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BRUCE W. EBERLE & ASSOCIATES, INC., 8330 OLD COURTHOUSE ROAD, SUITE 700, VIENNA, VA. 22180

April 7, 1982

Mr. Morton Blackwell
THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear Morton:

Thank you for the FYI of March 22, containing the letter to you of James L. Tyson.

Seeing your interest in the matter, I thought you would be interested in seeing the enclosed fund appeal which I wrote last week, and which has been approved by the Council for Inter-American Security and Congressman LeBoutellier, for mailing to the house list of the Council for Inter-American Security in the very near future.

In light of your interest, I have taken the liberty of creating a one page text for you to consider, in the hopes that the President may desire to communicate his views on this issue directly to his most vocal supporters.

Needless to say, it would be a tremendous help to the efforts of the Council for Inter-American Security if the text I have enclosed, or a substitute, were approved by the President.

As you may know, for six years the Council for Inter-American Security has been the only organization in America, that has as its sole and exclusive concern, the advancement of America's national security interests within this hemisphere.

The enclosed four page letter, approved by CIS and Congressman LeBoutellier, will mail on April 22. If successful, we will immediately test a prospect version. While I understand it might not be politically feasible for the President to directly endorse the call for a boycott of the Lou Grant TV show, it is my hope that you might agree, that the President might find it fitting, to endorse

MS

call

Eugene &

tell him we
can't get proper
message be

wants.

These people
have a
\$300,000 debt
to Eberle.

I phoned
Richard &
it is taken care
of.

Doug

Mr. Morton Blackwell

Page two

April 7, 1982

the general activities of the Council for Inter-American Security.

I will look forward to hearing your response. If you need additional information (e.g., copies of publications), please feel free to call on me, or to call directly to Lynn Bouchey (543-6622).

Sincerely



Richard A. Delgaudio
Executive Vice President

RAD/pm
Enclosures

cc: Ronald F. Docksai
CIS President

L. Francis Bouchey
CIS Executive Vice President

SUGGESTED TEXT FOR WHITE HOUSE APPROVAL
For House Mailing (60,000)
Council for Inter-American Security

Fellow American:

I am told you are the kind of American who would not refuse to answer a call for help from a troubled neighbor.

America's neighbor El Salvador, is in trouble, and I am determined that the United States should answer the desperate call for help and assistance.

Many of the one million citizens who voted in the recent election in El Salvador were threatened with death by the Marxist guerrillas.

The leaders of the Council for Inter-American Security have been of tremendous assistance to me in this matter.

In fact I totally agree with my good friend Congressman John LeBoutellier, who says, here in Washington, the publications of the Council have been an island of truth in a sea of misinformation.

Now is the time for Americans of conscience to join in answering the call for help.

As I have said before, if not us, who? If not now, when?

I strongly encourage your support of the Council for Inter-American Security. Thank you.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Date Submitted 3 / 31 / 82By L. F. BoucheyApproval Requested No Later 4 / 2 / 82Of Council For Inter-Amer. Security
(organization)SUBMITTED TO: Hon. John LeBoutellier PROJECT Ed Asner/El Salvador

This draft copy contains original ideas and concepts created at the direction of the above named Organization. All factual representations and/or promises of future activity on the part of the Organization are true to the best of its knowledge. The organization accepts responsibility for such factual statements and plans to execute the stated activities. The signator agrees to assist in the activity, if any, to the extent set forth in the following draft copy. Please indicate your approval by signature below on each page and return.

- ☐ Approved
☐ Approved w/Revisions (initialed)

Authorized Signature

Date

OK by phone by LFB for LeB
4/1/82
11:52 PM
taken by Beck

Dear XXXXX:

If you liked Jane Fonda, you'll love Ed Asner.

Where Jane Fonda gave aid and comfort to the Communist enemy, Ed Asner gave that and \$25,000.

Where Jane Fonda allowed herself to be used for propaganda purposes by the Communists, Ed Asner is going her one better by leading a fundraising campaign here in the U.S., to raise one million dollars for the Marxist terrorists in El Salvador.

And where Jane Fonda could claim confusion about what the people of Vietnam really wanted, Ed Asner sides with guerillas against the one million people of El Salvador who recently voted against the Communists in an open election.

" I think we're on the wrong side" said Ed Asner, and never mind elections he seems to be saying.

If you liked Fonda, you'll love Asner. If you agree with Communist Mao Tse Tung, "power grows out of the barrel of a gun," you'll love Asner.

But if this behavior outrages you as much as it does me and President Reagan, then good news!

Now you can do something about it, for the Council for Inter-American Security has asked me to lead their nationwide campaign to stop the Hollywood star of the Lou Grant show from giving aid, comfort and cash to our enemy.

And the first step in this campaign is for you

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to write to the President of the CBS TV network and tell him you are ready to join in a boycott ^{MS.} of the sponsors of the Lou Grant TV series.

If Ed Asner won't stop aiding the Marxist enemy, then we Americans can retaliate by boycotting those who sponsor his TV show.

If Ed Asner says he has the freedom to do what he wants and help who he wants, then you and I have the freedom to refuse to buy his sponsors' products.

Ed Asner has already been heard to say he hopes people won't boycott his show.

That is for him to decide, for if he continues to help the brutal Marxists in El Salvador then he must answer to the American people who have the freedom to hit him with a boycott of his sponsors.

Please join me in this nationwide boycott.

For unlike Jane Fonda, Ed Asner is defending a communist guerilla assault on a neighboring country two hours plane ride from the U.S. border.

Unlike Jane Fonda, Ed Asner is raising one ^{million} million dollars for the guerillas.

Unlike Jane Fonda, Ed Asner is ignoring the one million people who risked their lives, literally dodging bullets in many instances, to cast their ballots in a free and open election.

Asner claims this money will be used for medical supplies. Its hard to believe anyone-- even a TV personality like Asner-- could be this naive. He takes at face value the cliches and revolutionary slogans mouthed by the guerillas and their helpers.

This money helps the communist terror campaign.

~~This money helps those who proudly claim they killed 6,000 people in El Salvador in 1980.~~

Ed Asner's guerilla buddies threatened to kill anyone who voted in the recent election. And to prove they mean business, Asner's buddies murdered the secretary general of one of the political

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parties in El Salvador and shot several party officials, including a candidate for President.

Ed Asner's ^{"side"}~~buddies~~ includes top guerilla leader Cayetano Carpio, whose terrorist group kidnapped and killed the Foreign Minister and dumped his body on a main road on Mother's Day.

Terrorist Carpio ^{forces} also assassinated the Education Minister and murdered a Swiss diplomat.

And while the terrorists kill government leaders, diplomats, businessmen and innocent civilians, Asner says if the people "choose" Communism then let them have it.

When did the people of ANY country ever choose Communism? Perhaps Asner still doesn't know-- the Communists don't believe in elections. When was the last election in Cuba? Vietnam? The Soviet Union?

If Asner really believed in democracy, then he would join me, President Reagan and the Council for Inter-American Security, in applauding the one million people of El Salvador who defied the guerillas' death threat and voted in an election.

If Asner really believed in democracy, then he should join San Salvador's acting Archbishop who said the guerillas "have made violence and loyalty to Marxism their watchword, and because of that the majority have turned their backs on them."

③ But Asner is silent when El Salvador's Catholic bishops unanimously denounced the "armed communist groups" for engaging in terrorism aimed at disrupting the recent national elections.

Ed Asner's guerilla friends broadcast over their clandestine radio station an appeal to all working persons in first-class hotels to poison the food and drink of the guests.

Ed Asner has fallen for the Communist line hook, line and sinker.

But what's worse, he's actively campaigning here in the United States, against national policy, against President Reagan, and for the guerillas.

Ed Asner goes one step better than Jane Fonda, acting as a U.S. fundraiser for the terrorists.

You and I must not stand for this, we must not

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Date

Page four of letter to XXXXX

CS04CTR

be silent. For there is something we can do.

In fact there are three things you can do.

First, write a personal letter to the President of the CBS TV network, or at least send the enclosed postcard to him telling him you have pledged to join my nationwide boycott of the sponsors of the Lou Grant show.

Second, send a letter or a postcard to one of the sponsors of the Lou Grant show, listed on the enclosed card, telling them the same thing.

And finally to help me in this nationwide boycott send your contribution payable to "CIS".

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ I pray you can send me at me at CIS at least \$MRD. ⁴⁶

If you can send a larger \$MRD+30% I will be ever so grateful.

But your contribution in any amount is critical to the success of this project.

The Council for Inter-American Security is the only organization in America which has for six years focused exclusively on the Soviet threat in this hemisphere.

But where Ed Asner can tap his Hollywood millionaire friends for contributions for his cause, and count on a sympathetic media, the Council can only count on you to make our case.

Indeed, here in Washington the publications of the Council are an island of truth in a sea of misinformation.

A guerilla victory in El Salvador would be a disaster for the U.S. And it would be unconscionable for us to look the other way as the latest version of Jane Fonda, Ed Asner, aids those terrorists.

Please join my boycott of the sponsors of the Lou Grant show and send your \$MRD+30% or \$MRD.

Sincerely,

JOHN LE BOUTELLIER
U.S. Congressman

P.S. Asner also claims El Salvador is another Vietnam. If he's right, and the Communists win, we could have up to ten million refugees fleeing into Texas and California. One more reason to act now.

R191
R201 - In 3ch
R202 - 7x5

El Salvador

Groups Compete in Central America Policy

The following are some of the principal groups seeking to influence U.S. policy and public opinion on Central America. Description of funding is based on groups' own information.

American Institute for Free Labor Development: Sponsored by the AFL-CIO and funded largely by the U.S. Agency for International Development; provides technical advice to the peasant group supporting the land reform in El Salvador. While critical of official abuses against peasants, AIFLD is supportive of civilian elements in the Salvadoran coalition government and backs upcoming elections there.

Amnesty International: London-based human rights organization funded by individual donations; investigates and condemns rights violations by governments of all political orientations; has issued reports alleging human rights abuses by Guatemalan and Salvadoran armed forces.

Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America: Made up of 19 chambers of commerce in the region; generally conservative and supportive of the region's governments.

Caribbean-Central America Action: Organization of more than 50 U.S. companies that works, with State Department support, to "strengthen the private sectors" in the region and encourage contacts with businesses in the United States.

Central America Working Group: Promotes conservative views by sponsoring visits of Central Americans to the United States, lobbying and writing articles. The group uses the office of the Inter-American Security Council and relies mainly on volunteer workers.

Coalition for a New Foreign and Military Policy: Made up of 49 church, labor and "social action" organizations "working for a peaceful, non-interventionist and demilitarized U.S. foreign policy"; provides a Washington office for groups around the country; monitors U.S. policy-making and helps local groups organize political activity to

influence policy-makers; funded by donations from local affiliates and individual members, sale of literature and "a broad array of foundations."

Collegiate Association for the Research of Principles: The youth organization of the Unification Church; organizes demonstrations and distributes publications supporting Reagan administration policies; receives funding from members and the church and relies heavily on volunteer work by members.

Committee in Solidarity With the People of El Salvador: Federation of about 300 local organizations supporting the Salvadoran opposition through demonstrations, teach-ins and publications; active on university campuses; supported by individual contributions and foundation grants.

Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University: Sponsors publications and seminars on foreign policy issues; funded by donations from individuals, corporations and foundations, with less than 5 percent of its income coming from contracts for technical government studies.

Council for Inter-American Security: Research and educational organization "specializing in hemispheric defense and security issues"; supportive of current policy. The council, which includes many retired military officers among its advisers, is funded primarily through direct mail solicitations, an official said.

Council of the Americas: Organization funded by 200 member corporations with interests in Latin America; provides information to its members and recommendations on Latin America policy to the government.

Council on Hemispheric Affairs: Sponsored by unions, professional and academic groups to counter the influence of large corporations and banks on policy toward Latin America; funded by two small family foundations and the sponsoring organizations; generally opposes administration policy.

Heritage Foundation: Puts out policy papers and other publications from a conservative point

of view; funded by individual contributions, corporate donations and foundation grants.

Hudson Institute: 20-year-old conservative-oriented think tank supported by contracts from governments and businesses and foundation grants. About one-third of its income is from government defense contracts; according to a report issued by the institute last year.

Institute for Policy Studies: Washington-based research and educational organization opposed to U.S. policy; funded mostly by small grants from individuals and foundations and a larger grant from the Sam Rubin Foundation.

Institute on Religion and Democracy: Formed recently to promote a more conservative foreign policy view within the Catholic and Protestant churches; funded by foundations and in the process of soliciting a wider group of contributors; directs most of its material to clergy and prominent lay people.

Inter-Religious Task Force: Ecumenical organization providing assistance to church groups working against Reagan administration policy.

National Network in Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People: Disseminates material supporting the new revolutionary Nicaraguan government and opposing Reagan administration policy; funded by contributions from about 60 local groups, churches, the Stern Fund and other foundations.

Network in Solidarity With the People of Guatemala: Supports demonstrations and other activities in opposition to administration policy and disseminates information in support of groups seeking to overthrow the government of Guatemala; funded by private contributions and the dues of local chapters.

Religious Task Force: Funded by Catholic religious orders; provides information to church-supported groups working to influence U.S. policy.

Washington Office on Latin America: Church-funded; monitors the policy-making process in Washington and helps Latin American opposition figures make their views known in the United States.

'Unlike Vietnam, which was then and there,
Central America is here and now.'

EL SALVADOR

The Battle For Central America Is Now

By VFW Commander-in-Chief
Arthur J. Fellwock

The title for this article is no flashy hype to achieve effect.

Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas O. Enders recently made the same point repeatedly before Senate and House committees.

Before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Secretary Enders asserted:

"The decisive battle for Central America is underway in El Salvador."

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is on record as declaring:

"Central America is the most important place in the world for the United States today."

