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LATIN AMERICA: THE ARAB CONNECTION

A Foreign Affairs Background Memorandum  
By Jacob Kovadloff  
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For many years, Western nations, especially the United States, were virtually the only important foreign investors in Latin America, a region rich in the raw materials--metals, fuels and so on--needed to feed highly industrialized economies. Implicit in this financial predominance was political influence; after World War II, for example, members of the new Organization of American States--a loose federation inspired by the U.S. "Good Neighbor Policy"--almost automatically followed this country's lead on most international issues.

In recent years, these political and economic ties to the West have been loosening: Castro's Cuba has been a Communist satellite since 1962; Argentina and Brazil, which have embarked on huge industrialization programs of their own, and Venezuela and Mexico, both important oil exporters, no longer accept other nations' efforts to control their economies or political orientation. And smaller, poorer countries reflect the winds of nationalism and Third World ideologies that have swept so many underdeveloped areas of the globe. The pervasive poverty and other social ills long plaguing Latin America provide fertile ground for agitation and terror from Cuban-inspired and local guerrilla groups at both political extremes. Leftist terrorist groups are often countered by terrorist repression, official and non-official, from the right. Political upheavals have overturned democracies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and have toppled repressive regimes in Bolivia and Nicaragua. Several other authoritarian governments also face strong challenges.

This situation offers a hospitable climate for the economic and political ambitions of the newly rich Arab world, and a number of Arab states have acted to take advantage of it. In this move, they are aided by a substantial Arab presence in Latin America, the worldwide resurgence of ethnic consciousness and the growing importance of the Middle East in world affairs.

The Arab-Latin Americans

Of the 342 million population in Latin America, estimates of the number of people of Middle East extraction range from 9 to 15 million. There are 5 million Arabs in Brazil and 2 million in Argentina.

By contrast, there are 600-700,000 Jews in all of Latin America, half of them in Argentina, 150,000 in Brazil, 50,000 in Uruguay and 40,000 in Mexico. The balance of Latin America's Jewish population is scattered among the more than a dozen other states, with Latin Americans of Arab origin far outnumbering Jews in the region.

The overwhelming majority of Latin American Arabs are Christians (Maronites, Catholics, Copts and others) well assimilated into the area's predominantly Spanish, Portuguese and Italian societies. There are also a sizeable number of former Syrians and Lebanese who retain the French culture which dominated these countries until after World War II. Only a small number remain Muslims; nevertheless, ethnic solidarity between Latin American Arabs and the Arab world is strong and has increased sharply since the Middle East conflict, and the stepped-up propaganda of the Arab League, Arab diplomats and the PLO.

International Relations

All the Latin American countries, rich and poor, proclaim themselves part of the Third World, and generally vote with the Arabs and the Soviet bloc against Israel and the West in the UN and other international forums.



All Latin American states claim to be peace-loving but many are heavily armed, and several of the larger states compete sharply for regional dominance. Simmering territorial disputes sometimes further complicate the political scene: Argentina and Chile both claim the Beagle Channel Islands; Chile, Bolivia and Peru want the coastal areas which Chile won in a war with the other two countries more than 100 years ago; Venezuela and Colombia dispute rights to their shared oil-rich shores; Peru and Ecuador claim each others' border oil fields. It was only a few months ago that Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay finally settled their conflicting claims to the rivers that course through all four countries and represent valuable sources of hydroelectric power.

Many of the states have territorial quarrels with Western nations. Mexico argues that the status of millions of Mexicans illegally entering and living in the Western U.S. should be regularized as partial compensation for the American seizure of this territory in 1847. Panama's recently won agreement with the U.S. ceding complete ownership of the Panama Canal to Panama by the end of this century came only after years of bitter negotiation. Cuba objects to the continued presence of the U.S. base at Guantanamo. There is an ongoing dispute about fishing rights: Latin American countries unanimously favor a 200-mile off-shore limit; the U.S. and other Western countries insist on a 20-mile limit. In addition, Argentina continues to protest British occupation of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, rumored to swim in a sea of oil; and Guatemala demands that Great Britain give up Belize. Despite these differences, however, most Latin American nations maintain cordial relations with the U.S. and other Western countries, and even with Israel, whose trade with South and Central America and Mexico increases annually. Professions of anti-imperialism notwithstanding, many of the nations of the region energetically solicit capital investment from the West, and especially from the U.S.

#### Arab Penetration

The overwhelming factor in the Arabs' penetration of Latin America has been economic interest on both sides. The entire region needs both fuels and investment capital, and Arab money is now as plentiful as its oil reserves. Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia and Trinidad are the only petroleum exporters in the region. (Mexico, although not a member of OPEC, keeps pace with the cartel's prices.) The other nineteen Latin American countries must import oil; and most of those oil needs are met by the Arab oil-producing states. At the same time, Latin America's need for capital meshes well with the Arabs' desire to invest their cash reserves in potentially profitable enterprises. The oil states also want to buy development technology at the best terms, and several countries in Latin America are in a position to furnish it. The Middle East nations would also like to diversify their sources of military equipment, which until now has come primarily from the U.S. and other Western countries.

Brazil, the world's fifth largest nation, is far and away the most aggressive seeker of Arab business in Latin America, and numerous missions to the Middle East have come home with sales contracts for billions of dollars in manufactured goods and for public works that will provide work for large numbers of Brazilian technicians and workers in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates.

Petrobras, Brazil's state-owned oil company, bid successfully for exploration of Iraqi wells. The project included exploration, well-draining, an oil pipeline network, and the expansion of a terminal; and the deal was detailed in the Brazilian press in September 1979. Braspetro, a subsidiary of Petrobras, would invest about \$2 billion in an Iraqi oil field at Majnoon, which the company discovered in 1973. With an estimated reserve of 7 million barrels, this field was expected to yield 700,000 barrels a day by 1983. In exchange for this investment, Braspetro would be able to buy 25 percent of the first 350,000 barrels at \$4 below prevailing prices, and pay even less as production increased.<sup>1</sup> By early January 1980, the agreement had been sweetened.

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1. The New York Times, Jan. 11, 1980.



Brazil announced that it was relinquishing its development rights to the Majnoon fields in return for a shipment of 11.3 million barrels, for which she will pay about \$180 million, or \$16 per barrel (Iraq's selling price elsewhere is \$26 per barrel). Brazil will be able to buy another 20.7 million barrels at market prices, and is guaranteed an extra 160,000 barrels per day for the next 13 years.<sup>2</sup>

Other Brazilian companies have also made profitable agreements with Iraq: Mendes Juniors is building a 300-mile railroad for \$1.5 billion; about 600 Brazilian workers and technologists are already working on this project in Iraq, and a total 2,200 are expected by April 1980. Esusa has built a hotel in Bagdad providing work for 250 Brazilian employees; Engesa has sold Iraq about \$100 million in arms; Mengels has sold the country a million heating canisters. At the October 1979 Manufactured Goods International Fair in Bagdad, the Brazilian Pavilion included 46 corporations. It is clear, however, that economic growth is only part of Brazil's long-term ambitions. In an announcement of talks with Iraq on a banking transaction, Brazilian officials said "it is implicit" that both sides want to "eliminate" American and European bankers as middlemen. And, as The New York Times reported on January 16, 1980, Brazil's goal is to assert its own geopolitical power on its own continent and elsewhere in the Third World, with particular emphasis on Africa.

More ominously, perhaps, a Brazilian mission headed by Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro visited Iraq to study other technological needs, including the development of nuclear energy (although Argentina is far ahead in this technology after its purchase from West Germany). This mission follows an agreement, in September 1979, between Iraq's Minister of Commerce and the President of Nuclebras (Brazil's state agency), which includes not only sales of natural uranium, but also construction of advanced nuclear reactors--technology which Brazil itself has not yet received in full from West Germany.

As Carlos Chagas, a well-known journalist, wrote last November in O Estado de São Paulo: "...[We] were never so dependent on Washington as we are now on Iraq....The President of Iraq holds the key not only to Iraqi, but to Brazilian security....As long as our energy sources are not diversified...we need the good will of Iraq to survive." On the other hand, Chagas continued, Iraq needs Brazil: "Without access to nuclear energy for economic development, and a counterweight to what Israel may have, Iraq's survival is in danger....[although] the word 'bomb' was never used...the Arabs know they will never enter the Atomic Club with the help of the big powers. Finally, we need oil, we are friends, we have common interests." President (General) Joao Bautista Figueiredo said the same thing more succinctly shortly afterwards. Asked by a reporter how he thought the oil crisis would affect Brazil's prospects for 1980, he replied: "You should ask the Arabs; they are the ones who can answer that question."<sup>3</sup>

New York Times correspondent Warren Hoge summarized the reasons for this dependency in an article early in February 1980:

"It is no coincidence that Brazil's great period of record-breaking growth and its control over inflation both came to an end in 1973, when world oil prices began to soar. Brazil has played the petroleum card with abandon, creating the world's ninth-largest automobile industry and tracking its vastness with tens of thousands of miles and highways. It did not react to the new realities of the game in the middle 1970's, and it is now paying the price.

Brazil imports 85 percent of its petroleum, and will spend \$10 billion for it this year. The amount is staggering in itself, but it poses a particular burden for Brazil. The country already has a foreign debt of \$52 billion, 70 percent of which must be amortized in the early 1980's, and it is trying to combat both trade imbalances and domestic inflation by reducing imports and increasing exports."<sup>4</sup>

2. Latin American Weekly Report, London, Jan. 18, 1980.

3. O Estado de São Paulo, Nov. 28, 1979.

4. "Energy Costs Stunt Brazil's Development," The New York Times: International Energy Supplement, Feb. 3, 1980.



Brazil is the largest arms producer in the Third World. Last July, she delivered to Iraq the first ten of a 2,000-unit purchase of armored combat cars (some of them, it has been rumored, to be forwarded to Syria for use on the Golan Heights). It was also reported that Brazil was preparing a mass sale of weapons to the Saudis.<sup>5</sup> Among those under consideration is a counter-insurgency turbojet to replace an obsolete British model, and a light tank purportedly at half the price of its American equivalent and better suited to desert warfare, as well as other sophisticated weapons promoted as more adaptable to the Middle East climate and the skills of its work forces. Qatar has already agreed to buy such armaments from Brazil, and talks with Kuwait are in progress. In addition, Saudi Arabia and Brazil have negotiated agreements on joint projects for agricultural and industrial development in Pakistan and the Sudan.

