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United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 27, 1982

Honorable Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

In 1979, the Soviet President Brezhnev made an explicit nuclear blackmail threat. Brezhnev stated that if the U.S. Senate did not vote for ratifying the SALT II Treaty, there would be "grave and even dangerous consequences for our relations and for the situation in the world as a whole." Many of our constituents are asking: Is the Reagan Administration now about to bow to this Soviet threat? We want to be able to respond in the negative.

Even before the Soviet Combat Brigade in Cuba was discovered and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan occurred in late 1979, a majority of the Senate realized that SALT II was unequal and unverifiable. Since then, the Soviets have intimidated the Polish people, and have increased their arms shipments to Cuba threefold over the rate of 1962. These aggressive Soviet actions totally contradict the 1972 agreement on Basic Principles of US-Soviet relations, but the preamble to the SALT II Treaty states that the treaty "proceeds" from this agreement. Thus the very foundation of SALT II is being violated by the Soviets.

We are opposed to the Senate Joint Resolution on arms control passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee apparently with strong Administration support on June 9, 1982. This resolution would make it the law of the land that "The United States shall continue to refrain from actions which would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agreements, provided the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." You yourself have stated that the key provisions of SALT II can not be verified by the U.S. Moreover, the Soviets have not been showing restraint, according to Defense Department threat assessments. Senate passage of this resolution would constitute enactment of the SALT II Treaty, its de facto ratification. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has stated that it intends this resolution to have the "full force and effect of the law," which any Senate Joint Resolution indeed has when passed by Congress and signed by the President.

Treaties are also the law of the land when ratified. The Treaty-making power of the Constitution requires that 67 Senators give their advice and consent before a treaty can be ratified by the President. But the resolution in question would require only the votes of 51 Senators to make U.S. compliance with the SALT II Treaty law of the land. Moreover, the resolution would improperly

involve the House of Representatives in the enactment and de facto ratification of the SALT II Treaty. A simple majority of the House is all that would be required to pass the resolution. Finally, the Executive Branch's lobbying efforts in support of this resolution in circumvention of the Treaty-making powers challenges the Separation of Powers concept in the Constitution. Thus the resolution supported by your Administration raises profound Constitutional questions.

The Soviets have authoritatively stated repeatedly in the Soviet press that they will not comply with the SALT II Treaty. With de facto U.S. ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the Soviets would thus have all the benefits of U.S. compliance with SALT II, while they themselves have accepted no obligations.

Moreover, passage of this resolution would have grave implications for the national security of the United States. First, as you have said many times and as stated in the Republican Platform, SALT II is fundamentally flawed, unequal, destabilizing, and unverifiable. Former President Carter acknowledged that the election of 1980 was a referendum on his SALT II Treaty. But the American people voted to reject that treaty. Second, compliance with the provisions of SALT II could paralyze your strategic force modernization program, which is vital to restoring U.S. national security. Finally, SALT II enactment is wholly inconsistent with successfully negotiating your START proposal. If the U.S. is legally bound to comply with SALT II indefinitely, the Soviets would have every incentive to stretch out negotiations while they continue to add to their strategic superiority as they did during protracted SALT I and II negotiations. The U.S. unilateral deactivation of 292 U.S. strategic delivery vehicles covered by SALT II prior to beginning START negotiations also does not enhance the U.S. START negotiating position.

Dr. Fred Iklé testified in 1979 that Brezhnev's statement on the Backfire bomber, an integral part of the Treaty, was false. Ikle stated: "The Senate hence faces the uncomfortable situation that the treaty package submitted to it contains an important statement that is contrary to fact...(By approving SALT II) The Senate would make itself an accomplice to a Soviet deception." Moreover, an official Reagan Defense Department document shows that the Soviets falsified the range of their AS-3 Kangaroo air to surface missile and the number of their bombers equipped with air to surface missiles of range greater than 600 kilometers in the SALT II Data Exchange, another integral part of the Treaty.

Your Administration has repeatedly declared that SALT II is dead. For example, a recent letter of May 5, 1982, signed by both State Secretary Haig and Acting Defense Secretary Carlucci, stated

that "the SALT II Treaty is not in the national security interest of the United States and should not be ratified." Yet you have already personally committed the U.S. to a policy of SALT II compliance if the Soviets also comply. Further, your administration has supported enactment of a Senate Joint Resolution which would enact U.S. compliance with the SALT II Treaty as the law of the land.

We strongly urge you to reexamine the present situation in the light of the guidelines laid down in your platform and campaign, and withdraw the Administration's support for the Senate Joint Resolution recently approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee--a resolution that amounts to de facto ratification of the SALT II Treaty--and support instead Senate Resolution 407, introduced by Senator Garn, as a more realistic approach to mutual arms reduction.

With deepest respect,

Gene Helms

John P. East

RB Kord

Steve Symms

"I think it's time that you, the American people, heard some straight talk about Mr. Carter's SALT II Treaty. The real truth about the Treaty is that Mr. Carter himself doomed its fate from the moment it was negotiated. It has been effectively blocked, not by Ronald Reagan, but by the United States Senate-- your elected representatives from all over the nation, fulfilling their constitutional obligation to advise and consent on treaties. It has been critically denounced by dozens of the most eminent scholars and knowledgeable analysts, Democrat as well as Republican."

"A Strategy of Peace for the '80s," October 19, 1980

"I believe the SALT II Treaty should be withdrawn, and I especially believe that the U.S. should not abide by its terms prior to ratification. To abide by the terms of the proposed agreement would violate Article XXXIII of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.

"Arms Control and the 1980 Election," Arms Control Association, May 1980. Answers to questions supplied by Reagan Campaign Committee.

SALT II

"SALT II is not Strategic Arms Limitation, it is Strategic Arms Buildup with the Soviets adding a minimum of 3,000 nuclear warheads to their inventory and the U.S. embarking on a \$35 billion catchup which won't be achieved until 1990, if then."

"To suggest, as the Administration has, that any shortcomings in this SALT II agreement can be rectified in continuing talks leading to a SALT III agreement is an exercise in futility.... I believe the Senate should declare that this treaty, fatally flawed as it is, be shelved and the negotiators should go back to the table and come up with a treaty which fairly and genuinely reduces the number of strategic nuclear weapons."

