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their influence with some UNESCO officials to conduct a relentless campaign behind the scenes in support of a Soviet-backed proposal for international arrangements by which governments may regulate or control the news flow within and between countries. The proposal has been opposed by Western nations because of the threat it presents to the fundamental principles of a free press.

The IOJ is heavily infiltrated by Czechoslovak and Cuban agents. It operates a world-wide news service, offered practically free to Third World news media. A review of this IOJ service in any given country faithfully reflects current Soviet propaganda themes.

THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PEACE (IIP)Background

The International Institute for Peace (IIP) came into existence as a front for the World Peace Council (WPC) after it was expelled from France in 1951 for subversive activities. The WPC moved first to Prague, then, in 1954, to Vienna. When the WPC was expelled by the Austrian government in 1957 for "interference in the internal affairs of countries with which Austria has good and friendly relations," the IIP was set up in Vienna to provide a legal cover for the WPC secretariat. The WPC continued operations under the IIP's name until September 1968, when the WPC moved to its present headquarters in Helsinki. The IIP has continued to function at the original WPC address (Estate-Haus, Mollwaldplatz 5, Vienna).

A notable example of the IIP's usefulness to the parent front was provided a year after the World Peace Council was forced to move from Austria. After years of lobbying on behalf of its Soviet sponsors, the WPC succeeded in organizing a "Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe," which opened in Vienna in November 1969. Throughout the preparation for the conference the WPC, trying to keep behind the scenes, used the IIP as a surrogate. Maurice Lambilliotte, a member of the IIP executive committee, headed the preparatory committee.

Present Status

The IIP remains strongly under the influence of the larger Soviet-controlled WPC. The IIP has a presidium of seven members and an executive committee of 30. Although the executive body is ostensibly independent of the WPC, it is in fact elected by the WPC General Assembly.

Of the IIP presidium officials elected in December 1969, the president, James Endicott of Canada, and the two vice-presidents, J. Dobretsberger of Austria and Nikolai E. Polyanov of the USSR, were also members of the WPC. In the present presidential committee which runs the IIP, the WPC members include Dr. Eric Burhop of Britain (who is also president of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, WFSW), Goran von Bonsdorff of Finland (a WFSW corresponding member) and Dr. Marian

Dobrosielski of Poland. A former director of the IIP, Romesh Chandra, of India, a faithful follower of the Soviet line for a quarter century, has been secretary-general of the WPC since 1966. He was elected, at a Congress in Warsaw in 1977, to the presidency of the World Peace Council -- an office vacant since the death of F. Joliot-Curie in 1958. The present president of the IIP is Dr. Georg Fuchs of Austria, and the office in Vienna is under the control of the administrative director, Vladimir Bruskov of the USSR; Moscow, therefore, appears to have its own man in residence.

The IIP delegates to the World Congress to End the Arms Race, for Disarmament and Detente (organized by the Continuing Liaison Council of the World Congress of Peace Forces), held in Helsinki in December 1976, comprised two delegates from West Germany, one each from Britain and Austria, two from Finland, one from East Germany and one, Alexander Kaljadin, from the USSR.

Significantly, however, the IIP's affiliate organizations are mainly in Communist countries -- the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland and Hungary. The others are in Austria, West Germany and Finland.

Activities

The IIP claims to provide a forum where scientists from East and West can discuss peace problems. The establishment of an 18-member scientific council was announced in December 1969. In 1970 the late Josef Lukas of Czechoslovakia (then a member of the WPC presidential committee and director of the IIP) described the IIP as the "scientific-theoretical workshop of the WPC." After the IIP convened a "Scientific Conference on Questions of European Security" in February 1971 at Vienna, Georg Fuchs (then IIP vice-president) termed it "the first representative meeting of prominent scientists from the East and West at which the major political, economic and cultural problems in Europe were thoroughly discussed."

But while discussions of detente and disarmament serve as a screen, the organization concentrates on issues in support of Soviet policies. For example, the IIP was brought into the Sino-Soviet dispute on Moscow's side. When a Chinese peace committee accused WCP secretariat members of a "base trick" to prevent Chinese delegates from attending a 1966 meeting of the IIP in Vienna, the IIP's lawyer in that city accused the Chinese of "inaccurate and tendentious statements."

The IIP publishes "Peace and Sciences" in English and German. It has member organizations in Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany, Finland, Poland, Hungary and the USSR.

THE CHRISTIAN PEACE CONFERENCE (CPC)Background

The Christian Peace Conference (CPC) came into being in 1958 and was formally constituted in 1961 at an All-Christian Peace Assembly which the CPC, at the invitation of the Ecumenical Council of Czechoslovakia, had helped to organize. The All-Christian Peace Assembly (ACPA), installed as the highest organ of the CPC, held further conferences in 1964, 1968 and 1971 and was scheduled to hold its fifth meeting -- in Prague, as always -- in 1978. Prague is the CPC headquarters.

The CPC set out from the start to attract religious-minded people from countries outside the Soviet bloc who believed in the CPC's avowed aims to promote international Christian unity and "to dedicate itself to the service of friendship, reconciliation and the peaceful co-operation of nations, united action for peace and to co-ordinate peace groups in the peaceful development of society."

For some West European members there was early disillusionment. Richard K. Ullmann, a former Vice-President of the CPC and one of those who attempted to counter Soviet influence, acknowledged as early as 1963: "We had better admit that our Eastern brothers are being used for Communist policy and that through them we are being used in the same way."

Officials of the CPC, along with those in a number of other front organizations, were replaced by Moscow in an effort to restore discipline following differences that arose over the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The invasion precipitated a crisis in the CPC and almost caused its collapse. The then CPC President, Joseph Hromadka, and Secretary-General, J. Ondra, both Czechoslovaks, were forced out of office after they had protested against the invasion. Several West European members resigned from the organization. But by February 1970 Russian control had been restored and the CPC has become increasingly subservient to Soviet policies since. Reporting on the Fourth General Assembly of the CPC, held in Prague in September 1971, Le Figaro (Paris) said that the CPC had become "an instrument of Soviet policy All who meet in Prague will have accepted beforehand the decisions taken for the CPC's future under the presidency of Metropolitan Nikodim (USSR) and with Junusz Makovski (Poland) as Secretary-General."

Nikodim has been President of the CPC since 1969. A Hungarian, Dr. Karoly Toth, has succeeded Makovski as Secretary-General. The CPC has seven vice-presidents -- one each from Madagascar, Cuba, Hungary, Switzerland, India, West Germany and Czechoslovakia.

A Committee for the Continuation of Work (CCW), consisting of some 98 members, carries on the CPC's work between meetings of the Assembly. There is a working committee of 23 members, including the president and secretary-general, and there is an international secretariat of 18 members.

The CPC claims to have members in 48 countries. Members of Christian associations, professors of theology and Christian laymen are eligible for membership. Regional organizations exist in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America and Australia.

The CPC operates as a surrogate of the World Peace Council, and is represented on the WPC's presidential committee and on its council.

Activities

According to its constitution, the CPC seeks "to be a forum at which Christians from all over the world will meet together and search for God's will concerning current political, social and economic problems." The CPC strives to maintain close cooperation with such bodies as the World Council of Churches, the Conference of European Churches, the All-African Church Conference, the Berlin Conference of Catholic Christians (East Germany) and Pax Christi International. The CPC has consultative status with UNESCO and is frequently represented at meetings of various UN special committees, including those on racialism, decolonization and disarmament. It issues a quarterly publication, Christian Peace Conference, in English and German and an information bulletin about three times monthly.

The CPC helped to set up a preparatory committee to organize a World Conference of Religious Leaders in Moscow in 1977. The CPC took part in discussions at Bremen in April 1976 on "Liberation and Detente -- young Christians participate, in the spirit of Jesus Christ, in efforts towards a better world."

Eighty participants from Europe, North America, Africa and Asia attended a seminar in West Berlin in January 1975 on "What is the meaning of the Word Christian in the Work for Peace?" CPC President Nikodim, at whose suggestion the seminar was held, sent a message noting that the gathering was the first opportunity in years for leading members of the CPC to enter into discussions with former members of the movement and with representatives of other Christian peace groups. The message express-

ed the hope that ways could be found to continue the "fellowship." At an international secretariat meeting at CPC Prague headquarters in January 1976, a resolution was approved to "support all constructive efforts towards international detente and the implementation of the resolutions of the Helsinki conference."

In spite of such facades, the record shows that the CPC's major effort is to promote Moscow-approved political policies. Some examples are listed below:

- The head of the Russian Orthodox Church delegation to a CPC Working Committee meeting at Limuru, Kenya, in April 1977 was cited by Tass as having "decisively rejected suggestions by Western propaganda concerning 'violations of human rights' in the USSR."
- The CPC in January 1976 publicly called for support of the MPLA in Angola.
- At an International Secretariat Working Committee meeting in Moscow in April 1976, at which 50 leading church representatives were present, Metropolitan Nikodim spoke of "the necessity of putting an end to Zionism's misuse of religious ideas for justifying Israel's aggressive policy."
- The Asian Christian Peace Conference (January 1975), attended by 100 representatives from 22 countries, adopted a resolution demanding "full reunification of Korea in accordance with the principles of the five-point proposal of the North Korean government."
- At the World Conference of Peace Forces held in Moscow in October 1973, J. Michelko, of Czechoslovakia, speaking for the CPC on the disbanding of military blocs in Europe, protested against broadcasts of Radio Free Europe.
- At the CPC's Fourth General Assembly in 1971, resolutions on Vietnam, the Middle East, East Pakistan and South Africa all reflected Soviet positions. At subsequent major CPC meetings statements issued on such international issues and others (for example, Angola, Spain, Chile, disarmament, Cyprus, Latin America and a new international economic order) have continued to follow the Soviet line.

Trends

The scope of the CPC's work appears to be increasing. In addition to regional conferences in Europe, a Christian Conference for Peace in Latin America was held in Chile in April 1972.

and venues for meetings of the CPC Working Committee have included Canada (September 1973), Madagascar (September 1974), the USA (April 1976) and Kenya (April 1977). A Conference on Disarmament and Hunger, first discussed in 1975, is still to be held. The CPC planned an All-African Christian Peace Assembly in Sierra Leone in December 1977 and an All-Christian Peace Assembly in Prague in June 1978.

Its Soviet sponsors have made efforts since 1968 to increase CPC influence in developing countries. The secretary-general reported to the CPC's Fourth Assembly in 1971 that representatives of the Third World now "constitute nearly 40 percent of the assembly."

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRATIC FEDERATION (WIDF)General

Like many other Communist fronts, the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF) began in Paris (1945) but subsequently (1951) was expelled by the French government and set up its headquarters in East Berlin. It now claims 120 national affiliated organizations in more than 100 countries and its ability to generate activities among leftist women's groups around the world suggests this claim is not overly exaggerated.

However, no non-Communist women's group of any importance has ever joined and WIDF has been run by the Communists since its founding by the French Communist-dominated Union of French Women.

The Union of French Women, which became a major WIDF affiliate, subsequently condemned the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a violation of state sovereignty and non-interference. At the subsequent WIDF Sixth Congress, no French delegate was elected to the post of either president or secretary-general; one or both of these posts had been filled by the French previously.

In the past WIDF has claimed a total membership of "over 200 million." Whatever the figure, most members are from



Freda Brown of Australia, the President of the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), is also a member of the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council (WPC). She has been a member of the Central Committee of the pro-Soviet wing of the Australian Communist Party since 1961. Her husband, Wilton, is also one of Australia's top Communists.

Communist countries. WIDF claims that its budget is supported by affiliation fees and "special contributions," but no figures are made public. Prior to its World Congress of Women in East Berlin in 1975, however, one million marks (about \$400,000) was known to be transferred to its account.

WIDF publishes a glossy quarterly in French, English, German, Russian, Spanish and Arabic and issues bulletins and pamphlets on special topics. It maintains close relations with the World Peace Council (WPC) and other fronts. Its President, Freda Brown (Australia), and Secretary-General, Fanny Edelman (Argentina), are members of the WPC presidential committee. WIDF has status with both UNESCO and with ECOSOC, where it maintains permanent representatives. It also has special status with the International Labor Organization for matters dealing with the rights of women workers and child labor and maintains contact with the World Health Organization on a regular basis.

Activities

WIDF's avowed goals are "to unite women regardless of race, nationality, religion and political opinion, so that they may win and defend their rights as citizens, mothers, and workers, protect children and ensure peace, democracy and national independence; and to establish friendship and solidarity."

It has had no compunctions, however, about interpreting its charter solely in terms of support for propaganda campaigns of the Soviet Union and the other Communist fronts. Run by a bureau and a secretariat, the so-called "highest organ" of the Federation, The Congress, has met only every four or five years and has little say in policy matters.

In any case there has been a party consensus on most issues, although opposition among some of its members to its subservience to Moscow led to a withdrawal of the Italian affiliate as early as 1963. Since the Soviet-Chinese split, Peking and Albania have regularly attacked WIDF as "Moscow's puppet." Its own spokesmen, as well as its programs, repetitively articulate the premise that "only socialism (i.e. communism) leads to woman's complete liberation and offers the most favorable conditions for maximum use of her rights as mother, worker and citizen."

This theme was interwoven among all the topics discussed at WIDF's 1975 "World Conference of Women," held in East Berlin as part of United Nations "women's year" activities - the latter itself being a WIDF initiative through its UN association. WIDF managed to get UNESCO support for a preparatory meeting for the East Berlin conference, sponsored in Havana by the Cuban Federation of Women. Participants from 140 countries

took part in the 1975 conference, and speakers included Hortensia Allende of Chile and Angela Davis, well-known U.S. Communist. Tightly controlled by the East German hosts and WIDF officials, the meeting aroused some controversy, but was generally successful in promoting East German and Soviet policies and a considerable amount of anti-Americanism.

As part of its Seventh Congress, held simultaneously, WIDF announced plans for a number of seminars and conferences supporting Soviet policies on peace and security in Asia and a world disarmament conference. The 1976-1980 program of action included a series of international meetings on women's role in the struggle against Zionism, apartheid and fascism as well as about their status in various professions. Regional meetings were planned on such topics as the struggle for peace and national independence in Asia, "the role of women and their organizations in defending their rights ... and opposing pillage by the multi-national companies" in Latin America, and "ideological penetration by imperialism with the aid of mass media" in Europe.

Centers offering courses in literacy, hygiene and nutrition were planned for Africa, Latin America and Asia as part of a facade of WIDF activities in seeming support of its charter and responsibilities under its UN status. Meanwhile, in June 1977, the president and secretary-general of WIDF took part in a Moscow conference on "Women and Socialism" as part of the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution. Tass has reported WIDF's "profound concern" over American plans to develop a neutron bomb and the Federation consistently supported Moscow's propaganda on Angola and other African issues.

Methods

WIDF's programs have been a mix of openly avowed support for Soviet policies and "educational" projects regarding women's role and rights in society and how socialism can provide solutions to their problems. It is somewhat different from the other fronts in the completely Communist character of its membership. Although it maintains an International Liaison Bureau in Copenhagen for contact with other organizations in the West, it appears to make little effort to involve other leftist groups or persons in its own programs. This is atypical of the classic front and WIDF appears at times to exist mainly to provide Moscow with consistently quotable statements from a so-called international group for use with its own Soviet and bloc constituency. It also serves effectively vis-a-vis the Third World in offering Marxist solutions to social, educational and economic inequities, an effort significantly aided by its identification with various UN agencies. While its significance as a voice in

support of Soviet foreign policy is hard to demonstrate, its "social" work among women's groups in developing countries has considerable potential for the long-term advancement of Marxist doctrine.