Volkswagen in Brazil is considering setting up an assembly plant in Egypt with a capacity of 10,000 to 15,000 cars a year; and Egypt's Ambassador Ezzedine Rifaat said recently that his country might also sell oil to Brazil soon, explaining that Egypt expected to start prospecting near the Libyan border shortly, possibly with Brazilian help.

Brazil is far from the only Latin American country seeking business in the Arab world. Argentina is selling meats (mostly lamb) and grains to the Arabs; Ecuador sells bananas and other fruits; and Peru sells copper. The government of Chile sold one of its largest agricultural properties, Hacienda Rupanco, to the Vice President of a Saudi Arabian bank for \$35 million. Uruguay has been trying, with mixed success, to sell meat and agricultural produce to the Arab countries. Colombia has sold coffee in quantity to the Middle East and has cordially received several Arab business missions. Most other Latin American states are too poor and underdeveloped either to produce goods the Arabs might buy or to absorb large Arab investments.

#### 'Diplomatic Pragmatism'

It is hardly surprising that Latin America's foreign policy has followed its thrust for economic ties with the Arab world. A high Brazilian official has described his government's relations with Arab countries as the "art of diplomatic pragmatism." And as Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira pointed out when the 1973 Arab oil embargo had halted Brazil's economic boom, oil is bought more easily with politics than with money.

Although Brazil has been ruled by more or less repressive military governments for more than 15 years, its foreign policy usually reflects an earlier democratic history. Thus "diplomatic pragmatism" goes far to explain why Brazil--a country that fought against Hitler in World War II--was one of the three Latin American states (along with Cuba and Mexico) which voted at the 1975 United Nations General Assembly for the resolution equating Zionism with racism.

Cuba's anti-Zionism vote was expected. And Mexico's was directly attributable to the personal ambitions of its then President, Luis Echeverría. Barred by law from seeking a second term of office, Echeverría decided, as Mexican wags were saying, to run for "President of the World"--that is, to succeed Kurt Waldheim as UN Secretary General. As part of his international campaign he traveled to several Arab states, recognized the PLO in Mexico's behalf, offered his own good offices to settle the Arab-Israel conflict, and arranged for Mexico to support the Zionism-racism resolution. (He was nevertheless not elected to the post he coveted.)

Since José López Portillo became President of Mexico in 1976, the country's policy toward Israel has grown markedly friendlier. President López Portillo governs his country as a democratic leader and is trying to use its recently discovered oil reserves--perhaps the largest in the world--to develop a rational economy that will assure a decent standard of living for millions of Mexicans who now live in poverty. Diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel and the United States have become normal and realistic. Mexico will be selling more oil to Israel despite the furious Arab-inspired outcry and local

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5. Saudi Arabia Newsletter, Oct. 7, 1979.



leftist pressure against the decision. Further evidence of the nation's friendlier attitude was the visit to Mexico by Israel's President Efraim Katzir in 1979, and President López Portillo's scheduled return visit early in 1980. Nor does Mexico evidence any intention of joining OPEC, although Saudi Arabia's Minister of Energy, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, visited Mexico recently. López Portillo has stated firmly that his country wants no political commitments that may be inconsistent with the national interest.

"Diplomatic pragmatism" also dictated Brazil's vote at this General Assembly session for a resolution on "The Inadmissibility of Hegemonism in International Relations," with its clause which "resolutely condemns...racism including zionism." (Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Panama and Peru also voted in favor; Chile, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela abstained.) Brazil's delegate, Sergio Corrêa da Costa, made sure to tell an interviewer he had voted on "instruction" from his government. "Politically it meant some alignment with the Arabs," he explained, and "Brazil has a very large Arab population...more Lebanese than in Lebanon." Also, "Brazil is so vulnerable and dependent on Arab oil." And finally, the country has 5,000 to 6,000 technicians in Iraq, which makes for "very close relationships. There is a political price they expect." 6

### Raising Arab Ethnic Consciousness

As Arab economic and political influence has risen, many heretofore highly acculturated Latin Americans of Arab extraction have begun to organize and to cultivate their ethnic roots. This has not, however, been a spontaneous movement from within the population; its primary impetus came from the Arab League, and then from a number of Arab diplomats who have aided the League in this task. In several countries these functionaries have helped organized a network of institutions designed to awaken dormant ethnic and national identities. The first of a series of conferences for this purpose was held in 1968 in Argentina; at this meeting, a Federation of Arab Institutions in the Americas was formed. After several subsequent meetings in Argentina and Brazil, a conference in 1977 in Santiago, Chile designated the Federation as the official link with the Arab states.

The next Federation meeting took place in 1979 in Iraq, where the 100 delegates from Latin America were received by President al Bakr. The group later proceeded to Damascus as guests of the Syrian Government and its President, General Hafez al Assad. Jordan's King Hussein will be the Federation's host in 1981.

In late 1979, 1,000 Federation delegates from Arab and Latin American countries meeting in Caracas, Venezuela, founded a Pan-American Institute of Arab Culture with headquarters in Buenos Aires, as well as an Arab-American Information, Publicity and Communications Center based in Santiago, Chile. According to a conference report, the center's first undertaking is to track down Latin Americans of Arab ancestry who have been so thoroughly absorbed into Latin American cultures that they have lost all contact with their countries of origin.

Besides the ethnic and cultural emphasis of these organizations, their agenda include a good deal of economic and political concern. As early as 1973, it was the Federation of Arab Institutions in the Americas which set up Arlabank in Lima, Peru; today this bank holds not only Arab deposits, but capital contributions from Spain and several Latin American countries. (Arlabank is managing a \$45 million loan to Peru for its Mantero hydroelectric project.)

One officially stated purpose of the newly-formed cultural and information centers in Buenos Aires and Santiago is "to work for the free self-determination of the Palestinians and their right to their homeland...we consider the PLO the legitimate representative of that people..." Victor Ananias of Chile, President of the Federation, was quoted in Agence France Presse (Oct. 6, 1979) as stating; "The solution we propose for the Middle East is the disappearance of Israel to

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6. The New York Times, Jan. 21, 1980

7. La Segunda, Santiago, Chile, Nov. 9, 1979



make way for a secular, democratic Palestinian state." And to journalists who asked whether they thought the PLO was a terrorist organization, several Latin American delegates to Caracas replied that, on the contrary, its armed activity was "legitimate defense."

### Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism

PLO propaganda and anti-Zionist agitation--which sometimes slips over into venomous anti-Semitism--have intensified everywhere with the growth of Arab wealth and power. But the political instability of Latin America, its extreme dependence on foreign investment for its economic development, and its peculiar demography and ethnic composition have made it a special target of Arab anti-Israel propaganda. It also poses a special threat to Latin American Jews, who are accustomed to living amicably with their neighbors of Arab extraction. In some countries, notably Argentina, a pre-existing undercurrent of anti-Semitism makes the Arab campaign against the Jewish state--and against Latin American Jews who support it--easier and more effective.

In earlier years, anti-Israel and anti-Jewish propaganda, though crude, was seldom challenged. The Arab League specialized in distributing Hitler's Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion as well as anti-Semitic literature by local authors. Today, although revised editions of the Protocols are still part of the packet of materials provided opinion molders, and such extreme anti-Semitic magazines as Cabildo in Argentina still print hoary tales of worldwide Marxist-Zionist-Yankee conspiracies, such extreme attacks often elicit sharp protests. Some of the Catholic press in Argentina has run editorials attacking all Nazi-like anti-Jewish campaigns, and Monsignor Jorge Mejía, now head of the Vatican office handling Jewish relations, denounced such propaganda when he was editor of the Catholic magazine Criterio. On the other hand, in 1971 the pro-Palestinian Maronite priest Carlos Abram was able to undermine the ecumenical thrust of a traditional religious New Year's Day celebration of peace held in the largest square in Buenos Aires.<sup>(8)</sup>

Anti-Israel appeals today are generally more sophisticated and more "respectable." Arab diplomats who are willing to work with left-wing and right-wing extremists have often taken over the propaganda activities from the Arab League. All too often, Latin American politicians lend themselves to these efforts. While José López Rega, called by many Argentines the "Rasputin" of Isabel Perón's regime, was negotiating an oil-purchase agreement in Libya in 1974, he instructed his office that no telex messages to him be signed by Jews (the order was aimed at José Ber Gelbard, Finance Minister of Argentina). During his trips to Libya, López Rega established the eastern base of a "cultural bridge" between the two countries, and on his return, extolled the ideological affinity between the Qaddafi and Peron governments. He also summoned all Argentine legislators of Arab extraction to a surprise meeting at the Presidential mansion where he upbraided them for abandoning their "roots" and ordered them to forge close ties to the Arab world.<sup>9</sup>

The most effective Arab propaganda today, especially with regard to the PLO's bid for recognition and respectability, is generated by Latin American adherents of "diplomatic pragmatism." In September 1979, for example, Brazil's Foreign Minister Saraiva Guerreiro told the UN General Assembly that some states still refuse to accept the changes necessary to "a true peace" in the Middle East, which would not come without withdrawal from "all the territories taken by force," and "without participation of the PLO, one of the most important elements in the region's political scenario."<sup>10</sup>

Though some newspapers which ordinarily emphasized the dangers of PLO penetration praised Guerreiro's "certainly pragmatic" speech, this press reaction was not unanimous. The New York correspondent of the Fôlha de São Paulo, who is ordinarily sympathetic to the Arabs, observed that conversion from Jehovah to Allah accelerates "in proportion to OPEC price raises," adding that Petrobras preferred to "suckle at OPEC breasts" rather than to prospect its domestic fuel sources."<sup>11</sup>

8. American Jewish Year Book, 1972, p. 440.

9. American Jewish Year Book, 1976, p. 273.

10. O Estado de São Paulo, Sept. 25, 1979.

11. Paulo Francis, Fôlha de São Paulo, Sept. 25, 1979.



In October 1979, Professor Musel Belal, President of the Syrian Parliament's International Committee, came to Brazil to request official recognition of the PLO. He was received by President Figueiredo, by the Foreign Minister, leaders of the Parliament, the President of the Supreme Court and São Paulo's Governor, who had previously refused to meet the PLO representative and is openly friendly to the Jewish community. Not long afterwards, 50 members of the Brazilian Parliament (out of a total of some 300) signed a petition urging PLO recognition.

