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SOCIAL PROGRAMS

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Amount (in Billions)</u>
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1977	215.7
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1978	234.4
------	-------

1979	259.4
------	-------

1980	303.3
------	-------

1981	349.4
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	<u>1,362.2</u>
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1982	364.2 (in Billions)
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1983	391.3
------	-------

1984	417.4
------	-------

1985	446.0
------	-------

1986	<u>472.0</u>
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	2,090.9
--	---------

Total Outlays:	3,453.1
(Current Prices)	

TOTAL NATIONAL DEFENSE

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>Amount (in Billions)</u>
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1977	97.5
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1978	105.2
------	-------

1979	117.7
------	-------

1980	135.9
------	-------

1981	162.1
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	<u>618.4</u>
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1982	188.8 (in Billions)
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1983	226.0
------	-------

1984	255.6
------	-------

1985	303.9
------	-------

1986	<u>342.7</u>
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	1,317.0
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Total Outlays:	1,935.4
(Current Prices)	

(Current as of March 1981)

USEFUL QUOTE:

"It is customary in Democratic countries to deplore expenditures on armaments as conflicting with the requirements of the social services. There is a tendency to forget that the most important social service a government can do for its people is to keep them alive and free."

Sir John Slessor
Air Marshall, U.K.

AIR FORCE ECONOMIES AND EFFICIENCIES

*military
info
Defense*

1. Last year the Air Force received 91,000 suggestions from its employees. These resulted in savings of more than \$76 million.
2. During the first part of this year, the Air Force documented 527 management efficiencies representing more than \$1 billion in savings/cost avoidances.
3. During the first half of this year, Air Force energy management programs used \$720 million less than the FY 75 rates.
4. When the Air Force needed a new B-52 weapons trainer, a contractor offered to build one for \$20 million. Instead, we took an old B-52 out of storage and converted it to a trainer. This saved more than \$13 million.
5. When the Air Force needed a new reconnaissance airplane, we didn't build one from scratch. We used an excellent existing design, the U-2, and converted it into the new plane, the TR-1. This saved more than \$250 million in development, testing and evaluation costs.
6. The longer the Air Force flies B-52s, the more engine parts we need. Buying new parts for old engines is expensive. So we recycle the parts from engines from our fleet of retired B-52s. This has already reduced our bill for engine parts by \$92 million over a 2-year (FYs 81-82) period.
7. The Air Force reduced its travel expenses by \$20 million through a variety of common sense management techniques like buying airline discount fares and consolidating trips.
8. Working with General Dynamics, the Air Force made production line improvements designed to make the F-16 construction process more efficient. The result? In 1980 we saved more than \$16 million while building 175 of the new fighters.
9. Air Force logistic experts found a way to use computers to identify and track shipping containers. Now we can recycle and use them more efficiently. It saved the Air Force \$2 million.
10. Up-front investments and multi-year contracts are both proven money savers for the Air Force. For example:
 - a. We know we will need cannon shells for the A-10 aircraft for several years to come. Instead of buying one year at a time, we negotiated a fixed price, multi-year contract. This long-term agreement assures the contractor of stable labor and raw material costs so he can guarantee us a better price. We will save \$34 million over what we would have spent by purchasing the ammunition a year at a time.

b. This year we bought four sets of satellite components. We will be using these over several years. But because we bought them all at one time, the manufacturer was able to sell them for \$31 million less than if we had stretched the buy over several years.

(Sources: Items 1-9, AF/AC; Item 10, SAF/PAX)

AIR FORCE SPENDING IN PERSPECTIVE

1. Since 1976, Americans have spent more money on alcohol each year than they have spent to fund the operations of their Air Force.
2. In recent years we Americans spent nearly three times as much on toys and sports supplies than we spend on the budget for the Air Force's Strategic Forces.
3. In the last five years we Americans spent twice as much for radios and TV sets, records and musical instruments than we spend for the Air Force's General Purpose Forces.
4. The gross profits from Las Vegas casino gambling are almost twice as much as the Air Force's fuel bill for an entire year.
5. Ten years ago, private aviators flew the same total flying hours each year as did the entire U.S. Air Force. Today, private aviators fly three times as many hours each year as the Air Force.
6. In 1960, America spent over twice as much for national defense as it did for recreation. Today in America we spend nearly (over 85 percent) as much money for recreation as we budget for our total national defense.
7. Last year Americans spent \$9 billion playing coin-operated electronic games. That's more than the Air Force spent to buy new airplanes. Americans spent \$3 billion going to the movies. That's more than the Air Force spent to buy missiles. In short, last year America spent more on electronic games and movies than it spent to supply the Air Force with airplanes and missiles.
8. For 1982, the Air Force budget represents 1.7 percent of our nation's GNP. Before the Vietnam War, in 1964, the Air Force budget represented 3.3 percent of our country's GNP. Using 1982 dollars, the 1964 budget would have been \$68 billion. In 1982 the Air Force budget is \$54 billion, a reduction of more than 20 percent from 1964's spending level when the Soviet threat to our freedom was considerably less than it is today.

(Sources: Items 1-6, AF/AC; Items 7-8, SAF/PAX)

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE -- B-1

File

May

<u>FOR</u>	<u>LEANING FOR</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>LEANING AGAINST</u>	<u>AGAINST</u>
Stevens	Stennis (RR)	Huddleston (RR)	Chiles	Hatfield
Weicker	✓ Inouye (Inman)		Johnston (RR)	Proxmire
McClure	✓ Sasser			Byrd, R.
Laxalt	✓ DeConcini (Inman)			Hollings
Garn	Specter (RR)			Eagleton
Schmitt				Burdick
Cochran				Leahy
Andrews				Bumpers
Abdnor				
Kasten				
D'Amato				
✓ Mattingly				
Rudman				

SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE -- MX

<u>FOR</u>	<u>LEANING FOR</u>	<u>UNDECIDED</u>	<u>LEANING AGAINST</u>	<u>AGAINST</u>
Stevens	Specter (RR)	Johnston (RR)	Chiles	Hatfield
McClure	✓ Huddleston (RR)	✓ Weicker *	Burdick	Proxmire
D'Amato	Stennis (RR)	✓ DeConcini		Eagleton
Kasten	✓ Bumpers (Carlucci)	Inouye		Byrd, R.
Abdnor		✓ Mattingly		Leahy
Andrews		✓ Sasser		Hollings
Laxalt				
Garn				
Schmitt				
Cochran				
Rudman				

*Note from MA
to Ned re votes at 10:00*

November 14, 1981

✓ - Ned built checks on finances
* OK on missile; doesn't see basing mode

Patrick J. Buchanan

Pluralism In a Free Society

WASHINGTON — Within a single 24-hour period last weekend, no fewer than a dozen media heavies on just three programs — PBS' "Washington Week in Review," ABC's "Nightline" and "Agronsky & Co." — volunteered their respective embarrassment, anger and disgust over the White House decision to restore a tax exemption to Bob Jones University.

Not one defended the decision; not one among the "herd of independent minds" volunteered a word in defense of the fundamentalist school that prohibits interracial dating.

The episode is revealing. Revealing for what it tells us of the orthodoxy of our established secular-political church, and for what it tells us of a White House in which some of us invested too much hope.

Washington is still, in many ways, the most tolerant of capitals. It is yet permissible to praise Fidel Castro as a Cuban patriot, so affronted and alienated by Washington's rebuffs to his advances that, heartbroken, he rushed into Soviet arms. It is still permissible to speak of Mao's holocaust as an experiment noble in purpose that unfortunately miscarried. To have been called "soft on communism" in the 1940s is a badge

of honor; to be "soft on segregation" in the 1980s is a visa to the social boondocks.

Those liberal politicians who fraternized with the tax-exempt Peoples Temple of Jim Jones will, I suspect, sooner be readmitted to grace than some Washington journalist who sent a check to Bob Jones.

Acutely aware of the gravity of their sin, White House aides who participated are frantically casting about for absolution. Friendly reporters are called, informed in confidence of the caller's innocence of all complicity, his utter horror on learning what was to be perpetrated.

Since somebody has to carry the can for a decision that went down, after all,

without dissent, James Baker and Michael Deaver are described as being "furious" — while the finger of suspicion is pointed toward Edwin Meese III. With Richard Allen's assassination ancient history, Meese moves into the cross hairs.

★★★

THE POLITICAL LESSON the White House is ignoring is that the bleating of the lamb only excites the tiger. In the political-ideological struggle in which they are engaged, like it or not, whispered "Peccavi's" (I have sinned) only betray a lack of conviction to the Adversary Press, inviting contempt.

The Bob Jones decision is itself more defensible than the subsequent conduct of those who took it. Even E. B. Williams would be hard-pressed to defend a client who keeps blubbing apologies and throwing himself on the mercy of the court.

"Federal subsidies for segregation" is the parrot line of the president's critics. But if that were so, why would the Jewish Commission on Law and Public Poli-

Richmond Times-Dispatch

JOHN STEWART BRYAN III
Publisher

EDWARD GRIMSLEY
Editor of the Editorial Page

ALF GOODYKOONTZ
Executive Editor

MARVIN E. GARRETTE
Managing Editor

Thursday, January 21, 1982

cy have filed an *amicus* brief on behalf of Bob Jones? If tax exemption equals federal subsidy, should not tax exemptions for all churches be lifted as violation of the First Amendment?

