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*CIA*

# THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

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HEARINGS  
BEFORE THE  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT  
OF THE  
PERMANENT  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS  
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

DECEMBER 27, 28, 29, 1977, JANUARY 4, 5, AND APRIL 20, 1978



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APPENDIX R

The Director  
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

3 July 1978

Honorable Edward P. Boland, Chairman  
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence  
House of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am forwarding an unclassified study on Soviet propaganda as a follow-up to the request made by Representative Ashbrook at the 20 April 1978 hearing on CIA and the media. It is my understanding that the Committee wishes to include this study in the hearing transcript.

Because the study is unclassified, it deals only superficially with certain aspects of Soviet propaganda operations, most particularly with the covert activities of the KGB. I believe, however, that it will provide a useful primer on the scope and magnitude of the Soviet propaganda apparatus as well as the cynical disregard for truth which characterizes Soviet propaganda operations.

The study--as its last paragraph indicates--covers Soviet propaganda directed against American interests from abroad, but does not concern itself with Soviet propaganda operations conducted within the United States, as this is outside CIA's purview. You may wish to consider requesting the appropriate agency to prepare such a study. As our paper suggests, there are indications that Soviet propaganda activities against the United States will increase in the future.

Yours sincerely,

  
STANSFIELD TURNER

Enclosure

## INTRODUCTION

1. This paper is submitted in response to a request from the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence for an unclassified study of Soviet propaganda activities. We are aware that the Committee is principally concerned with Soviet exploitation of the media; but in order to respond comprehensively to this requirement, we shall discuss not only Soviet media operations, but those elements of the Soviet propaganda apparatus which, while not media themselves, are employed by the Soviets largely to stimulate media attention to Soviet propaganda themes. Among these are the pro-Soviet communist parties and the international communist front groups. We shall also deal briefly with other aspects of Soviet propaganda which do not normally involve media exploitation, such as KGB "agent of influence" operations and forgeries, and the use of the Soviet diplomatic corps to disseminate "the line."

2. This study will consider the role propaganda plays in Soviet foreign policy, principal Soviet propaganda themes, and techniques peculiar to Soviet media activities. In this respect, however, we shall largely limit ourselves to Soviet propaganda directed against the interests of other governments, rather than those which publicize the achievements of the Soviet state and society.

3. Because this paper is unclassified and is intended only as a general survey of a highly complex subject, certain aspects of Soviet propaganda are touched on perhaps more lightly than they deserve. We would be happy to provide the committee with additional details on any topic covered in this report on a classified basis.

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

4. The Soviets believe that propaganda plays a highly significant role in the execution of foreign policy. Propaganda campaigns are planned and directed at the highest levels of the Soviet regime. The fundamental aims of Soviet propaganda directed abroad are to weaken the opponents of the USSR and to create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet policy. The primary target of Soviet propaganda abroad is the United States; Soviet propaganda seeks to isolate the

United States from its allies and to create a world-wide image of the United States as aggressively "imperialist" and "racist." Specifically, the Soviets attempt to show that U.S. military spending and weapons development make this country the major threat to world peace. Such anti-American themes are used both to denigrate the United States and to bring pressure to bear on U.S. policymakers. Moreover, they are exploited directly or by implication to justify both aggressive Soviet policies abroad (as being in support of the "anti-imperialist struggle") and heavy Soviet military expenditures.

5. To carry out its propaganda programs, the Soviets have developed a world-wide network of assets second to none, consisting of an extensive short-wave radio system, broadcasting in many languages; two news agencies; the pro-Soviet communist parties; the international communist fronts; bilateral friendship societies and other quasi-official instrumentalities; a large corps of foreign correspondents, many of them Soviet intelligence officers; the foreign clandestine propaganda assets under the control of the KGB; and the intelligence services and assets of Cuba and Moscow's East European allies.

6. Noteworthy aspects of the propaganda activities carried out by this network include:

a. Central coordination: All Soviet media are subordinated to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and their activities are coordinated at the highest levels of the party. The Soviets are able to orchestrate propaganda campaigns on a world-wide basis with relative ease.

b. Intensity: By the same token, the Soviets are able to saturate their media with specific themes to ensure broad international attention on major propaganda issues.

c. Duration: The world-wide campaign against the U.S. development of the "neutron bomb" (clearly evaluated by the Soviets as a major target for anti-U.S. propaganda) began in mid-1977 and continues to this day. It is, however, merely an aspect of the general Soviet campaign against U.S. weapons development which began not long after World War II. Such general themes-- U.S. "racism" is another--may be repeated in varied forms, virtually ad infinitum.

d. Disregard for truth: Western propagandists generally believe that propaganda emanating from official sources should be true, in order to establish

source credibility. Clandestine propaganda, it is felt, may occasionally distort or lie, but only in extraordinary circumstances. On the other hand, in Soviet propaganda, whether official or covert, exaggeration, innuendo, and outright falsehood are common. Thus, since mid-March, the Soviets have attempted, by repeated efforts in a variety of media, to establish in the European mind that the kidnapping of Aldo Moro was the work of Western intelligence services or, specifically, the CIA. A summary of the Moro campaign, which epitomizes Soviet deceptive practices, begins our study.

#### I. THE MORO KIDNAPPING

7. On 16 March Italy's most notorious left wing terrorist organization, the Red Brigades, blocked the path of an automobile carrying Christian Democratic Party President Aldo Moro, shot down his five bodyguards, and kidnapped the veteran political leader. Moro's abduction was universally regarded as a severe setback for moderate elements in Italy, if not the West as a whole. He had played a pivotal role in maintaining the unity of the Christian Democratic Party and in orchestrating the understanding between Christian Democrats and Communists on which Italian political stability depended. Thus it seemed inconceivable that Moro's kidnapping could be interpreted as serving the interests of the United States; but a listener to Radio Moscow might have drawn different conclusions.

8. On 16 March, the very day of the incident, a Radio Moscow short-wave broadcast in English labelled the kidnapping a "crime of reaction," and one of several "attempts by a right wing force to aggravate the situation in Italy." This general statement was apparently intended to lay the groundwork for more specific charges. On 18 March, in a broadcast aimed specifically at the Italian audience, Moscow alleged that the kidnapping was "prepared by internal and international reactionary forces." Another broadcast on the same day stated that the official French Communist Party newspaper "L'Humanite" had reported that "secret services whose activity is connected with the NATO military base in Naples" were involved. On 19 March Moscow rephrased this charge, blaming "a far flung organization with connections far beyond Italy's borders." A 23 March broadcast alleged that the kidnapping of Moro had been too complex an operation to carry out without the assistance of foreign secret services, and quoted "L'Humanite" again: "It is no secret that the Central Intelligence Agency is actively operating in the Appenines Peninsula."

9. Broadcasts on 28 and 31 March again strongly hinted that CIA was involved in the Moro affair. Then, on 2 April the Soviets made a direct charge. On the Moscow Radio International Service, commentator Anatoliy Ovsyanrikov stated: "Well, to call a spade a spade, that service /behind the kidnapping/ is called the Central Intelligence Agency and the foreign power that it belongs to is the United States of America."

10. Soviet media thereafter continued to condemn the United States and NATO generally for interfering in Italian internal affairs, as well as blaming CIA for the Moro kidnapping. As late as 7 May, two days before the discovery of Moro's body, TASS was alleging that the aim of the Red Brigades, under a mask of leftism, was to induce a rightward political swing in Italy, that the Red Brigades must have had outside help, and that it was perhaps significant that Western intelligence services, particularly the USA, were actively interfering in Italian political life. (The only "evidence" of CIA involvement Soviet propagandists have offered is that the operation was too complex to be carried out by mere terrorists.) These themes have not only been repeated by pro-Soviet press outlets, like "L'Humanite," but in a whispering campaign by Russian diplomats.

11. It should be noted that the themes introduced by "L'Humanite," undoubtedly at Soviet suggestion, were picked up and rebroadcast by Soviet official media. "Feedback," a problem of great concern to the U.S. Congress as far as the American media is concerned, is normal practice for the Soviets.

## II. ROLE OF PROPAGANDA IN THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

12. All countries use propaganda to advance their foreign policy goals. The CPSU leadership, however, regards propaganda as a major, indeed, indispensable, adjunct of Soviet foreign policy and military strategy. The Soviets are willing to spend vast sums on propaganda; our rough estimate of 2 billion dollars per year might be on the conservative side. It is believed that the World Youth Festival staged in Moscow in 1957 by the International Union of Students, a communist front group, alone cost in excess of \$200,000,000--and that was only one, albeit the most costly, of many international actions carried out by Soviet front organizations in 1957. The Politburo itself approves the major themes of Soviet propaganda campaigns--and the means which will be used to disseminate them. For example, KGB forgeries and other major covert actions require Politburo concurrence. (Mikhail A. Suslov, a Party Secretary and senior member of the Politburo in point of service, holds the propaganda "portfolio" within the Politburo.)

13. Under the Politburo's general guidance, the various elements of the Soviet party and government bureaucracy play important operational and coordinating roles. Among these are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the KGB; the CPSU's International, Propaganda and Information Departments (see paragraph 14 regarding the Information Department); and the Radio-TV Committee, a ministry-level organization which administers Soviet broadcasting. Of these, one of the more significant, though not well known, is the International Department (ID), which is responsible for: liaison with communist parties outside the Bloc; the international front group apparatus; and national liberation movements. Boris Ponomarev, a Party Secretary and candidate member of the Politburo, oversees the work of the ID.

14. In the spring of 1978 Leonid Zamyatin, director of TASS, was elevated to become director of a new "Information Department" of the CPSU Central Committee. A variety of overt sources have indicated that Zamyatin will be responsible for "directing foreign propaganda." While the scope of his duties remains unclear, his appointment suggests that the Politburo intends to place even greater emphasis on propaganda in the future.

15. There are two other recent indicators that the Soviets intend to place increasing reliance on propaganda, and particularly to intensify their propaganda against the United States:

a. In January 1978 the Presidium of National Presidents of the World Peace Council, the major Soviet front, held meetings in Washington and New York. Participants interviewed such American decision and opinion makers as they could contact, trying to obtain soundings of the mood prevailing among American leaders.

b. Simultaneously, a delegation of members of the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet parliament, arrived on a tour of the United States. This delegation included Ponomarev, Zamyatin, and a number of other Soviets who play a primary role in the development and execution of propaganda policy. This group visited newspapers and radio stations in several American cities. It is apparent that one purpose of their mission was to determine major concerns of American opinion makers, as well as the susceptibility of American mass communications to Soviet media operations.

## III. CHARACTERISTICS OF SOVIET PROPAGANDA

16. Centralized Control and Orchestration. The foregoing paragraphs underline the point made earlier that Soviet propaganda policy is formulated at the highest levels of the bureaucracy, with its execution tightly coordinated from Moscow. This close coordination and control ensure that the entire Soviet propaganda network is fully responsive to the demands of policymakers, and can be mobilized quickly and efficiently to disseminate whatever specific propaganda themes they desire on a world-wide basis. As in the Moro kidnapping exploitation, it ensures that themes planted in one vehicle can be immediately picked up and re-broadcast by other propaganda assets.

17. Intensity. The main elements of the Soviet international propaganda network were listed in paragraph 5 and are described in detail in Part V. This vast complex of propaganda assets enables the Soviets to bombard the international audience with propaganda material from a broad variety of sources: some official, such as Radio Moscow; some quasi-official, such as the communist press; and some nonattributable to the USSR, such as the covert placements of the KGB. The impact of this diversified network, dwelling on a certain number of pre-determined themes, albeit with variations in content and perspective, is hard to overestimate.

18. To make this point with greater force, we have appended an annex on the Soviet propaganda campaign against deployment of the "neutron bomb" in Europe, which was initiated in July and August of last year, largely through intensive treatment by Soviet shortwave radio. Subsequently the themes established by Soviet media were re-broadcast in Eastern Europe and then picked up by the front groups, which held many public meetings and demonstrations in Europe on the "neutron bomb" issue. The broad attention paid to the subject by non-communist Western and third world media thereafter can be attributed partly to stimulation by this official and semi-official campaign, supplemented by the clandestine activities of the KGB. The "neutron bomb" has by now become a major political issue in virtually every European capital.

19. Duration. The neutron bomb campaign has continued since July of last year. Viewed in the perspective of time, however, it appears not as an independent campaign, but simply another phase of the Soviet propaganda effort against U.S. weapons development and military spending, which has continued without abatement since shortly after World War II. The World Peace Council has campaigned exclusively on this general theme-- along with praising alleged Soviet initiatives on disarmament--

since its formation in 1949-50. The theme of American "racism" has at least as long a history in Soviet propaganda, overt and covert.

20. Disregard of the Truth. In Western countries official government media generally adhere to the truth, albeit colored by subjective interpretation, not only for moral reasons, but on the sound practical grounds that reliance on the truth in time establishes credibility. Western governments and public opinion alike prefer that misleading propaganda be disseminated only through secure, nonattributable foreign outlets, in other words, that it be the exclusive province of the secret services. In the United States, Congress has expressed concern over even clandestine dissemination of false information abroad, fearing that such misleading material could be unwittingly picked up by American reporters overseas and pollute the U.S. media.

21. No such inhibitions deter Soviet propagandists. Ethical considerations are subordinated to the demands of the Soviet State. The "big lie," as the Moro kidnapping exploitation demonstrated, is hardly the exclusive province of the KGB. Moscow Radio, TASS and other official media demonstrate little concern for truthfulness. Credibility is seen as being achieved not through accuracy, but by careful blending together of fact, distortion and outright falsehood, enhanced by intensive repetition.

22. Another recent example of misleading Soviet propaganda is the OTRAG case. In 1975 a consortium of German air industry companies combined to create OTRAG (Orbital Launch and Rocket Corporation), a company intended to develop a capability of placing satellites in space for commercial clients. In 1976 OTRAG contracted with the Government of Zaire for a large testing and launch range in the Shaba province. The site was accessible to the public, and technical facilities as of 1977 were observed to be extremely crude. It is clear also that while the sponsors of OTRAG may well have been sincere in their plans eventually to develop a rocket for commercial purposes, as of early 1978 they had acquired no commercial clients; operations were at a standstill.

23. However, in the fall of 1977 TASS began to send its clients stories claiming that OTRAG was a West German rearmament scheme designed to produce cruise missiles and IRBM's. Media in Europe and the Third World, at least in part under KGB encouragement, added bits of information about the new "secret" German military missile development facility in Zaire. By early 1978 a combination of TASS, the Soviet internal press, and KGB covert press placement had created a legend that the United States (specifically the CIA and Department of Defense),

France and West Germany, with Zairean President Mobutu's connivance, were engaged in a conspiracy to help Germany become a major nuclear missile power through development of OTRAG as a cruise missile testing range. As the complex of fabrications has grown, it has been picked up by legitimate journalists throughout the Third World and even in the West.