Both for its own programs and its close support of other fronts, such as WFTU in the labor field and WFDY in the youth field, it appears to receive considerable financial support from its communist party backers as indicated by its very professional and costly propaganda publications. The heavy expenditure of foreign exchange by East Germany for the 1975 Congress attests to the importance with which WIDF is regarded in the bloc. Although it faces competition from programs supported by Western governments and non-communist women's international organizations, WIDF is by far the more aggressive in pressing the identification of ideology as the dominant factor in the determination of women's role in society.

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS (IADL)

Background

Although restricted in membership by definition, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) has been one of the most useful Communist front organizations at the service of the Soviet Communist Party. Founded at Paris in October 1946 on the occasion of an International Congress of Jurists, the organization made its debut with a leftist-French coloration, as it was initially sponsored by the Mouvement National Judiciaire. Lawyers from 25 countries attended the first convocation.

By 1949 it was obvious the IADL was a Communist instrument. Most non-Communist members by then had withdrawn their support. Expelled from France in 1950, the IADL set up headquarters in Brussels. Lawyers representing 64 countries registered at the Tenth Congress held in April 1975 in Algiers. A membership of 25,000 is claimed.

A Review of Contemporary Law is published by the IADL twice a year, and an Information Bulletin sporadically. Propaganda pamphlets occasionally are disseminated.

The latest statement of aims as enunciated at the 30th Anniversary Meeting held at the UNESCO Building in Paris was: "To put law at the service of men, democracy, freedom and the new international economic order."

However, the real and ideological interests of the IADL were covered by the agenda at the Algiers meeting which considered law to be a function in the struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism and apartheid. Under the banner of anti-imperialism, the IADL's thrust at Algiers was to do battle with the large international companies as a way to gain adherents and backing in the developing world, and in the name of the rights of man to defend leftist groups and individuals bent on changing economic, social and political institutions. Mention of the defects of the Communist world was not in accord with the rules of the meeting. The IADL has sent observers to trials in such countries as Chile, Iran, Morocco, Spain and Turkey, but never to trials held in Communist countries.

Tactics, frequency of meetings and the intensity with which causes have been, and are, pursued vary with the temper of the times and traumatic events affecting the Communist movement.

The IADL in the past three decades has responded to such events as the cold war, the Stalin-Tito confrontation, repression in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Berlin crises, Allende's rise and fall and the USSR's policy of détente. It has over the years set up a number of subsidiary commissions and committees to support specific Soviet propaganda themes. IADL pamphlets and bulletins have also supported these causes.

The Sino-Soviet feud surfaced within the IADL at Conakry in October 1962. At Conakry the Chinese moved unsuccessfully to set up a rival IADL organization, excluding the USSR. At the Budapest Congress in 1964 the Chinese delegation charged that an illegal agenda had been foisted on the meeting by the USSR based on the erroneous "line" of the Soviet Union. At the IADL's 20th Anniversary Meeting in Paris, Chinese lawyers sent a telegram announcing they would not attend and denouncing the "conspiratorial activity of a handful of IADL leaders under the manipulation of Soviet revisionists." The Chinese probably did not make a blanket indictment that most IADL leaders were in the Soviet camp because they hoped to wean away some of them into the Chinese orbit. The Chinese may have been influenced by a striking event in 1966 -- a protest by the IADL French affiliate (the French Democratic Lawyers' Association) with regard to the trial of two Soviet writers, Andrei D. Sinyavsky and Yuli M. Daniel. The protest signed by Pierre Cot and Joe Nordmann, President and Secretary-General respectively of the IADL, was the first time a USSR action had been criticized.

Campaigns and Issues

In retrospect the lone protest against a Soviet dereliction in the Sinyavsky-Daniel trial looked suspiciously like an effort to improve IADL's credibility. Prior to that there had been one-sided, IADL inquiries into "war crimes" in Korea; in 1965 and again in 1967 IADL commissions went to North Vietnam, joining forces in the second instance with the Bertrand Russell Vietnam Tribunal.

There were other issues, such as support for "progressive" elements in Indonesia brought to trial following an unsuccessful Communist coup, the trial of Regis Debray in Bolivia and a commission report on arrests of leftists in Iraq in 1963. Invariably a blind eye was directed towards the USSR and Eastern Europe. As time went on the IADL spread its inquiries even further so regional affiliates in India, Africa and Latin America could draw attention and attract support. Two regional conferences took place in Latin America in 1952 and 1953 to help set the stage, one in Calcutta in 1955 and the one held in Conakry.

Activities in 1970s

From March 1964 to July 1970 no IADL Congresses were held. (The Eighth was at Budapest in 1964 and the Ninth at Helsinki in 1970.) With the embarrassing Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the IADL marked time and did what it could to extend its organizational scope.

The IADL Bureau met with 50 lawyers from 20 countries at Budapest in May 1971. There they set the tone and direction for the 1970s. Pierre Cot and Mihaly Korom, the IADL President and the Hungarian Justice Minister, as keynote speakers, laid down "principles" on Vietnam, the Middle East, the international petroleum situation, European security and cooperation and racial discrimination; proposed various meetings on oil rights (sovereignty of natural resources), human rights (i.e. defense of communists), the economic struggle in Latin America, a world conference on Indochina; and then passed the decisions of the Bureau meeting to a World Peace Assembly which had been conveniently scheduled by the World Peace Council, also at Budapest, a week later.

The Budapest Bureau meeting also was an occasion to kick off a propaganda barrage -- a "save Angela Davis campaign," charges the U.S. was escalating the Indo-China war and support for Hanoi's "peace proposals." IADL leaders then fanned out to meetings they helped promote, such as a Colloquium on the Rights of Oil-Producing Countries at Algiers in October 1972; a forum on Human Rights in Latin America, held at Montevideo in September 1971; and the Third International Conference of Lawyers on Indochina at Brussels in February 1973.

During the past two years, the IADL has made little effort to cloak its support for Soviet foreign policy and other Communist ties. Its main publicity vehicles for news releases invariably are L'Humanite of Paris and East Berlin's Neues Deutschland. On the occasion of IADL's 30th Anniversary Meeting in December 1976, held at the UNESCO Building in Paris, major congratulatory messages, according to L'Humanite, were from President Podgorny of the USSR, Pham Van Dong of Vietnam and President Boumediene of Algeria.

These were among the major subjects and "causes" pushed during the past two years:

- IADL protested Israel's Uganda raid as a "crime against international law."
- IADL pressed a campaign against Chile, and called on journalists to join in efforts to save the lives of imprisoned leftists in that country.

- "Imperialist intervention" in Zaire was protested. No adverse comment was offered about Cuban intervention in Angola.
- IADL organized an International Conference on Human rights in Namibia, which took place at Dakar in January 1976.
- IADL criticized U.S. failure to implement the Paris Vietnam agreement.
- IADL named delegates to attend Bonn Peace Week '77.

In the 31 years of IADL's existence, it has so consistently demonstrated its support of Moscow's foreign policy objectives and is so tied in with other front organizations and the Communist press that it is difficult for it to pretend that its judgments are fair or relevant to basic legal tenets. The IADL has not hesitated to work openly, even publicly, with other front organizations -- especially the World Peace Council. President Cot is a Peace Council member and was awarded the Lenin Peace Prize in 1953.

INTERNATIONAL RADIO AND TELEVISION ORGANIZATION (OIRT)

Background

In its early days the International Radio and Television Organization (OIRT) seemed to fulfill the main requirement stipulated by Lenin (at the Third World Congress of the Comintern in 1921) for a "transmission belt": a front organization under Communist control but with a non-Communist majority of members. The organization was founded at a conference in Brussels in 1946 by 28 radio organizations of European and African countries under the name of the International Radio Organization (IRO).

From the beginning the eight votes of the Soviet Union and its satellites, used as a bloc, were sufficient to maintain control over the non-Communist members of IRO. But the manner in which the Communists sought to run the show provoked Algeria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Morocco, Tunisia and the Vatican to secede in November 1949. The IRO facade of a democratic mix of disparate ideologies collapsed. In February 1950 the British Broadcasting Corporation struck a blow against the Communist-controlled IRO by organizing a rival non-Communist organization, The European Broadcasting Union (EBU), with headquarters in Geneva. In April 1951 IRO received another rebuff when Syria and Yugoslavia withdrew their membership. Most other leading non-Communist organizations have since left the Moscow-controlled front, mostly to join the EBU.

At a General Assembly in July 1959 the IRO's name was changed to International Radio and Television Organization or Organisation Internationale de Radiodiffusion et Television (OIRT). By 1963 the only non-Communist members of OIRT were radio and television organizations from Finland, Egypt, Iraq and Mali.

Structure

In contrast to other front organizations, full membership in OIRT is confined to national (broadcasting and television) organizations. There is provision for associate membership. While remaining outside the now almost totally Communist OIRT, the Yugoslavs have attended meetings as observers.

The OIRT's highest body is the General Assembly, which elects the Administrative Council. Within the Administrative Council is the Presidium, comprising the president, vice-presidents, secretary-general, director of the technical center and chief editor. In 1966-67 the president was from Poland, the secretary-general from Czechoslovakia, the two vice-presidents from Mali and Mongolia respectively, the director of the technical center from the USSR, the chief editor from Czechoslovakia, the chairman of the technical commission from Bulgaria and the vice-chairman from Cuba. Ordinary members of the Administrative Council came from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, the USSR, Cuba and China (although China had already for all practical purposes withdrawn from the organization).

In 1973 the OIRT President was Dr. Jan Zelenka of Czechoslovakia. Another Czechoslovak, Jaromir Hrebik, had the key post (in terms of liaison with the USSR) of secretary-general -- a position he had held for at least 10 years.

The OIRT headquarters are in Prague, where the main technical center is also situated. Before the Sino-Soviet split the OIRT had another technical center in Shanghai. The Intervention Council, set up by the OIRT in 1958, established a television network of OIRT members in 1960.

Activities

OIRT's overt activities are mainly concerned with technical matters. The organization has published a periodical review, mainly technical, Radio and Television, in English, Russian, French and German. The avowed aims of the organization are to link broadcasting and television services in various countries, to exchange information and to "uphold the interests of broadcasting and television by solving all questions by means of international co-operation." But OIRT has a basic political propaganda function on behalf of its Soviet sponsors, including attempts to influence the development of Third World radio and television organizations through training and other assistance programs.

OIRT is the tool for the co-ordination of radio and television propaganda of the Communist countries for ultimate targeting at non-Communist countries. Because the radio and television organizations of the Communist countries are state-controlled and subject to the ideological direction of the Communist Party, talks and other programs acquire the political slant desired by Moscow.

During the early years of the organization Communist broadcasts to Latin America, Africa and Asia increased no-

ticeably. At the 1965 General Assembly of OIRT, held in Warsaw, a resolution was adopted calling for "the fullest expansion of fruitful ties with the radio and television broadcasting organizations in Africa, Asia and Latin America."

While stepping up the export of radio and television propaganda to Third World countries in the years immediately following the Warsaw resolution, OIRT and its East European affiliates also attempted to build up relationships with West European broadcasting and television services. A number of agreements on co-operation between East and West European countries were concluded or renewed in 1967; and the Austrian and Yugoslav television services were represented at discussions on joint programs devoted to the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution and plans for covering the 1968 Olympic Games.

OIRT held what was described as its 51st Administrative Council Session in Bucharest in December 1976. As reported by the Romanian national news agency, Agerpres, the meeting was attended by representatives of the broadcasting and television organizations of European Communist countries and of Finland and Cuba. Program exchanges and other forms of co-operation were discussed, according to the report.

WORLD FEDERATION OF SCIENTIFIC WORKERS (WFSW)General

The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) was launched in London in 1946 at the initiative of the British Association of Scientific Workers. The WFSW has consultative status with UNESCO. Headquarters is in London and the secretary-general's office is located in Paris. Although individual scientists and scientific organizations in all parts of the world may join, the main membership, claimed at 300,000, is drawn from Communist countries which from the start have controlled programs and policies.

Of the eleven General Assemblies held since 1948 (the London meeting in July 1945 was a Constituent Conference), three were in non-Communist cities (London, Helsinki and Paris); one Assembly meeting was split between Paris and Prague; and seven others were held in Communist East Europe.

Although the General Assemblies are forums from which positions are presented in detail, planning and primary tasks are carried out more and more through the Executive Council. The Bureau, which convokes its own meetings, recommends strategy and initiatives and acts also on the recommendations of standing committees. Regional centers in Prague, Cairo and New Delhi tailor activities to their geographical areas.

Published material and guidance is conveyed through the quarterly, Scientific World, now printed in English, French, German, Russian and Esperanto. Two recent pamphlets, on Disarmament and Ecology, were produced jointly with the WFTU.

The current roster of officers illustrates where the core of the organization has its roots, and the dominance of the Communist countries in its affairs. In addition to British President Dr. E. H. S. Burhop (1971 Lenin Peace Prize winner and member of World Peace Council Presidential Committee), representatives from these countries are officials: USSR, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, Poland, Yugoslavia, Mongolia, Vietnam, France, India, Egypt, Japan, West Germany and Holland.

Strong Eastern European representation not only assures policy and program control of the WFSW by the Communist countries, particularly the Soviet Union, but it provides a way

by which financial resources can be funneled into the apparatus by legitimate membership contributions and in other ways.

Ninety percent of WFSW's financial support is estimated to come from the Soviet Union and East Germany. President Burhop gave an indication of that assistance when on the occasion of a Symposium of Young Scientific Workers in 1971 at Enschede, Netherlands, he thanked the Soviet and East German affiliates for their generous donations to the travel fund.

Because of propaganda and "abuse-of-science" campaigns increasingly undertaken by the WFSW, the organization has coordinated more and more with other front groups, including the World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Teachers' Unions, International Union of Students and the International Radio and Television Organization (producing for many years the program Science in Service of Peace). WFSW has arranged a systematic input into UNESCO and the ILO.

Ties with the World Peace Council have been constant. Professor F. Joliot-Curie, the first WFSW President from its founding until 1957, was also President of the World Peace Council. Professor C. F. Powell, the second President, was a member of the WPC, as have been other officers of the WFSW. The WFSW was a major influence in organizing the first conference of the Pugwash Movement of Scientists for Peace. Professor Powell was chairman of the Pugwash Continuing Committee in 1967.

Disputes in the Communist world have echoed within the WFSW. Yugoslavia was expelled from the WFSW at the time of the Tito-Stalin controversy. The Sino-Soviet confrontation found expression at the Afro-Asian Scientists Symposium in New Delhi in 1965. The Chinese delegate accused the Soviets and Indians of collusion in attempting to undercut the influence of a previous scientific symposium held in Peking in 1964. The Chinese convened their own "Physics Summer Colloquy" at Peking three months later. The WFSW refused to condemn the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, as suggested by some affiliated organizations. Ivan Malek, head of WFSW's center in Prague, was fired after the invasion as a result of Soviet pressures.

Activities

The avowed aims of the WFSW, stated in the Constitution and Charter, meet the general criteria of most scientists: To employ science for the peace and welfare of mankind; to use it as a means to help solve the urgent problems of the times; to exchange scientific knowledge freely; to improve the status of

the scientific worker; to direct scientific endeavors for the advancement of society; and so on.

Actually, throughout its history, the WFSW has neglected the pursuit of scientific objectives and has concentrated on supporting the Soviet line regarding disarmament and world political issues. For example:

- During the 1962 Cuban crisis the WFSW protested U.S. defensive measures, but was silent about the Cuban-Soviet missile buildup.

