

Perhaps more important, it has contributed a relationship between these two leaders based on a lot of substantive discussion between them. So it was just the kind of get-acquainted that we wanted and I believe General Secretary Gorbachev wanted; that is, they got acquainted on the basis of wrestling with difficult substance and it worked well.

MORE

Q Mr. Secretary, did the President give the Soviet leader any assurances that we would not go beyond research in SDI at this point?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The President's statements in our meetings were very parallel to statements you've heard him make many times. On the one hand, insisting that we must pursue the research and answer the question. And if the answer to the question is positive, then, as he has said many times, he believes that we should all sit down and share this technology so that we can move into a pattern of deterrence that has a greater defense component to it. And if you had been sitting in the meeting, you would have recognized very clearly the things the President said.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think it was impulse which you referred to as the prospect of resulting in a new agreement, either in strategic arms or in INF in the coming year?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: It remains to be seen. And I think it is at least notable that in the joint statement, the idea of a separate INF agreement is identified. Now, of course, that was emerging in the negotiations as they were taking place, but certainly, the subject came in for considerable discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary, why shouldn't people think that if after two days of such intense talks on all of these complicated questions the two leaders couldn't agree to more than a restatement of what you had achieved last January here in Geneva and what had been emerging in Paris and at the negotiations on the interim INF group. Why shouldn't people think that those problems are intractable that you've actually had setback here because they couldn't get any further than where they'd already been on arms control?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, people will believe whatever they want to believe. The -- I don't know where your reference to Paris comes in. But, actually, I think what we have seen is a process, starting with the agreement last January, the beginning of the negotiations and the tabling of proposals by us and we've seen some counterproposals from the Soviet Union that constituted movement, some counter-counterproposals by us that constituted further movement, and you see that movement identified in this document. So I think there is a process here and if you say what assurance do I have that it will go anywhere, I don't have any assurance.

Q But what you're saying --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I can describe it to you.

Q Sir, what you're saying, though, is that this is basically cataloguing the progress that has been made over the past year on these issues, but not advancing them at all.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I would say you get a little advanced by this kind of discussion, but certainly there wasn't any definitive movement or decision. In fact, the meetings didn't set themselves up, really, as detailed bargaining sessions on the particulars of these things, but more handled on a general plane. But I think it was quite positive in general.

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Q Mr. Secretary, two questions. Are there some guidelines given to the negotiators in the arms talks that do not appear in the joint statement? And second, on the statement of agreeing not to seek -- not to achieve military superiority, how does that differ from the agreement made in Moscow in 1972 or 1973 -- almost identical language -- which the Soviets then almost immediately violated in Angola and other spots around the world?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think the military superiority refers to the respective forces. We have felt that the regional issues which you referred to are a very important component of this total picture and as it has emerged in the course of this meeting, that notion that problems around the world and the distress that they produce is a major part of this problem. That emerged as something that is recognized on both sides and there is set out here indications of an effort to get at it. And I think the notion that people arm themselves because of distrust, not the other way around, is very prominent here. So we have to start with these areas that create the tensions and then, of course, working on arms control, but wanting to see an interplay there.

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SECRETARY SHULTZ: They're talking about a sense of importance and urgency and a kind of a mutual commitment to give a little heat to those who are going to be doing the negotiating. Now, you asked about guidelines and we discussed various ways of putting what might be said to negotiators. And in the joint statement some things are identified -- 50 percent is in there -- separate INF is in there. But, in the process of discussing the ideas that they have and that we have, I -- perhaps they should have a little clearer idea of the sort of guidelines that we're going to give our negotiators. And, of course, we're going to go back and, under the light of all that's been said, prepare ourselves and our negotiators for the next round.

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the areas you would think of were referred to. And the idea is in there that we need a process. And, of course, we've been having these regional meetings for the last year, and perhaps you noticed that Foreign Minister meetings will be regularized, so we'll definitely have them set out more often than just in connection with the U.N. General Assembly time and that the meetings of the Foreign Ministers will undoubtedly take as items for the agenda -- and prepared agenda -- certain regional issues. And I think we expect Mr. Shevardnadze and I to get away from the pattern that has been typical where we sort of cover the waterfront every time and say, "All right, let's have a meeting, and this time let's focus on these two topics and not on everything" and go into them in more depth. So I think there is emerging a sense of process, and the President's initiatives at the U.N. have been a definite contributor to that sense of progress.