#### IV. SOVIET PROPAGANDA OBJECTIVES AND THEMES

24. Soviet propaganda directed abroad may extol the achievements and policies of the Soviet State; praise foreign governments or political groupings with whom the Soviets are attempting to curry favor (e.g., Ethiopia, Southwest Africa Peoples Organization-SWAPO); condemn the enemies of those governments or groupings (e.g., Somalia, South Africa); or attack the adversaries of the USSR, primarily China and the United States. The preponderance of Soviet external propaganda, however, is aimed at the United States, her NATO allies, and other countries with whom the U.S. has friendly relations.

25. The content of Soviet propaganda targeted against the U.S. changes in accordance with the issues of the day, but at all times reflects certain continuing objectives, among which we can list the following:

- a. To influence both world and American public opinion against U.S. military and political programs which are perceived as threatening the Soviet Union;
- b. To demonstrate that the U.S. is an aggressive, "colonialist" and "imperialist" power;
- c. To isolate the United States from its allies and friends;
- d. To discredit those who cooperate with the U.S.;
- e. To demonstrate that the policies and goals of the United States are incompatible with the ambitions of the underdeveloped world;
- f. To discredit and weaken Western intelligence services and expose their personnel;
- g. To confuse world public opinion regarding the aggressive nature of certain Soviet policies;
- h. To create a favorable environment for the execution of Soviet foreign policy.

26. Among the themes employed to achieve these objectives we can include:

a. *The U.S. is devoting excessive funds to its military budget in general, and to weapons development in particular.* Since World War II the Soviets have campaigned vigorously against virtually every major new U.S. weapon. The atom bomb itself was a target of Soviet propaganda until the moment the Soviets acquired their own atomic capability. As indicated in the annex to this study, the "neutron bomb," though patently a low-yield nuclear weapon intended for defense against a Soviet armored assault, provided the Soviet propaganda machine with superb raw material for a doomsday weapon scare story. Moreover, because this "sinister" weapon was to be stored and used primarily in Europe, its development could be exploited to demonstrate that the Americans were pursuing military policies in total disregard of the interests of their European allies. The clear intention was to isolate the United States from the rest of NATO. To the extent that the "neutron bomb" campaign was expected to reach the United States, we assume it was intended to encourage public hostility towards the American defense establishment. Similarly, the OTRAG story was intended to stimulate European, and American, public opinion against U.S. and German "militarism," and conceivably was specifically targeted against the development of the cruise missile. A sub-theme in this context is alleged U.S. intransigence on SALT and other arms control issues; the USSR, conversely, is portrayed in Soviet propaganda as a champion of disarmament.

b. *Allies and friends of the United States are servants of "imperialism" or henchmen of CIA.* President Anwar Sadat of Egypt has, in particular, been visited with a cascade of vituperation for his efforts to establish a mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. On December 15, 1977, a Moscow Radio broadcast to the Arab world quoted a Baghdad newspaper article, with apparent approval, to the effect that "American imperialists are encouraging /Sadat/ to conduct this course." A "Radio Peace and Progress" broadcast from Moscow on 29 December in Arabic charged that Sadat had obtained about \$1,000,000...since 1960 in return for his services to Washington." During the most recent Indian election campaign, Soviet media condemned the leaders of the Janata Party as "fascists," "reactionaries," and "in the pay of the CIA." Though

Janata leaders are outspoken proponents of non-alignment, the Soviets apparently feared their victory would lead to a shift in Indian foreign policy towards the United States. When Janata won the election, the Soviets were highly embarrassed and their media were forced to alter the themes of their broadcasts to India abruptly. U.S.-West German and U.S.-Israeli ties are frequent targets of extremely hostile Soviet propaganda.

c. *The U.S. is the devoted friend of conservative or right wing regimes.* Propaganda aimed at Latin America frequently alleges U.S. support of certain right wing South American governments, while broadcasts directed at Africa exaggerate U.S.-South African ties. U.S. arms sales (real or imaginary) to "repressive regimes" are frequent targets of Soviet propaganda, thus: TASS, in English, 6 February 1978, "Among the biggest weapons clients of the U.S. are the dictatorial regimes in South Korea, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Haiti." Soviet propaganda is particularly aggressive in condemning real or alleged arms sales to regimes which are adversaries of Soviet clients, such as South Africa or Iran. (An exceptionally high volume of current Soviet propaganda is directed at Iran and U.S.-Iranian ties. This can presumably be explained by Iran's position on the Soviet border, her status as an oil producer, and Soviet anticipations of an unsettled political situation following the demise of the Shah.)

d. *The United States, through clandestine intelligence operations or diplomatic pressure, is constantly interfering in the affairs of other countries, including its closest allies, to advance its own interests, to help local right wing groups to prosper, and to bring down "anti-imperialist" regimes.* The Moro kidnapping exploitation is a good example of this sort of propaganda. A forged U.S.I.S. press release, containing a spurious speech by President Carter which implied that the U.S. was exerting heavy pressure on the Greek government with respect to Greece's relationship with NATO, was mailed to various Greek newspapers in September 1977. The official communist daily reprinted the forgery, which is assumed to be of KGB or satellite intelligence service origin. Soviet diplomats in Africa are known to be spreading rumors of alleged U.S. plots to unseat certain African socialist leaders.

e. *The United States is by nature unsympathetic to the needs and ambitions of the third world.* Alleged American racism is a continuing subject of Soviet propaganda, as in the current media campaign protesting the "rigged" death sentence of the U.S. black "civil rights worker" John Harris (convicted of rape, robbery and murder in Alabama). The American capitalist system is portrayed as of little relevance to the economic requirements of underdeveloped countries.

27. These various propaganda themes, primarily intended to weaken the Soviets' major adversary, fulfill at the same time a corollary purpose: to justify and promote the foreign policy of the USSR. Thus, to the degree the Soviets are successful in projecting the image of the United States as an "imperialist" nation, they justify their efforts to gain influence and control events in the third world as part of the "anti-imperialist struggle." To condemn the "neutron bomb" and American defense spending is at the same time to attempt to deflect criticism of Soviet weapons development, foot-dragging over SALT, and the burgeoning USSR defense budget. Criticism of U.S. weapons sales to "reactionary" regimes legitimizes Soviet "arms transfers" to "freedom fighters" and "national liberation movements" engaged in the "anti-imperialist struggle"--and generally facilitates the Soviets' efforts to expand their influence and role in the third world.

28. In short, propaganda exploiting these themes fulfills objectives a. through f.: It is generally designed to show the United States as the principal threat to world peace and stability. At the same time, it serves objectives g. and h. by obscuring the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union and creating a favorable environment for the conduct of Soviet policy abroad.

29. These parallel sets of objectives tend to manifest themselves most blatantly in material produced for internal consumption. Thus an "Izvestiya" editorial of 4 February 1978 condemns the "insidious designs of the militarists of the United States" as leading to "an increased threat of a new war," while claiming that "the Soviet Union spares no effort to halt the arms race." Propaganda directed at Third World audiences tends to be weighted in favor of attacks against the West as opposed to self-praise. As far as the West is concerned, although the Soviets do project some of their cruder propaganda to Western audiences over shortwave radio and through other overt media, it is likely that they judge the Western and particularly the American audience too sophisticated to accept such themes as, for example, that the USSR is

the unchallenged champion of peace and disarmament. Moreover, we believe that the Soviets regard Western and American decision-makers as a more important propaganda target than the American mass audience. To reach them, the Soviets are more likely to employ the more subtle means of influencing opinion described in Part V, such as diplomatic channels and third country "agents of influence." In propaganda disseminated through such channels--largely in one-on-one conversational situations--it is difficult to separate "the line" from actual Soviet perceptions of reality. Therefore, our judgments as to the themes the Soviets are attempting to project through these channels remain speculative, although not unsubstantiated by reporting.

30. We assume that these themes are largely intended to fulfill objective "g" and "h" by affecting American policy-makers' perceptions of Soviet intentions. In the May 1978 "Encounter," Lord Gladwyn, a former British foreign minister, suggests that the Soviets are attempting to persuade the West "that Russia is 'just an ordinary Great Power' with certain legitimate interests," that is, to promote the concept that the USSR is in many ways the mirror image of the USA. A variation on this theme which we have noted in certain channels is that the leadership of the USSR, as in the United States, is composed of "moderates" and "hard-liners," Soviet "hawks" and "doves." Brezhnev emerges as a leading "dove," committed to detente and willing to oppose the Soviet military establishment's demands for an expanded share of the budget. Our belief that this theme may at times be deliberate Soviet propaganda is reinforced by the fact that the Soviets could clearly see themselves as gaining diplomatic advantages by American acceptance of such a line. For example, if we grant that Brezhnev is a "dove," then we must accommodate ourselves to his demands in order to encourage the more moderate elements in the Soviet leadership; moreover, we must expect that the deal Brezhnev offers us is the best we can expect to get from the Soviets.

#### V. SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA ASSETS

31. In the following paragraphs we describe the foreign propaganda assets of the Soviet Union. Because we are concerned solely with propaganda directed abroad, we have not considered the propaganda role of the Soviet press. The press is, of course, an important vehicle for propagandizing the Soviet people. Additionally, the Soviets frequently use such major prestigious publications as Pravda and Izvestiya as the means of initiating new propaganda themes, or floating new stories related to old themes, so that they may be replayed by Soviet short wave radio, TASS, or other elements of the Soviet foreign propaganda network.

32. Broadcasting. International radio broadcasting plays a conspicuous role in Soviet propaganda. Total output of Soviet broadcasting to foreign listeners doubled in the last 20 years, to approximately 2,000 hours per week. Currently, 13 radio stations in the USSR maintain regular program schedules for foreign listeners around the world. The most famous is Radio Moscow, which is the official voice of the Soviet Union. Radio Moscow uses more than 100 short wave transmitters and beams programs to virtually every country in the world.

33. Also located in Moscow is a smaller, but more aggressive political station, Radio Peace and Progress. It went on the air in November 1964 claiming to be the "Voice of Soviet Public Opinion." The Soviet government disclaims responsibility for this radio's programs, but in fact Radio Peace and Progress uses the technical facilities of Radio Moscow and is under the control of the Soviet government. It broadcasts programs for three general regions--Latin America, Asia and the Arab World--as well as programs specifically for Haiti, Brazil, Paraguay, China, Mongolia, Indonesia, Israel and Germany. Because of its ostensibly "unofficial" status Radio Peace and Progress can take a harder political line with less diplomatic risk than Radio Moscow, and it does so frequently.

34. Strung out across the land mass of the USSR are ten domestic radio stations that also broadcast to foreign countries--Radios Baku, Dushanbe, Kiev, Minsk, Riga, Tallinn, Tashkent, Tbilisi, Vilnius, and Yerevan. For the most part they broadcast to neighboring countries, such as Iran, Turkey, Afghanistan, and Sweden, although the stations in Kiev, Vilnius, and Yerevan beam their signals as far as the Western Hemisphere.

35. At this time there is one clandestine radio station operating from Soviet soil, which is a significant, but perhaps temporary, reduction from the six or more that operated in the past. The current station calls itself the "National Voice of Iran to Iran." It does not identify its location or sponsorship, but monitoring indicates it uses Radio Baku's transmitters. It broadcasts pro-communist, anti-Shah news, commentaries and features in Azerbaijani and Persian.

36. Another special radio is "Radio Magallanes," which transmits from Moscow. Formerly the radio station of the Chilean Communist Party, "Radio Magallanes" moved to the USSR in 1974 to continue Spanish-language broadcasts to Chile. It is not a clandestine radio, but acknowledges both its location and its sponsorship by Radio Peace and Progress.

37. There are four other radios that are probably directed by Soviet broadcasters, but are transmitting from Eastern

Europe. They are "Our Radio to Turkey and Cyprus," "Voice of the Turkish Communist Party to Turkey and Europe," "Voice of the Italian Emigrant to West Germany," and "Voice of Greek Democrats Abroad to West Germany." The four radios are clandestine stations, not acknowledging their location or sponsorship. They broadcast news and commentaries, and may feature news bearing upon discontent among their target audiences. Two of the stations broadcast specifically to foreign workers in Western Europe.

38. In recent years the Soviets have expanded their linguistic capabilities and are currently broadcasting in 84 languages. Much of their increased language coverage is in Third World tongues, with African and Indian languages receiving particular Soviet attention. Soviet broadcasts to Africa maintain a regular program schedule in 11 indigenous languages (Amharic, Bambara, Fula, Hausa, Lingala, Malgache, Ndebele, Shona, Somali, Swahili, and Zulu), as well as English, French and Portuguese. The Soviets use 13 languages for broadcasts to India (Assamese, Bengali, English, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Malayalam, Marathi, Oriya, Punjabi, Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu).

39. The Soviet Union also produces television programs for foreign audiences, which are distributed abroad through official bilateral agreements with other countries and through hookups between East European and West European television systems.

40. The Soviets also produce a large number of propaganda films for foreign audiences.

41. News Agencies. The Soviet Union has two major news agencies, which distribute news in print abroad. They are TASS (Telegrafnoye Agenstvo Sovetskoy Soyuz) and APN (Agenstvo Pechati Novosti). Their relative positions and roles are much the same as those of Radio Moscow and Radio Peace and Progress. TASS is the official news agency of the Soviet Union. It is the first to carry official government announcements and it is considered more authoritative and reliable than Novosti. Novosti (or APN) on the other hand is ostensibly an "unofficial" Soviet news agency and therefore free to take a hard political line and disregard political niceties.

42. TASS maintains bureaus and correspondents in approximately 100 countries and supplies its service directly to at least 60 countries in Russian, English, Spanish, German and Arabic. The overall volume of TASS transmissions in all languages is believed to be more than 800 hours daily. (The actual volume may be higher, as this figure includes a rather conservative estimate of TASS microwave transmissions.)

43. Novosti claims that it has information exchanges with more than 100 international and national agencies, more than 100 radio and television companies, more than 7,000 of the world's largest newspapers and magazines, and 120 publishing houses. It also claims an annual transmission to foreign media of 60,000 articles and more than 2 million photo prints, as well as correspondents in 80 countries.

44. As impressive as these figures are, it should be recognized that both TASS and Novosti make much of their material available to foreign press outlets free of charge, so that their volume is not an entirely valid measure of their impact.