- The WFSW Conference on ABC (atomic, biological and chemical) Weapons at East Berlin in November 1971 took up "abuse of science" themes upon which it had hammered since the Korean War (in those days a "germ warfare" campaign against the U.S. was conducted). At the East Berlin meeting a resolution was passed calling upon the U.S. to "cease chemical warfare in Vietnam." The Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference also was a major agenda item, as it had been since the executive council's meeting at Varna in 1966.

Activities over the past two years clearly show what kind of organization WFSW has become and how it can be expected to act in the future.

President Burhop called a meeting of the Bureau and the special commissions at East Berlin in January 1976 to evaluate the results of a disarmament symposium in Moscow in 1975 and the implications of the Helsinki Conference on the WFSW. The 11th General Assembly at London in September 1976 worked under the umbrella theme, "The Interrelation of Current Economic and Social Developments with Science and Technology." A Bureau meeting in January 1977 at Morainvilliers, France, announced plans for an international symposium on multinational companies to be held in 1978. Earlier the Socio-Economic Committee at a Paris meeting planned coordination activities and information exchanges with the WFTU, ILO and UNESCO.

For his part, President Burhop was responsible for two "disarmament initiatives." He was one of a number of signers of a letter sent in December 1975 to the British Prime Minister in which the United Kingdom was asked to cooperate with the USSR in seeking a universal ban on nuclear weapons. In 1977 he issued a WFSW brochure denouncing the U.S. decision to produce the neutron "bomb" -- an issue which precipitated frenzied activity by a number of other front groups.

Organizationally, the WFSW today is more tightly controlled than ever by its largely Communist membership. It has succeeded in setting up liaison and lines of communication with United

Nations organs. As always, it works in tandem with other front organizations. It has enlarged the number of members and affiliates in the developing world.

Now and into the foreseeable future, the WFSW will support Moscow's disarmament proposals and the Kremlin's positions on security and cooperation in Europe. The U.S. (as in the case of the neutron issue) will continue to be attacked for "abuse of science." Efforts will be made to curry favor in the developing world, directing criticism at the multinational companies as monopolists charged with exploiting the scientific worker. In Europe, and West Germany in particular, charges of discrimination against scientific workers with leftist persuasions can be expected.

If anything, the WFSW will be more political and less scientific

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RESISTANCE FIGHTERS (FIR)

Origins

The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR) was organized in 1951 in Vienna, where it has maintained its headquarters since.

Growing out of an association of former political prisoners, the new federation expanded the membership to include individuals or groups which had been victims of Nazism or fascism, including especially World War II partisans and resistance organizations. Descendants of those so involved are also eligible. At the time it was a major effort by the Communists to influence and make use of an elite veterans groups, many of whose members had moved into political or bureaucratic positions of significance in Western Europe. Its roots and the nature of its membership limited its organizational efforts essentially to East and West Europe, where it claims representation in every country. The only non-European affiliate is in Israel.

The FIR presently publishes a journal in French ("Resistance Unie") and in German ("Widerstandskampfer"). It maintains two press services in those languages, used to publicize activities and resolutions and occasionally issue special pamphlets.

Its current President is Italian (Arialdo Banfi); Alex Lhote of France is Secretary-General. The FIR is recognized by UNESCO and ECOSOC.

Activities

In addition to promoting the memory of the horrors of concentration camps and the ideals of the resistance, the FIR charter calls upon its members to unite to secure independence for their homelands and freedom and peace for mankind. Members are to fight against racial, political, ideological and religious discrimination and to work for peaceful relations between nations in accord with the United Nations Charter.

Nevertheless, like other Soviet fronts which are supported and controlled by a department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the FIR has been persistently selective in imple-

menting its charter only in support of Soviet foreign policy positions. Calling attention to neo-Nazism and fascism in such countries as Spain, Chili, Greece or West Germany has been a recurring theme in its meetings and publications over the years.

It has consistently followed the Russian lead on disarmament, human rights, the Portuguese elections and South Korea.

After Tito's break with Moscow the Yugoslav affiliate was expelled. Discrimination against Polish-Jewish survivors of concentration camps in the Polish affiliate was ignored, as were the purges of pro-Dubcek members of the Czech Association of Anti-Fascist Fighters. A serious and vituperative split in the Congress over the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia was glossed over in reports of the session and different accounts distributed to Eastern and Western member groups.

The FIR Historical Commission has organized conferences on the History of the Resistance which extol the role of the Communist partisans and the Red Army, denigrating all other parties. Its responsiveness to Soviet interests is further documented by the alacrity with which it set aside its anti-United States program on Vietnam in 1974 to accommodate Moscow's initiatives on arranging a European Security Conference.

Although FIR since its founding has consisted mainly of Communist groups, with its acceptance by ECOSOC it has had more success in arranging joint efforts with Western veterans organizations, such as the Paris-based World Veterans Federation, with which it organized a European symposium of ex-servicemen for disarmament in 1975. In July 1977 it called for an end to the arms race in a message to other non-governmental organizations with consultative status in ECOSOC.

Current Status

Although the highest governing body of FIR is its Congress of representatives of member organizations, that body now meets only every four years and real power lies with the Bureau. Headed by the president, it controls the secretariat, supervises implementation of decisions by the Congress and is responsible for the budget. No budget figures are made public, but the federation claims to be financed by affiliation fees, gifts, legacies and "other subventions."

FIR sponsors such activities as annual memorials and rallies at monuments and at former concentration camps, medical conferences on the effects of imprisonment, and days or weeks of "solidarity with Former Political Prisoners and Fighters against Facism." All are used as a facade or occasion to enunciate positions on issues selected by the Bureau with Soviet guidance.

These annual pilgrimages or celebrations have become less frequent and the significance of World War II resistance and veteran groups has declined with the passage of time. The FIR, however, continues to add its voice to the chorus of other Soviet fronts. It maintains close liaison with the World Peace Council (WPC) and the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL) and has sponsored exhibitions and lectures at the world youth festivals sponsored by the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY). Although FIR strength may have eroded in recent years and the level of its activities declined, it continues to contribute to Moscow's worldwide propaganda program.

The non-Communist International Union of Resistance and Deportee Movements (UIRD) has denounced FIR as "an instrument of agitation and propaganda" serving the USSR and has consistently rejected FIR appeals for joint action.

THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
OF THE
PERMANENT
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST AND SECOND SESSIONS

DECEMBER 27, 28, 29, 1977, JANUARY 4, 5, AND APRIL 20, 1978



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THE CIA AND THE MEDIA

THURSDAY, APRIL 20, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT OF THE
PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:04 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Les Aspin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Aspin (presiding), Boland (chairman of the full committee), Zablocki, Fowler, Wilson, Ashbrook, McClory and Robinson.

Also present: Thomas K. Latimer, staff director; Michael J. O'Neil, chief counsel; Patrick G. Long, associate counsel; Jeannie McNally, clerk of the committee; and Loch Johnson, Herbert Romerstein, Richard H. Giza, professional staff members, and Catherine Wilson, secretary.

Mr. ASPIN. The Oversight Subcommittee of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence has been holding a series of hearings on the relationship between the CIA and the media. We had a series of meetings in December and January in which journalists, people who were in the management of the media, ambassadors, and former CIA officials testified. Today we are finishing up at least the open hearings on this subject by inviting the Director of the CIA, Adm. Stansfield Turner, to come and talk to us about the subject.

And we welcome you here this morning, Admiral Turner. Why don't you start with an opening statement.

STATEMENT OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER, DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERBERT HETU, ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS TO THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE; AND MR. ANTHONY LAPHAM, GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps two of the greatest changes affecting the foreign intelligence process that have taken place in recent years are our policy of greater openness and a well defined system of congressional oversight. I think that this hearing epitomizes both of these changes in a very dramatic way.

Hence, I am delighted to have this opportunity to discuss CIA's relationships with the U.S. media, and to describe the new regulation which I issued on November 30, 1977¹ in this regard.

I would like first, however, to pay special tribute to my predecessor George Bush, who on February 11, 1976² issued the first CIA regulation in this entire area.² His trailblazing piece of work was very important to this entire process, and set us off on the right track.

One of my early actions as Director of Central Intelligence was to initiate a review of how this regulation and all of our associations with the U.S. media were working. That review indicated that Agency policies and operations in this area had actually, through the process of trial and error, been further refined. And therefore, I found it desirable to issue this amplifying regulation.

This new regulation recognizes and reflects in an integral way the important new philosophy of openness which we have instituted during the past year. This philosophy takes as a basic premise the right of the media and of the U.S. public to know as much about the intelligence process and product as is consistent with our national security. The clarification of CIA relationships with the U.S. media was designed to leave no doubt in anyone's mind of the extent of any relationship which CIA might properly have with U.S. media representatives. It is within this spirit that the regulation was issued, and it is within this spirit that I appear here before you today.

In this statement I will address some of the points about the regulation that might be of special interest to you. But first it is necessary that I make clear a distinction between the Agency's relationship with the U.S. media in an operational sense, that is, in collecting intelligence which is the primary thrust of this regulation, and our collateral responsibility to maintain regular liaison with the U.S. media to provide timely information about the Agency, its product, and the intelligence process.

Concerning the former responsibility, the regulation unequivocally bars any relationship with full- or part-time journalists, including so-called stringers, accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network, or station, for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities. The parallel clause in the 1976 regulation had prohibited, "paid or contractual relationships." This regulation raised the possibility that an unpaid relationship or quid pro quo arrangement might be condoned. The new clause flatly prohibits a relationship of any kind for the purpose of collecting intelligence or conducting an intelligence operation.

At the same time, the new regulation explicitly protects the right of any citizen, journalist or otherwise, to impart information voluntarily to an Agency official, at home or abroad, which that citizen believes is important to the U.S. Government. We believe that it is absolutely essential to preserve their rights as U.S. citizens to voluntarily perform a patriotic service to their country. At the same time, I would emphasize that the regulation does strictly prohibit CIA's tasking a U.S. journalist with performing any oper-

¹ See appendix B, p. 333.

² See appendix A, p. 331.

ational assignment. In short, while the CIA cannot actively task or dispatch even a willing journalist to seek out or furnish particular information or assistance, it may accept whatever information a journalist elects to transmit voluntarily.

We believe it is fair to require that a journalist be duly accredited in order to be covered by this regulation. There are numerous part-time journalists, freelancers, who are not accredited by any U.S. media organization but who occasionally, and sometimes frequently, write for publications. Many of us here today fit into that category in our interpretation of the term. A freelancer is a free agent, not accredited by or under contract to any media organization. To limit the Agency's relationships to such a general, ill-defined group would indeed seriously hamper our ability to carry out our responsibility to collect foreign intelligence.

Mr. Chairman, I probably even couldn't hold my own job under such a definition.

I am aware that there has been concern expressed in some quarters that the restrictions imposed by the regulation could be overturned at my discretion. I refer to paragraph 3 of the regulation which states that "no exception to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the express approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." I would like to assure the subcommittee that the most careful deliberations went into the inclusion of this clause. It allows for those extremely infrequent but extraordinary situations when a member of the U.S. media organization is in a position to provide unique and otherwise unavailable information to the U.S. Government. Such a situation might arise, hypothetically, if a foreigner accredited to a U.S. media organization informs a CIA official of a planned terrorist activity, such as a planned assassination of an ambassador or the planned bombing of an airliner or so on, and the foreigner is related, perhaps, to a member of a terrorist group who trusts him and no one else, so only he can serve as an intermediary to the terrorists.

Without the discretionary provision, the CIA official would be unable to employ the services of the foreigner, to possibly assist in deterring a major terrorist activity. I would hasten to add that including this provision does no violence to the special status afforded the press under the Constitution of the United States. I extend to you the strongest reassurance that the exception would be used only under the most extraordinary circumstances. I would also point out that even under such extraordinary circumstances, the normal safeguards come into play. That is, the oversight congressional committees would be in a position to inquire into such exceptions as a part of their oversight responsibilities.

In addition, any member of the intelligence community, feeling that he saw something going on improper in this regard, has recourse to the Intelligence Oversight Board to report such an activity.

The November 30, 1977 regulation also goes beyond the previous statement by barring without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, any relationships with nonjournalist staff employees of any U.S. media organization for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities.

This provision applies to those employees who are in no way involved in writing or editing news information. It is CIA policy not to enter into any relationship with nonjournalists such as printers, circulation personnel and salesmen, without the specific knowledge and authorization of senior management of the U.S. news media organization concerned. Finally, the new regulation explicitly prohibits the use of the name or facility of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.

Mr. Chairman, the Agency is in full compliance with this self-imposed limitation. While the severity of the restrictions might on occasion hamper our capability to discharge my responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, we have chosen to appear under these limitations out of respect for the special status afforded the press by our Constitution. Moreover, the recognition and appreciation of the need to protect the integrity and the independence of the press has been balanced carefully and cautiously against my responsibilities to collect foreign intelligence. Experience to date has confirmed that appropriate balance has been found, and that the regulation is appropriately formulated. We do not see a need for revision at this time.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I will turn my attention to our liaison with the media to provide as much unclassified information about the CIA, the intelligence product, and the intelligence process as is legitimately possible.

As part of this program we arrange, only on request of a newsperson, unclassified substantive briefings on areas of their interest. The briefings are designed to provide background information to the newsperson. We provide these briefings on an unattributable basis. This is done to preserve the conversational tone of such briefings and to insure the anonymity preferred by the briefers. In this way they differ from an attributable interview, which we also provide on request on a variety of subjects.

The briefings, normally some 3 or 4 a week, are provided by analysts from the overt side of our Agency. There have been 172 such briefings since March of 1977, 111 different representatives of the media were included in these briefings.

There are many other aspects to our public affairs program. I myself undertake a very active public program in support of our desires to inform the press and the public about intelligence. In my first 12 months as Director, I have made 41 addresses, including 11 to college audiences, submitted to some 41 interviews by individual journalists, and participated in 11 press conferences.

Through the Public Affairs Office, we respond to telephone inquiries from the media in a positive, forthright, but unclassified way. We receive some 60 such phone inquiries from the media weekly. The Public Affairs Office also disseminates to the press and the public as much of our research as can be reasonably declassified.

Since March of last year we have distributed approximately two unclassified reports per week. I am convinced that we owe the public as much of our product as can be legitimately disseminated as a return on their tax dollars. With these same objectives in

mind, we sponsor group visits to the Agency and respond to some 60 to 70 letter inquiries from the public each week.

This openness program has been well received by the public and the media and continues to expand. I believe you are aware that I have requested five additional positions for the Public Affairs Office to carry on this work. Personally I am convinced that it is of the utmost importance in helping to restore the public's confidence in their intelligence services. I also require the additional support to enable me to perform adequately as the intelligence community's spokesperson to the Congress, the media, and the public, a new responsibility assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence by the President's Executive Order 12036 of January 24 of this year.

Mr. Chairman, we are determined to provide the media and the public as much information as possible. At the same time we are dedicated to keeping all of our relations with the U.S. media completely proper and in full keeping with the Constitution of the United States.

I would be happy to respond to your questions, sir.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you, Admiral Turner, for your helpful and interesting statement.

