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You are cordially invited to a White House briefing on President Reagan's proposed sale of AWACs to Saudi Arabia.

The speakers will include:

1. Dr. Richard V. Allen, the President's National Security Advisor
2. Hon. James L. Buckley, Under Secretary of State

The briefing will be held in the White House Family Theater on Tuesday, October 6, 1981 at 4:00 P.M.

Please enter the White House through the East Gate.

We hope that you will be able to attend.
Please R.S.V.P. to Kathy or Maiselle at
202-456-2657.

Elizabeth H. Dole
Assistant to the President for Public Liaison

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 5, 1981

The following statement was issued by the undersigned former national security officials today:

The sale of AWACS and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia would make a substantial contribution to the national security interests of the United States in a vital part of the world. The rejection of this sale would damage the ability of the United States to conduct a credible and effective foreign policy, not only in the Gulf region, but across a broad range of issues.

The Honorable Harold Brown
The Honorable Zbigniew Brzezinski
The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
The Honorable Gordon Gray
The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Honorable Melvin Laird
The Honorable Lyman Lemnitzer
The Honorable Robert McNamara
Admiral Thomas Moorer
The Honorable William P. Rogers
The Honorable Elliot Richardson
The Honorable Walt Rostow
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Honorable James Schlesinger
General Brent Scowcroft
The Honorable Maxwell Taylor

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING
FOR REPORTERS BY
SENATOR NANCY KASSEBAUM

The Old Executive Office Building
Room 450

October 8, 1981

11:55 A.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: Senator Kassebaum has just finished about a 15 minute meeting with the President and she will have a brief statement of which we have copies -- we'll pass out at the conclusion and she'll be happy to take your questions.

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Thank you, Larry. For some time, I have been contemplating the AWACS proposal. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, we have been very involved in hearings, as you know, the last couple of weeks.

My initial inclination was to support the sale. I believed that it would enhance regional stability. I also was persuaded that if we did not complete the sale, that the Saudis would be able to purchase the British Nimrod.

These considerations, while valid, were not necessarily compelling. But recent events in the region, however, do make a compelling case for the sale. I think the assassination of President Sadat makes it crucial that we reach out to all moderates in the Arab world. The sale now, more than ever, is in the interest of Mideast stability and American security.

My active support of the proposal is not a sentimental memorial to President Sadat -- a courageous and imaginative world leader. It is rather a recognition of the reality we face in the aftermath of his tragic death. I hope that we can quickly consummate the sale and get the issue behind us as we shape a post-Sadat Mideast policy.

We must continue our strong relationship with Egypt and Israel and build our ties with the Saudi moderates. Our friendship with one nation does not preclude our involvement with others. As I have focused in the last few days on the complex of issues surrounding the AWACS proposal, I believe that the preeminent consideration must be regional stability. I hope that others will concentrate on that element as well.

This isn't a question that should, nor I think, will be decided on partisan or political personal benefit. It is a question of whether the sale will enhance or inhibit American interest for a stable rational Mideast.

I have concluded that it serves those interests. I hope others will too. Thank you.

Q Senator, how do you answer opponents of the AWACS deal who say that the Sadat assassination dramatizes the dangers of U.S. supplied arms getting into the wrong hands?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: We're never going to be able to, I think, evaluate whether it's wrong hands. There's always been, for a long period of time, an uncertainty about the Mideast, the fragile tensions that have torn the area apart for centuries will continue to be. But we have to deal with the reality as it is and I think work towards those key Arab states that have been moderate in policy and certainly are anxious to work with us. As I say, in no way does it preclude the importance of Israel and its long and historic ties to us. It will continue. I think it's paramount

MORE

that we maintain a relationship with Israel and with the other key Arab states. I don't believe, indeed, that we can determine whether it's going to fall into the wrong hands or not.

Q Senator, this is your response to the Sadat assassination and part of your justification for supporting the AWACS sale. The almost immediate response of the Saudis was to urge the Egyptian leadership to now abandon the Camp David process. Do you think it's wise to continue this sort of military support of the Saudis if they are so recalcitrant in joining the U.S. backed peace process in the Middle East?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Sometimes things are said for the press and for public at home and indeed won't be the intention and I would certainly hope that it will not be. I don't think --

Q It's been a very consistent line, though, on their part.

MORE

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: It has been in the past. It doesn't mean it will necessarily continue to be in the future.

Q Well, do you have any indications to suggest that the Saudis would join in the Camp David peace talks?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I don't have any indications, no. But I certainly think that we should be willing to take an imaginative step on our own part and reach out without necessarily tying all sorts of conditions, as a matter of fact, to the sale and take a gamble that indeed it will be productive. I think it can be.

Q Senator, in exchange for your support of the President's position on AWACS, did you receive any assurances about the basing of MX missiles in Kansas?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No, I did not. That didn't even come up.

Q Three months ago you said you thought we should suspend consideration of the AWACS sale. And you said, "The last thing we need right now is more arms in the Mideast regardless of who wants them."

Aren't things less stable now than they were then?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: That was at the time following the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Baghdad and I said I thought that it would be wise to not conclude the sale of the F-16's to Israel and hold back any decision on the AWACS.

We proceeded with the sale of the F-16's and so I think we might as well go ahead, and as I said, make this decision and get it behind us and move on, plus, now, the very significant factor, of course, of the assassination of President Sadat and the conditions that will change in the Mideast as they are searching for new relationships. And I think it's very important that we have a presence there.

Q Senator, you're in a distinct minority in terms of supporting AWACS, it appears, in the Senate. Do you think you are --

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Oh, I don't think so.

Q Do you think that the AWACS will pass in the Senate, the President proposal will pass and are you part of a stampede to the President's side, if you will?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No, I'm not part of a stampede. As a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, as I say, we have been going through exhaustive discussions about the AWACS proposal. I think it's going to be close. I have always felt it would be close. I do believe that the conditions now have made it -- there are different factors that have entered in that have made, I'm sure, some different considerations that I feel are important. And it's the stability of the region. And I think this can enhance it, but more importantly, as I said before, I think we need to get it behind us.

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Q Senator, considering that some people see the Sadat assassination as a not too subtle warning to other would be moderate Arab leaders not to cozy up too close to the United States, is that why it's important in some way to support the AWACS proposal?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I don't know that we can -- how it will be read. Most of the comments that I have seen regarding the assassination have believed it came from fundamentalist Moslems and was not particularly related to friendship with us.

That certainly will always be factor. And I think we have to take that into consideration. Certainly those nations that don't want to appear too close to us, as I say, will make comments for home consumption and yet very much want a working relationship. I don't know for how long you can have it both ways, but part of diplomacy is being skillful and being flexible and I think that pertains to everyone.

Q Senator, let me ask you a question on a related matter. The New York Times reports this morning that a plan born during the latter months of the Carter administration and apparently carried out through the spring of this year involved a covert plot against Colonel Qaddafi by the United States, France, the Saudis and Egypt. The story did not specify that assassination was involved, but some sort of covert action involving Egyptian and Sudanese troops.

Let me ask you as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee, were you aware of such a plan? And number two, do you think that is a proper U.S. role to play in that very unstable region?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No, I was not aware. I just went on the Foreign Relations Committee in January and if this was something that had been contemplated in the previous administration, I would not have been aware of it,

nor do I think the Foreign Relations Committee would have been aware of it. I think that we have always had obviously a role in covert activities. That is not to say that it is wise or that we should. But it has been a reality and I could not judge this particular situation. Certainly Colonel Qaddafi has himself engaged in many destabilizing, covert activities, and will continue to do so, I am sure.

Q Do you think that it is fair to play the same game with him?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I cannot really make a judgement until I would know if even, indeed, that had been the case.

Q Senator, your opening statement struck many of the things that White House spokespersons are striking in the AWACS matter. Did anyone on the White House staff assist in the drafting of your statement?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No, they did not.

Q Your staff did it, then?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: I did that with my staff, yes.