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Q Yes, you did.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

AT 10:00 AM Local  
4:00 AM EST

November 21, 1985

U.S. FACT SHEET

THE PRESIDENT'S PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES

In his November 14 Address to the Nation, on the eve of his departure for his Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan called for a series of bold new initiatives to bring the people of the United States and the Soviet Union into direct contact.

In that speech, the President said, "Enduring peace depends on openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly." The President also determined to "find as yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate, fruitfully, for the benefit of mankind."

In this respect the two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields.

Background

The U.S. and USSR have had formal cultural and educational exchanges for more than 25 years. We have just concluded a new General Exchanges Agreement for academic, cultural, and performing artist exchanges. This agreement provides for reciprocal exhibits of theater, art, design, and technology to travel throughout the other country accompanied by language qualified guides.

Traditional exchanges such as these are valuable, but more is needed. The President hopes that we can lessen the distrust between us, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more open world. His Exchanges Initiatives are new programs to increase day-to-day contacts between our peoples.

What are the Initiatives?

The Exchanges Initiatives on which the U.S. and USSR have agreed to cooperate include:

- The annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture, and economics in Soviet and American institutions of higher education;
- The creation of a U.S.-Soviet scholarship program for the best students from each country in the natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, and technology for the period of an academic year;
- Measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR.

more

- A joint program of cancer research;
- A program for cooperation in the development of microcomputer educational software for elementary and secondary school instruction;
- Expansion of contacts in sports, including regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports.

The objective of these initiatives is to build bridges between the peoples of the two countries. These proposals would expand contacts, increase cooperation on one of today's toughest medical problems, and encourage people of both countries and work and study together.

For our part, once the two governments have opened the doors to this kind of exchange, the Administration will look to the people to take the lead. The President, therefore, intends to appoint a high-ranking Administration official to work closely with the private sector to ensure that these exchanges initiatives are realized. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

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U.S. FACT SHEETMAGNETIC FUSION RESEARCH

Fusion is the energy source of the sun. Magnetic fusion (also known as controlled thermonuclear fusion) is the process of combining together hydrogen nuclei to produce helium, with the release of energy. This requires raising the hydrogen to a very high temperature (millions of degrees) and confining the plasma with strong magnetic fields. The essential features of this process have been demonstrated circa 1983 in several devices in various laboratories.

Since the 1950s, scientists of several nations have been engaged in magnetic fusion energy research. Steady progress has been made toward understanding the underlying problems of magnetic fusion.

Magnetic fusion energy offers the potential for an inexhaustible supply of energy in the mid-to-late twenty-first century, but there are many unanswered questions that need to be solved and economic problems which must be overcome before practical and commercial use of fusion is realized.

The United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan all have fusion energy research programs, and there is a substantial amount of cooperation between them. For example, U.S. and Soviet scientists regularly visit each other's laboratories, and both sides have benefitted from these exchanges.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev today advocated the widest practical development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy which is essentially inexhaustible for the benefit of all mankind.

The United States and the Soviet Union are consulting with other countries with resources and expertise to contribute to this research effort.

Regarding the transfer of technology, the basic knowledge of fusion devices is well understood by scientists of many nations, and advanced devices have been designed and operated by several nations, including the Soviet Union. U.S. and allied participation in this project will, as always, be governed by strict adherence to existing COCOM guidelines to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology with military potential.

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U.S. FACT SHEETUS-USSR GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT

On November 21, 1985, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a general exchanges agreement in Geneva. Formal cultural and educational exchanges with the Soviet Union have existed for more than twenty-five years. The signing of this Agreement is the culmination of a one and a half year process which began in June, 1984 when President Reagan announced that the U.S. was prepared to initiate negotiations on this important agreement.