I will not dwell long on either what might have been or what should have been.

On Feb. 12, 1823, President James Monroe enunciated the famous doctrine that bears his name.

Drafted by Secretary of State John Quincy Adams, the Monroe Doctrine warned European powers that any attempt "to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere" would be considered "dangerous to our peace and safety."

Unequivocal support for the Monroe Doctrine has been a long-standing VFW

position and is currently embodied in National Security Resolution 402, "Restore American Primacy in Central America, the Caribbean, and South America," and has been carried forward as a Priority National Security Goal.

For more than a century and a quarter the Monroe Doctrine served as a policy shield for all the Americas.


Fidel Castro shattered historic hemispheric serenity when he seized power in Cuba in 1959. Always a Marxist-Leninist, Castro in 1970 abandoned any pretense of being a Tito-like figure in the Caribbean and for the last 12 years has accepted the Soviet Union as his permanent protector and provider.

Castro paid back Godfather Brezhnev by flooding Africa and the Middle East with Cuban military "advisers" and positioning at least 3,200 Cubans in Nicaragua, turning that hapless land into a platform for an indirect Soviet attack on Central America, the land bridge linking the North and South American continents.

Surely, the poor nations of Central America, once contemptuously dismissed as banana republics, have real social and economic problems that cry out for compassionate solutions. Poverty is a fact of life for the 20 million people in this part of our hemisphere, as the accompanying figures attest.

Profile of Central America

Country	Population (Millions)	Literacy	Life Expectancy	Infant Mortality Per 1,000 Births
Costa Rica	2.228	90%	69.7 years	22
El Salvador	4.825	62%	62.2 years	51
Guatemala	6.975	46%	57.8 years	77
Honduras	3.649	57%	57.1 years	103
Nicaragua	2.654	50%	55.2 years	122



(I have not included Belize, formerly British Honduras, which considers itself more Caribbean than Central American or the Isthmian nation of Panama straddling the continents.)

Now, if Cuba or the Soviet Union truly wants to help Central America, the poverty indicated in those figures clearly shows where their efforts should go.

Fact is that the Soviet Union and Cuba are turning Nicaragua into a Central American version of North Korea or North Vietnam, a privileged sanctuary for explosive area-wide aggression.

Consider that during the so-called bad old days of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, there were 12,000 men in the National Guard of Anastasio Somoza Debayle. Today, the Nicaraguan Army and the armed militia are building towards a force of some 250,000 people under arms, one of every 10 Nicaraguans. In the U.S., this proportion would mean nearly 24 million Americans under arms, rather than slightly over 2 million.

Now, as we know, the Somoza regime was a repressive dictatorship, but one friendly to the U.S. and one constituting no threat to its neighbors. The Sandi-

nistas, as has been pointed out by Ambassador Kirkpatrick, are not only a repressive dictatorship that threatens its neighbors, but one line of their national anthem describes us Americans as being the "enemies of mankind."

So much for the goodwill bought by the \$120 million in assistance furnished by the United States to Nicaragua since the 1979 revolution.

The Cuban-instigated growth of Nicaraguan military power is a clear and now threat to Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, whose combined armed forces total only 32,500 men. Soviet tanks have been moved to Nicaragua. Jet aircraft soon will follow, as Nicaraguan airfields are being prepared for MiGs.

By the time you read this article, El Salvador may well have been lost. If successful models of counter-insurgency were followed, the Salvadoran army should total some 50,000 rather than 13,000 to root out and destroy the 5,000 terrorists roaming the villages and the countryside.

The interim government of President Jose Napoleon Duarte is, at this time of writing, the only hope for a peaceful and

democratic future for El Salvador.

The carnage continues between murderous traditionalists, imperfectly controlled by the Duarte junta, and murderous guerrillas, totally controlled by their Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan supporters and instigators.

The elections of March 28 were an attempt to set up a nationwide constituent assembly. A president will be elected in 1983.

The terrorists refused to participate in the March elections and threatened to kill anyone running for office.

Secretary Enders pointed out:

"One thing is for certain. If, after the loss of Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority, who in Central America would not live in fear? How long would it be before major U.S. strategic interests—the Canal, sea lanes for our oil imports, and Mexican oil deposits—would be at risk?"

The answer must be: Let's never find out how long.

Yet today a popular U.S. TV actor, Ed Asner, is playing a Jane Fonda-type role in opposing U.S. efforts to save what
(See Battle page 14)

Central America Is Now

(Continued from page 13)

is left to be saved in El Salvador. The prestige media are busy type-casting the Salvadoran insurgents as high-minded rural reformers. (Remember when Fidel Castro was described by the New York Times's Herbert Matthews as a sort of Robin Hood in the Sierra Maestra mountains?)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick has a thought here worth recalling.

"In short, the Salvadoran terrorists have behaved, not as chivalrous Robin Hoods emerging from some Central American Sherwood Forest to comfort the oppressed, but as well-armed political freebooters inspired by anti-democratic ideology, a consuming will to power, and no inhibitions about the use of violence."

Finally, Western Hemisphere nations are getting the message.

Mexico is training a 4,000-man quick reaction force to protect her oil fields.

The protocol-ridden Organization of American States supports the Salvadoran government in its call for free elections.

The bishops of El Salvador last September called for self-determination and the end of "foreign" (translation: Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan) intervention.

The Reagan Administration has put together a \$246 million aid package of \$165 million in economic and \$81 million in military assistance to turn the tide.

The stakes, not alone for El Salvador or even Central America, are mortal. The United States is now on the front line.

In a recent Joint Chiefs of Staff paper, the military chiefs asked, and then answered, a central question for the decade of the 1980s:

"Will Moscow be more inclined to confront the United States in a developing crisis?"

Their answer is bleak:

"They will be more willing to do so where they enjoy significant military and geo-strategic advantages."

In the same paper, the Joint Chiefs noted that 60% to 70% of U.S. oil imports move through the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean and that Soviet and Cuban forces in the Caribbean pose a clear threat to U.S. reinforcement of Europe in a crisis situation.

Clearly, the Moscow-Havana-Managua Axis is seeking, in the United States' own back yard, to create conditions of-

fering these significant military and geo-strategic advantages to the Communist powers.

And, should they succeed, Katie, bar the door!

What should and can the United States do?

My answer follows:

The Administration and Congressional leadership must agree on a single course of action and stick to it.

Unlike Vietnam, which was then and there, Central America is here and now.

No U.S. military involvement of any sort should even be considered at levels designed to produce protracted indecision. Once again, as with Vietnam, the U.S. would be fated to fail. The U.S. should be in to win or should stay out.

This point is clearly set forth in National Security Resolution 436 which states that if the United States has to defend itself or its national security interests by going to war "we fight with the unconditional objective to win and that our trained military leaders be authorized and expected to conduct the war toward this goal in the shortest possible

time."

The key, of course, is Cuba and Cuba's flooding of Central America with Soviet arms.

A wide range of options is open to the United States to halt the flow of arms from Cuba.

They include diplomacy, economic pressure and other alternatives currently under study.

A possible U.S. action if other measures fail is to mine Cuban and Nicaraguan harbors. Mining is not an act of war; blockading is.

Finally, as the supreme U.S. national interest is directly involved, the U.S. should advise every nation that sends ships through the Panama Canal that unless or until stability has been returned to Central America, this country will halt further implementation of the treaties affecting the canal.

For too long the United States virtually ignored developments in Central America—immersed as the nation was in combating threats to freedom in other parts of the world. Now is the time to defend its interests close to home. **WAV**

El Salvador at a Glance

The strategic importance of tiny El Salvador to the United States is underscored by its location less than 750 miles northwest of the Panama Canal, as well as its nearness to major cities in this country.

The difference between El Salvador and Vietnam, recently asserted William J. Casey, CIA director, is that the Central American republic is at the United States' "doorstep" and "insurgency there is beamed at Costa Rica, Guatemala and Honduras."

El Salvador, a little more than 1,200 miles south of Houston and New Orleans, is 1,000 miles from Miami, 1,900 from Washington, 2,000 from Chicago, 2,100 from New York and 2,400 from Los Angeles.

It is also a few miles closer to Houston than Houston is to Washington.

A third of the country's exports are to the U.S. and 29% of its imports come from this country.

One of the world's most densely populated nations, El Salvador has a popula-

tion of nearly 5 million living in an area of 8,260 square miles, the size of Massachusetts, or 582.32 persons per square mile.

This compares with neighboring Guatemala, 7.26 million people, 42,042 square miles and 172.68 per square mile, and Honduras, 3.69 million population, 43,277 square miles and 85.26 per square mile.

Only Honduras, with a per capita income of \$528, is poorer than El Salvador, which had \$639 in 1978, the most recent year for which figures are available.

El Salvador is divided into four regions, the northern mountains, the southern mountains, the plateau and the Pacific coastal plain.

The northern mountains area is rugged, containing 6% of the population and no large towns. This is where the guerrillas have been the most active. It comprises 15% of El Salvador's territory.

Most populous is the area of the southern mountains where 63% of the Salvadorans live. It is 30% of the country and is composed of some 20 volcanoes ranging from 4,000 to nearly 8,000 feet. This region produces 90% of El Salvador's coffee, tobacco and manufactured goods; two-thirds of its grain, fruit, veg-

(See *El Salvador* page 20)



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
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El Salvador . . .

(Continued from page 14)

etables and sugar, and half its cotton, rice and animal and forest products.

The plateau region is one of deep valleys containing 45% of El Salvador's area and a fourth of its population. It is dry and ranges from 700 to 3,500 feet in altitude. Ten percent of El Salvador is along the Pacific coastal plain, which is home to 6% of its people. It produces beef, cotton, sesame and rice.

Nearly 90% of El Salvador's population is mestizo—mixed Indian and European—while the balance is 10% Indian and 1% Caucasian.

El Salvador has the distinction of being the first in Central America to defy the Spanish colonial rulers and declare its independence in 1811, although it was not until 1839 that it became free. It is also the sole Central American country with only a Pacific coast.

Heightened by Nicaraguan, Cuban and ultimately by Soviet involvement, the present strife in El Salvador is another bloody chapter in the country's volatile history.

The five guerrilla groups most readily identifiable, under the overall command of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, named for the founder of El Salvador's Communist Party who was executed in 1932 after an unsuccessful revolt, are:

FPL, led by Salvador Cayetano Carpio, a former baker with strong ties to Havana. Known as "Marcial", he formed his own group in 1970. Murders of two cabinet ministers and a Swiss diplomat, seizures of three embassies and numerous bombings of buses and power stations are attributed to the FPL.

ERP, under Joaquin Villalobos, a one time university student, has attracted recruits from urban areas and developed from FPL in 1977.

FARN, an offshoot of an attempt at leftist unity in 1974, is led by Fermin Cienfuegos.

Communist Party of El Salvador, allied with Moscow since before the death of Stalin, is headed by Jorge Schafik Handal, whom Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig traced last year traveling through Eastern Europe in quest of arms.

PRTC, a Trotskyite faction which has the clandestine Radio Liberation.

The guerrillas' political arm, the Democratic Revolutionary Front, known by its Spanish abbreviation, FDR, is headed by Mexico City-based Guillermo Manuel Ungo, a former member of the ruling junta.

VAV

Patrick J. Buchanan

Time to Mount the 'Bully Pulpit' on Behalf of Foreign Policy

WHEN Secretary of State Alexander Haig in the first days of the Reagan administration publicly indicted the Soviets for complicity in terror, cries for additional proof arose — principally in the United States — even though the Moscow connection to international terrorism had been thoroughly documented in Claire Sterling's excellent book, "The Terror Network."

When the Department of State issued its "White Paper" on communist direction and support of the guerrilla movement in El Salvador, two major American newspapers labored diligently to discredit the paper — using as a confidential source the work of CIA turncoat Philip Agee.

One week after Haig pointed to tangible evidence of what is generally known from circumstantial evidence — i.e., that the Soviets are testing chemical weapons on Third World peoples — the quality and conclusiveness of the evidence is being challenged in the press.

OVER THE PAST DECADE, there have appeared in America what might be called Moscow's public defenders. They are politicians, academics, intellectuals, commentators, reporters, ex-civil rights leaders who are less concerned with the barbarian behavior of the Soviet Empire and its myrmidons than they are with the quality of American evidence of same. If the U.S. evidence is somehow tainted by mistake or excess, they want the case against Moscow thrown out of the court of public opinion on technicality.

For example, assume the State Department paper on El Salvador contained errors. Is there anyone who believes the basic substance is a mistake, who believes that the guerrilla army of thousands in that beleaguered nation is sustained by purchases on the black market?

When the president's ambassador walked out of the Law of the Sea meetings, rather than endorse a treaty surrendering U.S. rights to the seas' resources, chagrin seemed greatest on America's Eastern seaboard. When the neutron bomb was bolted together, Moscow's propaganda bullhorns picked up a powerful echo in the United States. When the Americans alone opposed the one-sided malevolent U.N. resolution calling for a peoples war against South Africa for having attacked guerrilla sanctuaries in Angola, CBS News rushed out to film black Americans echoing the anti-American rhetoric at the United Nations. When France and Mexico gave qualified recognition to the guerrillas in El Salvador, their initiative was held to be enlightened by circles here, in contrast to the reactionary American position of support for the government installed under Jimmy Carter.

IN SHORT, wherever American policy is attacked as stupid, blind or reactionary by the Third World, our Western allies, or even at times by the Soviets,

the attack will find a receptive and sympathetic hearing among some in the United States. This is a sea change from an earlier era that ended in the middle 1960s.

While the Reagan foreign policy is in the mainstream of the postwar tradition, an important slice of the American Establishment has steered far outside of that mainstream.

This fact of American political life — the angry, across-the-board dissent of a significant slice of the American intelligentsia from the basic outlines of American foreign policy — is a fact of immense importance. Its implications do not yet appear to have been adequately

recognized by the Reagan administration.