Q Senator, the death of President Sadat indicates how tenuous the situation in any Middle Eastern state can be. Will not the introduction of this sophisticated arms package to Saudi Arabia, including the enhancements on the jets, increase tensions in the area? Israel is oppose to it. How can you see this as a stabilizing factor?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: Because I think as Egypt is struggling to establish stability with the change of government, there is going to have to be a pulling together of some of the moderate Arab states. Certainly the Saudis are one. They are important to us. They are important, really, to Israel. This, as you know, will not be a sale that will be completed until 1985,-- between 1985 and 1987. Many things can change even in the next several months. But to move ahead and finalize a discussion which has been ongoing for a long period of time, going back again to the previous administration, I think is crucial. I think we need to move beyond this to broader policy in the Middle East, and I think that is what is fundamental.

Q Senator, did the administration tell you anything new about the AWACS deal to get your support, or was specifically the assassination the deciding factor?

SENATOR KASSEBAUM: No, there was nothing particularly new. As I said, I started out with two areas that I felt were important and those were really more or less confirmed during the hearings. Then I think the compelling case for the need to take action and to move on was the assassination.

Thank you.

END

12:05 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 5, 1981

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT,
DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND MR. HAROLD BROWN
FOLLOWING LUNCHEON WITH
FORMER NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISORS

North Portico

1:10 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: This distinguished bipartisan group of former national security officials have agreed to the following statement of support for the sale of AWACS and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia. After reading this statement, both Harold Brown and Henry Kissinger would like to make a further statement of their own.

The statement is: The sale of AWACS and other air defense equipment to Saudi Arabia would make a substantial contribution to the national security interests of the United States in a vital part of the world. The rejection of this sale would damage the ability of the United States to conduct a credible and effective foreign policy, not only in the Gulf region, but across a broad range of issues.

I want to thank each one of these gentlemen who are here for their recognition that this sale is in the national security interests of the nation. Their public appearance at this time is an indication of the broad bipartisan support this sale has among knowledgeable former national security officials from both Republican and Democratic administrations, going all the way back to the Eisenhower administration.

And we believe, as I've said before, that not only is what we're talking about in the interest of our national security, but it is in the best interests of the national security of our friend and ally, Israel.

Now, Henry -- Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. President, I'm aware of the intense debate that is going on on this issue and I can sympathize with many of the concerns that have been expressed. It is my strong conviction, however, that these concerns cannot be met by objecting to the sale of AWACS. I believe the sale is in the national interests of the United States. It is compatible with the security of Israel. It is essential for the peace process in the Middle East. And it is important for the President's ability to conduct an effective and credible foreign policy. And so, I would urge those who have legitimate concerns, to meet them in conversation with the administration and to vote for the AWACS package without attaching conditions -- that are incompatible with the dignity of Saudi Arabia and with the effective conduct of our foreign policy.

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. And now, former Secretary Brown.

MR. BROWN: Thank you, Mr. President. I believe that American national security depends very strongly on the preservation of peace and of a favorable situation in Southwest Asia. One can understand the arguments that well-meaning opponents of the AWACS transfer make. I believe that when these are weighed against the advantages that this sale brings to U.S. national security, that the conclusion is that it would not help U.S. security, it would not help Israeli security, to have this sale rejected.

I think that both from a military point of view and from a diplomatic point of view the transfer is advantageous to the U.S. From a military point of view in terms of the ability it gives us to have information on air movements in the area and from a diplomatic point of view because the United States needs, if it is to continue to

MORE

contribute to the peace process, to have close relations with Israel, with Saudi Arabia, and with other countries in the region.

I think that would be severely damaged if this sale were overturned. I hope that the members of Congress who are going to consider this matter take into full consideration these facets of the issue. And when they do, I believe that they should come out in favor of it. Thank you.

THE PRESIDENT: This concludes, but I think you can all see that there's a who's who roster here of men who have served this country over a great many years and have proven today they continue to serve any time they're needed.

And on behalf of all the people of this country, I just want to express my heartfelt thanks to all of you for being here today and doing this. Thank you very much.

END

1:20 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

PRESS BRIEFING

BY

MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN,

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS;

COLONEL ROBERT LILAC; MAJOR ROBERT KIMMIT;

ADMIRAL JAMES NANCE

Room 450, Old Executive Office Building

September 22, 1981

12:10 P.M. EDT

MR. ALLEN: We promise to enlighten you today on the subject of AWACS and you will be able to pose all the questions that United States senators and members of the House, representatives posed to us and others posed to us. We'll try to answer those questions in detail. We're going to try to make this as much of a technical briefing as we can primarily because a lot of the misunderstanding surrounds the system itself. And we think it would be useful for you to know from beginning to end what the technical aspects of the system are.

You know that we have made the case in various forums including the Washington Post on Sunday outlining the administration's proposition. In the final analysis, our argument is that this sale serves United States national security interests. It serves it in a variety of ways without in any way endangering or jeopardizing the long-range security of Israel.

As you know, the President has reaffirmed the American-Israeli relationship in explicit terms -- described to Prime Minister Begin America's enduring commitment to Israel and her security.

The ultimate meaning of this sale will be to strengthen regional security for all states in the region against a growing Soviet threat and a threat by proxies of the Soviet Union. We believe that this sale will enhance American military capabilities in the region and we make you aware of the fact that the existence of the Saudi aircraft in the region can be of material assistance to the United States in fulfilling its own military obligations.

In a certain sense, the existence of the aircraft there constitute important assets for Western security. In addition, the improvement of our security posture will lead to inducements to others to join the peace process, we believe. The President is dedicated, above all, to the creation of lasting and just peace in the region. We believe that Saudi Arabia can be an important component of that peace, of that peace structure and we are going to do everything we can to improve our relations with Saudi Arabia. That we should have friendly relations with nations of the region does not necessarily contradict or undermine the interests of certain friends in the region. Nor do we believe that any improvement in our relations with the moderate states of the region need come at the expense of any of our friends in the region. We are attempting to pursue a balanced policy that looks out for U.S. national security interests and sends the appropriate message to would be aggressors or those who would create instability and chaos in the Middle East -- that the United States is indeed intent upon fulfilling its responsibilities.

We think that this is a tangible step by the United States in securing vital oil facilities. Those oil facilities are crucial to the Western economies, to the United States, to Western Europe and to Japan. And it is our firm belief that by taking steps to secure the Saudi oil fields for the long term that we will, in fact, undergaurd our own security.

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And we think, too, that this sale represents a step in the right direction in that the United States will again be recognized as a credible friend, a reliable and steadfast friend, one that is committed in the region and one that will not easily be deflected from the goal of providing support for friends.

Overall, we also ask that the Congress observe which it itself laid down in conjunction with the President and not to prejudge this matter. We believe that the case that will be made over the next weeks will be a persuasive and compelling one. And as I indicated at the outset, we will make that case on the basis of its serving U.S. national security interests.

Colonel Robert Lilac of the Air Force is with us today. Let me also mention that Bud Nance, my deputy, is here to help answer questions, and Major Robert Kimmit. If you have any questions about the organization of our groups or how we have been conducting our affairs with respect to the development of the case for AWACS and its presentation, we would be happy to answer those too.

I've asked Colonel Lilac in five to seven minutes to go over the case with you. Obviously, you want to ask questions, but this is essentially the way we try to do it for members of Congress, although they sometimes care to have a longer presentation. Colonel Lilac will try to do it in this brief amount of time.

COLONEL LILAC: Saudi Arabia is a very large nation. I think that this story has been told. However, it's probably not understood in a true military context. Saudi Arabia has a very limited military manpower base. Population estimates in Saudi Arabia from six to eight million people. You take the tremendous amount of resources that Saudi Arabia has of \$285 billion development and the competition that that amount of money presents over the limited resources; the military manpower base is quite small. Saudi Arabia's military planners have to do an efficient job with the limited manpower resources they have and this creates the case for as efficient and as capable -- as technologically capable a weapon system as possible in the kingdom.

Our F-15s that we currently plan to start delivering into Saudi Arabia in January, 1982 will be based at three widely separated bases within the kingdom -- at Dhahran, Taif and Khamis Mushayt. I have the names of the actual airbases here for those of you that are interested. However --

Q We can't see them.