More Direct Contact Between U.S. and Soviet Peoples

In last Thursday's Address to the Nation on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan said, "enduring peace requires openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly." Over the years a major vehicle for this important process has been the General Exchanges Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This agreement is a concrete expression of that desire.

Goals

In addition to the mutual benefit that comes from sharing expertise, resources, and data in solving common problems, and the cultural richness both sides gain from sharing their best with each other, exchange programs also can help break down barriers, lessen distrust, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more open world. As the President said in his 1984 speech to the Smithsonian conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges: "Civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible."

What the Agreement Includes

Specific exchange activities addressed in this agreement include:

- reciprocal U.S. and Soviet traveling thematic exhibits on aspects of each country's life and society, to travel throughout the other country accompanied by language qualified guides;
- exchanges of at least ten individual performers and at least ten major performing arts groups of each country;
- expansion of academic and educational exchanges, including: 15 Fulbright teaching professors, 40 long-term IREX researchers, language teacher training programs, language teacher exchange, exchanges between archives and joint seminars;
- exchanges in a wide variety of professional fields such as art, theater, sports, film, architecture, music, law, journalism, medicine, museums, radio and television;
- exchanges of publications, including book exhibits, magazines, technical publications between libraries;

more

(OVER)

- distribution in the Soviet Union of the magazine America Illustrated and in the United States of Soviet Life;
- exchanges of parliamentarians and other government officials at federal, state, and local levels;
- expansion of civic and social organization exchanges as tourism and sports contacts.

#### Background

Official exchange agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have existed since 1958. The American National Exhibition provided the setting for the famous 1959 Nixon-Khrushchev "kitchen debate." From 1959-72, these activities were sustained by a series of two-year agreements. On June 19, 1973, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a six-year agreement. U.S.-Soviet exchanges expanded through the 1970s when there were nearly a dozen bilateral cooperative agreements in force in cultural, educational, and scientific and technological fields.

The Exchanges Agreement, while between governments, paves the way for the U.S. private sector to be deeply involved in exchanges. Universities, dance companies, theater groups, athletic organizations, churches, and professional organizations of doctors, lawyers, can all invite their Soviet counterparts to visit the United States for conferences, concerts, tours, professional symposia. In return Americans will pay return visits to all corners of the Soviet Union.

President Reagan has repeatedly called for increased access to television and other media in both countries by agreed representatives. In his speech of last week, the President asked, "If Soviet spokesmen are free to appear on American television, to be published and read in the American press, shouldn't the Soviet people have the same right to see, hear, and read what we Americans have to say?" The agreement now includes the principle of television appearances by representatives of each country.

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## THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 AM Local  
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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary  
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FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 AM Local  
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November 21, 1985

U.S. FACT SHEET

North Pacific Air Safety Agreement

The US, Japan, and the USSR signed an agreement November 19 on procedures to implement the North Pacific [NOPAC] Air Safety Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in Tokyo on July 29 of this year. The Memorandum of Understanding provides for a new communication link between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk for use when a civil aircraft assigned to a NOPAC route is in trouble. It specifies certain cooperative measures among the three sides to identify and assist such aircraft and offers the use of a radio broadcasting station on Kamchatka as a navigation aid.

The implementation procedures amplify on these undertakings and specify what the respective area control centers [ACCs] will do in the event an aircraft is lost, has deviated from course, has a communication failure, been hijacked, or has an in-flight emergency requiring immediate landing on USSR territory. The procedures agreement also stipulates that the USSR will inform Japan or the U.S. if an unidentified aircraft appears in a Soviet Flight Information Region [FIR] which could be an aircraft that had strayed from a NOPAC route.

# # #



Q & As on the NOPAC Air Safety Implementation Accord

Q: When will this agreement come into force?

A. -- The Memorandum of Understanding came into force through an exchange of diplomatic notes on October 8 of this year. It will take several more months for the communication circuit to be set up and become operational, however.