The issue here is not whether we like the dating policy at Bob Jones. It is pluralism in a free society. How much diversity, reactionary or radical, in behavior and practice are we willing to accept in our private institutions?

Twenty years ago, the Black Muslims of the Honorable Elijah Muhammad were making prison converts out of the wretched of the Earth: pimps, prostitutes, rapists, killers, thieves. Clergy of several faiths, studying the alarming nation of Islam, concluded that this was a legitimate religion, entitled to the same constitutional protections and tax benefits as any other — even though its mosques and schools practiced a racial separation that makes Bob Jones look like Greenwich Village.

★★★

CONSIDER ALSO the "segregation academies," the private and religious

schools that sprouted up during the court's busing binge in the 1970s. Should these be entitled to a tax exemption?

Why not? After all, the first segregation academies in America were parochial schools — set up by Catholic bishops in Northern cities to protect Catholic children from doctrinal contamination in Protestant-dominated public schools. Similarly, fundamentalist Protestants are attempting to escape the forced busing and secular humanist atmosphere of today's public schools.

Morally, where is the distinction between middle-class parents shifting their kids into newly established private schools to escape integration in Mississippi and wealthy parents shifting their children into already established private schools to escape integration in the District of Columbia?

If, however, the high priests of the prevailing orthodoxy are determined to destroy these private schools using the IRS, their noses should be rubbed in their own hypocrisy.

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NSC Aide Sees 'a Drift Toward War'

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

The top military officer on the staff of the White House National Security Council claimed yesterday that the "Soviets are, on the move, they are going to strike," and said the United States is "in the greatest danger that the republic has ever faced since its founding days."

In a speech that appeared to go beyond even the hard line the administration has taken, Army Maj. Gen. Robert L. Schweitzer also declared that Moscow now has nuclear superiority in all three legs of the

strategic triad—meaning land-based and submarine-based missiles and long-range bombers—and spoke of "a drift toward war."

Schweitzer, who heads the defense group on the NSC staff, said evidence continues to mount that the Soviets have in mind invading Poland, that Moscow continues practicing maneuvers aimed at taking over Persian Gulf oil fields, that U.S. church leaders have not been helpful in combating the Soviet presence in Latin America and that a backlash involving Israel could occur here if

the sale of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia is thwarted by Congress.

A White House spokesman, describing Schweitzer's speech as "off the wall," said, "We want to knock this one hard." He said of the speech, "It's much more pessimistic than the president's own views."

Schweitzer provided his grim assessment in a speech before several hundred Army officers and others at the annual meeting here of the Association of the United States Army. His speech marked one of the rare times that someone on the NSC

See SCHWEITZER, A9, Col. 1

White House Aide Grimly Assesses Soviet Might

SCHWEITZER, From A1
staff, other than its director, presidential adviser Richard V. Allen, has been allowed to speak publicly. Allen has also told NSC staff members they may not talk to reporters.

Another White House spokesman said Schweitzer "was giving his own personal views and not speaking for the administration." If Schweitzer had submitted his speech for White House approval, it would not have been approved, the spokesman said.

Schweitzer told the audience that his speech probably would not have been approved if he had submitted an advance text. He said he told his bosses generally what he was going to say and they expressed the "hope" he would not cause trouble.

Well, I think we are going to have to get ourselves in trouble and our principals [apparently meaning our allies] in order to lay out the threat, because the threat is believed

not to exist," Schweitzer said. "That's the feeling in [Western] Europe. They think it's automatic, another 30 years of peace. That's wrong. The Soviets are on the move. They are going to strike. They've got every incentive and the capability."

Schweitzer also said:

- On Poland: "A possible, certainly threatened, Soviet invasion" is the leading challenge to the western alliance. While scholars and analysts may debate the timing or strength, "the evidence continues to mount that the Soviet Union very much has this in mind."

- On the Caribbean: The region "is in flames. There is no other way to describe it." There is some level of active, organized communist insurgency in every country throughout South America, he said, while in the Caribbean and Latin America there is, in addition, endemic economic and sociological revolutions. "The

last administration minimized the communist threat and maximized human rights. In so doing, they confused a goal with a policy."

- On pacificism: "The seed of pacificism and neutralism is sweeping over Europe, and we're not immune to it in this country, where bishops and churchmen have been extremely unhelpful in trying to deal with the realities of the [communist] threat down in Latin America."

- On the Middle East: If the AWACS deal is vetoed, the United States faces an \$8.5 billion loss of sales and tax revenues and the Saudis would buy Nimrod warning planes and Mirage fighters from Britain and France. Then Israel would ask U.S. help to meet this new threat. The Israelis will say, "Here is our list, and we want it on the same terms . . . and 50 percent grant aid that you've always given us in the past."

"I wonder if there isn't going to be some backlash in the U.S.," Schweitzer said, when it is considered that the United States diminished Israeli security and now is making demands on U.S. taxpayers "to buy them [the Israelis] out of a threat that really will be created with our own hands."

- On Soviet superiority: "The Soviet Union knows that for the first time they have superiority in every leg of the triad," and thus "they may be tempted to use nuclear or non-nuclear forces." This was "a very bad trend—the drift toward war." No administration figure has made such a sweeping claim of Soviet supremacy. U.S. submarines and bombers still are judged superior.

- On the press: "The press gets fed a steady diet . . . and if they didn't get this, they'd get sick. So sometimes they make it up, or extend and expand on it." Those remarks brought the most applause.

Let's say

file Military

BRIEFING PAPER

Military Issues

I. Compensation issues

A. Pay cap

As part of his anti-inflation program, President Carter held the salary increase for both military personnel and GS civil servants to 5.5%. Under the law applicable to both, the salaries are to be adjusted each year to take account of inflation. The October, 1977, raise was 7.05%. Military personnel feel that it is unfair to single them out for making sacrifices in the anti-inflation effort. It is unfortunate that, under present law, military personnel are tied together with civilian employees, so that Congress cannot give the hard-working, underpaid military personnel a raise without also giving the lazy, overpaid civil servants a raise at the same time.

B. Double dipping

Double-dipping is the label attached to the practice of retired military personnel working for the federal government as civilians and drawing both a civilian salary and a military pension. The very term "double-dipping" is anathema to military personnel, because they believe it to be unfairly misleading. The retirement benefits of a retired member of the Armed Forces represent delayed compensation for prior services, while his current salary represents current compensation for current services. Delayed compensation is by no means unique to the military. Many people work out delayed compensation schemes with their employers for tax reasons. For example, many professional athletes sign contracts whereby they continue to receive compensation after their playing days are over. If O. J. Simpson signed such a contract with the San Francisco 49'ers, and if he continued with the team as an assistant coach after the end of his playing career, thereby receiving his delayed compensation from his playing days and another salary as an assistant coach, would anyone accuse him of "double-dipping?"

Under current law, the "double-dipping" practices of retired regular officers are limited, but not the similar practices of retired reserve officers or retired enlisted men. After the first \$4,000, a retired regular officer loses 50¢ of every dollar of his retirement pay for every dollar he earns as a civilian employee of the federal government.

C. Severance pay for enlisted men

An officer who is involuntarily released from active duty under honorable conditions is entitled to severance pay of \$15,000, provided he has served at least 5 years on active duty. A regular officer is entitled, provided he is promoted to the third officer rank, to remain on active duty at least that long. An officer who is promoted to the fourth officer rank is entitled to remain in until he has a full 20 years and is entitled to retire. Enlisted men, on the other hand, do not have these benefits. An enlisted man enlists for an initial period of 3 or 4 years, then he can reenlist for successive 4-year periods. If, at any time before he has in his full 20 years, his request for reenlistment is denied, he must leave the service with nothing.

D. Grandfather clauses

If any change is to be made in military compensation or retirement systems, a "grandfather clause" should be included so that people then on active duty or already retired are not hurt by the change. The retirement system is a substantial part of the inducement for most career members to stay in. It would be very unfair to change the system after a man has already put in most of his part of the bargain.

II. Travel issues

A. Travel entitlements for junior enlisted

Under current law, a member of the Armed Forces who is transferred is entitled to government-sponsored shipment of his household goods only if he is at least an E-4 in rank, and only if he has at least 4 years in the service (in the case of an enlisted man). Junior enlisted personnel are entitled to ship only one "seabag" at government expense. If a PFC receives orders to Germany, he can take his wife and child if he wants to, but he must pay their way and pay for the shipment of his furniture. Once there, he cannot receive government quarters or an allowance in lieu of quarters for the dependents. For years, there has been talk to extending travel entitlements to junior enlisted personnel, but nothing has been done.

B. Dollar devaluation

Military personnel in Germany and Japan have been wiped out by the de facto devaluation of the dollar in relation to the Mark and the Yen. In just one year, the dollar lost over 30%. Particularly hard hit are junior enlisted personnel living "on the economy" because the military does not sponsor their dependents. (See above.) Perhaps an indexing factor could be worked out to increase the pay of military personnel overseas as the dollar loses value against the currency of the host country.