COLONEL LILAC: You can't see them?

Q The names.

COLONEL LILAC: Dhahran Airbase, King Abdulaziz Airbase, Taif, Prince Fahd Airbase, Khamis Mushayt, King Khalid Airbase. Dhahran, the only airbase in the Eastern province area protecting the vital oil field resources. This map, for those of you that hopefully can see it -- if I can point to these green spots, are the oil field resources in the entire region, with everything coming together at Ras Tanurah, the main transshipment point for oil out of the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the vital oil field resources being centrally located in this region, in the Dhahran area.

Saudi Arabia itself, when you overlay it with the Continent of Europe, covers the continent, where we the U.S. Air Force, have ten main operating bases and NATO has over twice that

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many. Saudi Arabia is going to try to do the job from three widely separated main operating bases.

If you overlay it with the United States, it covers the United States east of the Mississippi. As a matter of fact, when you overlay it with the United States, a little problem pops out just from the geography. If Dhahran and the oil field resources that we talked about were attacked in the Eastern province area, Dhahran would be a likely military target. If Dhahran were destroyed or put out of commission for some degree of time, we'd have to be defending those vital oil field resources from the other F-15 bases back at Taif or Khamis Mushayt. That distance is this problem I'm trying to create for you is similar to trying to defend Chicago from a place as far away as Wichita or Dallas. And geometry works out when you overlay it with a map of the United States.

In order to do that, we're talking about providing the elements of the package -- the five AWACS, six KC-707 tight tankers -- they're essentially an AWACS 707/320B airframe that is as common with the AWACS as possible so that the Saudi military manpower problem is not exacerbated by putting two different weapons systems in there. So the airframe will be as common with the E-3 AWACS as possible. Those six tankers, with an option for two more, conformal fuel tanks for the F-15 and AIM 9-L missiles for the F-15 as well.

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To point out the need for an AWACS in the situation in Saudi Arabia, we just have to go to a quick arithmetic study, if you will, of the ground radar environment that exists in Saudi Arabia without AWACS. Ground radars, even if we place them wall-to-wall, there are about 100 of them along the eastern province of the kingdom. A ground radar is limited by line of sight, and a ground radar in a low elevation area can only see 20 to 30 nautical miles.

Now, 20 to 30 nautical miles gives you only two to four minutes of warning of an attacker flying at 400 to 600 knots, coming at low level across the Gulf. With that two to four minutes of detection time, early warning time, assuming that the command and control system requires one or two minutes to get that identification and get the information down to the airbase at Dhahran to launch, add five minutes for launch, and five minutes of launch time, is the capability that the best air force in the world can provide. Five minutes of launch capability -- five minute alert.

By the time you add in that one to two minutes and five minutes of launch, you can see that with this aircraft -- attacking aircraft being only two to four minutes away from Ras Tanurah, he has come in, hit and destroyed the oil field area, and on his way back home before the interceptors at Dhahran even get airborne.

The bottom line of that discussion is that detection is too late to prevent destruction of the target. However, we overlay the AWACS into the situation, and we come up with an entirely different picture. Assuming that the AWACS is 50 miles back from the coast for a little additional protection and survivability, he can see all the way across that 150 mile wide Gulf, and detect an aircraft as he is crossing -- as he comes away from the coast of Iran in this particular scenario that I'm depicting for you. And that can either be an Iranian aircraft or Soviet aircraft or any other kind of attacking aircraft that might be coming in with hostile intentions.

Q The Israeli's, we said over here. (Laughter.)

COL. LILAC: I doubt that the Israeli aircraft would be coming from this direction. (Laughter.)

The 150 nautical mile detection gives us time to get that 150 mile detection, that one to two minutes to get our command and control situation squared away, there is a five minute launch time, and we're still able to go out and be airborne while the attacker is still 80 to 90 nautical miles from the oil fields, and we're able to come out and identify, and if necessary, destroy the attacking target while he is still 40 to 50 miles before he gets to the oil field, rather than afterward, as with the case with just the ground radar.

I will show you the pictures of the other equipment, I think you are familiar with it, and then I'll answer any questions or we'll move on to the next part of the discussion. The KC-707 type Tanker that I talked about has boom capability on the tail which can refuel the AWACS or the F-15, and the proper drogue down the wingtip can refuel the Saudi F-5.

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Now, I would also like to point out that the advantage that we accrue from this kind of a weapons system being in the region, is that if the Saudis request that we come in to help them out with any kind of larger conflict that they get into, or any kind of a contingency operation, that the Saudis ask us to come in and operate, our AWACS or our U.S. Air Force fighters, whatever they might be, can operate off of this boom system on the tail, and even in a more immediate mode, our U.S. Navy fighter aircraft, currently operating in the Gulf or operating in the Arabian Sea, can refuel off the proper drogue capability on the wingtips. So, there is an inherent prepositioned asset, if you will, by having the 707-type tanker in the Royal Saudi Air Force inventory.

The conformal fuel tanks for the F-15 add just under 10,000 pounds of fuel to the F-15 to enable it to stay in the air longer. The F-15, if it had to operate from Taif or Khamis Mushayt to go operate over in the oil fields, would require a three hour round trip to get across the kingdom and back. It needs additional fuel over what it currently has internally to the F-15 in order to provide that mission, or in any other kind of scenario to stay in the air longer to provide a combat air patrol.

The specific numbers that we're talking about, depending upon the kind of mission that you are flying and the kinds of maneuvers that you pull on the aircraft, this increases the endurance of the F-15 from 40 to 70 percent of increased endurance over the basic airplane.

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The AIM 9-L sidewinder missile gives the Saudis the capability for a head-on, infra-red missile capability which they do not currently possess. They currently possess the A9P3 which requires them to get around behind an attacking aircraft in order to shoot them down. That diversion in order to get around behind an aircraft to shoot it down would require the attacker to divert away from the main fighter force that might be coming in to attack and one to two fighters attacking could peel off and divert those F-15s while the rest of the aircraft press on into the target and do their job.

The F-15 currently does have the AIM 7-S radar missile, Sparrow missile, but that requires -- it's a long distance missile for radar -- it's a radar lock on and radar firing -- and the situation in Saudi Arabia as we currently face in any of our situations, we believe that visual identification will be one of the requirements.

By the time you get in and visually identify the attacking aircraft to determine whether it's an airliner or some other friendly, or a bad guy coming at you, by the time you get into that mode to visually identify them, you're within the range of being able to shoot the AIM 7-sparrow missile. So, the AIM 9-L gives you the capability head-on, infra-red to shoot a guy in the face.

The 707 320-B airplane with the radar on top is the AWACS that we're talking about -- the E3A. The E3A -- what we've done in the case of E3A is take that brown radar that's got the problem of bumping into the horizon at 20-30 miles, moves it up to 30,000 feet. At 30,000 feet, our eyeball, or radar eyeball if you will, does not bump into the horizon until 208 miles. So, therefore, we get that increased detection time that we talked about in the case of the AWACS.

The AWACS does not have any electronic intelligence gathering capability, does not have any signal intelligence gathering capability. The E3A is not an EF-111. It's not an EA6B, it's not an SR-71.

Q This now is the guts. Will you just slow down and go over this again?

COLONEL LILAC: Sure.

Q Would you start now of what it is not?

COLONEL LILAC: Yes, I will. As a matter of fact, for Mr. Donaldson's benefit, I'll even --

Q I'd like to see a picture. I'd understand it better.

COLONEL LILAC: A lot of you people who can't see it, we'll provide it in the foyer so you can take a look at it later. The AWACS radar that's up in the air, when it gets up into the sky, when you put it up to 30,000 feet and we start looking at the earth, we get that -- in a novel radar mode, we get nothing back but clutter. The earth reflects all the radar energy and we can't sort out any targets from the clutter. So we have to incorporate a mode of radar called "pulse Doppler." Pulse Doppler is similar to what you use in a radar speedtrap and it depends upon the frequency shift from a moving target. When a piece of radar energy goes out and bumps into a target, if the target is moving the returned radar energy will be shifted slightly in frequency. Computer on the AWACS is able to sort that out and tell that that target is moving and the novel threshold is about 90 miles an hour. Anything moving over 90 miles an hour we can see and we expect that. Anything less than that is clutter and we reject it.

