Gorbachev interview 11 a.m.

haracterized meeting as constructive and open

e had great difficulty in seeing things from the American point of view but the meetings helped him in this.

Ve seek equal security for all parties. We do not seek military superiority and of course will not permit the U.S. to gain military superiority over us.

Space weapons are of absolutely critical importance to us. We have reached a critical stage for once the door is open for the use of these weapons it will be almost impossible to stop it for it is difficult to control/ verify.

Significant disagreementes conti-nur to exist between us.

The choice betweeen survival and mutual destruction is a question which we looked at objectively., because in our age questions of war and peace have become questions of survival.

uestion of regional conflicts -- he explained that you cannot blame Moscow for everything that goes wrong in the ~~world~~ third world -- The President and I agreed not to ~~anything~~ make any more stupid remarks.

Our two countries have an obligation to help resolve regional conflicts - and our commitment is to provide assistance without interference in their own internal affairs.

It is possible to improve Soviet-American Relations; there are problems, we know, but we must work together

but I want to come back to the main issue - arms control

More More on SDI: Some react positively to SDI thinking it is defensive, but we cannot even deal with the current arms race without an extension into space. There are no guarantees where this will take us. I told the President that that we would not attack first, why do you need SDI, don't you believe us? If not, why should we believe you?

If we come to an agreement on SDI, our labs would be open for inspection. In fa fact if we come to any arms control agreements-- we will agree to verification it won't be a problem.

THEMES FOR LARRY SPEAKES
11:00 A.M. Wednesday
BRIEFING

-- The talks have been proceeding in a good, CANDID atmosphere.

-- The President has looked forward to these first discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev and to the opportunity they provide for a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the relationship.

-- The two leaders in their private and plenary session meetings haved discussed the fundamentals of the U.S./Soviet relationship. The President has welcomed this opportunity to lay out his views on issues which involve the U.S./Soviet relationship.

-- He has welcomed the opportunity to hear General Secretary Gorbachev's presentation on these same fundamental issues.

-- The President is prepared to do his part to put the relationship on a more constructive and long term footing.

-- We are doing our part to find reasonable, common ground and expect the Soviets to do likewise.

-- We wish to chart a careful, predictable course in our relationship which brings steady progress without leading to the extreme swings of the pendulum which at times have been exhibited in the past.

-- These top-level meetings in Geneva represent an important new phase in this process.

-- Our policies have been steady and consistent.

-- Our efforts to reach our goals in the interests of world stability and peace will continue.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

For Immediate Release November 20, 1985

ALLIED PARTICIPATION AT SPECIAL MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL

Belgium	Prime Minister Wilfried Martens
Canada	Prime Minister Brian Mulroney
Denmark	Prime Minister Poul Schlueter
France	Foreign Minister Roland Dumas
FRG	Chancellor Helmut Kohl
Greece	Vice Premier Yannis Haralambopoulos
Iceland	Prime Minister Steingrimu Hermannsson
Italy	Prime Minister Bettino Craxi
Luxembourg	Prime Minister Jacques Santer
Netherlands	Prime Minister Rudd Lubbers
Norway	Prime Minister Kaare Willoch
Portugal	Prime Minister Anibel Cavaco E Silva
Spain	Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez
Turkey	Prime Minister Turgut Ozal
UK	Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
USA	President Ronald Reagan

# # #

FBIS 063 (SEE 039)

(USIA ALERT)

MOSCOW TV CARRIES GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE

TAKE 1 OF MANY -- GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE

LD211226 MOSCOW TELEVISION SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 1000 GMT 21 NOV 85

(PRESS CONFERENCE GIVEN BY CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE GENERAL SECRETARY MIKHAIL GORBACHEV AT THE PRESS CENTER OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS IN GENEVA -- LIVE)

(TEXT) ESTEEMED LADIES, GENTLEMEN, COMRADES. OUR TALKS WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FIRST IN THE LAST 6 AND A 1/2 YEARS, HAVE JUST ENDED. THIS IS, WITHOUT DOUBT, A SIGNIFICANT EVENT IN INTERNATIONAL LIFE. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS MEETING WILL BE EVEN CLEARER IF ONE BEARS IN MIND NOT ONLY SOVIET-AMERICAN BUT INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AS A WHOLE, WHICH ARE GOING THROUGH A PARTICULARLY, AS I WOULD ALLOW MYSELF TO PUT IT, DIFFICULT PERIOD.

FIRST, A FEW WORDS ABOUT WHAT PRECEDED THE GENEVA MEETING. IT WAS AWAITED WITH IMPATIENCE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. PEOPLE HAD GREAT HOPES FOR IT, FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD AND FOR A LOWERING OF THE DANGEROUS LEVEL OF INTERNATIONAL TENSION WHICH HAS REACHED A DANGEROUS LEVEL. TRUE, DOUBTS WERE ALSO EXPRESSED; HAS THE CONFRONTATION OF TWO POWERS NOT GONE TOO FAR TO BE ABLE TO COUNT ON ANY ACCORDS AT ALL? ALL THIS WAS THE CASE -- YOU KNOW THIS AS WELL AS WE DO.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1248Z BR

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 3 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE.

LD211259

(TEXT) JUST BEFORE THE GENEVA SUMMIT MEETING A SESSION OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIS WAS HELD IN SOFIA, AT WHICH THE POWERFUL VOICE OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES SOUNDED OUT IN DEFENSE OF PEACE, FOR A RELAXATION OF TENSION AND COOPERATION, AGAINST THE ARMS RACE AND CONFRONTATION, AND IN FAVOR OF AN IMPROVEMENT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES ON EARTH.

ALTHOUGH THESE STEPS OF OURS, DICTATED BY A FEELING OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF PEACE, DID NOT MEET WITH A PROPER REACTION ON THE PART OF OUR PARTNERS IN THE FORTHCOMING TALKS IN GENEVA, WE HELD FIRMLY TO A CONSTRUCTIVE POSITION. WE CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO ENDEAVOR THROUGH STRENGTH OF ARGUMENTS, STRENGTH OF EXAMPLE, AND STRENGTH OF COMMON SENSE TO BREAK THE DANGEROUS COURSE OF EVENTS.

THE VERY COMPLEXITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION CONVINCED US THAT A DIRECT CONVERSATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES WAS ESSENTIAL BECAUSE OF THE ENORMOUS ROLE WHICH BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES PLAY. NATURALLY AN ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITY ALSO ARISES OUT OF THIS ROLE FOR THESE STATES AND THEIR POLITICAL LEADERS. OUR CONCLUSION WAS AS FOLLOWS. THE TIME HAD COME WHEN, UNDER THE THREAT OF UNIVERSAL NUCLEAR DEATH, ONE MUST LEARN THE GREAT ART OF LIVING TOGETHER. BOTH OUR -- THE SOVIET -- PEOPLE, AND, I AM DEEPLY CONVINCED, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, ARE EQUALLY INTERESTED IN THIS. ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD ARE INTERESTED IN THIS.

WE FELT AND CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE MOOD OF THE PEOPLES IN ALL COUNTRIES IS IN FAVOR OF PEACE, AND THAT THE DESIRE TO NOT ONLY PRESERVE PEACE BUT ALSO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND GAIN REAL PROGRESS IN THE FIGHT TO HALT THE ARMS RACE IS INCREASING. THIS IS A SITUATION WHICH HAS A GREAT TWO-FOLD SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTAINS TWO GREAT MEANINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

(MORE)
21 NOV 13422 BR

FBIS 079

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 4 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///MEANINGS AND CONCLUSIONS.

LD211318

(TEXT) ON THE ONE HAND, IT WAS INSPIRING. IT MEANS THAT WHAT WE ARE DOING IS IN KEEPING WITH THE HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE VAST MASSES OF PEOPLE IN THE WORLD, REGARDLESS OF WHERE THEY LIVE AND WHICH POLITICAL VIEWS, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS OR TRADITIONS THEY SUBSCRIBE TO. BUT AT THE SAME TIME, IT WAS NOT ONLY INSPIRING BUT COMMITTED US TO A GREAT DEAL; ABOVE ALL, TO RESPONSIBILITY.

PERHAPS IF ONE WERE TO DESCRIBE, TO SAY IN ONE WORD, WHAT IT IS THAT CHARACTERIZES THE PRESENT STATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION, IT WOULD BE: ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITY. THE PEOPLES HAVE UNDERSTOOD THIS RESPONSIBILITY AND THEY ACT IN WAYS WHICH BEFIT THEM. BUT IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THIS SITUATION AND THIS CHARACTERIZATION OUGHT TO NOURISH STATES' POLICIES AND ALSO THE PRACTICAL ACTIONS OF POLITICIANS.

ONE CANNOT MAKE UP FOR THE ABSENCE OF A POLICY THAT TAKES ADEQUATE ACCOUNT OF THE PRESSING NEEDS BEING FELT BY ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD WITH ALL KINDS OF PROPAGANDIST PACKAGING. THE PEOPLE HAVE NOW LEARNED TO UNDERSTAND EVERYTHING RAPIDLY AND TO PUT EVERYTHING IN ITS PLACE. THIS IS MY DEEP CONVICTION AND THIS HAS HELPED ME AND MY COLLEAGUES IN THE SOVIET UNION WHO MAKE UP THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP -- BY UNDERSTANDING THE SITUATION IN THIS WAY -- TO SECURE OURSELVES AGAINST UNNECESSARY WRONG STEPS AND CONCENTRATE OUR ATTENTION ON A CONSTRUCTIVE PATH, ON THE QUEST FOR WAYS TOWARD A BETTER WORLD, A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD.

I WAS ENORMOUSLY IMPRESSED BY THE LETTERS I RECEIVED -- FROM THE SOVIET UNION, FROM THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, FROM AUSTRALIA, FROM THE WHOLE OF EUROPE, FROM ASIA, AFRICA -- FROM CHILDREN, WOMEN, MEN, VETERANS.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1351Z BR

FBIS 083

TAKE 5 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///WOMEN, MEN, VETERANS.

LD211333

(TEXT) IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO STRESS THAT THE YOUTH OF THE WHOLE PLANET RAISED THEIR VOICE VERY ACTIVELY IN THESE LETTERS: THOSE TO WHOM THE FUTURE BELONGS, THOSE WHO ARE STEPPING FORWARD INTO LIFE AND TAKING ONTO THEIR SHOULDERS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD.

AND NOW TO THE MEETING ITSELF. THE FACE-TO-FACE CONSERVATIONS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN TOOK UP QUITE A LARGE PROPORTION OF IT. AND NOT JUST ARITHMETICALLY. THE MEETINGS WERE FRANK, PROLONGED, SOMETIMES SHARP, AT INDIVIDUAL MOMENTS EXTREMELY SHARP, AND YET, IT SEEMS TO ME, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT ALSO PRODUCTIVE. THEY TOOK UP, OF COURSE, SIGNIFICANTLY MORE TIME THAN PLANNED; I WOULD SAY THAT THEY TOOK UP THE MAIN PART OF THE TIME OF THESE 2 DAYS.

WHEN THE PRESIDENT AND I TOOK OUR LEAVE OF EACH OTHER JUST NOW, WE COUNTED HOW MANY TIMES WE HAD MET ALONE, AND WE SETTLED ON SOMEWHAT ABOUT FIVE OR SIX TIMES. AS A RULE THESE CONVERSATIONS LASTED AN HOUR OR MORE. THEY ALLOWED US, YOU UNDERSTAND, TO DISCUSS A BROAD RANGE OF PROBLEMS FACE TO FACE. THE CONVERSATIONS, IN POLITICAL LANGUAGE, WERE FRANK, DIRECT, AND I THINK THEY HAD NOT ONLY A GREAT, BUT I WOULD SAY DECISIVE SIGNIFICANCE.

ABOVE ALL, PRECISELY AT THESE CONVERSATIONS, AS WELL AS AT THE PLENARY MEETINGS AND IN THE EXTENSIVE CONTACTS BETWEEN ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS ON THE CORRESPONDING LEVELS, OF EXPERTS -- BOTH ON THE SOVIET SIDE AND THE AMERICAN SIDE -- THIS PART WAS REPRESENTED BY QUITE AUTHORITATIVE PEOPLE KNOWN NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY, BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD. ALL THIS TAKEN TOGETHER MADE IT POSSIBLE IN THESE 2 DAYS TO DO SERIOUS WORK, SERIOUS WORK.

WE PRESENTED OUR VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD. THE STARTING POINT OF OUR ANALYSIS IS THIS: IN THE PAST DECADES, CARDINAL CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE WORLD AND THEY NEED NEW APPROACH, A FRESH VIEW ON MANY THINGS CONCERNING FOREIGN POLICY. ONE VERY IMPORTANT FEATURE IS CHARACTERISTIC FOR THE PRESENT INTERNATIONAL SITUATION: WE RECOGNIZE IT AS SUCH AND WE AND THE UNITED STATES HAVE TO TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT IN OUR FOREIGN POLICIES. I AM REFERRING TO THE FOLLOWING: IN THE PRESENT CONDITIONS, THE ISSUE IS NOT ONLY THE CONFRONTATION OF TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS BUT THE CHOICE BETWEEN SURVIVAL AND MUTUAL DESTRUCTION. IN OTHER WORDS, THE QUESTIONS OF WAR AND PEACE, QUESTIONS OF SURVIVAL, ARE, BY THE VERY COURSE, THE OBJECTIVE COURSE, OF THE WORLD PROCESS, AND I WOULD LIKE TO UNDERLINE THAT I AM USING SPECIALLY THE WORD SURVIVAL NOT TO DRAMATIZE AND FRIGHTEN BUT IN ORDER FOR US ALL TO FEEL, AND FEEL DEEPLY, AND TO RECOGNIZE THE REALITIES OF TODAY'S WORLD. (SENTENCE AS HEARD) THESE QUESTIONS HAVE NOW EMERGED IN THE FOREGROUND AND ARE -- THIS PROBLEM IS IMMEDIATE AND URGENT, AND AFFECTING THE INTERESTS OF US ALL -- ALIVE. I WOULD SAY THAT THEY HAVE MOVED TO THE CENTER OF WORLD POLITICS. WE CANNOT GO AWAY FROM THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS TO THIS URGENT PROBLEM. SUCH IS, WE ARE CONVINCED, THE WILL OF THE SOVIET PEOPLE, THE WILL OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE -- SUCH IS THE WILL OF ALL PEOPLES. THIS, FIRST OF ALL. SECONDLY, WE HAVE ONCE MORE DRAWN THE ATTENTION OF THE AMERICAN SIDE TO THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCE: I HAVE ALREADY TALKED ABOUT IT, BUT THIS IS SUCH AN IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCE AND WE ATTACH SUCH A GREAT IMPORTANCE TO IT THAT WE DECIDED TO EXPRESS IT AGAIN AT THIS MEETING; NAMELY, THE FACT THAT EVEN AT PRESENT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO START PRODUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND TALKS ON QUESTIONS OF HALTING THE ARMS RACE AND NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. TOMORROW, IT WILL BE EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1420Z BR

FBIS 086

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 6 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///EVEN MORE DIFFICULT.

LD211347

(TEXT) THIS IS WHY THE MEETING WAS NECESSARY, WHY RESPONSIBLE DIALOGUE WAS NECESSARY. WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT -- ALL OF US -- WHERE WE MUST STOP, LOOK AROUND, THINK AGAIN AND DECIDE, ON THE BASIS OF REALITIES, ON THE BASIS OF A BROAD APPROACH TO THE DETERMINATION OF NATIONAL INTERESTS, WHAT WE MUST DO NEXT IN THE WORLD.

DURING THE MEETINGS AND CONVERSATIONS I WANTED TO UNDERSTAND WHAT POSITION ON THIS CARDINAL ISSUE -- THE ISSUE OF WAR AND PEACE -- WAS BEING ADOPTED BY THE PRESENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. WELL, WE HAVE ALL READ QUITE A LOT ON THIS MATTER AND MANY OF YOU HAVE SAID A GREAT DEAL OVERALL ON THIS SUBJECT. BUT FOR THOSE WHO MAKE THE DECISIONS IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO UNDERSTAND WHAT THE VERY POINT OF DEPARTURE IS FOR HOW OUR PARTNERS ARE FORMULATING THEIR POLICIES, AND WHAT ARE THE INITIAL IDEAS BEHIND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PRESENT AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION. (LONG PAUSE)

IT TOOK A GREAT DEAL OF WORK -- GREAT EFFORTS, I WOULD EVEN SAY -- TO TRY WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND WITH GREAT RESPONSIBILITY, WITH A BROAD VIEW TO EVALUATE EVERYTHING WHICH WOULD HELP FIND AN ANSWER TO THIS VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION.

HERE IS WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO TALK ABOUT NOW: THIS ANALYSIS HAS SHOWN THAT NOTWITHSTANDING ALL THE DIVERSITY OF APPROACHES AND EVALUATIONS WHICH CAME TO THE SURFACE DURING THIS VERY SERIOUS AND NECESSARY WORK -- WITHOUT WHICH, WITHOUT DOING THIS WORK IT WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE TO COME TO THE MEETING -- WE DISCOVERED, AND SO IT SEEMS TO US, THAT WE HAVE SOMETHING IN COMMON WHICH COULD SERVE AS A STARTING POINT IN IMPROVING OUR RELATIONS. THIS IS AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FACT THAT NUCLEAR WAR IS INADMISSIBLE, THAT IT CANNOT BE WAGED AND IT CANNOT HAVE ANY VICTORS. THIS THOUGHT WAS EXPRESSED MORE THAN ONCE, BOTH ON OUR SIDE AND THE AMERICAN SIDE. AND FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE CENTRAL PROBLEM IN RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES IN THE PRESENT STAGE IS THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY. WE ARE RESOLUTELY IN FAVOR OF ATTAINING AGREEMENTS ENSURING EQUAL SECURITY FOR BOTH OUR SIDES. WE IMAGINE THAT IT IS PRECISELY ON THIS BASIS THAT IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO EFFECT CONSISTENT STRENGTHENING OF MUTUAL TRUST AND A GENERAL IMPROVEMENT IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE, WITHIN WHICH ONE CAN HOPE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE, FOR FRUITFUL DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, HUMANITARIAN PROBLEMS, PROBLEMS OF CONTACTS, RECIPROCAL INFORMATION, AND SO FORTH.