Let me turn the questions over to others.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, I just want to compliment Admiral Turner on the openness program that has been installed so well in the brief period of time which he has been sitting in the chair as the DCI. It is a very heavy responsibility. With reference to openness to the public and the media, that program has been going on well. But beyond that, I also want to pay my respects to the intelligence community, not alone the CIA, but across the clear spectrum of the intelligence community for the cooperation it has given to this committee since it was put in place back in August of last year. In every instance in which this staff has sought briefings, whether it has been members of the full committee or whether it has been members of the staff, the intelligence community has willingly and readily supplied that information, a lot of it, of course, which is secret.

And with that, I want to assure you that insofar as I am concerned, and I know I speak for other members of the committee, you have won our respect for the manner in which you have handled your job.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. BOLAND. And I notice that in the first 12 months as DCI you have made 41 addresses, including 11 to college audiences, submitted to some 41 interviews by individual journalists, and participated in 11 press conferences, and I just wondered who was keeping score.

Admiral TURNER. I think I am going to cut back on that, Mr. Chairman. I think, you know, it was an effort to begin to get this policy started. I do find it rewarding in many ways, though, to get out of Washington, get off the eastern seaboard, and to get the feel for what other people are thinking and asking about us. It is useful.

Mr. BOLAND. In your opening statement, you indicate that since March of 1977 you have conducted 172 briefings, some attributable and some unattributable.

Do you have that broken down between attributable and unattributable?

Mr. ASPIN. Perhaps you could identify yourselves for the record.

Admiral TURNER. On my right, Mr. Herbert Hetu, who is Director of Public Affairs, and on my left Mr. Anthony Lapham, who is General Counsel.

Herb, all 172 were unattributable, and on top of that----

Mr. HETU. About 100 were attributable.

Mr. BOLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. I don't have a question. I would just like to echo what the chairman said. I think you have had a very rough reorganization job, and while you have had some darts and arrows shot at you, you seem to have withstood it very well, and I have every confidence that the intelligence function of the Government is going to be continued and enhanced under your leadership.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you very much, sir.

If I may say for a second, yes, we have had a lot of publicity in the reorganization and the so-called struggle and so on, but it is behind us and it is just going very smoothly, and we are getting tremendous cooperation out of all the other agencies, those in Defense and State and Treasury and everywhere else, and I feel since with the team pulling together now that the Executive order has been issued.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, let me maybe start off with a few questions about the directive, now called the Turner directive.

In the hearings that we had, a number of people raised questions, mostly in terms of what ambiguities that they perceived, or, what was your interpretation of such and such a term. I would like to go through the directive, if I might, and just ask you about some of the areas, some of which you have covered, I think, in your statement, others of which have not been covered.

First of all, the directive says: "Accordingly, the CIA will not enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists."

"Enter into any relationships", I think, is a very important statement, and you clarified that in your opening statement. One of the questions that came up in our earlier hearings, raised mainly by people who used to work for the CIA, namely, Mr. Colby and Mr. Dave Phillips, suggested any relationship was perhaps going too far, and that you have prohibited any relationship with the exception on the next page of "voluntary information."

But it is your intention, then, to really eliminate even a kind of voluntary association when it extends to things other than just voluntary giving of information?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

I read paragraph a. to say "enter into any relationships" and that to be qualified by the last part of that same sentence, after the comma after the word "station," so I think it reads "enter into any relationships for the purpose of conducting intelligence activities," is the way I read that sentence.

Mr. ASPIN. Right. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't leave the exchange of information totally aside. This is activities only.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Let me ask then about the second point where it says with full-time or part-time journalists. The term "journalists" there, does that extend to other forms of journalists such as columnists, editorial writers, managers, publishers, commentators, people like that? The question was raised in the earlier hearings. I think most of the journalists thought that the term "journalist" included those people, but they were wondering whether in fact in your terminology journalist does include columnist, editorial writers, commentators, media policymakers, and management.

Admiral TURNER. Yes; it certainly does. The closest we have come to defining that again is to say anybody accredited, and then go to radio, television and so on. But it is intended, as opposed to the paragraph b. where we talk about nonjournalistic staff, and draw the line between those who write or influence the writing content—maybe writing is the wrong word, but the message content, whether it is oral or written.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Let me raise the question that you also raised in your opening statement, and that is about freelancers.

It was a dividing point, but I think an awful lot of the witnesses thought that perhaps freelancers ought to be included. I recognize the issue that you raised, the problem of the definition of freelancers, and I don't suppose there is ever any way to define freelancers in a clear way in which there isn't going to be some problem; but I am raising the issue because I am wondering whether we ought not try to define and include freelancers.

There have been several definitions offered for freelancers in the hearings that we have had, but one of them which seemed as good a working definition as any was that a freelancer is anybody, first of all, who calls himself a freelancer, or second, anyone who receives a majority of his income or spends a majority of his time writing as a freelancer.

And I throw that out as a possible definition, not suggesting the definition isn't going to cause perhaps some problems somewhere else; but basically my impression is that freelancers usually call themselves freelancers, and a person who writes an occasional article for a magazine doesn't call himself a freelancer, and in fact is not what we would want to include in the term freelancer.

Admiral TURNER. There is no question, we could try further to define this. I will defer to my General Counsel, but we really are getting into a spot nowadays where we are going to have to take all of our agents and put them through law courses in order to conduct their business, and I really have some reluctance to keep drawing finer and finer lines unless there is a major equity involved.

I mean, accreditation is pretty simple, clear cut. You start getting beyond that, and we begin to get fuzzy, and it really is quite a burden on our people. All these other—I am not talking in this area only, but you know, so many of the legal prohibitions which we support, but they do put a tremendous burden on our people in

the field. You pick up a message, it has got a U.S. name in it, you go get a match right away. But there are so many of these issues that I am reluctant, unless there is some indication they are really going to make a big difference here, to keep tweaking definitions that cause our operational people problems.

Mr. ASPIN. I agree, and I think basically we want to be very careful that we are not writing regulations which create more problems than they are trying to correct.

And, as I say, freelancers are a debatable point in the hearings that we had before. I was just trying to get your reaction to it. I don't think it is all that impossible to define. I think that you could get a working definition of freelancer, and the question then becomes one of whether it is important.

And let me make the point for why it might be important to cover freelancers. Essentially what we are talking about, or what came through all these hearings, is not so much the objectivity of the press but the credibility of the press. The objectivity is something which is internal, and you can even be paying a person to be working for us in some CIA capacity, and he or she might maintain their objectivity as a journalist. It is an internal thing, and people can maintain their objectivity even though they are on the payroll.

On the other hand, some people lose their objectivity when they are not on the payroll, and they become very one-sided in their reporting.

So really, this question about paying reporters or not paying reporters really comes back down to their credibility rather than their objectivity. I mean, it is the credibility from the standpoint of the American public, that they then at least feel what they read is not tainted by being written by somebody who is being paid by the Agency, not to write that story, necessarily, but to bias their reporting.

So essentially all of this, whether we pay people or don't pay people, seems to come down to the question of credibility rather than the question of objectivity, and I think at least an arguable case can be made there are enough freelancers around writing in American publications of one kind or another (more often magazines, to be sure, than newspaper or television) that, to maintain the credibility of the American press, freelancers could be included.

I can see your point, but I make the opposite point just because it was made in our hearings.

Admiral TURNER. Well, that is reasonable enough. I would like to say that as a general point that in all of these regulations, whether it is in this area or electronic surveillance or anywhere else, I do think that we all have to put some confidence in the oversight process. Clearly, for us to pay and influence a freelancer who, you know, really is a significant journalist is against the spirit of this regulations, and I have some confidence that there are so many checks built in already to our process that if any of us start really violating the spirit, somebody is going to report it to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and/or you in your oversight process will be asking us about this, and I would hope and expect that with some periodicity, you will come to me or to Herb Hetu here and say, well, tell us about the exceptions the DCI made this last year, tell us about the nonmedia associated people, freelancers that you

have had any dealings with this year, give us an example or two, and get a flavor of the thing, and I think that if we try to put all the regulations that are going to go into the charter this next year and so on, into very precise detail, we may get ourselves tied in knots. I don't want to have total freedom, but I do think we have to trust the oversight process to do a good bit of checking.

It certainly has me worried enough that I don't feel that, you know, I have any freedom here to go out and contravene the spirit of what I have written without a high probability of somebody calling me up here before you to account for it.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me hit just a couple more of the points that were raised at the hearings and then I will turn it back to others to ask questions.

Further on down, you say that "CIA will not enter any relationship with full- or part-time journalists, including so-called stringers accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network, or station for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities." The question was raised about whether "any intelligence activities" included all forms of CIA activities or just intelligence collection. In other words does it mean any intelligence activities, in the phrase used in the National Security Act of 1947 which allows the Agency to conduct covert operations or other intelligence activities, as the National Security Council will direct?

Is it that term of intelligence activities, or do you mean just intelligence collection?

Admiral TURNER. I would include any covert action as well, yes.

Mr. ASPIN. I am just trying to clarify it for the record. It would include all forms of the covert activities, and what we are not really talking about is simply intelligence collection. To the Agency, intelligence activities means a whole range of things, and not just intelligence collection.

But you mean the broader definition of intelligence activities and not the narrow definition?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, indeed.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me then raise a couple of more points.

The last of that first page says: "Use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities."

The argument was raised that perhaps the prohibition ought to include using any bogus U.S. news media organization. In other words, not only would it be important that somebody would not be able to use an existing newspaper, say the Washington Post, but also would not say they were a representative of the Washington Sun when there is no such thing as the Washington Sun. And it was suggested this section perhaps ought to be expanded to include anything that is supposedly a U.S. news organization, but in fact is a phony one, one that does not exist.

Admiral TURNER. No question, that could close another small possible loophole. I only say it is certainly against the spirit of the regulation to create a news organization for the purpose of doing this.

Mr. ASPIN. So that was not left out purposely because it is something very important or vital to the way you conduct operations.

Admiral TURNER. No; it is not.

I don't really wish to preclude that option.

Mr. ASPIN. Lastly, let me go to the exceptions clause on the back page: "No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI." You address that very well in your statement. My own inclination, I guess, would be to have no exceptions at all; but you make the case that there ought to be some exceptions, such as in the case of terrorists.

What about the suggestion Bill Colby made which would require that if there were any exceptions, the appropriate committees of Congress be notified?

Admiral TURNER. I have no objection in principle to that. It is a question of how much paperwork, how much micromanagement you want to get into. In this case I think it would be small because I don't intend to make exceptions very often.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask this. I take it there have been no exceptions since you issued the directive on November 30, 1977?

Admiral TURNER. That's correct. I mean, I am sure. I don't remember any. So, you know, I think that is just a matter of style, whether you want to again count on the oversight process that once in a while you would in a review of our actions ask me about this kind of activity, or whether you really want to start a paperwork routine here that requires us to report in. Again, it is going to be a big issue in the whole charter legislation, how many reports do we have to turn in. The draft the Senate has done has something like 96 reports?

Mr. LAPHAM. Very large.

Mr. ASPIN. And one more statement, and let me turn it over to Bob McClory because I guess he has got to go. But let me make a case for the argument that I am trying to make for no exceptions at all.

If the possibility of your ever using the exceptions clause is so small and so remote and so slight, I would argue, then, it ought not be in the Turner directive at all on the grounds this one loophole does, of course, open up the possibility that all of this is being circumvented, and at least opens the argument—if somebody wants to maliciously make it—that all of the directive is being circumvented, that all of it is so much eyewash, and that in fact it doesn't mean anything because, of course, there are exceptions being made and, of course, you are coming up to tell us and we are going along with the gag, and it is just a big hoax. The whole thing is a hoax.

That being the case and the chances of you using it are as remote as that, I would argue perhaps it ought to come out altogether.

Admiral TURNER. I would argue strongly in the other direction because first, it is primarily intended for what might be an emergency situation where you just can't go get a law changed in time to help, a life and death situation, and second, I would like to suggest that even the most important editor or columnist or somebody else, if he really was going to be able to find out for us whether war was going to start tomorrow or, you know, something very important happened, you know, I think you and I ought to condone an exception if it is really in the interest of the country.

You know, you are taking a very, very small chance of a very small lessening of the credibility of the U.S. media. I think the country would be ill advised to absolutely by law preclude that. I would rather have lots of checks on me that I don't abuse that, but preserve that opportunity for the country to do something of great importance which could come along.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Let me turn it over to Bob McClory.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you. I appreciate your recognizing me at this time, and I have one question, or one statement.

I have been very impressed by your public appearances before this and other committees, and the prestige and the confidence that you have provided for the entire intelligence community, and I want to commend you publicly for that.

I also want to observe that in your testimony here this morning you have indicated the possible overreaction of the Congress which neglected the intelligence community almost entirely for a period of almost 30 years, and then suddenly we are interested in enacting a great deal of legislation. For example, you mentioned the charter legislation, and you mentioned the electronic surveillance legislation. I myself feel that in regard to foreign intelligence surveillance, particularly of foreign powers and foreign agents, subjecting you and the intelligence community to a requirement to get a court ordered warrant is excessive, and I think it can hamstring you, and I think it can make great difficulties.

On the other hand, there are questions now raised with regard to the guidelines concerning CIA relationships with the media. It is the fourth amendment that is involved, the search and seizure fourth amendment that is involved in electronic surveillance. With regard to this subject it is the first amendment.

Do you feel that perhaps it would be better in order to work under these guidelines that we submit this to a court, a specialized court to determine whether or not you are interfering with the exercise of freedom of the press, that you may be interfering with the free flow of information or the freedom of news persons to report the news freely to the American public?

Would it bother you to have, in addition to congressional oversight and Presidential oversight and so on, to also have a court order to decide whether or not you are adhering to the constitutional restrictions?

Admiral TURNER. Well, I think it is another fine line like whether we have utterly no escape clause in here whatsoever, that it just puts one more level of control on. It could be operated that way. The emergency clause that I mentioned is of course largely intended to be used in emergencies when maybe timing would be of an essence here and you would hate to have to be slowed down while you went to get a court order if it was a matter of a terrorist activity and life and death. So I would not be included to support that in this case.

Mr. McCLORY. You have the responsibility, you have the accountability, we have the right of oversight. Isn't that adequate?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, I think it is in this case.

Mr. McCLORY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Wyche Fowler.

Mr. FOWLER. I have no questions at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Ashbrook?

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes.

Admiral Turner, I would like to get some information regarding the use of journalists and the news media by the other side. I certainly don't suggest that if they do it we have to do it, but I think we recognize that intelligence doesn't operate in a vacuum.

Do the Soviet KGB and other Communist bloc intelligence services use journalists for their own purposes?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No doubt about that, is there?

Admiral TURNER. There's no doubt in my mind.

Mr. ASHBROOK. I wouldn't think it would take very long to answer that one.

Do they use their own news agencies such as Tass, Novosti, the East German ADN, and so forth, as a cover for intelligence officers?

Admiral TURNER. Yes; very definitely.

Mr. ASHBROOK. No question about that.

Are legitimate newsmen from the Soviet bloc coopted or tasked by their intelligence services?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Do the Soviet bloc intelligence services use newsmen from non-Communist countries as sources, witting or unwitting, agents of information, disinformation, or agents of influence?

Admiral TURNER. We certainly suspect that highly. I am not sure that I have concrete evidence.

Mr. ASHBROOK. This is an open hearing, so I don't know that I want you to provide specific examples at this time, but I wonder if you could provide our committee in the near future, with either a classified or unclassified report—I suppose if we want to print it in the record, it should be an unclassified report—on these activities by hostile intelligence services?

