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#### PERSECUTION OF MISKITO INDIANS

Shortly after the Sandinistas came to power, they started resettling the Miskito Indians from their traditional area along the border. They resettled them because they wanted to re-establish control over the border AND the Miskito Indians who had historically been an independent peoples. Even Somoza allowed them to maintain their own culture and traditions.

Historically the Miskito Indians HAD NOT been politically involved. They had kept to themselves. However, since many of them spoke English and were a group apart (independent) the Sandinistas decided that they had to establish their (Sandinista) control.

The entire economy and culture of the Miskito Indians was based on the river where they had lived for centuries, the decision by the Sandinistas to move them to the interior of the country, to "resettle them" totally disrupted their social and economic way of life. Therefore, 10,000 of them fled to Honduras immediately. Of the few who remained, most have now fled to Costa Rica.

(Information received from: Mr. Roger Snyder, Department of State HA/HR Main State Building Washington, D.C. 20520

Phone: 632-4833)

NOTE: Mr. Snyder called at the behest of Ambassador Otto J. Reich.

#### PERSECUTION OF CATHOLICS

The government of Nicaragua has been harassing and to some extent attacking the Nicaraguan Catholic Church focusing their attacks on Archbishop Obando y Bravo. (Archbishop Bravo is very popular with the people of Nicaragua.) It is interesting to note that the Archbishop had openly opposed Somosa in the latter days of the Somosa government.

Archbishop Bravo has consistently stood up for religious freedom, pluralism and democracy in Nicaragua and therefore, has been the traget of Sandinista rath. Because of his refusal to accept the party line, the Sandinistas have prohibited him from appearing on TV to celebrate mass on Sundays. (Prior to this time, each Sunday either the Archbishop or a priest delegated by him had appeared on TV celebrating the mass. The Archbishop has refused to allow the government to tell him who may and who may not celebrate the mass. Because of this, the government has reacted by cancelling the televising of the mass totally.)

Last August (1982) there were some particularly serious incidents involving the Archbishop and others. Some turbas (mobs) attacked the Archbishop's representative when he was going to a church to remove some religious objects to signify that the sacrament could no longer be celebrated at that church. The Archbishop had ordered the removal of the objects because the priest of the church had refused to accept the discipline of the church and actively opposed the church and supported the Sandinistas.

Another incident involved a Catholic church school. Some teachers in the school who supported the Archbishop were forced to leave the country.

In another incident, Monsignor Caraballo, the Archbishop's spokesman was visiting an ill parishioner in downtown Managua. Some people forced their way into the home, forced the Monsignor to disrobe and then forced the Monsignor into the street where a government television crew was awaiting to film the entire event. The government claimed that the TV crew "happened to be going by" when the Monsignor who was

alleged to be having an affair with the wife of the parishioner and who was alleged to have been found in bed by the husband, was driven, naked, into the streets.

Finally, during the recent visit of the Pope the turbas (mob) began shouting "Power to the Government." These demonstrations were noted throughout the world as very rude and as having serious political overtones.

### PERSECUTION OF THE PROTESTANTS

In August, 1982, the turbas seized a number of temples of Jehovahs Witnesses; Seventh Day Adventists, and the Mormons.

Although most of the temples have been returned because of the public outcry, two belonging to the Mormons and all of the Jehovahs' Witness temples are still being held. There is speculation that because the Jehovahs' Witnesses are against military service this may be a motivating factor in the government of Nicaragua not returning the temples to the Witnesses.

# WASHINGTON August 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: JOHN TILLER

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell

SUBJECT: Central American Briefings

This is to confirm our conversation of yesterday pursuant to Mrs. Whittlesey's request that you work to set up a series of briefings regarding Central American policy.

Her idea is that you would undertake to arrange with the appropriate Administration officials briefings for:

- White House and EOB staff, which should be cleared through Jim Baker's Office.
- 2. Presidential Appointees and appropriate
  Schedule C staff in other Departments and
  Agencies, which should be coordinated through
  Craig Fuller's Office.
- Members of Congress and their staffs, coordinated through Ken Duberstein.
- 4. Appropriate State and local government officials which should be coordinated through Rick Neal in Lee Verstanding's Office.

You should work closely with Dolf Droge on this. He is in charge of providing our speakers and briefers. Joyce Thomann will help you reserve appropriate rooms in our complex. I would think that the invitations to the briefings should come not from the Office of Public Liaison, but from Lee Verstanding with respect to the State and local officials, Jim Baker with respect to White House and EOB personnel, etc. This will lighten our administrative load considerably.

I will be happy to assist in every way and look forward to chatting with you frequently as the series progresses.