But we can see a low level aircraft, we can see it out

to the radar horizon at 200 miles. As a matter of fact, if the aircraft is pretty small, we actually have a little bit of degrade capability. We can only see a real small size target out to 175 miles.

But as long as it's above that radar horizon or size, we can see it if it's moving over 90 miles an hour.

Q What's your mountain range interference?

COLONEL LILAC: Yes, sir. We can see that 200 miles as long as we don't have something in the way. I cannot see, for instance, if I put this cigarette lighter behind the telephone, I cannot see it here because my radar cannot see through the telephone.

I have to drive up to this point in order to be able to see that cigarette lighter. It's radar math -- very simple. It's pure physics. It's no magic, not anything fancy. It's strictly the physics of radar.

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I can see those things that are moving 90 miles an hour but I can't see tanks, troops and ground targets. We do have a maritime mode. In the maritime mode, we are reflecting radar energy at the water. In simple laymen's terms, the water absorbs radar energy and does not reflect it. So, it does not reflect it back to the transmitter. Therefore, I can turn off this pulse doppler mode that depends on a frequency shift and I can just accept what would normally be clutter over the earth and on a sea, where the water absorbs the radar energy. Anything I get back in return, I can accept the fact that that is a target and is a ship. That's why I can see a ship at sea in low sea states -- as long as it's not high sea states where I get a lot of reflection, I can see those ships -- 40 foot sized ships or bigger in maritime mode but I can't see a tank on the desert.

People say, "Why don't you turn the maritime mode over a smooth desert?" I still get that reflected radar energy problem and I see nothing but clutter and I can't sort out the targets, whatever targets might be from the desert. I can see radar jamming, when someone's jamming me, throwing a lot of energy up at me, I can see radar jamming as a strobe. I can't sort out where he is but I can know where he's coming from. I don't know how far.

However, I can see radar jamming but the AWACS has no capability to perform jamming. It doesn't have any active jammers. As I said, it's not an EF 1-11 type aircraft or any A6B. We have other aircraft in the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy inventory that do those jobs:

The AWACS can control air defense fighter intercepts, but it has no capability for signal intelligence gathering or electrical intelligence gathering. When it receives that return blip off a target, when it sends the radar energy back, it's nothing more than a blip. It doesn't receive any radar energy from a thing on the ground. It's transmitting radar energy and analyze it and sort it out and do any intelligence work on that radar energy. It cannot receive radar energy emitted from another target. It receives only it's own returns. It does not have any electronic self-protection measures either. It doesn't have any radar homing and warning gear as we have in fighters because the AWACS is a defensive system. We don't put it far forward into a mode where it would be in the environment where it would be painted by something like a surface to air missile. So, it is a defensive system and it was designed to do the job that it does do and does do very well and that is air borne early warning and control. It can't take photos. It does not have a camera on board to take any pictures in any mode -- the Saudi airplane, the U.S. airplane or the NATO airplane. That's a little bit slower of what it can and can't do.

I guess the other point that I did want to make and I've got one other chart but it's very, very small and I'll discuss it with any one later on that might want to, we talked about that radar masking. As a matter of fact, in order to see all of Israel, because of the radar masking problem, the AWACS would have to fly in Jordan very nearly to the West Bank in order to see all of Israel from its operating altitude of 29,000 to 30,000 feet. If we take a look at what the AWACS can see from the Northwest corner of Saudi Arabia, there's a lot -- and I've got little white areas on here blanked out and I'll show it to anybody that wants to later, but there's areas -- a lot of areas in Israel that the AWACS, in its operating altitude, cannot see in Israel. As a matter of fact, for the AWACS to be operating in a mode that is relatively safe, it would have to operate well away from any hostile area or any area where a potential threat might possibly be coming from.

Our concept in NATO is that we -- and our normal operation operate 150 miles back from the forward edge of the battle area and only look 50 miles beyond the FEBA or forward edge of the battle area.

However, you don't even have to move the AWACS back that 150 miles which we believe the Saudis would do. We're teaching them -- they said they would use our doctrine with the AWACS. We believe they'd operate those valuable resources -- operate them in a survivable mode. But all you have to do is move the AWACS back about somewhere between 75 and 100 miles back from its Northwest most border in order to be able to -- excuse me, when you operate back that distance, 75 to 100 miles, you see none of Israel because of this radar masking effect that I talked about and the limitations of the 208 miles miles that you can see.

Q -- what altitude do you see none of Israel?

COLONEL LILAC: This particular chart that I'm talking about here is down to zero. I've got various altitudes depicted. This one, you can see it knocked down to 200 feet where -- if a target is flying 200 feet or below, you wouldn't see it.

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Q What guarantees do you have, what assurances that dealing in a war situation that the plane will not change mode, will not change locations so it observe Israel?

COL. LILAC: The assets are valuable assets. In order to operate in the mode that we are talking about, the AWACS would -- using our doctrine -- would stand away from any threat. If it flies in modes where it is far forward, say it did fly in Jordan, it is way within what we call the safe escape line. An aircraft in the scenario that a lot of people want to postulate, an aircraft taking off from Israel going against a dedicated attack could get to and shoot down the AWACS. It could not run away from it.

Q So what if it wants to go on a suicide mission?

COL. LILAC: Excuse me?

Q What if they are there to take a suicide mission?
What if they undertake that?

COL. LILAC: I guess if they want to undertake a suicide mission they probably -- they would be shot down.

If they are operating in that mode -- let me make another point -- the scenario that you postulate is very, very remote from an operational point of view. What good would it do up there? It cannot see ground targets, so if it is trying to coordinate attack in that particular situation, it cannot direct fighters to a ground target.

Q Why not?

COL. LILAC: It does not have that capability.

Q Let's go over something you said. It has no capability of gathering electronic intelligence?

COL. LILAC: That is correct.

Q It cannot ever monitor Israeli radio signals?

COL. LILAC: No sir.

Q What I don't understand is this: You can always fit an airplane to do that, can you not?

COL. LILAC: Theoretically, the airplane could be fitted -- any airplane could be fitted to do something. We have other airplanes --

Q You are saying that we don't propose to sell the Saudi Arabian airplane that is thus fitted?

COL. LILAC: Nor does our AWACS have that capability.

MR. ALLEN: Nor would the Saudis logically do that.

COL. LILAC: That is correct.

MR. ALLEN: We will maintain the systems as we have indicated before from the outset, with as many as 900 individuals, and this number over the course of 15 to 20 years bring them to about 200, but we will still perform that basic maintenance.

Q Are there no Saudi Arabian pilots you can train to operate them?

MR. ALLEN: There are no Saudi Arabian pilots. There are

some in the --

COL. LILAC: Are trained to fly AWACS now?

Q We've been training them in this country, have we not?

COL. LILAC: No, we have not trained any Saudi pilots in the AWACS.

Q Are there any trained?

COL. LILAC: No, there are not.

Q May I ask you about another aspect of that sale? The A9-L -- Sidewinder missile? When the California congressional delegation made it known that it opposed the AWACS sale, it also made public a letter from 18 U.S. Air Force pilots based in New Mexico, who said that they don't want that missile falling into Saudi hands. Can you tell us why an Air Force pilot would not want that missile distributed to a foreign air force?

COL. LILAC: I cannot comment on the letter. I have not seen the letter. I did see the news release where it said that some U.S. Air Force pilots said that. What you have to understand about the A9-L is that it is currently in the hands of many foreign air forces. Israel currently has it. It is currently being co-produced in West Germany. It is currently in all of the NATO nations. Saudi Arabia doesn't have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. I think that situation --

Q That is a little different.

COL. LILAC: I think the pilots are uninformed on the facts of the security relationships that we have with Saudi Arabia and the track record that we have in protecting technology with Saudi Arabia and our foreign military service bases.