These Americans do not simply disagree with, for example, the president's approach to Namibia. They think the United States is on the wrong side of "wars of national liberation," that we are on the wrong side in the Middle East, on the wrong side in southern Africa, on the wrong side in Central America. They are pro-Palestinian, pro-Angolan, pro-Sandinista. To them, these are the waves of the future, and their chosen enemies are the rightist regimes of Central and South America, the South Africans and Menachem Begin.

Eight months into his administration,

the president has yet to make the public case of why his policy is correct about these regions of the world — and why they are wrong. He appears not even to be an active participant in the increasingly acrimonious national debate. How does he expect public support for his policy, for example, of American military assistance to El Salvador — against the guerrillas — when he has yet to address the American people on the stakes involved? Three press conferences, and not a single televised address on foreign policy, scarcely qualify as using TR's "bully pulpit," in the fashion of Reagan's former hero, FDR.

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NEWS BULLETIN

Contact: Roger Reed
Director of Publications
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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

POSTPONEMENT OF SALVADORAN ELECTIONS URGED

(Washington, D.C.)-- Popular elections in El Salvador, scheduled for March 1982, are an open invitation to more bloodshed and should be postponed, according to Latin America specialist Cleto Di Giovanni, Jr.

"The high state of violence currently in El Salvador makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, for political parties to organize themselves at the grass-roots level and for candidates to engage in public debate over controversial issues," Di Giovanni states in El Salvador's Political Path, a new study published by the Council for Inter-American Security Educational Institute.

Di Giovanni calls honest elections the best solution to the Salvadoran crisis but suggests that elections be postponed until later in 1982. He discusses each of El Salvador's political parties and movements that could be expected to participate in an electoral campaign.

"As long as these opposing parties and candidates feel inhibited in their political activities, the currently ruling party and leader, the Christian Democrats and Duarte, have an advantage in getting their points of view across and influencing voters," writes Di Giovanni.

The scheduled 1982 elections are for National Constituent Assembly delegates. They will write a new constitution to replace the one suspended after the 1979 coup. General Presidential elections are scheduled for 1983.

(more)

Council for Inter-American Security Educational Institute

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Honest elections would be better than negotiations which would allow political groups with little popular support to influence the make-up of El Salvador's government.

"Through an honest electoral process, the next government of El Salvador could acquire something no government in that country has had in the past decade---legitimacy," he concludes.

Furthermore, the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR) states in a captured document that "any negotiations between the Front and the Salvadoran junta should be viewed as an opportunity for the guerrillas to buy time and build up their military strength."

The document was declared authentic by one of its authors, Front leader Ruben Zamora.

The Council for Inter-American Security Educational Institute, which published Di Giovanni's study, is a non-partisan foreign policy research organization that publishes information on hemispheric affairs.



Memorandum

El Salvador's Political Path

by Cleto Di Giovanni, Jr.

Summary and Conclusions

1. A political solution to the current crisis in El Salvador will be found either through negotiations between the Salvadorean junta and its opponents on the left and right or through the electoral process. The better alternative, for El Salvador and the United States, is the electoral process.

2. Through violence, neither the Marxist guerrillas nor the rightist militants have been able to gain mass support. Each extreme represents a small fraction of the overall population—a population fed up with violence from whatever quarter. It would be unjust to allow these extremes an opportunity to influence the composition, structure, and policies of El Salvador through negotiations. In the case of the Marxist guerrillas, their negotiating entity, Manuel Ungo's Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), would not be able to reach any political solution not approved by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), which controls all political and military aspects of the Salvadorean leftist revolution. In a recently captured document, the FDR stated that any negotiations between the Front and the Salvadorean junta should be viewed as an opportunity for the guerrillas to buy time and build up their military strength.

3. Through an honest electoral process, the next government of El Salvador could acquire something no government in that country has had in the past decade—legitimacy. For that process to be respected in El Salvador and abroad, for it to allow reasonable and responsible people from whatever belief to rejoin the political fabric of Salvadorean society, for it to serve as a vehicle which the nation could use to move towards

political stability, not only the election itself but the campaign leading to it has to be valid and open. International supervision of the balloting and the counting of the votes will mean little if the campaign did not permit free debate of the issues. The timing of the first round of elections announced by Salvadorean junta president Napoleon Duarte—March 1982 for Constituent Assembly elections—appears at this point to be unrealistic and could be advantageous to Duarte and his Christian Democratic Party. With the climate of violence which exists in El Salvador currently, with Marxist guerrillas able to exercise influence over 30 percent of El Salvador, and with little prospect that the high profile of violence can be lowered by the end of 1981, few opposition candidates who value their lives will campaign, and no political party other than the Christian Democrats will be able to organize itself well at the grass roots level for a campaign.

4. Thus, it would seem reasonable for elections to be postponed, perhaps until later in 1982. During this period, concrete steps should be taken to prepare for elections, such as the drafting of election laws, deciding the number of constituent assembly delegates to be elected based on current population figures, etc.

5. In today's El Salvador, the political constituencies which will be influential in shaping the outcome of any honest elections will be the two principal democratic labor movements, the moderate private sector, the independent professionals, the Army, and the Catholic Church. Competing for their votes will be parties, some formed, some embryonic, covering the spectrum. If an open campaign is possible, whichever of these parties can form a centrist alliance will have the advantage.

Political Developments 1970 - 1980

Until the October 1979 coup, the dominant political party for the past several years had been the Party of National Conciliation (PCN). It elected General Fidel Sanchez Hernandez as president in 1967, Colonel Arturo Molina in 1972, and General Carlos Humberto Romero in 1977. It was also the party which, in El Salvador's unicameral 54 member Legislative Assembly, managed to go from 26 deputies to 52 in six years. Successful at being declared the winner in elections, its performance in 1972 contributed to much of the later, openly expressed suspicion about the government's integrity.

Few elections in El Salvador's recent history have been as important as that one in February 1972. Because of those elections, the left and the Catholic Church termed 1972 as "El Salvador's Political Year."

The PCN, supported primarily by the military and the nation's middle class, nominated Col. Molina, the young former powerful Private Secretary to General Sanchez Hernandez, as its presidential candidate. His running mate was Dr. Enrique Mayorga, senior legal adviser to Banco Capitalizador and a man with strong ties to the nation's conservative Catholics.

Opposing the PCN ticket on the left was a coalition, the Unified National Opposition (UNO), made up of the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), which was the legal front of the Communist Party of El Salvador, the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), which was the party of the international socialists, and the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). This coalition, which had not existed before the 1972 elections, ran, as its presidential candidate, Napoleon Duarte. As the Christian Democratic mayor of San Salvador from 1966 to 1972, Duarte had gained popular appeal and was widely considered El Salvador's most charismatic politician. His running mate was Manuel Ungo, a socialist and currently the president of the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). (In the 1967 presidential election, there had been no coalition of leftist forces against the PCN. The center-left PDC had run Abram Rodriguez, a moderate, as its presidential candidate, and the Revolutionary Action Party [PAR], which had been the traditional opposition party to the military since the 1940s, had nominated Fabio Castillo, a socialist, as its candidate. [Castillo is currently a member of the joint FDR-Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front diplomatic commission.] The Communist Party's UDN supported the PAR ticket in 1967.)

Opposing the PCN on the right were two parties. The more extreme was the Independent Democratic Unified Front (FUDI), whose presidential candidate was General Jose Alberto Medrano, one of the organizers of Orden, the

neighborhood security apparatus officially disbanded by the junta after the October 1979 coup. The more moderate was the Salvadorean Popular Party (PPS), whose presidential candidate was Antonio Rodriguez Porth, and vice presidential candidate was Ernesto Palomo.

FUDI was supported by a small number of El Salvador's prominent families, particularly those in agriculture. The majority of the significant families, however, gave their economic backing to the PPS. Both parties had conservative platforms designed to maintain their power and minimize social changes. FUDI's platform was primarily protective of landowners, whereas PPS' platform was in support of industry, commerce, and banking.

The UNO's platform claimed that it addressed the roots of El Salvador's problems. It proposed sweeping social changes, including controls on the private banking and insurance companies and land reforms, under which the large properties would be divided into smaller plots and deeded to peasants. (These proposals were more drastic than those implemented by the Duarte government in March 1980.)

The PCN's platform advocated administrative and fiscal reforms, expansion of public health facilities, and increased public works projects, such as roads and schools. It also proposed a more modest and limited approach to land reform. Although the PCN was hardly the favorite of most of the country's wealthy families, and although these families gave money to the PPS, they feared that the PPS could not win and that the UNO might carry the election. Consequently, these families tended to vote for the PCN ticket as the lesser of two evils.

Under Salvadorean laws in effect at that time, every Salvadorean citizen over 18 years of age had the right to vote, regardless of sex, education, or property ownership. Votes had to be cast for the party ticket, not for individual candidates. To win, a party's ticket needed 51 percent of the total direct popular vote. If no party received the required percentage, the Legislative Assembly, by a two thirds vote, decided the winner from among the two leading tickets.

The elections were held on the third Sunday of February. Radio reports by mid-evening had the Duarte ticket ahead, but the final results announced later in the week showed that Molina had edged Duarte by one percentage point. UNO cried foul, and there were widespread charges of PCN electoral manipulation and tampering. The final results, however, gave the victory to neither party; Molina and Duarte officially received 43 and 42 percent of the total popular vote, respectively, less than the 51 percent needed for victory. Within 10 days of the election, and

with little advanced notice to opposition politicians, the PCN-dominated Legislative Assembly met to decide the next president. It chose Molina.

Before Molina could take office on July 1st, Inauguration Day, a small group of relatively unknown and power hungry military men, headed by Colonel Benjamin Mejia, attempted a coup against President Sanchez Hernandez. Neither rightist nor leftist, the coup plotters wanted power for themselves. During the preceeding months, however, Mejia had had considerable contact with the PDC.

Late on Friday night, March 25th, a team of the plotters, let by Col. Antonio Nunez, arrested both Sanchez Hernandez and his chief of staff, Lt. Col. Carlos Humberto Romero, who, having learned of the coup, ran to the Presidential House to warn Sanchez Hernandez and was captured there with him before they could mount an effective defense. They were taken to a local quartel and held prisoner.

The following day, Saturday, the 26th, Duarte, in a radio speech, called upon the public to support Mejia and the coup. After making this plea, Duarte fled to the home of the First Secretary of the Venezuelan Embassy and sought refuge. He was arrested there by security forces that evening. He claims he was physically mistreated by them that night. The following day, under pressure from President Nixon, the Salvadorean government expelled Duarte from the country. Stopping in Guatemala, he then went to Venezuela, where he lived in exile until he returned to El Salvador following the October 1979 coup. Manuel Ungo took asylum in the residence of the Venezuelan Ambassador, then fled El Salvador about a week later. He went to Venezuela for awhile, then to Washington, D.C., and later returned to El Salvador with President Molina's permission.

The arrest, mistreatment, and exile of Duarte and the widely believed charges of PCN tampering with the 1972 election results gave impetus to the formation of organized and militant opposition to the military government. One of the major guerrilla groups, the Popular Forces of Liberation (FPL), which had been formed in 1970 as a result of an internal split in the Salvadorean Communist Party, was a small, fledgling band of terrorists which had committed only one major kidnapping until 1972. After the elections that year, the FPL's organization and support improved.

Contributing to popular mistrust of the PCN was the way in which it increased its strength in the Legislative Assembly during the 1970s. The entire Assembly was up for reelection every two years. At the beginning of the decade, the PCN needed the support of other rightist parties in the Assembly to dominate. In 1978, of the Assembly's 54 members, 52 belonged to the PCN and two to the PPS. The Christian Democratic Party, at the beginning of the decade, had a large minority, but it was gradually eliminated as an opposition force in the

Assembly through a variety of fraudulent ploys committed during President Molina's term. By 1978, the Legislative Assembly had become an obedient tool of the Executive.

In the mid-1970s, guerrilla violence and popular opposition to the government increased. Although the country was still tranquil compared to what was to follow, the prelude to the 1977 presidential election was tense.

In 1976, a year before the elections, the country was watching those men around President Molina to determine which would be given the nod to run as his successor. Apparent PCN candidates at the time were Guillermo Garcia, president of the nation's telecommunications company (and currently Minister of Defense), Eugenio Vides Casanova, Director of the Central School of the Armed Forces (and currently Commander of the National Guard), Roberto Escobar Garcia, Minister of Agriculture, and Juan Martinez Varela, Ambassador to Spain. To the surprise of many, none emerged victorious. Instead, Carlos Romero became the heir-apparent.

Friction developed almost immediately between Romero and others in the military, particularly over the issue of land reform. In the 1972 campaign, Molina had promised to enact some sort of land reform program. After being elected, he shelved that promise. To bolster his party's standing in preparation for the 1977 elections, he, in 1976, dusted off this promise and began to plan a pilot land reform program for the eastern part of El Salvador which would affect primarily cotton (not coffee) farms. Immediate opposition arose from some of the affected region's prominent agricultural families, who organized the Federation of Eastern Regional Agriculturalists (FARO).

Romero, recognizing his need for money for the campaign, opposed Molina's land reform program and, instead, supported FARO and the National Association of Private Enterprises (ANEP). Molina backed down and withdrew the agrarian reform plan, and Romero entered the presidential race on a pro-business platform.

In January, a month before the election, a prominent Salvadorean industrialist, Roberto Poma, was kidnapped by the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (ERP), one of the major guerrilla groups, and died in their captivity. The mood of the country became even more tense.

In the February election, the two major parties were the UNO and the PCN. The UNO's presidential candidate was Colonel Ernesto Claramount Rosaville, and the vice presidential candidate was Antonio Morales Ehrlich. The PCN ran Romero for president and Julio Astacio, former minister of health, for vice president. The PPS also ran. In an election which few, if any, believe was honest, Romero won by 67 percent of the popular vote.