"SALT and the Search for Peace," September 17, 1979.

"I have repeatedly stated that I would be willing to negotiate an honest, verifiable reduction in nuclear weapons by both our countries to the point that neither of us represented a threat to the other. I cannot, however, agree to any treaty, including the SALT II treaty, which, in effect, legitimizes the continuation of a one-sided arms buildup."

"PEACE: Restoring the Margin of Safety," August 18, 1980

SALT II

Q: If you were elected, would you withdraw the SALT II treaty from Senate consideration?

A: Yes. But at the same time I did, I would make it plain that I was prepared to sit down with the Russians for as long as it might take to negotiate a legitimate arms limitation agreement. My objection to SALT II is it is not arms limitation. It legitimizes arms race. It begins by letting the Soviet Union build 3,000 more warheads, then we can build some to catch up, only we can't catch up until 1990. I think it is a fatally flawed treaty, and it isn't arms limitation.

Interview with Associated Press, New York Times, October 2, 1980.

SALT II

Q: You're still determined to throw out SALT II and start from scratch?

A: "Whether you throw it out or whether you use it as a starting point at the next talk and say this is what's wrong and here's what might be right and start from there-- that's all right with me. But there's no belief on my part that the treaty, as it is, could ever be signed by us."

Text of the President's Interview With Star Editors and Reporters, Washington Star, August 5, 1981.

SALT II

"...is illegal, because the law of the land, passed by Congress, says we cannot accept a treaty in which we are not equal, and we're not equal in this treaty for one reason alone: Our B-52 bombers are considered to be strategic weapons; their Backfire bombers are not."

Transcript of the Presidential Debate Between Carter and Reagan in Cleveland, New York Times, October 30, 1980.

SALT II: Interview with Richard Allen

"Governor Reagan believes that the existing treaty does not, under the circumstances of the present time and for the foreseeable years in this decade, serve our interests. Simultaneous with the continuation of any SALT talks must come a reconstruction of America's defenses.

"Reagan's Foreign Policy-- From Someone Who Knows," New York Times June 29, 1980.

REPUBLICAN PLATFORM

Q: Governor, you were obviously elected with millions and independent votes, do you still feel totally wedded to the Republican Party Platform? ...

A: I am-- I ran on the platform; the people voted for me on the platform; I do believe in that platform, and I think it would be very cynical and callous of me now to suggest that I'm going to turn away from it. Evidently, those people who voted for me-- of the other party or of independents-- must have agreed with that platform.

Transcript of Reagan News Conference with Bush on Plans for Administration, New York Times, November 7, 1980.

- 1) end Carter coverup of SALT violations
- 2) close window of vulnerability
- 3) seek superiority
- 4) accept no arms control agreement locking
US into inferiority
- 5) no new negotiations until US forces can prevail
in battle

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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July 1, 1982

Senator Strom Thurmond, Chairman
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Strom:

On June 9, 1982 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations adopted a joint resolution on arms control which provides that, "The United States shall continue to refrain from actions which would undercut the SALT I and SALT II agreements, provided the Soviet Union shows equal restraint." The Committee has ordered that the Resolution be reported, and has stated that it intends this measure shall have the "full force and effect of the law." In my judgment, this action by the Committee on Foreign Relations is supportive of the nuclear freeze position which is a direct threat to our national security.

Frankly, the proposed resolution raises a serious constitutional issue that should be examined by the Committee on the Judiciary. Article II of the Constitution requires that treaty commitments of the United States must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate. In effect, the joint resolution in question would circumvent the treaty-making process by providing de facto ratification of the SALT II treaty through a mere resolution that requires a simple majority of the Senate and improperly involves the House of Representatives. Because some Executive Department personnel have been actively lobbying in support of this resolution, the procedure that is presently being followed further contravenes the Separation of Powers principle that serves as the bedrock of our Constitution.

For these reasons, I urge you to seek sequential referral of the joint resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary, for further referral; if you deem it appropriate, to the Subcommittee

Senator Strom Thurmond
Committee on the Judiciary
Page Two

on Separation of Powers. I shall also be pleased to assist you in any way that I can to conduct hearings on the Separation of Powers issue involved even if a referral of the bill cannot be obtained.

Finally, let me emphasize that this resolution was not formally introduced in the Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. The resolution, which has no number, was generated within the Committee. A request for referral of the resolution to the Committee on the Judiciary would therefore serve to protect the jurisdictional rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, while at the same time alerting the leadership to a potential problem of jurisdictional encroachment through this committee generated original legislation.

I appreciate your interest in this matter and shall work with you in any way that I can in seeking an appropriate solution.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "John", written in a cursive style.

John P. East, Chairman
Subcommittee on
Separation of Powers

THE NATIONAL CENTER



FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

Amy Moritz
Executive Director

May 26, 1982

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
for Public Liason
Room 191
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Morton:

Seeing you at dinner last week reminded me that I have been remiss in not keeping you informed about the activities of our organization.

The current activities of The National Center can be summed up as 1) providing visible opposition to the nuclear freeze movement and to the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons; and 2) distributing brochures and informational packets to the public at large about these two issues.

On the first point, we are currently sponsoring approximately three dozen rallies opposing the nuclear freeze across the country between now and June 30, and we are sponsoring a number of activities, including a press conference and counterdemonstration, to reduce the negative publicity the President's policies will get at the June 12 "peace" rally in New York City.

On the second point, we are developing a national mailing list of individuals who can be counted on to distribute brochures, write letters to their newspaper or Congressman, or in some other way "spread the word" about the conservative point of view on an issue. We are developing this mailing list through direct mail "Will You Help Us?" letters to proven conservative activists and by advertising in a large number of public policy journals, national magazines, and college newspapers. Naturally, our emphasis has been on conservative publications, but we have attracted some liberals to our chemical warfare project through liberal journals and have thereby convinced some of the nuclear freeze groups to interrupt their own activities to circulate our chemical weapons brochures.

I am including with this letter several copies of the brochures of our two committees, The Committee to Stop Chemical Atrocities and The Committee to Prevent Nuclear War, for your reference. If you

Mr. Morton C. Blackwell

May 26, 1982


page two

know of anyone who might be interested in having one to an infinite number of free copies of these brochures please do not hesitate to have them contact me.