(MORE)
21 NOV 14382 BR

///AND SO FORTH.

LD211407

(TEXT) HERE ALSO IS THE KEY TO THE PROBLEM OF PRESERVATION OF LIFE ON EARTH AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CHANGE OF ATMOSPHERE TOWARD GOOD WILL.

WE TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN STRIVING AND WILL NOT BE STRIVING TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER THE UNITED STATES IN THE SPHERE OF SECURITY. FURTHERMORE, I TRIED MORE THAN ONCE IN PRIVATE AND AT PLENARY SESSIONS OF THE DELEGATIONS, TO EXPRESS OUR DEEP CONVICTION THAT LESS SECURITY FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IF COMPARED WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR US BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAD TO DISTRUST AND LACK OF FAITH, AND WOULD GENERATE INSTABILITY. BUT WE, AT THE SAME TIME, RECKON ON THE SAME APPROACH BY THE AMERICAN SIDE CONCERNING US. WE TOLD THE PRESIDENT AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION THAT WE IN TURN, WOULD NOT ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY OVER US UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES. I THINK THIS IS A LOGICAL ARGUMENT. BOTH SIDES WOULD HAVE TO BECOME USED TO STRATEGIC PARITY AS THE NATURAL STATE OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. IF THERE IS ANYTHING TO TALK ABOUT IT IS HOW, BY JOINT EFFORTS, TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF THIS PARITY. IN OTHER WORDS, TO IMPLEMENT REALISTIC MEASURES FOR THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS ON A COMMON BASIS. HERE IS A SPHERE WORTHY OF LEADERS OF SUCH GREAT STATES AS THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, AND ALSO A SPHERE OF ACTION FOR OTHER STATES' LEADERS, BECAUSE THIS IS OUR COMMON QUESTION.

FROM THIS FOLLOWS QUITE LOGICALLY ALSO THE FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE: NEITHER OF US, NEITHER THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NOR THE SOVIET UNION MUST DO ANYTHING THAT OPENS DOORS FOR AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE OR IN NEW SPHERES. SPECIFICALLY IN SPACE. THIS IS WHY, IF THIS IS DONE, THEN THE SCALE OF MILITARY RIVALRY (FBIS NOTE: GORBACHEV PAUSES, RESTARTS) IF THIS WERE TO BE DONE -- IF THE DOORS WERE OPENED TO SPACE -- THEN THE SCALE OF THIS RIVALRY WOULD GROW IMMEASURABLY, AND THE ARMS RACE, I THINK, WOULD ASSUME -- IT CAN EVEN NOW BE FORECAST TO A CERTAIN EXTENT -- AN IRREVERSIBLE CHARACTER, BECAUSE IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO KEEP CONTROLS ON IT.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1455Z BR

FBIS 098

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 8 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///CONTROLS ON IT.

LD211449

(TEXT) IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO VERIFY IT. AND EACH SIDE WOULD HAVE THE FEELING AT ANY MOMENT THAT IT IS LOSING OUT IN SOMETHING, AND IT WOULD FEVERISHLY SEARCH FOR EVER NEW METHODS OF RESPONDING. THIS WOULD URGE ON THE ARMS RACE. AND NOT ONLY IN SPACE, BUT ON EARTH TOO, FOR THE RESPONSES DO NOT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE IN THAT SPHERE. THEY SIMPLY HAVE TO BE EFFECTIVE. THIS IS MY REASONING, AND I AM REASONING BEFORE YOU IN THE SAME WAY AS WHEN I WAS CONVERSING WITH THE PRESIDENT. ONE CAN IMAGINE THAT IF SUCH A SITUATION WERE TO BEGIN, THE POSSIBILITY OF AN AGREEMENT ON SOME RESTRAINT OF THIS MILITARY RIVALRY, THE ARMS RACE, WOULD BECOME, IN GENERAL, VERY VERY PROBLEMATICAL. I SHOULD LIKE TO RETURN AGAIN TO MY ASSERTION THAT THE PRESENT PERIOD IS CHARACTERIZED BY THE FACT THAT WE HAVE REACHED A CERTAIN POINT. AND IF ONE FAILS TO CONSIDER AND WEIGH EVERYTHING IN A TRULY RESPONSIBLE FASHION, ONE COULD REACH SUCH POLITICAL CONCLUSIONS AND, AS A RESULT OF INCORRECT, ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS FOR POLITICIANS.... (APPEARS TO CORRECT HIMSELF -- FBIS) FOR POLITICS, ONE COULD EMBARK ON SUCH STEPS AS WILL HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR OUR PEOPLES.

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES WILL REMAIN. THE RIVALRY BETWEEN US WILL ALSO BE MAINTAINED. BUT WE MUST ACT IN SUCH A FASHION THAT THIS RIVALRY DOES NOT GO BEYOND THE FRAMEWORK OF WHAT IS PERMITTED AND DOES NOT LEAD TO A MILITARY CONFRONTATION. LET EACH OF THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS PROVE ITS ADVANTAGES BY EXAMPLE. WE HAVE A GOOD IDEA OF NOT ONLY THE WEAK ASPECTS, BUT ALSO THE STRONG ASPECTS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY AND OF THAT OF OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTIRES. WE KNOW THEIR ACHIEVEMENTS AND THEIR POTENTIAL. OF COURSE, WE KNOW BETTER OUR OWN POSSIBILITIES, INCLUDING THE UNREALIZED ONES. IN BRIEF, WE ARE IN FAVOR OF COMPETITION WITH THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, IN FAVOR OF ACTIVE COMPETITION. HISTORY ITSELF IS NOT SIMPLY THEORETICAL ESTIMATIONS AND REASONING. HISTORY ITSELF HAS CONVINCINGLY CONFIRMED THE VITALITY OF THE POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE. (GORBACHEV AT THIS POINT TAKES A DRINK OF WATER -- FBIS) I AM TRYING TO HAVE LESS WATER ("WATER" HERE MEANS "PADDING" OR WAFFLING" -- FBIS) IN MY SPEECH BUT, NONETHELESS, WATER IS NECESSARY. (LAUGHTER FROM AUDITORIUM)

FURTHER, A GREAT DEAL IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR MUTUAL RELATIONS DEPENDS ON HOW EACH OF THE SIDES INTERPRETS THE WORLD AROUND US. IT SEEMS TO US THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT HERE TO HAVE A PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF HISTORICAL REALITIES AND TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THEM WHEN FORMING ONE'S POLICIES. IN THIS INSTANCE I HAVE IN MIND BOTH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND THE AMERICAN LEADERSHIP. THE WORLD TODAY IS A VERY MULTIFACETED TOTALITY OF SOVEREIGN COUNTRIES, PEOPLES WHO HAVE THEIR OWN INTERESTS, THEIR OWN ASPIRATIONS, THEIR OWN POLICIES, THEIR OWN TRADITIONS, THEIR OWN DREAMS. MANY OF THEM HAVE ONLY JUST EMBARKED UPON THE PATH OF INDEPENDENT DEVELOPMENT. THEIR FIRST STEPS ARE TAKING PLACE IN INCREDIBLY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN LEFT BY COLONIALISM, BY DEPENDENCE. SOME OF THEM, HAVING ACHIEVED POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, WISH TO ENSURE FOR THEMSELVES ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE. THEY SEE THAT THEY HAVE RESOURCES, THEY HAVE A WORKFORCE.

(MORE)

FBIS 113

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 9 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///HAVE A WORKFORCE.

LD211505

(TEXT) THE FIRST STEPS ARE BEING TAKEN IN UNBELIEVEABLY DIFFICULT CONDITIONS LEFT BY COLONIALISM AND DEPENDENCE. SOME OF THEM, HAVING ACHIEVED POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, WANT TO ENSURE ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE FOR THEMSELVES. THEY SEE THAT THEY HAVE RESOURCES, THEY HAVE MANPOWER, THEY HAVE A COMBINATION OF THAT WHICH, IN THE CORRESPONDING LABOR PROCESS, SO TO SPEAK, CAN PROVIDE THEM WITH A BETTER LIFE. THEY ARE, AFTER ALL, ENORMOUS CONTINENTS. IT IS A NATURAL DESIRE OF EVERY PEOPLE TO PUT ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS INTO PRACTICE BOTH IN THE POLITICAL SPHERE AND IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ONES. THIS POLICY PLEASES SOME AND NOT OTHERS, BUT IT IS A REFLECTION OF THE INTERNAL PROCESSES OF EACH COUNTRY IN QUESTION, OF THE INTERESTS OF THIS OR THAT PEOPLE WHICH INDEED HAS THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT, THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE, CHOICE OF ROAD, CHOICE OF SYSTEM, METHODS, FORMS, CHOICE EVEN OF FRIENDS. THIS IS THE RIGHT OF EVERY PEOPLE. IF THIS IS NOT ACKNOWLEDGED I DO NOT KNOW HOW INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CAN BE BUILT.

WHEN I WENT TO ENGLAND IN DECEMBER LAST YEAR AND I MANAGED TO ACQUAINT MYSELF, ALTHOUGH I RECALLED THE EXPRESSION FROM BACK WHEN I STUDIED INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AT THE LAW FACULTY OF MOSCOW UNIVERSITY, I KNEW THOSE WORDS, BUT I DECIDED TO RESTORE THEM: THEY ARE THE WORDS OF THE FAMOUS PALMERSTON, WHERE IT WAS SAID THAT ENGLAND DOES NOT HAVE ETERNAL FRIENDS OR ETERNAL ENEMIES, THERE ARE ONLY PERSONAL (PAUSES) ETERNAL INTERESTS. (SENTENCE AS HEARD) WELL, PERHAPS I AM NOT SPEAKING LITERALLY, BUT CLOSE. AT THAT TIME I SAID TO MRS THATCHER, I AGREE WITH THAT, BUT IF PALMERSTON AND YOU, THE PRESENT POLITICAL LEADER OF ENGLAND, RECOGNIZE THAT YOU HAVE SUCH INTERESTS, THEN YOU MUST RECOGNIZE THAT OTHER PEOPLES AND OTHER COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE THEIR INTERESTS, AND WHEN ABOUT 200 STATES ENTER THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA AND EACH OF THEM IS STRIVING TO REALIZE ITS OWN INTERESTS, BUT TO WHAT EXTENT THEY ARE PUT INTO PRACTICE DEPENDS ON TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE INTERESTS OF OTHERS. THAT MEANS THERE WILL BE SOMETHING IN COMMON, BASED ON COOPERATION. TO CALCULATE IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE WHOLE WORLD IS SOMEONE'S FIEFDOM; AND HERE I REFER BOTH TO THE SOVIET UNION AND TO THE UNITED STATES AND TO OTHER COUNTRIES: WE REJECT THAT PRINCIPLE. WE HAVE ALWAYS SAID THIS, BOTH 10 YEARS AGO AND TODAY WE ARE SAYING IT, AND WE SHALL SAY IT TOMORROW. IT IS NO GOOD, WE DO NOT HAVE A DUAL POLICY HERE. HERE WE ARE CONDUCTING AN HONEST AND OPEN POLICY, AND WE ACT IN THAT WAY. TENSION -- WE SAID THIS BOTH TO THE PRESIDENT AND TO THE AMERICAN DELEGATION AS A WHOLE -- CONFLICTS, EVEN REGIONS (AS HEARD) AND EVEN WARS WHICH ARISE IN ONE PART OR ANOTHER BETWEEN VARIOUS STATES IN ONE PART OF THE WORLD OR ANOTHER, ARE ROOTED BOTH IN THE PAST AND IN TODAY'S SOCIOECONOMIC CONDITIONS OF THOSE COUNTRIES AND REGIONS.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1555Z BR

FBIS 106

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 10 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///COUNTRIES AND REGIONS.

LD211511

(TEXT) TO REPRESENT THE MATTER AS IF ALL THESE TANGLES OF CONTRADICTIONS ARE CAUSED BY THE COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST IS NOT ONLY INCORRECT, IT IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS. IF TODAY MEXICO AND A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES, INCLUDING RICH STATES, EVEN BRAZIL, ARE NOT ONLY UNABLE TO PAY THEIR DEBTS, BUT ALSO UNABLE EVEN TO PAY THE INTEREST ON THE DEBTS, ONE CAN IMAGINE WHAT WILL HAPPEN AND WHAT PROCESSES ARE BREWING IN THESE SOCIETIES. THE SITUATION WILL BECOME MORE ACUTE, IT WILL LEAD TO AN EXPLOSION, AND WHAT THEN? WILL THIS AGAIN BE THE HAND OF MOSCOW? LISTEN, ONE CANNOT COME OUT IRRESPONSIBLY WITH SUCH JUDGMENTS ON SUCH QUESTIONS BEFORE THE WORLD. THESE BANALITIES STILL OCCUR HERE AND THERE. HOWEVER, THEY ARE IMPERMISSIBLE, AND PARTICULARLY AT SUCH MEETINGS AS OURS. THEREFORE, WE AT ONCE AGREED, LET US NOT TALK BANALITIES WITH EACH OTHER. MANY BANALITIES WERE USED ON THE EVE, DURING THE PREPARATION, IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE MEETING. IT WAS A SQUABBLE, WITH YOUR ASSISTANCE. (LAUGHTER)

CERTAINLY, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES ARE TWO MIGHTY POWERS, WITH GLOBAL INTERESTS, WITH THEIR ALLIES AND FRIENDS. THEY HAVE THEIR OWN PRIORITIES IN FOREIGN POLICY. HOWEVER, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SEES THIS NOT AS A SOURCE OF CONFRONTATION BUT MORE AS A SOURCE OF ENHANCED, PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY OF OUR STATES, THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THEIR LEADERS, FOR THE FATE OF THE WORLD. THAT IS HOW WE UNDERSTOOD IT. CERTAINLY, WE CAN ARGUE ABOUT THE STATE OF AFFAIRS IN ONE PART OF THE WORLD OR ANOTHER -- PARTICULARLY THAT OUR ASSESSMENTS WILL BE DIFFERENT, OFTEN OPPOSITE, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT CONCERNS SOME EVENT OR OTHER, THE REASONS FOR SOME CONFLICT OR OTHER.

IN PRINCIPLE, WE ARE NOT AGAINST DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS REGIONAL PROBLEMS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SEEKING WAYS TO FACILITATE THEIR SETTLEMENT. WE SPOKE OF THIS, AND THE PRESIDENT AND I AGREED TO CONTINUE THESE JOINT EFFORTS, AND THIS WAS REFLECTED IN THE CONCLUDING STATEMENT; BUT WE CONSTANTLY STRESS AND I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THIS NOW, WITHOUT ANY KIND OF INTERFERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES.

SUCH IS OUR CONCEPT OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, WITH WHICH WE CAME TO THE MEETINGS AND WHICH WE SET OUT BEFORE THE PRESIDENT AND THE WHOLE DELEGATION. IT WAS PRESENTED IN JUST THIS FORM, IN A MUCH MORE EXPANDED FORM OF COURSE, BUT I HAVE TRIED TO SUMMARIZE THE GIST OF IT, AT THE MEETING IN GENEVA. WE CONSIDER THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IS QUITE POSSIBLE. MANY PROBLEMS HAVE ACCUMULATED, I WOULD SAY THERE ARE WHOLE PILES OF THEM TO BE CLEARED UP, AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS THE POLITICAL WILL TO DO THIS WORK, BUT IT MUST BE DONE JOINTLY. WHEN ROCKFALLS TAKE PLACE AND GEOLOGISTS OR MINERS ARE IN A CRITICAL SITUATION, THE RESCUE TEAMS WORK TOWARD EACH OTHER, IN ORDER TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM AND SAVE THEIR PEOPLE.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1610Z BR

SAVE THEIR PEOPLES.

LD211518

(TEXT) WE MUST DO THIS RESCUE WORK WITH JOINT EFFORTS TO SAVE OUR RELATIONS FROM FURTHER INCREASE IN TENSION SO THAT WE DO NOT MOVE TOWARD CONFRONTATION AND RETURN THEM TO A NORMAL CHANNEL, TOWARD IMPROVEMENT. WE ARE READY FOR THIS.

I SAID TO THE PRESIDENT, IT WILL BE A BIG MISTAKE IF YOU AND I DO NOT MAKE USE OF THE CHANCE THAT HAS COME UP TO CHANGE THE SITUATION IN OUR RELATIONS -- AND IN VIEW OF THE TREMENDOUS INFLUENCE OF OUR STATES, THAT MEANS IN THE WORLD, TOO -- FOR THE BETTER.

I WOULD LIKE TO RETURN ONCE AGAIN TO THE MAIN ISSUE WHICH WAS, SO TO SPEAK, THE CRUX OF THE MEETING. THERE WAS NOT A SESSION, NOR A FACE-TO-FACE MEETING, WHERE IT DID NOT OCCUPY THE CENTRAL POSITION. I AM THINKING OF THE ISSUE OF WAR AND PEACE, ARMS CONTROL. THIS WAS THE CRUX OF THE GENEVA MEETING.

WE EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICAN SIDE THAT THE STAR WARS PROGRAM WILL NOT ONLY GIVE AN IMPULSE TO THE ARMS RACE IN ALL TYPES OF WEAPONS, BUT WILL ALSO PUT AN END TO ALL RESTRAINT IN THIS RACE. IN REPLY, THEY SPOKE AGAIN AND AGAIN ABOUT THE SUPPOSEDLY DEFENSIVE NATURE OF A BROADSCALE SYSTEM OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE WITH SPACE-BASED ELEMENTS. THEY SAID TO US: WHAT WILL YOU TELL YOUR PEOPLE AFTER GENEVA -- THAT YOU REFUSED TO MAKE REDUCTIONS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS? ON THIS SCORE OUR ANSWER WAS THIS: I REPEAT, WE ARE READY FOR A RADICAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON CONDITION THAT THE DOOR BE SHUT FIRMLY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE. WE ARE READY TO GO THE FIRST STEP, ON THE BASIS OF APPLYING A 50 PERCENT PRINCIPLE OF REDUCTION, AND THEN, BRINGING IN OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS, TO GO FURTHER.