MCB: jet

cc: Faith Ryan Whittlesey



# NEWS RELEASE

# OFFICE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS

WASHINGTON, D.C. - 20301

PLEASE NOTE DATE

HOLD FOR RELEASE UNTIL 6:00 PM (EDT) MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983 NO. 450-83 697-5131 (Info.) 697-3189 (Copies)

REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
TO BALTIMORE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1983

I am delighted to be here this evening and to have the opportunity to speak to you on this issue of such importance to us all.

Central America is closer to Baltimore than is California-in terms of geographic distance, that is. But the intellectual
distance between here and Central America is enormous. Most of
the American people are not well informed about Central America;
many are misinformed; and some are outright disdainful about
the cultural and social importance of this region.

You all have an obligation to remedy this situation, so that you and your representatives in Congress can engage in constructive support—or constructive criticism—of the Administration's policy.

To begin with, you should know that the President's policy for Central America has not yet been given a chance to work: Congress has denied the President the means to succeed.

Indeed, Congress has involved itself in the management of US policy for Central America more than for any other region of the world.

- While Congress has quickly and easily approved some four and a half billion dollars in Security Assistance for nations in the Mediterranean region, it slashed nearly in half the much smaller allocation for nations in the Caribbean region—so much closer to home.
- While Congress has been generally supportive of the deployment of some 1200 U.S. Marines to Lebanon, it fought fiercely to limit the number of US trainers in El Salvador to 55.

- While Congress has not objected to large military exercises in the faraway Indian Ocean region, it heavily criticized the recent military exercises in the Caribbean region.
- While Congress has for a long time supported Radio Free Europe, the fine radio program that brings the truth to the people of Eastern Europe, Congress has delayed for two years President Reagan's request for Radio Marti, a new radio station that would bring the truth to the people in Cuba.

As we consult with members of Congress on these issues, we are often told that, you, their constituents, are pressing such positions on them. But as we review the public opinion polls, we discover an extraordinary lack of information. For example, in a recent New York Times/CBS poll, only 8 percent of the respondents knew, both for El Salvador and Nicaragua, whether the US was supporting the government or the insurgents.

You must help us overcome not only a lack of information, but also a great deal of misinformation. This misinformation is not accidental; it is the result of a well-organized and well orchestrated effort. A fabric of fiction has been tightly woven to conceal the essential facts. Let me review with you some of these fictions:

Fiction has it that US influence in Central and Latin
America has prevented democratic development, that the spread of
Leninist regimes is the tide of history, a natural process of
social reform that we should not oppose. The fact is that the
trend toward democratization has continued: among the 32 independent states of Latin America and the Caribbean, 17 are now democratic.
Since 1978, five countries have made a peaceful transition from
military regimes to elected democratic governments. It is the
much criticized military regimes that are often transformed into a
democracy; but there has never yet been a Marxist-Leninist regime
that was succeeded by democracy.

Another bit of fiction: that the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua would have developed into a pluralistic democracy, had it not been for the US intervention. The fact is that the Sandinistas, only a few weeks after they came into power, reneged on their promise for early elections, began to attack the democratic trade unions, and invited Cuban military and security personnel in steadily growing numbers. Yet, during the first 18 months of the Sandinista regime, the United States provided more than \$120 million in direct aid and endorsed over \$220 million in Inter-American Development Bank aid — more than the previous Somoza regime in Nicaragua had received from the United States in twenty years! Clearly, it was not US interference that drove the Sandinistas to link up with Fidel Castro — unless economic aid is regarded as "interference."

Another piece of fiction is the charge that the Reagan Administration is "militarizing" the problems of Central America and is bringing the East-West conflict to the region. Well, the East is already here. The Soviets are giving ten times as much military assistance to Cuba and Nicaragua as we are providing to all of Latin America. And Soviet military advisors in Cuba and Nicaragua outnumber US military advisors in the Caribbean region twenty to one.

\* \* \*

Since Congress is so deeply involved in our day-to-day policy towards Central America, our key objectives need to be clear to the American people. Moreover, Congress must share with the Administration an understanding of our basic strategy.

On one thing we can all agree: We do not want the United States to fail. We must succeed.

But what is it we would like to see happen, and what do we want to prevent? We have wide agreement, I believe, that the United States favors a continuation and strengthening of the trend toward open, genuine democracy. And we favor social and economic betterment for the people in Central America, a region so close to us.

Equally important is what we want to prevent. We want to prevent the expansion of totalitarian regimes -- particularly Leninist ones, since they will import Stalinist police systems, bring in Soviet arms, and even invite Soviet military bases. There are two more reasons why Leninist regimes are particularly dangerous: once entrenched, they tend to become irreversible, and they usually seek to export their totalitarianism to other nations.

Given these objectives, what should be our strategy?

I.