I have also enclosed a copy of some of the other nuclear disarmament materials we have circulated since you mentioned last Friday that you are putting together an informational packet for representatives of the American Legion on the nuclear freeze. Leonard Holihan recently arranged for his assistant, Peter Nassetta, to work out of our office, so Peter has contributed some of the informational materials of The Coalition for Peace Through Security as well. Peter has highlighted some of the most significant phrases in his articles in case the American Legion representatives do not have time to read a large amount of material.

It was nice to see you and Helen again last week. I have told Lilli Dollinger to call me if I can assist the 1982 Youth Campaign in any way and I am fulfilling a promise to Peter Keisler by actively recruiting students for the upcoming Leadership Institute school. I trust that you will contact me if I can be of assistance to you in any way, or if you would like any additional copies of the materials we are publishing here at The National Center.

Best,


Amy Moritz

Enclosures

file Billy Graham

George F. Will

Let Us Pray for a Little Skepticism

When Vladimir Bukovsky, a Russian dissident, was being sent into exile, a KGB agent noted that the handcuffs on Bukovsky's wrists were made in America. But handcuffs are not America's most embarrassing export.

Billy Graham's sojourn as guest of the masters of the Gulag coincided with the anniversary of the Nazi surrender, so he said (according to *The New York Times*): "I want to remind you that the United States and the Soviet Union were allies at the time against a common enemy. Now we have another common enemy—the possibility of a nuclear war."

Graham did not remind anyone that the Soviet Union and the Nazis began the war as allies, and their falling-out was not a Soviet idea. But Graham's delicacy is less interesting than his "common enemy" formulation.

Is it his notion that the threat of nuclear war is a mysterious "third force"? Or the result of some odd misunderstanding, some mutual mistake? Whatever, his language suggests a moral symmetry between his country and the Soviet Union. Evidently they are equally innocent victims—but of what? Physics?

The Kremlin is sponsoring the—take a deep breath—World Conference of Religious

Workers for Saving the Sacred Gift of Life from Nuclear Catastrophe. The Kremlin's audacious cynicism is wondrous. A "gift"—from whom? Marx? And when, did the Kremlin begin speaking of "the sacred"?

This travesty, this exploitation of clergymen's vanities and naiveté, is designed to strengthen the "peace movement"—but only in the West. In East Germany, a new law makes it a crime to wear a button saying "Swords into Plowshares." In Moscow, "Ground Zero Week" lasted the minutes it took the police to pounce on the handful of people who unfurled a banner.

The *Washington Post* reports that when Graham spoke in two churches, both "were heavily guarded with police sealing off all roads leading to them. Hundreds of KGB security agents . . . were in the congregation." Graham told one congregation that God "gives you the power to be a better worker, a more loyal citizen because in Romans 13 we are told to obey the authorities." How is that for a message from America?

According to *The Post*, Graham is "a star attraction" at the conference and "is being driven around Moscow in a Chaika limousine while others are shepherded around in a fleet

of buses." He has conferred with Georgy Arbatov, the Kremlin's foremost stroker of Americans. Graham calls Arbatov "wonderful."

Graham is America's most famous Christian. Solzhenitsyn is Russia's. The contrast is instructive.

When advocates of a "nuclear freeze" recently showed their movie (the one that says war would be terrible) to some Senate wives, Jane Denton, the wife of the Alabama senator, noted that there would be no showing for the wives of Politburo members. Not to worry, Jane. The *Baltimore Sun* recently reported on two local "peace" activists:

"When the Rev. Hope Harle-Mould and his wife, the Rev. Linda Harle-Mould, returned nearly a year ago from a trip to the Soviet Union, they were struck by the strength of a 'grass roots' movement there against the nuclear arms race."

The Washington Cathedral (Episcopal) has Gothic architecture but trendy politics. One service last Sunday was a prayerful rally for ERA. And here is Bishop John Walker preaching at the Cathedral last November: "We must know that all we did between 1900 and the independence of Cuba was designed to make Cuba turn away from us. Perhaps if we had the strength and security of who we are, we might say we were wrong. We might reach out a hand of brotherhood and forgiveness to the Cuban people even as we seek their forgiveness of us."

Forgive Walker's mussy language. (Surely he does not mean "designed.") Forgive the hyperbole ("all" that we did?) in the service of facile guilt-mongering. But don't forgive the intellectual vacuum at the core of his thought—the idea that dealings would be with "the people" of Cuba, rather than with the regime that is their jailer.

People pray for different things. There was a London church where, between performances, an actress prayed to be delivered from the attentions of Edward VII. I pray that some of today's clergy, on the left and the right, will stop acting as though pious intentions are substitutes for intelligence, and excuses for irresponsibility. A crusty 19th century Briton, A.W. Kinglake, wanted skeptical words inscribed on all churches: "Important If True." Skepticism becomes more necessary as churches become more political.



LARRY P. McDONALD
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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

July 13, 1982

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Mr. Morton Blackwell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Morton:

I cannot thank you enough for the material forwarded on July 9th dealing with proposals to obtain a one-sided disarming of United States nuclear capability.

As you probably are already aware, a concerted effort met with success in reversing a proposed nuclear arms freeze in my own District in the City of Rome. The information you provided will add substance to refute any further attempt by at best, the misinformed, to betray United States national interest in my District.

Sincerely,

Larry
Larry P. McDonald

LPM/pem

GENERAL FACT SHEET ON ARMS CONTROL

U.S. ARMS CONTROL POLICY

BACKGROUND

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has been the leader in serious disarmament and arms control proposals. Many of these have focused on controlling the spread of nuclear weapons. For example, in 1946 the U.S. submitted a proposal (the Baruch plan) for international control of nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. In 1955, President Eisenhower presented his "open skies" proposal, under which the U.S. and the Soviet Union would have exchanged blueprints of military establishments and provided for aerial reconnaissance. The Soviets rejected both plans.

Major arms control agreements to which we are a party include the Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963), which prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water; the Direct Communications Link or "hot line" (1963), improved in 1971, for use by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. during international crises; the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which bans placing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space; the Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968), the purpose of which is to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty (1971), which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds and ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal zone; the Accidents Agreement (1971), which provides for U.S.-Soviet measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; the ABM Treaty (1972), which imposes limitations on defense against ballistic missile weapons; and the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms (1972), which froze the number of strategic ballistic missile launchers on either side.