AMONG THE PEOPLE, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT IN THE WORLD PERHAPS, EVEN AMONG CERTAIN POLITICIANS AND EVEN JOURNALISTS, THERE IS, SO TO SPEAK, A CERTAIN POSITIVE REACTION TO SDI. THEY SAY THAT AFTER ALL, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, ABOUT A SHIELD.

FBIS 109

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 12 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///ABOUT A SHIELD.

LD211538

(TEXT) THAT IS COMPLETELY WRONG. AFTER ALL, THE MAIN POINT, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE FACT THAT MOUNTAINS OF WEAPONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN STOCKPILED IN THE WORLD NOW, IS THAT IT IS FURTHER BEING PROPOSED TO US THAT SINCE THERE IS AN ARMS RACE AND WE CANNOT GET THE BETTER OF THIS PROCESS OR TAKE IT IN HAND, CURB IT, AND GO BACKWARDS, IT IS FURTHER BEING PROPOSED TO US, IN THIS MOST COMPLEX SITUATION, TO OPEN UP COMPETITION IN SPACE. WHO WILL GUARANTEE, WHO WILL BE ABLE TO GIVE A GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL THEN BE ABLE TO ORGANIZE ANY KIND OF PRODUCTIVE TALKS? I THINK THAT NO SENSIBLE PERSON WILL BE ABLE TO. AND THEN THE AMERICAN SIDE DOES NOT WANT TO ADMIT THAT THE SDI MEANS PUTTING WEAPONS INTO SPACE. BUT IT DOES MEAN WEAPONS IN SPACE.

AND IF TODAY THERE ARE WEAPONS ON EARTH AND UNDER THE WATER, THEN WE WILL HAVE WAVES OF SOVIET -- OF AMERICAN AND SOVIET WEAPONS -- OVER THE HEADS OF ALL PEOPLES. AND WE WILL LOOK, GAZE AT THAT SKY, AND WAIT FOR SOMETHING TO CRASH DOWN. LET US ALL IMAGINE -- THIS IS WHAT WE WANTED TO SAY TO THE AMERICAN SIDE -- LET US IMAGINE FOR A MOMENT; GIVEN THE COLLISIONS THERE HAVE BEEN AND ARE HAPPENING NOW. SOMETHING SEPARATES FROM A ROCKET; THE HEAD GOES ON, THE CARRIER PART FALLS AWAY AND COLLIDES WITH SOME KIND OF GROUPING OF THESE SPACE WEAPONS. SIGNALS WILL BE SET OFF, WHICH MAY BE SEEN ALMOST AS AN ATTEMPT BY THE OTHER SIDE -- I'M NOT SAYING BY WHOSE SIDE, BY OURS OR WHOSE, IN THIS CASE -- AS A SIGNAL THAT AN ATTEMPT IS BEING UNDERTAKEN TO ANNIHILATE THIS. (AS HEARD) ALL COMPUTERS ARE SWITCHED ON, THE POLITICIANS CANNOT DO ANYTHING SENSIBLE IN THAT CASE, AND WE ARE AT THE MERCY OF EVENTS.

YES, ONE CAN PAINT MANY PICTURES. I SAID TO THE PRESIDENT THAT IN AS FAR AS WE FEEL THAT THIS IDEA HAS CAPTURED HIM, AS A PERSON, WE CAN PERHAPS EVEN UNDERSTAND TO SOME EXTENT; BUT THAT HIS POSITION AS A POLITICIAN -- ANSWERING FOR SUCH A POWERFUL STATE, FOR ITS DEFENSE, FOR QUESTIONS OF SECURITY -- THIS WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND. WE THINK THAT AFTER THESE CONVERSATIONS, THE AMERICAN SIDE WILL WEIGH UP IN THE MOST RESPONSIBLE MANNER ALL THAT WE SAID ON THIS THEME.

WE SAW AT THE MEETING THAT THE AMERICANS DO NOT LIKE OUR LOGIC, BUT WE CAN IN NO WAY DISCOVER ANY LOGIC IN THEIR ARGUMENTS. THEY SAY: BELIEVE US, IF WE ARE THE FIRST TO INVENT IT, WE WILL SHARE IT WITH YOU. THEN, MR PRESIDENT, I CALL ON YOU TO BELIEVE US. WE HAVE ALREADY STATED THAT WE WILL NOT USE WEAPONS AND WE WILL NOT ATTACK THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. WHY ARE YOU BEGINNING -- WHILE NOT JUST PRESERVING THE ENTIRE OFFENSIVE POTENTIAL ON EARTH AND UNDER THE WATER -- WHY ARE YOU FURTHER PROPOSING, WHY DO YOU INTEND TO LAUNCH AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE? DON'T YOU BELIEVE US? IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT YOU DO NOT BELIEVE US. AND WHY SHOULD WE BELIEVE YOU ANY MORE THAN YOU BELIEVE US? WE HAVE ALL THE MORE GROUNDS NOT TO BELIEVE YOU, AS WE ARE CALLING ON YOU NOT TO CLAMBER INTO SPACE, AND TO ENGAGE IN DISARMAMENT ON EARTH. THAT IS A THOUGHT WHICH EVERY PERSON CAN UNDERSTAND.

(MORE)

FBIS 113

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 13 OF MANY -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///PERSON CAN UNDERSTAND.

LD211542

(TEXT) ON THE WHOLE, ONE WOULD LIKE TO HOPE -- AND THIS IS WHAT WE BELIEVE -- THAT THIS WAS NOT THE U.S. SIDE'S LAST WORD. THE TALKS WERE THOROUGH: WE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO EACH OTHER'S ARGUMENTS AND RECORDED ALL OF IT. IF THE UNITED STATES FINDS THE WILL AND RESOLVE TO THINK AGAIN AND EVALUATE ALL THE DESTRUCTIVE ASPECTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE STAR WARS PROGRAM, A PATH WILL OPEN UP FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND OF HALTING THE ARMS RACE.

WHEN I SPEAK OF THIS, I ALSO BEAR IN MIND THAT THIS ALSO APPLIES TO PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION. A LARGE AMOUNT OF SPECULATION IS BEING BUILT UP AROUND THIS PROBLEM, WITH THE USSR'S POSITION BEING DELIBERATELY DISTORTED. BUT THE TRUTH BOILS DOWN TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS OPEN TO VERIFICATION. IF AN ACCORD IS ACHIEVED ON BANNING THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS TO SPACE, WE ARE PREPARED ON A MUTUAL BASIS TO OPEN OUR LABORATORIES FOR MONITORING AN ACCORD OF THAT KIND. WHAT HAS BEEN SUGGESTED TO US IS SOMETHING LIKE: LET US OPEN UP THE LABORATORIES AND MONITOR HOW THE ARMS RACE IN SPACE IS GOING. THAT IS NAIVE; AND THE STARTING POINT IS FALLACIOUS AND UNACCEPTABLE.

IF THE U.S. SIDE ALSO HALTS ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS AND WE CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON THIS, AGAIN THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEMS WHATSOEVER FROM OUR SIDE REGARDING VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION. IF BOTH SIDES AGREE TO REDUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY 15 PERCENT, THEN OF COURSE THE REDUCTION PROCESS WILL HAVE TO BE MONITORED; AND WE ARE INTERESTED IN THAT NO LESS THAN THE AMERICANS ARE.

I WOULD LIKE TO SAY LITERALLY TWO WORDS ABOUT THE FACT THAT AT THIS STAGE DIFFERENCES ALSO CAME TO LIGHT IN THE POSITIONS REGARDING A 50-PERCENT REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE HAVE OBSERVATIONS ON THE PLAN PRESENTED BY THE AMERICANS; THE AMERICANS HAVE OBSERVATIONS ON OUR PLANS. BUT WE ARE NOT MAKING A DRAMA OUT OF THESE DIFFERENCES, AND WE ARE READY TO SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION IN THE EVENT THAT A RACE DOES NOT BEGIN IN SPACE. THE TWO SIDES' PROPOSALS FORM A BASIS FOR A SEARCH FOR MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS: COMPROMISES ARE POSSIBLE HERE; TIME AND CLARIFICATION OF THE SITUATION ARE REQUIRED. WE ARE READY TO SEARCH FOR THESE SOLUTIONS, PROCEEDING FROM THE FOUNDING PRINCIPLE THAT WE ARE NOT STRIVING TO ACHIEVE SUPERIORITY AND WE ARE FOR EQUAL SECURITY.

AT THE MEETING THERE WAS AN EXCHANGE ON PROBLEMS OF A HUMANITARIAN NATURE. THIS RESULTED IN THE APPROPRIATE AGREEMENTS REFLECTED IN THE STATEMENT. I WILL RECALL THAT WE SUCCEEDED IN ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS OF BILATERAL SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. AGREEMENT WAS REACHED ON EXPANDING CONTACTS IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL FIELDS, AND IN THE FIELD OF EDUCATION AND INFORMATION. EXCHANGES OF STUDENTS, TELEVISION PROGRAMS, AND SPORTS DELEGATIONS WILL BE WIDER. AN ACCORD HAS BEEN REACHED IN PRINCIPLE TO CONCLUDE AN AGREEMENT ON AIR COMMUNICATIONS. I THINK A REPORT ARRIVED FROM MOSCOW...

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER, INTERRUPTING) APPARENTLY YESTERDAY.

(GORBACHEV) APPARENTLY YESTERDAY, AND THIS PROBLEM HAS BEEN REMOVED.

I WOULD ESPECIALLY LIKE TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT IT WAS DECIDED TO ADDRESS JOINTLY A NUMBER OF OTHER STATES REGARDING COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF THERMONUCLEAR FUSION.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1643Z BR

FBIS 121

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 14 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///OF THERMONUCLEAR FUSION.

LD211556

(TEXT) THIS IS A VERY INTERESTING IDEA. ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD OPEN A FRESH PAGE IN AN EXTRAORDINARILY IMPORTANT SPHERE -- PROVIDING MANKIND WITH AN ESSENTIALLY INEXHAUSTIBLE SOURCE OF ENERGY. HERE YOU HAVE A FIELD FOR JOINT WORK. AND HERE, INCIDENTALLY, ONE NEEDS BOTH ENORMOUS EFFORTS ON THE PART OF SCIENTISTS AND GREAT EFFORTS ON THE PART OF THE TECHNICAL WORLD; TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS WHICH WOULD PROMOTE AND ACCELERATE TECHNICAL PROGRESS AND THAT OF TECHNOLOGY.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF POLITICAL RESULTS AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE MEETING, IT SEEMS TO ME IMPORTANT TO TAKE YET ANOTHER FACTOR INTO ACCOUNT. WE HAVE WITNESSED THE GREAT POLITICAL EFFECT OF THE MEETING. IT REVEALED AND ACTIVATED THE INTEREST OF THE WORLD PUBLIC IN THE PROBLEMS OF SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, THE DANGER OF THE ARMS RACE, AND THE NECESSITY OF NORMALIZING THE SITUATION.

I CANNOT FAIL TO MENTION, IN THIS CONNECTION, SEVERAL EPISODES. THE DAY BEFORE YESTERDAY, OUR MISSION WAS VISITED BY A GROUP OF LEADERS OF U.S. PACIFIST MOVEMENTS, HEADED BY THE PROMINENT POLITICIAN, JESSE JACKSON. I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT WE SAW AND CONTINUE TO SEE THEM AS WORTHY AND RESPECTED AMERICAN CITIZENS WHO REPRESENT MILLIONS OF INHABITANTS OF THE UNITED STATES WHO SIGNED THE ADDRESS TO PRESIDENT REAGAN AND MYSELF, WISHING US SUCCESS IN OUR MEETING, AND WITH SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE, INCLUDING AN APPEAL TO STOP NUCLEAR TESTS.

AMERICAN WAR VETERANS, WHO TOOK PART IN THE ELBE MEETING, ALSO CAME TO GENEVA. REPRESENTATIVES OF MANY PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, INCLUDING CHILDREN'S ORGANIZATIONS -- I BELIEVE LEONID MITRIFANOVICH HERE RECEIVED THEM AT MY REQUEST; IT WAS A VERY MOVING MEETING -- WERE ALSO HERE. NOT TO MENTION THE FACT THAT WE CONSTANTLY FELT THE POWERFUL SUPPORT AND SOLIDARITY OF OUR SOCIALIST FRIENDS AND THE NONALIGNED COUNTRIES. EVEN BEFORE THE MEETING, THE LEADERS OF SIX STATES: INDIA, MEXICO, ARGENTINA, TANZANIA, GREECE, AND SWEDEN, ADDRESSED US WITH A PROPOSAL TO FREEZE ALL KINDS OF NUCLEAR ARMS. WE VALUE THEIR INITIATIVE HIGHLY.

A GROUP -- A LARGE GROUP -- OF NOBEL PRIZE WINNERS PUT FORWARD A PROPOSAL WHICH I WAS PREPARED TO SIGN IMMEDIATELY, EXCEPT FOR ONE POINT. IT INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING WISH OR DEMAND: NOT TO DEPART OR LEAVE GENEVA UNTIL WE HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT. (LAUGHTER FROM HALL) BUT IT'S A BIT RISKY, AT THE MOMENT, TO GIVE ONE'S FULL AGREEMENT TO THIS BECAUSE ONE MIGHT NOT EVER RETURN TO ONE'S HOMELAND. (LAUGHTER) ALTHOUGH NOW I MIGHT HAVE THOUGHT DIFFERENTLY. I WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PUT MY SIGNATURE UNDER THIS POINT AS WELL.

(MORE)
21 NOV 1650Z BR

FBIS 124

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 15 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///POINT AS WELL.

LD211619

(TEXT) ESTEEMED LADIES AND GENTLEMEN; COMRADES. AT SHARP TURNING POINTS, AT PIVOTAL STAGES IN HISTORY, IT HAPPENS THAT MOMENTS OF TRUTH ARE SIMPLY AS VITAL AS AIR. THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION HAS BECOME TOO DANGEROUS BECAUSE OF THE INTENSIFIED ARMS RACE, AND THERE ARE TOO MANY FABLES BEING CONCOCTED ON THAT SCORE, FRIGHTENING PEOPLE. A REAL NEED HAS COME ABOUT TO BLOW AWAY THAT FOG AND TO VERIFY WORDS WITH DEEDS. YOU WON'T DO BETTER THAN WITH THE AID OF DIRECT TALKING, SUCH AS IS OFFERED USUALLY BY A SUMMIT MEETING. I ESPECIALLY HAVE IN MIND OUR STATES, CONSIDERING THEIR ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE WORLD. HERE THE DISCUSSION OF PROBLEMS IS TRANSLATED ON TO A NEW PLANE, WHERE IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO HIDE FROM THE TRUTH. AND SO, WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE GENERAL OUTCOME OF THE MEETING, THERE WILL HARDLY BE A CORRECT OR SOME SORT OF UNAMBIGUOUS EVALUATION.

FBIS 128

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 16 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///MEET AGAIN. (APPLAUSE)

LD211642

(TEXT) (UNIDENTIFIED VOICE) PLEASE, YOUR QUESTION FIRST.

(UNIDENTIFIED VOICE IN ENGLISH) PLEASE IDENTIFY YOURSELF.

(QUESTION IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) MR GENERAL SECRETARY, (JOHNSON), BBC TELEVISION NEWS, LONDON. MR GENERAL SECRETARY. PEOPLE IN THE WEST OFTEN ASK WHAT THE RESULTS OF THIS SUMMIT MEETING WILL BE FOR THE CORRELATION OF THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES, EAST AND WEST.

(GORBACHEV) I AM LOOKING TO THE FUTURE (?HERE), AND IF WE BEGIN TO ACT, NOT JUST IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, BUT ALSO IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, IN THE SPIRIT OF RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH I THINK NEVERTHELESS WAS PRESENT AT THE GENEVA MEETING, WE WILL FIND THE ANSWERS TO THE MOST VITAL PROBLEMS AND WAYS OF RESOLVING THEM. I AM DEEPLY CONVINCED OF THIS.

(QUESTION) VALENTIN ZORIN, SOVIET UNION. YOU HAVE SPOKEN OF THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TODAY, EVEN FOR A NEW WAY OF THINKING. HOW, SPECIFICALLY, DO YOU SEE THIS NEW APPROACH, NEW WAY OF THINKING?

(GORBACHEV) I AM CONVINCED THAT A NEW POLICY IS NEEDED FOR THE PRESENT STAGE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, WHICH ARE INTERLINKED, ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A GREAT INTERLINKAGE BETWEEN STATES, INTERDEPENDENCE. WE SEE A NEW APPROACH AS BEING THAT THE REALITIES OF THE MODERN WORLD WOULD UNDERLIE THE CONTEMPORARY POLICY OF ANY STATE. THAT IS THE MAIN PRECONDITION FOR THE FOREIGN POLICY OF STATES TO BE CONSTRUCTIVE, AND FOR ITS IMPLEMENTATION TO LEAD TO AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE WORLD SITUATION. THE PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND WAR ARE AT THE CENTER OF ALL WORLD POLITICS, A PARTICULAR CONCERN OF ALL PEOPLES. IN ALL COUNTRIES, IN THE DEVELOPED CAPITALIST, IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, THERE ARE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THERE ARE SOCIAL PROBLEMS, THERE ARE ECOLOGICAL PROBLEMS. THEY CAN BE MORE SUCCESSFULLY RESOLVED ON THE BASIS OF COOPERATION, MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. DIALOGUE IS NEEDED, AN EXPANSION OF COOPERATION AND OF TRADE IS NEEDED, A JOINING OF FORCES IS NEEDED. THIS MUST BE KEPT IN MIND. IN THE END, THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEVELOPING WORLD CANNOT BE SHUT OFF, SHUT OFF FROM WHAT IS BUILDING UP THERE.