Q I was perhaps wondering if you or the Admiral could tell us how much security the United States lost when all of those F-14's we gave the Shah fell and all of the Phoenix missiles and their guidance books were lost in Iran?

COL. LILAC: I am not capable of talking about the F-14, however, I would say that your analogy -- drawing an analogy between the Shah and Saudi Arabia probably need to get into a discussion with the State Department about the fallacy of that.

MR. ALLEN: Or questions of overall stability. I think a point that is useful to make here in this regard with the positioning of the AWACS near Jordan. Last night there was a show on a network that indicated, and perhaps they misspoke, indicated that flying in the eastern border of Saudi Arabia that the AWACS could see all of Israel, and of course, that is not the case.

Q At the Pentagon it was said -- General Seaforth gave a briefing some months ago, I think you might have been there -- and showed slides and circles of what the AWACS could see, and he absolutely said that flying in the -- what the region he called the notch, the

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border between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, that the plane could observe Israel.

COLONEL LILAC: (Inaudible.) I'm discussing it with you now.

Q So you're telling me that flying in that -- what you call "the notch" between Saudi Arabia and Jordan, still can't see Israel?

COLONEL LILAC: That's right. Flying in that notch, even though the nominal 208 mile low level coverage covers Israel, in order to see over the top of the masking, you actually have to fly up in this region in order to see all --

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Q Damascus only hides cigarette lighters on the ground to some extent. (Laughter.) That masking being mountain ranges and such, is it not? Israeli Air Force planes presumably would be flying at a higher altitude, would they not?

COLONEL LILAC: Then they are currently seen by ground radar as it exists right today on the 22nd of September, 1981.

Q In that notch area?

COLONEL LILAC: Anywhere in Jordan.

MR. ALLEN: As long as they are of sufficient altitude to be seen by line-of sight.

Q Can the AWACS fly back in Saudi Arabia around that notch area?

COLONEL LILAC: Yes, sir.

Q And simply raise its altitude and get over that terrain-masking problem?

COLONEL LILAC: No, sir. It is designed for an operational altitude of 29,000 to 30,000 feet. Currently the AWACS has a pressurization situation such that it cannot go higher than that. If those pressurization situations were fixed in the future in order to get up to 30,000 feet -- or excuse me, something like 40,000 -- with this kind of a configuration -- I don't know if you have been on a 707 at 40,000 feet, but they have to work to get up there to get over thunderstorms. To fly it with that drag load, you have to burn down fuel and in order to get to 40,000 feet, you would have to burn down 7 hours of fuel before you could get to that altitude and after you get there, the only increase that you get is about 38 miles in additional range, that you get additional capability by operating at 40,000 feet. You can operate there for a very short time before you have got to come back down and go land, so your limitations on being able to operate at that altitude are extreme. They are currently physical limitations on the airplane.

MR. ALLEN: The one point that I want to make in follow-on to Sam's is that -- and Colonel Lilac mentioned it, though perhaps not specifically enough -- it cannot see troops. It cannot see tanks. There has been a wide-spread notion that somehow this was the equivalent of illuminating all of another country, say, Israel, in the manner of a television camera. It simply cannot do that. It does not see people.

Q Mr. Allen, you pointed out that once the Israeli planes lift off above 200 feet that they are open to ground radar coverage in the other Arab countries. The track data that those ground radar stations have is not in the possession all of one government. You are not arguing, are you, that there is no value in having a plane with a detection logic on that computer and all of that track data in the possession of one command center to see those planes once they lift off above 200 feet? You are not saying it is the same coverage from four different Arab ground stations that the AWACS would perform, would you Colonel?

COLONEL LILAC: I would like to speak to that question, if I may. First of all, if the AWACS were militarily placed in a foolish situation in being that far forward to do what we think is an operationally not logical mission -- it cannot see ground targets, it cannot control an offensive ground operation. The only thing it can do is to see airborne targets. It cannot tell airplanes that are flying in, where the SAMs are coming from, where the Triple A is coming from in the situation

that you are talking about, in that very formidable Israeli ground environment, ground air defense system that exists. The only thing it can do is talk to information about airplanes that are flying in the air.

Q That is all that it was designed to do.

COLONEL LILAC: That is exactly right. Thank you.

Q It was not designed to control ground strikes, was it?

COLONEL LILAC: A lot of people don't understand that.

Q What I am saying is --

COLONEL LILAC: Let me answer your question. No, sir. I don't mean to -- don't say that I am trying to -- let me finish this question. I really want to focus on it because the information that the AWACS would get from seeing those ground targets that are flying above 90 miles per hour, something has to be done with it. Okay? The ground stations, the ground entry stations that we are furnishing as a part of the ground environment system in Saudi Arabia, will not be in these other nations. They have to down-link the information into the ground in Saudi Arabia. Okay? What can be done with that information that is down-linked into the ground in Saudi Arabia? The information is extremely perishable. That information in the air defense world is like, if it is over a minute old it is not much good to you. Now, who are you going to talk to? You are going to talk to the other fighters from the other places and tell them some information. Is that the next step in the postulation? I am trying to follow --

Q Colonel, my question to you was, isn't it more valuable to have track data from aircraft that you are picking up, from aircraft flying at 200 feet, going to one highly sophisticated aircraft that has a detection logic in the computer to interpret that data than to have it scattered among four different disparate ground --

COLONEL LILAC: Yes it is, but what is he going to do with it?

MR. ALLEN: It is more logical, but there are other questions that have to be --

Q You have been explaining this to us from a point of view of all that AWACS cannot do for the Saudis. Will you assume for a moment that for whatever reasons the Saudis decided that they wanted to participate in some kind of hostile action against Israel in a time of war between Israel and Arabs. In this case what could the AWACS possibly do to benefit the Saudis and the other Arab forces? In a worst-case scenario, from a military point of view.

COLONEL LILAC: In a postulation that you ask, what information could it give?

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It could get information on aircraft that might be coming if it could sort out the difference between the two of them, aircraft, only that might be coming to intercept some aircraft that might be coming into Israeli airspace. But, however, a technical limitation on that, the AWACS has UHF, HF and VHF radios. MIGs that might be flying out of Iraq and Syria have VHF radios that are on a different frequency band than the VHF radios in the AWACS. It can't even talk to MIGs.

Q What else could the AWACS do to possibly help the Saudis or any other Arab forces? What information could you, as the man in charge, possibly gain --

COLONEL LILAC: You're saying in that particular situation, what could Saudi Arabia do against Israel. It could take that information it has on targets that are flying in the air. It could transmit it to the ground stations in Saudi Arabia. Theoretically, on the ground in Saudi Arabia, someone could pick up a telephone, if a telephone line existed, and talk to an air base or talk to somebody in Syria. By the time that that guy picks up that phone from up and talks to Syria and the guy in Syria does somehow get the information, transmits it to his guy or tries to transmit it back in the air, the information is so old as to be useless. I'm saying that the information is extremely perishable.

MR. ALLEN: It tells you that an airplane was at a certain time in the past.

Q But if Israel as it did in 1967 chooses to conduct a preemptive strike against a number of Arab countries, would not this aircraft on duty in that notch help alert Arab countries that Israel was doing that?

MR. ALLEN: No, it wouldn't have the capability to do it in a timely manner. As he pointed out, there are not communications links. It is not a flying battle station, coordinating aircraft for the purpose of a pan-Arab attack or pan-Arab defense. It simply cannot do it.

Q -- Israeli attack against the Baghdad reactor and could there not have been enough time to alert Baghdad?

COLONEL LILAC: I'm glad you asked that, Mr. Donaldson. The AWACS was flying in this region in Saudi Arabia at that time.

Q -- in the notch. I mean, we're all asking about the notch.

COLONEL LILAC: Okay, if it were flying in the notch at that time and were in that vulnerable mode, it could see those airplanes -- technically, it can see those airplanes. If it were in that very vulnerable position that it would be in.