U.S. PRINCIPLES

One of President Reagan's first official acts was to order an intense review of arms control policy, to learn the lessons of the past in order to achieve more lasting progress in the future. Four principles, which the Administration is working to put into practice, underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;
- Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;

- Are verifiable, because when national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and
- Enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.

U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

On November 18, 1981, President Reagan offered to cancel deployments of the Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) if the U.S.S.R. would eliminate its SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles. The U.S. is negotiating toward this end with the U.S.S.R. in Geneva. On May 9, the President announced a two-phased approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which began on June 29, aimed at the following objectives:

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level -- about half the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current U.S. level.

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The U.S. is party to the two existing international arms control agreements affecting chemical and biological weapons. The first, the Geneva Protocol of 1925, prohibits the use in war of these weapons; the second, the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, prohibits the production, development, and stockpiling and transfer of biological and toxin weapons. The U.S. is committed to achieving a complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, and transfer, and to that end, we participate in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

The MBFR talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, underway in Vienna since 1973, are concerned with the reduction and limitation of conventional forces in Central Europe and with associated

confidence building, stabilization, and verification measures. On June 10, 1982, the President announced in Bonn the new NATO initiative to seek common collective ceilings in the reductions area (the Federal Republic of Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg in the west, and East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia in the east) of about 700,000 ground forces and about 900,000 ground and air forces. The NATO initiative also includes measures to encourage cooperation and verify compliance.

VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

Arms control agreements with a highly secretive adversary like the U.S.S.R. cannot be based simply on trust. We must have effective means of verification that enable us to know with confidence whether agreements are being honored. In practice, this means we must be able to monitor activities in the areas covered by such agreements in order to detect any violations; we must be able to do so early enough to permit us to assure Soviet compliance and take steps to offset the effects of any noncompliance. Agreements that cannot be effectively verified are not acceptable.

In the past, we have relied primarily on national technical means (NTM) of verification -- sophisticated data-collection methods (e.g., photographic, electronic, radar, seismic) operated unilaterally by the U.S. As arms control agreements, the systems they cover, and the possibilities of concealment become more complex, it will be essential to supplement NTM with some form of "cooperative" verification measures. In the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the U.S. is participating in discussions of verification and compliance issues related to nuclear weapons testing. The Reagan Administration has made clear that the U.S. will insist on verification procedures, including the possibility of measures beyond national technical means, if necessary, to ensure full compliance with any agreement.

INDIVIDUAL FACT SHEETS ON INF AND START

FACT SHEETS ON INF
AND START

ARMS CONTROL AND NATO INF MODERNIZATIONBACKGROUND

In order to sustain NATO's deterrent strategy in the face of the massive buildup of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), NATO ministers agreed in December, 1979, to modernize the Alliance's INF, while pursuing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on arms control involving those forces. This decision was reconfirmed by NATO in May, 1982. In the absence of a full arms control agreement arising out of U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations, the U.S. will deploy 108 Pershing II's and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs), beginning in December, 1983. The new systems will be mobile and capable of dispersal in times of crisis, thus enhancing their survivability and reducing the danger of a Soviet preemptive attack. These deployments have not been forced in Europe but, rather, were arrived at through a process of genuine consultation with our NATO partners. Modernization will not increase the risk of a nuclear war limited to Europe; on the contrary, the deployments will serve to remind the Soviets that they cannot hope to limit a nuclear war to the territory of others.

SOVIET DEPLOYMENT

The need for NATO modernization stems from the fact that in the mid-1970's, the Soviets began deploying the triple-warhead SS-20, exacerbating the threat to our European Allies and adding to an already destabilizing imbalance in INF.

- The Soviets currently deploy some 300 mobile SS-20's, with 900 warheads, in addition to 300 single-warhead SS-4 and SS-5 missiles, for a total of 1,200 warheads on longer-range INF missiles (not counting refires). NATO has no similar systems deployed.
- This deployment gives the Soviets a capability to hit, accurately and in great number, targets located anywhere in Western Europe from locations deep within the U.S.S.R, far beyond the range of any of NATO's European-based systems.

If deterrence is to be maintained, the Alliance must move to redress the imbalance, either through negotiation or, in the event a concrete INF arms control agreement obviating the need for GLCM and Pershing II is not achieved, through modernization.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL

INF modernization has not set back the prospects of arms control but, in fact, has forced the Soviets to accept, in principal at least, the need to limit their nuclear weapons targeted on Europe.

As a result of NATO's demonstrated resolve to modernize its nuclear forces, the U.S.S.R. has been persuaded to put on the negotiating table, for the first time, nuclear forces that threaten the Allies. Without NATO modernization, there would be no prospect of reducing the Soviet nuclear threat to Europe.

We are now negotiating with the Soviets in Geneva on the basis of the President's November 18, 1981, proposal to cancel deployment of Pershing II's and GLCMs in exchange for elimination of all Soviet SS-20's, SS-4's, and SS-5's. We are focusing on longer-range INF missiles because they are the most destabilizing systems. The U.S. proposal, if carried out, would be a major step toward achieving stability at dramatically reduced levels of forces. During the first round of negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. tabled a treaty that embodied this proposal. Both sides have had a chance to set forth their respective positions and to ask questions about the position of the other side. The talks have been serious and businesslike; we intend to consider Soviet proposals and to negotiate in good faith.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES

Soviet proposals made thus far contain elements that cannot provide a basis for an equitable and verifiable agreement. A Soviet proposal outlined earlier this year would not require destruction of a single SS-20 missile, but would force the cancellation of NATO's modernization program and the virtual elimination of U.S. nuclear-capable aircraft from Europe. The Soviet proposal, based on contrived claims that a balance exists in INF, includes U.K. and French systems and calls for reductions from an unequal starting point, which would give the U.S.S.R. an overwhelming advantage.

A so-called unilateral moratorium on further deployment of Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles announced by President Brezhnev also calls for a halt in NATO deployment preparations, but allows the Soviets to retain all of their currently deployed INF missiles. The Soviet objective clearly is to forestall NATO deployment without sacrificing Soviet INF superiority. NATO must remain committed to modernization of its INF if it is to convince the Soviets that they have no alternative to serious negotiations toward reduced and equal limits.