The Vice President of Iraq also visited the country shortly afterward; and during his visit the PLO was officially accorded recognition as sole representative of the Palestinian people. When Israeli embassy officials criticized this step, they were admonished by the Foreign Ministry not to interfere in Brazil's affairs. The move backfired, however, when it was revealed--by the Iraqis, to the chagrin of Brazil's Foreign Ministry--that there was a secret agreement permitting the PLO to open an office in Brazil in addition to those now operating in Havana and Mexico City. Widespread criticism by the major media of this "inexplicable opening to terrorism," as one newspaper put it,<sup>12</sup> has not yet abated.

As soon as recognition was official, the PLO representative in Brazil, Farad Sawan, flooded the country with literature, press handouts, speeches and other propaganda, especially in the universities. The public was outraged, and leading intellectual and political figures, most of them members of the Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (Brazilian Democratic Movement), spoke out at large meetings and in the press, demanding to know why Israeli diplomats were told not to interfere in Brazil's foreign affairs, while Arab promoters of the PLO were allowed to do so. At one meeting, in December 1979, a PLO representative, unable to make himself heard above shouts of anger, was forced to leave. Stores in a heavily Jewish neighborhood were closed in support of an anti-PLO rally. The Government was finally obliged to ask Sawan to soft-pedal his activities. And when, in August and September 1979, the respected O Estado de São Paulo ran a series of articles condemning terrorism, including that of the PLO, Sawan charged the paper with promoting "a racist campaign against the Palestinian people."<sup>13</sup>

The PLO gains in Brazil have inspired other Latin American countries to consider the possible advantages of Arab ties. In Uruguay, for example, the newspaper El Día, which had earlier carried an editorial warning that a small, poor country could not afford not to spend its money to establish a "diplomatic presence" all over Africa--including the Middle East. In Peru's largely controlled media, the messages are all anti-Israel, pro-PLO; and the PLO representative in that country, while not officially recognized, operates freely and openly. In late December 1979, Father Abraham Ayad, a Maronite Christian and advisor to Yasir Arafat, came to Lima to conduct "an intense program of activity" for the PLO.<sup>14</sup>

In Venezuela, whose President Luis Herrera Campins recently toured Algeria, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the PLO's sailing has been less smooth: when its supporters publicized a meeting with the country's Foreign Affairs Minister, the latter denied it had taken place.

Brazil has been urging Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru to avoid the risks of recognizing the PLO individually by granting such recognition as a bloc, without extending diplomatic representation.<sup>15</sup>

#### Support for Terrorism

A few years ago, it was difficult to convince Latin Americans that the reign of guerrilla terror that swept the region in the mid-1970s had any outside support. The presence of Palestinians in some terrorist militia was con-

12. La Prensa, Buenos Aires. The same point was made in O Estado de São Paulo and other Latin American periodicals.

13. O Estado de São Paulo, Nov. 14, 1979.

14. Ojo (Eye), Lima, Peru, Dec. 25, 1979.

15. Latin American Newsletter, Jan. 4, 1980.



sidered by most officials to be exceptional. But in the past two years the Argentine Government and its supporters in the media have repeatedly and publicly asserted that many of the indigenous guerrillas who wrought such havoc in the country were armed, and frequently trained in Arab countries. A recent cable from the Spanish news agency, EFE, included a statement by Major Sahad Hadad of Lebanon that South American guerrillas had been joining Palestinian units.<sup>16</sup>

According to recent reports, the PLO has donated \$2 million to the Montoneros, who proudly boast of meetings and agreements with Yasir Arafat, producing photographs as evidence. Among those appearing in photographs with Arafat is Mario Firmenich, a "Montoneros" leader whose political beginnings were in extreme right Nazi-Fascist groups. The pro-government magazine *Somos* (We Are) reported that he had "established contacts with Iraq, Libya and the military ETA [Basque guerrillas] in Spain; Argentine guerrillas now receive instruction in Libya and South Yemen."<sup>17</sup>

A recent United Press International cable from Tanzania reported that five African and Middle Eastern liberation movements had sent telegrams to President Rafael Videla of Argentina requesting the release of the Montoneros' former African representative and his family, reportedly seized by the Army in September 1979. Referring to a "Pact of Fatima" signed in Spain by Arab-Hispanics and the Montoneros, the cable said that the emotional basis of this alliance was "an ethnic policy whose fundamental aim in the Southern Cone is the elimination of Jewish communities through terrorist and propaganda efforts."<sup>18</sup>

Monsignor Hilarion Capucci, jailed in Israel several years ago for smuggling arms and explosives for the PLO, has visited Latin America at least twice, championing the PLO cause before journalists, students and academics. An extensive propaganda campaign has been launched by pro-Arab and pro-Nazi groups in Argentina to denounce illicit and "suspicious" operations by Argentine Jews.

This propaganda effort recalls the days of the late Hussein Triki, a notorious anti-Semite, and the first agent of the Arab League in Argentina, who was expelled from the country in the 1960s for fomenting social unrest.

Notwithstanding the Government's acknowledgment of close ties between the Arabs and subversive groups, Argentina is avidly seeking economic and trade relations in the Middle East. Arab investors and bank representatives visited Argentina in December 1979 at the invitation of José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz, Minister of Economy. And immediately before the UN Subcommittee on Human Rights met in Geneva in February 1980, Ambassador Enrique Lupiz, Director of Politics in the Foreign Affairs Ministry, was sent to the Middle East to "discuss bilateral issues, among them the position of the Arab countries on human rights in Argentina."<sup>19</sup>

### Conclusion

Although still politically and economically unstable, Latin America is no longer a backwater region dominated by the industrial West. The more advanced nations--Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela--are using their natural resources to become full partners in the world economy, and demanding to be recognized as such; Even the smaller and poorer countries are demonstrating an ever-growing political and economic sophistication. For years the Arab states made promises, rarely honored, of investment and other assistance in return for political support from Third World nations; now many of these nations want the promises kept. And with North America and Europe losing their political and economic dominance over the region, the newly rich Arab states have become strong competitors in all areas of Latin American life.

There is serious question, however, about the price that Latin American nations will be asked to pay for Arab political and economic support. Will the new ties really hasten Latin American independence--or will they lead to a new dependence more onerous than that of the past?

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16. Jan. 14, 1980.

17. Jan. 2, 1980.

18. *Prensa Confidencial*, Buenos Aires, Oct. 2, 1979. DPA (German Press Agency), Oct. 4, 1979.

19. *Gente*, Buenos Aires, Dec. 6, 1979; *Clarín*, Jan. 14, 1980.





I.D.F. Spokesman

March 1981

## THE PLO AND INTERNATIONAL TERROR

"We exchange information and experience with all of the liberation movements. We send the elite of our youth and our cadres to learn from the experience of others. We accept every combatant into our ranks. We do not cut ourselves off from international revolutionary movements. We are an integral part of them. We are interested in their affairs and are interested in receiving their full support in our political and military struggle."

Majid Abu Shrar, member of the PLO Central Committee and director of PLO Information (in an interview to the Kuwaiti Ar-Rai al 'Aam 6. January 1981).



## THE PLO AND INTERNATIONAL TERROR

The PLO serves as the hub of international terrorism, ranging from extreme left-wing to radical right-wing underground movements. Apart from serving their own narrow interests, cooperation among these subversive groups is generally based upon a common ideological commitment either to "the struggle against imperialism, Zionism and Capitalism," or to "the concepts of anarchy and "world revolution."

The principal theatres of international terrorist activity are Western Europe, Latin America, Japan, such Middle Eastern countries as Turkey and the Gulf States, and East Africa. Over the past ten years, the PLO - and, indirectly, the Arab and Eastern-bloc countries which support it - has been responsible for the planning and/or execution of a substantial number of the attacks on government institutions, bombings, skyjackings, kidnappings and murders perpetrated in these regions.

### SUPPORT FROM ARAB STATES

Arab states - primarily Syria and Saudi Arabia - provide the PLO with extensive political support and lavish assistance in a broad variety of realms, including financing, training, the supply of intelligence and forged documents, arms procurement, the use of diplomatic mail for the shipment of weapons and explosives, and asylum. This aid is not provided for ideological reasons alone, but also for a variety of unrelated motives which include the undermining of rival Arab states, the enhancement of their own status in the Arab world and the "purchase" of protection from PLO subversion of their regimes.

Arab aid has transformed the PLO into the world's foremost terrorist organization - with the facilities and capacity to conduct its organizational and training activities openly, whereas other subversive groups are forced to operate underground. As a result of this aid the PLO enjoys such luxuries as "legitimate" offices, a sophisticated propaganda network and extensive training facilities, as well as virtually unrestricted political backing and access to both weapons and financing. Moreover, PLO agents operate freely in most Western European countries, in the Communist states and throughout Latin America.

### MUTUAL AID

It is little wonder, therefore, that this *de luxe* status had made the PLO a much-sought-after partner for cooperation by all of the world's underground movements.



Thus, the PLO has developed an extensive network of ties with subversive movements the world over, and cooperation among them exists in such diverse realms as training, arms supply, document forging, financing, logistics, recruiting, intelligence gathering, operational planning, the conduct of *quid-pro-quo* and joint operations, the provision of asylum and general coordination.

Following are some examples of this cooperation:

#### Training

- \* In May 1972 a spokesman for the Turkish government announced that it had arrested 14 Turkish terrorists who were returning from training courses in Syria.
- \* On 11 June 1977 *The Daily Telegraph*, of London, reported that 20 members of the Turkish revolutionary underground had arrived in Lebanon at the beginning of June 1977 for training at PLO camps in that country. It also reported that various groups of Turkish terrorists were undergoing training at camps of the Al-Fatah faction of the PLO in Syria.
- \* In May 1978 *The Irish Times* reported that members of the Irish Republican Army were being trained in Lebanon.
- \* On 21 March 1979 the British *Economist Foreign Report* reported that Colombian terrorists were being trained in PLO camps.
- \* On 23 June 1980 *The Daily Telegraph* reported that 4 members of the West German Red Army Faction, 6 members of the Italian Red Brigades, 130 Turkish Armenians, 170 Iranians, 4 members of the Japanese Red Army and 3 members of the Basque ETA underground had participated in terrorist training courses at the Hamoriya Camp, south of Damascus, during 1979/80.
- \* In an interview with the Italian newspaper *Panorama* on 7 July 1980, Bassam abu Sharif, deputy head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) faction of the PLO, announced that many Italians and other foreigners had been trained at his organization's camps in the Middle East.