It would seem to me that we should put it in the record as a matter of balance.¹

Admiral TURNER. Fine. We would be happy to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. It is funny, we always seem to be pointing a finger at you and yet we don't note as we should that you do operate worldwide. You operate against adversaries who do not use the same standards, do not have the same Constitution. To repeat what I said in the beginning, I don't suggest and I don't think any of us believe that simply because they do it we should do it, but I think we should at least legislate with the understanding that we are going by one set of rules, the Turner memorandum, and as near as I can tell, there is no set of rules for the other side.

Admiral TURNER. A U.S. media representative quite legally could work for the KGB, but under these regulations, not for me.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Yes; it is always interesting. Could you imagine if we had someone on our side, like Wilfred Burchett, that he would be able to tour Russia? This is a good example of the differences. It may be the Achilles heel that we have. I am not one that regrets or begrudges our Constitution. Quite frankly, I am glad it is there, but

¹See appendix R, p. 529.

I think we have to recognize that it does place disabilities on us in the real world of intelligence. I commend you for trying to operate within our constitutional system against an adversary that doesn't have one, and I recognize that most of the time you have one hand tied behind you, and that is the way it probably always will be in our system.

But if you could supply an unclassified report on activities by hostile intelligence services using the media, I would be most appreciative.

Admiral TURNER. I would be happy to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Mr. ZABLOCKI.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Perhaps this has already been asked, and Admiral Turner has referred to it, but does this memorandum for the media on CIA regulations on the relationship with the U.S. news media also apply to all intelligence gathering agencies of our country, such as DIA and some of the other agencies, or just CIA?

Admiral TURNER. This one actually applies only to the CIA.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Is there a corresponding one for the DIA?

I am not encouraging that it be applied to the DIA because I feel that we are tying our hands too much in reacting to some of the, if there were abuses in the past.

I have no further questions.

Mr. ASPIN. Mr. Robinson, do you have any questions?

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral TURNER. In your opening statement you are discussing the difficulty of limiting the scope of your memorandum with regard to relationship with the media or your regulations, rather, and talking about relationship with those who are not accrediteds, and you say to limit the Agency's relationship to such a general, ill-defined group would indeed seriously hamper its ability to carry out its responsibility to collect foreign intelligence. You close the paragraph by saying, I probably couldn't even hold my job.

And I wonder what the impact of this group is upon this situation to the degree that you make that rather strong statement with respect to it.

Admiral TURNER. Well, I think I am saying, Mr. Robinson, that there are a lot of people who contribute occasionally to various journals or newspapers or magazines, and that if we get into a situation where we have to debate on each one of those, unless there is some clearly defined line of demarcation below the one we have already drawn in accreditation that more than just that you would maybe be denied some specific individuals. It comes to the fact that you people finally just say, well, it is too complex to try, if he is anywhere near this shady area, and you lose opportunities of getting information or assistance from Americans who could be of considerable value to you because I think you have to appreciate by the time a regulation like this gets down to a GS-9 out in the field, he begins to get sort of uptight about whether he is going to get put on report or be taken to task for violating this. So he shades the thing a little bit further, and pretty soon you get where people just drop important and interesting contacts.

Mr. ROBINSON. Well, you are making exactly the point that I hoped that you would, because I feel that the inference might be drawn otherwise, that this group represents such a wealth of information that you are dependent upon them and that you can't get along without them, and that is not what you are saying at all.

Admiral TURNER. No; I don't think so. Yes; that's correct.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Bob, do you have anything?

Mr. WILSON. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, previous Directors of the CIA have often made the statement that one of the problems of the CIA is it is not able to defend itself, because by either admitting to the charges or denying the charges, they are furnishing information to those who should not have it.

In your opinion, should the CIA be able, either openly or through devious means, be able to answer the false charges against the Agency or the United States, some of which are knowingly promoted by hostile foreign intelligence services?

Admiral TURNER. I think it is a cross we have to bear, Mr. Wilson, on the one hand to protect our classified information; on the other hand not to put out false information which has tremendous implications and dangers for our society, and we just have to grit our teeth sometimes when we know there is a good explanation for something we are being accused of. And it is particularly tough when it is a negative situation because if you deny it when you didn't do it, then you are in a position of not being able to deny it when you did do it, and therefore you have confirmed the accusation on the other side.

Mr. WILSON. Now, about the publication of books and information. Sometimes classified information is leaked to the media by employees or former employees of the various intelligence agencies. Do you feel that our laws are strict enough in that regard or we should have stricter laws?

Admiral TURNER. Well, we are testing that at the moment, as you know, with Mr. Snepp in the courts right next door here in Virginia, to see whether the secrecy agreement we have will hold up and will give us good protection. So I am hesitant until that is resolved, to know:

Certainly if the courts strike down the secrecy agreement, and say it is not valid, we don't have a case against Mr. Snepp. I think we are going to have to come to you and ask for some kind of help here.

Mr. WILSON. Some kind of legislation.

Admiral TURNER. To substitute for that. Beyond that, whether we should have tougher teeth in the laws, is a very difficult question and one I am sure we are going to be debating between ourselves in the charter business when it comes up.

Mr. WILSON. In our previous media event, along this line we, as you know, called in some of the former ambassadors and some of the critical writers and media people who had made their feelings about CIA known. I wasn't able, because of scheduling problems, to make all of those meetings, but everytime we had somebody there who had some experience with the CIA, I tried to ask the question:

"How do you rate the CIA along with other intelligence services of our allies and our adversaries"? I was very pleased that despite all of the problems that have been reported in the press, that generally—in fact, I don't know of any exception—the attitude by those witnesses was that our intelligence service is the best in the world.

I hope it is going to be even better under your guidance, and I certainly wish you well.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Bob, would you yield?

Following up on your first question regarding the ability or lack of ability to defend yourself against charges, real, imagined, true, untrue, what if false charges are prompted by a hostile foreign intelligence service, and you know in fact that they are, do you feel the same reluctance to embark on a campaign to straighten it out?

Admiral TURNER. I certainly don't want to indicate that we have a policy of total passivity here because I think one of the things we have done in our greater openness in this last year has been to answer more questions, to answer them more forthrightly. It is just that you do get into some positions where you are very cornered. We have made some exceptions in this past year. For instance, we were accused of bugging the Blue House in Korea. We did not do that. We came out and said that. But of course, it could put me in a difficult position if I were asked in some other instance, why don't you answer this time.

We have said that Mr. Scharansky in the Soviet Union did not work for us because we thought there was such a human rights value at stake here, you know, the man was being falsely accused and so on, that we did that. It puts us in a very difficult position in the future because generally our answer to that kind of question has got to be no, or they keep asking it until they pin one of our true contacts down. I haven't come across the case you specifically cited, in fact, and, you know, I would have to weigh the equities in each instance if we were having a disinformation program put out against us here. Other things you have to do then is consider how you retaliate to that and turn them off from taking advantage of you in this way. And there are ways to do that.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Well, you are giving the answer that I at least hoped to get. If such a thing happened, you wouldn't feel an inability to in some way retaliate. If it were across the board, if, for example, the Soviet Union were all of a sudden to put as No. 3 on their agenda discrediting the CIA, using all the contact sources, groups, et cetera, at their disposal—

Mr. WILSON. How do you know they haven't done it already?

Mr. ASHBROOK. I don't know that. I am just saying if.

That would include using newsmen, all the things we are talking about here. Obviously it would put you in an interesting, difficult position. But I wouldn't like to think that you would be sitting back and say we can't do this because we are nice guys. We have to play the rules this way.

Admiral TURNER. Oh, no, it is not a matter of being nice guys in that circumstance. It is a matter of in each instance weighing the short-term and the long-term equities of what we do. Do we lose more in the long haul by attacking or revealing, and I think

sometimes we don't as I have cited these two instances where we thought the equities were very big and made the exception.

Mr. ASHBROOK. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you.

Admiral Turner, let me probe a little bit more on the whole issue of the Turner directive, what it covers and doesn't cover, and the whole relationship with the media.

We have been using in the hearing three charts¹ which you may not be familiar with; but I guess some of the other people on your staff may be familiar. Essentially what they refer to is the kinds of associations that could exist. The first chart distinguishes between the voluntary association and the salaried association between the media and the CIA. One is based on voluntary, the other is based on some kind of paid relationship.

The second chart covers the different kinds of classifications of people in the media that we are talking about, and a third chart covers the various kinds of activities that newspaper or media people might actually do in connection with the CIA.

Now, let me just try to figure out where the Turner directive does draw the line on these things. We have already discussed, as you say, the phrase "any relationship," so the Turner directive covers both voluntary associations and salaried associations. You have already talked about that in your opening statement. The people that the statement clearly covers include full- and part-time accredited journalists and stringers. That you say. It also covers nonjournalist staff employees with the notification of management, as you say. Editors and media policymakers, we ascertained in the question and answer are covered; and you made the eloquent statement about why we shouldn't cover freelancers.

For the record, could you just state your views on foreign media, because I think it is one of the things that was also a matter of great debate during the hearings we had? People said we ought to apply the same directive to the foreign press as to the domestic press, and others argued to the contrary. I wanted to get your views on the record on that subject.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Mr. Chairman, if you would yield, among the people on the chart there—the American media—were the governmental media such as the USIS, and Radio Free Europe intentionally omitted? Radio Free Europe, by the way, is quasi-governmental.

But with Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, to what extent is there any coordination with the activities of the CIA or with the directive now? Is the directive found to be applicable to these agencies or to these media as well as it relates to the CIA?

Admiral TURNER. Well, we have not considered them under the rubric of this directive, Mr. Zablocki, as not being—they are not U.S. media organizations, and we don't have relationships with them to influence their product, and I would assume that they would have regulations that would prohibit their being influenced by us or by the National Association of Manufacturers or any other types of organization.

¹ See appendixes C, D, and E, pp. 335, 336, and 337.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. It is not my intention to further tie our hands in the gathering of information or using certain media for obtaining such information, but just to get the record straight, I just wondered to what extent the CIA had any coordination with those activities.

Admiral TURNER. I think the answer is none. Does anybody—

Mr. ZABLOCKI. You have no input as far as, for example, Radio Free Europe or the Board of International Broadcasting?

Admiral TURNER. No, no, sir.

Mr. ZABLOCKI. Thank you.

Mr. ASPIN. Could you, just for the record, give us your views on whether the Turner directive applies to foreign media?

Admiral TURNER. Well, there are two basic purposes to all these exercises, it seems to me. The one is to prevent the American public from receiving information that is biased or influenced, and as you pointed out very clearly, also to maintain the credibility of the U.S. media.

Certainly the credibility factor is not there in dealing with foreign media. On the question of whether any relations we have with foreign media might end up with the U.S. public receiving some erroneous information or distorted information, I would only say that so much of the foreign media are not free, that any U.S. media who take it from a foreign media without a good deal of checking of the sources and the authenticity, are doing the public a very poor service to begin with, whether anybody has influenced the foreign media—I mean whether we have influenced the foreign media or not.

So I don't think there is a danger, great danger here to the U.S. public if we have a relationship with foreign media people.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is basically your view that this ought to be continued because, essentially, we are not dealing with a credibility problem, as you say. As for the blowback effect, you say American media ought to check the stories before they accept something that is published in a foreign paper.

Admiral TURNER. Particularly Pravda and some of those. I am sure our people don't just accept that on face value.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go back to that again, but just to finish up the charts, let's turn to the activities column over in the final chart there. When you say that the CIA will not enter into any relationship for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities, I am wondering what is permissible and what isn't, and with the caveat on this side.

I take it that some of those things are permissible and some are not. In other words, with story confirmation, if somebody calls up, clearly we start with the most innocuous form of association between the media and the CIA. If somebody calls up and wants to confirm a story, you will talk to them.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

If some information swapping is of the kind where you have one of the people out in the field, perhaps, in some foreign capital, talking to a reporter from an American paper, they sit down and they talk to each other, that is a permissible form of contact?

Admiral TURNER. I think the necessary caveats here are open and voluntary.

Mr. ASPIN. Open and voluntary, right.

Prebriefing, you have already covered because you say that is one of the things you do.

Now, debriefing. What are your ground rules on that? If somebody comes back from a trip abroad and might have some information that is useful to you, what are your operating procedures?

Admiral TURNER. Again, open and voluntary. We won't solicit them, and there would be no quid pro quo for the prebriefing and so on.

Mr. ASPIN. Would it be the kind of thing that you might call them, or do you wait for them to contact you?

Admiral TURNER. Voluntary is on their side and—

Mr. ASPIN. And so they would have to initiate the contact on debriefing.

You wouldn't call and ask them to come in and talk to you about what they saw?

Admiral TURNER. Maybe I broke my own rules. The other night I was talking to a journalist who we prebriefed for a trip to China, and I said gee, I would sure like to sit down and hear about your experiences, and the answer was, that would be contaminating. And so I thought that was a one-sided arrangement where they will take our information but they won't even sit down and talk to us about what they had for dinner in China.

But no, we don't have any kind of a program of asking people to—I mean, I think you have to be very careful here because, I want to be perfectly forthright, there are times when I call up friends in the media and say look, I would like to just sit down and have a chat with you, not because I think they have got some particular information, but I want to bounce ideas off somebody who is knowledgeable. And that is why this is a delicate area.

I have found in my whole career that when you are in this kind of international affairs business, other than academics, the people who have the broadest grasp of the kind of thing you are doing and you want to get outside your own environment and exchange ideas with people who see it differently than your own employees are the media, and it is very valuable to all of us to be challenged by them.

Mr. ASPIN. I just wondered what the ground rules are. I see no reason why you shouldn't call up somebody and ask them if they want to come in and talk to you about it; but I just wondered whether under your guidelines, where you say that we will not enter into any relationships, how you are interpreting that in the case of calling up somebody and saying, "Look, we would like to hear about your trip."

Admiral TURNER. Let me say this. I think that the way the regulation is written, it doesn't prohibit that.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Admiral TURNER. We, as a policy today, are not doing that, but I point out a couple of times where I have done it, sort of inadvertently, maybe. But I don't think in a dangerous way.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Now, I take it that the rest are the kind of things in the prohibited category. You already said that you do no prior tasking of

intelligence collection. Asking for access to files and outtakes, even on a voluntary basis, this directive would prohibit, and the rest of the kinds of things, doing any kind of support or agent work. These are not what you ask staff people to do under this directive.

Admiral TURNER. Is that correct, Herb, those are all prohibited? I believe so, yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Mr. Chairman, may I ask a question with respect to the prior tasking of intelligence collection?

Your statement says you would emphasize that the regulation does strictly prohibit the CIA's tasking the U.S. journalist with performing any operational assignment. While CIA cannot actively task or dispatch even a willing journalist to seek out and furnish particular information or assistance, it may accept whatever information a journalist elects to transmit voluntarily.

Is that too restrictive an interpretation?

When Bill Colby testified before this committee, he raised some concern about your interpretation of the regulation as put in place and how you would handle it. What is your response to that?

What if a willing journalist said: "I am willing to be tasked for this particular matter?"

Admiral TURNER. I think that should only be done, Mr. Boland, under the paragraph 3, escape clause, where I can make an exception. If I determined in that instance that his being tasked by us was of such importance to the country, to risk some diminution of the credibility of the U.S. media, then I think it is worthwhile, but it is better to put it under that exception where, you know, it gets spotlight attention.

Mr. BOLAND. Well, you have stated in your statement today that that exception would be used only in extraordinary circumstances.

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. BOLAND. Is it so extraordinary that a U.S. reporter might willingly agree to be tasked and indicate to you that he was willing to be tasked for a particular intelligence mission?

Why would you put that in the realm of extraordinary? I take it that the exception would be used under unusual and, to use your word again, extraordinary circumstances.