START PROPOSAL

BACKGROUND

On May 9, 1982, President Reagan announced a new proposal to reduce significantly the nuclear arsenals of both the U.S. and the Soviet Union and to reduce the threat of nuclear war. The negotiations, beginning on June 29, are called START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) -- to emphasize the President's goal of nuclear weapons reductions and to signify a break from the unratified SALT II Treaty.

The President's initiative has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R. Such a relationship, however, can be built only on reciprocity and mutual restraint. Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

U.S. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Significant Reductions. We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality. We seek agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces. The U.S. will accept nothing less.
- Security. We seek agreements that will enhance U.S. and Allied security and reduce the risk of war.
- Verifiability. We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions we seek.

START NEGOTIATIONS

To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase of negotiations, on significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing growth in ballistic missile warhead numbers that

would have been permitted under the unratified SALT II Treaty. In this first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by at least one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We also will seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half the current U.S. level.

In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw weight. Throw weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First-phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

RELATIONSHIP TO SALT

The President's START proposal has built upon the experience of the SALT process, and we will continue to benefit from that experience. It is U.S. policy to take no action that would undercut existing agreements, provided the Soviets exercise equal restraint. We believe that this policy can contribute to a positive atmosphere for START negotiations. However, the Reagan Administration will not pursue ratification of SALT II for three broad reasons:

- First, the Treaty has specific flaws. These include the perpetuation and codification of dangerous, destabilizing asymmetries, illustrated by a unilateral Soviet advantage of 308 heavy ICBMs. It contains several ambiguities, particularly with respect to provisions for verification. It permitted force expansion and did not achieve force reductions -- it is possible that the Soviet ICBM forces alone could have grown to more than 8,000 warheads under SALT II.
- Because of these and other shortcomings, SALT II never achieved the broad national support that a treaty of this importance must have. Even before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there was a divisive debate on the merits of the Treaty. Attempting to ratify SALT II now would only reopen that controversial debate -- at a time when a broad consensus behind the President's proposal is needed.
- Finally, formalizing the SALT II Treaty would make achievement of the President's goals for START more difficult by establishing unacceptable precedents for a future agreement. For example, Soviet Backfire bombers and heavy

missiles are treated in a manner inconsistent with our plans for START. These and other provisions would have to be changed later in START. While observing the general limitations of SALT II would not impede progress toward START, codifying them most certainly would.

A REASONABLE APPROACH

The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive Soviet buildup of ballistic missile forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces. The President's START proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions on both sides and a stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- PROPOSED REDUCTIONS

On May 9, the President announced a bold, new proposal to reduce significantly the risks posed by large nuclear arsenals. He has proposed a phased approach to reductions focused on the most destabilizing elements of nuclear forces. The initial phase would reduce the total number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000, would limit the number of warheads carried on ICBMs to one-half that number, and would cut the total number of ballistic missiles to an equal level about one-half of the current US level. In a second phase, we would seek further reductions in the overall destructive power of each side's arsenal to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw weight below the current US level. We will also treat bombers and other strategic systems in an equitable manner. The proposed reductions, coupled with effective verification, will substantially reduce the nuclear threat and will make a major contribution to the stability of the nuclear balance.

The significant reductions proposed by President Reagan are shown in the following comparison:

FIRST PHASE

	<u>Approximate Current Levels</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Ballistic Missile Warheads (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 5,000	7,200	7,500
Land-Based Ballistic Missile Warheads		
o Proposed ceiling of 2,500	2,150	5,900
Ballistic Missiles (Land-Based and Sea-Based)		
o Proposed ceiling of 850, approximately one-half current U.S. levels	1,600	2,350

SECOND PHASE

Missile Throw Weight

o Proposed ceiling below current U.S. levels	2 MKG	5 MKG
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STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS TALKS (START) -- THE US PROPOSAL

The President has opened the door to a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union based upon the principles of reciprocity and mutual restraint.

Arms control is an important instrument for securing such restraint. Equitable and verifiable agreements, when combined with sound foreign and defense policies, can play a critical role in enhancing deterrence and ensuring a stable military balance.

The President has outlined the objectives of U.S. arms control policy:

- Significant Reductions: We seek to reduce the number and destructive potential of nuclear weapons, not just to cap them at high levels as in previous agreements.
- Equality: Americans will accept nothing less. We want agreements that will lead to mutual reductions to equal levels in both sides' forces.
- Verifiability: We will carefully design the provisions of arms control agreements and insist on measures to ensure that both sides comply. Otherwise, neither side will have the confidence needed to accept the deep reductions that we seek.

On May 9, the President announced a bold and realistic two-phased U.S. approach to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) aimed at these objectives.

- In the first phase, we will seek to reduce the number of ballistic missile warheads by one-third, to about 5,000. No more than half the remaining ballistic missile warheads will be on land-based missiles. We will also seek to cut the total number of all ballistic missiles to an equal level, about one-half of the current U.S. level.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions in overall destructive power of each side's arsenals to equal levels, including a mutual ceiling on ballistic missile throw-weight below the current U.S. level.

The President's proposal attempts to reduce the threat of nuclear war by enhancing deterrence and securing a stable nuclear balance. The main threat to the strategic balance has been the massive

Soviet buildup of ballistic missiles forces. Because of their large size, increasing accuracy, and short flight times, these missiles (and particularly land-based ICBMs) pose a significant threat to U.S. deterrent forces.

- To enhance deterrence and ensure a stable nuclear balance, the President's proposal focuses, in the first phase, on significant reductions on ballistic missile warheads and deployed ballistic missiles themselves. This would halt and reverse the destabilizing trend that would have been permitted under the unratified SALT II Treaty.
- In the second phase, we will seek further reductions to equal ceilings on other elements of strategic forces, particularly ballistic missile throw-weight. Throw-weight is an important measure of the size and destructive potential of ballistic missiles. First phase reductions will reduce the current disparity in ballistic missile throw-weight, and lay the groundwork for the second-phase reductions to achieve an equal throw-weight ceiling below current U.S. levels.