Turmoil intensified. The ERP, in protest over the election results, formed a political front organization, the Popular League 28 of February (LP-28). A band of mili-

tant rightists issued death threats against Jesuits who did not leave the country. Prominent priests sympathetic to the left were killed and became martyrs. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was kidnapped and executed by guerrillas. And Jimmy Carter took office.

The glue that had held El Salvador together was the alliance and cooperation between the Army, the wealthy elements of the private sector, the Church, and the U.S. Embassy. That bond began to disintegrate. As leftist members of the Church became targets of violence from the right and military, the Salvadorean Archbishop, Oscar Romero, became more vocal in his condemnation of the government for human rights violations and shifted traditional Church support of the right towards the left. Although he spoke for a minority of his bishops, he, as archbishop, commanded the pulpit and the press and drew international attention for his criticism of the government. President Romero became a made-to-order guinea pig for Carter's human rights experiments, and the U.S. Embassy

also withdrew its support for Salvadorean government.

As wealthy landowners and other prominent families began to experience increasing numbers of terrorist kidnappings and killings, they turned to the government and Army for help and protection, and received none. The Army's indifference to their plight caused many members of the private sector to suspect Army complicity with guerrillas in some of the kidnappings, and these suspicions, fear, and anger dissolved whatever bond remained between the wealthy elements of the private sector and the Army. Flushed with success at having helped precipitate the downfall of Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua in mid-1979, Carter began to apply intense pressure on Romero to leave in the belief that a Nicaraguan-type solution was needed in El Salvador. Romero resisted and asked to finish out his term. The Carter administration turned thumbs down, and Romero was overthrown in a bloodless coup in October 1979. Few tears were shed by El Salvador's prominent businessmen and Church leaders.

Negotiations Versus Elections

Since the October 1979 coup, El Salvador has experienced an escalation of violence which has spared no one, its various governments have not been noted for stability, and it is becoming an economic basket case. To restore some semblance of order, certain groups in the United States and abroad are advocating negotiations between the Duarte government and the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR). It is unlikely that such negotiations would result in any settlement beneficial to US interests in the area.

Those supporting negotiations portray the FDR as "the democratic opposition," or as a group of dissident politicians, or as a political entity co-equal with the leftist guerrillas in the revolutionary movement. In fact, the FDR is subordinate to and controlled by the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), which commands all political and military aspects of the revolution. Those who are members of the DRU are the leaders of the guerrilla organizations. Manuel Ungo, the FDR president, is not a member of the DRU.

The FDR, in other words, is the political and propaganda front organization of the DRU and was created to represent the revolution abroad as a political alternative to the current junta. Although it does contain certain political groups (socialists, dissident Christian Democrats, etc.), it has no significant support independent of the guerrillas and their own front organizations. (For an excellent and detailed study of El Salvador's revolutionary left, see Alexander Kruger's "El Salvador's Marxist Revolution," April 10, 1981, Heritage Foundation *Background* No. 137.)

Thus, negotiations between the junta and the FDR would provide the guerrillas with an opportunity to influence the structure, composition, and policies of the Salvadorean government through a political process. They have failed to acquire this opportunity through combat.

The FDR has publicly claimed it is not interested in negotiating directly with the junta but would be willing to talk with the United States. Privately, the FDR has prepared its strategy for negotiations, and this strategy became known when a document containing it was recently captured. (See appendix for the text of this document.) Clearly, the FDR views negotiations as being to its advantage, not only for the reasons outlined in this captured document but also because the FDR realizes it would not be able to win in honestly held popular elections.

Those strongly advocating negotiations are the Mexicans and some of the European Christian Democrats and socialists. Their motivations need to be examined.

The Mexican government, of course, has found it convenient to project itself internationally and particularly internally as nationalistic and willing and able to stand up to the US, especially in Latin American matters. Taking these traditional moves beyond posturing, however, has been Mexico's pro-Marxist minister of foreign affairs, who has apparently influenced President Lopez Portillo into believing that Mexican support for the communist insurgents in Central America will somehow confer immunity on Mexico from guerrilla activities within its own borders. The military, security elements, and some members of the private sector are less sanguine, however, that if Cuban-supported guerrillas are able to knock off Central American countries, one by one, they will stop at the Guatemalan-Mexican border.

European Christian Democrats have their own reasons for supporting negotiations. Some sincerely believe that negotiations can lead to a peaceful resolution of the conflict and to a weaning away of Ungo from his Marxist guerrilla backers. The duplicity with which the FDR views negotiations, as seen in the captured FDR document (see Appendix), makes any good faith negotiations unlikely. Furthermore, Ungo, without the guerrillas, has no support or backing which would give him any standing in a negotiating session.

There is, however, another, more political reason why at least some Christian Democrats from abroad are eager for FDR-junta negotiations. Christian Democrats have poured a lot of money and manhours into Latin America, and the only government they can claim is Venezuela's. They now have a chance to acquire El Salvador, but only if the weak Christian Democrats there can bolster their support by reuniting with dissident elements of their own party and forming an alliance with the socialists in the FDR. After all, such an alliance between Christian Democrats, socialists, and even communists was formed for El Salvador's crucial 1972 presidential elections. Fortunately, there are some Christian Democrats, mature in the ways and dangers of Castro, who recognize the "downside" of any such alliance in today's volatile Central America and who have some private concerns about the brand of Christian Democracy practiced by Duarte.

Yet another problem raised by negotiation is the split it might create in the fragile Salvadorean junta, itself, should Duarte allow himself to be maneuvered into negotiating with some in the FDR in order to broaden his own political power base. The military leaders of El Salvador have no particular need to be loyal to the principles of Christian Democracy, but they do have need to be loyal to their

troops who have recently shed blood in fighting the communists. These commanders would have a difficult time explaining to their troops why they allowed the communists to gain concessions at the negotiating table which the insurgents were not able to win on the battlefield.

Most of the discussion about "negotiations" has focused on the FDR. However, foreign affairs committees in both houses of the US Congress, in April and May 1981, passed amendments to the foreign aid bill that requires the president to certify that the Salvadorean junta is prepared to negotiate with its "opponents"—presumably this could mean extreme rightist militants opposed to Duarte's reforms as well as leftist guerrillas—as a condition for the continuation of US military assistance to El Salvador. Although an extreme rightist influence in El Salvador would be beneficial to immediate US security interests in the region, such an influence would not be accep-

table to El Salvador's population at this stage in the nation's development and would only serve as a prelude to further leftist advances and increasing local and regional instability.

The only way to confer legitimacy on the next Salvadorean government is through honest elections. Let those who claim to speak for El Salvador compete for the popular vote. The Salvadoreans have been through a great turmoil. With tragedy and hardship comes maturity, and the Salvadoreans are prepared to choose for themselves whom they want as their leader. It is in the interest of the United States to do what it can to insure that an open, valid, and internationally supervised electoral process takes place which can lead to the next government. Salvadoreans are no longer willing to accept with prolonged equanimity any appointed, self-proclaimed, or dishonestly elected government once the current and transient junta leaves office.

Preparations for Elections

Opposed to negotiations and recognizing that it is transient, the Salvadorean junta has announced that the next government will be chosen by popular elections. As the first phase of this electoral process, according to Duarte's timetable, delegates to a National Constituent Assembly will be elected by the populace in March 1982. This Assembly will write a new constitution to replace the one suspended after the coup of October 15, 1979. Duarte has further stated that general elections, including presidential, will be held in 1983.

At the present time, there are no legally registered political parties (although several* are acknowledged by the government), no currently registered voters, and no rules to govern the electoral process. To prepare for the 1982 elections, the junta appointed a three man Central Electoral Commission (CCE), which was sworn in on March 5, 1981. With a budget of approximately \$500,000, the CCE has expressed the hope of completing its draft of new election laws by mid-1981 and of circulating this draft, first to lawyers, then to others, by October or November 1981. The CCE also plans to begin registering voters and parties once a legal framework is devised. The formal call for elections will occur 60-90 days before Election Day.

One of the questions the CCE will have to answer is the number of delegates to be elected to the National Constituent Assembly. The 54 delegates in the previous Legislative Assembly (which should serve as a model for the Constituent Assembly) were elected on the basis of the 1960 census. Another question concerns the right of the Communist Party to register. The chairman of the CCE said on March 13, 1981 that "...all those parties or political groups which accept the democratic rules and respect the constitution and the electoral law will be able to participate. If the Communist Party wants to participate within these rules, it will be allowed to participate." Duarte has also offered a general amnesty to anyone who would put aside his arms and join in a peaceful political process, and his military colleague in the junta, Col. Jaime Gutierrez, said on April 25, 1981 that "...the elections must be open to all parties that advocate peace and abide by the rules of democratic elections and the laws of the republic."***

Opposition to the CCE has sprung up from segments of the right and the left. The center-rightist Popular Orientation Party (POP) has pointed out that the chairman of the

CCE, Jorge Bustamante, is a gynecologist and not qualified to deal with technical legal matters. (Bustamante was also one of the founders of the Social Democratic Party in the 1960s.) The POP also has complained that only the Christian Democratic Party, and none other, is represented in the CCE.*** Bustamante has replied to some of these charges by assuring the POP that those CCE members who belong to the Christian Democratic Party have agreed to give up their party posts. Other rightists have complained that a new constitution is not needed, that the old constitution should be put back into effect, and that forthcoming elections should be called, instead, for a Legislative Assembly.

The left has branded the electoral process as another US-junta gimmick. Pointing to the history in El Salvador of dishonest elections, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) has questioned how the proposed elections could be any different. Defying them, the FMLN, in a Radio Venceremos broadcast on March 9, 1981, said, "Here we have a determined and armed people willing to go to the end and not lay down a single rifle. We are going to defeat the electoral maneuver..." Rhetoric aside, the left is aware that it would have as much difficulty in getting popular support for its cause at the ballot box as it has had on the battlefields. Therefore, to interfere with the electoral process, guerrillas have recently started to burn local city halls (31, thus far) and incinerate voter lists and other historical documents needed to reestablish a framework for elections. As elections approach, the left can be expected to try to disrupt them with even more violence.

To insure honest elections, both Duarte and Gutierrez have called for assistance from abroad. In his April 25 speech, Gutierrez invited foreign bodies "with experience in democratic practices" to let the CCE "know what technical assistance they can provide to support a clean and impartial suffrage." Duarte has said that he would support the sending of an independent team of observers to El Salvador to insure that the elections are fair.

International observers, whether from foreign governments or international organizations, will, indeed, be necessary to guarantee the integrity of the process to Salvadoreans and the world community. Because of the physical security problems they may encounter in performing their duties, particularly in the countryside, they may have to be armed. Obviously such arming would present some delicate problems.

*These parties are the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), National Conciliation Party (PCN), National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), National Democratic Union (UDN), and the Salvadorean Popular Party (PPS).

**FBIS translation from El Salvador Domestic Service

***In addition to Bustamante, the other two members of the CCE are Antonio Guvara and Ramon Rodriguez. The three alternate members are Mauricio Massier, Edgar Belloso, and Luis Alberto Aparicio.

The Rush to Elections

The electoral process consists of more than just election day. It also includes the campaign leading to election day, and that campaign has to be as open and valid as the voting and ballot counting if the electoral process is to have integrity.

If elections are called for March 1982, there is reason to be concerned about the openness of the campaign and security of the balloting.

The high state of violence currently in El Salvador makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, for political parties to organize themselves at the grass roots level and for candidates to engage in public debate over controversial issues. As long as these opposing parties and candidates feel inhibited in their political activities, the currently ruling party and leader, the Christian Democrats and Duarte, have an advantage in getting their points of view across and influencing the voters.

At the present time, the communist guerrillas have influence over approximately 30 percent of El Salvador, particularly in the rugged areas along the Honduran border where the guerrillas are well dug in. The Salvadorean army has not yet been able to develop and implement the tactics needed to confront the guerrillas in these areas successfully. In addition, the guerrillas continue to receive supplies from abroad; there has been some reduction in the flow of supplies by air from Nicaragua, but land and sea routes continue to be used, and some enemy supplies are coming across the Guatemalan border. It is difficult to imagine how an open campaign and free election can be held throughout the country under these circumstances. The Salvadorean military has to be allowed the time to regain better control over these hostile or contested areas before a campaign and elections are held. To accomplish this task, the Salvadorean military will need time and appropriate assistance from the United States. There is no shortcut.

The leftist guerrillas are not the only ones contributing

to El Salvador's currently high profile of violence. The military forces, themselves, have yet to learn how to conduct certain operations in contested areas without high casualties among civilians. Recognizing this weakness, guerrillas have set up a variety of ploys which have resulted in soldiers firing on civilians. In addition, some rightist militants have also carried out operations against persons whom they believed to be working against their interests. Firmer command and control by Salvadorean military leaders over their troops in the field (by an improved and expanded NCO and officer cadre, for one thing) should make some dent in this violence.

A key element in controlling these unwarranted and extra-legal killings by military and paramilitary forces is judicious use by the Reagan administration of the leverage it has acquired with the Salvadorean government through its support of it, and with some right wing elements through a willingness to understand their problems and frustrations, which was not displayed by the previous administration. The image projected to the Salvadorean government and rightists by the new Reagan team in the State Department's Inter-American Affairs Bureau, from assistant secretary to desk officer, will largely determine how effectively this leverage can be exploited.

In any event, it is unlikely that the violence in El Salvador can be reduced and the climate made more propitious for a campaign and elections by the end of this year or early next year. In such an environment, voting might be restricted because of physical hazards, and political opposition to Duarte might be muted and minimized. If elections are to serve their purpose in restoring popular confidence in the political process and in the government, people should believe they can observe the campaign and vote without excess danger, and the opposition to Duarte should be as wide and vocal as legally permitted. These requirements might be better met if elections were postponed until later in 1982.