#### Operational Collaboration

- \* On 30 May 1972 a squad of Japanese Red Army terrorists, acting on behalf of the PFLP, perpetrated the Lod Airport massacre, in which 26 civilians were killed and 76 wounded.



- \* On 20 July 1973 a combined squad of PFLP and Japanese Red Army terrorists skyjacked a Japanese jumbo jet en route from Paris to Tokyo via Amsterdam and diverted it to Libya, where it was blown up.
- \* On 31 January 1974 a combined squad of PFLP and Japanese Red Army terrorists sabotaged the Shell Oil Co. fuel depot in Singapore.
- \* On 21 December 1975 a combined squad of PFLP, West German Red Army Faction and Venezuelan Carlos Network terrorists occupied the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, taking hostage the oil ministers who were convening there at the time.
- \* On 28 June 1976 terrorists from a variety of organizations skyjacked an Air France airliner which had been en route from Tel Aviv to Rome via Athens and diverted it to Entebbe, Uganda on behalf of the PFLP.
- \* On 13 October 1977 a combined squad of Baader-Meinhof and PFLP terrorists skyjacked a Lufthansa airliner en route from Majorca to Frankfurt via Rome and diverted it to Madagascar.
- \* On 12 November 1980 the PLO representative in Pakistan announced that some 300 Pakistanis had applied for admission to the PLO during the previous month. He noted that candidates would be selected from among the applicants for military training by the PLO, and that Pakistanis had already participated in PLO operations.

#### Asylum

- \* The terrorists who skyjacked the Japanese jumbo jet in July 1973 (see above) were granted political asylum by Libya.
- \* The terrorists who sabotaged the Shell Oil Co. fuel depot in Singapore in January 1974 (see above) were granted political asylum by South Yemen.
- \* Three Japanese Red Army terrorists who seized the Embassy of France in The Hague in September 1974 were flown to Syria, where they were subsequently released.
- \* The terrorists who occupied the OPEC headquarters in Vienna in December 1975 (see above) were flown to Algeria and subsequently to Libya, where they were granted political asylum.
- \* A squad of Japanese Red Army terrorists who skyjacked a Japanese airliner en route from Paris to Istanbul and forced its crew to fly it to Bangladesh, Kuwait, Damascus and Algiers, was granted political asylum by Algeria.



The PLO has been active in bringing together representatives of the world's underground organizations for political and operational consultations. In the June 1980 issue of *International Terrorism*, Professor Charles Horner, of the Advanced School for Diplomats at Georgetown University, Washington, reported on an international congress of world terrorist organizations that took place in Beirut in 1978. Participating were representatives of the Italian Red Brigades, the Irish Republican Army, the West German Baader Meinhof Gang and Red Army Faction, the Argentinian Montoneros, the Spanish ETA, the Japanese Red Army and, naturally, of the PLO, which hosted the congress.

A more recent example of this type of activity was documented by the Lebanese daily *An-Nahar*, which reported on 15 January 1981 that a group of terrorists representing the El Salvador Liberation Organization, the Chad National Liberation Front and the Spanish Basque BENTA underground had visited Lebanon as guests of the PLO.

#### 'INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION'

The principal underground terrorist organizations with which the PLO maintains close ties are:

- \* The Turkish Popular Liberation Army
- \* The Eritrean Liberation Front
- \* The Japanese Red Army
- \* The Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia
- \* The Argentinian Montoneros
- \* The Brazilian Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria
- \* The Chilean MIR
- \* The Colombian Guerilla Group
- \* The Nicaraguan Sandinists (before and after they attained power)
- \* The Guatemalan MR-13
- \* Various underground movements in San Salvador
- \* The Uruguayan MLN, Tupamaros
- \* The Venezuelan Carlos Network
- \* The Italian Red Brigades
- \* The Spanish Basque BENTA
- \* The Spanish ETA
- \* The West German Baader-Meinhof
- \* The West German Red Army Faction
- \* The Irish Republican Army



Following is a breakdown of PLO contacts with these organizations.

Turkish Popular Liberation Army

- \* In an interview with the Turkish journal *Hürriyet* on 26 May 1971, Leila Haled, who participated in two aircraft skyjackings on behalf of the PFLP, stated that her organization *"sends instructors to Turkey to train Turkish youth in urban guerrilla warfare, kidnapping, skyjacking and other matters."*
- \* On 23 May 1971 the Israeli Consul General in Turkey was murdered by members of the Turkish Popular Liberation Army. After the murder, Fatah expressed its solidarity with the Turkish organizations fighting against their government and against *"American imperialism and its agents in the area."*
- \* On 24 May 1972 a spokesman for the Turkish army announced that 14 Turkish terrorists had been apprehended in a boat owned by Al-Fatah in the southern waters of Turkey near the Syrian border. They had been returning to Turkey after having trained at a Fatah base. In the official announcement, it was stated that *"these anarchists had been trained by Fatah to undermine the Turkish republic and its national unity, as well as to serve Marxist-Leninist interests."*
- \* The Turkish daily *Yeni Istanbul* wrote in this context on 24 June 1972: *"Turkey faces open attacks by Fatah, which enjoys the standing of a quasi-state in certain Arab countries. We know in which countries Fatah operates, yet we continue to maintain friendly relations with countries recognizing that organization and granting it asylum."*
- \* On 21 February 1973 the Turkish terrorist Faik Hasan Bulut was captured during an IDF operation at the Nahar al-Bard PLO camp in Lebanon. In his trial before an Israeli military court in Lod on 30 July 1973, Bulut stated that he had met with a Fatah representative in Turkey who had smuggled him across the frontier to Syria, where he was trained for one month in the use of various arms. From there he was sent to Lebanon for training at the Nahar al-Bard camp, where he was captured. The weekly *Falastin ath-Thawra* reported on 15 March 1973 that 9 Turkish terrorists had been killed in the IDF operation against the Nahar al-Bard and Al-Badawi PLO camps.
- \* On 30 May 1973 the Turkish news agency *Haber* reported that 18 Turks had been killed in the fighting in south Lebanon during May of that year and that 5 bodies had been sent to Turkey for burial.
- \* In May 1979 a plot to kidnap the Israeli and American Counsuls General in Istanbul was uncovered. Two Turkish Popular Liberation Army terrorists were killed and two others were wounded in the incident.



\* On 2 January 1980 Abraham Hagar, the EL-AI manager in Istanbul, was murdered on behalf of the PLO by 3 members of the Marxist Unit for Warfare and Propaganda, which is a splinter group of the Turkish Popular Liberation Army.

#### The Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)

\* In April 1970 ELF terrorists sabotaged a car belonging to the Israeli company Inicoda, in Ethiopia, on behalf of the PLO.

\* In an interview with the Libyan newspaper *El Hakika* on 16 June 1972 the secretary of the ELF, Osman Saleh Sabbe, revealed that both Libya and Fatah had granted it financial and military assistance.

\* On 22 November 1975 a passing out parade was held for members of the ELF at the completion of a training course at the "17th September" camp of the PLO's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command in Syria.

\* On 21 November 1980 ELF representative Muhammad Osman abu Bahar stated that his organization enjoyed amicable relations with the PLO, which supplied it with propaganda material and military assistance.

\* On 13 December 1980 the Lebanese weekly *Nidal ash-Shaab* reported that members of the PLO's Popular Struggle Front had met with a delegation of the ELF. The Eritrean delegation expressed complete support for the Palestinian cause and people under the leadership of the PLO, which was its "sole and legitimate representative."

#### The Japanese Red Army

\* On 5 June 1972 the Lebanese newspaper *Usbua al-Arabi* wrote: "The connection between the PFLP and the JRA began on the basis of a common ideological background and a common understanding about the ways to strike at the imperialist interests."

On 30 May 1972 members of the JRA perpetrated the Lod Airport massacre on behalf of the PFLP (see above). On each anniversary of this tragedy, an anarchist periodical is published in Japan by the National Press with notices on behalf of the JRA calling for solidarity with the Palestinians and the PLO.

\* On 20 July 1973 a combined squad of PFLP and JRA terrorists skyjacked a Japanese jumbo jet en route from Paris to Tokyo via Amsterdam, and forced its crew to fly it to Libya where it was blown up (see above).

\* On 31 January 1974 a combined squad of PFLP and JRA terrorists sabotaged the Shell Oil Co. in Singapore (see above).

\* On 6 February 1974 a combined squad of PFLP and JRA terrorists seized the



Japanese Embassy in Kuwait. They succeeded in obtaining the release of 4 terrorists imprisoned in Singapore who were eventually flown to South Yemen, where they were granted asylum.

\* Among the terrorists who surrendered in the Tel al-Za'ater camp in Beirut when it was captured on 20 July 1976 by the Lebanese Christians was a 35-year-old member of the JRA.

#### The Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (SALA)

SALA is one of the most active terrorist groups in the world. Its operational base is as yet unknown, and the identity of its leaders is shrouded in mystery, but it has assumed responsibility for operations conducted around the world. All that is known to date about SALA is that its leaders are Marxists and that most of its members are middle-class Armenians living in Lebanon and in the United States. *The Los Angeles Times* has reported that it maintains close contacts with the PLO, especially with its PFLP faction, which trains its members, supplies them with arms and publishes their periodicals. It appears likely that the activities of SALA are concentrated in Lebanon, whose Armenian population numbers some 200,000.

Among the Israeli targets damaged in SALA attacks was the El Al office in Rome, which was bombed on 9 December 1979 and on 18 February 1980 by this organization.

#### Latin American Underground Organizations

\* On 3 July 1970 a hand grenade was thrown at the residence of the Consul General of Israel in Guatemala by the Guatemalan MR-13 on behalf of the PLO.

\* On 6 September 1970 a combined squad of Nicaraguan Sandinists and PFLP terrorists attempted to skyjack an El Al airliner en route from Tel Aviv to London.

\* On 13 and 19 January 1975 members of the Venezuelan Carlos Network perpetrated attacks on El Al airliners at Orly airport, Paris, on behalf of the PFLP.

\* On 26 January 1975 a Venezuelan terrorist attempted unsuccessfully to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in Paris.