III. Claims issues

A. Personnel claims

Almost all military personnel are familiar with what are known as "personnel claims." These are claims under the provisions of the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act of 1964, as amended, 31 U.S.C. §§ 240-243. This act applies to all employees of the federal government, both military and civilian, but its impact is felt most by military personnel. The most common occasion for filing a claim under the act would be a move pursuant to orders. When a member of the Armed Forces receives orders for a PCS ("permanent change-of-station") move, he goes to a military transport office to arrange for the movement of his household goods. The military arranges for the move, but the actual transportation of the goods is usually conducted by a commercial moving company. The contract between the government and the moving company limits the company's liability for loss of or damage to the goods to just 60¢ per pound per line item. (Even less for foreign moves.) For example, if the company loses or destroys your \$400 camera which weighs one pound, the company's liability is 60¢. If the military member is to get any meaningful compensation for the loss or damage, it must come from the government as a personnel claim.

Under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act, supra, the maximum amount that may be paid for any one incident of loss or damage is \$15,000. For example, if your entire shipment of household goods is lost in an aircraft crash, ship sinking, warehouse fire, etc., your maximum recovery is \$15,000. This limit was last raised in 1972. It is time that it be increased again.

Even more vexing are the limits administratively placed on claims by the Judge Advocates General of the 3 military departments. Enclosed is a copy of the "Allowance List" used by all 3 departments. This document, which in my legal opinion is illegal, places arbitrary maximums on various items or classes of items. For example, there is a \$750 limit on photographic equipment and a \$1,000 limit on rugs. If your rug, which was destroyed in a government move, is worth more than \$1,000, you are nonetheless limited to \$1,000 except in very unusual circumstances.

Note: The \$15,000 maximum can be increased only by Congress, but these arbitrary maximums can be abolished administratively.

B. Feres doctrine

A member of the Armed Forces on active duty has no cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act for any injury which is "incident to his service." [Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).] The "incident to service" concept is very broad. Any time a member of the Armed Forces is on a military base or utilizing any facility or service to which he is entitled by virtue of his service, he is "Feres barred." This doctrine does not apply to dependents or to retired personnel.

The most common class of claims which are "Feres barred" are medical malpractice claims. (More about the hazards of military medicine below.) If a member of the Armed Forces is injured by medical malpractice of a military doctor, etc., he cannot sue the government or the doctor. He is left almost without a remedy.

IV. Military medicine

The military medical system is in terrible shape, largely because of the inability to recruit and retain doctors after the end of the draft. Malpractice is rampant. Work that should be done by doctors is being done by lesser-trained personnel. All doctors, including psychiatrists and dermatologists, must stand watch as "medical officer of the day." Thus, if you go to a military hospital at night with a possible heart attack, you may find that the only doctor on duty in the hospital is a psychiatrist.

Retired personnel and dependents are often turned away from military hospitals. They must go to civilian doctors or hospitals and pay at least part of the bill under the CHAMPUS program. This is a very important issue to them, since they feel that they are entitled to free medical care by virtue of their years of service.

In an attempt to recruit doctors, the military services have offered medical school scholarships. However, many new doctors, upon completion of medical school, suddenly discover that they are "conscientious objectors" and thus avoid their military commitments.

V. Veterans' issues

A. Veterans' preference

As part of his civil service reform bill, President Carter attempted to sharply restrict "veterans' preference" in the civil service system. Under the current system, a veteran has a lifetime preference in the civil service system. He can use his preference to get a job, since it entitles him to a certain number of "points" which will put him above equally qualified non-veterans. He can also use the preference to get a promotion or to avoid losing his job during a RIF ("reduction-in-force"). The preference is a lifetime preference.

Carter's proposal would have limited veterans to one use of the preference, and it would have required that that use be made during the first 10 years after discharge. This proposal was dropped from the bill before it was enacted, but many servicemen are nonetheless angry at Carter for proposing it.

Most states have some form of veterans' preference for state employees. Some state laws are more generous to veterans than the federal law. A case involving the Massachusetts law is currently pending in the United States Supreme Court. A lower court declared the Massachusetts law unconstitutional as "sex discrimination." The Solicitor General filed an amicus curiae brief in defense of the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law, but Carter rebuked him for having done so. It is possible that the brief will be withdrawn.

B. Veterans' educational benefits

Persons who entered the Armed Forces after January 1, 1977, are not entitled to the full VA educational benefits. They are entitled to participate in a much more modest contributory plan. This change in the law was, in my opinion, a serious mistake. The VA educational benefits were a strong drawing card for recruitment. Recruitment of qualified volunteers is a real problem. Increasingly sophisticated equipment requires highly competent and trained personnel, even in the enlisted ranks. Many of the recruits, even those who are high-school graduates, are "functional illiterates." Reinstating the full VA educational benefits will help attract high-school graduates who are "college material."

→ The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Massachusetts law.

Defense

SUBJECT: Republican Defense Antics: The Kansas Episode

1. Attached is an explanation of Senator Kassebaum's recommended defense budget mark that she supports as a member of the Budget Committee. It was circulated by her defense legislative assistant.

2. Among other things, Senator Kassebaum would

- Cancel the B-1
- Introduce a "high agility bomber" to compete with "Stealth."
- Cancel the F-15
- Cancel the F-18
- Substitute A-7s for A-6 buys
- Cancel the Advanced Attack Helicopter
- Cancel the M-1 tank
- Cancel the PATRIOT battlefield SAM system
- Cancel nuclear aircraft carrier construction
- Cancel AEGIS cruisers
- Cancel nuclear attack subs
- Cancel New Jersey activation

3. In all cases, all alternatives to the canceled programs either

- (1) Provide considerably less combat power than the original programs (AEGIS, PATRIOT, M-1 tank) and/or
- (2) Do not exist. (In the case of the "high agility" bomber, the alternatives stink of a ploy that would entice such defense experts as Senator Kassebaum to oppose practical--if expensive--systems to chase after mirages.

4. This is another example that supports your contention that the Reagan Administration lacks a clear picture of America's national security requirements. If the President were able to get his act together, there would be considerably less of this kind of mindless chasing after rabbits. With Republicans all over the national security lot, how can we ever hope to forge a bipartisan consensus?

THE KASSEBAUM BUDGET MARK: INCREASING U.S. DEFENSE FORCES WHILE MEETING OUR ECONOMIC NECESSITIES

The Kassebaum budget mark accepts test and performance data that demonstrates that many very expensive weapons programs are not militarily effective. It also accepts the proposition that these expensive and ineffective systems should be replaced by existing ones that are proven to work and which are considerably cheaper. The Kassebaum budget mark also refuses to purchase systems now in research and development that are clearly seriously deficient in concept and design and which are tremendously expensive. Thus, this budget mark proposal refuses to purchase some weapons systems altogether, and in other cases it replaces unacceptable programs with sensibly priced ones which are effective. The result of these "trade-ins" is a considerably smaller defense budget but a larger defense force. Accordingly, the mark addresses both the nation's serious present budget situation and the demonstrated need to expand U.S. defense forces.

The weapons programs that the Kassebaum budget mark assumes the end of or which it replaces are as follows:

Strategic Systems

MX Basing Mode: The Kassebaum budget mark would preserve funds for the MX missile but would remove funds for the basing mode. These funds, \$.5 billion in FY '82, when requested originally, were intended for the now rejected Multiple Protective Shelter system, for which there appears only waning support in the Congress and the Executive. Research and development monies for possible later MX basing modes are not affected.

Titan II Missile: The Kassebaum mark assumes the retirement of obsolete, unsafe Titan II missiles. However, the mark assumes that the retirement commence in FY 1982 rather than 1983 as recommended by the President. The mark further assumes the placing of modern strategic missiles in the Titan silos.

B-52D Aircraft: The mark agrees with the President's recommendation to retire B-52D aircraft. The mark also assumes that newer B-52 G & H models will continue to be modernized and will be fully equipped with cruise missiles as soon as those missiles have demonstrated an ability to navigate over flat, unsurveyed, unfamiliar terrain.

B-1 Bomber: The mark assumes immediate termination of the B-1 program and the continuation of the "Stealth" bomber development. The mark intends to protect "Stealth" development from erosion by preventing the diversion of "Stealth" funds to pay for the expected cost growth of the B-1 program. The mark hedges against "Stealth" development risk by assuming immediate funding of a \$400 million high agility bomber prototype program with a two company fly-off in three years. The high agility bomber would use existing engines and its design would stress inconspicuousness and agility through small size, passive rather than emitting electronics and high acceleration and maneuverability. The high agility bomber would

be able to penetrate Soviet defenses at lower altitudes than the B-52, E-1 or "Stealth"; it would accelerate bomber modernization; it would complement "Stealth" by complicating Soviet defense requirements; and its low cost would provide a hedge against "Stealth" development risk by enabling, if need be, the rapid expansion of the bomber force to greater levels than the present force.