WE MUST SEEK IN THIS NEW POLICY ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS OF THESE ENORMOUS CONTINENTS, ANSWERS WHICH CORRESPOND WITH THESE REALITIES. HERE THERE ARE HUNDREDS OF STATES WHICH ARE STRIVING FOR A BETTER LIFE. AND THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE -- I AM RETURNING TO IT -- IS THAT WE HAVE TO DO EVERYTHING TO STOP THE ARMS RACE. THIS IS NOW UNDERSTOOD BY ALL. IF THIS IS NOT DONE, ALL OUR REMAINING HOPES, PLANS AND ACTIONS MIGHT BE WORTH NOTHING. SO I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS THROUGH THE OLD APPROACHES, WHICH TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ONLY, WHERE POLICY IS EXCLUSIVELY BOUNDED BY PURELY EGOTISTICAL INTERESTS, ALTHOUGH THEY ARE PASSED OFF AS NATIONAL INTERESTS. (SENTENCE AS HEARD) A NEW POLICY IS NEEDED WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE PRESENT STAGE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL REALITIES WHICH HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE FORE BY THE VERY COURSE OF THE WORLD PROCESS.

(MORE)

FBIS 130

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 17 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///THE WORLD PROCESS.

LD211634

(TEXT) (QUESTION IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) OUR STATES JOINTLY DEFEATED FASCISM. DO YOU THINK THAT THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES CAN BE ALLIES AGAIN IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST FAMINE, POVERTY, TERRORISM, POLLUTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT, ILLNESSES?

(GORBACHEV) THANK YOU FOR REMEMBERING THAT IMPORTANT ERA OF OUR JOINT HISTORY. WE DO REMEMBER THIS; WE DO NOT FORGET. AND AS A RESULT OF THE GENEVA MEETING, THERE ARE, I THINK POSSIBILITIES FOR BROAD COOPERATION BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND PEOPLE. AND WHEN I SAY THIS I DO NOT OVERSIMPLIFY THE SITUATION: I KNOW THE DEPTH OF DIFFERENCES WHICH DIVIDE US NOW AND I DO RECOGNIZE THE REAL STATE OF PRESENT SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS; BUT I AM CONVINCED THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE -- INCLUDING COOPERATION IN PROBLEMS ABOUT WHICH YOU SPEAK. BUT I SIMPLY DO NOT WANT TO DEAL WITH THE NUANCES OF THESE PROBLEMS NOW. WE CAN RELEASE, IF WE STOP THE ARMS RACE, VAST MEANS TO COME TO THE AID OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. IF TODAY IN LATIN AMERICA A VAST NUMBER OF PEOPLE ARE STARVING -- AND THIS INCLUDES THE 50 PERCENT OF THE CHILDREN WHO ARE SUFFERING FROM MALNUTRITION, IT SEEMS -- I HAVE BEEN GIVEN DATA THAT WITH A REDUCTION BY ONLY SOME 5 TO 10 PERCENT, THIS PROBLEM CAN BE REMOVED. (AS HEARD) ALL THIS IS INDEED WORTHWHILE FOR US TO THINK ABOUT. I WELCOME YOUR QUESTION AND I THINK -- TO REPLY TO IT AFFIRMATIVELY -- I SAY THAT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT CERTAIN NUANCES DO NOT EXIST BETWEEN US ON THESE PROBLEMS, THE APPROACH TO THESE PROBLEMS.

(QUESTION) GOOD DAY, MY NAME IS RODGERS; I AM A CORRESPONDENT OF THE AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANY IN MOSCOW. (SENTENCE BEGUN IN RUSSIAN AND COMPLETED IN ENGLISH)

(GORBACHEV) WE HAVE MET BEFORE. (AUDIENCE LAUGHTER)

(RODGERS, IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED RUSSIAN) YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU ARE DISAPPOINTED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN'S REPLY ON STAR WARS. TELL ME, PLEASE: IS THE WORLD A SAFER PLACE THANKS TO YOUR MEETING?

(GORBACHEV) I THINK THAT I WOULD BE TAKING LIBERTIES IF I WERE TO CLAIM THAT EVEN IN THE PRESENCE -- THAT IS, WHEN THERE ARE THE SAME NUMBER OF WEAPONS AFTER THE MEETING AS BEFORE THE MEETING, THAT THE WORLD HAS BECOME SAFER. BUT IN ANY CASE, I THINK THE MEETING ITSELF, ITS RESULT, IS A DEFINITE CONTRIBUTION TO THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY, FOR IT LAYS THE FOUNDATIONS FOR A PATH TOWARD UNDERSTANDING, RESPECT, DIALOGUE -- THAT IS, EVERYTHING WHICH ASSISTS THE STRENGTHENING OF SECURITY. THUS, I THINK THAT IN THIS SENSE GENEVA HAS HAD A POLITICAL EFFECT ON US.

(MORE)

///EFFECT ON US.

LD211708

(TEXT) (QUESTION) MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH, WHAT SPECIFIC PRACTICAL STEPS COULD THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TAKE TO HALT THE ARMS RACE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE?

(GORBACHEV) IT SEEMED TO ME THAT I DEVOTED MY ENTIRE SPEECH TO THIS. HOWEVER, I SHOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT WE HAVE TO STOP. IF WE CAN AVOID AN ARMS RACE IN SPACE, WHAT WE HAVE CONTRIBUTED AND WHAT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS CONTRIBUTED, ENABLES US TO ADVANCE TOWARD EACH OTHER, TO SEEK COMPROMISES, TO SEEK PARITY AT A LOWER LEVEL. I COULD OF COURSE ADD, THERE IS A GOOD MECHANISM FOR THIS, THE GENEVA TALKS. I SHOULD LIKE TO ADD FURTHER THAT WE HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAS NOT YET SAID ITS LAST WORD ON THE BANNING OF ALL TESTS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE WHOLE WORLD IS IN FAVOR OF THIS, THE WHOLE WORLD. THE AMERICAN SIDE STILL HAS TIME TO THINK OVER THE SITUATION. THIS WOULD BE A TREMENDOUS STEP. I THINK THIS IS ANOTHER STEP WHICH WOULD SPEED UP THE PROCESS OF HALTING THE ARMS RACE AND REDUCING ARMAMENTS. I THINK IT WOULD FACILITATE THE PROCESS, THE GENEVA PROCESS, AND THE FURTHER INTENSIFYING OF THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE BETWEEN USSR AND U.S. LEADERSHIPS. WE AGREED TO EXPAND IT AND I THINK THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE TOP LEADERS OF OUR COUNTRIES TOO WILL FACILITATE THIS. AND ANOTHER THING; THE SUBJECT AT GENEVA, I REFER TO THE GENEVA TALKS WITH THEIR KNOWN SUBJECT AND AIMS, IS A MATTER FOR ALL PEOPLES, AND EACH PEOPLE, AND EACH RESPONSIBLE POLITICIAN, PARTICULARLY THE HEAD OF ONE STATE OR ANOTHER, MUST NOW TAKE A FIRM POSITION ON THIS MATTER. THIS WOULD BE OF TREMENDOUS SIGNIFICANCE. I THINK THAT AN ABSOLUTE, OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF POLITICIANS FAVOR SPEEDING UP THE PROCESS IN GENEVA AND FINDING WAYS TO HALT THE ARMS RACE AND GET ON WITH DISARMAMENT.

(QUESTION) GDR TELEVISION. I REPRESENT GDR TELEVISION: (HORST ANDARTIN). COMRADE GENERAL SECRETARY, I HAVE TWO QUESTIONS FOR YOU. THE FIRST QUESTION: COULD YOU PLEASE ASSESS AGAIN, IN YOUR OPINION, WHAT RESULTS, WHAT OUTCOME, IN YOUR OPINION, FOR YOU, ARE THE MOST VALUABLE, AS ONE MIGHT SAY THE MOST IMPORTANT FROM THESE TALKS? THE SECOND QUESTION: THIS IS THE SECOND TIME IN A MONTH AND A HALF THAT YOU HAVE MET LEADERS FROM CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. COULD YOU DESCRIBE THE ROLE OR SIGNIFICANCE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE AT SUMMIT LEVEL, OR AT THIS LEVEL AT THE PRESENT TIME IN SOLVING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES?

OF COURSE, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SO MUCH BETTER IF WE HAD REACHED AGREEMENT IN GENEVA ON THE MAIN, THE CENTRAL PROBLEM OF STOPPING THE ARMS RACE. THIS, UNFORTUNATELY, DID NOT HAPPEN. THE AMERICAN SIDE SO FAR HAS PROVED NOT READY FOR MAJOR DECISIONS. BUT ON THE WHOLE I THINK THAT THIS PROCESS COULD NOT HAVE BEEN COMPLETED IN THESE 2 DAYS, EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN HELD ON SUCH A WAVELENGTH. WE HAVE A MECHANISM. BUT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE MEETING THAT TOOK PLACE WAS TOO IMPORTANT AN EVENT TO EVALUATE IN SOME SORT OF SIMPLISTIC CATEGORIES. IT HAS PERMITTED A CLEARER UNDERSTANDING OF THE NATURE OF OUR DISAGREEMENTS, THE REMOVAL -- AT LEAST I THINK SO AND HOPE SO -- OF CERTAIN PREJUDICED EVALUATIONS IN RELATION TO THE USSR AND THE POLICY OF ITS LEADERSHIP, THE CLEARING AWAY OF THE ACCUMULATED, OR AT LEAST SOME OF THE ACCUMULATED PREJUDICES. IT MAY HAVE A FAVORABLE INFLUENCE ON THE FURTHER PROCESS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS. TRUST IS NOT RE-ESTABLISHED IN ONE GO. IT IS NOT AN EASY PROCESS. WE LISTENED ATTENTIVELY TO THE PRESIDENT'S ASSURANCES THAT THE UNITED STATES IS NOT STRIVING FOR SUPERIORITY AND DOES NOT WANT A NUCLEAR WAR. WE SINCERELY WANT THESE STATEMENTS TO BE CONFIRMED IN DEEDS. WE SHOULD LIKE TO LOOK AT THE MEETING AS THE BEGINNING OF A DIALOGUE WITH THE AIM OF GAINING CHANGES FOR THE BETTER, FOR THE BETTER BOTH IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, AND INDEED IN THE WORLD AS A WHOLE. AND IN THAT SENSE I WOULD RATE THE MEETING AS CREATING THE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING FORWARDS. SUCH, IN GENERAL OUTLINE, IS OUR EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GENEVA MEETING, AND THIS GIVES ME THE GROUNDS, AS I LEAVE HOSPITABLE GENEVA, TO VIEW THE FUTURE WITH OPTIMISM. COMMON SENSE MUST TRIUMPH. TILL WE MEET AGAIN. (APPLAUSE)

(MORE)
21 NOV 1703Z BR

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 19 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///SOLVING FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES?

LD211719

(TEXT) (GORBACHEV) IS THAT THE FIRST QUESTION? THE FIRST QUESTION...

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) NO, THE FIRST WAS: WHAT ARE THE MOST IMPORTANT (WORDS INDISTINCT -- DROWNED BY VOICES) AND SIGNIFICANCE.

(GORBACHEV) I WOULD STRESS, IN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION, FIRST OF ALL, THAT THE GENEVA MEETING WAS AN IMPORTANT STAGE IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. IT LAYS THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE QUEST TO IMPROVE AND NORMALIZE THEM ON ALL FRONTS AND IN THIS SENSE -- IF IT IS CONTINUED IN THE FUTURE, WITH JOINT EFFORTS FROM BOTH SIDES - IT WILL FURTHER THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION IN THE WORLD. I WOULD SAY THAT THIS IS A POLITICAL RESULT, SO TO SPEAK.

THE GENEVA MEETING -- AT THE CENTER OF ATTENTION DURING THE GENEVA MEETING WERE ISSUES WHICH TROUBLE ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD. AND THE JOINT STATEMENT BY THE LEADERS OF THE SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE FACT THAT THEY CONSIDER NUCLEAR WAR TO BE AN IMPOSSIBILITY (NEVOZMOZHNYY), THAT IT CANNOT BE STARTED, THAT THEY ARE NOT STRIVING FOR MILITARY SUPERIORITY, THAT THEY WILL GIVE A NEW IMPULSE TO THE GENEVA PROCESS, HAS IN ITSELF ENORMOUS SIGNIFICANCE IF IT IS CONSISTENTLY IMPLEMENTED WITH PRACTICAL STEPS. WELL, I ALSO THINK THAT THIS MEETING SHOWED THAT WHATEVER THE CONDITIONS, WE MUST STRIVE TO MAINTAIN POLITICAL DIALOGUE, WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE POSITIONS TO BE COMPARED, AND ENABLE US TO UNDERSTAND ONE ANOTHER BETTER ON THE BASIS WE SHOULD SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY-ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE TOPICAL PROBLEMS OF OUR AGE.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN FRENCH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) THE ITALIAN JOURNAL LE MATIN. MUCH IS SAID IN THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE LOSSES IT SUFFERED DURING WORLD WAR II. WHAT DOES MR GORBACHEV THINK 40 YEARS AFTER THE END OF THE WAR; WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO SEE A REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY?

(MORE)
21 NOV 18192 BR

FBIS 136

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 20 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY?

LD211728

(TEXT) (GORBACHEV) I THINK THAT ALL THESE QUESTIONS WERE DISCUSSED AND EXAMINED IN GREAT DEPTH IN THE COURSE OF THE HELSINKI PROCESS. AND THE HELSINKI PROCESS WAS THE COMMON VIEW OF ALL EUROPEAN STATES, TOGETHER WITH THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA. I THINK THAT THE HELSINKI PROCESS AND ALL (AS HEARD) AND THE FINAL ACT SIGNED BY ALL THE STATES DESERVE TO BE SUPPORTED AND DEVELOPED IN EVERY WAY BY US, AND PRECISELY HELSINKI PROVIDES THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION TOO.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) A QUESTION THERE, PLEASE.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN FRENCH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) YOU HAVE SAID THAT YOU COMPLETELY DISAGREE WITH THE UNITED STATES REGARDING STAR WARS. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS THIS AGAIN?

(GORBACHEV) I WOULD HAVE TO REPEAT AGAIN TO A SIGNIFICANT EXTENT WHAT I HAVE ALREADY SAID. BUT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO EXPRESS OUR POSITION IN A FEW WORDS. IT AMOUNTS TO THE FACT THAT WE ARE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE FRAME OF MIND AT THE NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. WE WILL STRIVE TO SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS IN ORDER TO STOP THE ARMS RACE AND ACHIEVE A RADICAL REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, SO THAT LATER, AT SOME STAGE OF THIS PROCESS, WE REALISTICALLY APPROACH THE QUESTION OF ALTOGETHER ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BY THEN WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF THE ENTIRE WORLD COMMUNITY. WE SAY FIRMLY THAT THIS IS POSSIBLE, THIS ACHIEVEMENT WOULD BE POSSIBLE IF THE DOOR TO THE ARMS RACE, TO EXPANDING THE ARMS RACE IN SPACE, WERE TO BE TIGHTLY SHUT BOTH BY THE SOVIET UNION AND BY AMERICA.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) YOUR QUESTION, PLEASE. NO, NO, NO, NO, NO (WORDS INDISTINCT)

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) THANK YOU. (WORDS INDISTINCT), ASSOCIATED PRESS.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) THE ASSOCIATED PRESS AGENCY.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) GO AHEAD, PLEASE.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) MR GORBACHEV, YOU SPOKE OF THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO THE STAR WARS PROGRAM AND THAT YOU DISCUSSED IT IN DETAIL. HOW DID THE PRESIDENT REACT TO YOUR ARGUMENTS REGARDING THE STAR WARS PROGRAM? DID HE EVALUATE YOUR ARGUMENTS? DO YOU SEE A POSSIBILITY OF SHIFTING THIS QUESTION OUT OF THE IMPASSE?

(GORBACHEV) I WOULD REPLY TO YOUR QUESTION LIKE THIS. I THINK THAT THE AMERICAN SIDE HAS EVERY REASON AFTER THE MEETING TO THINK OVER ALL THAT WHICH WE SAID. WE ARE HOPING FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF OUR ARGUMENTS. THEY ARE FOUNDED, WE THINK, ON A SENSE WHICH CORRESPONDS TO THE SPIRIT OF THE JANUARY ACCORD, NAMELY THAT AS THE RESULT OF THE GENEVA PROCESS WE SHOULD ENTER A ROAD OF RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON THE CONDITION OF PREVENTING, WITH A SIMULTANEOUS PREVENTION OF ARMS RACE IN SPACE (AS HEARD). AND THAT OBJECTIVE HAS BEEN DEFINED BY US. THE PRESIDENT CONSIDERED IT TO BE A SHIELD, BUT WE HAVE SHOWN, I HOPE CONVINCINGLY, THAT THESE SPACE WEAPONS COULD BE USED EQUALLY AGAINST MISSILES, AGAINST SATELLITES AND AGAINST FACILITIES ON EARTH. THESE SPACE WEAPONS ARE A NEW KIND OF WEAPONS AND THEREBY A NEW SPHERE OF ARMS RACE OPENS UP.

THEREFORE, IT IS UNACCEPTABLE. IT WOULD COMPLICATE THE ENTIRE SITUATION AND MAKE THE SITUATION AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA VERY PROBLEMMATIC. THEREFORE, I APPRECIATE THAT AT THE PRESIDENT'S LEVEL AND AT THE CPSU GENERAL SECRETARY'S LEVEL IT HAS BEEN EMPHASIZED THAT THE WORK WOULD BE ACCELERATED IN GENEVA IN THE COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE BASIS OF THE JANUARY ACCORD. NOW THIS IS A POINT OF VIEW REINFORCED NOT ONLY BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTERS' SIGNATURES BUT ALSO BY STATE LEADERS. WE VIEW THIS AS A SPECIFIC SIGNAL AND HOPE.

(MORE)

FBIS 137

(USIA ALERT)

TAKE 21 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///SIGNAL AND HOPE.

LD211742

(TEXT) (UNIDENTIFIED VOICE) WHAT IS YOUR QUESTION, PLEASE?

(UNIDENTIFIED VOICE IN ENGLISH, WITH SUPERIMPOSED TRANSLATION) PETER SNOW, BBC TELEVISION "NEWSNIGHT" PROGRAM. MR GENERAL SECRETARY, I REPRESENT THE BBC. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO NEGOTIATE AN END TO THE ARMS RACE IN SPACE, WILL YOU BE ABLE TO KEEP UP WITH AMERICAN TECHNOLOGY IN THIS FIELD, OR WILL YOU BE LEFT BEHIND?