Current Political Activities

Emerging in El Salvador today are certain groups of voters, in various stages of organization, who will have to be wooed and whose votes will have to be won by any party seeking victory in an honest election. At the top of this list are the Church, the democratic labor movements, and the Army.

El Salvador is predominately Catholic, and the Church has had significant influence in shaping public opinion and, to a degree, that nation's recent history. Although its liberal, activist minority has succeeded in projecting its image abroad, the majority of the Church leadership is centrist or conservative and could be expected to be a voice of moderation and prudence among its people. The democratic labor movements, center or center left, are the 130,000 to 160,000 member Salvadorean Agrarian Union (UCS), made up of agrarian peasants, and the 80,000 member Popular Democratic Coalition (UPD), an umbrella organization of 15 trade unions, political groups, and civic associations. The Army is important because it has popular respect, despite the image given it by the international press. Other major voting groups are the independent professionals and the middle and upper middle class moderate private sector, some of whose members have formed themselves into the Productive Alliance. Whatever political party can forge the greatest coalition among these groups and use it to expand its influence among the population will win the next honest election.

Less important because of their declining popularity and influence are the 100,000 or so members of the various leftist groups associated with the FDR and FMLN. Also less important are the wealthy elements of the private sector and extreme rightists (who are not necessarily synonymous), the former because they are few in number, disorganized, and demoralized, and the latter because they represent a fringe element outside the main stream.

Competing for votes are several parties across the political spectrum (see diagram). Included are the old par-

ties: Christian Democratic Party (PDC), Party of National Conciliation (PCN), National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), National Democratic Union (UDN), and the Salvadorean Popular Party (PPS). These clearly have the advantage of some organization and experience. They have the disadvantage, however, of being associated with the old order.

Additional parties have formed recently, such as the center rightist Popular Orientation Party (POP), started about a year ago by a small group clustered around Felipe Lopez. At the present time, POP appears to be a shell with little following. There are reports that former Army intelligence major Roberto D'Abuisson recently made known in Guatemala his intention to form a rightist party, the National Republican Alliance (ARENA), and still others may be formed in the near future.

The group on the political horizon to watch, at least for the present, seems to be a party which is sometimes referred to as the Popular Democratic Mobilization (MPD) and, at other times, as the Salvadorean Democratic Mobilization (MDS). By whatever name, its leader is a lawyer, Rene Fortin Magana, and he is assisted by Nelson Segovia and Ricardo Castaneda, also lawyers. Fortin Magana, now in his fifties, had been a member of the socialist junta that overthrew President Lemus in October 1959 and remained in power for three months. Since then, he has reportedly moved more towards the center in his political orientation. His two colleagues are centrists; Castaneda had been sub-minister under Foreign Relations Minister Mauricio Borgonova, a prominent member of the private sector slain by leftist guerrillas in May 1977. This group started only with lawyers, but it is now expanding to include other independent professionals, as well. Since the first round of elections will be for Constituent Assembly delegates, it is too early to speculate if this or other parties will decide on a civilian or military officer as a future presidential candidate.

THE SPECTRUM OF EL SALVADOR'S POLITICAL PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS



PCS - Communist Party of El Salvador
 UDN - National Democratic Union
 (the political front of the PCS)
 MNR - National Revolutionary Movement
 (Ungo's socialist party)
 PDC - Christian Democratic Party
 MPD - Popular Democratic Mobilization,
 also known as MDS

MDS - Salvadorean Democratic Mobilization
 PCN - Party of National Conciliation
 POP - Popular Orientation Party
 PPS - Salvadorean Popular Party
 FUDI - Independent Democratic Unified Front
 FAN - Broad National Front

*Those parties which have participated in previous elections

Napoleon Duarte is serving a temporarily useful role in the junta at the present time, but he is the wrong man to lead El Salvador as a full-term president. His economic planning is unsound and unrealistic. His reforms have contributed to El Salvador's economic decline, and the suspicion and hostility that is mutual between him and important segments of the private sector make any rapprochement between the two unlikely. Yet unless these segments of the private sector begin to plan and participate in the nation's economic recovery, El Salvador will continue to remain on the welfare roles of the United States. An honestly elected replacement for Duarte with good economic as well as political sense would be in the best interests of both El Salvador and the United States.

The Salvadorean private sector can help in making such an election come true. To do so, it will have to make some adjustments within itself. Its intense dislike of Duarte has colored its reasoning and has made it believe that Duarte is so unpopular and supported by so few people that he could

not win an election. Their overconfidence is dangerous. Duarte's old popularity may have declined, but he is still a shrewd and ambitious politician with a "vision" of his country's future and his place in that future. He still has charisma. He still has name recognition. He holds all the power of the office. In consonance with the U.S., he has been able to blame the guerrillas, not himself, for his nation's problems, including economic. He is formidable.

If key elements within the private sector remain divided among themselves and inflexible, the private sector will be weakened in its battle with Duarte and will not serve the constructive role that it should play. It would be encouraging if reasonable and responsible members of the private sector were to work among themselves *and with others* in putting together a party, platform, and campaign which would have a chance of appealing to a broad enough spectrum of the voting population to win. Its program might not be based on pure free market economics, but it would be an improvement over Duarte's socialism and the FDR's Marxism.

Recommendations

1. An enduring and beneficial political solution to El Salvador's current crisis is better achieved through open and honest elections than through negotiations with extremists of either side. Not only should the Reagan Administration encourage such elections vice negotiations, but it should also encourage the Salvadorean government to hold these elections when both the campaigning and the balloting can be full, open, and valid. Even then, international observers, perhaps armed, will be needed.

2. Until elections are held, the Reagan Administration should be prepared to assist the Salvadorean government with military supplies and trainers needed to control Marxist-generated violence. The Reagan Administration will not be able to do so if it continues to fail to articulate and defend its Salvadorean policy before the American public.

3. In order to sell its policy at home, the Reagan Administration will have to bring under control unnecessary violence from the Salvadorean military and irresponsible violence from the militant right. The Reagan Administra-

tion has the potential to accomplish these improvements, but to realize that potential will require, in part, that officials in the State Department's Inter-American Affairs Bureau reflect the philosophy of the new administration and have credibility with the Salvadorean military and key sectors of the Salvadorean right.

4. Reagan Administration officials should cease pegging their Salvadorean policy to Duarte and his reforms. There are more important aspects of El Salvador than Duarte that merit U.S. support, and the Administration should not make that support a hostage to him.

5. Long range interests of El Salvador and the United States would be better served by a Salvadorean government that is neither socialist nor communist. In view of the amount of international political help both the socialists and communists in El Salvador will receive from their supporters as the electoral process gets underway, conservative private groups in the United States should be prepared to assist and advise responsible segments of the Salvadorean private sector in forming themselves into a political force with a pragmatic program.

APPENDIX

(The following is an English translation, supplied by the Department of State, of a captured Salvadorean communist guerrilla document on negotiations. It was printed in *El Diario de Hoy*, San Salvador, on April 27, 1981. One of the signers of the document, Ruben Zamora, has vouched for its authenticity [see "Is El Salvador Negotiable?" by Stephen S. Rosenfeld, *The Washington Post*, May 15, 1981.]

MEMORANDUM TO: General Command. **FROM:** Diplomatic Political Committee (CPD). **MATTER:** Proposal for International Mediation. **DATE:** 3 February 1981.

1. **INTRODUCTION.** We now enter a new phase of the international aspect of our war. We already have completed in a positive manner the first phase of the diplomatic offensive. Despite it all, and in view of the nature of the objective situations therein, our actions have not been (sic) limited to political deeds which tended to delay diplomatically the military strengthening of the enemy.

Five fundamental features define, in our opinion, the entering to a new stage:

1.1. The vacuum following the first phase of the military offensive and the intense imperialist pressures have elicited some skepticism, weariness and fear among friends and allies (especially Latin Americans).

1.2. As result of the above, it is becoming more evident that we will be pressured to "negotiate" with the junta. Since the talks with Pema Gomez (17 January), who acted as spokesman for Torrijos and Carlos Andres Perez, other actions have clearly revealed this tendency (talks with Carazo, Turbay, PRI Relations Secretary Madrazo).

1.3. The TIAR threat pends over our heads.

1.4. The pressures against Nicaragua are becoming more forceful.

1.5. There (sic) has been a considerable increase of military aid to the junta making possible a great control of the logistic flow to our fighters, further hindering our forces' military action. This situation can only be relieved through diplomatic activity.

2. **ALTERNATIVES.** We visualize only three possible means of general reaction to this new situation.

2.1. To abandon as an objective the dialogue with the United States designed for the objective posed in the previous period. This decision would be based on three uncertain suppositions: A) that we could win militarily even though the enemy is becoming stronger in arms, communications, logistics, and leadership capacity; B) that we could be absolutely sure of our friends and allies despite the pressures being endured by them; C) that limited foreign military invasion could not affect us seriously.

2.2. To wait for the North Americans to open the doors again. This, however, is only a possibility, and we cannot have our strategy depend on it as this would mean (sic) losing our initiative and surrendering politically to the enemy's will.

2.3. The third alternative consists in adopting an initiative of mediation, which is not the same as a dialogue and cannot be readily considered as a negotiation. This alternative implies the official involvement of several governments in the process and permits a more or less extended handling of time, according to our convenience.

3. **PROPOSAL.**

3.1. General Layout: The FMLN-FDR expresses to a group of governments (the procedure is explained further on) its willingness to find a political solution to the conflict, tactically stating its disposition to reach a negotiation with the junta.

It notes, however, that the main obstacle to reaching this objective is the U.S. policy of military aid to the junta. The FMLN-FDR would accept, therefore, an international mediation if: A) the group of mediating governments obtains from the United States a commitment to withdraw its military presence from El Salvador; and B) it arranges a dialogue between the U.S. government (sic) and the FMLN-FDR on the steps and confirmation of an effective military withdrawal.

The time factor is essential. The success of this maneuver to a great extent depends on carrying it out at the right time and pace. We start from the supposition that it is an auxiliary maneuver of the major operation, which is war. Therefore, its timing must strictly depend (sic) on the military war plan.

3.2. Objectives of the maneuver.

3.2.1. It allows us to maintain the initiative in the politico-diplomatic terrain, since we choose the mediating team, determine the steps to be taken and the time they should be taken.

3.2.2. It provides our friends and allies with more opportunities for mobilization and reaction in the face of the U.S. pressures, and permits them to assume a more active and legitimate role.

3.2.3. It allows the involvement of Latin American governments which so far have remained outside the conflict (Colombia, Peru, Brazil, for example).

3.2.4. It contributes decisively to maintaining the problem outside the OAS or, in the case of it being brought up before it, to count on a number of countries (seven, as a minimum) which would oppose the implementation of TIAR. (Note: TIAR is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.)

3.2.5. It helps us gain (sic) time to improve our internal military situation in relation to the enemy's might.

3.2.6. It would allow (in its second phase) a softening of the repressive conditions in the interior of the country, with which our masses could have a breather, recover from the blows, and renew action positively.

3.2.7. It would give us the opportunity to renew a more direct contact with the people.

3.2.8. It would help us to improve and reach agreements with "democratic" military sectors.

3.2.9. It could allow us to establish an international medical organization (of the group of countries chosen by us) to relieve fighters and communities in the most affected areas.

3.2.10. It would permit us to increase contradictions among the enemy ranks.

3.2.11. If the proposal (which in principle is most reasonable) fails to prosper, we would be in a most favorable position internationally.

3.3. Maneuver risks.

3.3.1. Danger that our leadership should interpret the maneuver as "surrender" or capitulation.

3.3.2. It means a change of position concerning not to hold a dialogue with the junta. By the manner in which the proposal is presented, however, the FMLN-FDR will not sit to dialogue with the junta, but instead would accept the good offices of the international mediating team. This will permit us to continue handling publicly — should we choose to do so — our refusal to talk with the junta.

Stages. A) We speak with Nicaragua and get together concerning the aspects of the maneuver.

B) Nicaragua (or any other close country) would approach groups of governments stating the convenience of adopting a mediation initiative and propose it to the Salvadoreans.

C) The group (four or five) makes (in private or in public, whatever is most convenient) the proposal to the FMLN-FDR.

D) The CPD answers accepting but with the following conditions:

D.1. Commitment for U.S. military withdrawal.

D.2. Dialogue between the United States and the CPD to agree on the withdrawal.

D.3. Mediation should be conducted outside the OAS.

D.4. We want the cooperation of a larger number of countries (Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia, Grenada, Guyana, Nicaragua, Peru, Brazil, Panama).

D.5. If that group agrees with the mediation proposal we would choose from them a three-nation committee.

E) The three-nation committee is elected.

F) The mediating committee satisfies the conditions (D.1. and D.2.)

G) Mediation begins.

The first proposal on our part would be the need for both parties to make certain concessions so the mediation may have possibilities for reaching solutions in the future. This would be preceded by a delaying period.

G.1) Discussion of the nation's situation. Exchange of positions (via mediators) which could be more or less extensive, according to the convenience as recommended by the leadership.

G.2) Freedom (with or without trial) for all political prisoners.

G.3) Lifting of the state of siege and martial law.

G.5) Guarantees for entry for the CPD.

G.6) Respect for the military areas under our control.

Note: We must define what concessions we could offer in exchange for the above. Logically, we would be asked for a cease-fire.

D) (sic) End of mediation.

At this point of the discussion, we foresee the conclusion of the mediation. If we have accomplished our objectives, then we should "withdraw," in view of any repressive action or evidence of ill feeling, which surely will be produced.

If the military situation should be desperate at that point of the process, we would be forced to continue.