First, we want to help build the road toward democracy and economic development. In the end, the people in each country will have to make their own choices. They can succeed only through their own dedicated effort. But we can help, through advice and influence, by facilitating trade, and by giving aid. The Caribbean Basin Initiative of the Reagan Administration (to which Congress has now agreed) is right on target. So are our efforts in El Salvador in behalf of elections and for improvements in the judicial system.

Also, we are using diplomacy to help the government of El Salvador win over those who are willing to abandon violence and compete in elections, provided they can be assured of safe and fair participation. But we must not underestimate our adversaries. The hard core among the insurgents will never settle for a fair democratic process. We can no more negotiate an acceptable political solution

with these people then the social democrats in revolutionary Russia could have talked Lenin into giving up totalitarian Bolshevism.

# II.

This leads us to the second requirement. As Secretary Shultz recently explained, the guerillas in El Salvador have used a "rule or ruin" strategy: they seek to destroy economic assets faster than our aid can restore them. You cannot have economic development in a nation, if guerilla forces keep blowing up bridges, power lines, school buldings, buses ... You have to defeat these "rule or ruin" forces militarily. This is the purpose for our military assistance.

Every so often the critics of the Administration proclaim -- with accusatory connotation -- that we seek a "military solution" in El Salvador. If a "military solution" means putting primary emphasis on military assistance and military means, then it is more factual to accuse the Reagan Administration of seeking an "economic solution," since three dollars out of four in the requested assistance programs are for economic aid.

What we seek to do is to open the doors to democracy and close the doors to violence. But we have to use military means against those who insist—till they have imposed their rule—on using violence.

Let me make this clear to you:

- -- We do not seek a military defeat for our friends.
- -- We do not seek a military stalemate.
- -- We seek victory for the forces of democracy.

And that victory has two components:

One: Defeating militarily those organized forces of violence that refuse to accept the democratic will of the people.

Two: establishing an adequate internal system for justice and personal security.

At this point, let us recall our first agreed principle: We do not want the United States to fail. Hence, we must allocate sufficient means so that we can succeed. As long as Congress keeps crippling the President's military assistance program, we will have a policy always shy of success. We will remain locked into a protracted failure.

This the American people should not tolerate. If we are merely involved to fail, then we should not be involved at all.

The resources needed to succeed are small compared to our investment for security in other regions of the world. Once Congress gives us the means to succeed, the capability and determination of the United States will become clear. This will make the Soviet Union more cautious, which in turn will help our success. On the other hand, if we signal that we are afraid of victory over the forces of violence, if we signal that we have opted for protracted failure, we will only encourage the Soviets to redouble their effort. We will be inviting ever-increasing difficulties.

## III.

The third requirement of US strategy for Central America is least well understood. We should seek to prevent the partition of Central America, a division of this region into two spheres, one linked to the Soviet bloc and one linked to the United States. Such a partition would inexorably lead to a hostile confrontation of large military forces, a confrontation that could last for decades.

We can see how such a confrontation works, as we look at Cuba. During the 24 years of the Castro dictatorship, while the standard of living deteriorated and human rights were widely violated, Cuba built up a large military establishment. It has the second largest army in Latin America (second only to Brazil), it has some 200 MIG fighter aircraft, submarines, 6000 to 8000 Soviet advisors, and several Soviet intelligence installations. In addition, Castro has sent some 30 to 40 thousand troops abroad to provide the mercenary forces to protect the Soviet imperial outposts. As a result of the militarization of Cuba, our sealines to NATO are now seriously threatened.

The Sandinista regime in Nicaragua is determined to create a "second Cuba" in Central America. Ever since they seized power, the Sandinistas embarked on a major military buildup. Today, they have a much larger army than Somoza ever had, and they have expressed the intention to build the largest force in Central America. Nicaragua is building new military airfields, and is importing Soviet tanks, helicopters, armored vehicles, and other equipment.

This "second Cuba" in Nicaragua would be more dangerous than Castro's Cuba since it shares hard to defend borders with Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas have already started terrorist activities in both these countries. In addition, Nicaragua provides essential support for the insurgency in El Salvador.

Even after the insurgency in El Salvador has been brought under control, Nicaragua--if it continued on its present course-would be the bridgehead and arsenal for insurgency for Central America. And once the Sandinistas have acquired the military strength that they have long been planning for, they might well

use that strength for direct attacks on their neighbors to help speed up the "revolution without frontiers" that they promised us.

At that time, the only way to help protect the democracles might be for the United States to place forward deployed forces in these countries, as in Korea or West Germany. Clearly, we must prevent such a partition of Central America.