45. Publications. The Soviet Union publishes a large number of books and magazines for consumption abroad, and Novosti plays a key role in this enterprise. At its own publishing house in the USSR, Novosti publishes books, brochures, guides and booklets in over 50 languages. Combined editions run more than 15 million copies annually.

46. Novosti also publishes in other countries, bringing out more than fifty magazines and over 100 press bulletins as well as a number of newspapers. One of these magazines, Soviet Land, is a bi-monthly, published in India in 12 languages with a print run of more than 500,000 copies. Another is Sputnik, a general interest monthly magazine, that pays particular attention to articles for youth and young adults in foreign countries. It is published in English, French, German, and Urdu. Both TASS and Novosti have large staffs, and Novosti also draws upon freelance writers.

47. Pro-Soviet Communist Parties. There are more than 75 pro-Soviet communist parties outside the USSR and the Communist Bloc with a total estimated membership of over 3,500,000. Over 2,500,000 of this total is in Western Europe. These parties are uniquely valuable to Soviet propaganda. Communist parliamentarians make speeches in support of Soviet interests which are picked up by media of all political colorations. They also acquire membership on international parliamentary and consultative bodies. Party journalists infiltrate left-of-center, moderate and conservative media. Additionally, some parties have major newspapers of their own; and a few of these have truly impressive circulation figures--for example:

Italy	L'Unita (daily)	400,000
	Paese Sera (daily evening)	180,000

France	L'Humanite (daily)	150-180,000
	L'Humanite dimanche (weekend)	450-500,000
Japan	Akahata (daily)	2,200,000
	Zenei (monthly)	100,000

Moreover, party members are always available to swell the ranks in demonstrations called by front groups or other organizations to protest U.S. policies or for other Soviet propaganda purposes. While many Communist Parties, particularly in Europe, are no longer under tight Soviet control, they still generally follow the Soviet line on foreign policy matters.

48. International Communist Front Groups. There are 13 major international communist fronts. A front is an organization which appears to be independent but is in fact funded and controlled by the Soviets. While the size and membership of fronts may vary, they all employ similar propaganda techniques, such as mass assemblies and international festivals, to gain publicity. Their purpose is to spread Soviet propaganda themes and create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union. A list of these organizations follows:

	<u>Claimed Membership*</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization	No data	Cairo
Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau	No data	Cairo
International Association of Democratic Lawyers	25,000	Brussels
International Federation of Resistance Fighters	4,000,000	Vienna
International Organization of Journalists	150,000	Prague
International Union of Students	(Affiliates in 90 Countries)	Prague
Women's International Economic Federation	200,000,000	East Berlin

\*Many front groups members are citizens of Soviet or Bloc countries. The non-Soviet Bloc membership of the International Organization of Journalists, for example, is estimated at about 15,000.

	<u>Claimed Membership*</u>	<u>Headquarters</u>
World Federation of Democratic Youth	40,000,000	Budapest
World Federation of Scientific Workers	300,000	London
World Federation of Trade Unions	170,000,000	Prague
World Peace Council	(Affiliates in 120 Countries)	Helsinki
International Radio and Television Organization	No data	Prague
Christian Peace Conference	No data	Prague

\*See page 15.

49. A major forthcoming front group propaganda activity is the 11th World Youth Festival, scheduled for Havana July-August 1978. This Festival, sponsored by the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Democratic Youth, will be attended by representatives of communist and non-communist youth groups from most countries of the world. A total of 15-20,000 delegates is anticipated. It can be expected that the Soviets and Cubans will closely orchestrate its proceedings, and ensure that the proceedings of the conference, resolutions adopted, and speeches by those permitted access to the rostrum will project an image of international backing for Soviet/Cuban policies in Africa and Latin America.

50. The most important international front is the World Peace Council (WPC), which acts as a major sounding board for Soviet themes on peace and disarmament. The President of the WPC is Romesh Chandra, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of India. It has affiliate national Peace Councils in 120 countries. Because of the strident nature of its propaganda, the WPC was ejected from its original headquarters in France, and later from Vienna. It has maintained headquarters in Helsinki since 1969. In that year, it was recognized by the United Nations as a legitimate non-governing organization, and since then has become active in UN-sponsored disarmament activities. There is unconfirmed reporting that the WPC intends to establish a permanent presence in New York.

51. Front organizations may establish regional as well as national affiliates. For example, FELAP, the Latin American Federation of Journalists, is an extension of the International Organization of Journalists.

52. The international front organizations alone produce 33 monthly and biweekly publications which are mailed to willing and unwilling recipients all over the world. Some fronts also produce special bulletins which are mailed in bulk to addressee lists far exceeding the membership of their affiliates. (An unclassified handbook on the international fronts is attached.)

53. Friendship Societies. Bilateral friendship societies play an important supplementary role to the activities of the international communist fronts. Friendship society activities are carried out under the direction of the "Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries," established by Lenin in 1925. The Union publishes a newspaper, "The Moscow News," in English, French, Spanish and Arabic and a magazine, "Culture and Life," in Russian, English, Spanish, German and French. Local friendship societies, such as the Indo-Soviet Friendship Society, are generally controlled by Communist Party members or other individuals sympathetic to the Soviet Union. They frequently invite Soviet representatives to speak on a wide variety of subjects (e.g., "The Indo-Soviet Commission for Cooperation in the Social Sciences"). Coverage of these cultural gatherings by the local press is an important propaganda spinoff of friendship society activities, through which it is hoped to offset the adverse publicity the USSR has received through the defection of such prominent personalities as Rostropovich and Solzhenitzyn. Friendship societies often maintain reading rooms or libraries, well stocked with Soviet publications and Marxist classics. They also sponsor cultural exchange activities such as film festivals.

54. Soviet Journalists Abroad. There are close to 500 Soviet journalists stationed abroad, most of them employees of TASS, Novosti, Pravda, or Izvestiya. While these journalists claim to be as independent as any Associated Press or New York Times reporter overseas, they are as much employees of the Soviet state as a Soviet Consul or Ambassador, and, indeed, frequently live in official Soviet residences abroad. These journalists perform a variety of functions in addition to their normal role as reporters. Novosti offices abroad publish press bulletins, from which many third world newspapers extract material for publication. Some TASS and Novosti representatives double as intelligence operatives, and may be directed to recruit and handle local media assets. Additionally, Soviet correspondents, because of their ostensible independent journalist status, are able to establish regular professional relationships with their local colleagues with an ease denied to American officials. These relationships frequently enable them to influence local press coverage of international developments.

55. Diplomatic Contacts. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an integral part of the Soviet propaganda apparatus.

The Soviets use their diplomats not only to spread the official, overt Soviet line, but also as a means for passing deliberately misleading information to foreign governments. For example, a recent authoritative report revealed that a Soviet ambassador had advised the Chief of State of a third world country that the U.S. was plotting to overthrow his regime.

56. At times, Soviet diplomats or other officials abroad (e.g., TASS correspondents) are used as "private channels" between Brezhnev and the local Chief of State or government. The Soviets apparently believe that messages passed through these channels have greater impact and credibility than normal diplomatic exchanges. In these messages Brezhnev frequently appears as a moderate "reformist," surrounded by hard-liners. (See paragraph 30.)

57. Propaganda Activities of the KGB. The KGB provides a nonattributable adjunct to the vast overt Soviet propaganda network. It performs certain unique functions, such as the manufacture and distribution of forgeries and running high level influence agents, but its propaganda activities represent only a small fraction of the overall Soviet effort.

58. KGB Covert Media Assets. Much of the Soviet covert propaganda effort is at best only semi-clandestine. Pro-Soviet or anti-American propaganda appearing in the foreign press is often so blatant in nature that its Soviet origin is obvious, even though the source is not admitted. Most of this semi-clandestine activity is believed to be handled by non-intelligence personnel, rather than the KGB. KGB placement, often intended to denigrate local opponents of the Soviets, will normally be far more subtle, and even contain mild criticism of the USSR to conceal their sponsor. Sometimes the purpose of KGB or other Soviet press placements abroad is to propagandize the Soviet people. Recent editorials appearing in African journals which have explained the correctness of Soviet policies in, for example, Ethiopia, have been broadly replayed in the Soviet press and radio news networks. Also, KGB press placements abroad may have a third country as a target. The Soviets might find it difficult at present to float a story in the Cairo press; but they could use a controlled press asset in another country to, let us say, plant an article that the U.S. was plotting against Sadat, in the belief that if the story was sensational enough, it was bound to reach official Egyptian eyes and ears automatically. Otherwise, the Soviets could replay the story in controlled media elsewhere to reach an Egyptian audience.

59. KGB "Agents of Influence." Reporting indicates that the KGB has a number of officers who are accomplished at developing strong personal friendships with political and

economic leaders in both capitalist and third world countries, arriving with them at an understanding that permits the other party to collaborate occasionally with the Soviets on matters of mutual interest while retaining his integrity and loyalty to his country. In return for his services, the KGB may offer such a collaborator support for his undertakings, when they do not conflict with Soviet interests; international publicity for his accomplishments; or special communications channels to the Kremlin leadership. It appears that some "agents of influence" are employed by the Soviets because of their role as senior executives of institutions which comment or publish material on domestic or foreign policy matters.

60. KGB Political Action. The KGB at times assists the CPSU/ID in the clandestine funding of certain political leaders in Africa and Asia. Soviet support of some political groups must, however, be indirect. The KGB may wish to avoid direct contact with certain terrorist or national liberation movements because exposure would have serious consequences for the Soviet image and Soviet foreign relations (as well as for the recipients of Soviet assistance). In such cases the KGB operates through "cut-outs," such as non-Soviet revolutionary support organizations and leftist branches of certain international religious, social or philanthropic organizations. (The Soviets might also use local communist parties as go-betweens with radical groups they wish to support.)

61. Forgeries. Forgeries of apparent Soviet origin have been appearing with increasing frequency in the last year. Most of these recent forgeries have been alleged copies of official U.S. Government documents, which contain demeaning references to friendly governments. The Arab world, and Egypt in particular, appear to have been prime targets of recent Soviet forgery efforts. KGB forgeries are not always intended for media exploitation. For example, last March an envelope containing a microfilm of a bogus letter from U.S. Ambassador Eilts in Cairo turned up at the Sudanese Embassy in Beirut. The letter, addressed to our Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, called for the overthrow of the Numayri Government in the Sudan. In this instance, the intended audience of the forgery was the Sudanese Government; surfacing in the press was not vital. But in other cases, as for example the forgery of President Carter's speech on Greece cited in paragraph 26, d., the intended audience is the general public. In such cases, it is common Soviet practice to mail forgeries anonymously, or under a pseudonym, to local newspapers, in the hopes that one will automatically replay the document because of its sensational nature, or on a prior understanding that the communist press will exploit the forgery. A variation on this technique is to ensure that a prominent Soviet agent of influence receives the forgery and denounces it publicly, with the denunciation, it is hoped, covered by the press.

62. Soviet Satellite Propaganda. The Cuban and European intelligence services conduct propaganda operations parallel to, and in support of, the KGB. It is well known, for example, that the Czechs are particularly adept at the fabrication of forgeries. Three major satellite press agencies: CETEKA (Czech); DNA (East German); and PRENSA LATINA (Cuban); supplement the product of TASS and Novosti. As indicated in paragraph 37, clandestine radio transmitters are located on the soil of certain Bloc countries. Cuban short wave radio broadcasts regularly in Spanish and Indian dialects to Latin America. The Soviets frequently employ personnel of other communist states as front men when they do not wish to appear openly involved in domestic situations. For example, after the Communist Party of India split into pro-Moscow and pro-Peking factions in 1974, East German diplomatic and media representatives frequently contacted members of the pro-Peking group in efforts to induce them to reunite with the pro-Soviet faction.

63. Conclusion. This paper has not dealt with Soviet propaganda activities conducted within the United States, as they do not fall within the responsibilities of this Agency. We believe that some of the evidence presented in this paper suggests that such a study would be worthwhile. The recent visits to the United States of the leading personalities of both the Soviet central propaganda apparatus and the WPC, the major Soviet front group, may well presage, as we have suggested, an intensification of Soviet propaganda intended to influence American public opinion and policymakers. Campaigns initiated abroad against American policies, and particularly new U.S. weapons--such as the "neutron bomb" or the cruise missile--presumably had their U.S.-based counterpart. We have mentioned that certain Soviet themes floated overseas have reached the U.S. press; but the Soviets would be unlikely to rely on mere windfalls such as these as the mainstay of a propaganda assault against their principal adversary. If, as must be assumed, the main objective of Soviet propaganda is to weaken the United States and her allies, operations to further this end are undoubtedly taking place on our home soil.

Attachments:

1. Annex
2. "International Communist Front Organizations" Booklet

ANNEX

## SOVIET PROPAGANDA: THE "NEUTRON BOMB"

INTRODUCTION

1. The Soviet Union during July and August 1977 initiated an intensive worldwide campaign against U.S. production of the "neutron bomb" which continues to this day. The Soviets have pursued this issue in every media channel and wherever it was possible to stimulate adverse public discussion. The campaign demonstrates that the Soviets maintain an impressive capability to promote international propaganda on issues they consider important.

BACKGROUND

2. Initiative from Moscow. A study of broadcast commentary of Moscow domestic and international radio services from 4 July through 21 August suggests that the earliest sustained propaganda on the "neutron bomb" originated exclusively from the Soviet Union and that the Soviets escalated this attack in later weeks to support the propaganda campaign as it got underway elsewhere. Of some 3,000 broadcast items examined weekly, the number devoted to the neutron bomb issue rose from an insignificant level during 4-10 July, to dominate Soviet commentary during the three weeks of 25 July to 14 August. The attention given the neutron bomb then began to fade.

<u>Period</u>	<u>Total Items</u>	<u>Neutron Bomb Issue</u>
4-10 July	3,247	--
11-17 July	3,123	2%
18-24 July	3,163	5%
25-31 July	3,118	13%
1-7 August	3,091	13%
8-14 August	3,445	11%
15-21 August	3,331	5%

3. No other topic during the 25 July to 14 August period received so much attention. The campaign was sustained not only by volume but with specially staged, dramatic events. On 30 July, TASS for the first time since December 1974 issued a broad statement on U.S. foreign policy, denouncing the "neutron bomb." During the week of 1-7 August, Soviet media directed attention toward support of the "Week of Action" on

the bomb organized for 6-13 August by the World Peace Council front group. To keep up momentum, Pravda on 9 August published an appeal by 28 communist parties against production of the "neutron bomb."