The President's approach is reasonable and equitable. It would lead to significant reductions on both sides and a stable nuclear balance, which should be in the interest not only of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., but of the entire world. The President has emphasized our intention to negotiate in good faith and to consider all serious proposals from the Soviets.

The debate on nuclear weapons issues has focused public attention on a matter of crucial importance. It is now time to demonstrate support for the ambitious, yet realistic, approach to strategic arms control embodied in the U.S. START proposal. The START negotiations will begin on June 29.

FACT SHEETS ON: U.S. STRATEGIC FORCE MODERNIZATION
U.S. DEFENSE SPENDING
THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS RACE
THE NUCLEAR BALANCE

MODERNIZATION, BALANCE
AND DEFENSE SPENDING

Strategic Forces -- U.S. Modernization Program -- Overview

Because of enormous Soviet military investments and deployment of new generations of Soviet strategic systems over the last two decades, the trends in the strategic balance have moved against the U.S., and threaten the survivability and credibility of U.S. strategic deterrent forces.

-- The Soviet ICBM force is significantly larger and more powerful than ours; they have the capability to conduct a first strike on our Minuteman silos, and this capability is growing.

-- The Soviets have deployed 62 ballistic missile firing submarines, a force that is larger than our own.

-- The Soviets have invested heavily in survivable command, control, and communications systems, strategic air defense, and civil defense. These programs are important elements in the overall balance.

-- The Soviets now lead in most significant measures of overall strategic capability. The U.S. retains a lead in warheads, but that relatively small advantage rests, in part, on an aging bomber force whose ability to survive attack and penetrate Soviet air defenses is increasingly in question, and on an ICBM force that is vulnerable to attack.

Last October, the President announced a comprehensive strategic modernization program designed to correct these deficiencies. The program includes:

-- Deployment of the new MX land-based missile as soon as possible.

-- Procurement of 100 B-1B bombers in the near-term, and deployment of the Advanced Technology Bomber for the 1990s.

-- Development of the new Trident II (D-5) submarine-launched ballistic missile, continued procurement of Trident submarines, and deployment of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles as a secure reserve force.

-- Deployment of a more survivable and enduring communications and control system.

-- Modernization of strategic defense.

DEFENSE AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET

Defense spending should be measured against the threat, not against social programs.


- DOD-expenditures today account for 28.5% of the Federal Budget and 6.3% of GNP. In the 50's and 60's Defense was between 40-50% of the budget and between 8 and 9% of GNP**

Defense Spending is Productive.


- Social spending goes generally to goods and services. Defense spending stimulates investment.**
- On the average, \$1 B in defense spending creates 25K-35K jobs.**

THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS "RACE"

US



USSR



US-USSR STRATEGIC FORCE COMPARISON

TOTAL ACTIVE INVENTORY


Ballistic Missiles

	<u>1962</u>			<u>1972</u>			<u>1982</u>	
	<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>		<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>		<u>US</u>	<u>USSR</u>
ICBMs	78	40		1054	1500		1053	1398
SSBNs/SLBMs	9/144	38/100		41/656	57/500		33/544	70/950
Warheads	222	140		3700	2000		7100	7500
Throweight (Klbs)	400	500		3000	7000		4000	11,000

Nuclear Capable Bombers

Bomber	1700	160		500	150		347	400
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TOTAL FEDERAL OUTLAYS (FY 1983 CONSTANT \$, BILLIONS)



ALLOCATION OF FEDERAL RESOURCES

	<u>1940's</u>	<u>1950's</u>	<u>1960's</u>	<u>1970's</u>	<u>1980's*</u>
<u>DEFENSE:</u>					
% OF GNP	17.2	10.1	8.6	6.0	6.5
% OF FEDERAL BUDGET	55.4	54.5	44.3	29.1	30.1
<u>HUMAN RESOURCES:</u>					
% OF GNP	3.4	4.1	6.0	10.4	10.8
% OF FEDERAL BUDGET	19.2	22.6	30.2	48.2	50.6
<u>ALL OTHER FUNCTIONS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:</u>					
% OF GNP	4.4	4.1	4.8	4.4	4.4
% OF FEDERAL BUDGET	25.4	22.9	25.5	22.7	19.3

||
*ESTIMATED THROUGH 1987

BOOKLET ON THE NUCLEAR FREEZE MOVEMENT/PROPOSAL

United States Department of State

THE NUCLEAR FREEZE

April 1982



The Nuclear Freeze

In recent months, a proposal for a U.S.-Soviet nuclear weapons freeze has attracted widespread attention. A resolution supporting such a freeze has been submitted to Congress, and versions have been placed on the November ballot in several states. While the wording of different versions varies, and some call for eventual reductions in arms levels, the basic idea is this:

The President should immediately propose that the United States and the Soviet Union adopt a mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles and new aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear weapons, subject to strict verification.

The U.S. Government recognizes that the proposal represents the best of intentions: to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and encourage more rapid progress in a critical and exceptionally complex area of arms control. We all share these objectives. But, after carefully reviewing the proposal, we have concluded that a freeze at existing nuclear levels would have adverse implications for international security and stability and would frustrate attempts to achieve the goal on which we all agree: the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

What Kind of Arms Control Agreements Do We Seek?

Four principles underlie the U.S. approach to arms control. We seek agreements that:

- *Produce significant reductions in the arsenals of both sides;*
- *Result in equal levels of arms on both sides, since an unequal agreement, like an unequal balance of forces, can encourage coercion or aggression;*
- *Are verifiable, because when our national security is at stake, agreements cannot be based upon trust alone; and*
- *Enhance U.S. and allied security and reduce the risk of war, because arms control is not an end in itself but an important means toward securing peace and international stability.*

These four principles were highlighted by the President in his speech of November 18, 1981. They are the foundation for the U.S. position in the current Geneva negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF). They also form the basis for our approach to strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, negotiations we will call START—*Strategic Arms Reduction Talks*.

What Are the Drawbacks of a Freeze Proposal?

While the Administration shares the genuine and deeply felt convictions that have given rise to the freeze proposal, we believe the proposal does not constitute sound defense or effective arms control policy, and thus we cannot support the freeze itself. A freeze would be dangerous to security, stability, and the cause of peace for the following reasons:

- *A freeze at existing levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability.* The freeze would prevent us from correcting existing dangerous deficiencies in our nuclear forces caused by the sustained Soviet buildup. The substantial improvements in the Soviet force of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), for example, have given the Soviet Union the means to destroy a large part of our ICBM force. In addition, there are about 600 Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles capable of striking our NATO allies. These missiles are not offset by any comparable U.S. systems. In this case, a freeze would prevent us from restoring the balance.