Yet, Congress has so far failed to give the President the means he requires to succeed. In the Democrats' response to President Reagan's April 27 address on Central America to a Joint Session of Congress, Senator Dodd said: "We will oppose the establishment of Marxist states in Central America." Yet, the Democratic majority in the House of Representatives has done exactly the opposite. It voted to oppose US assistance to those who oppose the establishment of a Marxist state in Nicaragua. That is to say, the House, in effect, voted to establish a sanctuary for the Sandinistas.

Congressional legislation to deny US support to the democratic resistance forces in Nicaragua would turn Nicaragua into a sanctuary from which the nations of Central America could be safely attacked, but in which US supported forces could not operate. This would enable the promoters of totalitarianism—while being supplied and replenished by Cuba and the Soviet bloc—to attack neighboring countries indefinitely, and always with impunity. Hence, it would deprive the Marxist groups in El Salvador of any incentive to compromise. Indeed, if such legislation were passed, the Sandinistas and Cubans might well find it safe to increase their assistance to the insurgents in El Salvador and to step up the destablization of Honduras and Costa Rica. This, after all, would be fully consistent with their presently declared objectives; and the guaranteed sanctuary would render such escalation almost risk—free.

The psychological impact from cutting off US assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance forces fighting for democracy in their native land would be severe. Such a cut off would signal throughout the region that the totalitarian Leninist forces represent the winning side. The democratic forces would have cause to despair. They would see that terrorist and insurgent attacks against them are being generously supported by Cuba and the Soviet bloc, and that these attacks can be conducted from safe havens that are protected by the US Congress, in effect, from all counter-interference. Conversely, the totalitarian Lenist force would know that as soon as they seize control of a country, they will be secure: Cuba and the Soviet bloc will help them maintain an efficient police machinery to repress the people; and should any group arise to fight for freedom, the United States Congress would deny it all support.

Let me recapitulate.

Our basic objectives for Central America are clear: we want to strengthen democracy; we want to prevent in this hemisphere the expansion of totalitarian regimes, especially those linked to the Soviet Union.

To this end, we extend economic support and promote democratic development. But given forces of violence that will not accept the democratic will of the people, we also have to provide military assistance—enough to succeed. In addition, we must prevent consolidation of a Sandinista regime in Nicaragua that would become an arsenal for insurgency, a safe haven for the export of violence. If we cannot prevent that, we have to anticipate the partition of Central America. Such a development would then force us to man a new military front—line of the East—West conflict, right here on our continent.

To prevent such an outcome, the Administration and Congress must work together with a strategy that can succeed.

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Edited Transcript of Ambassador-at-Large Vernon A. Walters' Address to the Outreach Group on Wednesday, August 24, 1983, 1430 Hours, Room 450 EOB

I would like to talk a little bit about Central America, an area which has occupied a considerable portion of my life at various times and I would like to try, insofar as I can, to dispel a number of myths concerning Central America. You know the Hispanic peoples know what you mean when you say the "Liendra Negra" - the "Black Legend". The black legend is that the Spaniards went to South America and burned the Indians, and all they were interested in was getting gold. They were a mystery to the Indians and exterminated them and generally didn't behave like we noble Anglo-Saxons who treated ours so well. Well, the fact is that they had a couple of universities going a hundred years before Harvard was founded. And secondly, as one Spaniard said to me, "Our Indians are still there. Where are yours?" That black legend has been transferred to us. The other day I was in Spain and someone said "Well, Willy Brandt and Carlos Andrez Perez put out a statement and said that the United States is principally to blame for the situation in Central America. What do you have to say about that?" I said, "They are both distinguished statesmen." I doubt that Carlos Andrez Perez made such a statement. He was in my office recently and he certainly didn't say anything like that to me. But I said, "You know, regardless of how remarkable they are, it is just as difficult for them to be always right as it is for the United States to be always wrong."

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Now, one of the principal myths about Central America is that it is our backyard. It is not our backyard; it is our front lawn. And what happens there is of vital interest to It is the land bridge between us and South America and the incalculable reserves of that continent which we want to make sure are lined up on the side of freedom. The second myth is that the United States regards all insurrections against injustice and oppression as Communist inspired. They're not. But when they identify themselves as such, we have to take them seriously. When Umberto Ortega, one of the Nicaraguan Commandantes, says, "Marxism-Leninism is the guide of Sandinismo, and without Marxism-Leninism, there is no Sandinismo," we've got to take him seriously. is not the US saying it, that is Ortega himself saying that he is. And he said it in a document put out by the Public Relations Department of the People's National Sandinista Army of Liberation. Fidel Castro, on the 6th of June, 1961, said, "I became a Communist at the age of seventeen; I am one now, and will be one until the day I die." So much for the New York Times theory that we pushed him into their arms. I mean, he said so himself. We didn't take Adloph Hitler's Mein Kampf seriously either and it turned out to be quite serious: About twenty five million dead. So it is not a question of we regarding all of these people who are rebelling against social injustice or against oppression, against various forms of dictatorship, as all being Communist. Only when they

identify themselves to us as such. They will tell you now that, "Oh, Ortega said that." i.e. it is only rhetoric.