Q. Does this agreement mean the Soviet Union has agreed there will be no more Korean Airliner shootdowns?

A. -- It doesn't. But it does reduce the danger of a repetition of such a tragedy, and that was what we were aiming for. Agreeing to take these steps does not change anyone's legal responsibilities and obligations. In our view, using the new mechanisms we have agreed on is a very practical way of reducing the chances of recurrence, and that is why we are pleased that agreement has been reached on the implementation procedures. The basic objective in all of these talks was enhancing air safety.

Q. If an airliner strayed off a NOPAC route toward Soviet territory, would the Soviet Union get in touch with us under this agreement?

A. -- This agreement establishes the mechanisms and means for doing that, and the Soviet Union has committed itself to get in touch with us when an unidentified civil aircraft enters one of their flight information regions.

Q. But if Soviet law provides for shooting down an airplane, and no one is changing their legal obligations, what is this agreement worth?

A. -- We never expected or aimed for changes in their law, because current international law obliges all countries to assist a civil aircraft to proceed safely without shooting it down. What we were aiming for was new mechanisms and commitments to use them which would make it more likely that those obligations under current law are honored in the future. We have achieved that aim. In addition, the mechanism we have agreed on will provide some means to assist aircrews before they are in violation of Soviet territorial airspace.

Q. What type of situations does the procedures document cover?

A. -- It provides that in the event of an emergency situation in-flight that requires an immediate landing, the Soviet Area Control Center will provide assistance to the aircraft up to and including a landing on Soviet territory if it cannot reach U.S. or Japanese territory.

-- It also delineates what each control center should do when it has information, or reason to suspect, that an aircraft has strayed into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union.

- For example, if either the Anchorage or Tokyo Centers is aware that an aircraft under their control has inadvertently deviated into a Soviet Flight Information Region and is out of communication with Tokyo or Anchorage, they will advise the Khabarovsk Center of that fact. The Soviets will then attempt to relay information to the aircraft to return it to course.
- Conversely, if the Khabarovsk Center has reason to believe that an unidentified aircraft detected in its airspace has strayed from one of the Northern Pacific routes, it will communicate with Tokyo or Anchorage and provide the information it has on the aircraft's location, altitude, and course.
- With this information, either the Tokyo or Anchorage Center will attempt to provide all pertinent information on the aircraft to Khabarovsk.
- Other procedures spelled out in the agreement provide guidance for handling an aircraft that has been hijacked and is heading into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union, or one which has suffered a loss of communications.

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U.S. FACT SHEET

EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES - KIEV AND NEW YORK

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to open consulates in Kiev and New York, on the basis of full reciprocity in staffing and administrative arrangements. In the Soviet view, this exchange of consulates is contingent on the successful outcome of negotiations on the resumption of civil air service between the two countries. Both sides will conduct further discussions on the specific conditions under which the consulates will be occupied and opened for business.

At the 1974 meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, it was agreed to an exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York. Arrangements had proceeded and both countries had advance teams in place looking toward formal opening in 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The advance parties were then withdrawn.

In the summer of 1983, we agreed in principle to again move to open in Kiev and New York. Forward progress was stalled by the Soviets, who tied the opening of the consulates with negotiations to resume Aeroflot service. We did not accept their linkage of these issues, and continued to pursue each issue on its own merits.

This agreement on opening consulates is in pursuit of the President's desire to expand contacts and enhance understanding between our two peoples. It is a useful and practical step for both the United States and the Soviet Union. A consulate in Kiev will give us an official American presence in an important Soviet agricultural, cultural and commercial center, which is visited annually by thousands of American tourists.

# # #

Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York

Q: When will our Consulates be open?

A: -- We will be discussing specifics with the Soviets in the coming months.

-- We hope to move the issues forward as quickly as possible. Both sides have much to gain in cooperating in the timely and fair resolution of these administrative details.

-- In keeping with our policy of strict reciprocity, our consulates will open for business simultaneously.

Q: Have we settled on a final Consulate office building in Kiev? What will our facilities be like there?

A: -- A US inspection team visited Kiev the week of November 11 to consider potential properties for our consulate.

-- We are continuing to discuss administrative arrangements with the Soviets on this issue.