I have, incidentally, no disagreement with the exception myself, but I think discretionary power ought to remain in specific heads of agencies and departments. As a matter of fact, on the committee that I chair, the Appropriations Subcommittee, with some 11 agencies, I don't know of anyone, whether it is a Cabinet officer or an administrator, that doesn't have some discretionary power to waive some rule or regulation practically in all of them. I think that probably cuts across the whole Government, so I have no particular problem with that.

You obviously don't agree with Bill Colby that your interpretation is too restrictive.

Admiral TURNER. Yes; I do not——

Mr. BOLAND. That CIA will not willingly task——

Admiral TURNER. Will not task a willing——

Mr. BOLAND. A U.S. reporter; but if he is anxious to come in and voluntarily disclose information which is helpful to you, you would accept that, of course.

Admiral TURNER. Yes. It is a matter of weighing the equities here.

I think I am with Bill Colby in the sense that the more freedom I have, the better I can do that job, but at the same time, we are all here talking today about protecting the American citizen, and I think if you start opening that up, it becomes a point of danger.

Mr. BOLAND. I am not sure that that is so. I don't really quite follow that. I think that if some U.S. reporter or member of the media comes in and says, "I am willing to be tasked, I am in a good position to be tasked for this particular assignment and some particular intelligence that would be helpful to CIA," then I don't think there is any abuse of any inherent constitutional power in this instance.

Admiral TURNER. Wouldn't that reduce the credibility the chairman is talking about, though, because some of our media would be tasked by us and some would not.

Mr. FOWLER. Would the gentleman yield?

I thank the chairman for yielding.

The incredible thing about this directive—and I am commending the work of Mr. Aspin and his committee, regardless of what side you are on, I think the directive goes further in protecting the professional status of journalists than it does in helping with the work of the CIA or even the credibility of the CIA.

What Admiral Turner and the CIA have done is say that even, as you were saying, even when you have a willing journalist, willing to be tasked, that you are not going to do it, and by not doing it, what you are doing is protecting the worldwide reputation of journalism as a profession. As we all know, except for Washington, most journalists are hungry. [Laughter.]

Up here, you know, they have to loosen their belts after lunch, but I can see over and over again, throughout the country, some young journalist who would be delighted to supplement his income and his reputation for verve by willingly soliciting a relationship for the best and most patriotic of reasons with the CIA. But what this directive is doing is saying look, we are going to protect your own flank against your members who would like to play both sides, and in that, I think that you have done an extraordinary job through your directive in trying to protect an institution that it is certainly not your job as the chief intelligence officer of our Nation to protect.

Mr. ASPIN. If I may comment for a second, I think what we are talking about is that, essentially, all of this comes down to a very heavy burden on the journalistic community. I don't think there is any way you can write a regulation that maintains the integrity of the journalists, nor should we try and write a regulation that maintains the integrity. And even with this one, there are subtle ways in which somebody could be tasked. I just commend Admiral Turner for writing a directive like this which, in effect, says it is not the policy of the Agency to do these things. But essentially, even if it were, if the Agency had no policy like this, it would be bad journalism to allow yourself to be prior-tasked by the Agency. I mean, it is just a classic conflict of interest.

Mr. FOWLER. That is why they are protected, the journalists.

Mr. ASPIN. How could somebody be doing some work for the Agency while at the same time reporting on the Agency's activities? The reporter will eventually find himself in a conflict. But I am just happy to see that the Admiral has a regulation which in effect says it is not our policy to do these things.

Now, still, to protect against that, you need the integrity of journalists, and you need the integrity of the Agency and the people out in the field; but if it is a statement of policy, it is a good statement of policy, and I commend him for it.

Mr. BOLAND. I am happy, too, but I am amazed that the CIA has interpreted that relationship that way at all.

Mr. ASPIN. That's good. It's all right. Don't complain about it. [General laughter.]

Let me just talk a second, Admiral, if I could, about this whole relationship because we raised some very interesting issues in these hearings, and you have to have sat through these crazy hearings to really get the flavor of the relationship between these two ant hills, the media and the intelligence community.

In a sense, the Agency is like other agencies of the Government. It is like the State Department, it is like the Defense Department, in the sense that everybody in town is trying to influence the media. It is a game everybody plays in this town: trying to influence the media, getting favorable stories about them in, getting unfavorable stories out.

Admiral TURNER. Some of us just aren't very good at it.

Mr. ASPIN. But when you talk to journalists, what really kind of frightens them about the Agency, essentially, which doesn't frighten them about the State Department and doesn't frighten them about the Defense Department, is that the Agency speaks about assets and control and handling, and they have a lot of secrecy connected with it. It is a kind of a moth-in-the-flame relationship where they are fascinated by what the Agency does. But they are very fearful of getting sucked in because, after all, Agency people are professionals at dealing with these kinds of things. That is a part of their trade.

And it is a peculiar relationship because in some sense they are in the same business. Both the Agency and the journalists are out looking for information and both of them have something that the other one wants. You would love to use those journalists for cover and that kind of thing. And to do your line, you think, "If they would only be patriotic and only do what they are supposed to." And the journalists think, "If those guys would just give me the information and let me get my Pulitzer Prize." You have got great information that they need. They have got a sort of access and kind of ability to influence events that you would like. So, it surprises you that they don't want to come and be debriefed; but it doesn't surprise them at all. They take information, not give it. They are in the information-taking business; and, what they give, they give through their outlet, their publication.

So it is a weird thing. Journalists and Agency people like each other; in a sense, they are kind of fascinated by each other. And in lots of ways they are similar kinds of people. Each of them has what the other one wants. Each of them is trying to use the other, in a way, and each of them is wary of being used by the other. It is

the most amazing kind of relationship I think I have ever followed, and I just uncovered it in these hearings. As I say, you have to sit through the whole hearings to get the flavor of this kind of complex interrelationship.

Admiral TURNER. If I may?

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Our openness policy, we have gotten into some ridiculous situations now where we had a journalist call up the other day and say you briefed me in January on such and such. In March it changed and you didn't call me and tell me. I mean, they want me to be the press bureau for the whole American media, and the effrontery to think that we are going to pick up the phone when somebody gets a change of policy in some foreign country because we gave a briefing on it once. We can't guaranteed that briefing for a lifetime.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me go, if I may, back to the questions.

On the media, we are talking about the whole issue of what we cover in the American media, and the question about flowback. Let me raise a couple of issues that have come up in the hearings concerning foreign media and the concern that what is in the foreign press might get back into the American press. Let me ask specifically, for example, about the case of Reuters.

Now under the Turner directive, Reuters would not be covered. It is a British news service.

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Mr. ASPIN. So it would not be prohibited; yet Reuters has, I don't know, what, some 16 newspapers in the United States which get its service?

What do we say about the case of Reuters? It is a British news service, and it may be unique in the sense that I don't know of any other news service which is so extensively reported in the United States; but it is a British news service so it is a case where the Turner directive does not apply. It is, however, a case where information could easily flow back into the United States or articles could appear in the United States press written by people who were involved with the CIA.

Admiral TURNER. It seems to me you have to hypothesize a chain in which our relationship with a foreign correspondent results in his distorting his press coverage, results in it being them replayed by the editor of a U.S. journal who reprints it and therefore giving some bad information to the American public. I think it is a fairly tenuous chain, first that our relationship is going to lead to something being very distorted in the first place, you know, but no maliciousness in us, yes, but again, there are checks that I mentioned before. And the problem other than putting in this regulation the names of Reuters and London Times or other agencies we know are free and open, is you then cut us off from all kinds of media opportunities—and I have described to you how valuable I think the outlook of media people is, from areas that are just not free anyway, and that the editor would look with great skepticism before the Prague Gazette or something was replayed in the U.S. media.

So yes, there is a risk. I am not trying to minimize that.

Mr. ASPIN. I guess what I am pointing out, then, by this line of questioning is that there is some area which is still not in a sense covered and the only way to cover it would be to go to the foreign media, which you made the argument against and others have made the argument against. But there is a chance of direct play-back into the United States on something directly written, Reuters being a case. But there is a number of feature services, too. I guess the Observer, the Guardian, the Times of London have got feature services. There is that Toronto Globe and Mail correspondent in Peking for many years who American newspapers were playing because we had no access into Peking. He was reporting from Peking for a number of years. So there are these cases where you have foreign press operations coming right back in, and it is not simply a case of the U.S. editor checking the story before he plays it in our paper because these are wire service stories that they are inclined often to take and put right into the papers.

Admiral TURNER. But on the other hand, because they are free press, I think you have some reasonable check that the Reuters correspondent is not going to take orders from Herb as to what to put in his paper. He is going to—because he has his credibility at stake. The Pravda correspondent doesn't have his credibility at stake.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Now we can buy people from—I have got to be careful here.

No; you have a much better chance of buying and directing influencing a fellow who is in a nonfree press.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Which would be treated with skepticism when it comes back to the United States just because it comes from a nonfree press. Your ability to take somebody from the Reuters or Guardian or whatever services and dictate to them what to put in their newspaper or their copy is fairly low.

Mr. ASPIN. Actually, isn't the chance to dictate copy fairly low at both ends of the spectrum? It is hard to dictate to the British press, but it also would be awfully hard to dictate to Pravda and Tass to get a story in there.

What you are really talking about is the middle-level people where the press is kind of up for sale, and there you can have some influence about what they publish.

Mr. FOWLER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. ASPIN. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. FOWLER. Admiral Turner, you mentioned, to slip into the vernacular that I abhor, the question of disinformation, whether it be perpetrated through journalists or anybody else. I thought you were mentioning, in answering the chairman's question, that we have some checks against apparently what you call this blowback effect, the blowback effect coming from disinformation.

What are those checks?

Admiral TURNER. Well, first of all, let's make sure we make a distinction here.

If there is a deliberate effort on the part of the CIA to buy a foreign journalist, to get him to print a deliberate story, that is not

intelligence; that's covert action and you all have to approve—approve, I'm sorry, you all have to be informed.

Mr. FOWLER. I was just going to say, I was delighted that you would yield to the Fowler effect.

We get the Fowler effect with the Turner directive, and it makes a lot of progress. [General laughter.]

Admiral TURNER. Bad slip, but you all are informed of the covert action thing. So what we have just been talking about by inference is really a covert action. Now, if it comes to using a member of a controlled foreign media to target and get us information, you know, I go to him and say I want you to ask so and so or, you know, find out so and so, that is intelligence collection, but that really has very little blowback possibility other than the fellow maybe is more friendly because he is on our payroll or something, some sort of effect.

Mr. FOWLER. I understand that, but let's just say we have recruited, however we do it, we end up with a story, a false story in the foreign press. That story, depending on its magnitude or its timing, is going to be reported on the 6 o'clock television news, that so and so press reports this. Therefore, that information, though false, will be reported to the American public. In other words, you can't control, once the false facts are out there, for whatever reasons, however laudatory from my perspective, those false facts cannot be controlled as to who the audience, as to what audience, to which audience will be the ultimate recipient.

Is that not correct?

Admiral TURNER. That's correct.

Mr. FOWLER. Now, if that is correct, is there anything that we can do about that?

Admiral TURNER. I don't think so without unduly tying our hands. On the one hand you do have the control of the covert action notification procedures. You do have the fact that when this country wants to put information out, we really want to put out true information. I mean, our motive for putting out false information is so much less than the rest of the world. I mean, we just don't need that technique as a general matter. And third, you do have the check that even the 6 o'clock news isn't going to put out something from a news agency that is just totally—that is not credible. You know, sometimes what you are talking about would just not get a hearing in many cases because it wouldn't be believable.

But yes, I can't guarantee you that there won't be some blowback. I am simply saying I think it is all second- and third-order effects, and that there are clear checks against our starting a, sorry, a disinformation campaign or a false information campaign into the foreign media that comes back here.

Mr. FOWLER. I appreciate your recognition and assessment of the difficulties of controlling that source.

That's all that I think it is important for us to recognize that, I don't know what the circumstances are and we certainly can't explore it right now, for using disinformation, but it just seems to me that what you have said is that there are no—that if that disinformation is seeded, there are no checks as to which audience it ends up influencing.

Admiral TURNER. I wouldn't want to go quite that far, sir. I think there are checks. I think the integrity of the U.S. media is a check.

Mr. FOWLER. There are no checks; the CIA can have no checks.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir, there is no guarantee, but I think the system has its built-in check, your check on me that I am not starting big disinformation campaigns without deliberate or proper oversight, and the checks of our own media process that it doesn't want to get taken into a false story. That is, I think the standard of any good reporter is to try to be sure he is only putting out good information and not bad.

Mr. FOWLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. One final area that the Turner directive does not cover which came to light in the hearings, besides the Reuters News Service and related cases, was the relationship between the Agency and foreign media outlets. I am thinking of subsidized English language newspapers in other countries, such as the Rome Daily American; or actually having a proprietary in the way of a feature service of some kind abroad. That is another way in which Americans might get influenced in unfortunate ways by some relationship which the Agency might have with foreign—and particularly English-language—newspapers abroad. This seemed to many of the witnesses—and I must say, it seems to me, too—to be a peculiar kind of way of influencing foreign opinion, as we are more likely to influence American journalists in that country who don't speak the language very well, or American tourists who happen to be going through rather than influencing the opinion in the foreign country.

And I wondered if you had any comment about the whole relationship between the Agency and subsidizing foreign English-language press abroad, or news services of one kind or another.

Admiral TURNER. That all gets into the covert action field. So to the extent that any of that were contemplated, it is subject to the whole set of oversights that we have been talking about there. I think that is the check against our doing something in that category that isn't worth the danger.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask, then, just to finish up on this directive, what is the status of the directive? Is it now a formal regulation? What is the legal status of the directive?

Admiral TURNER. It is a printed regulation of the Central Intelligence Agency and binding on everybody there.

Mr. ASPIN. Does that mean it has been sent out to the field and everything has been conveyed?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is a formal regulation.

[Admiral Turner, nods in the affirmative.]

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, if you were going to make any changes in that directive, would you make them public?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes. This is an unclassified directive.

Mr. ASPIN. But what I am saying is, it being a directive and nothing which has been approved or disapproved by Congress, if you were to make any changes in this directive or the directive were to be changed in any way, would you do it publicly?

Admiral TURNER. I not only would because it would—it is unclassified and it would end up being public, but if I tried to sneak something in here, the media would be in here on top of me in nothing flat, and I think there is nothing better than to have a forward policy on this because it is going to come out anyway. So why get beaten over the head for trying to sneak it out.

Mr. ASPIN. So it would be made public if the thing gets changed?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. Are there any supplementing directives or any implementing directives? Very often a policy comes out and then a little bit later there are telegrams going out that implement it and that say, "All right, here is what it really means." Sometimes it is not quite clear that they jibe.

Are there any supplementing instructions or anything to go with this?

Admiral TURNER. No; there are none.

Mr. ASPIN. Thank you very much.

Mr. ROBINSON. Mr. Chairman before you leave that general area, may I ask a final question?

Mr. ASPIN. Surely.

Mr. ROBINSON. Admiral, in your statement you mentioned that you give two types of interviews, unattributable and attributable, and the unattributable interviews are made on request by news people. The attributable ones are made as a general rule three of four times a week, but the ones that are made on request have also a requirement that the person receiving the interview would protect the anonymity of the briefer.

Does the protection go further than just protecting the anonymity of the briefer, in other words, for example, is there any request to protect the confidentiality of the material involved?

Admiral TURNER. No, sir, we do not brief on anything that is classified, so any information we give them is theirs to do what they want with.