Maybe, but about half of the original junta has now fled the country and are outside. So, evidently they feel the democratic revolution was betrayed.

This area between the Panama Canal and the Rio Grande River is vital to us because it contains one hundred million people. One hundred million people whom we feel are entitled to the same freedoms and democracies that we have. For whom we wish a pluralistic society. The Soviets have an interesting doctrine called the Brezhnev Doctrine. The Brezhnev Doctrine says that when the Socialist Regime of any communist country is threatened, the Red Army reserves the right to intervene to guarantee the achievements of Socialism. Well, I am not sure that we shouldn't have a doctrine that guarantees the achievements of democracy. We apparently let the Monroe Doctrine fall into what the lawyers, I believe, call desuetude. And wouldn't it be a good idea if maybe we had a doctrine that democracy deserves to be helped. Because if you look at the history of the world, this century, one interesting fact strikes you. Democracies almost never engage in aggressive wars. They are almost always a factor of dictatorships, right or left. By their nature they are driven to external adventures. In democracies when you have to ask the people to sanction a foreign war, unless it is a defensive war, very rarely are they willing to do so. We abhorred Nazism, but

it still took Pearl Harbor to get us into the war. It is very difficult to get a democracy to go to war other than in response to an attack upon itself. And this is one of the reasons why, not just philosophically but pragmatically, we believe a pluralistic, democratic society is a good thing, not just for us, but for the people of Central and South America and all over the world in fact.

It is also a question of the maintenance of peace. You are far more likely to have peace where there are democratic regimes than where there are dictatorial regimes. And that is a very powerful factor. Large wars often grow from small wars. World War II grew out of a war between Poland and Germany. World War I grew out of a war between Austria and Serbia. So the important thing is that we do not have wars which can grow. The third thing is that this area is not just important to us. It is even more important that our enemies do not obtain control of it. Because then we do have a soft underbelly. Americans ask, what does El Salvador have to do with me? Well, El Salvador is closer to San Antonio than San Antonio is to Boston. You know, during the Falklands crisis, Mrs. Thatcher at one point in Number Ten Downing Street said, "It was in this room that Neville Chamberlain said, speaking of Czechoslovakia in 1938, 'Why should we go to war for this far distant country about which we know so little and with which we have so little in common?' And," she added,

"because he did that, we had a war that killed twenty five million people." So this is really the question that Cain asked: "Am I my brother's keeper?" And in a world that is the size of the one in which we now live, the answer is: Yes. We all are our brother's keepers. Because the fate of our brothers today may be ours tomorrow.

When you have a vast country with the resources of the Soviet Union actively carrying out Lenin's dictum," Probe with bayonets. If you run into steel, try somewhere else," it is important that they not find the absence of steel in this area. It is important that they are not permitted to enslave these hundred million people. They will tell you that all of this is caused by poverty and oppression and lack of freedom. If that were true, we would have a lot more revolts in a lot more areas than we do. Certain areas have been chosen. And -- this is a personal opinion -- my opinion is that the real target of the Soviet planners in that area is Mexico. If they could destabilize Mexico -- and our Mexican friends insist there is no danger of this, and perhaps they are right and perhaps they are wrong, but if they are wrong, the price they will pay is very great -- how much interest would the United States be able to pay to Europe, Africa or Asia?

The people in Central America are no less people than we are. If we like for ourselves the advantages of freedom and democracy, why should we deny them to them. Economically we

don't care whether the society is socialist, capitalist or mixed. Personally, I hope it is mixed or capitalist because there is one thing I have always found about socialism, it is undoubtedly one of the most noble doctrines man has ever evolved, but it doesn't work. It hasn't worked anywhere. I think we ought to give these people a chance to develop a pluralistic, democratic society in which they have a chance to change their mind, in which, if they want to try some experiment, they have an occasion four years later to review that experiment and see whether it was any good or not.

I think that is one of the key things that we want to try and help them achieve. Democracy is in trouble in Central America. It is under attack—in £entral America and if we don't defend it, who will? It is not just under attack from local forces; it is under attack from outside forces. All you have to do is turn up the airwaves and hear the storm that beats on those transistor radios throughout Central America every night to know that it is under attack from outside and not just from forces within each country.