4. CONTINGENCY PLAN.

We must foresee the political and publicity uses, in case the Yankees obstruct the mediation in its first phase.

5. CONFIDENTIALITY. It is absolutely necessary for no one to learn of the nature of the maneuver of this initiative. This is indispensable for the maneuver to be successful.

UNITED TO FIGHT UNTIL FINAL VICTORY

REVOLUTION OR DEATH: WE SHALL WIN

Submitted by Ruben Zamora, Salvador Samayoa, Mario Aguinada, Guillermo Manuel Ungo. February 1981.

OBSERVATIONS ON MEDIATION PROPOSALS

1. These must be expanded in order to organize the negotiation, its presentation and discussion with Sandinist and Cuban *companeros* has been authorized.

Guillermo Ungo, Mario Aguinada and Pancho are authorized to go to Havana on Monday, 9 February, for this purpose.

2. The possible participants in the negotiation are:

Abdul Gutierrez, Morales Ehrlich, Majano, FMLN-FDR.

Mediators: Nicaragua, Mexico, Belize, Panama, Costa Rica, Honduras. The USA-PTD-Commanders' dialogue would be held using a single communication channel which would be Mexico.

3. We must define the objectives more clearly, both in our foreign and domestic policies. We must keep in mind that the foreign policy includes the prevention of intervention, and domestically a breather for the masses. We must keep in mind the current circumstances and Nicaragua's participation.

4. Section G-6 which appears in page 7 must be eliminated.

5. The cease-fire, is to be used not as a defensive tactic but as a tactical instrument within the maneuver. Do not use it in the case of mediation but during the negotiation, if necessary.

6. Be sure not to show the maneuver before our democratic allies (Mexico, Panama and others). It is best to speak in terms of our foreign policy rather than in terms of maneuver.

7. Collateral Activities.

A. In the United States we must develop to the maximum the initiative of the group of congressmen in favor of the "dialogue yes, military aid no" which would be directed at the State Department.

B. Development of activities with European social democratic leaders to pressure the United States in particular and Haig directly, so that he will accept the proposal and at the same time, get these leaders to seek a joint policy with the European Christian Democracy which would consist of supporting the proposal publically (sic) and privately.

C. Implement activities with the European Christian Democracy so that they support our proposal, pressuring Washington, the Salvadoran Democracy and COPEI. (Note: COPEI is the Social Christian Party of Venezuela, the currently ruling party there.)


D. Establish direct contacts with Monsignor River (sic) and the Vatican to obtain their support for the proposal, and a positive support by the Church for the same. With Rivera we can explore the possibility of a statement of the Episcopal Conference favorable to the proposal.


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April 10, 1981

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EL SALVADOR'S MARXIST REVOLUTION

INTRODUCTION

Within the last few months, the events in El Salvador have come to the forefront of American foreign policy. Since the bloodless coup in October 1979, which ousted General Romero and many of the leaders of the armed forces, El Salvador has undergone an escalation of violence from Marxist and rightist groups resulting in approximately 10,000 deaths during 1980. This already steep death toll increased further in January 1981 with the "final phase of the general offensive," a military attempt by the leftist forces to gain control of El Salvador prior to the U.S. presidential inauguration. The failure of the January "general offensive" has brought about a campaign to muster international support to pressure the Salvadorean government to reach a negotiated political solution with the leftist forces. This study examines the evolution, composition, political orientation, and objectives of the revolutionary left in El Salvador, composed of the DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate), a coalition of "Marxist-Leninist" guerrilla groups, and the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front), the international arm of the DRU.

ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

The communist movement in El Salvador originated in 1921 with the formation of communist cells and Marxist labor movements by a mix of university students and peasants inspired by the Soviet Revolution. They established a formal, overt party in 1925. The most prominent leader of this movement, Augustin Farabundo Marti, was captured by the Salvadorean government in 1932 and sentenced to death. This followed the communist inspired uprising that year which claimed up to 30,000 Salvadorean lives, including not only students and peasants, but also soldiers and others within the Salvadorean society. Since 1932, the PCS

(Communist Party of El Salvador) operated primarily in a clandestine fashion, infiltrating political parties and student groups. They also formed front organizations, which concealed their Marxist orientation, and used them to foment unrest.

Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power, the communist parties throughout Latin America reassessed their strategy, and most of them concluded that power could be best attained through a prolonged armed struggle. This brought about a dispute within the PCS over whether the party should attempt to gain power through elections or through an armed revolutionary confrontation. This quarrel over tactics resulted in the formation of two factions within the PCS. The first faction, comprised of intellectuals headed by Shafik Handal, proposed to work through the electoral process. The second group, headed by Cayetano Carpio, included most of the younger members within the PCS, and favored a prolonged armed struggle to destabilize and overthrow the Salvadorean government. For the radicals within the Carpio faction, Cuba became a nearby center of indoctrination and military training.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FPL

In spite of the Cuban support for terrorist movements, it was not until 1970 that the FPL (Popular Forces of Liberation Farabundo Marti) was formed, through a breakup of the two PCS factions. Through this split, Cayetano Carpio became Secretary General of the FPL, while Shafik Handal assumed full control of the remains of the PCS. The FPL, the largest and most influential of the Salvadorean guerrilla organizations, has conducted numerous terrorist operations, including assassinations, robberies, kidnappings, assaults and extortions. This guerrilla organization was largely responsible for the deterioration in the relationship between El Salvador's business community and the military government, primarily due to the government's failure to solve any of the many criminal acts committed against the private sector entrepreneurs. This mutual distrust increased due to FPL operations in which the guerrillas wore Salvadorean military uniforms, creating suspicion among the business community that the FPL was integrated with members of the Salvadorean security forces. This suspicion was further reinforced by the May 1977 kidnapping of Mauricio Borbonovo, a prominent Salvadorean businessman, who was abducted by persons referring to each other by military rank. The FPL later claimed credit for this abduction.

In 1975, the FPL set up a front organization to carry out its propaganda activities. This front organization, the BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc), was formed through a coalition of FPL supporters, primarily groups organized by Father Bernard Bourlang, a French Jesuit. Juan Chacon, Facundo Guardado, and Julio Flores, three of the four members of the Central Command within the FPL National Masses Committee, became the leaders of

the BPR, while the fourth member, Oscar Bonilla, became Secretary General of AGEUS (Association of University Students of El Salvador). Both the BPR and AGEUS were housed in the same office in the National University of El Salvador. The BPR has conducted many strikes, marches, and occupations of embassies and churches. The strong anti-U.S. sentiment and Marxist-Leninist ideology of both the FPL and the BPR are revealed through their publications, including the Red Star, Popular Combat, Guerilla, and The Rebel.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE ERP

During the early 1970s, a second guerrilla group was created by "dissatisfied members of the PCS."¹ This group, the ERP (the People's Revolutionary Army), currently under the leadership of Joaquin Villalobos, followed the Maoist line and developed ties with several guerrilla organizations in Latin America, including the Tupamaro National Liberation Movement of Uruguay, the People's Revolutionary Army of Argentina, and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement of Chile (MIR). The ERP has carried out terrorist operations similar to those committed by the FPL, including an October 1979 kidnapping of a prominent Salvadorean industrialist, Jaime Hill, by ERP guerrillas dressed in army and police uniforms.

The ERP formed its front organization, the LP-28 (Popular Leagues of February 28), in 1977 to carry out the organization's propaganda activities and for recruiting purposes. The LP-28 and the ERP promote their Marxist philosophy through their publications, Proletariat Thought, Communist Press, Red Flag, Wake Up Peasant, and The Power is Born from the Gun. The ERP and LP-28 undertook an important role in subverting the human rights movement in El Salvador by promoting an ERP member, Norma Guevara, into a position of leadership within the Salvadorean Commission of Human Rights (CDHES).

THE EMERGENCE OF THE FARN

The last major guerrilla organization was formed through the ERP's assassination of one of its members, Roque Dalton. This created a split within the ERP in 1975, resulting in the formation of the FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance). The FARN has conducted numerous kidnappings of foreign businessmen and charged exorbitant ransoms ("payment of the war tax"), becoming the wealthiest of the Salvadorean guerrilla groups. FARN's former leader, Ernesto Jovel, who was recently killed in action, has been replaced by Ferman Cienfuegos.

¹ "Communist Interference in El Salvador, Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency," U.S. Department of State, February 23, 1981.

To carry out its propaganda activities, the FARN took over the FAPU (Unified Popular Action Front), which had been formed in 1974 by the ERP and two Catholic priests, Higinio and Jose Inocencio Alas. The FAPU, whose theme is "armed struggle today, socialism tomorrow," has conducted numerous strikes, marches, and propaganda distribution projects. This group has been involved in El Salvador's labor movements and has worked particularly closely with STISS (Union of Workers of the Salvadorean Institute of Social Security). The Marxist ideology of FAPU and FARN has been extensively publicized in their publications, Pueblo and For the Proletariat Cause, which have also conducted a vitriolic campaign against the Salvadorean security forces, the Salvadorean business community, and particularly the United States.

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR

The Moscow-oriented PCS remained active in El Salvador's political system through its "recognized legal front," the UDN (National Democratic Union).² It was through the UDN, formed in 1970, that the PCS took part in the 1972 and 1977 Salvadorean presidential elections through the coalition of opposition parties known as UNO (National Opposition Union). The UDN is comprised of several Marxist labor and peasant groups, including CUTS (Salvadorean Workers Confederation), a Marxist labor conglomerate.

Under El Salvador's labor laws, ten unions are required to form one federation, and three federations form one confederation. The PCS, which has been involved in El Salvador's labor movement for some years, formed its third controlled federation, FUSS (United Trade Union Federation of El Salvador), in December 1978. With FUSS and two other federations, FESTIAVTSCES (Federation Union of Food, Garment, and Textile Industries Workers) and FENASTRAS (National Trade Union Federation of Salvadorean Workers), the PCS achieved control of its first confederation, the above-mentioned CUTS. The unions under the direction of CUTS have frequently taken over industries through violent tactics in cooperation with the guerrilla front organizations (BPR, LP-28, and FAPU). The role of these unions in El Salvador's Marxist struggle was highlighted by the Secretary General of FENASTRAS, Hector Bernabe Recinos, who declared in a radio interview, "The next move by FENASTRAS will be minor rebellions to give the people fighting experience and the staging of simulated uprisings in several towns."³

Even though the PCS inspired the formation of the FPL, the ERP, and the FARN, their respective front organizations, as well

² Karen De Young, "El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis," The Washington Post, March 8, 1981, p. A21.

³ "FENASTRAS Preparing General Strike, Rebellions," FBIS-LAM-80-151, August 4, 1980, Vol. VI, No. 151, p. 12.

as other smaller terrorist groups such as the PRTC (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers) and its front group the MLP (Movement of Popular Liberation), the PCS exercised very limited control over these groups. These groups, despite their similar ideologies, developed a strong rivalry for leadership within the revolutionary movement, and the PCS went so far as to label them "ultra-leftist."⁴ To reduce this friction, the Cubans "tried to play the role of peacemaker between the terrorists and the Communist Party of El Salvador."⁵ It was not until 1979 that the PCS joined the guerrillas, and became directly involved in El Salvador's "subversion and terrorism" through its militant arm, the FAL (Armed Forces of Liberation).

UNIFICATION OF THE SALVADOREAN INSURGENCY

In January 1980, largely through Cuban initiatives, the three guerrilla front organizations (BPR, LP-28, and FAPU), together with the PCS and PRTC front organizations, the UDN and the MLP formed an umbrella organization, the CRM (Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses). Likewise, in a May 1980 meeting in Havana, as "a precondition for larger-scale Cuban aid," the leadership of the FPL, the ERP, the FARN, and the PCS set aside their ideological differences, united and formed the DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate).⁶ "The DRU is the unified and military command of the revolution," and currently is composed of Cayetano Carpio, Shafik Handal, Joaquin Villalobos, Ferman Cienfuegos, and Roberto Roca, all of whom "describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist."⁷ In November 1980, a subordinate group of the DRU was formed, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), by the four DRU members and the PRTC. The FMLN is responsible for coordinating and executing the leftist military struggle to depose the Salvadorean government.

DIPLOMATIC FRONT OF THE SALVADOREAN INSURGENCY

Due to the obvious Marxist orientation within the CRM, a front known as the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front) was formed in April 1980 "to disseminate propaganda abroad" and to isolate the Salvadorean government from the international community. The FDR, a coalition of the CRM and the FD (Democratic Front), brought in a small "non-Marxist" element "for appearances sake." The FD, which also came into existence in April 1980, is composed primarily of Marxist groups such as CUTS, STISS, and AGEUS, and three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties. These three "small" leftist leaning parties are the MNR (National

⁴ NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March-April 1980), p. 20.

⁵ Samuel T. Francis, The Soviet Strategy of Terror (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981).

⁶ "Communist Interference in El Salvador."

⁷ NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol XIV, No. 4 (July-August 1980), p. 25.

Revolutionary Movement), the MPSC (Popular Social Christian Movement), and MIPTES (Movement of Independent Professionals and Technicians). The CRM is composed solely of Marxist groups. The AFL-CIO arm for Latin America, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, which has been involved in El Salvador's reform programs, described the FDR as "composed mainly of Marxist revolutionaries, but also containing elements of the democratic left which have joined the FDR in frustration at the inability of the moderate junta to gain full control over the government and military."⁸

The FDR chose Salvadorean multimillionaire Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, a member of the so-called fourteen families and long-time supporter of the guerrilla movement, as its first president. In 1979, Alvarez joined the BPR in the occupation of the Cathedral of San Salvador; and according to Julian Ignacio Otero, a high-ranking FPL defector, Alvarez contributed money to the guerrillas for the purchase of arms.