MR. ALLEN: -- remind you, as he pointed out, the AWACS aircraft in NATO are flying 150 miles back and there isn't any reason to believe that the Saudis -- may I just point out too, just a moment, point out that we know at all times where that AWACS is. We will be sharing the information that comes from the AWACS. In other words, --

Q Will you be able to veto its position?

MR. ALLEN: You mean veto its position -- tell it to change course?

Q If they say we want to put it up in the notch, can you say no?

MR. ALLEN: We don't think that the Saudis would risk that aircraft in that location.

Q Will we feel a moral obligation to let Israel know where the AWACS is since we know?

MR. ALLEN: These are questions that are hypothetical. I can't tell you. We're talking about five years down the road.

Q If Americans are flying it, why would it be a risk to be flying in the notch? Wouldn't that --

MR. ALLEN: Because that's not the -- we point out again, come back to the basic purpose of this sale. The purpose of the sale is to protect the oil fields of Saudi Arabia and to protect against other threats that emanate from this region and even conceivably from Ethiopia. You have a situation of increasing instability in Yemen, the PDRY. In North Yemen -- additional instability. In PDRY, there are Cubans, there are East Germans, there are Soviets. In Socotra, there are Soviets. In Dahlak Island in Ethiopia there are Soviets. This is the main target and as Colonel Lilac didn't get the chance to point out, there are -- in order to maintain one continuous orbit, you have to have five of these machines. I'd like to make one other point --

Q Dick, look, in everything that you've told us so far, you've explained that with five AWACS, you'd be able to cover the primary area on a 24 hour basis and suggested that it would be difficult, it would leave the Eastern province unprotected. And yet you were just telling us that you're looking for threats in the Yemen and Ethiopia area which would mean changing the theatre of operations. If they're going to do that, couldn't they just as easily change it up into the notch?

COLONEL LILAC: Let me point out one technical point if I might, Mr. Allen. If the AWACS were flying up in the notch you talked about, would we feel obligated to tell the Israelis where they were flying. We don't need to. The Israelis know. The E2-C has passive detection gear on it in which it can see the AWACS --

Q What is the E2-C? What is the E2-C?

COLONEL LILAC: -- at four -- on the underground radars. Remember this AWACS --

Q What is the E2-C, please?

COLONEL LILAC: Oh, I'm sorry.

MR. ALLEN: Israel's AWACS. They have them, four of them now and they're flying.

COLONEL LILAC: I'm sorry. I didn't hear the question. I was getting ahead of you a little bit. No, the point -- I think this is an important point to make. The E2-C flying in Israel, flying at whatever altitude it might be, the AWACS, in order to do its job has got to be at 29,000 to 30,000 feet. That AWACS, with the amount of radar energy that it emanates, could be seen at 400 miles from Israel long before the AWACS could see anything at all in Israel. And in addition to that, it's ground radars, Israeli's ground radars currently have coverage over that region could see it long before the AWACS could see anything in Israel.

MR. ALLEN: The E2-C does in fact have command and control capabilities does it not?

COLONEL LILAC: It has, in addition to that, it has passive detection gear and some ELINT capability.

Q -- 400 mile range?

COLONEL LILAC: It can detect -- I don't know the specific range but it can detect the AWACS at 400 miles.

MR. ALLEN: Now, we'd like to turn this question over to Lester Kinsolving. (Laughter.)

Q Dick, could you tell us why the Pentagon and the State Department repeatedly refused to give even an estimate of the total amount of military equipment which we provided the Shah of Iran and lost?

MR. ALLEN: No.

Q Why can't you estimate that, Dick? Wouldn't it be more reassuring to the public?

MR. ALLEN: Address that question to the Department of State and the Department of Defense. I couldn't be of any help to you in that area.

Q They're much more evasive than you are.

MR. ALLEN: I didn't hear you say that -- Steve.

Q Let me ask you a question related to -- If there is some sort of battle for air supremacy over not Israel but over Syria and Jordan, between Israel and Arab nations --

MR. ALLEN: Yes.

Q Are you saying that AWACS -- you can guarantee that the AWACS would not benefit the Arab side at all in that battle? In this case, the AWACS system would be flying, whatever, 150 miles further inland from that battle which itself is over Arab territory?

MR. ALLEN: Steve, all of this underscores the technical detail that Colonel Lilac has given you and other information that we have provided for you and will provide you underscores once again the basic purpose of this. We've been answering hypothetical military situations and questions being put to us by you and by others who have the right to ask those questions because members of Congress will have to decide on it. The point is that we are talking about in the first instance protecting those oil fields. That is what is first and foremost on our mind. Why did the four AWACS aircraft proceed to Saudi Arabia last summer? They proceeded there in order to protect those oil fields which are concentrated in this region. That is the area that we are talking about. It so happens -- look, the situation has changed dramatically in the last three or four years. Afghanistan has been invaded and occupied. You have a situation of increasing threat to the Straits of Hormuz; the growing instability in Yemen and the growth of the Soviet presence, I should say, instability -- the growing threat of Southern Yemen and the threat of instability in North Yemen; the situation in Ethiopia. The Soviet Union is moving and its proxies are moving in the region. That changes the whole picture and that underscores this vital, this crucial defensive requirement that we have to protect those oil fields.

Q But do the Saudis agree with you on that?

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Q But there's a question in that though -- you suggest that any reservations or risks on the other side are to be set aside because of the overwhelming importance --

MR. ALLEN: Not at all. But I think I've explained it. Obviously there is a --

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Q Obviously, you know the reason why people are asking this question.

MR. ALLEN: Of course, we do, and I don't belittle the question. I'm just trying to --

Q -- define the value in the areas that you say. In fact, on the contrary, the value in the very areas that you say raise the question of whether or not it would be of value on the other front. And so could you answer the question?

MR. ALLEN: Can you rephrase the question?

Q I understand it. The question was: Can you guarantee that there won't be any benefit to the Arab side in a war with Israel?

MR. ALLEN: I think we can fairly assure --

Q In a battle for air supremacy over Syria and Jordan --

MR. ALLEN: I think we can fairly assure that there will not be any benefit to the Arab side in an air war.

Q Doesn't that depend on the Saudi's good will? The Saudis are making much of their sovereignty in this case.

MR. ALLEN: Let me make the case --

Q How can you speak for them? They want this on a sovereign basis. So how can you propose to speak for them when it comes to -- in terms of their will?

MR. ALLEN: Let's assume that the Saudis will fly --

Q But how can you --

MR. ALLEN: Do you want to continue to ask the question or would you like for me to --

Q But I mean seriously, can you answer that?

MR. ALLEN: With respect to guarantees, we do know where the aircraft will be flying. We will be taking the information in real time. We will know where it is flying. If you ask, what about the possibility of putting the technology at risk or -- temporarily you always face that possibility with the sale of any defensive or offensive system. You always run a margin of risk. The Saudis are a cautious, prudent people and we intend that they should understand the method of operating this defensive system in a manner completely compatible with their training. And that is -- we don't have any reason to believe that they are going to put at risk a machine like this worth about \$200 million lightly. So, with respect to absolute guarantees, well, I guess we never have absolute guarantees. But the Saudis have given us assurances. They have agreed to the very stringent security requirements with respect to the technology.

Before we go off the subject, I want to emphasize to you that it is not just a question of whether or not the United States gives this early airborne warning and command system capability to Saudi Arabia. It will come, it can come from a competitor, from the British Nimrod, which in many ways is as much a machine as

MORE

the AWACS is and can perform many of the things that AWACS can perform; indeed, can go beyond it in certain key areas. And of course, the French will be more than willing to provide a combination of aircraft and missiles to make up the other component of the package. In the end, the question would be as Colonel Lilac graphically described to you, would we have prepositioned assets in the region, would we be able to benefit from it? The answer is clearly no.

Q A few minutes ago you pointed at the map and you expounded a thesis about where you see the changed situation -- what you perceive as a changed situation in the area and where you see the threats coming from and where a defense be there. But isn't what you said at variance with the actual statements of Saudi leaders as to who they perceive their principle enemy and where their principle threat comes from?

MR. ALLEN: Well, I think that the Saudi -- whatever public statements you may have been referring to, I think Saudi leaders know very well that the main threat to their long-range stability is that that is sponsored by the Soviet Union.