We are concerned if our analysts start getting too much publicity, they then get phone calls at home, they get phone calls at their private number at the office, and you know, it begins to get out of our control, as a matter of fact.

We have a very fine procedure, I believe. We set up recently a special office, and if we give one of these unattributable briefing, it is under Herb's general—it is in his office area, and that is where the media man comes, that is where our man goes, and it is under his general oversight, because you know, when you take a young analyst who hasn't much experience in dealing with the media, we have got to protect him as well as service the media. And so that is why we try to keep this anonymity. We don't hide all of our lights under bushes, but certainly some of that is useful.

Mr. ROBINSON. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, let me just follow up on that question because it did arise in one of the cases that one of the people who came before us to testify raised. One of the issues they raised was the possibility of briefings being given by the operations people, as opposed to the analysts. And the case that was cited was the case now in dispute of the Time magazine article about Allende. Let me just briefly go into the testimony to explain the situation.

What we were talking about in the testimony was a case brought forth by Dr. Morton Halperin. He brought forth a case where Time magazine was going to do a cover story about Allende. Reportedly—and Time disputes the report, I should say for the record—Time was going to give the cover story a certain slant. The Time people who were writing the story went over to receive a briefing at the Agency. They went to the operations people, and they got a different slant on the thing; and then they wrote their story in a different way, or so it was claimed. The Church committee uncovered some documents and claimed that it was different. Time magazine says nothing doing: We consulted a lot of different people and a lot of different sources.

Never mind the controversy; the point is that the analysts will do the briefing for the Agency now for the news media under your policy, as opposed to the operations people?

Admiral TURNER. That is correct.

Some of the operations people, both overseas and here, there used to be a lot of contact overseas. The media was quite unhappy in some instances with it, but we found that that was desirable and necessary, particularly if we are losing our cover overseas because a journalist would establish a relationship in Paris with our man and then he would go tell somebody when the man got transferred to some other station, hey, if you want to find something out in that country, go see Joe, and pretty soon we had no control over who knew who was who. And I don't have any enthusiasm, I mean, I just don't want the operations people dealing with media. They are in such sensitive areas that they should eschew that kind of relationship.

Mr. ASPIN. So it is your policy now that if somebody calls up and wants a briefing on such-and-such a subject and they don't specify who they want to see, you send them to the analyst.

Admiral TURNER. And if they do specify who they want to see, we still send them to the analyst.

Mr. ASPIN. And you try to apply that abroad, even where there are no analysts?

Admiral TURNER. That's right.

Mr. ASPIN. What do you do abroad? You just don't try?

Admiral TURNER. We don't give background briefings and things like that abroad.

Now, I don't—I have got to correct something for the record, Mr. Chairman. there is a directive that went out from the Operations Directorate amplifying or telling about this directive.

Mr. HETU. It doesn't change it.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't change it. We will provide you a copy of their message to reassure you on that, but one of the things here is that if you say there is to be no relationship and they have had this traditionally abroad with our station chief and the leading U.S. media people, we have had them come in with cables, well, I have known Joe all my life. Can I not invite him over for dinner, or if he invites me to dinner, or we go to a cocktail party. I mean, I just can't emphasize that to you too much, people in the field don't want to break either the law or the regulations and so they come in with all of these detailed questions as to what is the borderline here, and that is what this directive is about.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it unclassified?

Admiral TURNER. I am not sure whether it is or not, the Operations Directorate hardly ever puts out anything unclassified.

Mr. ASPIN. But you will provide it?

Admiral TURNER. I will provide it to you, if it is classified in its full form, and I will try to provide you an unclassified version of it for the record.

Mr. ASPIN. Fine, thank you. Let me then go into another subject, which gets us to the point that the implementing directives sometimes don't sound the same as the public directives. An issue arose in the hearings when we talked to the former Ambassadors; namely, the relationship between the ambassadors and the CIA, and particularly the station chief in the countries in which they were assigned. There was an article in the New York Times recently on this subject, and I would like to ask unanimous consent to put it in the record.¹

In essence, what had happened was that the President issued a directive saying the Ambassador was in charge of the people in his operation in a country. The charge in the article was that, in fact, there were supplementary CIA directives sent out afterwards which in effect began to hedge on that and say, "Well, there are certain things that the Ambassador ought not see, and certain matters that he should not be informed of, and certain message traffic that he should not have," whereas the original Carter letter had said the Ambassador was in charge of all personnel and was entitled to see all messages. This is an issue which, of course, has been around a long time. President Kennedy and President Nixon sent out similar letters to their Ambassadors, and, similarly, things which were given in the first instance by the President were taken away in the subsequent instance by the bureaucracy.

And I would like, if I could, to get your views about this on the record. Is there anything that the Ambassador should not see?

Admiral TURNER. Yes.

Mr. ASPIN. OK. What kinds of things?

Admiral TURNER. Sources, names of agents, in some cases he should see them, but in most cases not.

Mr. ASPIN. On what grounds should he not? Why shouldn't the Ambassador be allowed, if he wants to know, even the sources, the most critical kind of case to the Agency?

Why shouldn't the Ambassador know the sources?

Admiral TURNER. Not because we don't trust the Ambassadors, but for two reasons. Leaks of information, in my opinion, are geometrical with the number of people who know the information, regardless of who they are.

Second, in order to protect very secretive information, you must sometimes dissimulate. If you are shaking hands at a cocktail party with a man who is supposedly in the cabinet of the country to which you are accredited, and yet you know he is on our payroll, if you are not trained and skilled in this, and there is a counterintelligence agent from the KGB at the party, you may inadvertently give this away. And we have had instances of this kind of thing. It takes training to keep secrets.

¹See appendix P, p. 521.

There are sources I do not want to know personally. I am not that trained at it, even though I am becoming very conscious of it from my exposure. And I don't think Ambassadors would want to assume some of that responsibility when lives are at stake.

Further, we can't get some of these people to do the work for us if they know the Ambassadors are going to know this because they understand the mechanism I have just talked to you about. They will trust the Central Intelligence Agency because we are professionals; that is our business. And it is a real problem.

If they know—if they thought we were going to tell you their names, and you have never asked for that in any of the committees of the Congress, you know, we wouldn't be able to recruit some of these people.

So yes, there—and there has been never any intent by the Secretary of State or myself—we put out a directive that the President approved which set these guidelines, to make it a total disclosure to the Ambassador. What I have done, this new agreement I signed with the Secretary of State last spring was to draw that line where we stop telling the Ambassador further over in his favor. I have tried to be more open, more forthcoming because close teamwork between intelligence and the State Department is just very critical in my opinion, and therefore I wanted to lean over as far as I thought I possibly could to share with the Ambassador and make sure that we are all on the same team.

It is working well, and despite that erroneous story, the relationships have improved and are working smoothly. I know of only one or two Ambassadors who have had any complaints whatsoever with this. The vast majority of them—and I really had to check it since this story—are very pleased with the new program, and we did not put out any supplementary instructions that in any way contradicted the basic State-CIA agreement. I have not had anybody come to me and say here is a paragraph—but we did have to put out supplementary instructions, not because we were undermining it; because the onus of change was on us. I mean, we were opening up more. We were pushing the boundary line toward the Ambassador. The Ambassador didn't have to do anything different except understand he was going to get more information. But you don't get an organization, particularly in an area like this, which is vital to our operations, to make a substantial change without impressing on them how you are going to do it, and that you are going to do it.

I personally wrote a long cable to all my chiefs of station and said, now, this is what we have done, this is why we did it, and this is—politely—I want you to carry this out. That was one of the cables that Binder says was intended to do the opposite. And the last line in my cable was, you will show my cable to the Ambassador.

So I think it is a total canard.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Let me just press the issue a little further because I see almost no time in which a congressional committee would need to know the sources. I can see, however, some cases where the Ambassador might need to know the sources, and, indeed, it would be very appropriate for the Ambassador to know the sources.

Admiral TURNER. I agree.

Mr. ASPIN. Where would it be important that the Ambassador know?

How do you decide when the Ambassador should know and when the Ambassador shouldn't know?

Admiral TURNER. There is no prohibition on the Ambassador knowing anything. There is no, you know, express rule that says this kind of thing he will never be told. That is a matter of negotiation between the Ambassador and the chief of station. Only the chief of station is going to know everything that goes on in his station, so clearly he is the one who has got to make the first judgment.

But the rule that I laid out clearly is I don't want Ambassadors surprised about our activities.

Mr. ASPIN. Correct.

Admiral TURNER. So if an Ambassador, he is going to know there is an activity going on. He may not know the name of the person, if there is an agent involved in it. Well, once he knows about the activity, he has got some clue that maybe he wants to know the name. So it isn't totally dependent on the chief of station volunteering is what I am trying to say.

So there is an interplay in the field. The chief of station either volunteers or doesn't volunteer; the Ambassador has some information about the activity. He either asks or doesn't ask. If in that process there is a difference, it comes to Secretary Vance and myself to resolve. And that is all clearly laid out.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just quote a couple of paragraphs from the Binder article, because here is the case of Frank Carlucci in Portugal, now your deputy over at the CIA. The article states:

On learning that the Agency station chief was maintaining a covert relationship with several members of the 1974 Portuguese government, the official continued, Mr. Carlucci demanded that the connections be terminated.

He is talking about Frank Carlucci's activities.

The CIA officials and a knowledgeable State Department official agreed that under the new guidelines such a controversy would probably not arise because the CIA station chief would probably not feel obliged to identify all of his covert relationships by name. Under the directive, the Agency official went on, the Ambassador would be made aware of covert operations, but would not be involved in them.

In other words, what the article says was that when the situation became a little more vague, Frank Carlucci was able to get a lot of information, I guess by force of his personality and the unusual circumstances that existed. He was able to do things which an Ambassador now in that circumstance, even with the thing more delineated, would not be able to do.

Admiral TURNER. I say to you, sir, that's balderdash.

Mr. ASPIN. All right.

Admiral TURNER. There is nothing taken away from the Ambassador by these new regulations. His access to information is enhanced, absolutely.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes. I tend to think that you are right, that on balance the information is enhanced to the noncontroversial cases and, indeed, probably in 99 cases out of 100. I have talked to Ambassadors, too, and can confirm what you said, which is essentially that they are pleased with the information they are getting and, in fact, do not want any more or see any need for any more. I

am just wondering about the exceptional cases where you do have an Ambassador who really does want to get into it, or some kind of a crisis situation where the Ambassador really is the operation officer in that country, and now that we have delineated this thing so finely, whether in fact we would be prohibiting him from getting information. But you say that is not so.

Admiral TURNER. Well, you are saying delineated finely, and I am saying that all the new delineation is in favor of more information to the Ambassador.

Mr. ASPIN. Except that when it was vague, an Ambassador who really wanted to know, and really knew how to maneuver, could get an awful lot of information about what was happening just in terms of insisting upon it.

I don't know. It perhaps is not a situation that is going to arise.

Admiral TURNER. If there is any circumscribing here, it is all caveated with the provision that if there is a difference, it comes back to Vance and Turner.

Mr. ASPIN. Have you had a chance, or has there ever been a request for you and Vance to arbitrate any situations yet?

Admiral TURNER. Not thus far, but not too much time goes by that I don't talk to Secretary Vance about something like this. It is not because they have come to a head in the field and—well, there are differences. It is mainly over the degree of reporting that we do, and how much we work to find out what is going on in the local scene, and you know, some Ambassadors are very possessive and don't want anybody else reporting about political intelligence in their country. They are the head man. And I make it very clear to Secretary Vance I can't accept that because the President of the United States is entitled to intelligence reporting from anywhere in the world from people who are not associated with the policy process, and that is my people. And, therefore, I want and demand from them their assessments regularly of what is going on in that country, even though it may duplicate what the Ambassador does.

But I tell them I want you particularly, if you disagree with the Ambassador, you know, the country government is going to fall, no it is not going to fall, I want you to let the Ambassador know that you are sending me your opinion, and let me know that he would have disagreed with that.

Generally speaking, what is being worked out is they run the cable through the Embassy who then even maybe puts a paragraph on and say the following reason—that's fine with me, because I don't want to take just my chief of station's opinion if it is quite opposed by the Ambassador. I want to be able in my own mind to balance the two.

Mr. ASPIN. Is it a regular process, then, in the cases where there isn't a controversy, that the assessment cables—without sources now, I am not talking about the sources—are in fact shown to the Ambassador?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, yes. And the new provision, there is no way we can legally withhold that kind of a cable from the Ambassador.

Now, in each station, you know, I don't know how much the Ambassador wants to read.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Let me press a little further because I am a little puzzled on when you think it would be proper for an Ambassador to know the names of the sources and the times when it wouldn't be proper for them to know the names of the sources.

Admiral TURNER. Well, we feel that if the Ambassador is going to have regular contact with this person, that there may be times when he should.

Now, I have told you the other side of the story regarding whether he can keep the secret, so you know, there is a difference in each case, and I think in that kind of a case, you would approach the Ambassador and say look, there is somebody you are seeing every week. This is what he is doing for us.

Now, do you think you want to have the responsibility on your shoulders of not inadvertently disclosing that relationship? The risks of your doing business with him without knowing that he works for us are the following. I mean, you know, you might make an agreement on so and so which we have to come to you and tell you you really can't follow through on that. I am scratching here, but I think that has got to be worked out in each case. But, yes, we don't want an Ambassador to get totally trapped.

Mr. ASPIN. Would you think it proper to talk to the Ambassador before you approach a source if it might be a particularly risky source, and get his opinion?

Admiral TURNER. That is part of not being surprised.

I mean, we don't want to make a pitch to the foreign minister of some small country to come and be on our side, and then he goes and complains to the Ambassador, I was attempted to be recruited by your CIA man.

Mr. ASPIN. And the Ambassador is caught off guard.

Admiral TURNER. That would be being surprised.

Mr. ASPIN. Is there any other area where you think it would not be appropriate to tell the Ambassador?

Admiral TURNER. Oh, yes; yes.

Mr. ASPIN. What else, what other kinds of things?

Admiral TURNER. Well, sometimes the physical activity of collecting information, like some technical means, planting sensors or that kind of thing, is a very delicate, risky process, and you wouldn't want all the details. You know, you wouldn't want it to be known because of my geometrical leak rule, Turner's law of geometry, that--you wouldn't want the details, you know, the place, the time, the hour, the operational details to be known by anybody more than absolutely has to.

Mr. ASPIN. Yes.

Admiral TURNER. Somebody's life may be at stake if it ever got out, but again, you don't want the Ambassador surprised if it fails. So he has got to know enough about it but not every detail. That is the kind of line we are attempting to draw, and it just can't be written out in express rules. It has got to be negotiated in every instance.

Mr. ASPIN. OK.

Any thing else that comes to mind?

Admiral TURNER. I think those are the two principal categories of activities.

Mr. ASPIN. Because what has happened is that various Presidents have tried, in effect, to write kind of all-encompassing letters saying, "The Ambassador is in charge of everything," and, in fact, we wrote a law in Congress to that effect at one time which never had any implementing directives put out about it.¹

Basically, you are saying that really it is not the right way to go, that there is a small percentage of situations which should not be disclosed to the Ambassador.

Admiral TURNER. It doesn't mean he is not in charge. It means he doesn't need all of the details to be in charge.

Mr. ASPIN. Right, right.

So what you are saying, essentially, is that on some of these kind of things, we ought to be looking at this thing from a different angle, and Congress and the Presidents really ought to be doing this differently.