\* At least one member of the Carlos Network was involved in the skyjacking of an Air France airliner to Uganda on behalf of the PFLP in June 1976 (see above).

\* On 12 September 1978 *PLO Radio* in Lebanon announced that Abu Jihad, head of the "military wing" of the PLO, had met with members of the Argentinian Montoneros and the Uruguayan Tupamaros, who were being trained at PLO camps in southern Lebanon.

\* On 21 March 1979 the *Economist Foreign Report* reported that members of the Colombian Guerrilla Group were being trained in PLO camps.



\* On 12 July 1979 *The Washington Post* reported that members of the Sandinist underground in Nicaragua had trained in PLO camps in Algeria prior to that organization's accession to power.

\* On 24 December 1979 *The Daily Telegraph* reported that members of the Brazilian Vanguarda Popular Revolucionaria were being trained at PLO camps in Libya and Lebanon. It also reported that Manuel Cabias, the head of the Chilean MIR underground movement, was in touch with PLO leaders and that members of his organization were being trained in PLO camps.

\* On 23 June 1980 the Egyptian newspaper *Rose al-Youssef* reported that the PLO was giving military aid to various San Salvador underground movements.

\* On 23 July 1980 PLO head Yassir Arafat was given a royal welcome by the Sandinist leaders of Nicaragua, who declared their support for the Palestinian cause. Interior Minister Tomás Borge Martinez states: *"We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and that the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinists."* In his reply, Arafat recalled that Sandinist terrorists had trained in PLO camps and added: *"The links between us are not new; your comrades did not come to our country just to train, but also to fight. Your enemies are our enemies."*

\* On 2 February 1981 the Lebanese newspaper *An-Nahar* reported that a terrorist from San Salvador had attended the funeral held the previous day of a PFLP terrorist who had been killed in an Israeli air force attack.

#### The Italian Red Brigades (IRB)

\* On 4 August 1972 oil tanks were sabotaged in Trieste by a combined squad of the Black September faction of the PLO and the IRB.

\* On 26 April 1978 a terrorist network whose members included PLO, Swiss and IRB terrorists was discovered in Egypt.

\* On 14 February 1980 the *Economist Foreign Report* revealed that 3 members of the IRB had been arrested in Italy in possession of SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles supplied by the PLO and smuggled into Italy on board a Lebanese vessel.

#### Spanish Underground Organizations

\* On 12 September 1979 the Beirut newspaper *Al-Hawadith* published the following declaration by the head of the Spanish ETA: *"We regard ourselves as an integral part of the struggle for the Palestinian cause, with which we share a common enemy."*

\* On 5 June 1980 the Spanish authorities arrested 4 members of ETA who subsequently admitted to having been trained in PLO bases in Lebanon.



- \* On 5 September 1980 the Beirut newspaper *Al-Ahram* reported that the Basque BENTA underground was responsible for the kidnapping of Louis Godna Debosa, the Spanish ambassador to Lebanon, and that the kidnappers had been trained in PLO camps.

#### West German Underground Organizations

- \* On 12 December 1969 a combined squad of Baader-Meinhof and PFLP terrorists planted 3 explosive charges in West Berlin. Two of the charges - near the ELA offices and near America House - were discovered and defused before any action could be done, while the third exploded at the US Army officers' club.
- \* On 21 December 1975 a combined squad of PFLP and Red Army Faction terrorists occupied the OPEC headquarters in Vienna, taking hostage the oil ministers who were convening there at the time (see above).
- \* Heading the squad of terrorists who skyjacked an Air France airliner en route from Tel Aviv to Rome via Athens and forced its crew to fly it to Entebbe, Uganda, on behalf of the PFLP on 28 June 1976 was Wilfrid Boese, a left-wing West German terrorist (see above).
- \* On 13 October 1977 a combined squad of Baader-Meinhof and PFLP terrorists skyjacked a Lufthansa airliner en route from Majorca to Frankfurt via Rome and forced its crew to fly it to Madagascar (see above).
- \* On 9 May 1979 *Economist Foreign Report* revealed that Baader-Meinhof terrorists training in Lebanon had received instruction in biological and chemical warfare.
- \* On 6 May 1980 the arrest, in Paris, of 5 West German female terrorists who were affiliated with the PFLP was announced. The explosives in their possession had been forwarded via the South Yemen embassy in Paris.

#### The Irish Republican Army (IRA)

- \* In December 1972 the Belgian authorities intercepted a ship that had arrived at Antwerp from Cyprus carrying a cargo of arms sent by Fatah to the IRA.
- \* On 11 June 1978 *The Irish Times* reported that the PLO was training IRA terrorists at its camps in southern Lebanon.
- \* On 4 September 1979 the Belgian newspaper *Le Soir* reported that a charge which had exploded at the Grand Palace in Brussels in late August 1979 had been planted by IRA terrorists in collaboration with the PLO, and that cooperation between the two groups was extensive.



\* In the June 1980 issue of *Commentary*, Professor Charles Horner revealed that members of the IRA had received training under Cuban, Russian and West German instructors at three PLO camps - Ha'of, Mukkila and Al Jida - in South Yemen, and at a Libyan camp situated some 300 km. south of Tripoli.

#### LINKS BETWEEN NEO-NAZIS AND THE PLO

Publications appearing both in Israel and abroad have established that ties have existed between the PLO and various neo-Nazi groups since the 1960's, when ex-SS officers who had found asylum in Arab countries provided advice and guidance to the budding PLO.

In April 1969, a world conference of neo-Nazi organizations, in which about 100 delegates from Europe and Latin America participated, was held in Barcelona, at which an Algerian delegate proposed a resolution condemning Zionist imperialism and succeeded in obtaining a promise from the neo-Nazi organizations of assistance in both manpower and arms for the PLO. The first manifestation of this assistance was the recruitment of an ex-SS officer to command a PFLP training camp at Basra in southern Iraq. In September 1969 Jean Tireault, secretary of the neo-Nazi movement in Brussels, was arrested on suspicion of maintaining contacts with PLO members who had carried out a terrorist attack in Belgium.

In 1970 a complex network of financial cooperation between neo-Nazi organizations and the PLO was uncovered, following the appearance of François Gerard, a Swiss banker who was the director of the Arab Bank in Geneva, as an observer at the trial of a PFLP terrorist who had attacked an El Al plane at Zurich in February 1969. Gerard was suspected of being connected with the "Spider" currency smuggling network, which was regarded as responsible for the transfer to Swiss bank vaults of the booty of Nazi thefts and robberies.

In 1973 a number of European newspapers revealed that two well-known neo-Nazis, the Belgian Karl van de Put and the German Johan Schuller, had acted as recruiting agents for Fatah.

Shortly before the October 1973 Yom Kippur War, the neo-Nazi German newspaper *Nationalist and Soldiers' Chronicle* offered its readers a trip to the Middle East to learn about the Palestinian struggle. The notice stated that money was no problem, and that what was important was courage and friendship. At the same time, Austrian police arrested the Austrian neo-Nazi leader Herald Englke, after his party had given asylum and assistance to PLO members who had been smuggled into Austria using forged Israeli passports in order to carry out acts of terror there.

In January 1978 the general prosecutor of the West German Supreme Court at Karlsruhe opened an investigation into the links between the neo-Nazi organizations and the PLO, following the arrest of 4 Germans who were members of the Adolf Hitler Free Corps - which had been engaged in arms-running from Arab countries on behalf



of the PLO.

For the past few years, the various PLO factions have been showing their appreciation for the help which they have received from the neo-Nazis in Europe by providing them with financial assistance and training at PLO camps. For example, the West German student Gundolf Keller, a member of the neo-Nazi Military Sports Group who was killed in September 1980 when an explosive charge went off at the Munich Beer Festival, had undergone military training at a PLO camp in southern Lebanon. Karl Heinz Hoffmann, who heads this group, has also spent some time in Beirut, for 'business purposes.' The exact nature of his business was later revealed in conversations which were monitored by German security forces in which Hoffmann told his Palestinian friends that he was acting in the way Adolf Hitler would have acted had he still been alive. Further details of neo-Nazi-PLO cooperation were revealed on 30 January 1981, during the interrogation of Adv. Manfred Roeder, one of the leaders of the West German neo-Nazi movement.


#### CONCLUSION

In recent years international terror has become a serious problem for most of the countries of the free world. It not only threatens the well-being of individuals, but seeks to destroy the very fabric of democratic society by creating an atmosphere of fear and anarchy and by undermining the economies, social systems and international relations of free nations everywhere.

This growing threat has forced the countries of the world to divert ever-increasing human and economic resources to the war against terror--resources which are sorely needed for education, research, health and welfare, as well as for other productive and socially beneficial endeavours.

Without the decisive contribution of the PLO, international terror would not have become the terrible menace that it is today.







# AMERICAN ISRAEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

444 NORTH CAPITOL STREET, N.W. • SUITE 412 • WASH'NGTON, D.C. 20001 • (202) 638-2256

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## MEMORANDUM

February 5, 1982

### THE PLO IN EL SALVADOR

*"It was disgraceful of Reagan to call us terrorists. We are a great revolution that can never be intimidated. We have connections with all revolutionary movements throughout the world, in Salvador, in Nicaragua--and I reiterate Salvador--and elsewhere in the world."*

Yasser Arafat  
Associated Press  
April 14, 1981

With heightened attention on the tragic state of conflict in El Salvador, it is important that the connection between the PLO and the Salvadoran insurgents, as well as the PLO connection with insurgents throughout Latin America, be highlighted.

It should come as no surprise that the pro-Soviet PLO--ringleader and coordinator of the international terrorist network--should be involved in aiding Salvadoran insurgents by providing military and political support.

The United States government is well aware of this unholy alliance. On February 21, 1981, Vice President Bush acknowledged to Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir that "the PLO is aiding leftist guerrillas in El Salvador." (U.P.I. 2/21/81) There is ample evidence that the PLO, foes of all democratic systems, especially the United States, is linked to insurgents in El Salvador.

PLO-EL SALVADOR TIES ARE DEEPLY ROOTED. Contacts between Salvadoran guerrilla leaders and Arafat, as well as members of the PFLP, are frequent.

PALESTINIAN ARMS AND TRAINING HAVE BEEN SUPPLIED TO SALVADORAN GUERRILLAS. This fact has been confirmed both by Arafat and in testimony before Congress.