- *A freeze is not good enough.* We do not want to cap deployments at current levels; we want significant reductions in the nuclear arms of both sides, reductions that will lead to a stable military balance. The United States has already offered a bold new arms control initiative at the negotiations in Geneva on land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We proposed a "zero option" under which the United States would cancel the planned deployment of Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in exchange for the elimination of comparable Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. Our objective in negotiating strategic arms control agreements is also to achieve significant reductions.

- *A freeze would make significant arms control more difficult.* The Soviets would have little incentive to agree to reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms if they knew they could simply freeze the existing military situation. This has already been demonstrated in the area of intermediate-range forces, where the U.S.S.R. initially refused our offers to negotiate while steadily deploying some 300 SS-20 missile systems. The Soviets agreed to come to the negotiating

Introduction of Strategic Weapons by the U.S. and U.S.S.R. 1972-1982

ICBM—Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

SLBM—Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile

SSBN—Nuclear-Powered Ballistic Missile Submarine

ALCM—Air-Launched Cruise Missile




table only when it became clear that we and our NATO allies were determined to take steps to counter those SS-20 deployments.

- *A freeze would cast serious doubt on American leadership of the NATO alliance.* In 1979, in the face of continuing Soviet deployments, the members of the alliance agreed to begin deployment in 1983 of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles and to seek a U.S.-U.S.S.R. arms control agreement to reduce intermediate-range nuclear forces. A freeze now would, in effect, be a unilateral decision by the United States to withdraw from this joint allied undertaking.

- *A freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified.* The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets.

A Freeze and the Soviet Buildup

During the past decade, the Soviet Union has mounted a sustained buildup across the entire range of its nuclear forces. Soviet modernization efforts have far outstripped ours, particularly in the development and deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, which now pose a major threat to a large part of our land-based ICBM force. In the last 10 years, the Soviets introduced an unprecedented array of new strategic weapons into their arsenals, including the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 ICBMs, the Typhoon and Delta submarines and several new types of submarine-launched missiles, and the Backfire bomber. During this same period, the United States exercised restraint and only introduced the Trident missile and submarine and the cruise missile.

This trend has been harmful to the security interests of the United States and its allies and to global stability. It is not just a question of numbers. As their military capability has grown, the Soviets have increasingly resorted to the use of military force directly, or through proxies such as Cuba, to intervene in areas farther and farther from their borders. The increased assertiveness of Soviet behavior—the invasion of Afghanistan, pressure on Poland, support for insurgency in Central America—reflects growing Soviet confidence in their military capabilities.

ICBMs. Since 1972, the Soviets have developed and deployed at least 10 different variants of three new types of ICBMs. In the same period, the United States deployed no new types of ICBMs and only one variant of the existing Minuteman. In 1986, we plan to begin deployment of the MX, the first new U.S. intercontinental ballistic missile in 16 years.

Sea-Based Forces. The commissioning of the first U.S. Trident submarine in 1982 marked the end of a 15-year period during which the United States did not build any new ballistic missile-firing submarines. In this same period, the U.S.S.R. added over 60 missile-firing submarines in four new or improved classes. The Soviets are now deploying two new types of missile submarines—the Typhoon and the Delta III—while we are building only the Trident.

Bombers. When the first B-1 bomber becomes operational in 1985, it will have been nearly a quarter of a century since the last U.S. heavy bomber was produced. In contrast, the Soviets have produced more than 250 modern Backfire bombers that have inherent intercontinental capabilities. The Soviets also have improved their large air defense system designed to counter our bomber force. A freeze would not constrain these Soviet air defenses.

The chart on pages 4 and 5 compares the introduction of new strategic weapons by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and shows the momentum of the Soviet buildup over the last decade. As the chart shows, the Soviets introduced 12 new or improved nuclear weapons systems, while the United States only introduced three, and they upgraded or expanded every area of their nuclear arsenal.

Moreover, in most significant measures used to judge strategic forces—total number of systems, total number of ballistic missiles, total destructive potential—the Soviets now surpass the United States. Soon they could equal and surpass us in number of warheads, the one area where the United States has traditionally had an advantage.

The President entered office with a mandate to correct these trends. The modernization program he announced in October 1981 is designed to restore the strategic balance and prevent nuclear war. In so doing, it will give the Soviet Union a strong incentive to negotiate with us to achieve genuine arms reductions.

Conclusion

The Reagan Administration is committed to equitable and verifiable arms control aimed at substantial reductions in military forces. While the freeze proposal reflects the desire of people everywhere to reduce the threat of nuclear war, it would not promote reductions, equality, or verifiability. Rather, it would accomplish the opposite. A freeze at existing levels would lock in existing nuclear inequalities while making further progress in arms control difficult, if not impossible. For these reasons, our goal in arms control must be the negotiation of substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. We can do better than a freeze.

JUNE 25, 1982, PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO AMB. ROWNEY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 25, 1982

Dear Ambassador Rowny:

You are about to undertake one of the most important tasks of our age -- the negotiation of an effective and equitable strategic arms reduction agreement. Your efforts in this endeavor are vital to the citizens of the United States and the Soviet Union, and to all mankind.

Despite more than a decade of intensive negotiations, nuclear weapons continue to accumulate, and the strategic relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States has steadily become less stable. A major reason for this has been the massive buildup of the Soviet Union's ballistic missile force over the past 15 years.

An historic opportunity now exists for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reverse this process, and to reduce substantially both the numbers and the destructive potential of nuclear forces. Such reductions to equal levels must immediately focus on the most destabilizing elements of the strategic balance if we are to promptly enhance deterrence and stability and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. Further, the achievement of this goal should greatly reduce the nuclear anxiety that has become such a conspicuous feature of public concern throughout the world.

I do not underestimate the monumental nature of the task of effectively reducing forces. But while the task is formidable, the importance of undertaking these negotiations is fully appreciated by the American and, I believe, by the Soviet people. We must learn from the shortcomings of earlier efforts for, as you are well aware, the American people will not accept an agreement unless it is equal and verifiable, and contributes to stability.