The presumptions for terminating the B-1 program are as follows:

(1) Extraordinary cost combined with unpredictable cost growth (budgeted costs are about \$200 million per aircraft while some independent internal Air Force cost estimates are already as high as \$300 million per aircraft). (2) High tactical risk - the B-1's large size, poor low altitude maneuverability, and high volume of easily detected electronic emissions make it, at best, a marginal improvement over existing B-52 and FB-111 penetrating bombers. (3) Excessive long-term strategic risk - if the "Stealth" development runs into problems, the B-1's high cost will probably preclude the replacement of B-52's on a one-for-one basis. The alternative would be to further reduce conventional forces to free up funds for B-1 procurement. Thus, without compensation from the Soviets, the United States could be forced to continue its unilateral reduction of its bomber force or its conventional forces over the long-term.

Furthermore, Congress has not yet reviewed and accepted the President's new B-1 request.

E-4 Aircraft: The mark assumes the end of purchasing the E-4 "Kneecap" aircraft and the purchase of less expensive, equally capable strategic communications and control aircraft.

Tactical Air Systems

F-15/F-16 Trade Off: The Kassebaum budget mark assumes termination of the \$26 million per copy F-15 aircraft. The FY 82 F-15 procurement request for 42 F-15 aircraft exceeds the originally planned F-15 procurement of 729 aircraft and therefore termination of F-15 procurement does not significantly change the size of the originally planned F-15 force. The F-15 suffers from several long-term limitations that seriously degrade its effectiveness: First, the engine powering the F-15 has had its thrust lowered in order to improve its durability, and as a result, F-15's have been seriously degraded in performance. The Air Force currently does not know how to solve this problem. Second, the F-15 engines have begun to smoke which dramatically increases F-15 vulnerability by making it easier to see and shoot down. Third, the F-15's complex electronics are difficult and expensive to operate and this contributes to low readiness and high cost support. Fourth, the F-15's radar guided missile--i.e., the AIM-7F Sparrow--has proven ineffective in operational tests and its successor--the AIM-7M--is currently experiencing developmental and testing problems.

Fifth, although the use of the AIM-7 radar missile capability presumes the existence of a capability to distinguish enemy from friendly aircraft--i.e., the so-called identification friend or foe (IFF) capability--an effective IFF system does not currently exist and therefore the use of the Sparrow currently depends upon speculations about rules for firing in an uncertain future war. The only capability in the F-15 that the F-16 does not possess is the ability to shoot the Sparrow missile. The F-16 is less visible, more maneuverable, easier to support and has a longer range than the F-15. Thus, in view of the Sparrow's limitations and the F-15's engine problems, the F-16 is a more effective fighter in a one-for-one comparison. The F-16 also costs less than the F-15.

The President's FY '82 budget requests 42 F-15's for \$1.1 billion. The Kassebaum budget mark would purchase instead 60 F-16's in '82 for \$.7 billion in addition to the programmed F-16 purchase. A total of 180 F-16's would be purchased over three years rather than a smaller number of F-15's. This trade off brings a considerable savings and a larger tactical aircraft inventory.

F-18/A-7E Trade Off: Originally conceived as a low cost, low capability complement to the expensive Navy F-14 and to replace the A-7E bomber with more capability, the F/A-18 has seriously degraded in performance while the cost has risen to a point where it is unacceptably high. F-18 cost projections have now exceeded \$30 million per aircraft. The A-7E is a demonstrably better bomber with nearly twice the range with the same payload. Rather than buying 58 F-18's for \$2.7 billion, the Kassebaum budget mark assumes the purchase of 100 A-7E's in FY '82 for \$.8 billion. A total of 300 additional A-7E's would be bought over three years. Naval fighter assets would continue to expand from continued purchases of more capable F-14 aircraft.

A6-E/A-7E Trade Off: The President requests the purchase of 12 A-6E bombers for \$.3 billion. The Kassebaum budget mark would replace these expensive aircraft with cheaper LTV/A-7E's (12) for \$.09 billion. This trade off would imply a lesser Naval capability for all weather/night bombing ability in a smaller A-6E force; however, it is dubious that the tremendous cost of each copy of the A-6E is justified by its limited additional theoretical capability. This decreases the specialized night bombing force for the Navy and replaces it with a larger night and day capable A-7E force. Night bombing was so inaccurate in the Indochina War that little was achieved while losses were higher than daylight raids.

AH-64/AH-1S Trade Off: The President's request for 14 new AH-64 attack helicopters for \$.4 billion in '82 is traded in for 17 existing AH-1S Cobra TOW attack helicopters for \$.05 billion in '82. While the airframes of these helicopters differ, most prominently in cost, their weapons differ only marginally. The increased cost of the "advanced" attack helicopter is not justified when the existing Army model has essentially the same capability. A total of 51 AH-1S's would be bought over three years. Because neither helicopter can survive in European high intensity warfare, the remaining Third World low intensity wars are adequately served by the AH-1S.

LAMPS III/LAMPS I Trade Off: For a similar weapons suite, the LAMPS III cost is dramatically different. The President's request is for 18 LAMPS III anti-submarine/target designating helicopters for \$3.3 billion. The same number of similarly equipped, existing LAMPS I helicopters can be bought for \$2 billion. A total of 60 additional LAMPS I helicopters are recommended for purchase over three years.

Land Systems

M-1/M-60 Trade Off: The President recommends buying 720 M-1 tanks in FY '82 for \$1.9 billion. The Kassebaum budget mark recommends buying 1,000 M-60 tanks in FY '82 for \$.9 billion. 1983 and '84 M-60 purchases would be 2,000 and 3,000 respectively. Criticisms of the M-1 tank include the following:

(1) Range before forced maintenance stops at least one fourth that of M-60, (2) unreliable gun stabilizer for which crewmen have requested an "off" switch, (3) turbine exhaust which burns infantrymen on the back of or behind the tank and ignites flammable material (trees, shrubs), behind the tank, (4) easily detected by infra red viewers well beyond visual range, (5) weak armour on the rear sides, top and back of the tank, (6) unaimable turret top machine gun mounting, (7) fuel mileage so poor as to require doubling fuel truck requirements, and (8) much computerized support equipment is yet to be developed, let alone proven.

M-60 carries a main gun identical to that in the M-1. Some minor cost improvements are called for in the M-60, such as the replacement of highly inflammable hydraulic fluids...

M-2 & 3/M-113 Trade Off: This aspect of the Kassebaum budget mark assumes trading in the very expensive, ineffective M-2 and M-3 infantry fighting vehicles for continued, accelerated purchases of the M-113 armoured personnel carrier. While both have weak armour, the M-113 cost is a small fraction of that of the alternative. For '82, the President requested 60 M-2's for \$.8 billion. The new mark would buy 600 M-113's in '82 for \$.1 billion. A total of 1,200 additional M-113's would be bought in '83 and '84. Weaknesses of the M-2 and 3 vehicles include armour which vaporizes and kills the crew when hit, inadequate infantry transport capacity, high degree of unreliability and unmaintainability and very high profile.

Infantry Anti-Tank System Purchases: To replace the much criticized Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW), the Dragon man portable and disposable weapon which are ineffective against modern tanks, and the TOW anti-tank missile which exposes the gunner to hostile fire while this slow missile travels to its target, the Kassebaum mark recommends an immediate existing weapons competition, open to foreign systems, to select an effective, unguided, safe to-the-infantryman shoulder launched anti-tank weapon. A similar competition should be held for a heavy anti-tank weapon. Thousands of the winning weapons would be purchased in the coming years.

PATRIOT & ROLAND/I-HAWK & AA Gun Trade Off: The Kassebaum budget mark assumes the immediate termination of the Patriot ground to air missile system (which has been in development longer than any weapon system in the last 20 years and which has no capability against the maneuvering multi-target environment of Europe) and the end of the Roland ground to air missile system (which the President has recommended terminating due to extraordinary cost). The mark assumes the purchase instead of over 5,000 Improved Hawk ground to air missiles and the purchase of 20 mm and 35 mm anti-aircraft guns. These guns would be selected from an existing system competition. After selection, thousands of these guns would be purchased. The R&D Divad gun system proposal would be allowed to participate in this competitive selection. The '82 cost of Patriot and Roland are a combined \$1.5 billion. The first year of the proposed gun selection/procurement would be approximately \$.03 billion.

Naval Systems

Nimitz Class Carrier/62,000 ton CV Trade Off: The Kassebaum mark assumes the cancellation of the new nuclear powered carrier requested by President Reagan and its replacement with a conventionally powered 62,000 ton carrier for a savings in '82 of \$.1 billion and approximately \$1 billion in '83 and '84. This new carrier would be able to handle all existing naval carrier aircraft and would be without prejudice to proposals for smaller, \$.5 billion, carriers.

CG-47/FFG-7 Trade Off: This proposal assumes the cancellation of 3 DOD requested CG-47 AEGIS cruisers for a savings of \$3 billion in '82 and the purchase instead of 12 FFG-7 frigates over the '82-84 period. Massive electronic emissions from the AEGIS system will be a magnet to Soviet radar homing missiles. FFG-7 cost is approximately \$.4 billion per ship as opposed to more than \$1 billion for each CG-47. If there is objection to the high cost of the FFG-7, larger Dutch frigates are available for licensing in the U.S. for approximately one half of the cost.