People say, "Why don't you negotiate with the guerrillas?"
Well, we negotiated with Hitler -- we didn't, but the British
and French did in 1938, and it didn't turn out very well.
You've got to negotiate with strength. You've got to be able
to convince your adversaries that the route of force is not
a paying one. And also be able to convince your friends that,

if the other side chooses the route of force, you have the means of meeting it. And above all, in my opinion, you must not freeze yourself into any position of telling your adversaries what you are going to do or telling them what you are not going to do. Uncertainty is a very powerful weapon. If we had told Adolph Hitler, as we told the North Vietnamese, that under no circumstances were we going to invade Germany, I just wonder how long World War II would have gone on. We are told that the Sandinistas are really representatives of the working peasant class who want to till their soil, earn a living and not become a pawn in the struggle between the superpowers. You know, I hear a faint echo. That is what I heard about the North Vietnamese. They were just representatives of the little peasants who wanted to till their rice paddies and live their lives without becoming a pawn in the struggle between the superpowers. Well, what happened? Vietnam, when you had a war going on, you had American bombs falling all over the place; there was fighting in every village and all the young men were being drafted into the South Vietnamese army. There were no refugees. There were no boat people. When liberation came, one million, two hundred thousand Vietnamese chose to go out into the South China sea in open boats, risking the pirates, the typhoons, the storms to escape from "liberation". What, by the way, happened to those peasants who were going to till their soil? Well, they don't have any soil to till. All the soil belongs to the government. What about not becoming a pawn in the struggle between the superpowers? Well, at Cam: Ranh Bay there is today the largest electronics intelligence station the Soviet Union maintains outside the Soviet Union with the single exception of Lourdes in Cuba. And, if you look at Cam Ranh Bay today, you can see Soviet aircraft on the field. This for that part which said the North Vietnamese didn't want to be subject to the Soviets, didn't want to be subject to the Chinese; they just wanted to go their own little independent way.

I submit that when Mr. Ortega tells us that Sandinismo is guided by Marxism--Leninism, we have to take him seriously. And, obviously, a large number of his fellow commandantes have taken him seriously since a large number of the members of the original junta have left because they realize that the the revolution has been betrayed. And what does a "revolution without frontiers" of which the Nicaraguans speak mean? means you keep going until you get to the U.S. border. And you just take them one by one with the old salami tactics. Everyone said the domino theory was discredited. Was it? Vietnam fell. Cambodia fell with the greatest genocide in history, proportionally to population. Laos fell. two countries now are occupied by the Vietnamese. We were told these were the little farmers that just wanted to cultivate their little plots of rice and not bother anybody. And that is exactly what we are hearing now about the Sandinistas, who have the largest army in Central America, an army that is not big enough to stop us but is far too big

for their neighbors. And, if they have and are talking about this kind of an apparatus, what do they intend to do with it? Protect themselves against the Hondurans or the Costa Ricans? All is not by any means lost in this area. In Costa Rica we have just had a democratic election. In Honduras we have had a democratic election. In the Dominican Republic, where we intervened in 1965 militarily over great protests, there have been four separate changes of government by normal democratic elections whose results no one has really challenged. If we can just let democracy take root a little bit, have two, three changes of government by ordinary democratic process, as it has in Venezula for instance, this process will then become the normal accepted process as up until now the normal accepted process for change has been coups and violence.

If you have democracy, you have all the mechanisms of change, change of any kind you want as long as you get enough people to agree. But not irreversible change. In my lifetime I have seen all the great right-wing authoritarian dictatorships in the world replaced by democracies. But I don't know, and no one else in this room knows, what replaces a Communist dictatorship because no one in this room has even seen one replaced. The only possible exception was the Hungarian Communist Regime of Bela Kun in Hungary in 1929 which was ejected by the Romanian Army marching into Budapest and ejecting it. Outside of that, I do not know of a single case where a Communist regime has been reversible. It is not just the fact that once the people go under this kind of a regime, there is

no longer any hope. The regime is in power, it has weapons and it is quite prepared, in the name of its idealogy, to use those weapons to keep itself in power. It impedes the means of subverting the armed forces which, traditionally, in the case of the Russian Revolution and so forth, is what occurred. You got the soldiers to turn their guns against the regime. But when they control all the means, all of the media, it is very difficult to get to the soldiers to subvert them. And so it is not just a philosophical preference for a political pluralistic society, for an opportunity for the people to pronounce themselves in a fixed period of time on whatever experiments that they undertake, but it is the question of guaranteeing to these people the right to live as human beings and not as slaves. And this is the real issue in Central America and in the Caribbean. It is not a question of a border issue, it is not a question of a particular class of society, it is a question of the fundamental rights of people. Whether we believe these people are entitled to the same rights as we are. And if we do, and they are under attack, and their hope for the future and for freedom is under attack, it is up to us to do whatever is necessary to help them to preserve or to gain for the first time, in some cases, the possibility of being free and of controlling their own destiny.