Following the assassination of Alvarez, Guillermo Ungo, another individual born into a wealthy Salvadorean family, was appointed to the FDR presidency. Ungo, the leader of the "small" MNR, confirmed during a July 1980 FDR press conference in Washington that he traveled to the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Accompanying him on the trip was Fabio Castillo, who currently is the Secretary General of the Marxist MLP. Ungo, who served in the first Salvadorean government junta for two months following the October 1979 coup, described to NACLA his motivation for resigning: "[A]s the right gained more military control, we came to see that regardless of what we or the left did or said, the military would go right ahead with its plan to exterminate the guerrillas. These groups are so close to the popular and democratic organizations that the repression fell on us."⁹

As with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the Salvadorean Revolutionary Movement has developed a decoy, the FDR, made up of an overt leadership of non-Marxist leftists. Their purpose is to give the insurgents international credibility despite the fact that these leaders have no significant power base independent of the Marxists who control the FDR.


THE SALVADOREAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Prior to Archbishop Romero's assassination, the hierarchy of the powerful Salvadorean Catholic Church was divided into three factions. The most liberal of these factions included Archbishop Romero and Bishop Rivera y Damas, the centrist faction was led by

⁸ "U.S. Labor's Role in El Salvador," Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, Free Trade Union News, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1981), p. 2.

⁹ NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (July-August 1980), p. 25.

CHART OF THE SALVADOREAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT



*FD members under Marxist control.

Bishop Revelo, while the most conservative of the factions included Bishops Aparicio, Alvarez, and Barrera y Reyes. However, within the rest of the clergy and religious community there were other factions, including a small group which not only collaborated with the Marxist guerrillas, but actually participated in the armed struggle with the guerrillas. This collaboration and involvement in El Salvador's subversion, particularly by "foreign Jesuits," was condemned by Bishop Aparicio. The prelate has recommended that several of these foreign priests, including Fathers Jerez, Sobrino, de Sebastian, and Hernandez, be deported.¹⁰

Following the assassination of Archbishop Romero, Bishop Rivera y Damas was appointed Acting Archbishop of San Salvador. The liberal position of Bishop Rivera y Damas should not be misconstrued as supportive of the Marxist guerrillas. In fact, Bishop Rivera y Damas, has openly stated that the Salvadorean Church "does not morally support the popular insurrection being carried out by leftist organizations." Furthermore, Bishop Rivera y Damas said that "the Salvadorean left has not been honest with the people" in that they are all "inclined toward communism."¹¹ The recent FDR statement claiming that the Church supports the guerrillas in their fight against the junta was vigorously denied by the Salvadorean bishops. The bishops said "The fact that a small number of priests, nuns and laymen in the so-called 'peoples church' have followed a specific political option and have made a public commitment to the FDR is no reason to assume that this phenomenon is representative of the Salvadorean Catholic Church."¹²

THE GUERRILLAS' MILITARY STRATEGY

From 1970 to early 1980, the Salvadorean guerrilla organizations had concentrated their terrorist attacks primarily against selected targets within the armed forces, the business community, and the diplomatic corps. By 1979, this selected terrorist strategy began to affect a larger sector of the Salvadorean populace as business operations closed, exacerbating the country's unemployment situation. As violence spread, increasing numbers of casualties were suffered by innocent bystanders as a result of the frequent shoot-outs between the guerrillas and government forces. This guerrilla strategy of selective terrorism, however, was modified during the early part of 1980, when the guerrilla organizations started to cooperate with each other. They decided to attempt to depose the Salvadorean military-civilian junta through a major military confrontation, and "establish a democratic

¹⁰ Paul A. Fisher, "Clergy and Religious as Marxist Revolutionaries," The Wanderer, March 26, 1981.

¹¹ "Archbishop Says Church Does Not Back Insurrection," FBIS-LAM-81-013, January 21, 1981, Vol. VI, No. 013, p. P18.

¹² ACAN/EFE: January 30, 1981.

revolutionary government" free from any U.S. dependence. (See Appendix I.)

By July 1980, a high-ranking guerrilla leader, Jacinto Sanchez, defined three problem areas for the guerrillas that needed to be resolved for their strategy to succeed. The first such problem was to achieve a "unified leadership" of the revolutionary movement. This, according to the guerrilla, was "progressing rapidly." The second problem dealt with logistics, namely increasing "the fire power and strength of the armed revolutionary organizations" by training "more men for the war," obtaining additional "provisions, weapons and ammunition," and improving "communications." The final area of concern to the guerrillas was "to gain international recognition," and thereby isolate the Salvadorean government from the international community. Furthermore, Sanchez echoed the guerrillas' repetitive statement that the Salvadorean crisis could "only be solved militarily" because there was "no longer room for a political solution."¹³

At the same time the guerrilla organizations were sorting out their internal problems, they sought to expand the areas under their control from the unpopulated guerrilla-dominated zone along the Honduran border. This military expansion plan, implemented during mid-1980 (as revealed by Napoleon Duarte in a November 1980 Washington meeting), consisted of assuming military control of the mountain range which divides the eastern region of El Salvador from the central and western zones, thereby splitting the country in half. This strategy collapsed because the guerrillas, numbering approximately 6,000 militarily trained individuals, were no match for the 16,000-man Salvadorean armed forces. Therefore, the guerrillas adopted a temporary strategy of "hit and run" terrorism while they continued to improve their military capabilities for the "final phase of the general offensive."

THE GUERRILLAS' JANUARY 1981 GENERAL OFFENSIVE

By December 1980, the guerrilla forces announced that they were "in the final phase of the general offensive," since the FMLN had acquired "enough war material," including "rocket and grenade launchers," capable of destroying "military fortresses and armored equipment."¹⁴ Nevertheless, the most important factor of the guerrillas' timing of the "general offensive," which was set for January 10, 1980, was the result of the U.S. presidential election. This was pointed out by an FDR-FARN communique, which announced the general offensive "for the days

¹³ "PRTC Leader: Situation Can Only Be Solved Militarily," FBIS-LAM-80-144, July 24, 1980, Vol VI, No. 144, p. P5.

¹⁴ "Weapons Claims," FBIS-LAM-80-253, December 31, 1980, Vol. VI, No. 253, p. P4.

prior to the presidential inauguration of the fanatical Ronald Reagan."¹⁵ The guerrillas' strategy to overthrow the Salvadorean governing junta consisted of militarily confronting and weakening the army, acquiring popular support for a general strike, and isolating the Salvadorean government from the international community.

In spite of the massive international support for the guerrillas, the January 1981 "general offensive" failed because of four reasons. First, the guerrillas experienced logistical problems which prevented some of their units from receiving weapons in time for the offensive. Second, many of the weapons received were more sophisticated than the guerrillas had previously used; and, therefore, they were not familiar with their optimum use. Third, the guerrillas failed to incite the population for a general uprising and strike, which "the Salvadorean people completely disregarded" according to Acting Archbishop Rivera y Damas.¹⁶ Fourth, the guerrilla hard-core cadre had recruited poorly trained youngsters to serve in the front ranks of the offensive; and once these children got killed in battle, the more experienced cadre pulled back rather than expose themselves to hostile fire.

COMMUNIST SUPPORT TO EL SALVADOR'S INSURGENCY

With fully documented evidence collected during the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has shown that El Salvador has become the object of an international campaign by communist governments to destabilize the Central American region. This evidence, consisting largely of captured PCS documents, reveals the Communist bloc's involvement in supplying El Salvador's insurgency with arms and training. These captured documents disclose the trips made by Salvadorean guerrilla leaders, including Shafik Handal, to communist countries (Cuba, Nicaragua, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union), to procure Western-manufactured arms for the Salvadorean guerrilla movement. (See Appendix II.) These commitments of nearly 800 tons of modern weapons by communist nations consisted primarily of supplying El Salvador's guerrillas with American-made arms and ammunitions which had been captured or inherited by the present regimes of Vietnam and Ethiopia.

This documentary evidence has been partly confirmed by captured arms en route to El Salvador traced back to Vietnam. In a report by the U.S. Department of State, it is revealed that:

¹⁵ "FDR, FARN Communiques," FBIS-LAM-81-005, January 21, 1981, Vol. VI, No. 005, p. P7.

¹⁶ "Archbishop Says Church Does Not Back Insurrection," p. P19.

in late January, Honduran security forces uncover an arms infiltration operation run by Salvadorans working through Nicaragua and directed by Cubans. In this operation, a trailer truck is discovered carrying weapons and ammunition destined for Salvadoran guerrillas. Weapons include 100 U.S. M-16 rifles and 81mm mortar ammunition. These arms are a portion of the Vietnamese shipment: A trace of the M-16s reveals that several of them were shipped to U.S. units in Vietnam where they were captured or left behind. Using this network, perhaps five truckloads of arms may have reached the Salvadoran guerrillas.

A similar seizure was made in El Salvador in which a plane carrying "numerous weapons" was captured. The pilot, a Nicaraguan government employee, admitted "flying two earlier arms deliveries" to El Salvador.¹⁷

THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO EL SALVADOR'S CRISIS

Negotiations to form a coalition government between the FDR and the current ruling junta are being advocated by a variety of groups around the world as their concept of a "political solution" to the crisis in El Salvador. Perhaps some of these groups honestly believe that the FDR is the "moderate opposition" or "the democratic left," as it is being called. Those who understand the FDR seek such a solution in order to shift the focal point of the Salvadorean political spectrum to the left and, thereby, accomplish through negotiations what the Marxist guerrillas have not been able to achieve militarily. Furthermore, even if successful, these negotiations would result in a government similar to the junta which succeeded the Romero government, which collapsed after two months due to the many differing ideologies among its members -- including persons who are currently affiliated with the guerrillas and their front organizations.

The "political solution" being advocated by the Duarte government, and supported by the Reagan Administration, is a two-phased electoral process: in 1982, general elections for a constitutional assembly, and in 1983, presidential elections. In preparation for this process, Duarte has reorganized the Central Electoral Council. Its head, Jorge Bustamante, has invited all Salvadorean political groups, including the "Marxist parties," to participate in both elections. However, the Marxist parties, which are under the DRU/FDR, have shown no enthusiasm for this course.

¹⁷ "Communist Interference in El Salvador."

U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES

The current overall U.S. policy toward El Salvador has to deal effectively with the existing military and political crises. Only after the military struggle with the Salvadorean Marxist-dominated guerrillas is resolved, will the Salvadorean government be able to initiate a process leading toward democratization. Thus, the principal political role of the U.S. in El Salvador should concentrate on militarily defeating those elements opposed to the democratic process, so that an atmosphere conducive to elections can be created in time for the 1982 voting for a constitutional assembly.

The military role of the United States needs to be re-examined. Under the Carter Administration, the United States pursued a policy of total constraint in supplying military equipment to the governments of El Salvador. From the overthrow of the Romero regime in October 1979, until the eve of President Reagan's inauguration, the Carter Administration maintained a complete embargo on the supply of lethal military equipment to the government of El Salvador. Instead, the U.S. policy attempted to rely on economic assistance and the pursuit of social reforms to undermine guerrilla attacks on the Salvadorean government, and encourage a political settlement of the conflict. However, rather than cooperating with these policies, the guerrillas and their overseas Marxist supporters increased their determination to seize control of the country through military force. The Carter policies terminated with the January "final phase of the general offensive" designed to topple the Duarte government. Only in the aftermath of this full scale military assault, and after Communist bloc intervention was detected, did the Carter Administration finally allow limited lethal military equipment to flow into El Salvador. In spite of the unsuccessful outcome of the guerrillas' final offensive, they have continued to pursue a policy designed to overthrow the Salvadorean government through military force.

The Reagan Administration should continue and even expand support for the Salvadorean armed forces, by providing the necessary lethal and non-lethal military equipment and military advisors to offset the estimated 200 tons of military equipment already delivered to the Salvadorean guerrillas by the Communist bloc. More importantly, the U.S. should assist the Salvadorean government in preventing the delivery of the remaining 600 tons of military equipment committed by communist bloc nations, but not yet received by the Salvadorean insurgency. To halt these weapon and ammunition smuggling operations, the U.S. should continue exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Likewise, the U.S. should supply the Salvadorean armed forces with the surveillance equipment and training necessary to detect these weapons smuggling operations into the country. Honduras should also be encouraged to increase surveillance along the Salvadorean and Nicaraguan borders in order to uncover the infiltration routes used to supply the Salvadorean insurgency with weapons and ammunition.

Politically, the Reagan Administration should encourage the Duarte government to proceed with its plans to hold supervised elections for the constitutional assembly in 1982 and the presidency in 1983. This plan provides a reasonable framework for any groups interested in pursuing peaceful political changes in El Salvador. In the meantime, the U.S. should continue to discourage negotiations to form a coalition government between the Salvadorean junta and the FDR, which is merely a facade for the guerrilla-controlled DRU. In addition, the U.S. should encourage the ruling junta in El Salvador to suspend any reform programs yet to be enacted until after the elections. Through the elections, the Salvadorean people will be able to choose the political party offering those reforms or other programs they desire. It is the electoral process which provides the the most viable basis for both ending the fighting and encouraging the development of a pluralistic democratic society in El Salvador.

A final area of concern to the U.S. should be the Salvadorean private sector, the first target of terrorism by the Marxist guerrillas. During the last decade, the Salvadorean private sector has deteriorated to the point where its existence has been endangered, and therefore is in need of a program to help in its recuperation. The Salvadorean government, in cooperation with other countries and international organizations, should enact a program to revitalize El Salvador's private sector. In the long run, a strong private sector will make El Salvador less dependent on foreign economic assistance.