SSN-688/Diesel-Electric Submarine Trade Off: The mark assumes the cancellation of further Los Angeles class submarine construction. These nuclear powered attack submarines cost approximately \$.6 billion each. The President requested that 2 be built in 1982 for \$1 billion. The recommendation is to purchase instead 5 smaller, U.S.-built, German-designed ultra quiet diesel-electric attack submarines for \$.5 billion for all five. 15 of these submarines would be funded by the end of FY '84.

Oriskany, Battleship Cancellation: The Kassebaum budget mark assumes the termination of the Oriskany reactivation (which the Senate refused to support) and of the reactivation of any 30 year old battleship.

THE BAD NEWS

- o The Soviets have almost 1,400 land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. We have just over 1,000.
- o They have almost 1,000 Sea-launched ballistic missiles. We have about 650.
- o They have almost 4-1/2 million people in uniform. We have just over 2 million.
- o They have more than 7 thousand fighter aircraft. We have fewer than 4 thousand--including the Navy's.
- o They have almost 300 attack submarines. We have fewer than 100.
- o They have 46 thousand tanks. We have 11 thousand.

THE GOOD NEWS

- o The Soviets have just over 150 long-range bombers. We have almost 350...but...they are aging. In some cases they are older than the crews who fly them.

MORE BAD NEWS

- o Over the past 20 years the Soviets increased their military by almost one million people. We decreased ours by about one-third million. They now outnumber us by more than two to one.
- o In the same 20 years they increased the number of their tanks from 35,000 to 46,000--an expansion of 11,000. All we have is 11,000. They outnumber us by more than four to one.
- o The Soviets have 7,300 fighter aircraft to our 3,800--almost two to one. And they are producing a new fighter every seven hours. We produce a new one every 27 hours. The gap is widening.
- o Soviet military strategy includes a civil defense system. They have more than 100,000 people working full-time on civil defense. Their plans include nationwide blast shelters, underground food and water storage, practice evacuations, and relocation centers. They spend about \$2 billion a year on civil defense.
- o The Soviets spend about 13 percent of their Gross National Product on their military. We spend about 5 percent. They have spent about \$450 billion more than we have in the last 10 years.

QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN BREZHNEV

"At the present time no question of any importance can be solved without our participation and without taking into account our economic and defense might."

Minsk, 1970

"Trust us comrades, for by 1985...we will have achieved most of our objectives in Western Europe. We will have consolidated our position. We will have improved our economy. And a decisive shift in the (balance) of forces will be such that come 1985, we will be able to exert our will wherever we need to."

Prague, 1973

(The phrase "The Russians are Coming" is outdated but the above statement indicates their desire to influence world "happenings.")



from



The Conservative Caucus, Inc.

*file
SALT*

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NEW SALT STUDY REVEALS DECEPTIONS, VIOLATIONS BY SOVIETS:
REAGAN WARNED ON NEGOTIATIONS WITH KREMLIN

Washington, D.C.--A new study of strategic arms limitation treaties (SALT) negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union documents flagrant Soviet violations of the provisions of the SALT I treaty which expired in 1977 and the SALT II agreement to which the Reagan Administration has been unilaterally adhering, even in the absence of Senate ratification. The Conservative Caucus sponsored a news conference today to make the findings of this new book, *THE BITTER FRUIT OF SALT: A RECORD OF SOVIET DUPLICITY* (published by the Texas Policy Institute) available to the public.

The author of the study, former CIA official David S. Sullivan and the writer of the book's forward, Brigadier General Albion W. Knight, U.S. Army (Retired) were joined at the news conference by Howard Phillips, National Director of The Conservative Caucus, Huck Walther of the U.S. Defense Committee, and Philip Cox of the American Security Council.

"The pattern of Soviet SALT negotiating deception and diplomatic duplicity (including disinformation ploys, forgeries, treaty violations and hostile propaganda campaigns) suggest that arms

-more-

control treaties have served only to lull the U.S. into complacently and unilaterally deactivating its existing strategic forces and reducing its planned strategic forces," Sullivan charges in his book. "I have documented 14 examples of Soviet negotiating deceptions in SALT I and II and 30 cases of other arms control treaty violations. I also describe 47 examples of Soviet treaty violations, disinformation ploys and diplomatic deception ploys. Most of my evidence is from unclassified, official U.S. Government sources," Sullivan continued.

"Former American leaders have recently acknowledged that they were fundamentally deceived by the Soviets on key issues during both SALT I and II," Sullivan said. "I provide conclusive evidence to demonstrate that the Soviets have successively exploited detente and SALT negotiations in order to achieve a destabilizing level of strategic superiority over the U.S. This crucial advantage provides them with negotiating leverage. That, coupled with the Soviet Union's propensity for deception as part of its negotiating strategy, makes it unlikely that the United States will be able to negotiate equitable SALT III and theater nuclear force (TNF) agreements," Sullivan said.

Sullivan also provided examples of "U.S. unilateral restraint in strategic programs" and said that the Soviets "have continued their strategic buildup relentlessly."

Gen. Knight commented that "the real meaning of this new study is that the Soviets cannot be trusted no matter who is President. In my forward to the book (page vi), I outline nine prerequisites--nine questions--that must be answered before the President can tell the American people that an arms control agreement can make them safe. Two of these prerequisites are described in detail in Sullivan's book. In my view, the President has not adequately come to grips with any of these questions. If and when the President answers these

prerequisites, he should come to the conclusion that the United States should not proceed with new arms control talks with the Soviets," Knight said.

Howard Phillips said that the findings of this study "will be distributed to key opinion makers in Congress, in the media, and in the Executive Branch by The Conservative Caucus."

THE BITTER FRUIT OF SALT is one of the many publications on international and military affairs written by David Sullivan. A graduate of Harvard University (BA cum laude, 1965) and Columbia University (MIA, 1971), Sullivan is considered to be one of the most knowledgeable people in the U.S. on Soviet violations of SALT.

The Conservative Caucus is a non-partisan grass roots lobby founded in 1974, with 400,000 supporters nationwide.



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THE CONSERVATIVE CAUCUS PRESS CONFERENCE ON "THE BITTER FRUIT OF SALT"

Thursday, May 13, 1982

Ladies and gentlemen:

My name is Howard Phillips. I'm National Director of The Conservative Caucus, which is a nonpartisan grassroots lobbying organization with about 400,000 supporters nationwide.

Joining me this afternoon: on my immediate right, Henry Walther, who is the Executive Vice President of The United States Defense Committee; David Sullivan, the author of The Bitter Fruit of Salt: A Record of Soviet Duplicity; and Brigadier General Albion Knight (USA-Ret.), who is the head of The Conservative Caucus National Security Task Force and Vice President of The Texas Policy Institute. General Knight has a wealth of experience as an expert on arms control, and he will be joining in this discussion a little bit later on.

I'd like to begin our presentation by calling attention to a report in the May 12 Washington Post (yesterday's), in which it was stated as follows: "Haig stressed, however, that while SALT II as a treaty to be ratified was dead, the Administration would continue to abide by its limitations as long as the Soviets did not violate them. He said there was no evidence that Moscow was not continuing to abide by the pact and that the Soviets had dismantled nine older missile submarines thus far, in accordance with its provisions."

Very simply stated, Secretary Alexander Haig, if he was correctly quoted, or if his remarks were correctly described in yesterday's Washington Post, is speaking inaccurately. The fact is, there is a long history of Soviet violations of arms control agreements, including SALT I and SALT II. Most recently, there is a violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, in the sense of some of the things that the Soviets are doing with respect to Argentina at the present moment.

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Conservative Manifesto

The Bitter Fruit of Salt is an extremely important book, which will be distributed by The Conservative Caucus to every member of Congress and the key decision makers in the White House, the Defense Department, and the State Department. It spells out, chapter and verse, the evidence of Soviet treaty violations.

It's the position of The Conservative Caucus that President Reagan is making a tremendous mistake in departing from his originally stated intention of not entering into arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union until U.S. defenses had been built back up, and in the absence of linkage. At a time when the Soviet Union is involved in Afghanistan, at a time when they are subsidizing and encouraging terrorism throughout the world, at a time when they are operating through their puppet regime in Poland, it makes no sense whatsoever to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Recently, at a hearing in the House of Representatives, Congressman Larry Winn pointed out--and this was on April 2, 1982, at a hearing of the House Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs--he pointed out that at that particular time, despite the miracle of modern communications, the personal whereabouts of Leonid Brezhnev, the dictator of the Soviet Union, were unknown. The press was speculating on whether he was dead or alive. Congressman Winn broke through the miasma pervading the roomful of Congressional participants with the statement that left them dead silent for several moments, in stunned amazement--that sudden recognition of stark reality. "Verification, verification, that's the big word", said Representative Winn. "And right at this very minute, nobody in this room knows whether Brezhnev is in or out of the hospital."

Verification continues to be a problem, but even more fundamental is the question of whether the Soviets, with an almost unbroken record of treaty violations in the past, are any more to be expected to conform to treaty agreements in the future.

To comment on the evidence of Soviet treaty violations spelled out in his book, I give you David Sullivan.