The proposals you take to Geneva represent a practical, phased plan which will protect the legitimate security interests of both sides. It is designed to enhance deterrence and to achieve stability by reducing nuclear forces on both sides to equal levels in a verifiable manner. Its provisions significantly reduce the forces of both the Soviet Union and the United States and, therefore, contain benefits for both sides, as well as for the rest of the world.


I know that you and your delegation will present these proposals clearly and persuasively, along with the fundamental considerations that lie behind them. And, I want the Soviet delegation to know that concerns and proposals put forward by them will be given careful consideration by us. For our part, the United States is ready to move forward rapidly toward an agreement reducing strategic nuclear arms, and I am confident that if our efforts are met with the same seriousness of purpose by the Soviet Union, we can seize the historic opportunity that lies before us.

As the two leading nuclear powers in the world, the United States and the Soviet Union are trustees for humanity in the great task of ending the menace of

nuclear arsenals and transforming them into instruments underwriting peace. I am convinced that this can be done if both nations fully accept the principle that the only legitimate function of nuclear arms is to deter aggression.

I wish you Godspeed in your efforts, and assure you that these negotiations will have personal attention.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Ronald Reagan". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Ronald" and last name "Reagan" clearly distinguishable.

The Honorable Edward L. Rowny
Chairman
U.S. START Delegation
Washington, D.C. 20451

LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE

- July 23, 1982 Presidential Letter Supporting H.J. Res. 538,
Broomfield, Carney, Stratton Resolution
- Cosponsors of H.J. Res. 538
- Cosponsors of H.J. Res. 521, House Foreign Affairs Committee
Resolution
- Members who have not cosponsored either Resolution

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 23, 1982

Dear Bob:

Less than a month ago, we embarked on a major effort with the Soviet Union to negotiate a reduction in the strategic arsenals of both sides and thus to reduce the risk of nuclear war. I view this initiative as one of the most important and challenging of my Presidency, and I am determined that the United States will do everything in its power to achieve an effective, equitable, and verifiable agreement. The American people will not be satisfied with anything less.

As we engage in the sensitive and complex START negotiations with the Soviet Union, we need to demonstrate that the American people and Congress are behind the proposals carried by Ambassador Rowny to Geneva. The bipartisan resolution recently introduced by Congressmen Broomfield, Carney, and Stratton will make clear to the Soviets that the American people are united in seeking substantial reductions to equal and verifiable levels in the arsenals of both sides, and reducing the risk of war by accident or miscalculation. I strongly support the resolution.

We must not allow this opportunity to reach an agreement on substantial nuclear force reductions to be lost. I am concerned that the resolution reported earlier by the House Foreign Affairs Committee will signal to the Soviet Union that we are willing to accept something less than these reductions; that is, a freeze that leaves dangerous asymmetries in the nuclear balance and a return to the flawed SALT II agreement. Both these provisions would seriously undercut our negotiating position and reduce the chances for achievement of our START objectives.

With your support, we can achieve the goals we have set and enhance the prospects for peace and stability. I urge you and your colleagues to support the substitute resolution sponsored by Congressmen Broomfield, Carney, and Stratton.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. J. RES. 538

I

To express the support of Congress for the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in substantial, verifiable, equitable, and militarily significant reductions of their nuclear weapons resulting in equal and sharply reduced force levels which would contribute to peace and stability.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 15, 1982

Mr. BROOMFIELD (for himself, Mr. STRATTON, Mr. CARNEY, Mr. PRICE, Mr. MADIGAN, Mr. MURTHA, Mr. WINN, Mr. STENHOLM, Mr. GILMAN, Mr. CHAPPELL, Mr. EMERY, Mr. BREAUX, Mr. HYDE, Mr. DAN DANIEL, Mr. MARTIN of North Carolina, and Mr. WHITE) introduced the following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

JOINT RESOLUTION

To express the support of Congress for the United States and the Soviet Union to engage in substantial, verifiable, equitable, and militarily significant reductions of their nuclear weapons resulting in equal and sharply reduced force levels which would contribute to peace and stability.

Whereas the most serious challenges facing the American people, who are a people of peace, are the preservation of freedom and the prevention of war, with particular reference to nuclear war, by accident, miscalculation, or design;

Whereas the American people share the yearning of the world's people for reductions in nuclear armaments;

Whereas the Soviet Union, by its actions in Poland and Afghanistan, and through its refusal to abide by international chemical weapons agreements, has created threats to world peace;

Whereas sizable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and far lower level would enhance stability and the maintenance of peace;

Whereas the Congress has expressed its mandate in Public Law 92-448 that the United States should not enter into a nuclear arms accord that provides for force levels inferior to those of the Soviet Union;

Whereas the stated policy of the United States Government is to negotiate verifiable reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both the United States and the Soviet Union;

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union began formal negotiations in November 1981 in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of intermediate range nuclear forces;

Whereas in May 1982 the Foreign Minister of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations welcomed the President's proposal to cut stockpiles of long-range nuclear missiles as "a far-reaching but realistic offer" that could lead to "fair and effective agreements";

Whereas the United States and the Soviet Union began formal negotiations on June 29, 1982, in Geneva on the limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear armaments: Now, therefore, be it

- 1 *Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives*
- 2 *of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That (1) the Congress supports the initiation of the strategic

1 arms reduction talks and urges the Soviet Union to join with
2 the United States in concluding an equitable and verifiable
3 agreement which freezes strategic nuclear forces at equal and
4 substantially reduced levels.

5 (2) The Congress reaffirms support for Public Law 92-
6 448 which states that the United States not enter into an
7 arms accord which provides for force levels inferior to those
8 of the Soviet Union.

9 (3) To encourage arms restraint and stability, the
10 United States should propose to the Soviet Union and other
11 nations practical measures to—

12 (A) reduce the danger of nuclear war through ac-
13 cident or miscalculation;

14 (B) prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third
15 parties, including terrorists; and

16 (C) halt the worldwide proliferation of nuclear
17 weapons.

18 (4) The Congress insists that any arms control agree-
19 ment must be fully verifiable as our national security cannot
20 be based on trust alone.

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