THE PLO-SALVADORAN CONNECTION THREATENS U.S. SECURITY by increasing instability in the Americas and hostility to U.S. interests.

(over)



Associated Press  
Foreign Briefs  
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The PRA also supports other leftist guerrillas which kidnapped South African Ambassador Archibald Gardner Dunn, and are demanding that El-Salvador's military junta establish diplomatic relations with the PLO."

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"The DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate of the Salvadorean guerrillas) representatives met with visiting PLO leader Yasser Arafat in Managua on July 22, 1980. Arafat promises military equipment, including arms and aircraft

A Salvadoran guerrilla leader met with FATAH leaders in Beirut in August and November, and the PLO has trained Salvadorans in the Near East and in Nicaragua."

U.S. News and World  
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"Now the PLO has offered weapons and training to leftist forces in civilian-torn El Salvador, where a U.S.-backed junta is battling guerrillas of both left and right."

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January 21, 1982

"A report from Beirut last week quoted PLO leader Yasser Arafat as saying that Palestinian soldiers were actively supporting the Salvadori insurgency. The report triggered a furor among some Latin American U.N. delegations, diplomatic sources say."

Wall Street Journal  
January 14, 1982

"While in Beirut last March, Mr. Handal said about 2,000 residents of El Salvador were of Palestinian origin. 'I wouldn't be revealing a secret if I say that there are some in our revolutionary cadre who are Arabs.'"

(over)





P.L.O.  
information  
bulletin

Vol. 6, No. 13  
16-31 July 1980



# PALESTINE



NICARAGUA

LIBERATION

ONE STRUGGLE



## NICARAGUA ONE YEAR OF REVOLUTION

It is already one year since the revolution has been triumphant in Nicaragua, in the heart of the American continent. Nobody could imagine that the despotic dictator Somoza, who was a stooge of U.S. imperialism and an ally of Israel, would be overthrown by his people. Quite the same as nobody could imagine that the Shah of Iran, who was also a stooge of the U.S. and the staunchest ally of Israel, would be overthrown by his people. The U.S. and Israel are losing ground and they are getting more and more isolated.

There is no doubt that there is a common line between Nicaragua, Iran and Palestine. A common front against the common enemy, the enemy of the people, the enemy of freedom and liberation. As once nobody could imagine, that Chairman Arafat would visit Iran after the success of the revolution in February 1979. Chairman's Arafat visit to Nicaragua was also unexpected. It was simultaneously a shock and a blow to U.S. imperialism and hegemony in Central America.


Chairman Arafat was given in Nicaragua an official and warm reception, as one of the main figures of contemporary world revolution for freedom and liberation. In spite of the far distance between Nicaragua and Palestine, the Palestinian Revolution got old contacts and close relations with the Nicaraguan Revolution. Chairman Arafat was cheered and warmly received by the leadership as well as by the

people of Nicaragua. Talks were held at the highest level and with all the members of the Revolutionary Council and the government. Also an important meeting took place in Nicaragua, between Chairman Arafat and Fidel Castro who also came to congratulate for the success of the revolution.

After one year of victory against the fascist regime of Somoza, The FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional) scored a lot of successes for the Nicaraguan people. The Sandinista Front is working hard in organizing and creating a new life for their 2 million population. Nicaragua, a rich and vast country, has various natural resources which need to be exploited. The anti-Yankee front is getting bigger in Latin America, and Cuba is no more alone and isolated. The storms of revolution are stepping over from Nicaragua to Salvador, which is now on the verge of being liberated. Other countries will follow the path of revolution to overthrow the Yankee hegemony over the peoples of Latin America.

The Palestinian Revolution understands the international dimensions of its struggle and its international task of supporting, within its capabilities, international liberation movements. The more peoples of the world become free and independent, the closer the Palestinians are to victory. Zionism and Israel are nothing but an offshoot of U.S. hegemony, and they have to be defeated everywhere.





*Chairman Arafat  
welcomed at reception  
by Arab community*


### MEETING WITH FIDEL CASTRO

On July 22, Chairman Arafat in Managua also met with the leader of the Labour Revolution and acting head of the Non-Aligned Movement Fidel Castro. They discussed the situation in Central America and the Middle East which are both exposed to aggressive moves on the part of the U.S.A.

Chairman Arafat also paid a visit to Masaya, the Nicaraguan city where the fiercest battles took place

during the revolutionary uprising and which had heroically resisted the fascist onslaught of Somoza's mercenaries armed and trained by Israel and the U.S.A. In Masaya, Chairman Arafat visited the former house of the heroic Nicaraguan leader Sandino who first led the Nicaraguan people in their anti-imperialist struggle for liberation.

Before the departure of the PLO delegation, Chairman Arafat addressed on July 23 a mass rally at the Workers Center in the capital Managua, where the audience enthusiastically expressed their solidarity with the Palestinian people.



*A big campaign by the Ministry of Education: The Nicaraguan Revolution is fighting illiteracy*



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Wall Street Journal  
January 14, 1982

"While in Beirut last March, Mr. Handal said about 2,000 residents of El Salvador were of Palestinian origin. 'I wouldn't be revealing a secret if I say that there are some in our revolutionary cadre who are Arabs.'"

(over)



# Communist Interference in El Salvador

February 23, 1981

United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*  
Washington, D.C.



## CONTENTS

### Summary

- I. A Case of Communist Military Involvement in the Third World
- II. Communist Military Intervention: A Chronology
- III. The Government: The Search for Order and Democracy
- IV. Some Conclusions

### Summary

This special report presents definitive evidence of the clandestine military support given by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and their Communist allies to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas now fighting to overthrow the established Government of El Salvador. The evidence, drawn from captured guerrilla documents and war materiel and corroborated by intelligence reports, underscores the central role played by Cuba and other Communist countries beginning in 1979 in the political unification, military direction, and arming of insurgent forces in El Salvador.

From the documents it is possible to reconstruct chronologically the key stages in the growth of the Communist involvement:

- The direct tutelary role played by Fidel Castro and the Cuban Government in late 1979 and early 1980 in bringing the diverse Salvadoran guerrilla factions into a unified front;

- The assistance and advice given the guerrillas in planning their military operations;
- The series of contacts between Salvadoran Communist leaders and key officials of several Communist states that resulted in commitments to supply the insurgents nearly 800 tons of the most modern weapons and equipment;
- The covert delivery to El Salvador of nearly 200 tons of those arms, mostly through Cuba and Nicaragua, in preparation for the guerrillas' failed "general offensive" of January 1981;
- The major Communist effort to "cover" their involvement by providing mostly arms of Western manufacture.

It is clear that over the past year the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into another case of indirect armed aggression against a small Third World country by Communist powers acting through Cuba.

The United States considers it of great importance that the American people and the world community be aware of the gravity of the actions of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist states who are carrying out what is clearly shown to be a well-coordinated, covert effort to bring about the overthrow of El Salvador's established government and to impose in its place a Communist regime with no popular support.

Arms flow into El Salvador.





## I. A Case of Communist Military Involvement in the Third World

The situation in El Salvador presents a strikingly familiar case of Soviet, Cuban, and other Communist military involvement in a politically troubled Third World country. By providing arms, training, and direction to a local insurgency and by supporting it with a global propaganda campaign, the Communists have intensified and widened the conflict, greatly increased the suffering of the Salvadoran people, and deceived much of the world about the true nature of the revolution. Their objective in El Salvador as elsewhere is to bring about—at little cost to themselves—the overthrow of the established government and the imposition of a Communist regime in defiance of the will of the Salvadoran people.

**The Guerrillas: Their Tactics and Propaganda.** El Salvador's extreme left, which includes the long-established Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) and several armed groups of more recent origin, has become increasingly committed since 1976 to a military solution. A campaign of terrorism—bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, and seizures of embassies—has disrupted national life and claimed the lives of many innocent people.

During 1980, previously fragmented factions of the extreme left agreed to coordinate their actions in support of a joint military battle plan developed with Cuban assistance. As a precondition for large-scale Cuban aid, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders, meeting in Havana in May, formed first the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) as their central executive arm for political and military planning and, in late 1980, the Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Front (FMLN), as the coordinating body of the guerrilla organizations. A front organization, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR), was also created to disseminate propaganda abroad. For appearances sake, three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties were brought into the front, though they have no representation in the DRU.

The Salvadoran guerrillas, speaking through the FDR, have managed to deceive many about what is happening in El Salvador. They have been aided by Nicaragua and by the worldwide propaganda networks of Cuba, the Soviet Union, and other Communist countries.

The guerrillas' propaganda aims at legitimizing their violence and concealing the Communist aid that makes it possible. Other key aims are to discredit the Salvadoran Government, to misrepresent U.S. policies and actions, and to foster the impression of overwhelming popular support for the revolutionary movement.

Examples of the more extreme claims of their propaganda apparatus—echoed by Cuban, Soviet, and Nicaraguan media—are:

- That the United States has military bases and several hundred troops in El Salvador (in fact, the United States has no bases and fewer than 50 military personnel there);

- That the government's security forces were responsible for most of the 10,000 killings that occurred in 1980 (in their own reports in 1980, the guerrillas themselves claimed the killings of nearly 6,000 persons, including noncombatant "informers" as well as government authorities and military).

In addition to media propaganda, Cuba and the Soviet Union promote the insurgent cause at international forums, with individual governments, and among foreign opinion leaders. Cuba has an efficient network for introducing and promoting representatives of the Salvadoran left all over the world. Havana and Moscow also bring indirect pressure on some governments to support the Salvadoran revolutionaries by mobilizing local Communist groups.

## II. Communist Military Intervention: A Chronology

Before September 1980 the diverse guerrilla groups in El Salvador were ill-coordinated and ill-equipped, armed with pistols and a varied assortment of hunting rifles and shotguns. At that time the insurgents acquired weapons predominantly through purchases on the international market and from dealers who participated in the supply of arms to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua.