CONCLUSION

The Salvadorean guerrilla organizations, which compose the leadership of El Salvador's revolutionary movement, came into existence through the various sub-divisions within the PCS (Communist Party of El Salvador) during the last decade. In 1980, these splinter groups reunited along with the PCS, as a precondition for large scale military aid from Cuba. However, even after their abortive January 1981 attempt to topple the Duarte regime, the guerrillas have persisted in advocating a military solution to the Salvadorean crisis. This is in spite of the Salvadorean government's invitation to the Marxist groups to participate in the upcoming elections. The guerrillas' refusal to take part in the elections is understandable, since their popular support has fallen, and is estimated currently at approximately 80,000 people.

The misleading assumption abroad that the Salvadorean revolutionary movement attracts the majority of the Salvadorean people and represents most of that country's democratic sectors, is a product of a skillful international campaign by the FDR. This campaign has included providing an impressive list of organizations composing the Salvadorean revolutionary movement. In fact, some of the groups listed by the FDR consist of as few as a dozen persons, while other groups have overlapping memberships. The irony of the Salvadorean insurgency is that they have acquired

a measure of international credibility as representatives of the moderate, democratic opposition although the vast majority of its members describe themselves as "M-L."

The U.S. should continue to support efforts to bring about a "political solution" to the existing Salvadorean crisis through the electoral process. Through such elections the Salvadorean people can decide for themselves the political orientation and programs they wish to pursue. Thus, if any group believes it speaks for the Salvadorean people, it should be demonstrated through the planned elections.

Alexander Kruger
Policy Analyst

APPENDIX I

The FDR's platform is spelled out in great detail in its official publication, "El Salvador On the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory," published in El Salvador in January 1981 by the FMLN-FDR. The tasks and objectives of the FDR are:

1. To overthrow the reactionary military dictatorship of the oligarchic and U.S. imperialism, imposed and sustained against the will of the Salvadorean people for fifty years; to destroy its criminal political-military machine; and to establish a democratic revolutionary government, founded on the unity of the revolutionary and democratic forces in the People's Army and the Salvadorean people.

2. To put an end to the overall political, economic and social power of the great lords of the land and capital.

3. To liquidate once and for all the economic, political, and military dependence of our country on U.S. imperialism.

4. To assure democratic rights and freedoms to the entire people -- particularly for the working masses, who are the ones who have least enjoyed such freedoms.

5. To transfer to the people, through nationalizations and the creation of collective and socialized enterprises: the fundamental means of production and distribution that are now hoarded by the oligarchy and the U.S. monopolies, the land held in the power of the big landlords, the enterprises that produce and distribute electricity and other monopolized services, foreign trade, banking, and large transportation enterprises. None of this will affect small or medium-sized private businesses, which will be given every kind of stimulus and support in the various branches of the national economy.

6. To raise the cultural and material living standards of the population.

7. To create a new army for our country, one that will arise fundamentally on the basis of the People's Army to be built in the course of the revolutionary process. Those healthy, patriotic, and worthy elements that belong to the current army can also be incorporated.

8. To encourage all forms of organization of the people, at all levels and in all sectors, thus guaranteeing their active, creative, and democratic involvement in the revolutionary process and securing the closest identification between the people and their government.

9. To orient the foreign policy and international relations of our country around the principles of independence and self-determination, solidarity, peaceful coexistence, equal rights, and mutual respect between states.

10. Through all these measures, to assure our country peace, freedom, the well-being of our people, and future social progress.

APPENDIX II

Excerpt from "Communist Interference in El Salvador" U.S. Department of State, February 23, 1981

DOCUMENTS DEMONSTRATING COMMUNIST SUPPORT OF THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY

Two particularly important document caches were recovered from the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) in November 1980 and from the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) in January 1981. Only a very small portion of the total documents recovered are attached. Many of the documents are written using cryptic language and abbreviations. A glossary is provided before each document to define selected relevant terms.

CHRONOLOGICAL KEY TO THE DOCUMENTS

--December 16, 1979

Representatives of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), National Resistance (FARN), and Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), writing in Havana, thank Fidel Castro for his "help, and the help of (his) comrades of the Party" in establishing a unity agreement among these armed groups (see Document A).

--April, 1980

"Requests" (possibly for arms) are made in a meeting at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. (see Document B).

--April 28, 1980

In a meeting of the Political Commission of the Salvadoran Communist Party, Party leader Shafik Handal notes the need to take advantage of possibilities for help by the "socialist camp." Their attitude is "magnificent," he says. Handal also notes desirability of involving "everyone of the area" (i.e., Central America) as suggested to "Fidel." (see Document C)

--May 19 - 31, 1980

Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) is admitted to the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana. Coalition leadership, which assumes name of Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), meets with Fidel Castro on three occasions and with visiting German Democratic Republic leader Eric Honecker (see Document D).

--May 19 - 31, 1980

Guerrilla leadership meets twice with Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE - clandestine operations/special forces unit of Cuban Ministry of Interior) to discuss guerrilla military plans. In addition, they met with the Cuban "Chief of Communications." (see Document D)

--May 30, 1980

Shafik Handal departs from the Havana meeting for Moscow. (see Document D)

--June 1, 1980

Guerrilla leadership, minus Salvadoran Communist Party chief Handal, arrives in Managua. Joint Directorate of FSLN: (a) offers a headquarters for the guerrilla directorate "with all measures of security;" (b) states that it is disposed to "contribute in material terms;" (c) assumes "the cause of El Salvador as its own;" and (d) offers "advice and exchange of opinions" to the guerrillas. (see Document D)

-- June 2 - July 22, 1980

Salvadoran Communist Party Chief Shafik Handal visits: (a) the USSR, (b) Vietnam, (c) the German Democratic Republic, (d) Czechoslovakia, (e) Bulgaria, (f) Hungary, and (g) Ethiopia.

--June 2, 1980

Handal meets in Moscow with Mikhail Kudachkin, Deputy Chief of the Latin American Section of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Kudachkin suggests that Handal travel to Vietnam to seek arms and offers to pay for Handal's trip. (see Document E)

--June 9 - 15, 1980

Handal visits Vietnam where he is received by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, and Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Van Quang. Vietnamese, as "first contribution," agree to provide sixty tons of arms. (see Documents E and F)

--June 19 - 24, 1980

Handal visits German Democratic Republic where he is received by Hermann Axen, member of the GDR Politburo. Axen states that the GDR has already dispatched 1.9 tons of supplies to Managua. (On July 21, GDR leader Honecker telegraphs GDR Embassy in Moscow, indicating that additional supplies will be sent and that the GDR will provide military training, particularly on clandestine operations. GDR telegram adds that, although Berlin possesses no Western-manufactured weapons (which the Salvadoran guerrillas are seeking), efforts will be undertaken to find "a solution to this problem.") (see Documents E and F)

Mandal visits Czechoslovakia where he is received by Vasil Bilak, Second Secretary of the Czech Communist Party. Bilak notes that some Czech arms circulating in the world market will be provided. Transportation will be coordinated with the GDR. (see Documents E and F)

--June 27 - 30, 1980

Mandal visits Bulgaria where he is received by Dimitir Stanichev, member of the Central Committee Secretariat. Bulgarians agree to supply German-origin weapons and other supplies. (see Documents E and F)

--June 30 - July 3, 1980

Mandal visits Hungary where he is received by Communist Party General Secretary Janos Madar and "Guesel" (probably Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Andras Gyenes.) The latter offers radios and other supplies and indicates Hungarian willingness to trade arms with Ethiopia or Angola in order to obtain Western-origin arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. (see Documents E and F)

--July 3 - 6, 1980

Mandal visits Ethiopia where he is received by Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam and Berhanu Bayeh, Executive Committee member. Mengistu indicates that Ethiopia will supply "several thousand weapons" and ammunition. (see Documents E and F)

--July 22, 1980

Mandal is again received in Moscow, this time by Karen Brutents, Chief of the Latin American Section of the CPSU Central Committee. Brutents indicates that the Soviets agree in principle to transport the Vietnamese arms. (see Document E)

--July 23, 1980

"Comrade Bayardo" (Bayardo Arce of FSLN Directorate) meets in Managua with a delegation of the Salvadoran guerrilla Joint General Staff. Arce promises ammunition to the guerrillas and arranges a meeting for them with the FSLN "Military Commission." Arce indicates that, since the guerrillas will receive some arms manufactured by the communist countries, the Sandinista Army (EPS) will consider absorbing some of these weapons and providing to the Salvadorans Western-manufactured arms held by the EPS in exchange. (see Document G)

--July 22, 1980

Guerrilla military leadership meets in Managua, Nicaragua with PLO leader Yasir Arafat. (see Document G)

--July 27, 1980

Guerrilla General Staff delegation departs from Managua for Havana where Cuban "specialists" add final touches to their military plans. (see Document G)

--August 15, 1980

Ethiopian arms depart for Cuba. (see Document F)

--September 5, 1980

Vietnamese arms are scheduled to arrive in Cuba. (see Document F)

--September 24, 1980

Guerrillas receive and distribute five hundred thousand dollars (\$500,000) logistics donation from Iraq. Funds are distributed to the Nicaraguan FSLN and within El Salvador. (see Documents I and J)

--September 26, 1980

Guerrilla logistics committee informs its Joint General Staff that 130 tons of arms and other military material supplied by the communist countries have arrived in Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador. According to the report, this represents one-sixth of the commitments to the guerrillas by the communist countries. (see Document I)

(NOTE: To get an idea of the dimensions of this commitment, the Vietnamese offer of only 60 tons included 2 million rifle and machine gun bullets, 14,500 mortar shells, 1620 rifles, 210 machine guns, 48 mortars, 12 rocket launchers, and 192 pistols.)

--End of September, 1980

Nicaraguan FSLN suspends its weapons deliveries to El Salvador for one month after the United States Government protests to the Nicaraguan leadership over the supply activities. (see Document J)

--End of October, 1980

The Nicaraguan FSLN provides the Salvadoran guerrillas a new delivery schedule and resumes weapons deliveries. (see Document K)

--September - October, 1980

Guerrillas begin preparations for infiltrating weapons and equipment into El Salvador by land, air and sea. (see Documents J, L, M, N and O)

The guerrilla General Staff is informed that there are approximately 120 tons of military equipment now in Nicaragua ready for shipment to the Salvadoran guerrillas. By mid-November, the guerrillas indicate that 300-400 tons of weapons and material will be in Cuba ready for subsequent transfer to Nicaragua and then, clandestinely, to El Salvador. (see Document K)

--October 29, 1980

Guerrillas decide to open "clandestine" radio station in Nicaragua with the help of the Cubans and Nicaraguans. (see Document P)

--November, 1980

Beginning in November, the FSLN sends to El Salvador more arms than the guerrillas can receive and distribute. The guerrillas note that the boats are being overloaded in Nicaragua and ask that the FSLN better coordinate its delivery activities with the guerrillas. (see Documents Q and R)

--November 1, 1980

Salvadoran guerrilla logistics representative in Managua calls on armed groups in El Salvador -- the "last link" in the supply "chain" -- to work harder to absorb more arms shipments. The communist countries in some cases, the representative notes, have doubled their promised help. (see Document K)

--November, 1980

Due to overloading problems, the guerrillas raise the need for talks on delivery arrangements with the FSLN. (see Document S)

--January 10, 1981

The guerrillas launch their "general offensive" against the Salvadoran government. It failed.

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Milton
Blackwell

U.S. COMMITTEE
WORLD CONFERENCE ON RELIGION AND PEACE
WCRP/USA

777 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017

Telephone: (212) 687-2163

March 27, 1981

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President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear President Reagan:

Enclosed please find a policy statement on
El Salvador which our organization drafted,
discussed, and adopted yesterday.

We hope that your policy toward El Salvador
may be modified in line with our suggestions.

Sincerely yours,

file



Malcolm R. Sutherland
Executive Director

ME:rb
Enclosure

WCRP/USA POLICY STATEMENT ON EL SALVADOR
March 25, 1981

The Executive Council of the World Conference on Religion and Peace/USA* wishes to communicate to the President of the United States and his cabinet, and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the following statement with regard to emerging U.S. foreign policy in Central America:

We believe that the genius of the United States, its stature among nations, and its ultimate strength as a world power should rest on its concern for human rights and political democracy. Therefore, we are troubled that U.S. foreign policy is now turning from reliance upon these priorities and seeking to build its international strength primarily by increasing its military power, and by interfering anew by military means in conflict situations in Central America.

We are concerned that this developing policy will relay wrong signals to oppressed populations and freedom-loving people everywhere and have a demoralizing effect upon those struggling for social justice against poverty, violence, and tyranny.

Specifically, we believe that present U.S. military policy toward El Salvador weakens rather than strengthens our international influence and our effective resistance to repressive tendencies whether from the left or from the right.

We also believe that the people of any nation should be encouraged to resolve their own political problems and determine their own future without outside interference from any source.

Since we believe the problems of El Salvador are fundamentally economic and social rather than military or ideological, we urge that:

1. U.S. military aid be terminated and military personnel withdrawn.
2. The U.S. use all available means, short of military threat or action, to persuade all other countries and people to refrain from further military aid or intervention in El Salvador.
3. U.S. economic aid to the government of El Salvador be offered, provided that such assistance is directed to raising the living standards of the poorest of the population. Whenever possible, such aid should be extended multilaterally rather than bilaterally.
4. The U.S. encourage the government of El Salvador (a) to seek a political solution by correcting situations of injustice and grave inequity, thus eliminating the causes of guerrilla activity; (b) to broaden its leadership and popular base; (c) to disband its right-wing military squads; and (d) to proceed with early national elections under international supervision.
5. The U.S. adopt a similar non-intervention policy in relationship with other Central American countries.

* WCRP/USA is the American division of an international inter-religious organization, representing the major faiths in the world, primarily concerned with using the influence of religious institutions and teachings to increase international understanding and establish world peace with justice. The Executive Council of the American division is made up of leaders within the major religious faiths and denominations in the United States. Although these leaders represent different religious traditions, they are one in their opposition to tyranny, repression, violence, and the denial of basic human rights.