DAVID SULLIVAN:

Thank you, Howard.

Yesterday--I'm sorry, today--in The Washington Post, we had an editorial by the Post in which it stated, "Most of the terms of SALT II are being respected by the United States and the Soviet Union." This is the first time that that qualification, "most of the terms of SALT II are being observed (sic)", has ever appeared, to my knowledge, certainly in The Washington Post.

I'd like to quote a short section of President Reagan's speech last Sunday at Eureka College, in which President Reagan himself touched upon this problem of verifying Soviet compliance with arms control treaties. President Reagan stated (and I quote):

"So far, the Soviet Union has used arms control negotiations primarily as an instrument to restrict U.S. defense programs, and in conjunction with their own arms build-up, as a means to enhance Soviet power and prestige. Unfortunately, the sometimes suspicions have grown, that the Soviet Union has not been living up to its obligations under existing arms control treaties."

So the President of the United States himself recognizes that there may be a problem in verifying Soviet compliance with SALT and other arms control treaties.

The press release that you all have is self-explanatory, and I won't read the quotations from my book that appear in it, although I would like to comment a little about it.

If you add up the fourteen examples of Soviet negotiating deceptions in SALT I and SALT II--most of which, I should add, have been confirmed by the American statesmen themselves who were deceived by the Soviets in the arms control negotiations (SALT I and SALT II)--if you add those fourteen examples of negotiating deception to the thirty cases of SALT I, SALT II and other arms control treaty violations, and add to that the forty-seven examples of Soviet treaty violations, this information (INAUDIBLE) in diplomatic deception (INAUDIBLE), you get a grand total of about ninety-one cases of Soviet diplomatic duplicity, spanning the years 1982-1917.

While that's a rather impressive history data base from which we are drawing and making our judgments about Soviet intentions in arms control and Soviet intentions in diplomacy itself, and I would add that most of the evidence supporting these ninety-one cases of Soviet diplomatic duplicity since 1917, most of the evidence is drawn from official U.S. government sources. In fact, the forty-seven Soviet treaty violations, which I described in the book, are all extracted from an official U.S. government document of November 1962, published by the Department of Defense.

Now, what are the main examples of Soviet violation of SALT II, since we have been so recently assured, yesterday, by Secretary of State Haig that, in fact, the Soviets are complying with all of the provisions of SALT II, despite the Washington Post's caveat that it may mean "most" of the provisions. I would list the

following SALT II violations, in order of their importance:

The reported Soviet rapid reload/refire exercises for their giant SS-18 cold-launched ICBM.

The Soviet SS-16 deployment activity that has recently been described in the press.

The Soviet deployment of AS-3 Kangaroo inter-surface missiles on bear bombers. This is an interesting case (which I can go into more detail on in the question period, if you'd like), which is derived solely from official U.S. government sources.

The continued stockpiling of Soviet SS-20 and SS-16 mobile IR&ICBMs, and their camouflage and concealment.

Soviet SS-20 IRBM encryption and deployment.

The encryption of the following Soviet missile programs: the SS-NX-20, SLBM, SS-NX-19, SL...(FLIPPEN) SLCN, and the SS-18 Mod X ICBM--all of which are being encrypted in their telemetry signals during their test program, in violation of provisions of SALT II, which the Soviets are allegedly complying with.

And finally, the camouflage activity of new Soviet submarines and ICBMs.

On that point, I will close, and later on, after the other speakers have finished, perhaps you may have some questions about some of the details of these ninety-one cases of Soviet diplomatic duplicity, which are derived from official U.S. government sources.

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

And I might add that one of the tragedies of the situation is, that while the United States keeps its head in the sand about Soviet violations, we continue to adhere unilaterally to the expired provisions of SALT I and the unratified provisions of SALT II, even to the point of dismantling our already inadequate strategic forces. And the tragedy is, further, that President Reagan, despite his campaigning against SALT II during the 1980 campaign, has in fact, by such actions, opened wider the window of vulnerability.

To talk in detail about the mistake of placing U.S. survivability

on treaties which require trusting the good word of the Soviet Union, I am pleased to present Brigadier General Albion Knight.

GENERAL KNIGHT:

It is my view that President Reagan's proposal, made at Eureka College, to resume strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union at this time, is premature, is dangerous, and is unhealthy for the American people.

In Mr. Sullivan's book, in the FOREWORD, I discuss on page VI, the number of prerequisites that the United States government should go through in their thought process, and with the Congress of the United States and with the people of the United States, before resuming arms control negotiations.

In your packet, in the Member's Report of The Conservative Caucus, is my discussion of those prerequisites in greater detail.

I believe that until at least several of the prerequisites are met, further arms control negotiation with the Soviet Union is extremely premature and very dangerous, and the Reagan Administration has made no effort--almost no effort--to meet such prerequisites, and let me raise up just a few.

One of the first is that we must examine very carefully what our strategic balance really is, and this goes to the point that President Reagan is talking about, of reduction.

Reductions of what? From what data base? What is to be counted? Is just the data base that was in SALT II to be the basis for the reductions? If so, it is a very, very dangerous thing, because one of the fatal flaws of SALT II was that delivery vehicles were counted, but not missiles. And you must count any weapon system which threatens the safety and security of either nation, regardless of where they are located. And I think that unless the American F-111's in England; or the aircraft that are in carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean, which threaten the Soviet Union; or the MIG-23's that are sitting on a new runway two and a half minutes away from Miami (that can be nuclear-capable very quickly on new airstrips which are capable of flying the Backfire bomber and the T777-95; or the 325 cruise missiles that are on submarines off-shore, which are not counted; or the Backfire bombers, which are not counted; or our some 250 B-52's that are moth-balled in Arizona are counted; what is counted and what is not?

I recall to your attention: October 1973, we began Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks with the Soviet Union in Europe.

They are still going on nine years later, and one of the blocks to it is that there is a disagreement of how many soldiers the Soviet Union has in eastern Europe. We say they have 150,000 more than actually exist. So President Reagan, until he decides what the data base is going to be, is guaranteed a long negotiation that probably will be extremely unsuccessful.

The second prerequisite is clearing the record of violations. The previous Administration, and the Ford Administration, and the Nixon Administration hid from the public and the Congress the record of Soviet violations. This is the main story that Mr. Sullivan tells here (and he has told it before): that until such time that the violations are made very clear, the President should not expect the American people to support an arms control negotiation negotiated by the Reagan Administration. If such a negotiation was unsafe under Jimmy Carter, it is equally unsafe under Ronald Reagan.

The third prerequisite is that of verification. The Congress must thoroughly understand, and the American people must understand, what is possible to verify in this technical age and what is not possible to verify. The President proposes as a major part of his arms control negotiations that warhead numbers be controlled. That is one of the specific things that it's impossible to be verified unless there is constant and continuous on-site inspection at a location of an offensive weapon capability--at a silo location or at an airbase. That would be as unacceptable to U.S. armed forces as it would be to the Soviet Union. It is clearly impossible for a satellite (national technical means) to look through the skin of a warhead and tell how many sub-missiles (warheads) are inside that missile. It is clearly impossible for a satellite to fly over a manufacturing plant and tell whether or not SS-16 mobile missiles--Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles--are being produced. It is technically impossible to do a number of key things, and the President must clear what is technically possible and what is technically impossible.

From my understanding of the technical aspects of arms control, it is no longer possible technically to present to the American people a verifiable, equitable arms control agreement.

The fourth point that I wanted to raise up among the eight or nine that I listed is that of linkage. In the President's Eureka speech, he pointed out the problem in Poland. He has obviously decided that Poland is not a linkage. He has also decided, obviously, that Afghanistan is not a linkage, just as Vietnam was not a linkage to Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in 1972, and just as the fall of Vietnam was not a linkage to Gerald Ford as he

went to the Vladivostok negotiations and discussions, which did not result in a treaty.

But we must understand, whether the Administration really does decide that arms control is a separate and independent discussion and negotiation or whether or not it is tied into linkages, it is clear that on one hand the President said there must be linkages, and yet on the other hand he said that arms control must proceed without linkage.

My conclusion is, and I think that of The Conservative Caucus that we're stating publicly around the country, that President Reagan's new call for arms control negotiations is a serious mistake and is very much premature. The substitute is being raised up by Senator Hart, and by others, that SALT II should therefore be ratified. If SALT II was fatally flawed in 1979 and 1980, it is still fatally flawed, and aging has not done any better. Therefore, SALT II should not be adopted, and to that extent I agree with Secretary of State Haig; but if that is the case, then the Reagan Administration should cease at once from adhering to the provisions of an expired SALT I and of an unratified SALT II. If SALT II was fatally flawed, there is no effort being made by the Reagan Administration to correct those flaws, for in order to do so, it will make a very difficult negotiation process.

Thank you.

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

And for our final presentation before we go to questions, I'd like to introduce a gentleman who is the Executive Vice President of a new pro-defense organization, which was organized five months ago, and during that period of time, has increased its strength from a standing start--a ground zero, if you will--to forty-five thousand supporters throughout the country. And this is an organization which will be playing an increasing role in making defense an issue in our nation's political campaigns. It is an organization which will hold candidates and incumbents not to a Reagan standard of defense, but to a conservative standard of what is adequate in the nation's defense. Mr. Walther.