By January 1981 when the guerrillas launched their "general offensive," they had acquired an impressive array of modern weapons and supporting equipment never before used in El Salvador by either the insurgents or the military. Belgian FAL rifles, German G-3 rifles, U.S. M-1, M-16, and AR-15 semiautomatic and automatic rifles, and the Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil assault rifle

## VIETNAM PROMISES WEAPONS


Quantity	Type
192	9mm pistols
1,620	AR-15 (M-16) semiautomatic rifles
162	30-caliber machineguns
36	7.62mm M-60 machineguns
12	12.7-caliber M-50 antiair machineguns
36	62mm mortars
12	81mm mortars
12	DKZ-57 antitank rocket launchers
15,000	9mm rounds
1,500,000	AR-15 rounds (5.56mm)
240,000	7.62mm M-60 rounds
240,000	30-caliber rounds
130,000	12.7-caliber M-50 rounds
9,000	62mm mortar rounds
4,000	81mm mortar rounds
1,500	DKZ-57 antitank rocket grenades

have all been confirmed in the guerrilla inventory. In addition, they are known to possess .30 to .50 caliber machineguns, the U.S. M-60 machinegun, U.S. and Russian hand grenades, the U.S. M-79 and Chinese RPG grenade launchers, and the U.S. M-72 light antitank weapon and 81mm mortars. Captured ammunition indicates the guerrillas probably possess 60mm and 82mm mortars and 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifles.

Recently acquired evidence has enabled us to reconstruct the central role played by Cuba, other Communist countries, and several radical states in the political unification and military direction of insurgent forces in El Salvador and in equipping them in less than 6 months with a panoply of modern weapons that enabled the guerrillas to launch a well-armed offensive.


This information, which we consider incontrovertible, has been acquired over the past year. Many key details, however, have fallen into place as the result of the guerrillas' own records. Two particularly important document caches were recovered from the Communist Party of El Salvador in November 1980 and from the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) in January 1981. This mass of captured documents includes battle plans, letters, and reports of meetings and travels, some written in cryptic language and using code words.





## MODERN WEAPONS NOW IN GUERRILLA INVENTORY

Belgian FAL semiautomatic rifle  
German G-3 rifle  
U.S. M-1, M-16, and AR-15  
semiautomatic and automatic rifles  
Israeli UZI submachinegun and Galil  
assault rifle  
30 and 50 caliber machineguns  
U.S. M-60 machinegun  
U.S. and Soviet hand grenades  
U.S. and Chinese grenade launchers  
U.S. M-72 light antitank weapon  
U.S. 81mm mortars



Photos display captured weapons and  
munitions.





When deciphered and verified against evidence from other intelligence sources, the documents bring to light the chain of events leading to the guerrillas' January 1981 offensive. What emerges is a highly disturbing pattern of parallel and coordinated action by a number of Communist and some radical countries bent on imposing a military solution.

The Cuban and Communist role in preparing for and helping to organize the abortive "general offensive" early this year is spelled out in the following chronology based on the contents of captured documents and other sources.

**Initial Steps.** The chronology of external support begins at the end of 1979. With salutations of "brotherly and revolutionary greetings" on December 16, 1979, members of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCEs), National Resistance (FARN), and Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) thank Fidel Castro in a letter for his help and "the help of your party comrades . . . by signing an agreement which establishes very solid bases upon which we begin building coordination and unity of our organizations." The letter, written in Havana, was signed by leaders of these three revolutionary organizations.

At an April 1980 meeting at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City, guerrilla leaders made certain "requests" (possibly for arms). Present at this meeting were representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba, and the Soviet Union.

In notes taken during an April 28, 1980 meeting of the Salvadoran Communist Party, party leader Shafik Handal mentions the need to "speed up reorganization and put the Party on a war footing." He added, "I'm in agreement with taking advantage of the possibilities of assistance from the socialist camp. I think that their attitude is magnificent. We are not yet taking advantage of it." In reference to a unification of the armed movement, he asserts that "the idea of involving everyone in the area has already been suggested to Fidel himself." Handal alludes to the concept of unification and notes, "Fidel thought well of the idea."

#### Guerrilla Contacts in Havana.

From May 5 to June 8, 1980, Salvadoran guerrilla leaders report on meetings in Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua. They proceed to Havana and meet several times with Fidel Castro; the documents also note an interview with the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) Chairman Erich Honecker in Havana. During the Havana portion of their travels, the Salvadoran guerrilla leadership meets twice with the Cuban

Directorate of Special Operations (DOE, the clandestine operations/special forces unit of the Cuban Ministry of Interior) to discuss guerrilla military plans. In addition, they meet with the Cuban "Chief of Communications."

During this period (late May 1980), the Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) is admitted into the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana. The coalition then assumes the name of the Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) and meets with Fidel Castro on three occasions.

After the Havana meetings, Shafik Handal leaves Havana on May 30, 1980 for Moscow. The other Salvadoran guerrilla leaders in Havana leave for Managua. During the visit of early June, the DRU leaders meet with Nicaraguan revolutionary leaders (Sandinistas) and discuss: (1) a headquarters with "all measures of security"; (2) an "international field of operations, which they (Sandinistas) control"; and (3) the willingness of the Sandinistas to "contribute in material terms" and to adopt "the cause of El Salvador as its own." The meeting culminated with "dinner at Humberto's house" (presumably Sandinista leader Humberto Ortega).

**Salvadoran Communist Party Leader's Travels in the East.** From June 2 to July 22, 1980, Shafik Handal visits the U.S.S.R., Vietnam, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ethiopia to procure arms and seek support for the movement.

On June 2, 1980, Handal meets in Moscow with Mikhail Kudachkin, Deputy Chief of the Latin American Section of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Kudachkin

suggests that Handal travel to Vietnam to seek arms and offers to pay for Handal's trip.

Continuing his travels between June 9 and 15, Handal visits Vietnam where he is received by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat and Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Van Quang. The Vietnamese, as a "first contribution," agree to provide 60 tons of arms. Handal adds that "the comrade requested air transport from the USSR."

From June 19 to June 24, 1980, Handal visits the German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), where he is received by Hermann Axen, member of the G.D.R. Politburo. Axen states that the G.D.R. has already sent 1.9 tons of supplies to Managua. On July 21, G.D.R. leader Honecker writes the G.D.R. Embassy in Moscow that additional supplies will be sent and that the German Democratic Republic will provide military training, particularly in clandestine operations. The G.D.R. telegram adds that although Berlin possesses no Western-manufactured weapons—which the Salvadoran guerrillas are seeking—efforts will be undertaken to find a "solution to this problem." (NOTE: The emphasis on Western arms reflects the desire to maintain plausible denial.)

From June 24-27, 1980, Handal visits Czechoslovakia where he is received by Vasil Bilak, Second Secretary of the Czech Communist Party. Bilak states that some Czech arms will be provided. He adds that the Czech Republic will not be providing arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas as the country's position will be jeopardized. The German Democratic Republic.





Handal proceeds to Bulgaria from June 27 to June 30, 1980. He is received by Dimitir Stanichev, member of the Central Committee Secretariat. The Bulgarians agree to supply German-origin weapons and other supplies, again in an apparent effort to conceal their sources.

In Hungary, from June 30 to July 3, 1980, Handal is received by Communist Party General Secretary Janos Kadar and "Guesel" (probably Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Andras Gyenes). The latter offers radios and other supplies and indicates Hungarian willingness to trade arms with Ethiopia or Angola in order to obtain Western-origin arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. "Guesel" promises to resolve the trade with the Ethiopians and Angolans himself, "since we want to be a part of providing this aid." Additionally, Handal secures the promise of 10,000 uniforms to be made by the Hungarians according to Handal's specifications.

Handal then travels to Ethiopia, July 3 to July 6. He meets Chairman

Mengistu and receives "a warm reception." Mengistu offers "several thousand weapons," including: 150 Thompson submachineguns with 300 cartridge clips, 1,500 M-1 rifles, 1,000 M-14 rifles, and ammunition for these weapons. In addition, the Ethiopians agree to supply all necessary spare parts for these arms.

Handal returns to Moscow on July 22, 1980 and is received again by Mikhail Kudachkin. The Soviet official asks if 30 Communist youth currently studying in the U.S.S.R. could take part in the war in El Salvador. Before leaving Moscow, Handal receives assurances that the Soviets agree in principle to transport the Vietnamese arms.



**Further Contacts in Nicaragua.** On July 13, representatives of the DRU arrive in Managua amidst preparations for

the first anniversary celebration of Somoza's overthrow. The DRU leaders wait until July 23 to meet with "Comrade Bayardo" (presumably Bayardo Arce, member of the Sandinista Directorate). They complain that the Sandinistas appear to be restricting their access to visiting world dignitaries and demanding that all contacts be cleared through them. During the meeting, Arce promises ammunition to the guerrillas and arranges a meeting for them with the Sandinista "Military Commission." Arce indicates that, since the guerrillas will receive some arms manufactured by the Communist countries, the Sandinista Army (EPS) will consider absorbing some of these weapons and providing to the Salvadorans Western-manufactured arms held by the EPS in exchange. (In January 1981 the Popular Sandinista Army indeed

In late January, Honduran authorities seized a refrigerated trailer truck which was being used to smuggle arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas. Approximately 100 M-16 rifles, some of which were traceable to Vietnam, along with a large cache of ammunition and mortar rounds, were discovered in the hollowed-out insulation on the top of the truck. The truck also contained extra sets of license plates from the Central American area as well as quantities of Communist propaganda materials.

*Right: View of truck from rear.*

*Below: View of truck from above.*





-7-

IX - ~~Secretaría General del PC~~

~~Ofrecimiento de Viet Nam~~ (5 de septiembre estarán en Esmeralda)

~~192~~ pistolas 9 mm.  
~~120~~ AR 15  
~~162~~ ametralladoras M 30  
~~36~~ " pesadas M60  
~~12~~ " M50 calibre 12.7  
~~6~~ morteros de 62 mm.  
~~12~~ morteros de 81 mm.  
~~2~~ lanzacohetes anti-tanque DKZ-57  
~~1000~~ cartuchos de 9 mm.  
~~100000~~ " de AR 15  
~~100000~~ " para ametralladora M 30  
~~100000~~ " " " M 60 (7.62)  
~~100000~~ ametralladora M 50 (12.7)  
~~100000~~ obuses para morteros de 61mm.  
~~10000~~ " " " 81 mm.  
~~10000~~ " " anti-tanques DKZ-57

~~Yugoslavia~~

60 Toneladas

~~150~~ subametralladoras Thompson con 300 cargadores.  
~~10000~~ fusiles M<sub>1</sub>  
~~10000~~ " M<sub>14</sub>  
~~100000~~ tiros calibre 45 para las Thompson  
~~100000~~ M<sub>1</sub>  
~~100000~~ M<sub>14</sub> con 200 cargadores.