Now in the case of Nicaragua, once again, we have this myth that the United States pushed them into the arms of the Communists, that that is not where they really were going.

Well, perhaps not. I would simply point out that after the revolution in September of 1979, Mr. Rabello and Daniel Ortega were received by President Carter at the White House. Fidel Castro, I might add, paraded down Broadway under the confetti after he was victorious. Now, the myth is that the United States supports the military dictators. I submit that both Batista and Somoza fell when the United States made it clear that they were not going to sell them what they needed to stay in power. I would simply add, from the financial point of view, that to this day the largest donor of aid to Nicaragua has been the United States. And in the first three years after they came to power we gave the Sandinistas more money than we gave Somoza in seventeen years. So it certainly isn't that we turned our backs on them and refused to help them. They chose the path of supporting the Soviet Union, or supporting a Marxist ideal because they believed in it.

You know we always have a tendency to believe that no one is really a Marxist. There are convinced Marxists; I have talked to them. It is an article of religious faith with them. I personally happen to believe that Fidel Castro is a more devout Marxist than Yuri Andropov. Yuri Andropov is in power and he wants to stay there. I think Fidel really believes all the stuff he's been saying. And that is very dangerous, when you begin to believe your own oratory. So I think we have to realize that there is a great deal at stake. Now the Europeans have this myth of Uncle Sam the Goliath beating up on the poor little small countries of Central America and with military aide

we are always looking for military solutions. Well we are not. The President said something like seventy percent of our assistance has been economic. But all the economic assistance is not going to do you any good if you don't have some kind of security shield. So many people have adopted an economic deterministic view -- that if you are economically strong, that is all you need. Well, I look at history and every time I think about the gross national product of Macedonia under Alexander and the Persian Empire which he overthrew, or I think of the gross national product of the Germanic tribes emerging from the Northern forests wearing their animal skins, and the Roman Empire, which was unquestionably the largest, most productive economic unit that had appeared in the world until that time, I am reminded of the story that after Waterloo, Wellington invited Marshal Blucher to London and took him up the newly-inaugurated Nelson column. Blucher looked out over the city and under his breath he muttered, "What a city to loot!"

When people tell me that economic strength is all that is necessary and that there are no military solutions, I always suggest that whoever believes that go tell the Greeks because it was Constantinople for eleven centuries, but as a result of some military activities, it has been Istanbul ever since. And then I remember from my own lifetime that Germany entered World War II practically without a gold reserve, with food rationing in effect and with currency controls. It was six years against the rest

of the world and it was a pretty close-run thing. When you have people imbued with a kind of semi-religious faith, the kind of fanaticism that Marxism brings with it, you've got to understand that you have a real danger on your hands. A danger not only to the United States, but, most of all, and this people lose sight of, to the people of Central America. It is they who are going to lose their freedom in the short term. We may lose ours, if we lose them, in the longer term, but they are going to lose whatever freedom they have, just like Vietnam. Vietnam was not a perfect society by any means but there were thirty newspapers in Saigon under Thieu. Some were suspended; some were fined. You know how many there are now? One. The Party Organ. So, there are all kinds of things at stake that do not immediately escape us.

Finally, that brings me to another item which I think is of fundamental importance. The one thing that all Communist revolutions have in common, is that they engender huge quantities of refugees. From Hungary, there were four hundred thousand. From Cuba, there were eight hundred thousand. And that won for Cuba the title of the largest country in the world. The administration is in Havana; the government is in Moscow; the army is in Africa; and the population is in Florida.

Now, Cuba is an island. Central America is not an island.

We've had boat people from Vietnam. If we lose Central America, we are going to have a minimum of ten million foot people and they won't be foot people all the way. Because when they get

to the Guatemalan/Mexican border there will be buses waiting to take them to Nogales, Tijuana, Brownsville and Laredo. And someone there to say, "Por Aqui, Senores", that way. Now this is a country that was made by refugees but they didn't come in these enormous waves all at once. Refugees have built the United States but they came in over a period of time in some kind of order. We have ten million unemployed. What are we going to do if we get ten million refugees? Who is going to provide them jobs? Who is going to provide them with housing, schools, social security? These will be people who have lost everything. They will be willing to work for any salary. What will the impact of that be on the American job market? And you know, these people will want to stay -- I always tell this to my Democratic friends in Congress from the southern part of the United States -- they will want to stay where it is warm. And after they have been here a while, they will become naturalized. And they will be very anti-Communist and they will all register as Republicans and that is not in your interest.