Obviously you are not the only director to think that, because we have had this kind of back and forth for all these years. It has always been a peculiar thing, because Congress thinks it is right that the Ambassador ought to be in charge and ought to have every piece of information.

Admiral TURNER. I happen to be a military man, and what we are saying is that we are interested in giving our Ambassadors more complete authority over their activities than we even do our military people. You know, a military commander today isn't totally possessed of all the facts or all the control over his operations. He gets orders from Washington every couple of hours, and one thing or another, and neither are Ambassadors going to be—this old image of I am in charge, total access, total control, it just isn't practical in our modern society.

I think we have got it to where they are not surprised by our activities. They will have adequate control that we aren't doing things that they really don't think should be done.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me ask about one other area before we quit, and the House will probably be calling and we should probably let you go.

Let me ask about a case that came up in our hearings, and the reason I raise it is because it occurred since you have become the DCI, and that is the whole problem of the Demetracopoulos case, and the whole question of files.

Leave aside Demetracopoulos himself; I am not all that concerned about the particulars or going into the truth or falsehood of the statements, but only the questions about the CIA's use of files and what the ground rules are on using files about people.

First of all I guess the question is on the keeping of the files. What kinds of people does the CIA have files on?

Let me go into the background of this case again.

There have been articles, printed in the papers about this fellow Demetracopoulos, which attribute CIA sources with information which Demetracopoulos himself says is false. In any case, the question that it raises is not the validity of the information so much, but the use of files and the use of information to discredit people. This is the fundamental issue that we are talking about, and the

¹ 22 U.S. 2680a (Aug. 1, 1956).

questions are: to what extent does the Privacy Act apply to the CIA, to what extent does the CIA have files about people, what are the ground rules on which the CIA grants access to files to people who are outside of the Agency, say, in the media?

Admiral TURNER. It is a real problem because the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act both apply to us. We have no exemptions from that. We do not just provide files on people to anybody who asks. I find no evidence we have provided files on Demetracopoulos to anybody. On the other hand, we have to be very circumspect because any file we have can be asked for under the Freedom of Information Act; whether it is releasable or not is another issue, and there is a Freedom of Information and Privacy Act procedure going on with respect to the Demetracopoulos right now, and I hesitate to get into it too much before that is resolved and maybe gone to court and whatever else it takes.

Mr. ASPIN. I understand.

Mr. LAPHAM. Mr. Aspin, let me add to the Director's answer on that. It is true that the Privacy Act as well as the Freedom of Information Act applies to CIA. However, the Privacy Act contains a provision that allows CIA to exempt itself from certain of the requirements of that statute, and we have partially, although not fully, exercised that authority.

However, we are not permitted under that statute to exempt ourselves from the provisions that have to do with conditions on disclosure of information, that is conditions under which we can disseminate information. Those requirements of the statute are fully applicable to CIA as they are to any other agency.

Mr. ASPIN. And what is the case when you have, as with Demetracopoulos, a permanent resident alien? What is his status under this classification?

Mr. LAPHAM. His status is the same under both statutes as a U.S. citizen.

Mr. ASPIN. So he has the same access and has the same status as a U.S. citizen.

Mr. LAPHAM. Precisely. He is of equal status with a U.S. citizen under both acts.

Mr. ASPIN. And tell me again, what is the CIA exemption or how does that work in the act?

Mr. LAPHAM. The act gives the CIA power to exempt itself from certain limited requirements of the statute but does not, however, give the CIA any power to exempt itself from the requirements that relate to the disclosure outside the Agency of information in its files, private information in its files.

Mr. ASPIN. How does that apply if you are not making it public but making the information available to other agencies of the Government?

Mr. LAPHAM. It applies whether you are making it available to other persons who happen to be nongovernmental or to other government agencies.

Mr. ASPIN. The same thing.

May I ask, what is the basis on which the Agency would open a file on somebody?

What kinds of people do they have files on and how does the file system work?

Mr. LAPHAM. That is an enormous question. I can't begin to cover all of the ground on that, but I will try to get at it this way.

If you are talking about U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, then the basic ground rules are set forth in most recently the new executive order that the President has issued,¹ and before that was set forth in somewhat different form in the Executive order issued by President Ford,² that those orders enumerate categories of information which we are allowed to collect and to retain and to disseminate about U.S. persons, and those are the basic provisions that govern those activities where U.S. persons are involved.

Obviously there are an enormous number of circumstances in which we open files on persons, and they range all the way up from applicants for employment.

Mr. ASPIN. Admiral, you said that there is no record that anything was made available on Demetracopoulos himself.

Admiral TURNER. That's right.

Mr. ASPIN. There are some pretty good controls on that, on the use of those files? You keep very close control or access to those files?

Mr. LAPHAM. Well, again, the procedures are written to conform to the guidelines that appear in the Executive order, so that what gets into the files and what can come out of the files and be disseminated to other persons is essentially governed by those enumerated categories of information.

Mr. ASPIN. But is access to those kinds of files fairly limited and kept to a number of people, because there are a couple of ways in which the information on Demetracopoulos could have been made public? One is, of course, the newspaper reporter is given access to the files; but you said that apparently was not the case. The other way is that somebody had access to the files and looked at it and remembered what was in there, and then went and talked to somebody. And I was just wondering about what kind of access there is to files like this by people.

Admiral TURNER. Well, as a general rule, of course, we are quite compartmented in the Agency, for good cause. So I think the normal procedures provide a set of barriers, you know, the Southeast Asia people don't just let the European people into their files because they don't have cause for it under normal circumstances.

But I probably cannot give you a specific guarantee any more than the old need to know phrase, which we do take quite seriously. But I can't erect either a physical barrier or a specific regulation on this because, for example the European deskman does occasionally have need for a file on an Asian case.

Mr. ASPIN. Let me just tell you what the concern is, and that is a general concern. The specifics of this case are, God knows, very complex and murky; but the general concern is over the use of Agency information or maybe the use of Agency cachet to do a number on somebody. When one claims that CIA files exist which state such-and-such information, this gives it a certain kind of credence that wouldn't ordinarily exist. To say, "I heard that so

¹E.O. 12036 (January 26, 1978).

²E.O. 11905 (February 18, 1976).

and so claims he got medals in the war but he really didn't," is one thing; but if someone can say, "The CIA has investigated and found that he claims that he got medals and he didn't," that is a different story.

And there is a certain amount of evidence that Demetracopoulos is but one case of this kind of CIA cachet being used to really do in people; and very often the target may be critics of the CIA who have written books that are unpopular, that attack the CIA. I am just concerned about this whole area, and I don't know how to get a handle on it. If indeed, as you say in this case, the file was not made available to the press, and in fact the Privacy Act does for the most part apply to the CIA, those are the obvious legislative ways to get at the problem. Do you understand the problem that I am worried about? The case of maybe the CIA doing in Mark Lane as a person or doing in, maybe, Agee. Maybe Agee deserves to be done in; but it is a concern about the use of this kind of information. Maybe it isn't even information that is in the CIA files; but the use of information to attack critics or to attack people who are unpopular for one reason or another.

And I don't know how to get at the thing except that the Demetracopoulos case is an interesting example.

Admiral TURNER. I am not sure how to get at it either. We are bound by the several laws that put some restraints on it. The point that was made a while ago, do we ever defend ourselves against the false accusation that our file said so and so is one way we could be brought into trouble, too. And here again we have that some problem. Sometimes we can defend ourselves, sometimes we can't, even if we are falsely accused. And it is very tough to lay down some specific law or rule or regulation as to how you control the release of data from these files.

I mean, for instance, I have quoted in the press, and I will stand up and say any time that Mr. Snepp came to me and told me eyeball to eyeball that he would clear his book with me, and there is a memo to that in my file and I am sure it is in some file labeled Snepp down there.

So I have released information from a file there which, you know, clearly is intended to question the credibility in some sense of an individual, in part because I have been falsely accused in the media about my relationships in this case.

So we do release information, and there are cases where I have released information that was in the files, but it was also in my head from personal experience.

Let me give some more thought to this because it is a tough one.

Mr. ASPIN. It is a tough issue.

Let me see if anybody has any more questions.

Loch, do you have a couple of questions?

Mr. JOHNSON. I just have two brief questions.

May I refer you to your opening statement where you talk about briefings by the CIA for press people, and you mentioned that in any instances where you provide briefings on an unattributable basis, this is done to preserve the conversational tone of such briefings and to insure the anonymity preferred by the briefers.

I can fully understand why you would want to preserve the anonymity of your briefers, but I am not sure that preserving the

conversational tone is a good reason for having a cloak of anonymity.

My question is why don't you simply attribute your briefings to the CIA, not to a specific individual?

Admiral TURNER. Herb?

Mr. HETU. They are not attributed to CIA or to intelligence sources. This is just to further protect the anonymity of the briefer. I would emphasize again that we do these only on a request basis. Our ground rules are well known to the press and we have never had a complaint.

Admiral TURNER. Take another case. Now, Mr. Aspin just pointed out, the CIA imprimatur on something gives it added credibility. I am going to get very skittish if every time we have one of the unattributable briefings and it becomes attributable and therefore it can be quoted in the press as the CIA says so and so, because then I am going to want to assure that I have approved what that fellow says. In other words, I don't want him giving bad information, but the borderline between opinion and fact, between an Agency opinion and an analyst's opinion that could probably be made an Agency opinion but hasn't been officially endorsed is very fine.

Mr. JOHNSON. But one could simply attribute it to an analyst without naming the analyst.

Admiral TURNER. But then it becomes a CIA opinion no matter how you caveat it. They won't say a CIA analyst. They will say sources in the CIA said, and everybody—nobody in the public is going to feel that is attributed to a GS-13 and not to Stan Turner.

Mr. JOHNSON. I suppose the other side of the argument one can make is that the public has a right to know or an interest in knowing where the information is obtained by a journalist, and if it is obtained from the CIA, the people should be told.

Admiral TURNER. I endorse that 100 percent, if you really push that rule and make the journalists reveal their sources, I would be delighted, but I don't think you will get very far with that.

Mr. JOHNSON. I don't mean reveal sources in terms of individual people, but I mean agencies.

Admiral TURNER. They won't reveal where they got things, let alone the names of individuals, and I would be delighted if they would because we would close a lot of leaks if we could get the sources of journalists.

Mr. JOHNSON. You also say in your statement that your briefings are unclassified.

Do you ever give classified briefings to journalists?

Admiral TURNER. Absolutely not. They are not cleared for classified information. That would be breaking the law.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, if you give only unclassified briefings, then, why according to the record have you given background security checks on certain journalists before briefings?

Admiral TURNER. That is all in history when these rules didn't apply and we were talking about using them and we wanted to know if the fellow was reliable. If we were going to use him as a source of information or to go out and gather information for us, you know, you don't want a fellow who is also working for the KGB.

We don't do that now.

Mr. JOHNSON. Would you under your tenure conduct a background clearance check on a U.S. person who was a journalist?

Admiral TURNER. No; I would have no reason to.

Mr. JOHNSON. I suppose if that person applied to become an employee of the Agency—

Admiral TURNER. Well, then we are talking about doing it with his knowledge, and there is nothing wrong with that.

Mr. LAPHAM. There is a possibility, I would have to say, on that. If he came to us not in his capacity as a journalist but in his capacity, let's say, as a historical researcher and he wanted access to classified files, where there is a provision in the Executive order relating to classification the allows that kind of thing to be done, but that is going to involve historical research and access to classified materials under close safeguards, under those circumstances we might conduct a background investigation. That, of course, would be done, however, with his consent.

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, may we have for the record the document he is talking about that allows a journalist to have access to classified information?¹

Mr. LAPHAM. No, I didn't say a journalist. I said it allows historical researchers, and I suppose a circumstance could occur in which a journalist happened also to be the researcher.

Mr. JOHNSON. Because indeed sometimes journalists are also historical scholars.

Mr. LAPHAM. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. That's all I have.

Mr. ASPIN. Any more?

Admiral, thank you very much for a very informative and interesting morning.

Admiral TURNER. Thank you. I enjoyed it.

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.]

¹ See appendix Q, p. 522.

APPENDIX A



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

11 February 1976

Office of the Assistant to the Director

STATEMENT

Over the years, the CIA has had relationships with individuals in many walks of American life. These relationships, many of a voluntary and unpaid nature, have reflected the desire of Americans to help their country. Such relationships have been conducted by the Agency with the clear intent of furthering its foreign intelligence mission and have not been aimed at influencing or improperly acting on any American institution.

Genuine concern has recently been expressed about CIA relations with newsmen and churchmen. The Agency does not believe there has been any impropriety on its part in the limited use made of persons connected in some way with American media, church and missionary organizations. Nonetheless, CIA recognizes the special status afforded these institutions under our Constitution and in order to avoid any appearance of improper use by the Agency, the

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DCI has decided on a revised policy to govern Agency relations with these groups:

- Effective immediately, CIA will not enter into any paid or contractual relationship with any full-time or part-time news correspondent accredited by any U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio or television network or station.
- As soon as feasible, the Agency will bring existing relationships with individuals in these groups into conformity with this new policy.
- CIA has no secret paid or contractual relationship with any American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy.

CIA recognizes that members of these groups may wish to provide information to the CIA on matters of foreign intelligence of interest to the U.S. Government. The CIA will continue to welcome information volunteered by such individuals.

It is Agency policy not to divulge the names of cooperating Americans. In this regard CIA will not make public, now or in the future, the names of any cooperating journalists or churchmen.

APPENDIX B

NEW REGULATIONS APPROVED ON CIA RELATIONS WITH U.S. NEWS MEDIA

The Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, ordered implementation of the following regulations on 30 November 1977:

1. Policy. The special status afforded the press under the Constitution necessitates a careful policy of self-restraint on the part of the Agency in regard to its relations with U.S. news media organizations and personnel. Accordingly, CIA will not:

a. enter into any relationships with full-time or part-time journalists (including so-called "stringers") accredited by a U.S. news service, newspaper, periodical, radio, or television network or station, for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities. The term "accredited" means any full- or part-time employee of U.S. or foreign nationality who is formally authorized by contract or by the issuance of press credentials to represent himself or herself either in the U.S. or abroad as a correspondent for a U.S. news media organization or who is officially recognized by a foreign government to represent a U.S. news media organization;

b. without the specific, express approval of senior management of the organization concerned, enter into any relationships with non-journalist staff employees of any U.S. news media organization for the purpose of conducting any intelligence activities;

c. use the name or facilities of any U.S. news media organization to provide cover for any Agency employees or activities.

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2. Limitations

a. The policies set forth above are not designed to inhibit open relationships with journalists (as for example contracts to perform translating services or to lecture at Agency training courses) which are entered into for reasons unrelated to such persons' affiliation with a particular news media organization. Willingness on both sides to acknowledge the fact and nature of the relationship is the essential characteristic of the open relationships into which CIA will enter with journalists under this provision.

b. In addition, CIA will not deny any person including full-time or part-time accredited journalists and stringers regardless of profession, the opportunity to furnish information which may be useful to his or her Government. Therefore, CIA will continue to permit unpaid relationships with journalists or other members of U.S. news media organizations who voluntarily maintain contact for the purpose of providing information on matters of foreign intelligence or foreign counterintelligence interest to the U.S. Government.

c. Likewise, the Agency, through the Office of the Assistant for Public Affairs to the Director, will continue to maintain regular liaison with representatives of the news media to provide public information, answers to inquiries, and assistance in obtaining unclassified briefings on substantive matters.

3. Exceptions. No exceptions to the policies and prohibitions stated above may be made except with the specific approval of the DCI.

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