(GORBACHEV) HERE YOU HAVE TOUCHED ON A VERY INTERESTING QUESTION. I HAVE TRIED TO SAY TO MR PRESIDENT IN A FRANK AND DIRECT CONVERSATION THAT, AS IT SEEMS TO ME, MUCH IN AMERICAN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE SOVIET UNION IS BASED ON MISCONCEPTIONS. IN ONE CASE, THEY HAVE IT IN THEIR MINDS, THAT BY THE ARMS RACE, BY CONTINUING IT, THEY WILL EXHAUST THE SOVIET UNION ECONOMICALLY, WEAKEN ITS INFLUENCE IN THE WORLD AND THUS GIVE THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA A FREE HAND. HISTORY HAS SHAMED THESE PROPHETS. THERE WAS A TIME WHEN OUR SOCIETY HAD DIFFERENT POTENTIAL AND CAPACITIES. NOW WE HAVE TREMENDOUS CAPACITIES, AND THIS MISCONCEPTION IS SIMPLY A HINDRANCE TO CONDUCTING A REALISTIC POLICY. THERE HAVE BEEN MISCONCEPTIONS IN THE MILITARY SPHERE TOO. THEY TRIED TO OVERTAKE US, THEY INVENTED THE INTERCONTENTIAL BALLISTIC MISSILE, THE RESPONSE CAME, WITH A LITTLE TIME LAG, BUT IT CAME. THEN MULTIPLE WARHEADS APPEARED. THE RESPONSE CAME. WE HAVE ALWAYS FOUND A RESPONSE.

IT SEEMS TO ME, THERE IS AN ILLUSION IN MILITARY CIRCLES, WHICH HAS APPARENTLY BEEN TRANSMITTED IN SOME DEGREE TO POLITICAL CIRCLES, AND IN PARTICULAR POSSIBLY TO THE PRESIDENT -- THOUGH I AM NOT ASSERTING THAT THIS IS SO, BUT WE HAVE FORMED THIS IMPRESSION -- THAT THE AMERICANS HAVE A CERTAIN LEAD IN CERTAIN ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY, IN PARTICULAR AS REGARDS COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND RADIO TECHNOLOGY. AGAIN THERE APPEARS THE DESIRE TO SEIZE THIS AND ACHIEVE AN ADVANTAGE, AND HERE AGAIN THAT FINE WINGED PHRASE RESOUNDS THROUGH THE AIR, JOHNSON'S PHRASE, PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S. HE ONCE SAID, LONG AGO, THAT THE NATION WHICH RULES IN SPACE WILL ALSO RULE ON EARTH. SOME PEOPLE ARE RUBBING THEIR HANDS OVER THIS; THEY ARE SO KEEN, YOU SEE, TO ACHIEVE THIS WORLD SUPREMACY, TO LOOK DOWN ON THE WHOLE WORLD FROM ABOVE -- OLD AMBITIONS, FROM THOSE YEARS.

THE WORLD HAS CHANGED A LOT IN MANY RESPECTS. SO IF ONE SPEAKS OF THIS SO-CALLED TECHNOLOGICAL SUPERIORITY WHICH THEY CONTEMPLATE REALIZING WITH THE SDI, THUS PUTTING THE SOVIET UNION IN A DIFFICULT POSITION, THIS IS ANOTHER MISCONCEPTION. A RESPONSE WILL BE FOUND. I SAID TO THE PRESIDENT, BEAR IN MIND, MR PRESIDENT, YOU DO NOT HAVE SIMPLETONS SITTING IN FRONT OF YOU. AND IF THE PRESIDENT WAS GRIPPED BY THIS IDEA, THEN IT WAS MY OBLIGATION AS GENERAL SECRETARY, INDEED IT IS THE OBLIGATION OF ALL THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, TO GO THOROUGHLY INTO THIS; AFTER ALL, THIS IS THE PRESIDENT'S POINT OF VIEW TO GO INTO THIS IDEA. WE CONSIDERED IT AND CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT IF WE PROCEED ALONG THIS ROAD, AND THERE IS A CERTAIN PROPOSAL FROM THE AMERICAN SIDE, -- LET'S SEE, LET'S STUDY IT, IN GENERAL, LET US DISCUSS NOT THE QUESTION OF NOT PERMITTING THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, BUT WHAT WEAPONS TO TAKE INTO SPACE -- THEN WE ARE AGAINST THIS. WE ARE AGAINST THE RACE. WE ANALYZED THE OTHER SIDE OF THE QUESTION TOO. ALL RIGHT, IF THE AMERICANS DO NOT ACCEPT OUR ARGUMENTS AND OUR GOOD WILL, SO THAT WE COULD AT LEAST START ALONG THE ROAD OF A REDUCTION IN ARMAMENTS, THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, THOSE WHICH NOW EXIST, AND IF THEY TAKE THIS OTHER COURSE, WE SHALL OF COURSE FIND A RESPONSE. AND THE INSTRUCTIONS WHICH THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP GAVE IN THE PAST TO THE COMPETENT AUTHORITES, ORGANIZATIONS AND SCIENTISTS SHOW THAT OUR RESPONSE WILL BE EFFECTIVE, AND LESS EXPENSIVE, AND THAT IT CAN BE IMPLEMENTED IN A SHORTER PERIOD.

BUT OUR POLITICAL CHOICE DOES NOT CONSIST OF THIS, NOT OF WELCOMING SUCH A TURN OF EVENTS, THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED ALONG THE ROAD OF A SUITABLE RESPONSE TO THE SDI, BUT THAT WE SHOULD ALL THE SAME THINK OVER THE SITUATION AND PURSUE A RESPONSIBLE POLICY ON THE BASIS OF COMMON SENSE, ON THE BASIS OF THE MOOD AND THE LONGINGS OF PEOPLE, AND NOT WHIP UP, NOT COMPLICATE, THIS MOST ACUTE PROBLEM OF EXTERNAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

(MORE)

///EXTERNAL INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.

LD211756

(TEXT) (QUESTION) CZECHOSLOVAK TELEVISION AND RUDE PRAVO NEWSPAPER. COMRADE GORBACHEV, I HAVE A VERY SHORT QUESTION: IN WHICH SPECIFIC AND PRACTICAL SPHERES CAN YOU SEE THE POSSIBILITIES FOR DEVELOPING SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS AFTER THE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN.

(GORBACHEV) (?I THINK) THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE WILL BROADEN; WE HAVE AGREED TO VISIT EACH OTHER, AND THE DIALOGUE WILL BE CONDUCTED AT VARIOUS LEVELS, CONSULTATIONS WILL TAKE PLACE. THIS VERY FACT, I THINK, HAS TO BE WELCOMED. WE SHALL HAVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION IN THOSE SPHERES ON WHICH WE HAVE AGREED. I THINK THAT WE SHALL CONTINUE, AND WILL BROADEN OUR CONSULTATIONS ON THE EXAMINATION OF REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND THE STATE OF THE SITUATION IN VARIOUS REGIONS. AND FINALLY, WE HOPE THAT IN BOTH OUR BUSINESS CIRCLES AND IN AMERICAN BUSINESS CIRCLES THE MUTUAL INTEREST WILL BE PRESERVED. I KNOW THIS FOR CERTAIN. I THINK THAT CHANGES IN OUR RELATIONS, IF THEY FOLLOW SUCH A DIRECTION WILL ALSO MAKE IT POSSIBLE TO DEVELOP THE SCALE OF THIS COOPERATION IN THIS SPHERE AS WELL. I TELL YOU THAT WE ARE READY TO INVITE AMERICAN BUSINESS CIRCLES TO TAKE PART IN CARRYING OUT LARGE PROJECTS. WE HAVE GREAT PLANS. WE ARE DOING A LOT AT PRESENT WITH WEST EUROPEANS TO RAISE HIGHER AND TO BROADEN THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR ECONOMIC COOPERATION; WE WELCOME THIS. AND THEN I HAVE EXPRESSED THE VIEW TO MR PRESIDENT THAT ONE MUST NOT UNDERESTIMATE THIS SPHERE OF ECONOMIC MUTUAL RELATIONS, FIRST OF ALL BECAUSE (PAUSES) -- NOT BECAUSE AMERICA CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT SUCH ECONOMIC RELATIONS OR THAT WE CANNOT SURVIVE WITHOUT AMERICA, BUT, THANK GOD, WE SHALL SURVIVE AND I HOPE AMERICA WILL SURVIVE TOO -- BUT BECAUSE THIS IS A MATERIAL BASE FOR POLITICAL RELATIONS, A BASE FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS, FOR THE CREATION AND FORMATION OF A SITUATION OF TRUST, BROADENING OF CONTACTS ALSO AT THIS LEVEL. OPENLY SPEAKING, THROUGH THE ECONOMY WE GET MORE DEPENDENT ON EACH OTHER, AND THIS DEPENDENCE THEN IS REFLECTED IN SOLUTION OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS TOO. I THINK THE FURTHER BROADENING OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; WE ARE NOT BARGING IN UNINVITED, FOR GOODNESS SAKE. (LAUGHTER)?

(UNIDENTIFIED VOICE) LAST QUESTION.

(GORBACHEV) YES, AND I SHALL FLY.

(DIFFERENT UNIDENTIFIED VOICE) LAST QUESTION PLEASE.

TAKE 23 OF 23 -- 063 (GORBACHEV PRESS CONFERENCE)

///ON THE PLANE.

LD211805

(TEXT) (UNIDENTIFIED VOICE IN ENGLISH WITH SUPERIMPOSED RUSSIAN TRANSLATION) FROM ARAB REPORT, LEBANON. TALKING ABOUT REGIONAL QUESTIONS, HAVE YOU DISCUSSED THE MIDDLE EAST, AND IN PARTICULAR LEBANON? IF YES, WERE THE ATTITUDES OF THE TWO LEADERS VERY MUCH DIFFERENT? WHAT ARE YOUR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF EVENTS IN THIS REGION?

(GORBACHEV) IN OUR MEETING WE DEALT MORE WITH THE THEORETICAL SIDE OF THE PROBLEM, AND ALTHOUGH THE REGIONS OF CENTRAL AMERICA, THE NEAR EAST, AND AFRICA WERE MENTIONED, STILL VIRTUALLY ALL THE TIME WAS DEVOTED TO EXAMINING THE THEORETICAL SIDE OF THESE QUESTIONS, AND WE AGREED TO CONTINUE POLITICAL CONSULTATIONS AND TO EXPAND THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERACTION ON REGIONAL PROBLEMS.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH, AS ALWAYS, THE WRITER SEMENOV INSISTS. (AS HEARD)

GORBACHEV) I RESPECT THE WRITER SEMENOV, YET HE IS ALSO A JOURNALIST TO A CONSIDERABLE EXTENT.

(UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER) MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH, JUST NOW YOU SAID A FINE PHRASE: WE MUST STUDY THE ART OF LIVING TOGETHER. MY EXPERIENCE AS A WRITER SAYS THAT SINCE THE MISERABLE MACARTHY ERA, U.S. FILMS AND TELEVISION HAVE UNFORTUNATELY DRAWN AN IMAGE OF SOVIET MAN FOR THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AS SOME SORT OF MONSTER. DO YOU THINK THAT NOW, AFTER THE GENEVA MEETING, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO TAKE A FRESH LOOK AT SUCH A CONCEPT AND SPEAK MORE OBJECTIVELY, SO TO SPEAK, ABOUT THE SOVIET PEOPLE AS A PARTNER OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE?

(GORBACHEV) YOU KNOW, COMRADE SEMENOV, I'LL PUT IT THIS WAY, YOU SHOULDN'T PUT ALL THE BLAME ON POLITICAL LEADERS. (LAUGHTER) WE POLITICAL LEADERS HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT TO EXPAND CULTURAL CONTACTS AND EXCHANGES. THIS INCLUDES THE AREA OF MOVIES. YOU WILL MEET EACH OTHER, SO WHY NOT REACH AGREEMENT WITH EACH OTHER? (LAUGHTER) WE MUST ACT IN THE SPIRIT OF GENEVA, NAMELY IN THE SPIRIT OF FACILITATING AN IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS. (APPLAUSE)

GOODBYE. I HOPE THAT WE WILL HAVE MORE MEETINGS. (APPLAUSE)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

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U.S. FACT SHEET

MAGNETIC FUSION RESEARCH

Fusion is the energy source of the sun. Magnetic fusion (also known as controlled thermonuclear fusion) is the process of combining together hydrogen nuclei to produce helium, with the release of energy. This requires raising the hydrogen to a very high temperature (millions of degrees) and confining the plasma with strong magnetic fields. The essential features of this process have been demonstrated circa 1983 in several devices in various laboratories.

Since the 1950s, scientists of several nations have been engaged in magnetic fusion energy research. Steady progress has been made toward understanding the underlying problems of magnetic fusion.

Magnetic fusion energy offers the potential for an inexhaustible supply of energy in the mid-to-late twenty-first century, but there are many unanswered questions that need to be solved and economic problems which must be overcome before practical and commercial use of fusion is realized.

The United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan all have fusion energy research programs, and there is a substantial amount of cooperation between them. For example, U.S. and Soviet scientists regularly visit each other's laboratories, and both sides have benefitted from these exchanges.

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev today advocated the widest practical development of international cooperation in obtaining this source of energy which is essentially inexhaustible for the benefit of all mankind.

The United States and the Soviet Union are consulting with other countries with resources and expertise to contribute to this research effort.

Regarding the transfer of technology, the basic knowledge of fusion devices is well understood by scientists of many nations, and advanced devices have been designed and operated by several nations, including the Soviet Union. U.S. and allied participation in this project will, as always, be governed by strict adherence to existing COCOM guidelines to prevent the transfer of sensitive technology with military potential.

# # #

Qs and As on Fusion Project

Q: Aren't we giving away sensitive technology? Will such international cooperation compromise hard-won COCOM controls on technology transfer?

A: THE SOVIET UNION IS A WORLD LEADER IN FUSION AND OPERATES A FUSION REACTOR SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TOKAMAK FUSION TEST REACTOR (TFTR) AT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY. TOKAMAK IS AN ACRONYM TAKEN FROM FOUR RUSSIAN WORDS: TOROID (MEANING CYLINDER OR DOUGHNUT, WHICH REPRESENTS THE CONFIGURATION OF THE HEART OF THE MACHINE), KAMERA (MEANING CHAMBER), MAGNIT (MEANING MAGNET), AND KATUSHKA (MEANING COIL). THIS SERVES TO REMIND US THAT THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT FOR THE TOKAMAK AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS TAKEN UP BY THE OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS IN FUSION.

COOPERATIVE FUSION RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RESULT IN THE TRANSFER OF COCOM CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. U.S. AND ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM WOULD BE GOVERNED BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO COCOM WITH NO EXCEPTIONS. THE "NO EXCEPTIONS" POLICY IS IMPORTANT TO SUSTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR CURRENT COOPERATIVE REGIME WITH THE ALLIES ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

Q: If other Western countries don't join, will the U.S. and USSR proceed on a bilateral basis?

A: THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN TOGETHER TO DEVELOP MAGNETIC FUSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WILL WILL BE ATTRACTIVE, AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO PARTICIPATE.

Q: Why are you reducing the fusion budget in the U.S. and at the same time agreeing to this project?

A: THE ADMINISTRATION'S REDUCTION IN THE U.S. FUSION RESEARCH BUDGETS REFLECTS OUR LONG-TERM VIEW THAT THERE ARE MANY FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE SOLVED. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR FIRST PRIORITY HAS BEEN TO STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC RESEARCH BASE AND INCREASE AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO ANSWER THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS. A MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE VENTURE WILL PERMIT US TO POOL RESOURCES.

Q: What is the status of the USSR magnetic fusion research program relative to the United States?

A: THE USSR HAS MAINTAINED A POSITION OF ROUGH SCIENTIFIC PARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. IN BASIC FUSION RESEARCH. THEY ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING FOUR MAJOR TOKAMAK DEVICES, EACH OF WHICH IS DESIGNED TO EXPLORE AN ASPECT OF THE FUSION PROCESS. THEY APPARENTLY ARE PLANNING A FIFTH SUCH DEVICE. THEY ALSO HAVE EXPERIMENTAL FUSION DEVICES BASED ON DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES FROM THE TOKAMAK. SO THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY BROAD FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAM COMPARABLE IN SCOPE TO OUR OWN.

Q: Will this research have relevance for SDI?

A: THE OBJECTIVES OF MAGNETIC FUSION RESEARCH AND SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.

Q: What specific projects will this cooperative venture undertake?

A: IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO EVALUATE RESEARCH TO DATE IN ORDER TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE OPTIMUM NEXT STEP TOWARD THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF FUSION ENERGY. IT WILL ALSO TAKE TIME TO CONSULT ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND TO WORK OUT AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COSTS. THE INTEREST OF THE TWO LEADERS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS EVALUATION IS A PRIORITY EFFORT.

Q: What other countries qualify for participation?

A. WE CERTAINLY WANT PARTICIPATION FROM THE OTHER TECHNICALLY ADVANCED COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAMS -- THE EC COUNTRIES AND JAPAN. OTHER COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE TO CONTRIBUTE MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.

Q: If you restrict sensitive technologies, won't you be tying one hand behind your back in what is already a very problematic technological engineering feat?

A: OUR FUSION ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM TO DATE HAS PROGRESSED STEADILY USING UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGY. U.S. AND SOVIET SCIENTISTS ROUTINELY VISIT EACH OTHER'S LABORATORIES.

ANY MULTINATIONAL PROJECT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN EXISTING COCOM GUIDELINES TO PREVENT TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY WITH MILITARY POTENTIAL.

Q: Was this a U.S. or a Soviet initiative?

A: SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN OCTOBER. WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY STUDIED THE IDEA AND CONCLUDED IT HAS MERIT, AND HAVE MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OUR OWN ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS A NATURAL PROGRESSION OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR AS WELL AS OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FUSION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

Q: Won't this project divert funds from the Administration's SDI initiative?