Q Why do have high officials stand up in New York or give interviews to American reporters --

MR. ALLEN: I can't explain why Saudi officials --

Q But doesn't that have a bearing on the use of this -- on the potential use of this equipment?

MR. ALLEN: I think that the assurances that we have received in the negotiations on this sale and that we know will exist as ironclad parts of this transfer give us every reason to believe that the Saudis do recognize the source of their principle threat.

We've taken over all of Larry's briefing and I don't want to take too much more time.

Q A little more focus on the question asked about personnel. When you briefed us last March, you said that we would commit to about 400 Americans, including 60 Air Force people and that that would quickly dwindle to 60. Now, you're talking 900. Can you tell us what the difference --

COLONEL LILAC: The question as it was phrased -- if I might answer that -- the question that was phrased back last April when we were still refining the numbers of people that we had, we said, "Approximately 400 people in supporting the AWACS." It will be a little over 400 supporting the AWACS and a little over 300 supporting the tanker. So we're talking in the ball park of 800 Boeing and their subcontractor technicians, and we currently see the need for probably in the technical area, somewhere from 30, maybe a little bit more, U.S. people in assisting them in training of the operations aspects of the AWACS, with the Boeing people primarily responsible for the maintenance and the training of the Saudis in the maintenance area.

We never expect that to dwindle down to a number of technicians below probably a couple of hundred for the AWACS and the tanker, total, throughout the life cycle of the system.

Q What about the AWACS itself?

COLONEL LILAC: The AWACS itself? Our estimates are --

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right now we're still refining them. It depends on the military -- I mentioned about the limited military manpower -- it depends on that number of manpower, how they progress in training. So it's hard to put -- it's like putting a micrometer on a doughball right now. But it's probably more than 100 throughout the life cycle of the weapons system.

Q Mr. Allen, I really want to ask one more question. Colonel Lilac explained earlier in the briefing that the Saudis had been informed about our tactical doctrine and the way we use AWACS and were generally in agreement with us, and some of us have heard about that. But the Secretary of State said last week that there was, besides the third country exclusions and security of the aircraft agreement, there was something he called "geographical limits on the operations of the aircraft." Now, can you tell us anything about that?

MR. ALLEN: I think that matter will be elaborated in detail in the hearings. So, I'd like to defer the question for now.

Q Why are you deferring that? Is that under negotiation?

MR. ALLEN: It will be detailed to the members of the Congress and I think ultimately you'll have that information.

Q Dick, presumably, the Israelis know everything that you've told us today. They've been told the same things. Without asking you to characterize their reasons for continuing their objections, what have they told you they still fear notwithstanding what you've told us today?

MR. ALLEN: We've heard nothing new from Israel concerning the grounds for Israeli opposition to this sale. So we've had nothing new. I presume that addresses your question, but --

Q No, it doesn't because Mr. Begin, his staff, to you and the President and others, outlined something. What did they say?

MR. ALLEN: Well, we've heard nothing new that you don't already know. You asked if there was something new in addition to what had already been presented to the President and to others here, including members of Congress. No, there is nothing new.

Q In other words, you feel you've disposed in the information you've given us, and presumably them as well -- you've disposed of all the objections that --

MR. ALLEN: Not disposed. Obviously, the objections remain. There is still room for disagreement. We're going to put this case to members of the Senate and the House. Now, they have not had the benefit of this information. Our purpose was to give you this information about the technical characteristics of the AWACS system and the associated components because we thought perhaps it would help you sharpen your questions. We find the same thing is true of members of Congress. They are not entirely up to speed about the reality and the facts that we have to present. And so we are doing that in our one-on-one sessions and in the group sessions in an effort to enhance their level of information.

Q But have the Israelis told you that perhaps they don't share your assumptions about what the Saudis would or

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would not do.

MR. ALLEN: Yes. (Laughter.)

Q What happens if a hostile power takes over
in Saudi Arabia?

Q You really haven't answered all the questions.

MR. ALLEN: There's going to be a multiple choice
test on Thursday.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

1:10 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
(Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)

For Immediate Release

October 15, 1981

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
TO REPORTERS
FOLLOWING SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE VOTE

Bellevue Stratford Hotel
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

4:25 P.M. EDT

Q Sir, it looks like you may have lost in the Committee, 9-8.

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, that's what I was just going to speak to you about. Frankly, I'm gratified that it was that close. I, of course, would have wished that it would have been the other way -- one of them had had a headache and had to go home early or something and it might of -- but to be that close, and I still am going to continue believing that we can get it in the Senate vote on the floor.

And Lesley, in your earlier question here, I think I left the wrong impression. I was conscious that the press, the media had talked of the possibility of another way of doing this and that's what I was really commenting on and we hadn't had any conferences on it and we haven't, so I don't know what any possibility there would be on anything of that kind or whether we would consider it or not. We're going to continue believing that we can get the vote -- that the Senate is going to see that this is not only essential as three former presidents have been saying for the last few days to the United States -- it's essential to the security of Israel. We have totally protected the technology. There's no risk of that, certainly no risk to Israel and I just have to believe that there will be enough Senators that will recognize the importance to us of having the relationship that this can lead to where we can continue the peace-making process.

Q By not ruling out that waiver, sir, don't you leave the inference that if you win in the Senate, fine, but if you don't win, then you'll take it up?

THE PRESIDENT: No, this is what I was trying to correct -- that I would -- because we haven't even considered this and as hypothetical question as it is and I was just commenting because when you asked I thought, this was in connection with the stories that have appeared in the press.

Q But you will not rule it out completely either, right?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, it's a hypothetical question and I'm not going to -- I can't even answer that yet because I don't know whether I would or not.

Q Secretary Haig said once a few days ago that he thought you'd do what needed to be done under any circumstances. It led everyone to believe that you'd use it if you had to.

THE PRESIDENT: It's something, as I say -- it's hypothetical at the moment because I haven't even -- there hasn't even been any discussion with me on it.

Q Did Senator Zorinsky ever call you back?

THE PRESIDENT: No. Maybe they called the vote too soon.

END

4:30 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 28, 1981

Q AND A SESSION
WITH JIM BAKER
FOLLOWING THE AWACS VOTE

Mr. Baker's Office

5:10 P.M. EST

Q Just like you predicted?

MR. BAKER: Close to it.

(Laughter.) Q Are you discouraged by this small victory?

MR. BAKER: I'm not discouraged by having 52.

Q Were there any surprises?

MR. BAKER: Zorinsky was something of a surprise.

Q Was he? Why?

MR. BAKER: He's been on the other side all along.

Q Any others?

Q Zorinsky didn't announce.

MR. BAKER: He didn't announce. He said he was --

Q He was going to soul-search.

MR. BAKER: -- re-thinking, yes.

Q Any other surprises?

Q What about Senator Long?

MR. BAKER: No, that wasn't a surprise.

Q Can't you give us your instant reactions to this --
you're just finding out.

Q You saw it.

Q We saw it but --

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you --

SECRETARY HAIG: I think it's a very important victory.

Q Mr. Baker, what's your instant reaction?

MR. BAKER: The same as the Secretary's. It's a very
important --

Q To what do you attribute this victory?

MR. BAKER: -- and pleasing victory. I would attribute
it to the President's personal efforts with respect to each and
every one of these Senators and he spent a lot of time with each
one of them, each one of the questionable ones -- one-on-one mode.

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Q Do you think there was one telling argument --

MR. BAKER: When I say one-on-one, I mean just the President and just the Senator.

Q All right, but do you think there was one telling argument that really clinched it?

MR. BAKER: The national interest.

END

5:15 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
UPON HIS DEPARTURE
TO RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

The South Lawn

October 27, 1981

5:17 P.M. EST

Q How about telling us about the AWACS?

Q I understand that you have got it won. Is that right?

THE PRESIDENT: I am not going to say that. I am cautiously optimistic. But I feel good.

Q How about a count? If you won't say you will win, why don't you give us your estimated count?