4. There was nothing elaborate or complex in the themes used in the campaign. The "neutron bomb" was described merely as one more dreadful implement of war in the American arsenal, with the distinction of being the ultimate capitalist weapon, one which killed people but left property intact. The U.S. was portrayed as hypocritical for raising human rights issues while developing the bomb, and endangering the security of its European allies in the interests of its own defense. The bomb was also pictured as a threat to detente.

5. Echoes In Eastern Europe. The campaign in Eastern Europe, which took off in the latter weeks of July, was massive, well-organized and faithfully mirrored the Soviet effort. It employed all channels of public communication: press, radio, television, petitions, public letter-writing and demonstrations.

6. Front Group Action: In declaring 6-13 August an international "Week of Action," the World Peace Council established a focal point for action against the "neutron bomb." The Soviets' own Peace Committee used the occasion to pass a resolution stating the development of the neutron bomb violated the Helsinki CSCE agreement and threatened SALT negotiations. Similar staged incidents followed:

- Peace Councils in various East European states held protest meetings and passed resolutions.
- In Istanbul, a Peace Committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- An Accra group, described as completely out of local character, delivered a protest letter to the U.S. Embassy.
- In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups delivered notes to U.S. Consulates General. In Bonn, two Soviet journalists were observed at a demonstration at the American Embassy.
- A front group in Lima, Peru, sent a protest to the United Nations.
- In Tanzania, a WPC delegation sought propaganda assistance from President Nyerere.
- Other major international front groups, such as the World Federation of Trade Unions, participated in the "Week of Action."

The purpose of this front group activity was to maintain the campaign's momentum and to draw non-communists into the campaign, particularly in Western Europe. What had begun as manifestly a Soviet effort now appeared to many as a general public reaction to the alleged horrors of the "neutron bomb."

7. Media Pick-Up In Western Europe. There were two types of adverse public attention for the "neutron bomb" which the Soviets hoped to generate in Western Europe and, in fact, did. The first might be called "hack comment" and came from the front groups and from publications of communist parties. Thus there were articles in the Belgian CP newspaper, "Le Drapeau Rouge," (on ten different days), and the Austrian CP paper, "Volksstimme," "L'Unita" in Italy, the Greek CP/Exterior newspaper, "Rhizospastis," and so on. The second type of comment, and the far more important, was that of the non-communist press situated politically in the center or on the left. A segment of this press could be counted on to react almost automatically once the "neutron bomb" received enormous attention in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Others in this group could be expected to respond negatively on the bomb issue for various reasons: anti-Americanism; doubts on NATO's viability; hopes for maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union; or an honest distaste for the development of new weapons of mass destruction.

8. For the Soviets, the real propaganda success lay in the broad, adverse editorial treatment given the "neutron bomb" by this second journalistic sector, a performance judged by NATO Secretary General Luns in a 26 August speech as consisting of half-truths, untruths, and ignorance. This involved even the most objective elements of the media, which felt an obligation to carry both sides of the argument. An Italian source indicated it was impossible to distinguish left from right on the bomb issue, while a Paris report underscored the Soviet propaganda success by commenting that in France anti-bomb themes were appearing in local media totally independent of Soviet influence.

9. Propaganda Elsewhere. While Western Europe was the main target of Soviet propaganda on the "neutron bomb," the campaign, as the following examples illustrate, was of world-wide dimensions.

Libya: Tripoli media for weeks carried bomb-related propaganda of apparent Soviet origin.

Peru: Lima's most prestigious newspaper, "El Comercio," carried an attack on the bomb by the director of the International Institute for Peace front group, located in Vienna.

India: The Calcutta English language daily, "Amrita Bazar Patrika," carried 13 anti-American stories during the campaign, several related to the bomb.

Pakistan: The Urdu newspaper, "Mashriq," routinely published anti-bomb material.

Mauritius: The Port Louis newspaper, "Le Militant," carried three bomb-related articles.

Mali: "L'Essor," the country's only newspaper, published stories.

Ghana: Major Accra newspapers provided a steady diet of anti-bomb propaganda.

Afghanistan: In Kabul, the Soviet Embassy attacked the U.S. directly in its "News Bulletin."

Japan: For the first time in five years, a Soviet delegation appeared for a conference against nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and used that forum for anti-"neutron bomb" propaganda.

Ethiopia: The English language newspaper, "Ethiopian Herald," carried much Soviet-origin material on the bomb.

10. Phase Two. In September 1977 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown announced that President Carter would not approve production of the "neutron bomb" until America's NATO allies agreed to deploy the weapon. It might have been assumed that this statement would bring an end to the Soviet propaganda campaign. In fact, the Soviets maintained a continuing volume of propaganda on the putative horrors of the "neutron bomb" and encouraged their East European allies to do the same.

11. In late January 1978 every Western government announced that it had received a letter from Leonid Brezhnev warning that the production and deployment of the "neutron bomb" constituted a serious threat to detente. These announcements received heavy media coverage worldwide. Also, Western parliamentarians received similar letters from members of the Supreme Soviet, and Soviet Trade Union officials sent letters to Western union organizations and leaders. It gradually became clear that the Soviets had decided to shift their propaganda attack away from the United States and direct it more at our NATO allies, who would have to make the decision in the immediate future as to whether to accept deployment of the bomb on their soil.

12. Phase Three. Even as Brezhnev's dramatic gesture brought home to West Europeans the weight of the "neutron bomb" issue, the Soviets were planning a series of conferences in Europe which would move the propaganda drive into a third

phase. The target of this new effort was the United Nations Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD), to be held in New York from 23 May to 28 June.

Three conferences were utilized to provide psychological momentum at the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, organized a symposium in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body. This meeting, held 6 to 8 February, was attended by delegates from 22 countries and was used by the WPC to raise the 'neutron bomb' issue. The WPC president, Romesh Chandra, was quoted by the East Berlin newspaper, "Neues Deutschland," as stating that the Vienna meeting "was a contribution to the UN Special Session on Disarmament."

13. A much larger meeting was staged in Geneva 27 February to 2 March under the aegis of an organizing group calling itself the "Special Non-Governmental Organizations Committee on Disarmament." In fact, the real organizer was the WPC, aided by the Swiss Peace Movement and East Bloc representatives accredited to the United Nations in Geneva. Chandra presided over this meeting, which was attended by 126 representatives of peace organizations from 50 countries. The final statement condemned the proposed manufacture of neutron weapons and promised support against the "neutron bomb" for the third in this series of meetings, held in Amsterdam.

14. The Dutch Communist Party was the prime organizer of the "International Forum Against the Neutron Bomb," held 18 to 20 March in Amsterdam. The Soviets collaborated with the DCP in this extravaganza. Sympathizers from all over Europe were brought in for the meeting, which culminated on 19 March in a march of some 40,000 persons.

15. While the above conferences were being carried out there were other meetings and regional gatherings--some scheduled long before--which the Soviets adapted to their "neutron bomb" propaganda purposes. For example, the Second Continental Latin American and Caribbean Conference in Peace, Sovereignty and Economic Independence, held in Mexico City 1 to 4 February, and jointly sponsored by the WPC and the allied Mexican Peace Movement, was used to promote propaganda against the "neutron bomb." The WPC International Conference for Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, held 9 to 12 February in Athens, also addressed itself to the bomb issue. At the same time, East Bloc allies of the Soviets, particularly the Czechs, Poles and East Germans, maintained heavy propaganda activity against the "neutron bomb."

16. On 4 April 1978, American newspapers announced that President Carter had decided to delay production and deployment of the "neutron bomb." This declaration caused not so much as a break in stride in the Soviet campaign against the bomb. Soviet assets attacked the President's decision as a dodge; it was alleged that "nothing of substance had changed," and that the "protest movement must grow even stronger." In his 26 May 1978 address to the SSOD, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko said that neutron weapons "must be banned once and for all," calling them, "a particularly vicious and cruel means of mass destruction, intended to annihilate all things living."

#### ANALYSIS

17. We have selected the "neutron bomb" campaign for special consideration because it illustrates the duration and intensity with which the Soviets are capable of conducting an international propaganda campaign, as well as the general difference to the truth which characterizes much Soviet propaganda material. Also, the programmed development of the campaign, the interplay between various types of assets, and the quick shifts in emphasis in response to changing situations suggest the control Moscow enjoys over its international network. Moreover, the scope of the campaign demonstrates graphically the investment the Soviets are willing to make in propaganda.

18. Soviet Objectives. By creating an atmosphere of dread and foreboding about the "neutron bomb," the Soviets hoped to further a number of their basic propaganda objectives and themes. First, by presenting the bomb--a patently defensive, low yield nuclear weapon--as a new and particularly dreadful addition to the American nuclear arsenal, they encouraged criticism of U.S. defense spending and weapons development, and furthered the image of the U.S., rather than the USSR, as an aggressive "imperialist" country and the major threat to world peace. In so doing, they sought to justify, in the eyes of the world public opinion, Soviet military spending and the development of new Soviet weapons. It was natural that the principal geographical target of the Soviet "neutron bomb" campaign was Western Europe. Efforts to portray the bomb as escalating tensions in Europe were intended to create fears among the U.S.'s Western allies of American intentions, and thus to undermine NATO unity, a prime goal of Soviet propaganda activity. In particular, West Germany was portrayed as the sacrificial lamb of an aggressive U.S. military policy. To the extent that the "neutron bomb" campaign reached American eyes and ears, we can speculate that it was intended to stimulate doubts in the U.S. public about our own military establishment, its motives and its policies.

Impact. While an accurate measurement of the impact of any propaganda campaign is difficult, if not impossible, the fact that the "neutron bomb" has become a major political issue in most European parliaments must be attributed in some degree to the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda. The conclusion should not obscure the fact that many informed individuals in Europe sincerely opposed the "neutron bomb" on grounds entirely unrelated to the content of the Soviet propaganda campaign. That campaign, in fact, did not bother to come to grips with the pros and cons raised by military experts with regard to the "neutron bomb." The point is, rather, that by conducting a massive propaganda campaign exaggerating the lethality of this weapon, the Soviets made "neutron bomb" a household scareword in Europe, if not throughout the world.

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## INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST FRONT-ORGANIZATIONS

I SUMMARY

Soviet-controlled international front groups are among Moscow's major propaganda weapons today. A front organization is a group which appears to be independent but in fact is controlled by Soviet agents. Its objective: to create public support for Soviet policies among the unsuspecting.

Some front groups seek the support of the masses -- students, women and trade unionists. Other fronts aim at smaller targets -- lawyers, journalists and scientific workers. All Communist front groups have a common trait: they consistently push the Soviet line.

There are 13 major Communist international front organizations, most of which were started in the late 1940's. These groups claim millions of members but nearly all of this membership is found in Communist countries. The Soviet Union provides much of the money for these groups, directs their leaders and controls their propaganda -- all in secret.

Front groups employ similar propaganda techniques, including mass assemblies and international festivals, to gain publicity. The fronts fulfill other important purposes. They serve as a base for the development of Communists in countries where a Communist party is banned. They provide Soviet intelligence officers with opportunities to enlist individuals as agents. And they continue to create a false impression of public support for the foreign policies of the Soviet Union.

II BACKGROUND

Nine of the major Soviet-controlled front organizations got their start in the 1945-1948 period following World War II. They were the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the International Union of Students, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Organization of Journalists, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the World Federation of Scientific Workers and the International Radio and Television Organization.

This was the period when Stalin was expanding and consolidating Soviet power in Eastern Europe. A Communist coup vanquished Czechoslovakia in February 1948 and the Berlin blockade began two months later. It was the height of the cold war and the rest of the world recognized the fronts as aggressive cold war propaganda agencies.

Other fronts followed, three of them -- the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization, the International Institute for Peace and the Christian Peace Conference -- founded in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian revolution.

In subsequent years the fronts became less strident. They advocated peaceful coexistence, later detente, and switched to more sophisticated programs intended to appeal to well-intentioned but politically naive individuals. The fronts talked of goodwill, peace and understanding, even while continuing activities intended to advance Soviet global policies.

The fronts today, as a result of Soviet organizational efforts and clandestine financial assistance, are effective instruments of Kremlin foreign policy. They are widely accepted in many Third World countries and a number are officially accredited to United Nations agencies.

The fronts, however, remain under Soviet discipline and control, promoting causes which echo the Moscow line -- and shifting whenever Soviet policy changes. A front campaign in late 1977 against development of the neutron bomb was only one, although the most recent, example of this coordination of front activities by Soviet officials, acting through the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party and through the KGB/GRU, the Soviet intelligence agencies.

III THE MAJOR FRONTS

- The World Peace Council (WPC), with its headquarters in Helsinki, is the most important Soviet front organization. It has carried on a major expansion program in recent years, particularly in the Third World. The WPC President, Romesh Chandra (see page 13), a leader of the Communist Party of India, has been closely involved in front activities for more than a quarter of a century, consistently reflecting Soviet goals and policies. The WPC claims to have affiliates in 120 countries. It holds well-advertised international congresses every three or four years -- the last in Warsaw in May 1977. The WPC supports disarmament on Soviet terms (without international inspection) along with various subsidiary campaigns backing Soviet policy on the Middle East, Cyprus, Chile, South Africa and other regional problems.
  
- The Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), with headquarters in Cairo, is an off-shoot of the WPC and supports WPC programs at its various meetings and in its published material. AAPSO gives the Soviet Union a foothold in the Afro-Asian bloc and also in Latin America, through the related Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (AALAPSO). One indication of Soviet influence in AAPSO was the holding of the 12th AAPSO Council in Moscow in 1975.
  
- The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), centered in Prague, is the largest and one of the most active front groups. It claims a membership of 170 million in 70 countries. Most members, however, are in Soviet bloc countries, with 100 million in the USSR itself. The two largest non-Communist bloc trade unions in the WFTU are the General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in France and the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) in Italy, both Communist-dominated. The WFTU claims to be furthering trade unionism, but it attempts to weaken non-Communist labor organizations. WFTU-affiliated labor groups (in the Sudan, for example) have been involved in Communist takeover attempts. Like other fronts, the WFTU distributes large quantities of printed propaganda, including a monthly journal of 30 to 40 pages, printed in 10 languages and distributed in 75 countries. The journal is for labor activists. It outlines ways to promote the Soviet position on most major political events, whether labor related or not.