HENRY WALTHER:

Back some time ago when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, then-President Carter expressed his shock and amazement that the Soviets would do such a thing. One would have thought that no one would be shocked or amazed at that. I was shocked and amazed that we, in fact, had anyone in a position of authority who would be

even the slightest bit surprised at that.

During the campaign between President Reagan and President Carter, one of the things that I believe led to then-Governor Reagan's election as President was foreign policy, and the belief by the American people that anyone who doesn't understand that the Soviets are not nice people is unqualified to be President. Unfortunately, in the Congress we have many people apparently of the Carter mind-set.

I'd like to read to you from the debate on the defense budget last May (May 5, 1981, from The Congressional Record) a statement by Representative Mickey Leland of Texas. And he says, "Are we truly suffering now from some kind of an impending threat from the Soviet Union? I know that we have not heard from the Soviet Union that they have declared war. As a matter of fact, the implication by the Administration itself is that by way of the President's lifting the embargo against the wheat sales to the Soviet Union, we are in peacetime, and that we are, as a matter of fact, engaging in some kind of formal relationship with the Soviet Union. So why is it that we continue on this road of dealing with an adversary that is nonexistent?"

Increasingly over the last year, the Administration--despite good intentions, or what I believe are good intentions--are going the way of the Mickey Leland, the Tip O'Neills, and these other people in the Congress who somehow believe that if you ignore the Soviets they will just simply disappear.

The purpose of our organization, and what we will be doing over this next year, or two years, or three years, or four years, is holding the politicians' feet to the fire. The politicians, the political judgments, that this Administration has apparently made in order to cut some kind of deal with Tip O'Neill is not what the American people want. We're going to bring the facts, with full-page newspaper ads, with at least five million pieces mailed over the next six months, hold the politicians' feet to the fire, and let the chips fall where they may.

Thank you very much.

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

Okay.

Panelists, why don't you remain seated while we take some questions and we can use that mike. Who has the first question? Yes, sir. (INAUDIBLE QUESTION)

RESPONDENT: (David Sullivan?)

If you'll turn to page IV in the Foreword...page IV and V...and then on page 16 and 17 of the text, then again to page 24 of the text, there is some new material involving what is called the "secret intercept" of May 1972. That is new material. Also new is the compilation in the second half of the book of the Soviet SALT and other treaty violations, especially the table beginning on page 89--sorry, 88--(figure 8). That is new material that hasn't been (????) at recently. There are a lot of new things in this book; some of them are old, some of them have been said before, but they're said in a new way, some of them are brand new.

However, I would also call your attention to the AS-3 Kangaroo violations of SALT II. That is brand new, that is derived from the publication called (LOOK UP NAME OF PUBLICATION), published by the Defense Department last October, in which it states, on page 61, that the range of the AS-3 Kangaroo is 650 kilometers. That's an official U.S. government publication. Now, in the SALT II treaty of June 1979, in the Data Exchange, the Soviet Union officially stated to the United States that in the category of heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers, they had zero. Well, the Department of Defense said they have 105 equipped with the AS-3 Kangaroo, with a range of 650 kilometers. That is a violation of the Data Exchange--a falsification in the Data Exchange--which is violation of all the ceilings of SALT II, in particular of the 1,320 ceiling, including all MIRV missiles and bombers equipped with air-launch cruise missiles. Those (UNCLEAR) Soviet Bear bombers equipped with AS-3 Kangaroo missiles in the range of 650 kilometers should count in that ceiling of 1,320. They do not, according to the Soviet position in Data Exchange. That is an officially confirmed Soviet violation of SALT II, using official U.S. government data, and it directly contradicts Secretary of State Haig's statement yesterday that there are no known Soviet violations of SALT II. That is (UNCLEAR)

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

Yes, sir.

QUESTION UNCLEAR

GENERAL KNIGHT:

No, sir, it is not yet, to my knowledge.

UNCLEAR QUESTION:

GENERAL KNIGHT:

It's not recognized by the Secretary of State.

UNCLEAR QUESTION:

DAVID SULLIVAN:

I wish I could answer that; I can't. There is another...by the way, that case is on page 31 and then again...SALT II violations...on page 64. Now, there is a second new one that has never been discussed publicly. That involves the Soviet program of camouflage and concealment and deception. According to SALT I and SALT II, deliberate impedence of national technical means as satellite (UNCLEAR) is prohibited. Those are the precise words. (UNCLEAR) interference (UNCLEAR) is prohibited. The key word is "deliberate" (UNCLEAR)...One of the most difficult tasks for Intelligence to determine is the underlying intention of any Soviet action. Can Soviet camouflage and concealment and telemetry encryption that we see going on throughout the Soviet Union be characterized as deliberate or not. What is the underlying intent? It's a very difficult question. However, in the Soviet dictionary for military terms, published in 1966, the Soviets themselves defined camouflage, concealment, and deception--which they call "maskirovka"--and they state, that it includes deliberate interference with satellite reconnaissance. That is found on page 62, 63, and also on page 20. So there you have it, in an official dictionary of military terms, published in 1966, the answer to the most difficult Intelligence question we have regarding the Soviet Union--what is deliberate Soviet interference? The Soviets say "maskirovka", which is what they call their entire program of camouflage, concealment, and deception. Those are deliberate interference; that answers the Intelligence question. Therefore, all that camouflage and concealment ...(UNCLEAR)...is a violation of SALT I and SALT II by Soviet.....(UNCLEAR)

UNCLEAR QUESTION

GENERAL KNIGHT:

There has been reported discussion of the problem of camouflage, concealment, and deception, mainly (UNCLEAR), beginning in 1975. Yes, it has been discussed. However, the Soviets have accused the United States of deliberate concealment. We have never... (interruption by Mr. Phillips, "Can you check it out, please?") we have never accused the Soviets in the SCC of deliberately concealing or camouflaging anything. We have raised the idea of

problems, but the Soviets have accused us, directly, in the SCC, of violating SALT by camouflaging and concealing deliberately.

UNCLEAR QUESTION:

GENERAL KNIGHT: (OR DAVID SULLIVAN?)

Yes. Some of you may have seen the SALT II movie put out by the American Security Council. We've used several clips in Soviet films. Included in the Soviet film, is a picture of a (THIS ENTIRE RESPONSE IS INAUDIBLE)

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

Dave, could you spell out in detail something for which you were needed previously, about ways in which the United States government under the Reagan Administration has been cutting back on U.S. defenses in an effort to comply with the unratified and expired treaty.

DAVID SULLIVAN:

This is (UNCLEAR)

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

And that also fails to take into account the fact, as General Knight pointed out, that a substantial number of our B-52's are in moth balls and cannot be used except (UNCLEAR) (BEGINNING OF SECOND SIDE OF TAPE)

...we're even, if you want to say that. The Reagan Administration has decided they (UNCLEAR) If you add this all up, it totals 292 delivery vehicles that have been deactivated under the Reagan Administration.....without even asking the Soviets for a quid pro quo in arms control (UNCLEAR)

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

Perhaps you could also comment on Section 33 of The Arms Control and Disarmament Act, such as the legality of these (UNCLEAR) deactivations.

RESPONSE UNCLEAR:

HOWARD PHILLIPS:

Any further questions?. Yes, sir. (End of audible portion of tape.)

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

March 4, 1982

The President today announced his intention to nominate General John W. Vessey, Jr., to be Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will succeed General David Jones whose term expires in June, 1982.

General Vessey is currently the Vice Chief of Staff in the United States Army. From 1976 to 1979 he was Commanding General, Eighth United States Army; Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, United States Forces, Korea; and Commander-in-Chief, Combined Forces Command. From 1975-76 he was Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Senior Army Representative, Military Staff Committee at the United Nations. From 1974-75 he was Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Carson, Colorado. From 1972-73 he was Deputy Chief of the Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group in Thailand. From 1970-72 he was Commanding General, United States Army Support Group in Thailand. From 1969-70 he was Chief of Staff, 3rd Armored Division, United States Army in Europe. From 1967-69 he was Commander, 3rd Armored Division Artillery, United States Army in Europe. From 1966-67 he served as Executive Officer, 25th Infantry Division Artillery in Vietnam.

General Vessey received his B.S. degree in Military Science from the University of Maryland and M.S. degree in Business Administration from George Washington University. His military school attendance included The Artillery School, Basic and Advanced Courses; The Artillery and Guided Missile School, Advanced Course; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; Armed Forces Staff College; and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. He has received many U.S. decorations and badges including the Distinguished Service Cross and the Purple Heart. He received his battlefield commission at the battle of Anzio in 1944 during World War II.

General Vessey was born June 29, 1922, in Minneapolis, Minnesota.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

NSC

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 12, 1982

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STRUCTURE

I. National Security Council

The National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum for consideration of national security policy issues requiring Presidential decision.

The functions and responsibilities of the NSC shall be as set forth in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended.

The NSC shall meet regularly. Those heads of Departments and Agencies who are not regular members shall participate as appropriate, when matters affecting their Departments or Agencies are considered.