THE PRESIDENT: You know how it is. Those things can go one way or the other, but we have been busy and I still -- I think it looks good.

Q Do you feel that you have convinced some of the senators that you have seen in the last couple of days to have come to your side?

THE PRESIDENT: I think some have, yes.

Q What is the argument that you have been using that has persuaded most?

THE PRESIDENT: That it is good for the United States and good for peace in the Middle East and good for the security of Israel.

Q And good for President Reagan?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I have never been in an AWACS myself. (Laughter.)

Q No, sir. I mean the argument is being made that if they don't support you, they weaken your hand in the conduct of foreign policy.

THE PRESIDENT: I think that that would be a natural assumption to make, yes. But that is not the argument that I have been using.

Q What exactly has made you so optimistic tonight? I mean why do you feel good?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I just think that it is much closer than has been reported in the last few days.

Q You need three votes?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know how many.

Q Well now, when Ms. Thomas said in Cancun, "We have heard that before," you said, "Yes, before we have always won." Remember?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q You have won this one, haven't you?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know, really. No, you couldn't get me to say that if you threw a bomb at me -- and don't. (Laughter.)

Q In other words, would you consider an emergency arms -- invoking the emergency powers?

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THE PRESIDENT: We have not considered that. We have not talked about that yet, and I seriously doubt it.

Q You wouldn't rule it out though?

Q You are expecting some more senators to jump on the bandwagon now?

THE PRESIDENT: Jump on or climb on or --

Q Are you going to send the letter tomorrow to the Senate?

Q The letter tomorrow?

THE PRESIDENT: I think that the letter has gone, hasn't it?

MR. SPEAKES: It goes tomorrow.

THE PRESIDENT: Is it tomorrow? Yes, the letter is going up tomorrow.

Q -- any deals? Have you been giving anything away? Have you made any deals?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I don't make deals.

Q What happens if you lose, Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: I lie me down and bleed a while and then get up and fight again.

Q Which is closer, Marshall Coleman's victory or AWACS?

THE PRESIDENT: On both I am cautiously optimistic.

END

5:21 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 28, 1981

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
WITH SENATORS
FOLLOWING THE SENATE AWACS VOTE

The Oval Office

6:10 P.M. EST

SENATOR BAKER: That's what campaigning in Virginia does for you, Mr. President. (Laughter.)

SENATOR BAKER: Mr. President, that was quite a vote.

THE PRESIDENT: Oh --

Q How do you think he did it, Senator?

SENATOR BAKER: Well, I had one Senator today who told me he was going to vote for the proposal, so -- you know that man down at the White House could sell refrigerators to an Eskimo. I'm glad he could sell AWACS to --

The President did a tremendous job. He really did. We worked him very hard, I'm afraid -- talking to Senator, after Senator, but it paid off handsomely and it was a good operation.

THE PRESIDENT: Let me interject and say that there's a line up of gentlemen here who worked very hard also, to whom I'm very indebted.

SENATOR BAKER: We thank you. We appreciate it. And we're relieved. (Laughter.)

Q Any hidden tactics you want to reveal?

SENATOR BAKER: (Laughter.) No hidden tactics. It was one vote at a time.

Q What do you think did it? What pushed it over the top?

SENATOR BAKER: I don't think there's any one thing. I think that the weight of logic and time for people to think about it and to weigh the arguments pro and con -- I think we had the better argument -- and in the final analysis, that's what one would make of it.

Q You don't think it was the meeting with the President?

SENATOR BAKER: Oh, yes, but the President was our chief negotiator and at one time or the other I expect the President saw, virtually, maybe every member of the Senate or almost every member of the Senate. And with some of them he met more than once. I sometimes got ashamed of myself calling down here and asking him to meet with so-and-so and sometimes Mr. President would say, "Well, I already did that." I'd say, "Well, I know, but you've got to do it again." (Laughter.)

Q Was it excruciating?

THE PRESIDENT: No, and I must say it was very impressive also because many of the Senators that I talked to, I think most of them, were honestly trying to find what they thought was the right answer for the country.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

6:15 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 28, 1981

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
FOLLOWING
THE SENATE VOTE ON AWACS

The Oval Office

5:25 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I want to express my gratitude to the members of the United States Senate for their approval of the sale of the AWACS defense system to Saudi Arabia. Today I think we've seen the Upper Chamber at its best. The United States Senate has acted with statesmanship, with foresight, and with courage.

I can't fully express my gratitude to Senator Baker and the other Senate leaders, Democrats as well as Republicans, who played such a crucial role in this decision.

Today's action by the Senate will not only strengthen Saudi-American relations but will also protect our economic lifeline to the Middle East, win favor among moderate Arab nations, and most important, continue the difficult but steady progress toward peace and stability in the Middle East.

We've acted in concert to demonstrate that the United States is indeed a reliable security partner. Our friends should realize that steadfastness to purpose is a hallmark of American foreign policy while those who would create instability in this region should note that the forces of moderation have our unequivocal support in deterring aggression.

This vote alone doesn't mean that our security problems in that part of the world have been completely solved. This package is but a part of our overall regional security strategy. Our strategy seeks to enhance the capacity of friendly states to defend themselves and to improve our own ability to project our own forces into the region should deterrence fail. We'll continue to pursue efforts in both areas.

Our support for the security of Israel is, of course, undiminished by today's vote. The United States will maintain its unshakeable commitment to the security and welfare of the State of Israel, recognizing that a strong Israel is essential to our basic goals in that area.

Much work still remains ahead. I trust that all of us who disagreed openly and vigorously in recent days can now put aside our honest differences and work together for common goals: Friendship, security, and peace at last in the cradle

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of our civilization. Because of actions like today's by the Senate, the cause of peace is again on the march in the Middle East. For this, all of us can be grateful.

Q When did you know that you had won?

THE PRESIDENT: When they came in and handed me the votes.

Q Didn't you know earlier today -- that you could count it up?

THE PRESIDENT: A little while ago this afternoon, I felt that the count was -- that at least we were going to be assured of a tie, and that would have been a victory because it required a majority vote to stop this.

Q Do you think this will be an inducement to get the Saudis into the Middle East peace process now?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I do. I think that as a matter of fact, the Saudis have shown, by their own introduction of a peace proposal that they are willing to discuss peace in the Middle East.

Q Between Egypt and Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: What?

Q Between Egypt and Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, they submitted a plan. We could not agree with all the points, nor could the Israelis, but it was the first time that they had recognized Israel as a nation and it is a beginning point for negotiations.

Q What do you think this vote means for your ability to conduct the arms --

THE PRESIDENT: I think that it's going to be -- it's going to have a very good effect. We had heard from many leaders who had expressed their concern about what this could mean in the whole world scene, if it had not turned out the way it did.

Q Do you think it will help you put the budget fight ahead? The next budget round?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't know. I don't know whether the two are connected at all.

Q What aspect of what you told the senators did you think was the convincing aspect and what final thing do you think turned the tide in the last few days?

THE PRESIDENT: Contrary to some of things that have been said, there have been no deals made. None were offered. I talked strictly on the merits of the proposal and basically I tried to point out in every instance, the progress that has been made so far in the Middle East towards stability and peace and the part that was played in that by Saudi Arabia, Prince Fahd, beginning with the cease fire that we were able to secure in Lebanon, in which they played a major role. And I simply played on that that this, I felt, was essential for the security of Israel, for the entire Middle East and for ourselves on the world scene.

Q Do you foresee any circumstance under which by 1985 this sale might be cancelled if the Saudis aren't cooperating

with the lease?

THE PRESIDENT: I would think that the only thing that could happen to make us not fulfill that would be if by some chance, the radical elements that we know are there and that have made themselves tragically evident in the last few weeks, that if they should gain control in the Middle East and gain control of all of those governments we are talking about, I think the very fact of what we have done and the knowledge now that the United States and our allies are not walking away from the Middle East is going to contribute to the stability and make it very unlikely that the other can happen.

Q A big smile, Mr. President.

THE PRESIDENT: I'm trying to smile with dignity. I don't want to look jubilant. (Laughter.)

END

5:39 P.M. EST