Q: Why did you choose to open the new consulate in Kiev?

A: -- The US now has posts in Moscow and Leningrad.

-- Kiev is the third most important city in the USSR in terms of cultural and economic accomplishments. It is

a major manufacturing and scientific center.

-- It is visited by thousands of American tourists each year, including many members of the Ukrainian-American community.

Q: What will the consulate in Kiev do?

A: -- Once it has officially opened, the consulate in Kiev will provide the full range of consular services to Americans and Soviets within its consular district.

-- This includes representing the interests of Americans visiting the Ukraine and issuing visas to Soviets traveling to the US from the Ukraine.

-- In addition, the officers of the consulate will maintain contacts with government authorities in the Ukraine (the second most populous Soviet republic, with over fifty million inhabitants), keep the US government informed of developments there, and expand trade and cultural contacts with the region.

Q: Why are we reopening consulates now when we pulled out of Kiev following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Does our agreement to exchange consulates with the Soviets mean we no longer object to their presence in Afghanistan?

A: -- Our agreement on consulates does not signal a change in our policy toward the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan. We have repeatedly made clear to the Soviets our feelings on this subject and we continue to demonstrate our sympathy and support for the Afghan people.

-- Our agreement on consulates is fully in keeping with the President's desire to expand contacts between our two peoples.

-- An official US presence in Kiev is an ideal opportunity to foster understanding between the United States and the citizens of an important cultural, commercial and agricultural area of the Soviet Union.

Q: Why are we letting the Soviets bring more diplomats to the United States? Won't they all be spies?

A: -- Our agreement to open consulates is governed by strict reciprocity.

-- We will insist on strict equality in the size of the US and Soviet consulate staffs.

-- We are fully committed to a policy of substantive equality with the Soviets. We are increasing the number of Americans employed at Embassy Moscow and we expect the overall Soviet presence in the US to decrease. Consulate staffing is only one part of that issue.

Q: What will be the size of the consulate?

A: --I do not have specifics on the staffing at this time.

Q: Do we intend to have Soviets working for us in Kiev?  
Will we have any Soviet staff members?

A: -- I doubt it. However, we do not have specifics for you  
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## Office of the Press Secretary

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY  
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

TEXT OF AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

U.S. Capitol  
Washington, D.C.

November 21, 1985

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. Thanks, partner.

Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know your statements of support were and are greatly appreciated. You can't imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind me.

As you know, I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent over 15 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. Approximately 5 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, one on one. That was the best part -- our fireside summit.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so it's possible there will be 3,000 opinions on what happened. Maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I decided to file my own report directly to you.

We met, as we had to meet. I had called for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose -- but we understand each other better. That's key to peace. I gained a better perspective; I feel he did, too.

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All of these steps are part of a long-term effort to build a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union. No one ever said it would be easy. But we've come a long way.

As for Soviet expansionism in a number of regions of the world -- while there is little chance of immediate change, we will continue to support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom. But we have also agreed to continue -- and to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets on this and other regional conflicts and to work toward political solutions.

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. This is, after all, the eleventh summit of the post-war era -- and still the differences endure. But we believe continued meetings between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union can help bridge those differences.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West... (is)... wide and deep." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

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Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of illusory detente. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace.

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## Office of the Press Secretary

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EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY  
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

TEXT OF AN ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

U.S. Capitol  
Washington, D.C.

November 21, 1985

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. Thanks, partner.

Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know your statements of support were and are greatly appreciated. You can't imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind me.

As you know, I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent over 15 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. Approximately 5 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, one on one. That was the best part -- our fireside summit.

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

U.S. Capitol  
Washington, D.C.

9:20 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

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Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know that your statements of support here were greatly appreciated. You can't imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind you. (Applause.)

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Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening and God bless you all. (Applause.)

END

9:40 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

November 21, 1985

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT  
TO A JOINT SESSION OF CONGRESS

U.S. Capitol  
Washington, D.C.

9:20 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, members of the Congress, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home, and Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on, I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. (Applause.) She didn't know I was going to say that.

Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know that your statements of support here were greatly appreciated. You can't imagine how much it means in dealing with the Soviets to have the Congress, the allies, and the American people firmly behind you. (Applause.)

I guess you know that I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent over 15 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. And approximately 5 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, just one on one. That was the best part -- our fireside summit.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so it's possible there will be 3,000 opinions on what happened, so -- (applause) -- maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I decided to file my own report directly to you. (Applause.)

We met, as we had to meet. I called for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or national purpose -- but we understand each other better, and that's key to peace. I gained a better perspective; I feel he did, too.

It was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact, that I look forward to welcoming Mr. Gorbachev to the United States next year. (Applause.) And I have accepted his invitation to go to Moscow the following year. (Applause.) We arranged that out in the parking lot. (Applause.)

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be an energetic defender of Soviet policy. He was an eloquent speaker, and a good listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or for the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. We cannot assume that their ideology and purpose will change. This implies enduring competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

MORE

When I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviet Union in a way that was more realistic than in, say, the recent past. And so, in a very real sense, preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years ago when, with the help of Congress, we began strengthening our economy, restoring our national will, and rebuilding our defenses and alliances. America is once again strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost. (Applause.) We must not now abandon policies that work. I need your continued support to keep America strong.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, and that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on reducing nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because either side found it uncomfortable or inconvenient.

I brought these questions to the summit and put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but one that is really is safer.

I am pleased to report tonight that General Secretary Gorbachev and I did make a measure of progress here. (Applause.) While we still have a long way to go, we're still heading in the right direction. We moved arms control forward from where we were last January, when the Soviets returned to the table. We are both instructing our negotiators to hasten their vital work. The world is waiting for results.

Specifically, we agreed in Geneva that each side should move to cut offensive nuclear arms by 50 percent in appropriate categories. In our joint statement we called for early progress on this, turning the talks toward our chief goal, offensive reductions. We called for an interim accord on intermediate-range nuclear forces, leading, I hope, to the complete elimination of this class of missiles. And all this with tough verification. (Applause.)

We also made progress in combatting together the spread of nuclear weapons, an arms control area in which we've cooperated effectively over the years. We are also opening a dialogue on combatting the spread and use of chemical weapons, while moving to ban them altogether. (Applause.) Other arms control dialogues -- in Vienna on conventional forces, and in Stockholm on lessening the chances for surprise attack in Europe -- also received a boost. And finally, we agreed to begin work on risk reduction centers, a decision that should give special satisfaction to Senators Nunn and Warner who so ably promoted this idea. (Applause.)

I described our Strategic Defense Initiative -- our research effort that envisions the possibility of defensive systems which could ultimately protect all national against the danger of nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of views.

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority.

MORE

I made it clear that SDI has nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating non-nuclear defense systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If -- (applause) -- our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the safer, more stable world that we seek. Nations could defend themselves against missile attack, and mankind, at long last, escape the prison of mutual terror. And this is my dream.

So I welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev that we are a nation that defends, rather than attacks, that our alliances are defensive, not offensive. We don't seek nuclear superiority. We do not seek a first strike advantage over the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of my fundamental arms control objectives is to get rid of first strike weapons altogether. And this is why -- (applause) -- this is why we've proposed a 50-percent reduction in the most threatening nuclear weapons, especially those that could carry out a first strike.

I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a reciprocal program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We're offering to permit Soviet experts to see first-hand that SDI does not involve offensive weapons. American scientists would be allowed to visit comparable facilities of the Soviet strategic defense program, which, in fact, has involved much more than research for many years.

Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research reveals that a defense against nuclear missiles is possible, we would sit down with our allies and the Soviet Union to see how together we could replace all strategic ballistic missiles with such a defense, which threatens no one.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia -- (applause) -- those places where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against regimes which obviously do not represent the will or the approval of the people. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. (Applause.)

We discussed human rights. We Americans believe that history teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors. (Applause.) Human rights, therefore, is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue.

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on my proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale.

Americans should know the people of the Soviet Union -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

As you can see, our talks were wide ranging. And let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

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