A: THE U.S. SHARE OF SUCH A PROJECT WOULD REQUIRE A MUCH SMALLER COMMITMENT OF FUNDS THAN THE SDI, SO THERE IS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR DIVERSION. IN ADDITION, THE OBJECTIVES OF FUSION RESEARCH AND THE SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, AND EACH DESERVES SUPPORT ON ITS OWN MERITS.

Q: It is reported that the DOD is against this proposal. Why? Has this been resolved satisfactorily?

A: ALL OF US BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH NEED EXPLORATION PRIOR TO A FINAL DECISION, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, COST SHARING AND PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF A JOINT PROJECT. ALL USG AGENCIES HAVE AGREED THAT THESE ISSUES REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

Q: Do you expect Eastern European countries and China to take part, and if so, what can they contribute?

A: WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING SHARING OF COSTS.

Q: What has been achieved by the Fusion Exchange Agreement signed in 1973?

A: THE U.S. HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USSR SINCE 1973 UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS RENEWED IN 1983, CALLS FOR SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ON EXCHANGE PROJECTS OF INTERESTS. CURRENTLY THERE ARE TWELVE EXCHANGES OF TEAMS OF SCIENTISTS, SIX TO THE USSR FROM THE U.S. AND SIX VICE VERSA.

THE U.S. HAS BENEFITTED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE BREADTH OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM ITS CONSIDERABLE THEORETICAL CAPABILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELDS WHICH RECEIVE LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. PROGRAM. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE TWICE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED THE DIRECTION OF THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM: (1) SOVIET EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON TOKOMAKS COMPLETELY CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE U.S. PROGRAM, AND (2) A SOVIET DEMONSTRATION EVENTUALLY LED TO THE TANDEM MIRROR PROGRAM AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 AM Local
4:00 AM EST

November 21, 1985

U.S. FACT SHEET

US-USSR GENERAL EXCHANGES AGREEMENT

On November 21, 1985, the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a general exchanges agreement in Geneva. Formal cultural and educational exchanges with the Soviet Union have existed for more than twenty-five years. The signing of this Agreement is the culmination of a one and a half year process which began in June, 1984 when President Reagan announced that the U.S. was prepared to initiate negotiations on this important agreement.

More Direct Contact Between U.S. and Soviet Peoples

In last Thursday's Address to the Nation on his meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan said, "enduring peace requires openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly." Over the years a major vehicle for this important process has been the General Exchanges Agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This agreement is a concrete expression of that desire.

Goals

In addition to the mutual benefit that comes from sharing expertise, resources, and data in solving common problems, and the cultural richness both sides gain from sharing their best with each other, exchange programs also can help break down barriers, lessen distrust, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more open world. As the President said in his 1984 speech to the Smithsonian conference on U.S.-Soviet Exchanges: "Civilized people everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible."

What the Agreement Includes

Specific exchange activities addressed in this agreement include:

-- reciprocal U.S. and Soviet traveling thematic exhibits on aspects of each country's life and society, to travel throughout the other country accompanied by language qualified guides;

-- exchanges of at least ten individual performers and at least ten major performing arts groups of each country;

-- expansion of academic and educational exchanges, including: 15 Fulbright teaching professors, 40 long-term IREX researchers, language teacher training programs, language teacher exchange, exchanges between archives and joint seminars;

-- exchanges in a wide variety of professional fields such as art, theater, sports, film, architecture, music, law, journalism, medicine, museums, radio and television;

-- exchanges of publications, including book exhibits, magazines, technical publications between libraries;

more (OVER)

-- distribution in the Soviet Union of the magazine America Illustrated and in the United States of Soviet Life;

-- exchanges of parliamentarians and other government officials at federal, state, and local levels;

-- expansion of civic and social organization exchanges as tourism and sports contacts.

Background

Official exchange agreements between the U.S. and the Soviet Union have existed since 1958. The American National Exhibition provided the setting for the famous 1959 Nixon-Khrushchev "kitchen debate." From 1959-72, these activities were sustained by a series of two-year agreements. On June 19, 1973, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a six-year agreement. U.S.-Soviet exchanges expanded through the 1970s when there were nearly a dozen bilateral cooperative agreements in force in cultural, educational, and scientific and technological fields.

The Exchanges Agreement, while between governments, paves the way for the U.S. private sector to be deeply involved in exchanges. Universities, dance companies, theater groups, athletic organizations, churches, and professional organizations of doctors, lawyers, can all invite their Soviet counterparts to visit the United States for conferences, concerts, tours, professional symposia. In return Americans will pay return visits to all corners of the Soviet Union.

President Reagan has repeatedly called for increased access to television and other media in both countries by agreed representatives. In his speech of last week, the President asked, "If Soviet spokesmen are free to appear on American television, to be published and read in the American press, shouldn't the Soviet people have the same right to see, hear, and read what we Americans have to say?" The agreement now includes the principle of television appearances by representatives of each country.

# # #

Q's and A's on a New U.S.-USSR Exchanges Agreement

Q: How is this agreement better than the previous one? What have we learned?

A: -- The previous exchanges agreement with the USSR was a solid, well-balanced document. The results of the agreements varied; on balance, however, it opened channels of communication, expanded our knowledge of the Soviet people and the Soviet system, and increased Soviet understanding of the United States and its people. All elements of the old agreement have been included in the new.

-- In addition, we have strengthened the portion on academic exchanges, making more specific the obligations of the two sides. Language has also been added assuring greater balance and representation in the selection of US performing artists for travel to the Soviet Union.

Q: If we have this agreement, why did the President raise other exchange programs separately?

A: -- Negotiations on this agreement began in the summer of 1984. The agreement covers a number of specific, traditional programs, some of which were continued in the absence of an official agreement, such as academic exchanges and the reciprocal distribution of America Illustrated and Soviet Life. The President asked that

these negotiations come to fruition when ready. To improve mutual understanding, however, the President also felt the need to reach out to the Soviet people with a range of new, bold initiatives, beyond the scope of the agreement.

Q:: Why have you suddenly rediscovered the value of exchanges with the Soviet Union after breaking them off after Afghanistan?

A: -- We have hardly "suddenly discovered the value of exchanges." You will recall the President's eloquent statement on the value of genuine people-to-people contacts in his January 16, 1984, speech when he talked about the views and aspirations of average people in both countries. Then on June 27, 1984, he emphasized the need to establish better contacts between our governments and peoples. He also announced that we were beginning negotiations on a new exchanges agreement and called for the reinvigoration of our other bilateral exchanges.

-- Private exchanges of students, athletes, musicians and entertainers have continued at a steady pace throughout this period.

-- The President's Exchanges Initiatives do not signal a change in our policy toward Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As the President said in his June 1984 speech on US-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges "Our proposals . . . are not a signal that we have forgotten Afghanistan. We'll continue to demonstrate our sympathy and strong support for the Afghan people. The United States will support their struggle to end the Soviet occupation and to reestablish an independent and neutral Afghanistan."

Q: Was this agreement hurried through so that we would have something to sign in Geneva, something to deflect attention from arms control?

A: -- No. Negotiations on this agreement began in the summer of 1984. They were conducted for more than a year in a professional and business-like manner on both sides. The agreement was concluded when we reached a text that was satisfactory to both sides.

-- Obviously, we are pleased to have the opportunity to sign the agreement here in Geneva. There was no desire on our part to "rush" this important agreement, but we also saw no reason why it could not be completed during this meeting.

Q: Why do we need an exchanges agreement at all?

A: -- We do not have, as a rule, cultural or educational exchanges agreements with other countries. It is our preference to let America's own rich, vibrant cultural and academic world interact freely with other societies without governmental involvement. In the case of the Soviet Union, the USG finds it advantageous to have an official bilateral exchanges agreement to ensure reciprocity. It is our experience that with regard to Soviet exchanges, most American academic and other private institutions also find USG involvement advantageous.

Q: Does the absence of an official exchanges agreement mean there have been no exchanges over the last 5 years?

A: -- No. There have been numerous and various private exchanges between the U.S. and USSR. The USG encourages these people-to-people contacts. The exchanges agreement is in no way restrictive and places no limits on private sector initiatives.

-- In addition, certain programs which fell under the old agreement, and which are part of the new one, continued in force in the absence of an agreement. Academic exchanges continued, although at reduced

levels, and the reciprocal exchange of publications -- USIA's America Illustrated and the USSR's Soviet Life -- was also maintained.

Q: What are the major features of this agreement?

A: -- There are four major parts of the agreement:

- o (1) reciprocal traveling thematic exhibitions in each country staffed by language-qualified guides;
- o (2) academic and educational exchanges;
- o (3) performing arts exchanges, groups and individuals; and
- o (4) the exchange of America Illustrated and Soviet Life.

Q: Won't the KGB only exploit expanded exchanges to place more of its agents in the U.S.?

A: -- Under current practice, the U.S. Government carefully reviews each proposed exchangee and program.

-- We believe that the measures currently in place are effective and yet consonant with our desire to learn from Soviet exchangees and to expose them to American education, values, and our society at large.

Q: Why take the risk of letting Soviets in at all? Why not keep them all out and eliminate all risks of espionage?

A: -- All democratic countries have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible. The Soviet practice of sealing their people off and filtering and controlling contacts and the flow of information is a primary problem which led the President to call for more exchanges between our countries.

-- United States citizens rightfully believe that their society is among the most free, most prosperous, and the most conducive to creativity and free expression. There is much to gain from exposing large numbers of Soviet citizens to our way of life.

-- At the same time we will continue to protect our national security by carefully screening each applicant for a visa and taking all appropriate steps to ensure that espionage agents are not permitted to enter the United States.

Q: Just what are the benefits we get from these exchange programs?

A: -- Societies everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad, deep, and free as possible. By encouraging exchanges of American and Soviet citizens in the arts, education, science, sports, and other fields we hope to expose increasingly large and influential segments of Soviet society to our values, intentions, and goals.

-- Additionally, we hope to learn more about Soviet society and practices as well as to build relationships with Soviet academic, scientific, and intellectual leaders over a wide spectrum of their society. There are also very real benefits that come when exchanges of information and access to the other country's institutions reduce unwarranted suspicions and build confidence in our ability to discuss and resolve mutual problems. All of this forms a part of the President's efforts to strengthen the peace.

Q: Don't these exchanges initiatives imply a return to business as usual with the Soviets when they continue to ignore US requests on human rights issues?

A: -- We have made clear that human rights will remain a crucial factor in U.S.-Soviet relations. This agreement on exchanges does not in any way detract from the requirement for the Soviet Union to live up to its human rights commitments , nor does it mean that the nor does it mean that the U.S. cares any less about the fate of individuals subjected to human rights abuses in the Soviet Union.

-- By exposing large numbers of Soviet citizens to American values and our way of life, we will keep faith with those in the Soviet Union who are pursuing a more democratic and just society.

-- In protesting actions which suppress basic human rights we must not take out our indignation on those not responsible. That is why the President feels we should broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better on a direct basis.

-- Cooperation between the US and USSR over many years in scientific and technical fields such as atomic energy, environmental protection, housing and construction, and many others, has yielded many scientific benefits. These benefits arise from combining resources, drawing on each other's expertise or gaining access to unique institutions or geographical areas.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

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U.S. FACT SHEET

EXCHANGE OF CONSULATES - KIEV AND NEW YORK

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to open consulates in Kiev and New York, on the basis of full reciprocity in staffing and administrative arrangements. In the Soviet view, this exchange of consulates is contingent on the successful outcome of negotiations on the resumption of civil air service between the two countries. Both sides will conduct further discussions on the specific conditions under which the consulates will be occupied and opened for business.

At the 1974 meeting between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev, it was agreed to an exchange of consulates in Kiev and New York. Arrangements had proceeded and both countries had advance teams in place looking toward formal opening in 1979 when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. The advance parties were then withdrawn.

In the summer of 1983, we agreed in principle to again move to open in Kiev and New York. Forward progress was stalled by the Soviets, who tied the opening of the consulates with negotiations to resume Aeroflot service. We did not accept their linkage of these issues, and continued to pursue each issue on its own merits.

This agreement on opening consulates is in pursuit of the President's desire to expand contacts and enhance understanding between our two peoples. It is a useful and practical step for both the United States and the Soviet Union. A consulate in Kiev will give us an official American presence in an important Soviet agricultural, cultural and commercial center, which is visited annually by thousands of American tourists.

# # #

Exchange of Consulates - Kiev and New York

Q: When will our Consulates be open?

A: -- We will be discussing specifics with the Soviets in the coming months.

-- We hope to move the issues forward as quickly as possible. Both sides have much to gain in cooperating in the timely and fair resolution of these administrative details.

-- In keeping with our policy of strict reciprocity, our consulates will open for business simultaneously.

Q: Have we settled on a final Consulate office building in Kiev? What will our facilities be like there?

A: -- A US inspection team visited Kiev the week of November 11 to consider potential properties for our consulate.

-- We are continuing to discuss administrative arrangements with the Soviets on this issue.

Q: Why did you choose to open the new consulate in Kiev?

A: -- The US now has posts in Moscow and Leningrad.

-- Kiev is the third most important city in the USSR in terms of cultural and economic accomplishments. It is

a major manufacturing and scientific center.

-- It is visited by thousands of American tourists each year, including many members of the Ukrainian-American community.

Q: What will the consulate in Kiev do?

A: -- Once it has officially opened, the consulate in Kiev will provide the full range of consular services to Americans and Soviets within its consular district.

-- This includes representing the interests of Americans visiting the Ukraine and issuing visas to Soviets traveling to the US from the Ukraine.

-- In addition, the officers of the consulate will maintain contacts with government authorities in the Ukraine (the second most populous Soviet republic, with over fifty million inhabitants), keep the US government informed of developments there, and expand trade and cultural contacts with the region.

Q: Why are we reopening consulates now when we pulled out of Kiev following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Does our agreement to exchange consulates with the Soviets mean we no longer object to their presence in Afghanistan?

A: -- Our agreement on consulates does not signal a change in our policy toward the Soviet occupation of

Afghanistan. We have repeatedly made clear to the Soviets our feelings on this subject and we continue to demonstrate our sympathy and support for the Afghan people.

-- Our agreement on consulates is fully in keeping with the President's desire to expand contacts between our two peoples.

-- An official US presence in Kiev is an ideal opportunity to foster understanding between the United States and the citizens of an important cultural, commercial and agricultural area of the Soviet Union.

Q: Why are we letting the Soviets bring more diplomats to the United States? Won't they all be spies?

A: -- Our agreement to open consulates is governed by strict reciprocity.

-- We will insist on strict equality in the size of the US and Soviet consulate staffs.

-- We are fully committed to a policy of substantive equality with the Soviets. We are increasing the number of Americans employed at Embassy Moscow and we expect the overall Soviet presence in the US to decrease. Consulate staffing is only one part of that issue.

Q: What will be the size of the consulate?

A: --I do not have specifics on the staffing at this time.

Q: Do we intend to have Soviets working for us in Kiev? Will we have any Soviet staff members?

A: -- I doubt it. However, we do not have specifics for you on this at this time.

THE WHITE HOUSE

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(Geneva, Switzerland)

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November 21, 1985

U.S. FACT SHEET

North Pacific Air Safety Agreement

The US, Japan, and the USSR signed an agreement November 19 on procedures to implement the North Pacific [NOPAC] Air Safety Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in Tokyo on July 29 of this year. The Memorandum of Understanding provides for a new communication link between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk for use when a civil aircraft assigned to a NOPAC route is in trouble. It specifies certain cooperative measures among the three sides to identify and assist such aircraft and offers the use of a radio broadcasting station on Kamchatka as a navigation aid.

The implementation procedures amplify on these undertakings and specify what the respective area control centers [ACCs] will do in the event an aircraft is lost, has deviated from course, has a communication failure, been hijacked, or has an in-flight emergency requiring immediate landing on USSR territory. The procedures agreement also stipulates that the USSR will inform Japan or the U.S. if an unidentified aircraft appears in a Soviet Flight Information Region [FIR] which could be an aircraft that had strayed from a NOPAC route.

# # #

Q & As on the NOPAC Air Safety Implementation Accord

Q: When will this agreement come into force?

A. -- The Memorandum of Understanding came into force through an exchange of diplomatic notes on October 8 of this year. It will take several more months for the communication circuit to be set up and become operational, however.

Q. Does this agreement mean the Soviet Union has agreed there will be no more Korean Airliner shootdowns?

A. -- It doesn't. But it does reduce the danger of a repetition of such a tragedy, and that was what we were aiming for. Agreeing to take these steps does not change anyone's legal responsibilities and obligations. In our view, using the new mechanisms we have agreed on is a very practical way of reducing the changes of recurrence, and that is why we are pleased that agreement has been reached on the implementation procedures. The basic objective in all of these talks was enhancing air safety.

Q. If an airliner strayed off a NOPAC route toward Soviet territory, would the Soviet Union get in touch with us under this agreement?

A. -- This agreement establishes the mechanisms and means for doing that, and the Soviet Union has commited itself to get in touch with us when an unidentified civil aircraft enters one of their flight information regions.

Q. But if Soviet law provides for shooting down an airplane, and no one is changing their legal obligations, what is this agreement worth?

A. -- We never expected or aimed for changes in their law, because current international law obliges all countries to assist a civil aircraft to proceed safely without shooting it down. What we were aiming for was new mechanisms and commitments to use them which would make it more likely that those obligations under current law are honored in the future. We have achieved that aim. In addition, the mechanism we have agreed on will provide some means to assist aircrews before they are in violation of Soviet territorial airspace.

Q. What type of situations does the procedures document cover?

A. -- It provides that in the event of an emergency situation in-flight that requires an immediate landing, the Soviet Area Control Center will provide assistance to the aircraft up to and including a landing on Soviet territory if it cannot reach U.S. or Japanese territory.

-- It also delineates what each control center should do when it has information, or reason to suspect, that an aircraft has strayed into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union.

-- For example, if either the Anchorage or Tokyo Centers is aware that an aircraft under their control has inadvertantly deviated into a Soviet Flight Information Region and is out of communication with Tokyo or Anchorage, they will advise the Khabarovsk Center of that fact. The Soviets will then attempt to relay information to the aircraft to return it to course.