- The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), with headquarters in Budapest, claims a membership of 150 million in 100 countries, but membership is concentrated in the Soviet bloc. Though not without some rivalry between them, the WFDY often works closely with the much smaller International Union of Students (IUS), which has its headquarters in Prague. The two groups have jointly sponsored a series of international youth festivals over the past 30 years -- the last in East Berlin in 1973, the next scheduled in Havana in July 1978. Both the WFDY and IUS coordinate their activities with the WPC and other fronts. The terms "youth" and "students" identify the Fronts' target audiences for indoctrination. Control of both Fronts is held by trusted adults.
- The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ), centered in Prague, claims 150,000 members, many of them belonging to affiliated national unions. The IOJ attempts to discredit non-Communist news agencies and publications but remains silent about the absence of press freedoms in bloc countries. It offers training (indoctrination) programs to Third World journalists, offers a news service heavily weighted with propaganda and awards prizes to Communist and leftist media workers.
- The International Institute for Peace (IIP) was organized to provide temporary cover for WPC activities in 1958. IIP headquarters is in Vienna. It claims to provide a forum where scientists of East and West can discuss peace problems, but its membership is centered in bloc countries and IIP hews closely to the Soviet line in all its activities.
- The Christian Peace Conference (CPC), centered in Prague, describes itself as a forum for Christians everywhere to "search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems." Its highest organ is the All-Christian Peace Assembly (ACPA), which scheduled its 5th international conference in Prague in 1978. The CPC has been headed by Metropolitan Nikodim of the USSR since 1969. It helped to organize a world conference of religious leaders in Moscow in 1977. Statements issued after CPC meetings always follow the Soviet line.
- The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), with headquarters in East Berlin, has claimed a total membership of 200 million from 120 affiliated organizations in more than 100 countries. Most of the membership is in the Soviet bloc. WIDF sponsored a world congress in East Berlin in 1975 as part of a United Nations "women's year" which it helped organize. WIDF meetings and publications -- including a glossy quarterly printed in six languages -- emphasize Soviet bloc propaganda behind a facade of programs

dedicated to women's rights and education, peace and disarmament.

● The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), centered in Brussels, claims a membership of 25,000 and considers law a function in the struggle against "imperialism" and "colonialism." The IADL issues periodic statements about legal and human rights abuses in non-Communist countries but never discusses such violations in the bloc area. It has sent observers to trials held in such countries as Chile, Iran, Morocco, Spain and Turkey, but has never attempted to monitor trials held in the Soviet bloc.

● The International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT), with headquarters in Prague, offers full membership only to national broadcasting and television organizations. The avowed aims of OIRT are to facilitate exchanges and cooperative efforts among its members. In practice OIRT has become a tool for coordination of Communist radio and television propaganda. It attempts to influence the development of Third World radio and television organizations through training and other assistance programs. Only European Communist countries, Finland and Cuba were represented at a December 1976 OIRT Council meeting.

● The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) has its headquarters in London and a Secretary-General's office in Paris. It claims a membership of 300,000, drawn mainly from Communist countries. Its program follows closely on WPC propaganda initiatives and has included such "abuse of science" themes in the past as allegations of U.S. use of "germ warfare" or "chemical warfare." The WFSW picked up the WPC campaign against the neutron "bomb" in 1977.

● The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR), with its headquarters in Vienna, also maintains close liaison with the WPC, following the WPC line on disarmament. FIR, after World War II, brought together former political prisoners and victims of Nazism and Fascism, including World War II partisans and resistance organizations. It extolled the role of Communist partisans and the Soviet Army and was critical of non-Communist resistance groups. It is of declining significance today, although it continues to sponsor exhibitions and lectures at World Youth festivals and similar gatherings.

IV SOVIET CONTROL

The strongest evidence of Soviet control of the fronts through the years, despite poses of independence and non-alignment, has been their faithful adherence to the Soviet party line.

When the Sino-Soviet feud erupted, the fronts sided with the Soviet Union and elbowed Peking out of their meetings. Front officials suspected of pro-Chinese sympathies were eliminated.

When Tito broke with the Cominform, the front organizations expelled Yugoslav members; they were later welcomed back when Nikita Khrushchev repaired the breach.

Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising in 1956 and the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 resulted in public protests from some front officials. It took several years in each case, but Moscow finally replaced all those who disagreed with its policies. Most front activities meanwhile, remained in a state of suspension, until discipline had been restored.

Front groups, similarly, jumped to follow the Kremlin line when the 1973 Arab-Israel conflict erupted. All the fronts denounced Israel within a matter of days, usually in the same phrases. More recently they have echoed Moscow's position on such problems as Angola and Ethiopia. The president of the Ghana Peace Council (a WPC affiliate) was ousted from his post, after questioning the Soviet role in Angola, and accused of being "on the same side as the imperialists."

The various fronts joined in chorus against development of the new neutron radiation weapon in 1977. These same fronts earlier echoed the same line, sometimes using the same phraseology, for Moscow-proposed "general and complete disarmament" and in drumming up signatures for the Stockholm peace appeals.

The fronts coordinate and interact with one another, usually emphasizing the same subjects at the same time. Some who have become disillusioned with the fronts and quit them have publicly confirmed the fact of Soviet control and the undemocratic nature of front organizations, with public meetings stage-managed from start to finish by a leadership hand-picked by Soviet representatives.

Jiri Pelikan, a veteran Czechoslovak Communist who headed the International Union of Students from 1953 to 1963, told the New Left Review in January 1972:

"The Soviet Union was always trying to impose its tactical policy of the moment on the organization ... The Soviet members saw the IUS and similar organizations merely as unofficial instruments of Soviet foreign policy."

Richard K. Ullmann, a former vice president of the Christian Peace Conference, asserted as early as 1963:

"We had better admit .... that our Eastern brothers are being used for Communist policy and that through them we are being used in the same way."

Dr. Josef L. Hromadka, a Czechoslovak theologian, resigned as chairman of the CPC in 1969 following the Warsaw Pact 1968 takeover of Prague. He indicated in his resignation that although it had been Metropolitan Nikodim of the Russian Orthodox Church (the CPC president) who purged the CPC after the 1968 invasion, the move was in reality ordered by the Soviet government.

"This is not just an internal church decision," Dr. Hromadka said, "there must be pressure from outside." He died of a heart attack shortly thereafter.

Over the years, many rank and file members, as well as some officials, have dropped out of front activities after discovering that things were not as they seemed. Disillusionment over Soviet control has been the main cause of such defections. But front organizers continue to round up new recruits and sometimes boast of the new blood being brought constantly into the organization. Romesh Chandra, head of the World Peace Council, told the 1977 World Assembly in Warsaw, for example, that 60 percent of those in attendance had never participated in a previous WPC international meeting.

Besides offering a mechanism for manipulating public opinion, the fronts also offer the Soviet Union other important benefits.

Front gatherings serve as agent enlisting grounds for Soviet and bloc intelligence services. Front meetings in the USSR and Eastern Europe are ideal for this purpose because bloc intelligence officers can control the circumstances of their meetings with likely recruits, with no fear of surveillance by or interference from non-Communist security services. Most of the agents enlisted by Communist bloc intelligence services over the years were targeted while on visits to the Soviet bloc, some while in attendance at front meetings or on free vacations in the bloc offered in connection with these gatherings.

Fronts also act as cover for Communist parties and organizations in countries where open Communist groups or parties have been outlawed. They serve as propaganda organs in countries where conditions are not ripe for open Communist activities or for the establishment of a Communist party. They have also helped to channel training and arms to insurgents and opposition political groups.

V ROMESH CHANDRA -- NUMBER ONE FRONT MAN

The World Peace Council (WPC), the major Soviet-controlled international front organization, recently honored Romesh Chandra, an Indian Communist, by elevating him from Secretary-General to President at its 1977 meeting in Warsaw.

The honor was well-deserved from the Soviet point of view because Chandra, possibly the best-known of all front officials, has faithfully followed the Moscow line throughout his quarter century in the front movement. Year after year, Chandra has praised Soviet peace initiatives and condemned Western "imperialists." The WPC, Chandra said in Moscow in 1975, "positively reacts to all Soviet initiatives in international affairs." Two years earlier, at a 1973 Moscow peace conference, Chandra asserted that those peace organizations which took an anti-Soviet stance "ceased to be genuine peace organizations." Chandra has never strayed -- even during such periods of stress as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. He stood up for Moscow then though there were widespread protests from leaders of some other front groups who were subsequently ousted from office.

Chandra, now 58, travels to scores of countries annually as part of his WPC assignment. He speaks at WPC seminars and regional and planning conferences and before United Nations committees. He is cited in countless WPC news releases as an authority on peace.



Romesh Chandra of India has been an organizer and leader of Soviet front groups since at least 1950. He has been a key figure in the World Peace Council (WPC) since becoming a member of its executive committee in 1953. He is now its President. He helped found the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) and has played a role in launching and operating a number of other front groups. Chandra is so loyal to the Soviet Union that he once told a WPC gathering that any peace group which took an anti-Soviet stand was not a genuine peace organization.

He has been with WPC practically from its beginning, active in international front gatherings since at least 1950. He became a member of the WPC executive committee and one of its secretaries in 1953. The following year he helped launch another major Soviet front, the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) -- Moscow's response to being banned from the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung. Chandra has helped guide AAPSO since, including its participation in many WPC propaganda campaigns. Chandra is also a founder and former director of the International Institute for Peace, a separate front group which remains under WPC control. He also heads some front subsidiary groups.

Clever, ambitious and vain, Chandra has been known in India for years as the Indian with the Russian contacts. In 1953 Moscow used him as a go-between with the Indian Communist Party, advising the Party to refrain from criticizing Jawaharlal Nehru so as to keep him neutral. In 1963 Chandra made a secret trip to Moscow to uphold India's case in the Sino-Indian dispute. Chandra makes frequent stopovers in Moscow during his travels as WPC spokesman. Those familiar with the workings of the WPC say that the Kremlin uses these visits to keep Chandra posted on the party line.

The Russians, while thus keeping a short rein on Chandra, also exercise other means of control. They keep a representative of the Soviet Communist Party at Chandra's side at WPC headquarters, with authority to overrule Chandra whenever deemed necessary. Igor Belyayev, although listed only as a secretary in the WPC secretariat, is the Soviet representative who currently wields this power in WPC affairs.

VI POSSIBLE COUNTERMEASURES

A number of steps can be taken to regulate and control the activities of Soviet front organizations in non-Communist countries. Some are listed below.

- Records can be kept of local citizens who attend international front gatherings, particularly those held in the USSR or in the bloc countries of Eastern Europe. Most Communist agents have been enlisted while visiting or living in bloc countries. Even travel to Western Europe or elsewhere under front auspices may be suspect. Soviet bloc intelligence officers frequently offer free vacation trips to Eastern Europe to those attending front meetings in non-Communist countries. They may offer to provide special documents, so there will be no record of such a trip in a person's passport.
- Those local citizens permitted to attend international front gatherings can be warned in advance about the likelihood of recruitment efforts by hostile intelligence services. They can also be interrogated after their return to determine if approaches have been made.
- The financial accounts and budgets of national groups associated with Soviet international front organizations can receive close study. Requirements can be imposed on them to submit regular financial statements covering income from dues and local fund-raising activities and to observe national currency import regulations in the case of donations from abroad. The Soviet KGB and other bloc intelligence services have sometimes channeled clandestine funds to dissident groups and opposition political parties through national front groups.
- Some national front organizations have raised funds by the black market sale of vodka, cigarettes, cameras or other luxury goods which may have been smuggled into the country. Customs officials can keep a strict watch on such smuggling attempts and authorities can investigate suspected black market sales.
- Some security services have found that suspicious front activities can be kept under surveillance by encouraging local patriotic citizens to join and report regularly on developments.

● The international Communist fronts sometimes flood a country with propaganda -- mailed booklets and pamphlets, publications issued by various fronts, wall posters, etc. Much of this material would be barred if distribution were attempted by a Soviet bloc diplomatic mission. Reciprocity can be the general rule here as in other dealings with the Soviet bloc. Distribution of such propaganda could be banned on grounds the Communist countries do not permit distribution of outside propaganda to their citizens.


● Authorities can keep an eye on visiting delegations representing the various front groups. They can be screened, for example, to make certain that they are not being used to infiltrate subversive elements. Their contacts with local citizens can be monitored as a clue to likely targets. Similarly, records can be kept of those local citizens who accept membership on local front committees.

● Not all local citizens who agree to work with international front groups are traitors to their country. The Communists make a practice of attempting to attract idealistic but naive local personages to serve on local committees, even to serve as local chairman, to provide a facade of respectability. Those who accept such offers might well be cautioned, however, concerning such standard operating practices by these front groups. Similarly, local labor leaders who may have been chosen to attend a trade union course or seminar or young people who agree to attend a work camp or recreational activity organized by a front group should not be branded as potentially subversive for this alone; they, too, can be cautioned about use of such lures by Communist front groups for ulterior purposes.

● Local publishers, editors and other media representatives who may be the targets of Soviet line propaganda issued by national affiliates of international front groups can be advised to acquaint themselves with the recent history of these fronts, specifically the undemocratic manner in which they are organized, their reliance on Soviet financing and Soviet control over selection of officers and propaganda themes. The various Communist fronts, it can be noted, invariably criticize human rights violations in non-Communist countries, but are blind to such violations in Soviet bloc countries.

VII BACKGROUND, STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITIES OF FRONT GROUPS

MAJOR COMMUNIST FRONT ORGANIZATIONS



THE WORLD PEACE COUNCIL (WPC)

Background

The World Peace Council (WPC) is the Soviet Union's single most important international front organization. It is usually the first of the various front groups to respond to new Moscow propaganda initiatives and it coordinates the activities of a number of other front groups. The WPC Presidential Committee includes the top leaders of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), International Union of Students (IUS) and Christian Peace Conference (CPC).

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Communist writers themselves have cited the peace movement as the most important joint action of the "anti-imperialist" forces. Peace has been a major Communist slogan since the Bolsheviks campaigned for power in the USSR 60 years ago under the banners of "land," "bread" and "peace." The 1950 Stockholm Peace Appeal, launched in 1950, was the first big WPC endeavor. It sought an absolute ban on the atomic bomb, at a time when the USSR had not yet developed its own nuclear capacity. The 1950 appeal was so successful that Moscow decided recently to do it again with a new "Stockholm Appeal," directed against "the arms race, the stockpile of weapons in the hands of the imperialists . . . ." The WPC claimed in 1977 that the new campaign had attracted more than 400 million signatures. The Picasso peace dove, also promoted by the WPC, advertised scores of international Communist gatherings.

The peace movement led by the WPC appeared to be taking an expanding role in Soviet agitprop operations in 1977, partly to counter the adverse propaganda effect of increasing shipments of Soviet military supplies to such countries as Angola, Libya and Ethiopia and Moscow's supporting role in such conflicts as the Ethiopian-Somali confrontation and the victory of the MPLA in Angola over two non-Marxist liberation groups.