We face a very crucial problem, not unlike the ones the British and French faced when the Germans remilitarized the Rhineland. We now know that the German units that went into the Rhineland had orders, if the French reacted, to pull out at once. They remilitarized the Rhineland, they took the Saar, they took Austria, they took the Sudetenland, they took the whole of Czechoslavakia, they took Memel, and finally the war burst over Poland. But by that time the

Skoda works in Czechoslavakia were working for the Germans, not against them. Churchill once said--and this is an eternal truth--"You cannot slake the appetite of dictators by throwing them small countries to eat. Their appetite grows while they eat." As they digest Cuba, they will move on to the mainland-to Nicaragua. And when they have digested Nicaragua, they will digest Salvador. And then Honduras, and then Guatamala, and then it will be Mexico's turn. Now the Mexicans are convinced that no danger threatens them. I wish I could agree with them. I certainly hope that no danger threatens them but I do remember what Blucher said: What a city to loot. There is for us a choice now. We can either make a stand and defend regimes that are admittedly not perfect. But, is the solution to a flawed regime to replace it with a totally irreversible totalitarian Marxist dictatorship? Is that the answer? Because the Salvadorans or the Hondurans or the Guatamalan government do something that we don't like, is the answer to turn them over to a totalitarian dictatorship which will not be extinguished in our lifetime? That is not the solution and we all know it. And if that is not the solution, then it is our duty as a people, it is our duty as people who believe in freedom, who believe in the equality of all men, to do what we can to protect these peoples' right to decide their own future. And that, simply put, is the whole issue in Central America. And I am an optimist. Because if you look at the whole

course of human history since we came out of the caves; the course of that history has been in the direction of greater freedom and dignity for the individual. Many tyrants have temporarily stopped that flow. None has ever stopped it permanently. And the medieval tyranny that is masquerading as modern Marxism will not escape from the inexorable tide of history. It is our job to help the tide of history. We must not be found wanting or no one knows what the consequences will be.

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON August 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: ANNE HIGGINS

FROM:

Morton C. Blckwel

SUBJECT:

Letters of Appreciation from the President

Attached is a listing provided to me by Keith L. Miceli, Director of Latin American Affairs for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, of individuals who contributed significantly to the passage of the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative.

I believe it would be most appropriate if a letter of appreciation from the President were to be sent to each individual on the list thanking them for their assistance in securring passage of this priority legislation.

MCB: jet

1 Attachment a/s

Ltrs. Sent out 9/12/23 per Chuel in Ann Hyggin

Mr. Joseph F. Alibrandi Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer Whittaker Corporation 10880 Wilshire Boulevard Los Angeles, CA 90024

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Manager, La Antillana Comercial, S.A.
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Mr. Alfred Cumming, Director, Legislative Affairs Council of the Americas 1000 16th Street, N.W. Suite #600 Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. Peter Johnson Executive Director Caribbean/Central American Action Suite #1010 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036



# Chamber of Commerce of the United States

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

(202) 463-5460 Telex: RCA 248302 (Int'l) TWX 710 822 9382 (Domestic) Cable: COCUSA

August 19, 1983

Ms. Joyce Thomann
Executive Assistant to Morton C. Blackwell
White House Office for Public Liaison
Room 191
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20506

Dear Joyce:

I am please that you find merit in the suggestion for having the President send letters of appreciation to business leaders who, since March 1982, lobbied Congress urging passage of the CBI. Signing the CBI into law was a great foreign policy victory for the Administration.

The CBI was soundly conceived and is urgently needed to encourage the private sector to be the engine of economic growth. With the CBI now law, the business community is prepared to help this important region help itself, and thus foster U.S. national interests—economic, political and security.

Attached is a list of individuals from the business community who were instrumental in securing Congressional approval of the CBI. The list was compiled from names provided by the Association of American Chambers of Commerce in Latin America, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Caribbean/Central American Action, and the Council of the Americas.

I appreciate your interest and support in seeing this suggestion realized.

Sincerely,

Keith L. Miceli

Director, Latin American Affairs

Executive Vice President
Association of American Chambers
of Commerce in Latin America



# Chamber of Commerce of the United States

INTERNATIONAL DIVISION

(202) 463-5460 Telex: RCA 248302 (Int'l) TWX 710 822 9382 (Domestic) Cable: COCUSA

August 22, 1983

TO:

Joyce Thomann

FROM: Keith L. Miceli

RE:

Thank You Letters for CBI Support

Due to oversight, the following names were omitted from the list of names of business leaders who should receive letters of appreciation from the President for their support for passage of the CBI:

Mr. Robert Corrigan Washington Representative United Brands Company Suite 200 1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20006

Mr. Alfred Cumming Director, Legislative Affairs Council of the Americas 1000 16th Street, N.W. Suite 600 Washington, D.C. 20036

Mr. Peter Johnson Executive Director Caribbean/Central American Action Suite 1010 1333 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036.

Please add these names to the previous list.