-- Conversely, if the Khabarovsk Center has reason to believe that an unidentified aircraft detected in its airspace has strayed from one of the Northern Pacific routes, it will communicate with Tokyo or Anchorage and provide the information it has on the aircraft's location, altitude, and course.

-- With this information, either the Tokyo or Anchorage Center will attempt to provide all pertinent information on the aircraft to Khabarovsk.

-- Other procedures spelled out in the agreement provide guidance for handling an aircraft that has been hijacked and is heading into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union, or one which has suffered a loss of communications.

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(Geneva, Switzerland)

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U.S. FACT SHEET

THE PRESIDENT'S PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE INITIATIVES

In his November 14 Address to the Nation, on the eve of his departure for his Geneva meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, President Reagan called for a series of bold new initiatives to bring the people of the United States and the Soviet Union into direct contact.

In that speech, the President said, "Enduring peace depends on openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly." The President also determined to "find as yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate, fruitfully, for the benefit of mankind."

In this respect the two leaders agreed on the utility of broadening exchanges and contacts in a number of scientific, educational, medical and sports fields.

Background

The U.S. and USSR have had formal cultural and educational exchanges for more than 25 years. We have just concluded a new General Exchanges Agreement for academic, cultural, and performing artist exchanges. This agreement provides for reciprocal exhibits of theater, art, design, and technology to travel throughout the other country accompanied by language qualified guides.

Traditional exchanges such as these are valuable, but more is needed. The President hopes that we can lessen the distrust between us, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more open world. His Exchanges Initiatives are new programs to increase day-to-day contacts between our peoples.

What are the Initiatives?

The Exchanges Initiatives on which the U.S. and USSR have agreed to cooperate include:

-- The annual exchange of professors to conduct special courses in history, culture, and economics in Soviet and American institutions of higher education;

-- The creation of a U.S.-Soviet scholarship program for the best students from each country in the natural sciences, social sciences, humanities, and technology for the period of an academic year;

-- Measures to promote Russian language studies in the United States and English language studies in the USSR.

more

-- A joint program of cancer research;

-- A program for cooperation in the development of microcumputer educational software for elementary and secondary school instruction;

-- Expansion of contacts in sports, including regular meets in various sports and increased television coverage of sports.

The objective of these initiatives is to build bridges between the peoples of the two countries. These proposals would expand contacts, increase cooperation on one of today's toughest medical problems, and encourage people of both countries and work and study together.

For our part, once the two governments have opened the doors to this kind of exchange, the Administration will look to the people to take the lead. The President, therefore, intends to appoint a high-ranking Administration official to work closely with the private sector to ensure that these exchanges initiatives are realized. The resulting programs will be reviewed by the leaders at their next meeting.

# # #

Q's and A's on the President's Exchanges Initiatives

Q: What are the benefits from these exchange initiatives?

A: -- Societies everywhere have a stake in keeping contacts and communication as broad, deep, and free as possible. By encouraging exchanges of American and Soviet citizens in the arts, education, science, sports, and other fields we hope to expose increasingly large and influential segments of Soviet society to our values, intentions, and goals.

-- Additionally, we hope to learn more about Soviet practices and goals in various fields as well as build relationships with Soviet academic, scientific, and intellectual leaders. There are also very real benefits that come when exchanges of information and access to the other country's institutions reduce unwarranted suspicions and build confidence in our ability to discuss and resolve mutual problems.

Q: Don't we already have exchanges agreements? Why is the President offering new exchanges initiatives now?

A: -- The President's initiative on exchanges is intended to build on those already in place. We have had formal cultural and educational exchanges with the Soviet Union for more than twenty-five years. These exchanges have been valuable in keeping lines of communication open between various segments of our societies.

-- However it is important to recognize that the gulf that separates our two societies is too wide for us to rely solely on traditional programs. It is necessary to bring larger numbers of American and Soviet citizens together in a healthy, balanced give-and-take on ideas, values, and shared experiences.This can help break down barriers which separate us, open up Soviet society to new ideas, and prepare future generations to be better able to solve the difficult problems which divide our two countries.

Q: What about reciprocity? Don't the Soviets usually come out the winners in such exchanges?

A: -- Exchanges are exactly what the word implies -- give and take. Both countries have a wealth of cultural, artistic, academic, sports and entertainment resources which should be shared. There should be no suggestion of one side getting more out of such exchanges than the other. Both sides benefit. The purpose of these exchanges is to learn from Soviet artists and scientists, to discover our similarities, to understand our differences, and thereby be better prepared to solve common problems.

-- The exchanges will be fully reciprocal. Both sides must receive equivalent benefits and carry out equal responsibilities under any exchanges agreement. We will not enter into an agreement unless we believe it benefits the United States.

Q. Won't the KGB exploit expanded exchanges to place more of its agents in the U.S.?

A. -- Under current practice, the U.S. Government carefully reviews each proposed exchangee and program. If it is determined that an individual alien's presence in the United States would be contrary to U.S. national security, a visa would not be issued in that case.

-- These are only two of the many steps that are presently taken to ensure U.S. national security interests in exchange programs with the Soviet Union. We believe that these measures are consonant with our desire to learn from Soviet exchangees and to expose them to American education, values, and our society at large.

Q: Why take the risk of letting Soviets in at all? Why not keep them all out and eliminate all risks of expionage?

A: -- All countries have a stake in keeping contacts, communication, and creativity as broad, deep, and free as possible. The Soviet practice of sealing their people off and filtering and controlling contacts and the flow of information is a primary problem which led the President to call for more exchanges between our countries.

-- United States citizens rightfully believe that their society is among the most free, most prosperous, and the most conducive to creativity and free expression. There is much to gain from exposing large numbers of Soviet citizens to our way of life.

-- At the same time we will continue to protect our national security by carefully screening each applicant for a visa and taking all appropriate steps to ensure that known espionage agents are not permitted to enter the United States.

Q: Just what steps does the government take to identify and keep out spies? What happens when one is discovered in an exchange program already in the U.S.?

A: -- Every individual from the Soviet Union who applies for a visa to enter the United States is individually screened to determine if he or she is a bona fide visitor. If not, the visa would be denied under an appropriate section of the Immigration and Nationality Act. This screening is an interagency effort which begins at the Embassy where the person applies for the visa, and continues among all concerned USG agencies in Washington.

-- If any alien temporarily in the United States is discovered to be out of status -- that is pursuing activities other than those for which he or she applied for the visa -- that individual would be subject to proceedings initiated by INS. If those activities were illegal, the Justice Department would make an investigation to determine if charges should be filed.

Q: Doesn't this increase the danger that Soviets will steal or otherwise obtain our technology?

A: -- There are a number of laws and mechanisms to reduce the risk of undesirable technology transfer in our exchanges programs. These exist because we take the threat of illegal and undesirable technology transfer seriously and believe we must take all possible steps to counter it.

-- We do not believe the answer is to shut the door completely to exchanges. The benefits of these exchanges to us, in scientific, academic, political and social terms, are too great to forego. The solution is complex requiring careful screening of both the types of programs we open to exchanges and the actual individuals we invite to participate.

Q: Don't these exchanges initiatives imply a return to business as usual with the Soviets when they continue to ignore US requests on human rights issues?

A: -- In protesting actions which suppress basic human rights we must not take out our indignation on those not responsible. That is why the President feels we should broaden opportunities for Americans and Soviet citizens to get to know each other better on an individual basis.

-- Cooperation between the US and USSR over many years in scientific and technical fields such as atomic energy, environmental protection, housing and construction, and many others, has yielded many scientific benefits. These benefits arise from combining resources, drawing on each other's expertise or gaining access to unique institutions or geographical areas.

-- Furthermore, we will use the contacts opened by exchanges to continue vigorously advocating our human rights concerns. The professional contacts which grow out of scientific exchanges, for example, can serve as a mechanism to assert the interest of the American scientific community in the cases of dissident Soviet scientists.

November 13, 1985

FACT SHEET
New U.S. Proposals for Nuclear Arms Reductions

On November 1, at President Reagan's instruction, U.S. negotiators at the Nuclear and Space Arms Talks (NST) in Geneva, presented a new set of proposals for significant, equitable, and verifiable nuclear arms reductions. This followed the presentation by the Soviet Union in late September of a counterproposal which was in response to the concrete reduction offers which the U.S. had put forward at the outset of the negotiations.

President Reagan has stressed that the U.S. has four main objectives in seeking an effective nuclear arms reduction agreement:

- deep cuts;

- no first-strike advantage;

- defensive research, because defense is much safer than offense; and

- no cheating.

This fact sheet summarizes these latest developments in the negotiations.

Soviet Counterproposal

U.S. officials previously described a number of elements in the Soviet counterproposal of late September which would be unacceptable to the U.S. and its Allies, and explained how the effects of that counterproposal would be inequitable and destabilizing.

For example, Soviet definition of strategic delivery vehicles would cover U.S. LRINF missiles and "medium-range" nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, in Asia, and on all of our aircraft carriers, while about 2000 comparable Soviet nuclear delivery vehicles, as well as 300 Backfire bombers, would not be limited. In addition, the Soviets propose limits on "nuclear charges," defined to include gravity bombs and short-range bomber weapons, which must face unconstrained defenses. Given sizeable and unconstrained Soviet defenses against U.S. retaliatory bomber forces, and the fundamental

differences between bomber and missile forces, as well as other U.S.-Soviet asymmetries, the U.S. cannot accept a direct limit on gravity bombs and SRAMs carried by heavy bombers (as we do for missile warheads).

Nevertheless, the fact that the Soviets have accepted the principle of deep reductions is a welcome development if equitably applied. It underscores the strength of basic U.S. negotiating position, value of united Alliance, and soundness of strategy of pursuing this position in patient and determined manner.

The President is committed to exploring every opportunity to achieve equitable and verifiable reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. Accordingly, President directed that additional U.S. proposals be advanced, building on concrete reductions proposals made earlier by the U.S., and on positive elements of Soviet counterproposal. We thereby seek to establish genuine process of give-and-take.

Strategic Offensive Forces

Over three years ago, in May 1982, we proposed a cut of about one-half in the strategic ballistic missiles (both land- and sea-based) of the U.S. and USSR, and a cut of about one-third in the warheads on such missiles.

-- In response to the Soviet counterproposal, we could accept concept of 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces, but we:

- cannot apply this concept in unequal and destabilizing ways;

- cannot abandon support for Allies; and

- cannot renounce right to conduct SDI research, which is in full conformity with ABM Treaty.

-- Thus the new U.S. proposal builds on the 50% reduction concept in constructive and equitable way.

- Reductions to limit of 4500 on reentry vehicles (RVs) on ICBMs and SLBMs, about 50% below current levels

- Reduction to limit of 3000 on RVs carried by ICBMs, about 50% below the current Soviet level and roughly halfway between our earlier proposal for a limit of 2500 and their proposed limit of 3600

- 50% reduction in highest overall strategic ballistic missile throwweight of either side; in this case, from Soviet level of 11.9 million pounds (U.S. has 4.4 million pounds)

- Contingent upon acceptance of RV and throwweight limits, we would accept equal limit of 1500 on number of long-range ALCMs carried by U.S. and Soviet heavy bombers, about 50% below planned U.S. deployment levels.

-- U.S. cannot agree to one common limit on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. It is inequitable to place in a single category ballistic missile warheads, which arrive at their targets in minutes and face few defenses, and bomber weapons, which take hours to arrive on target and also face sizeable defenses.

-- But if Soviets were to accept proposed 4500 RVs limit along with proposed 1500 ALCMs limit, it would result in reduction to a total of 6000 ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs on each side.

-- With respect to strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs), U.S. has proposed:

- reduction in strategic ballistic missiles to limit of 1250-1450, about 40-45% below the current higher Soviet level

- in this context, U.S. could accept further reduction of heavy bomber limits to 350 (compared to our earlier proposal of 400), about 40% below the current U.S. SALT-accountable level.

-- For reasons similar to those stated for RVs and ALCMs, U.S. cannot agree to Soviet proposal to include in a single aggregate strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers.

-- However, if agreement reached on range of 1250-1450 for ICBMs and SLBMs, and on heavy bomber limits of 350, would result in reduction to a total of strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers of between 1600 and 1800.

-- U.S. proposal also contains following elements:

- ban on all new heavy strategic ballistic missiles and the modernization of existing heavy missiles, due to their destabilizing character

- ban on all mobile ICBMs, because of inherent verification difficulties

- "build-down" as suggested means of implementing agreed reductions

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

-- Previous U.S. proposals remain on table. U.S. continues to prefer total elimination of entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles.

-- We also have made following new proposal as interim step toward this goal:

- U.S. would cap LRINF missile launcher deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December 31, 1985 (140 PII and GLCM) in return for Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to same number

- There would be freedom to mix between systems deployed as of December 31, 1985, but mix would be subject for discussion. (Could agree on mix giving U.S. approximately equal number at around 420 to 450 LRINF missile warheads in NATO Europe, based on 4 warheads/GLCM launcher, 1 warhead/Pershing II launcher, and 3 warheads/SS-20 launcher)

- Soviets required to reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (outside range of NATO Europe) by same proportion as reduction of launchers within range of NATO Europe

- End result would be equal global LRINF warhead limits

- Appropriate constraints also applied to SRINF missiles

Defense and Space

-- U.S. is making clear once again that we are committed to SDI research program as permitted by, and in compliance with ABM Treaty.

-- We seek Soviet commitment to explore with us now how cooperative transition could be accomplished, should new defensive technologies prove feasible.

-- Also proposing now that Soviets join us in "open laboratories" arrangement under which both sides would provide information on each other's strategic defense research programs, and provide opportunities for visiting associated research facilities and laboratories.

Verification and Compliance

-- U.S. continues to stress critical importance of agreeing on effective verification means so as to be able to assess with confidence compliance with provisions of all agreements resulting from the negotiations. Verification is more important now than it ever was before, given Soviet conduct related to arms control over the last six years.

-- U.S. continues to stress a need for the Soviets to take necessary steps to correct current instances of non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. Non-compliance is politically corrosive and militarily real.

-- Soviet actions since the signing of SALT II have impeded U.S. verification of Soviet compliance and politically damaged the foundations of strategic arms control. Restoring compliance is a critical step.

-- Soviet Union must alter current practices which obstruct U.S. verification of compliance.

-- One initial step is for Soviets to alter current encryption of telemetry and revert to practices with regard to telemetry in use at time of signing of SALT II. This is militarily important in its own right, but its political significance is even greater.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR RELEASE AT 8:00 PM EST
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1985

FACT SHEET

President's Address to the Nation

In his Address to the Nation, President Reagan discusses his hopes and objectives on the eve of his departure for the Geneva meeting with Soviet Party General Secretary Gorbachev. He defines his mission as "a mission for peace." The President reviewes U.S. policy in the four areas of the Geneva agenda, and outlines new U.S. initiatives to increase people-to-people contacts and open new lines of communication and cooperation.

Overview: A Mission for Peace

-- It is the President's hope that in Geneva he and General Secretary Gorbachev can begin a "dialogue for peace that endures beyond my Presidency."

-- His objective is to begin a process of "facing our differences frankly and openly, and beginning to narrow and resolve them; communicating effectively so that our actions and intentions are not misunderstood and eliminating the barriers between us and cooperating wherever possible for the greater good of all."

-- When the President speaks of peace, he does not mean just the absence of war: true peace "rests upon the pillars of human rights, individual freedom, national self-determination and respect for the rule of law."

-- Therefore, we seek to make progress on all four fronts of the agenda for Geneva:

- o reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear arsenals, and moving toward defensive systems that threaten no one;
- o ending regional conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Central America that carry the seeds of wider war;
- o pursuing bilateral issues, including the inauguration of an unprecedented series of people-to-people exchanges; and
- o addressing human rights guaranteed by international agreements.

-- The President does not underestimate the difficulty of the task. Building a safer future, however, requires that we address candidly all the issues which divide us. "We should seek to reduce the suspicions and mistrust that have led us to acquire mountains of strategic weapons."

-- Success should not be measured by short-term agreements: "only the passage of time will tell us whether we constructed a durable bridge to a safer world."

Reducing Nuclear Arsenals and Risk of War: "We Have Gone the Extra Mile" for Greater Security

-- In 1977, and 1982, the U.S. proposed deep reciprocal cuts in strategic forces.

-- In 1981, the U.S. proposed the complete elimination of a whole class of intermediate range nuclear forces.

-- In 1984, the U.S. presented a draft treaty for a global ban on chemical weapons.

-- The U.S. has also made proposals in various forums for improving verification for nuclear testing limitations and for confidence-building measures.

-- The President is pleased that the Soviet leadership has begun talking about reductions and has presented its proposals in Geneva.

-- We are prepared for 50 percent reductions in comparable nuclear systems to result in a stable balance, with no first strike capability, and full compliance. U.S. negotiators have instructions to pursue this in Geneva. "If we both reduce the weapons of war, there would be no losers, only winners."

-- The whole world would also benefit "if we could both abandon these weapons altogether and move to non-nuclear defensive systems which destroy weapons, not people."

Ending Regional Conflicts: Building a Safer World

-- Arms control is not the whole answer; we must remove all sources of tension.

-- The President, in his UNGA speech, proposed a "regional peace plan" that calls for progress at three levels:

1) Negotiation among the warring parties, and internal reconciliation;
2) United States-Soviet discussions to support the process; and
3) Economic reconstruction.

-- The President's initiative aims to break the pattern of five key conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Central America -- in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua.

-- The President will pursue those promising initiatives in Geneva.

Freedom and Democracy: The Best Guarantors of Peace

-- "The rights of the individual and the rule of law are as fundamental to peace as arms control. History has shown that democratic nations do not start wars."

-- "We must and will speak in Geneva on behalf of those who cannot speak for themselves. We are not trying to impose our beliefs on others. We have a right, however, to expect that great states will live up to their international obligations."

People-to-People Initiatives: A More Open World

-- Despite our deep and abiding differences, the President believes we can and must prevent our international competition from spilling over into violence. "Enduring peace depends on openness, honest communications, and opportunities for our peoples to get to know one another directly."

-- The President is also determined to "find as yet undiscovered avenues where American and Soviet citizens can cooperate, fruitfully, for the benefit of mankind."