Everybody is for peace, and Moscow has capitalized on this fact for years by coupling the idea of peace with any number of Soviet policy initiatives, attempting to encourage broad acceptance of Soviet formulas for resolving international conflicts, ranging from Angola to Cyprus, with the most emphasis on Moscow's solutions for problems of disarmament and detente. The WPC attempts to create an emotional atmosphere which obscures any critical examination of Soviet disarmament proposals, specifically their lack of any enforcement machinery for international inspection, to make sure that no one cheats.

The WPC had its origins in a Soviet-organized "World Congress of Intellectuals for Peace," held in Poland in 1948. This led to the "First World Peace Congress" in Paris the following year, which resulted in establishment of the "World Committee of Partisans of Peace," renamed the "World Peace Council" (WPC) in 1950. WPC was forced to move to Prague in 1951 after the French government ordered it out of Paris for subversive activities. Then in 1954 Moscow moved WPC offices to Vienna, until the Austrian government forced it to move once again in 1957 for "activities directed against the interest of the Austrian State." However, WPC continued its operations in Vienna under the name of "International Institute for Peace" (IIP), until it finally moved to Helsinki in 1968 where it is located today. IIP remains in Vienna.

Although publicly committed to peace as its raison d'etre, WPC activities invariably coincide with Soviet international policies and goals, particularly support for sweeping Soviet

proposals on disarmament without international controls or inspection. This pro-Soviet bias has been evident throughout the years. The WPC denounces Western "colonialism" and "imperialism" at every opportunity, but closes its eyes to what the Chinese call Soviet "hegemonism" and "social-imperialism." It describes Western military maneuvers as threats to world peace, but defends Soviet bloc maneuvers as peace-keeping exercises. It demands withdrawal of Western forces from advanced bases, but ignores the growing number of Soviet military footholds in Africa and Asia. Periodic Communist crises through the years -- for example, over Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, the Cuban missile crisis, the ouster of Yugoslavia from the bloc -- have resulted in campaigns on Moscow's behalf and purges of front organization leaders who dared to question the Soviet position.

#### Structure

The WPC boasts an impressive organization chart, listing a president, 22 vice-presidents and about 120 additional members of a Presidential Committee chosen from affiliated peace organizations in more than 50 countries and from a number of other international front organizations. Romesh Chandra, a ranking member of the Indian Communist Party for many years, was named President at the 1977 WPC congress in Warsaw -- the first to hold this office since the death of F. Joliot-Curie in 1958. Chandra had been a faithful supporter of Soviet policies in his earlier post of WPC secretary-general since 1966. The Presidential Committee runs the WPC between Council meetings. There have been 11 major Congress sessions since 1949, the last one in Warsaw, convened with a good deal of advance promotion under the label, "World Assembly of Builders of Peace."

In addition to the Presidential Committee there is a WPC Bureau, responsible for implementing committee decisions, and a Secretariat, which serves as an executive body to carry out decisions of the Council, the Presidential Committee and the Bureau.

The WPC has established numerous subsidiary organizations, usually on an ad hoc basis, to carry on specific campaigns. Currently these include the International Campaign Committee for a Just Peace in the Middle East, the International Committee for Solidarity with Cyprus, the Commission on Mass Media and Information, the International Commission of Enquiry into the Crimes of the Chilean Junta, the Commission on Scientific Research for Peace, the Commission on Ending of the Arms Race and Disarmament, the Commission on Development and a New International Economic Order and the International Human Rights Commission. Moscow directed its WPC agents in 1977 to soft-pedal the human rights issue after embarrassing questions about Soviet violations were raised by non-Communists at earlier WPC-sponsored

meetings. A decision was made to confine WPC human rights activities only to regional gatherings, which could be confined to specific area violations with no danger of getting into Soviet bloc repression of its activists.

Ultimate control of the WPC lies with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which, with some assistance from other bloc countries, provides most WPC financing, and has a hand in selection of pro-Soviet Communists and other leftists for positions throughout the WPC administrative structure.

Chandra himself has a record of servile loyalty to the Soviet Union. He views Moscow as the foremost champion of peace, challenging imperialist proponents of the arms race, and says so publicly at the drop of a gavel. He is on the road almost constantly, speaking out at WPC-sponsored conferences, forums and protest gatherings all over the world; he makes frequent stopovers in Moscow on these travels, to consult on the party line.

Yet the Kremlin does not rely on Chandra alone to carry out its policies in the WPC. A representative of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party has for years sat at Chandra's side, in a background WPC role, but holding ultimate control. This position was held for a number of years by Aleksandr Berkov, but the job was taken over in early 1977 by Igor Belyayev. Berkov, and later Belyayev, were listed only as one of a number of secretaries in the Secretariat, but they were recognized within the organization as the final authority, including the power of veto, as representative of the USSR. Berkov, for example, was known to have over-ruled Chandra on certain decisions involving meetings or other activities and relayed the party line concerning WPC causes and operations. Two other Russians playing key roles in the WPC are Vitaly Shaposhnikov, who is listed as a Soviet member of the WPC Presidential Committee, and Oleg Kharkhardin, who is executive of the Moscow-based Continuing Liaison Committee (CLC) of the World Council of Peace Forces and also vice-chairman of the WPC-affiliated Soviet Peace Committee. Both are officials of the International Department of the Soviet CP Central Committee. The International Department (ID) is responsible for major clandestine political activities abroad including the front organizations, foreign Communist parties and activities such as strikes and demonstrations designed to destabilize foreign governments. In terms of power in Moscow the ID stands firmly over the KGB for clandestine political activities. In these matters the KGB may act only on direction of the ID.

The WPC structure is honey-combed with hand-picked pro-Soviet Communists and other leftists. There are a certain number of prestigious non-Communist figures to provide a facade of independence and nonalignment. But most individuals affiliated with the WPC are active in Communist affairs in their home countries and many are active on national peace committees. New members of the WPC are selected from nominations submitted in advance by the various national peace committees. These national committees, in turn, have been set up as local Communist fronts, generally with the assistance of the

WPC. By maintaining control over key WPC officials, the USSR commands the content of the communiques, resolutions and statements which issue from WPC events, and directs the final decisions on WPC projects and activities.

Opposition to Soviet domination erupts on occasion, but trusted leaders are usually able to confine this to private meetings of commissions or sub-commissions. At several 1977 meetings, beginning with the World Forum of Peace Forces held in Moscow in January, non-Communist participants embarrassed Soviet representatives on several occasions by asking pointed questions about human rights violations in the USSR. Opposition views seldom find their way into the large-scale public gatherings, however. Dissenting views, if they exist, are ignored. The Soviet human rights activist, Andrei Sakharov, sent a message in 1976 to a WPC-sponsored forum on disarmament in York, Britain, for example. It was not read to delegates, as Sakharov requested, because, the organizers said, it was too long, too late and of a "different nature" than other messages. Two Soviet delegates threatened to walk out if it were read.

WPC headquarters are in Helsinki, Finland. The WPC has opened a new office in Geneva, in order to be in closer touch with United Nations agencies there. The WPC holds consultative status with a number of UN agencies and WPC spokesmen have addressed UN committees on disarmament, decolonization and other matters. The UN sends representatives to the larger WPC meetings. A WPC delegation presented Joliot-Curie gold medals to UN committees on apartheid and decolonization in 1975 -- an act which brought a Chinese attack on the WPC as a "hired tool" of the Soviet Union. In May 1977, a Chinese spokesman at the UN went a step further and referred to the WPC as "the highest tool of a certain super-power."



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## International Fortnight of Actions against Horror-Bomb WPC BUREAU CALLS: BAN NEUTRON BOMB

The World  
Peace Council  
September

### Activities

The WPC attempts to achieve its propaganda objectives mainly by organizing worldwide campaigns, coordinated regionally by national peace committees. These have often involved mass collection of signatures -- for example the two Stockholm Appeals. Massive protest campaigns are sometimes launched, supported by forums, conferences, public statements and a flow of pamphlets and booklets. The WPC spearheaded such an effort against the neutron "bomb" in 1977. Regional campaigns are co-sponsored by individual peace committees, and delegations of top-level WPC officials from Helsinki make visits, particularly to Third World countries, to lend prestige to the local peace front and to stimulate local support for WPC goals.

WPC propaganda activities reach a peak every three or four years at large-scale Congresses, designed to attract the attendance of some well-known non-Communist liberals, as well as the solid core of loyal party members who stage-manage these spectacles. The most recent one, called "The World Assembly of Builders of Peace," held in Warsaw in May 1977, attracted 1,500 delegates from 125 countries according to its sponsors. Moscow provides clandestine funding for these periodic extravaganzas, which usually include free travel, free hotel accommodations and some sort of souvenir for delegates, such as a gold-plated watch, properly inscribed to peace. The previous Congress was held in Moscow in 1973 (where the watches were handed out) at an estimated cost to the USSR of more than \$10 million. The 1977 event may have cost more. One of the principal propaganda achievements of the Warsaw meeting was passage of a resolution condemning "the imperialist and Zionist maneuvers" against the USSR and their attempts to capitalize on human rights issues in the Soviet bloc. Delegates also paid resounding homage to Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Union for Moscow's policy of peace and detente. Congress resolutions are always by acclamation, not by a vote. Delegates sometimes do not get a chance to read resolutions they have adopted until they are published later.

Other WPC-sponsored meetings in 1977 included a "World Forum of Peace Forces," held in Moscow in January, said to have drawn 500 participants from 115 countries, and "A World Conference of Religious Leaders for a Lasting Peace, Disarmament and Just Relations Between Peoples," also held in Moscow in June, with a claimed attendance of 700 from more than 100 countries. At the first meeting Chandra, then WPC secretary-general, praised the Soviet Union for its "peace initiatives" in recent years.

Other WPC gatherings propagated the Soviet line on a variety of international issues, including Angola, Timor, Indonesia, Cyprus and the Middle East. On Angola, for example, the WPC condemned attempts to implicate the Marxist government (and, in effect, the Cuban troops stationed in Angola) in any "so-called

invasion of Zaire." The Angola issue -- as do other issues periodically -- resulted in some dissent in WPC ranks. Ben Kumah, President of the Ghana Peace Council, a WPC affiliate, was removed from his post, accused among other things of issuing an unauthorized press release on Angola "putting him on the same level as the imperialists." He had also been a member of the WPC Presidential Committee.

The WPC issues a number of publications including a bi-monthly, *New Perspectives*, distributed in English and French, and a monthly, *Peace Courier*, published in English, French, Spanish and German. It also puts out a large number of bulletins and booklets on specific regional issues.

THE AFRO-ASIAN PEOPLE'S SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATION (AAPSO)Background

The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), established in Cairo in December 1957, was designed to fulfil two purposes: (1) to serve as an anti-colonial offshoot of the World Peace Council (WPC) and (2) to facilitate Soviet entry into the Afro-Asian bloc, from which the USSR had been excluded at the Bandung conference of 1955.

AAPSO was created with the ostensible aim of co-ordinating the efforts of African and Asian people against colonialism and promoting their political, economic and cultural development. But whereas the Bandung conference sought to bring together "non-committed" African and Asian nations in a campaign for independence, AAPSO from the outset has been a tool of the Communists.

The Soviet Union and China were among 18 countries whose delegates decided on the formation of an Asian Solidarity Committee at a conference in New Delhi two weeks before the Bandung conference. In December 1956, the Asian Solidarity Secretariat, meeting in New Delhi, decided to expand the organization to include African countries. The first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was held in Cairo in December 1957. An AAPSO constitution was adopted in 1960.



Yusuf As-Sebai of Egypt has been Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) since it began in 1957. He was also elected its President in 1974. He is a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC) and Secretary-General of the Afro-Asian Writers Permanent Bureau (AAWPB).

During its first years, AAPSO was jointly controlled by the Soviet Union, China and Egypt. The Sino-Soviet dispute led to disruption of AAPSO conferences at Moshi, Tanzania, in February 1963 and at Winneba, Ghana, in 1965, and to a walkout of the Chinese from the eighth AAPSO Council conference in Nicosia in February 1967. The Nicosia conference decided to make Algiers, instead of Peking, the meeting place for the fifth AAPSO plenary conference that year. Since 1967, Soviet domination of AAPSO appears to have been virtually unchallenged; and working control of the organization remained in the hands of men trusted by Moscow. The Russians said that the departure of China strengthened rather than weakened AAPSO. By 1975 it was no longer necessary even to hold Council meetings in African or Asian countries. That year the 12<sup>th</sup> AAPSO Council meeting was held in Moscow.

#### Structure

AAPSO/membership has comprised three main elements:

- (1) African and Asian political parties and national liberation movements which have attained power.
- (2) Afro-Asian national solidarity committees whose members have been drawn primarily from local Communist and pro-Communist political groupings and related front organizations.
- (3) Representatives of political parties and movements in opposition to established regimes in African and Asian countries.

Many of the African political organizations and movements in this third group which are (or have been) active in AAPSO -- for example, the Socialist Workers and Farmers Party of Nigeria -- are banned in their home countries. Other member organizations play insignificant political roles in their own countries, partly because their affiliates lack substantial membership and because they fail to represent majority views. But any political group unrecognized by its own government but represented in AAPSO may be assumed to be acceptable to Moscow sponsors of AAPSO as well as to key Communists in control of AAPSO.

There does not appear to be a comprehensive listing of AAPSO members and affiliates. But committees affiliated to AAPSO exist in most countries of Africa and Asia. Afro-Asian Solidarity Committees in the Soviet bloc countries are accepted as associate members. Countries which have hosted AAPSO and AAPSO-related conferences in recent years include Egypt, Libya, Syria, India, Iraq, South Yemen, Cyprus, Lebanon, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Benin, Greece and Angola. An Emergency International Conference of "Solidarity with the Struggle of the People of Angola," held in Luanda in February 1976, was attended by delegates from approximately 50 AAPSO member countries and 80 international organizations.

At the first AAPSO conference (Cairo, 1957) countries -- classed as "progressive" by the Cairo Preparatory Committee -- which were represented by delegates chosen by their own governments included the USSR, China, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Egypt, Ghana, Sudan, Syria and Indonesia. The 13th International Conference of AAPSO held in Mozambique in September 1975 was attended by AAPSO Council members from Egypt, Cyprus, Gambia, Kuwait, Laos, Mali, "Palestine", Upper Volta, and the Soviet Union. Also represented were members of the national liberation fronts of Algeria, Bahrain and the Comoro Islands, the UPRONA Party of Burundi, the National Revolutionary Councils of Dahomey and Ghana, the "organizations for solidarity and peace" of India and Iraq, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Morocco, Namibia (South West Africa), the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa, the United People's Party of the Seychelles and delegates from Swaziland, South Yemen, Vietnam, Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), East Germany, Poland, Romania, the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the Organization for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America (AALAPSO), the Soviet Association of Jurists, the Finnish Committee for Africa, the Committee of Anti-Imperialist Solidarity, the African Society, Angola's MPLA, the African party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde Islands (PAIGC) and the Movement for the Liberation of Sao Tome and Principe. The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) was a joint organizer of the conference with AAPSO.