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in consultation with the regular members of the NSC, shall be responsible for developing, coordinating and implementing national security policy as approved by me. He shall determine and publish the agenda of NSC meetings. He shall ensure that the necessary papers are prepared and -- except in unusual circumstances -- distributed in advance to Council members. He shall staff and administer the National Security Council.

Decision documents shall be prepared by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and disseminated by him after approval by the President.

II. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of State

The Secretary of State is my principal foreign policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved policy.

I have assigned to the Secretary of State authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation, and the activities of Executive Departments and Agencies of the United States overseas. Such activities do not include those of United States military forces operating in the field under the command of a United States area military commander, and such other military activities as I elect, as Commander-in-Chief, to conduct exclusively through military or other channels. Activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of

a single Department or Agency and which are not of such nature as to affect significantly the overall US overseas program in a country or region are not considered to be activities covered within the meaning of this Directive.

The Secretary of State is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the foreign policy and foreign relations of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

III. NSC Responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of Defense is my principal defense policy advisor. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of general defense policy, policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the Department of Defense, and for the execution of approved policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the principal military advisors to me, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.

I have assigned to the Secretary of Defense authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to defense policy formulation.

The Secretary of Defense is responsible for preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the defense policy of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

IV. NSC Responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence

The Director of Central Intelligence is my principal advisor on intelligence matters. As such, he is responsible for the formulation of intelligence activities, policy, and proposals, as set forth in relevant Executive Orders. I have assigned to the Director of Central Intelligence authority and responsibility, to the extent permitted by law and Executive Order, for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to intelligence matters.

The Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for the preparation of those papers addressing matters affecting the intelligence activities, policy, and proposals of the United States for consideration by the NSC.

V. Interagency Groups

To assist the NSC at large and its individual members in fulfilling their responsibilities, interagency groups are established as described herein. The focus of these interagency

groups is to establish policy objectives, develop policy options, make appropriate recommendations, consider the implications of agency programs for foreign policy or overall national security policy, and undertake such other activities as may be assigned by the NSC.

A. The Senior Interagency Group -- Foreign Policy (SIG-FP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for foreign policy and foreign affairs matters, the SIG-FP is established. The SIG-FP shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State (Chairman); the Deputy Secretary of Defense or Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

When meeting to consider arms control matters, the Group will be augmented by the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The SIG-FP will:

1. Ensure that important foreign policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate interagency groups, or, if such matters require higher-level consideration, report them to the Secretary of State for decision or referral to the NSC;
3. Assure a proper selectivity of the foreign policy/foreign affairs areas and issues to which the United States applies its efforts;
4. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions; and
5. Evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of interdepartmental overseas programs and activities.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the State Department augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-FP, shall be established.

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B. The Senior Interagency Group -- Defense Policy (SIG-DP)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for defense policy and defense matters, the SIG-DP is established. The SIG-DP shall consist of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy or an Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Chairman); and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

The SIG-DP will:

1. Ensure that important defense policy issues requiring interagency attention receive full, prompt, and systematic consideration;
2. Deal with interdepartmental matters raised by any member or referred to it by subordinate inter-agency groups, or if such matters require higher-level consideration, report them to the Secretary of Defense for decision or referral to the NSC; and
3. Monitor the execution of approved policies and decisions.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Department of Defense augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-DP, shall be established.

C. The Senior Interagency Group -- Intelligence (SIG-I)

To advise and assist the NSC in exercising its authority and discharging its responsibility for intelligence policy and intelligence matters, the SIG-I is established. The SIG-I shall consist of Director of Central Intelligence (Chairman); the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman when such Departments and agencies have a direct interest in intelligence activities under consideration.

When meeting to consider sensitive intelligence collection activities referred by the Director of Central Intelligence, the membership of the Group shall be augmented, as necessary, by the head of each organization within the Intelligence Community directly involved in the activity in question. When meeting to consider counterintelligence activities, the Group shall be augmented by the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Director, National Security Agency.

The SIG-I will:

- (1) Establish requirements and priorities for national foreign intelligence;
- (2) Review such National Foreign Intelligence Program and budget proposals and other matters as are referred to it by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (3) Review proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence collection operations referred by the Director of Central Intelligence;
- (4) Develop standards and doctrine for the counterintelligence activities of the United States; resolve interagency differences concerning the implementation of counterintelligence policy; and develop and monitor guidelines, consistent with applicable law and Executive orders, for the maintenance of central counterintelligence records;
- (5) Consider and approve any counterintelligence activity referred to the Group by the head of any organization in the Intelligence Community;
- (6) Submit to the NSC an overall annual assessment of the relative threat to United States interests from intelligence and security services of foreign powers and from international terrorist activities; including an assessment of the effectiveness of the United States counterintelligence activities;
- (7) Conduct an annual review of ongoing sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations and sensitive counterintelligence activities and report thereon to the NSC; and
- (8) Carry out such additional coordination review and approval of intelligence activities as the President may direct.

A permanent secretariat, composed of personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency augmented as necessary by personnel provided in response to the Chairman's request by the Departments and Agencies represented on the SIG-I, shall be established.

D. Regional and Functional Interagency Groups

To assist the SIG-FP, Interagency Groups (IGS) shall be established by the Secretary of State for each geographic region corresponding to the jurisdiction of the geographic bureaus in the Department of State, for Political-Military Affairs, and for International Economic Affairs. Each IG shall be comprised of the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State (Chairman); and a designated representative of the Secretary of Defense. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies with responsibility for specific matters to be considered will attend on invitation by the Chairman. The IG for International Economic Affairs will, in addition to the above membership, include representatives of the Secretary of Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, and the U.S. Trade Representative.

IGs for arms control matters will, in addition to the above membership, include a representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Arms control IGs will be chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State or the representative of the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG-FP.

To assist the SIG-DP, IGs shall be established by the Secretary of Defense corresponding to the functional areas within the Department of Defense. Each IG shall be comprised of the appropriate Under or Assistant Secretary of Defense (Chairman); a representative of the Secretary of State; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of other Departments and Agencies will attend on invitation by the Chairman.

Under and Assistant Secretaries, in their capacities as Chairmen of the IGs, will assure the adequacy of United States policy in the areas of their responsibility and of the plans, programs, resources, and performance for implementing that policy. They will be responsible for the conduct of interagency policy studies within the areas of their responsibility for consideration by the SIG.

The Regional IGs also shall prepare contingency plans pertaining to potential crises in their respective areas of responsibility. Contingency planning will be conducted in

coordination with the Chairman of the Political-Military IG, with the exception of the military response option for employment of forces in potential crises, which will remain within the purview of the Department of Defense and will be developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

To deal with specific contingencies, the IGs will establish full-time working groups, which will provide support to the crisis management operations of the NSC. These groups will reflect the institutional membership of the parent body, together with such additional members as may be required to respond to the contingency with the full weight of available expertise.

To assist the SIG-I, IGs shall be established by the Director of Central Intelligence. The IG for Counter-intelligence shall consist of representatives of the Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director, National Security Agency; and a representative of the head of any other Intelligence Community organization directly involved in the activities under discussion. The IG for Counterintelligence will be under the chairmanship of the representative of the Director of Central Intelligence or the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation in accordance with guidelines to be provided by the SIG-I.

The operational responsibility or authority of a Secretary or other Agency head over personnel from the Department or Agency concerned serving on IGs -- including the authority to give necessary guidance to the representatives in the performance of IG duties -- is not limited by this Directive.

NSC

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 12, 1982

STATEMENT BY WILLIAM P. CLARK
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

The President today approved three National Security Directives in the following areas:

- Cancellation of certain Presidential Directives from the Carter Administration
- National Security Council Structure
- Protection of Classified National Security Council and Intelligence Information

The cancellation of Presidential Directives rescinds 32 Directives from the Carter Administration. Several of these have been superseded by subsequent Directives. Others are simply no longer relevant.

The Directive on the National Security Council Structure incorporates changes and sets forth specific responsibilities associated with effective operation of the National Security structure. A statement of this Directive is attached.

A new Directive setting forth procedures for the protection of classified National Security Council and Intelligence information is also attached. This Administration is acutely aware that the American people have a right to know, through the free press, what their government is doing so as to render informed judgments of their elected officials.

The President is also aware of his responsibility to lead this nation effectively, guaranteeing the security and welfare of the American people.

Unfortunately, a pattern has developed in recent years that directly hampers the development and implementation of an effective foreign policy for the United States. This pattern has often manifested itself in the unauthorized public disclosure of classified information. In many such cases, the publication of such information rules out a foreign policy option, or jeopardizes

-More-

an ongoing policy.

We fully recognize the paradox inherent in our system, in which a free press is encouraged to collect and print whatever it believes to be in the public interest while the government has the responsibility to protect certain categories of sensitive information. The measures to be taken under this Directive should not be construed as criticism of the press. The press has been doing its job -- collecting information -- better than the government has been doing its job -- protecting national security information. These limited measures are designed to restore a balance that has been lost.

Government employees, media personnel, and the American people should recognize that these measures are clearly necessary in the national interests, and that the end result will be a more effective government.

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