-- The U.S. and USSR have had formal cultural and educational exchanges for more than 25 years. We are concluding negotiations on a new General Exchanges Agreement on academic, cultural, and performing artist exchanges. This agreement will also provide

for exhibits of America's best talent to travel throughout the Soviet Union accompanied by Russian-speaking American guides.

-- Traditional exchanges such as these are valuable, but more is needed. The President hopes that we can lessen the distrust between us, reduce the levels of secrecy, and bring forth a more "Open World." He is proposing bold new programs to increase day-to-day contacts between our peoples.

-- The President's exchanges initiatives include:

o Education: greatly expanded educational exchanges of students and teachers at all levels, and a new scholarship program to send some of the best of each country's university students to study in the other;

o Contacts: an increase in people-to-people contacts through tourism and civic exchanges;

o Sports: increased sports exchanges ranging from televised athletic competitions to bring American and Soviet young people together in healthy athletic competition to off-the-playing field contact;

o Scientific and Space Cooperation: new programs for joint space ventures and joint medical research projects;

o Media Initiatives: proposals ranging from the cessation of jamming of international broadcasts to exchanges of television programming--including appearances by mutually agreed representatives of each country on the other's television; and

o Information Exchanges: a wider distribution of each country's books, journals, and periodicals in the other, perhaps through national cultural centers or bookstores.

-- These proposals would expand contacts, increase cooperation on some of today's toughest human problems, and encourage people of both countries to travel freely back and forth, visit each other's homes, and work and study together.

-- Such proposals alone will not bridge our differences, but they can help "build genuine constituencies for peace" in both countries.

-- Once we open the doors to this kind of exchange, the Administration will look to the people to take the lead.

Conclusion: "Without Illusions, but With Hope"

-- The President said "We go with an appreciation, born of experience, of the deep differences between us -- between our values, our systems, our beliefs. But we also carry with us the determination not to permit those differences to erupt into confrontation or conflict."

-- "We do not threaten the Soviet people and never will."

-- The President believes that progress can be made on our entire agenda if the Soviets are ready for it: the steady expansion of human rights for all the world's peoples; support for resolving conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that carry the seeds of a wider war; a broadening of people-to-people exchanges that can diminish the distrust and suspicion that separate our two peoples; and the reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear arsenals.

-- The U.S. and USSR cooperated in the past. In both World Wars, Americans and Russians fought on separate fronts against a common enemy. "Near the city of Murmansk, sons of our own nation are buried, heroes who died of wounds sustained on the treacherous North Atlantic and North Sea convoys that carried to Russia the indispensable tools of survival and victory."

-- While a single summit cannot establish a permanent peace, the President hopes that his meeting with Gorbachev "can begin a dialogue for peace." He looks to the future with optimism and goes to Geneva with confidence.

-- In sum, the President goes to Geneva knowing "how deep the hope of peace is ... in the heart of every American and Russian mother."

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 9, 1985

FACT SHEET

JAMMING OF VOICE OF AMERICA BROADCASTS

Jamming of VOA broadcasts occurs mostly in the Soviet Union -- notably in the Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijani and Uzbek languages. The Baltic languages (Latvian, Lithuanian and Estonian), Polish, Dari and Pashto broadcasts of VOA also are jammed. English language broadcasts to the Soviet Union, Poland and Afghanistan are not jammed.

Jamming violates several agreements signed by the Soviet Union. These include Principle VII of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and regulations of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU).

The United States informed the Soviet Union in advance through diplomatic channels that the President would be giving his weekly radio address to both the Soviet and American people. VOA also broadcast this information on the Voice of America to the Soviet Union. Pre-announcements of the time of the President's radio talk were repeated a number of times in VOA broadcasts, for three days prior to the talk itself.

The Soviet Union has engaged in jamming of VOA and other Western broadcasts for extended periods since 1948. However, from 1963-1968, and from 1973-1980, there was no jamming of VOA broadcasts. The Soviet Union today is believed to spend more funds on jamming VOA broadcasts than VOA spends to operate its worldwide network. VOA's projected 1985 operating budget is $161.3 million; the Soviet Union spends an estimated $250 to $400 million each year to operate a network of jamming stations throughout its territory.

The effectiveness of jamming varies, depending upon the time of day of the broadcast, the season of the year, and the location of the target radio receiver. There have been numerous reports of fairly clear reception of VOA and other jammed external broadcast signals in rural areas of the Soviet Union. Late night listening conditions are generally more favorable than those during daylight hours. It has now been more than five years since jamming of VOA broadcasts was resumed by the USSR, yet the projected audience to VOA Russian is now slightly in excess of 23 million people who tune in at least once a week.

Although jamming poses a formidable obstacle to some VOA listeners, many VOA broadcasts can still be heard in different locations, on multiple frequency bands or at times which are less susceptible to this intentional interference.

Most jamming is focused on areas with populations over 200,000. There are two basic methods of jamming. The first is "groundwave" or local jamming by transmitters set up in the target zone, usually in a large metropolitan area. Groundwave jamming is very effective but limited in range to 15 to 20 miles. The second method of jamming is by "skywave" transmissions. Here powerful transmitters bounce their signals off the ionosphere at an angle calculated to return to earth in the same area as the incoming broadcast. Skywave jamming is subject to "twilight immunity" -- it is very difficult to jam at dusk. The President last broadcast on the VOA on September 24, 1983. The regional languages broadcast to the Soviet Union were jammed at the normal levels.

(over)

History:

February 1948 -- USSR first jamming of VOA

June 1963 -- USSR stopped jamming VOA

mid 1960's -- USSR started to jam certain VOA broadcast

September 1973 -- jamming of VOA ceased

August 1980 -- USSR resumed jamming of VOA

# # #

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release November 9, 1985

STATEMENT BY THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

The President's address to the Soviet people today via the Voice of America was monitored by Russian language-qualified officers of the American Embassy in Moscow and the American Consulate in Leningrad. They report that in Moscow, two and possibly three frequencies were clearly audible and probably not jammed; the signal on one of them was as clear as a local station, according to the Embassy monitoring report. On another 15 frequencies, there were varying degrees of jamming.

In Leningrad, one Russian-language frequency was received loud and clear. All others were jammed. A Lithuanian broadcast of the speech was also received clearly in Leningrad; however, this same frequency may have been jammed in Lithuania.

Atmospheric conditions on November 9 were conducive to good reception of short wave signals in the Soviet Union. English language broadcasts, which are not normally jammed, were well-received.

We are pleased and hope that this development will set a precedent which will allow the Soviets to put a permanent end to jamming on all frequencies. A free flow of information would be a very positive development in people-to-people communications between the two nations.

# # #

Qs and As on Fusion Project

Q: Aren't we giving away sensitive technology? Will such international cooperation compromise hard-won COCOM controls on technology transfer?

A: THE SOVIET UNION IS A WORLD LEADER IN FUSION AND OPERATES A FUSION REACTOR SIMILAR TO THE U.S. TOKAMAK FUSION TEST REACTOR (TFTR) AT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY. TOKAMAK IS AN ACRONYM TAKEN FROM FOUR RUSSIAN WORDS: TOROID (MEANING CYLINDER OR DOUGHNUT, WHICH REPRESENTS THE CONFIGURATION OF THE HEART OF THE MACHINE), KAMERA (MEANING CHAMBER), MAGNIT (MEANING MAGNET), AND KATUSHKA (MEANING COIL). THIS SERVES TO REMIND US THAT THE SOVIETS DEVELOPED THE ORIGINAL CONCEPT FOR THE TOKAMAK AND SUBSEQUENTLY IT WAS TAKEN UP BY THE OTHER MAJOR PLAYERS IN FUSION.

COOPERATIVE FUSION RESEARCH WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RESULT IN THE TRANSFER OF COCOM CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. U.S. AND ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE PROGRAM WOULD BE GOVERNED BY STRICT ADHERENCE TO COCOM WITH NO EXCEPTIONS. THE "NO EXCEPTIONS" POLICY IS IMPORTANT TO SUSTAIN THE CREDIBILITY OF OUR CURRENT COOPERATIVE REGIME WITH THE ALLIES ON EXPORT CONTROLS.

Q: If other Western countries don't join, will the U.S. and USSR proceed on a bilateral basis?

A: THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO JOIN TOGETHER TO DEVELOP MAGNETIC FUSION FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES WILL WILL BE ATTRACTIVE, AND THAT OTHER COUNTRIES WILL WANT TO PARTICIPATE.

Q: Why are you reducing the fusion budget in the U.S. and at the same time agreeing to this project?

A: THE ADMINISTRATION'S REDUCTION IN THE U.S. FUSION RESEARCH BUDGETS REFLECTS OUR LONG-TERM VIEW THAT THERE ARE MANY FUNDAMENTAL SCIENTIFIC QUESTIONS THAT NEED TO BE SOLVED. CONSEQUENTLY, OUR FIRST PRIORITY HAS BEEN TO STRENGTHEN OUR BASIC RESEARCH BASE AND INCREASE AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO ANSWER THE CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS. A MULTILATERAL COOPERATIVE VENTURE WILL PERMIT US TO POOL RESOURCES.

Q: What is the status of the USSR magnetic fusion research program relative to the United States?

A: THE USSR HAS MAINTAINED A POSITION OF ROUGH SCIENTIFIC PARITY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. IN BASIC FUSION RESEARCH. THEY ARE CURRENTLY OPERATING FOUR MAJOR TOKAMAK DEVICES, EACH OF WHICH IS DESIGNED TO EXPLORE AN ASPECT OF THE FUSION PROCESS. THEY APPARENTLY ARE PLANNING A FIFTH SUCH DEVICE. THEY ALSO HAVE EXPERIMENTAL FUSION DEVICES BASED ON DIFFERENT PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES FROM THE TOKAMAK. SO THE SOVIETS HAVE A VERY BROAD FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAM COMPARABLE IN SCOPE TO OUR OWN.

Q: Will this research have relevance for SDI?

A: THE OBJECTIVES OF MAGNETIC FUSION RESEARCH AND SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT.

Q: What specific projects will this cooperative venture undertake?

A: IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO EVALUATE RESEARCH TO DATE IN ORDER TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE OPTIMUM NEXT STEP TOWARD THE PRACTICAL REALIZATION OF FUSION ENERGY. IT WILL ALSO TAKE TIME TO CONSULT ABOUT PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND TO WORK OUT AN EQUITABLE SHARING OF COSTS. THE INTEREST OF THE TWO LEADERS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS EVALUATION IS A PRIORITY EFFORT.

Q: What other countries qualify for participation?

A. WE CERTAINLY WANT PARTICIPATION FROM THE OTHER TECHNICALLY ADVANCED COUNTRIES WITH SUBSTANTIAL FUSION RESEARCH PROGRAMS -- THE EC COUNTRIES AND JAPAN. OTHER COUNTRIES WITH RESOURCES AND EXPERTISE TO CONTRIBUTE MAY ALSO PARTICIPATE.

Q: If you restrict sensitive technologies, won't you be tying one hand behind your back in what is already a very problematic technological engineering feat?

A: OUR FUSION ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM TO DATE HAS PROGRESSED STEADILY USING UNCLASSIFIED TECHNOLOGY. U.S. AND SOVIET SCIENTISTS ROUTINELY VISIT EACH OTHER'S LABORATORIES.

ANY MULTINATIONAL PROJECT WOULD BE CARRIED OUT WITHIN EXISTING COCOM GUIDELINES TO PREVENT TRANSFER OF SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY WITH MILITARY POTENTIAL.

Q: Was this a U.S. or a Soviet initiative?

A: SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH SECRETARY SHULTZ IN OCTOBER. WE HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY STUDIED THE IDEA AND CONCLUDED IT HAS MERIT, AND HAVE MADE SOME SUGGESTIONS OF OUR OWN ON HOW TO PROCEED. THE PROPOSED ACTIVITY IS A NATURAL PROGRESSION OF THE EXISTING AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR AS WELL AS OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS ON FUSION RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

Q: Won't this project divert funds from the Administration's SDI initiative?

A: THE U.S. SHARE OF SUCH A PROJECT WOULD REQUIRE A MUCH SMALLER COMMITMENT OF FUNDS THAN THE SDI, SO THERE IS LITTLE POTENTIAL FOR DIVERSION. IN ADDITION, THE OBJECTIVES OF FUSION RESEARCH AND THE SDI ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT, AND EACH DESERVES SUPPORT ON ITS OWN MERITS.

Q: It is reported that the DOD is against this proposal. Why? Has this been resolved satisfactorily?

A: ALL OF US BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS WHICH NEED EXPLORATION PRIOR TO A FINAL DECISION, INCLUDING PARTICIPATION OF OTHER COUNTRIES, COST SHARING AND PRELIMINARY SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AS TO THE FEASIBILITY OF A JOINT PROJECT. ALL USG AGENCIES HAVE AGREED THAT THESE ISSUES REQUIRE FURTHER INVESTIGATION.

Q: Do you expect Eastern European countries and China to take part, and if so, what can they contribute?

A: WE WOULD WELCOME THEIR PARTICIPATION, INCLUDING SHARING OF COSTS.

Q: What has been achieved by the Fusion Exchange Agreement signed in 1973?

A: THE U.S. HAS COOPERATED WITH THE USSR SINCE 1973 UNDER THE AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY. THE AGREEMENT, WHICH WAS RENEWED IN 1983, CALLS FOR SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE AND COOPERATION ON EXCHANGE PROJECTS OF INTERESTS. CURRENTLY THERE ARE TWELVE EXCHANGES OF TEAMS OF SCIENTISTS, SIX TO THE USSR FROM THE U.S. AND SIX VICE VERSA.

THE U.S. HAS BENEFITTED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THE BREADTH OF THE SOVIET PROGRAM, AND IN PARTICULAR FROM ITS CONSIDERABLE THEORETICAL CAPABILITIES. FOR EXAMPLE, THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM HAS BEEN ABLE TO MONITOR DEVELOPMENTS IN FIELDS WHICH RECEIVE LITTLE OR NO SUPPORT IN THE U.S. PROGRAM. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SOVIETS HAVE TWICE SIGNIFICANTLY INFLUENCED THE DIRECTION OF THE U.S. FUSION PROGRAM: (1) SOVIET EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS ON TOKOMAKS COMPLETELY CHANGED THE NATURE OF THE U.S. PROGRAM, AND (2) A SOVIET DEMONSTRATION EVENTUALLY LED TO THE TANDEM MIRROR PROGRAM AT LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Geneva, Switzerland)

FOR RELEASE AT 10:00 AM Local
4:00 AM EST

November 21, 1985

U.S. FACT SHEET

North Pacific Air Safety Agreement

The US, Japan, and the USSR signed an agreement November 19 on procedures to implement the North Pacific [NOPAC] Air Safety Memorandum of Understanding which was signed in Tokyo on July 29 of this year. The Memorandum of Understanding provides for a new communication link between Anchorage, Tokyo, and Khabarovsk for use when a civil aircraft assigned to a NOPAC route is in trouble. It specifies certain cooperative measures among the three sides to identify and assist such aircraft and offers the use of a radio broadcasting station on Kamchatka as a navigation aid.

The implementation procedures amplify on these undertakings and specify what the respective area control centers [ACCs] will do in the event an aircraft is lost, has deviated from course, has a communication failure, been hijacked, or has an in-flight emergency requiring immediate landing on USSR territory. The procedures agreement also stipulates that the USSR will inform Japan or the U.S. if an unidentified aircraft appears in a Soviet Flight Information Region [FIR] which could be an aircraft that had strayed from a NOPAC route.

# # #

Q & As on the NOPAC Air Safety Implementation Accord

Q: When will this agreement come into force?

A. -- The Memorandum of Understanding came into force through an exchange of diplomatic notes on October 8 of this year. It will take several more months for the communication circuit to be set up and become operational, however.

Q. Does this agreement mean the Soviet Union has agreed there will be no more Korean Airliner shootdowns?

A. -- It doesn't. But it does reduce the danger of a repetition of such a tragedy, and that was what we were aiming for. Agreeing to take these steps does not change anyone's legal responsibilities and obligations. In our view, using the new mechanisms we have agreed on is a very practical way of reducing the changes of recurrence, and that is why we are pleased that agreement has been reached on the implementation procedures. The basic objective in all of these talks was enhancing air safety.

Q. If an airliner strayed off a NOPAC route toward Soviet territory, would the Soviet Union get in touch with us under this agreement?

A. -- This agreement establishes the mechanisms and means for doing that, and the Soviet Union has commited itself to get in touch with us when an unidentified civil aircraft enters one of their flight information regions.

Q. But if Soviet law provides for shooting down an airplane, and no one is changing their legal obligations, what is this agreement worth?

A. -- We never expected or aimed for changes in their law, because current international law obliges all countries to assist a civil aircraft to proceed safely without shooting it down. What we were aiming for was new mechanisms and commitments to use them which would make it more likely that those obligations under current law are honored in the future. We have achieved that aim. In addition, the mechanism we have agreed on will provide some means to assist aircrews before they are in violation of Soviet territorial airspace.

Q. What type of situations does the procedures document cover?

A. -- It provides that in the event of an emergency situation in-flight that requires an immediate landing, the Soviet Area Control Center will provide assistance to the aircraft up to and including a landing on Soviet territory if it cannot reach U.S. or Japanese territory.

-- It also delineates what each control center should do when it has information, or reason to suspect, that an aircraft has strayed into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union.

-- For example, if either the Anchorage or Tokyo Centers is aware that an aircraft under their control has inadvertantly deviated into a Soviet Flight Information Region and is out of communication with Tokyo or Anchorage, they will advise the Khabarovsk Center of that fact. The Soviets will then attempt to relay information to the aircraft to return it to course.

-- Conversely, if the Khabarovsk Center has reason to believe that an unidentified aircraft detected in its airspace has strayed from one of the Northern Pacific routes, it will communicate with Tokyo or Anchorage and provide the information it has on the aircraft's location, altitude, and course.

-- With this information, either the Tokyo or Anchorage Center will attempt to provide all pertinent information on the aircraft to Khabarovsk.

-- Other procedures spelled out in the agreement provide guidance for handling an aircraft that has been hijacked and is heading into airspace controlled by the Soviet Union, or one which has suffered a loss of communications.