AAPSO headquarters remain in Cairo. Yusuf As-Sebai, who has occupied the key position of Secretary-General since AAPSO's inception, was elected AAPSO President in March 1974. As-Sebai, who has been Egypt's Minister of Culture, remains AAPSO Secretary-General as well as President (Chairman of the Presidium). But Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's renunciation in 1976 of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship raised doubts about Egypt's future role in AAPSO.

Other leading AAPSO officers include five Deputy Secretaries-General -- Facimo Banguera (Guinea), Kamal Baha el-Din (Egypt), Mursi Saad el-Din (Egypt), Nuri Abdul Razzaq Hussein (Iraq) and O. P. Paliwal (India) -- and three Deputy Chairmen -- Vasco Cabral (Guinea-Bissau), Vassos Lyssarides (Cyprus) and Azis Sharif (Iraq). Bahia Karam of Egypt is head of the women's section. There are 17 Secretaries: five from Black Africa, five from the Arab States, five from Asia and two from the USSR; and 13 Presidium members from different Afro-Asian solidarity organizations.

The Secretariat has been the key organizational unit in AAPSO, and since 1974 appears to have shared primary responsibility for the direction and execution of policy with the Presidium.

Conferences held by AAPSO are stage-managed in such a way that Soviet direction of policy remains more or less constant. At open sessions of AAPSO's forums, a representative of the host country's national committee generally acts as chairman. The representative selected is one who can be depended upon to accept Soviet guidance and to push through resolutions emanating from either the AAPSO Permanent Secretariat or from a preparatory committee (which has also, presumably, been selected because of its reliability in Soviet eyes). AAPSO debates, whenever considered necessary, are packed with disciplined Communists to ensure decisions acceptable to Soviet interests. Voting is nearly always by voice. Soviet guidance is well hidden from uninitiated delegates and is provided to key organizers and leaders at preparatory meetings, discreetly outside the hall while meetings are underway, or between conference sessions.

#### Activities

AAPSO's activities have been closely linked with those of the WPC; Yusuf As-Sebai has represented AAPSO on the WPC Presidential Committee. AAPSO conferences have also been attended by such front organizations as the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) and the International Union of Students (IUS) -- in addition to those fronts listed in attendance at the September 1975 international AAPSO conference.

As-Sebai is also Secretary-General of the pro-Soviet faction of the Afro-Asian Writers' Permanent Bureau (AAWPB), which broke away from the Chinese-controlled organization (AAWPB-Peking) in 1966. AAWPB-Cairo and AAPSO not only have an overlapping directorate but both focus on problems in the same geographical area. AAPSO, however, appears to be more active.

In association with the WPC, AAPSO has sponsored recent conferences in support of liberation movements in Southern Africa, gatherings in support of the Palestinian case against Israel, a conference of solidarity with Iraq, seminars on Middle East oil and a meeting on Indian Ocean bases.

AAPSO has involved itself in political controversies on behalf of North Korea, over Indochina, in defense of the MPLA in Angola and in support of liberation movements in Latin America. It has joined other fronts in denunciation of "imperialist subversion" against Cyprus. At a preparatory meeting in Nicosia in September 1977 for a year-end AAPSO conference in Baghdad, AAPSO announced support for an "independent, territorially indivisible, nonaligned, united and demilitarized Cyprus" and the withdrawal of all foreign troops.

But while taking up causes with which developing countries and anti-colonial movements are emotionally involved, AAPSO is invariably mindful of the interests of its Soviet sponsors.

A blatant example was the holding of the 12<sup>th</sup> AAPSO Council session in Moscow in September 1975. AAPSO Deputy Chairman Aziz Sharif said of the location: "Moscow has always been, and is, our dear city which attracts the eyes of all fighters against imperialism and colonialism."

An AAPSO Emergency International Conference for Solidarity with the People of South Africa, held in Addis Ababa in November 1976, was used as a forum to conduct frontal attacks against the West and particularly against United States initiatives in the Middle East.

The 5<sup>th</sup> International Session of the AAPSO Presidium, held at Cotonou, Benin, in March 1977, denounced U.S. "imperialist maneuvers" in the Spanish Sahara and accused Washington of "perpetrating a Two Koreas plot." The Presidium also issued a declaration of support for Soviet bloc policies in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Because Soviet representatives were among the founding members of AAPSO, Moscow has a special, controlling, relationship with the organization, over and above the usual front services the Soviets command. The Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee of the USSR is an appendage of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee, which makes policy decisions and provides direction to international Communist front organizations. The existence of such a Solidarity Committee inside the USSR gives Moscow an excuse for open activity and propaganda in the Third World. At the WPC/AAPSO conference on Indian Ocean bases (held in New Delhi, November 1974), for example, Soviet delegate Victor Popov was able to defend Russia's "peaceful role" in the Indian Ocean.

The Soviet Committee summoned As-Sebai to Moscow to review the 12<sup>th</sup> AAPSO Council session held in September 1975. AAPSO delegates were called from various countries to Moscow, presumably to receive guidance, before the 1977 Presidium conference at Cotonou and travelled directly from Moscow to the conference.

The AAPSO Secretary-General's report to Council in 1975 acknowledged contributions to the organization from Solidarity Committees in the Soviet Union, Egypt and Iraq and considerable help in money and kind from "Socialist" countries.

Since 1960, the AAPSO Fund Committee, located in Conakry, Guinea, has been used to distribute Soviet and bloc funds to national liberation movements and to selected political opposition groups in African countries. AAPSO has also been used to

channel arms and arrange training for African organizations favored by Moscow.

AAPSO forums have been used as cover for secret, direct negotiations between Soviet and other bloc representatives and leaders of non-ruling Communist parties and of radical opposition political parties bent on seizing power.

WORLD FEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS (WFTU)Background

The founding meeting of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in Paris in 1945 marked a renewal of the historical Marxist emphasis on the labor sector as perhaps the most important instrument in the conflict with capitalism. The meeting, originally an initiative of the British Trade Union Congress, was the first of many post World War II efforts by Moscow to foster controllable international instruments to support its policies. Befitting the significance accorded the proletariat in Marxist-Leninist theory, WFTU has been one of the most consistently active and largest of the fronts.

Like the other fronts, WFTU's initial mix of Communist and non-Communist affiliates and staff did not survive Moscow's efforts to consolidate its control, and by 1949 some of its non-Communist affiliates left to form the International Conference of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). In this early period, Moscow used WFTU to carry out a propaganda campaign, strikes and demonstrations in direct support of its opposition to Marshall Plan aid to West Europe. Its subsequent failure to support strikes in East Germany in 1953, or in Poland in 1956, and its endorsement of Soviet action against the worker-supported Hungarian revolution in 1956 further dramatized its role as a tool of Moscow's foreign policy.



Enrique Pastorino, President of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uruguay, living in exile in Prague. He became head of the WFTU when Renato Bitossi of Italy was ousted after the WFTU Secretariat criticized the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Pastorino, a Lenin peace prize winner in 1972, serves on the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council.

WFTU was expelled from its headquarters in Paris in 1951 for subversive activities; it relocated temporarily in the Soviet zone of Vienna, only to have to move farther eastward to Prague in 1956, where it remains today, for "infringing" Austrian neutrality.

As of 1975, WFTU claimed affiliates in 70 countries representing about 170 million organized workers. Almost 90 percent of its membership comes from its affiliates in the bloc. The Communist controlled General Confederation of Labor (CGT) in France and the General Confederation of Italian Labor (CGIL) have been WFTU's most significant affiliates in the West, providing the bulk of its non-bloc European membership.

### Structure

The organizational structure of WFTU closely follows the pattern of other fronts, with the highest authority residing in theory with a Congress of the Affiliates which meets every four years. The last five have been held in bloc countries; the 1978 session is scheduled for Prague. Observers from non-affiliated unions and other international organizations are invited, to help provide a facade of unity with other groups. The Congress "elects" a General Council which chooses an Executive Bureau to assist it in providing policy guidance between Congresses. Programs and decisions are actually carried out by a Secretariat headed by a Secretary-General, a post occupied since 1969 by Pierre Gensous, a long-time member of the French Communist Party. His only predecessor, Louis Saillant, also from France, is credited with the successful consolidation of Moscow's control, although he subsequently was displaced soon after criticizing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Other senior officials include Enrique Pastorino from Uruguay as President, Shripar A. Dange of India, as one of the Vice-Presidents, and Boris Averyanov, former head of the International Department of the USSR trade union, as the most prominent of the five departmental secretaries.

Since the number of delegates to the Congress for each affiliate is determined by the number of affiliate members, the Soviet Union's All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), combined with delegations from other bloc countries, completely dominates the assemblage. The AUCCTU also has a major role in WFTU's management through its direct ties into the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which formulates all national and international labor policy. The internal political role of Soviet trade unionism is well-established -- it claims 100 million members, and about 60 percent of the delegates to the AUCCTU Congresses are full or candidate members of the party. Its International Department maintains the largest overseas staff in

the international trade union field and is a known arm of Soviet intelligence.

Five departments under the Secretary General of WFTU oversee the implementation of programs. In addition to those concerned with geographic regions, there are specific departments for such activities as relations with UN agencies, propaganda, and the Trade Union Internationals (TUIs). The latter were established in part to counter the Trade Secretariats of the ICFTU and carry out programs among workers in similar or connected trades. Nominally independent, the TUIs are actually financed and controlled by WFTU and their affiliated unions are themselves usually parts of national unions which are WFTU members. They provide further opportunities for WFTU training and indoctrination and are heavily involved in recruiting individual unions for the unity campaign. Ten of the eleven TUIs have their headquarters in bloc countries. This TUI network is further supplemented by allied regional groups, such as the All-African Trade Union Federation (AATUF), the Permanent Committee for Trade Union Unity of Latin American Workers (CPUSTAL) and the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (ICATU).

WFTU has worked more diligently than the other fronts, with the possible exception of the World Peace Council (WPC), to develop close working relations with intergovernmental organizations. Reflective of this was its creation in 1967 of a "Special Commission on United Nations Agencies." It now has Category A status with ECOSOC, UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and has permanent representatives at the UN headquarters and with ILO and the FAO. As expected, it also maintains close relations with other fronts such as the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the Women's International Democratic Federation; these fronts receive program and information support, as well as financing for joint campaigns. WFTU has been particularly close to the WPC and its Secretary General is a member of the WPC Presidential Committee.

WFTU has an expensive publication program, including an illustrated monthly journal, "World Trade Union Movements," and a weekly bulletin called "Flashes." Pamphlets, brochures and special bulletins are also issued regarding specific events or campaigns. The monthly is circulated in about 75 countries in English, French, Spanish, German, Russian, Arabic, Japanese and other languages. "Flashes" appears in all the major European languages except Italian and there is also an Arabic edition. The TUIs have their own parallel publication programs which further proliferate the WFTU message. A new publication called "Opinion," which is devoted to African affairs, made its appearance in June 1977. The line and coverage of WFTU publications is generally traceable to "Trud," the organ of the Soviet affiliate.



The Communist international front groups spend millions annually for publication and distribution of a large number of front organs. The mastheads of some are pictured above. World Trade Union Movements, for example, is an illustrated monthly journal of 30 to 40 pages printed by the World Federation of Trade Unions in 10 languages and distributed in 75 countries. The journal, like other front publications, promotes the Soviet position on most major political events.

Like the other fronts, WFTU does not publish its budget figures, but claims that affiliation fees, publication sales and special donations cover its costs. Given the level of its activity, the latter category of income is probably substantial and includes subsidies in cash and kind from the bloc countries, for example, Czech support of the publication program and the underwriting of the WFTU training centers for Third World trade unionists by the East European affiliates where they are located. Some reports place the 1976 budget at about \$2.3 million (excluding the hidden subsidies) and indicate that it represents a 30 percent increase over the previous year, continuing an expansionary trend since 1974. Most of the increase is said to be for programs vis-a-vis other trade union organizations, representation at the UN agencies and the activities of the TUIs.

Even less information is available about an "International Solidarity Fund" which provides a supplementary budget for special -- usually sensitive -- activities such as strike support or special aid programs in countries struggling against "imperialism, colonialism, fascism, and the monopolies." Moscow has been known to use direct covert financing through both diplomatic channels and AUCCTU representatives to support local strikes and other political action programs.

#### Activities

WFTU's main task as described by Alexander Shelepin, the former chairman of USSR's labor confederation and prior to that head of the KGB, is "the comprehensive support and defense of the world socialist system." Its programs, whether linked with genuine problems of the worker or not, are designed primarily to support Soviet foreign policy. WFTU uses its bloc training centers and the educational programs of the TUIs to indoctrinate participants in a Marxist approach to labor activities.

A fairly typical agenda for one of its meetings was that of the Engineers Commission held in Prague in July 1977. It included "labor safety, a new economic order, multinational companies and preparation for the Ninth Congress of WFTU to be held in April 1978." Similarly, a WFTU-supported conference of the World Federation of Teachers, held in Moscow in 1977 to discuss "the school and the teacher in the world today," condemned the actions of "imperialist governments" and "reactionary forces" in South Africa, Chile, Uruguay and South Korea. A list of such meetings held around the world in the first six months of 1977 would include, among others, a meeting with the Cuban and Latin American members of the Wood and Building Materials Industries TUI in Warsaw, an Arab conference of metalworkers unions in Iraq, a "Workers Tourism" meeting in Paris and an Asian affiliate meeting in India. Appeals and messages of solidarity were issued with regard to Chilean prisoners, apartheid, ill treatment of Pales-


tinian political prisoners in Israel, implementation of the Helsinki Agreement, support of the MPLA in Angola, and condemnation of the "new escalation of the arms race by the United States."

In recent years WFTU has increasingly emphasized its campaign for unity of action among Communist and non-Communist labor unions, while simultaneously undercutting the influence of its main competitor, the ICFTU. The WFTU Congress in 1978 was to center on this theme. Representatives of the Socialist-oriented ICFTU and the Christian World Confederation of Labor were urged to participate and have been the object of a three year WFTU effort to arrange joint meetings or proclamations.

WFTU has also stepped up its participation with the agencies of the UN, particularly the International Labor Organization (ILO), to substantiate its bonafides in the unity campaign and presumably also to facilitate its effort since the early 1970s to relocate back to Paris or to Geneva. In 1974 it was able to catalyze the first of a series of ILO-sponsored meetings of Communist and non-Communist European unions on social welfare problems of workers. Its apparent new flexibility in permitting the Italian labor confederation to have "associative status" with WFTU, to allow it to meet the requirements of membership in the new European Trade Union Confederation with non-Communist unions of the European Community, is a measure of the significance WFTU's sponsors give to the unity campaign. The British TUC and the German DGB have been courted persistently by the Soviet Trade Union in its "bi-lateral" program of exchanges and joint seminars.

While WFTU support of Moscow on foreign policy issues is still obvious and often appears contrived, some WFTU leaders, such as Secretary Karel Hoffman, Chairman of the Czech Central Council of Trade Unions, have already criticized WFTU's propaganda for being too offensive and militant.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY) and  
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)



Aleksandr Sholepin of the Soviet Union has been a key figure in three Soviet front Organizations—the International Union of Students (IUS), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). In between, he also headed the Committee of State Security (KGB) for three years and was a member of the Politburo. Sholepin began his career in the Komsomol, the Soviet youth organization. As a leader of Komsomol, he was elected a vice chairman of IUS in 1949 at the age of 31. He was a vice chairman of the WFDY from 1953 to 1958. He was closely associated with Moscow-sponsored World Youth Festivals from 1949 to 1958 and played a major role in the 1957 festival staged in Moscow at an estimated cost of nearly \$100 million. Sholepin moved from the youth front to the KGB post, then, in 1967, was named chairman of the All-Union Council of Soviet Trade Unions, the central trade union organization in the USSR. He became a vice president of the WFTU during this period. Once considered a possible successor to Brezhnev, Sholepin lost favor in April 1975 and was ousted from the Politburo and his union posts.

WORLD FEDERATION OF DEMOCRATIC YOUTH (WFDY) and  
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS (IUS)

Background

The historical roots of Communist student and youth organizations trace back to the international Communist Youth Organization founded in the post-revolution days in Moscow. Its name alone was enough to scare off potential non-Communist collaborators, and it got nowhere.

Moscow tried again after World War II as part of an overall effort to create a series of Communist fronts without the Communist label. The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) was founded in London in 1945 with Soviet participation and the International Union of Students (IUS) got its start similarly in Prague a year later. At the beginning, both organizations represented varying shades of political opinion. Moscow's usual organizational problem of control versus influence was, however, resolved by Stalin in favor of control. As a result, most of the non-Communists who initially accepted the new international organizations as non-partisan were soon disillusioned with the heavy-handed Soviet attempts to dominate them and all but the most gullible dropped out.

The WFDY, based in Budapest, claims a membership of 150 million in more than 100 countries today, but most of its members are from Communist bloc countries; affiliated groups from non-Communist countries generally are connected with local Communist parties. The IUS, headquartered in Prague, has a smaller membership, estimated at 10 million, the bulk of it also in Communist countries.

The two organizations have worked together over the last 30 years in promoting a series of 10 youth festivals, staged in Communist capitals for the most part in order to maintain tighter control. The last such festival was put on in East Berlin in 1973. Preparations have been underway since 1975 for the 11th such festival, scheduled in Havana, Cuba, beginning July 28, 1978.

Like others of the Moscow-controlled fronts, the WFDY and IUS have reflected the internal feuds of the Communist movement.

In August 1968, for example, WFDY President Rudolfo Mechini and Secretary-General Francois Le Gal, both Communists in good standing in the Italian and French Communist parties,

respectively, sharply condemned the Warsaw Pact invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. Official action by the WFDY to protest the invasion was blocked, however, by Soviet bloc representatives on the Secretariat. Shortly thereafter both Mechini and Le Gal were removed from office and replaced by more disciplined comrades.

There were similar repercussions in the IUS, which had its headquarters in Prague and a Czechoslovak President, Zbynek Vokrouhlicky. He was subsequently replaced after sending protest letters to youth and student organizations in Warsaw Pact countries. The IUS never took up the Czech invasion at its meetings.

Another shakeup took place in the WFDY in early 1977 with the announced resignations of the federation's Italian President, Pietro Lapicciarella, and its French Secretary-General, Jean-Charles Negre. Both were said to be unhappy over Moscow's domination of the organization.

Since the mid-1960s, the Chinese Communists have been excluded from participation in the two groups. Discrimination has even extended to factions within individual Communist parties. Followers of the independent-minded leader of the Spanish Communist Party, Santiago Carrillo, have been removed from positions at both WFDY and IUS headquarters.

Jiri Pelikan, the Czechoslovak Communist who served as Secretary-General and President of the IUS for ten years (1953-63) summed up the Soviet position at IUS Headquarters in these words. "The Soviet Union was always trying to impose its tactical policy of the moment on the organization . . . . The Soviet members saw the IUS and similar organizations merely as unofficial instruments of Soviet foreign policy."

#### Organization

In theory the structures of the WFDY and the IUS are said to be democratic. There is a Congress of affiliated organizations every two or three years which elects an Executive Committee that is supposed to meet twice a year. The day-to-day work is carried out by a smaller Bureau and Secretariat, whose members are chosen by the Executive Committee. In practice, thanks to the magic of Soviet-style democratic centralism, the appointed executives decide what names will be listed on the election slates and thereby gain permanent control over all the key positions. The Soviets always hold a vice-presidential position in both the WFDY and IUS, and several other key positions are reserved for Communists responsive to Soviet direction.

The French affiliate of WFDY proposed in 1974 the creation of a separate West European Department at WFDY headquarters on the grounds that special conditions in the capitalist nations of Western Europe gave rise to special problems which were not shared by the Communist-governed states and, therefore, were not soluble on a pan-European basis. Presumably fearful that this seemingly innocuous change in the organization of its headquarters might serve as a carrier of the dread Eurocommunism virus, the East bloc leadership of WFDY opposed the French proposal. The proposal was subsequently withdrawn.

The WFDY publishes a monthly news bulletin, WFDY News, and a bi-monthly glossy magazine, World Youth, in English, French and Spanish. The IUS publishes a monthly World Student News and a fortnightly bulletin, News Service, in the same languages. Both organizations distribute booklets and pamphlets on topical and regional propaganda subjects. These publications, as do the statements and communiques issuing out of their meetings, consistently follow Soviet policy and are invariably directed against the West.

Both organizations are recognized by UNESCO and ECOSOC.

# NEWS


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## Meeting of International Students for the...

A consultative Organ...

### IN THIS ISSUE:

- The WFDY President meets Luis Corvalán
- Unemployment in capitalist countries
- Visits to headquarters
- International youth chronicle



### SEE IT: Task of our Generation

The youth of this world is...  
 and make it universal...  
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 (Continued on page 11)

Activities

The two youth and student fronts generally sponsor a half dozen or so meetings each year which are geared to current needs and opportunities for advancing Soviet foreign policy and denouncing western "imperialism."

Both organizations condemn discrimination and repressions directed against youth and students in such countries as South Africa and Chile and alleged violations in other non-Communist countries. But they have remained silent when student rights are violated in Communist countries -- for example, demonstrations by African students in Moscow and Sofia in 1963, imprisonment of Polish students in 1968, widespread arrests of students in East Germany in 1969 and crackdowns on student dissidents throughout Eastern Europe in recent years.

By far the most important activity of the WFDY and IUS, however, is their joint sponsorship of the World Youth Festivals. The festivals have attracted an average attendance over the years of 20,000 young and not-so-young persons. Communists seem to age slower than others, as many Soviet bloc youth and student officials are well into their thirties; Aleksandr Shelepin was closer to forty when he resigned as Vice President of WFDY in 1958 and took over as chief of the Soviet secret police organization KGB. The purposes served by the Festival are manifold. Under such attractive slogans as "anti-imperialist solidarity, peace and friendship," the gatherings serve, perhaps most importantly, to attract non-Communist sympathizers. The KGB and other bloc intelligence services look on the Festivals as a happy hunting ground for fresh recruitment prospects.

Youth festivals are expensive undertakings, costing up to an estimated \$100 million in some years. Fidel Castro is said to be attempting to raise a purse of \$50 million for the 1978 extravaganza planned in Havana. Overt sources of financial support, such as national fund-raising drives, probably account for no more than 30 percent of actual costs. The balance is paid through covert means by the Soviets and, under pressure from Moscow, by the other Warsaw Pact states.

THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF JOURNALISTS (IOJ)Background

The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ) was founded in June 1946 in Copenhagen. Two earlier groups, the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) and the International Federation of Journalists in Allied and Free Countries disbanded to merge with the IOJ in the belief that it would become a genuinely representative international organization. But Communists secured key positions in the new IOJ and when it became clear in 1949 that the Communists had taken control, all non-Communist affiliated unions withdrew. The IOJ's first President, A. Kenyon of Great Britain, described the organization then as "a branch office of the Cominform."

The dissident unions revived the IFJ as a non-Communist federation in 1952 with headquarters in Brussels. IOJ headquarters had been moved in 1947 from London to Prague, where they remain. In an effort to heal the split with the IFJ, the IOJ in 1955 founded an International Committee for Cooperation of Journalists (ICCJ). But with most of its officers leading members of the parent IOJ, ICCJ was simply the Soviet-sponsored IOJ under another guise. The IFJ announced its rejection of IOJ overtures for reunification so long as the IOJ represented countries in which freedom of the press was denied. The IFJ remained unwilling for years to collaborate with the IOJ on even technical and general matters. The Helsinki Agreement of 1975, however, appears to have led to a limited rapprochement between the two organizations. Observers from the IOJ attended the 13th Congress of the IFJ in Vienna in May 1976, and the IFJ sent observers to the 8th Congress of the IOJ in Helsinki in September 1976.

In 1963 a rival organization, the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association, was established by pro-Chinese journalists in Djakarta. Its headquarters are now in Peking.

Structure

Claimed membership in the IOJ, open to national unions of journalists, national groups and individual members, is 150,000. The highest IOJ body, the Congress, elects the Presidium, consisting of the President, Vice-Presidents and the Secretary-General. Policy-making, however, is carried out by the Secre-

tariat in Prague on directives which emanate from the International Department of the CPSU, transmitted through the International Section of the Journalists' Union of the USSR.

Kaarle Nordenstreng, a Finnish Professor of Journalism and Communications, was elected President of the IOJ at the 1976 Helsinki meeting as a result of strong Soviet backing. Arrangements had been made for IOJ Congress delegates to stop in Moscow for two or three days for pre-Congress briefings by officials of the Union of Soviet Journalists. The Russians had decided that Nordenstreng, an open admirer of the Soviet Union, would serve their interests better as chairman than would a known Communist.

Jean Maurice Hermann of France, a former Socialist closely allied since World War II with the French Communist Party, had been IOJ President since 1950, despite his protest registered in 1968 against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Russians, who suffered a temporary setback in influence in the IOJ after the invasion, waited until 1976 to push Hermann out of the president's office but approved his face-saving election as Honorary President.

Jiri Kubka, a Czechoslovak journalist who continues to hold the key post of Secretary-General, remains a favorite of Moscow. To show his loyalty to the Soviets, Kubka used the Presidium, at a 1969 IOJ conference in North Korea, to block any discussion of the Soviet invasion of his own country.

Presidium members are selected either because they represent important affiliated organizations or because they are specially useful as individuals in promoting Soviet/IOJ interests in target areas. Most of the 20 vice-presidents elected at the 1976 Congress were from Third World countries. One of the Vice-Presidents is Viktor G. Afanasiev, the Chairman of the Union of Journalists of the USSR and chief editor of Pravda.

The IOJ claims to be financed by affiliation fees and "cultural enterprises," such as lotteries and exhibitions. But funds from such sources are believed to cover only a fraction of the organization's total expenses. Affiliation fees of 50 cents per member bring in about \$75,000 a year. Between 1964 and 1974 an "International Solidarity Lottery" raised an average of just over \$500,000 a year. Although IOJ accounts are rarely published, a document submitted to the UN in 1968 claimed a budget of \$6.3 million. Most of the IOJ's funds are believed to come from "special contributions," but details of Soviet assistance are not available. The IOJ has a "Solidarity Fund" from which grants are made to support organizations, individuals and campaigns -- for example, a gift of nearly \$300,000 to Vietnam journalists in 1977.

The IOJ has close contact with other front organizations -- particularly the WPC, WFTU and WFDY. IOJ representatives in the

WPC include Secretary-General Kubka, IOJ Vice-President Ernesto Vera of Cuba (a key figure in the Communist bloc of journalists) and a Secretary from Poland.

The IOJ has collaborated with the Pan African Union of Journalists as a means of influencing African journalists and has set up a "Palestinian Center" in the Prague office.

#### Activities

The avowed aims of the IOJ include defense of "freedom of the press and journalists" and "defense of the right of every journalist to write according to his conscience and convictions." In practice the IOJ exploits, exaggerates or distorts cases of alleged persecution of journalists and of censorship in non-Communist countries -- with the exception of countries where Moscow is currying favor, for instance, India during its 1975-76 censorship. But the IOJ remains completely silent about the absence of a free press in Communist countries. It refrained from any activity to support Czechoslovak journalists who lost their jobs because they disagreed with the Soviet invasion in 1968. The organization did not even protest the arrest and expulsion of one of its own secretaries, Ferdinando Zidar, of Italy, from Czechoslovakia in 1972.

The IOJ has engaged itself in a systematic campaign to discredit independent international news agencies and non-Communist newspapers by repeated charges that these organizations and publications are tools of "imperialist monopolies." The organization supports all major Soviet propaganda statements on international issues. IOJ delegates took part in preparations for Lenin's centenary.

In support of a Soviet campaign to discourage the use of new, Western-developed technical equipment in the media, The Democratic Journalist, the IOJ monthly publication, recently described use of such equipment as "electronic imperialism -- imposing on the people of other countries a foreign ideology."

A major activity of the IOJ is the training of journalists, as part of a Soviet-directed campaign to influence journalists in the developing countries. Most of the training takes place in the IOJ's East European schools -- in Budapest, East Berlin and Prague. Another IOJ school has reportedly been completed in Sofia and further schools are planned in Havana, Algiers and Baghdad.

The IOJ, accredited to UNESCO, cooperates with that UN body in holding training courses and conferences for journalists. IOJ has participated in UNESCO discussions on the media and on mass communication. The IOJ and other Communist fronts have used