Piezas de repuesto

El 15 de agosto salía este cargamento para Habana.

~~Bulgaria~~

~~1000~~ subametralladoras de fabricación alemana con 200.000  
tiros.

~~10~~ comet. calibre 30 con 50.000 tiros

~~100000~~ uniformes

~~10000~~ botiquines individuales para combatientes

Estos dos últimos rubros serán enviados cuando se le proporcione modelos.

~~Checoslovaquia~~

Enviarán armas checas. No pueden cambiar en occidentales.  
No precisaron cantidad en armas.

~~Hungaria~~

Radio-comunicadores de ondas cortas y ultra corta.

~~40~~ cortas y 12 ultracortas

~~100000~~ uniformes conforme modelos y talla que se envíen



switched from using U.S.-made weapons to those of Soviet and East European origin.)

The DRU representatives also meet with visiting Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) leader Yasir Arafat in Managua on July 22, 1980. Arafat promises military equipment, including arms and aircraft. (A Salvadoran guerrilla leader met with FATAH leaders in Beirut in August and November, and the PLO has trained selected Salvadorans in the Near East and in Nicaragua.)

On July 27, the guerrilla General Staff delegation departs from Managua for Havana, where Cuban "specialists" add final touches to the military plans formulated during the May meetings in Havana.

**Arms Deliveries Begin.** In mid-August 1980, Shafik Handal's arms-shopping expedition begins to bear fruit. On August 15, 1980, Ethiopian arms depart for Cuba. Three weeks later the 60 tons of captured U.S. arms sent from Vietnam are scheduled to arrive in Cuba.

As a result of a Salvadoran delegation's trip to Iraq earlier in the year, the guerrillas receive a \$500,000 logistics donation. The funds are distributed to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and within El Salvador.

By mid-September, substantial quantities of the arms promised to Handal are well on the way to Cuba and Nicaragua. The guerrilla logistics coordinator in Nicaragua informs his Joint General Staff on September 26 that 130 tons of arms and other military material supplied by the Communist countries have arrived in Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador. According to the captured documents, this represents one-sixth of the commitments to the guerrillas by the Communist countries. (NOTE: To get an idea of the magnitude of this commitment, the Vietnamese offer of only 60 tons included 2 million rifle and machinegun bullets, 14,500 mortar shells, 1,620 rifles, 210 machineguns, 48 mortars, 12 rocket launchers, and 192 pistols.)

In September and October, the number of flights to Nicaragua from Cuba increased sharply. These flights had the capacity to transport several hundred tons of cargo.

At the end of September, despite appeals from the guerrillas, the Sandinistas suspend their weapons deliveries to El Salvador for 1 month, after the U.S. Government lodges a protest to Nicaragua on the arms trafficking.

When the shipments resume in October, as much as 120 tons of weapons and materiel are still in Nicaragua and some 100-400 tons are in Cuba. Because of the difficulty of moving such large quantities

overland, Nicaragua—with Cuban support—begins airlifting arms from Nicaragua into El Salvador. In November, about 2.5 tons of arms are delivered by air before accidents force a brief halt in the airlift.

In December, Salvadoran guerrillas, encouraged by Cuba, begin plans for a general offensive in early 1981. To provide the increased support necessary, the Sandinistas revive the airlift into El Salvador. Salvadoran insurgents protest that they cannot absorb the increased flow of arms, but guerrilla liaison members in Managua urge them to increase their efforts as several East European nations are providing unprecedented assistance.

A revolutionary radio station—*Radio Liberacion*—operating in Nicaragua begins broadcasting to El Salvador on December 15, 1980. It exhorts the populace to mount a massive insurrection against the government. (References to the Sandinistas sharing the expenses of a revolutionary radio station appear in the captured documents.)

On January 24, 1981, a Cessna from Nicaragua crashes on takeoff in El Salvador after unloading passengers and possibly weapons. A second plane is strafed by the Salvadoran Air Force, and the pilot and numerous weapons are captured. The pilot admits to being an employee of the Nicaraguan national airline and concedes that the flight originated from Sandino International Airport in Managua. He further admits to flying two earlier arms deliveries.

Air supply is playing a key role, but infiltration by land and sea also continues. Small launches operating out of several Nicaraguan Pacific ports traverse the Gulf of Fonseca at night, carrying arms, ammunition, and personnel. During the general offensive on January 13, several dozen well-armed guerrillas landed on El Salvador's southeastern coast on the Gulf of Fonseca, adjacent to Nicaragua.

Overland arms shipments also continue through Honduras from Nicaragua and Costa Rica. In late January, Honduran security forces uncover an arms infiltration operation run by Salvadorans working through Nicaragua and directed by Cubans. In this operation, a trailer truck is discovered carrying weapons and ammunition destined for Salvadoran guerrillas. Weapons include 100 U.S. M-16 rifles and 81mm mortar ammunition. These arms are a portion of the Vietnamese shipment: A trace of the M-16s reveals that several of them were shipped to U.S. units in Vietnam where they were captured or left behind. Using this network, perhaps five truckloads of arms may have reached the Salvadoran guerrillas.

The availability of weapons and materiel significantly increases the military capabilities of the Salvadoran insurgents. While attacks raged throughout the country during the "general offensive" that began on January 10, it soon became clear that the DRU could not sustain the level of violence without suffering costly losses in personnel. By the end of January, DRU leaders apparently decided to avoid direct confrontation with government forces and reverted to sporadic guerrilla terrorist tactics that would reduce the possibility of suffering heavy casualties.

### III. The Government: The Search for Order and Democracy

Central America's smallest and most densely populated country is El Salvador. Since its independence in 1821, the country has experienced chronic political instability and repression, widespread poverty, and concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few families. Although considerable economic progress took place in the 1960s, the political system remained in the hands of a traditional economic elite backed by the military. During the 1970s, both the legitimate grievances of the poor and landless and the growing aspirations of the expanding middle classes met increasingly with repression. El Salvador has long been a violent country with political, economic, and personal disputes often resulting in murders.

**The Present Government.** Aware of the need for change and alarmed by the prospect of Nicaragua-like chaos, progressive Salvadoran military officers and civilians overthrew the authoritarian regime of General Carlos Humberto Romero in October 1979 and ousted nearly 100 conservative senior officers.

After an initial period of instability, the new government stabilized around a coalition that includes military participants in the October 1979 coup, the Christian Democratic Party, and independent civilians. Since March 1980, this coalition has begun broad social changes: conversion of large estates into peasant cooperatives, distribution of land to tenant farmers, and nationalization of foreign trade and banking.

Four Marxist-Leninist guerrilla groups are using violence and terrorism against the Salvadoran Government and its reforms. Three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties—including a Social Democratic Party—work with guerrilla organizations and their political fronts through the Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR), most of whose activities take place outside El Salvador.



The Government of El Salvador—headed since last December by Jose Napoleon Duarte, the respected Christian Democrat denied office by the military in the Presidential elections of 1972—faces armed opposition from the extreme right as well as from the left. Exploiting their traditional ties to the security forces and the tendency of some members of the security forces to abuse their authority, some wealthy Salvadorans affected by the Duarte government's reforms have sponsored terrorist activities against supporters of the agrarian and banking reforms and against the government itself.

A symbiotic relationship has developed between the terrorism practised by extremists of both left and right. Thousands have died without regard to class, creed, nationality, or politics. Brutal and still unexplained murders in December of four American churchwomen—and in January of two American trade unionists—added U.S. citizens to the toll of this tragic violence. The United States has made clear its interest in a complete investigation of these killings and the punishment of those responsible.

Despite bitter resistance from right and left, the Duarte government has stuck to its reform programs and has adopted emergency measures to ease the lot of the poor through public works, housing projects, and aid to marginal communities. On the political front, it has offered amnesty to its opponents, scheduled elections for a constituent assembly in 1982, and pledged to hand power over to a popularly elected government no later than mid-1983.

The government's pursuit of progress with order has been further hampered by the virtual breakdown of the law enforcement and judicial system and by the lack of an effective civil service.

The introduction of the reforms—some of which are now clearly irreversible—has reduced popular support for

those who argue that change can only come about through violence. Few Salvadorans participate in antigovernment demonstrations. Repeated calls by the guerrillas for general strikes in mid- and late 1980 went unheeded. The Duarte government, moreover, has made clear its willingness to negotiate the terms of future political processes with democratic members of all opposition forces—most notably, by accepting the offer of El Salvador's Council of Bishops to mediate between the government and the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

In sum, the Duarte government is working hard and with some success to deal with the serious political, social, and economic problems that most concern the people of El Salvador.

**U.S. Support.** In its commitment to reform and democracy, the Government of El Salvador has had the political support of the United States ever since the October 1979 revolution. Because we give primary emphasis to helping the people of El Salvador, most of our assistance has been economic. In 1980, the United States provided nearly \$56 million in aid, aimed at easing the conditions that underlie unrest and extremism. This assistance has helped create jobs, feed the hungry, improve health and housing and education, and support the reforms that are opening and modernizing El Salvador's economy. The United States will continue to work with the Salvadoran Government toward economic betterment, social justice, and peace.

Because the solution in El Salvador should be of the Salvadorans' own making and nonviolent, the United States has carefully limited its military support. In January, mounting evidence of Communist involvement compelled President Carter to authorize a resupply of weapons and ammunition to El Salvador—the first provision of lethal items since 1977.

#### IV. Some Conclusions

The foregoing record leaves little doubt that the Salvadoran insurgency has become the object of a large-scale commitment by Communist states outside Latin America.

- The political direction, organization, and arming of the insurgency is coordinated and heavily influenced by Cuba—with active support of the Soviet Union, East Germany, Vietnam, and other Communist states.

- The massing and delivery of arms to the Salvadoran guerrillas by those states must be judged against the fact that from 1977 until January 1981 the United States provided no weapons or ammunition to the Salvadoran Armed Forces.

- A major effort has been made to provide "cover" for this operation by supplying arms of Western manufacture and by supporting a front organization known as the Democratic Revolutionary Front to seek non-Communist political support through propaganda.

- Although some non-Communist states have also provided material support, the organization and delivery of this assistance, like the overwhelming mass of arms, are in the hands of Communist-controlled networks.

In short, over the past year, the insurgency in El Salvador has been progressively transformed into a textbook case of indirect armed aggression by Communist powers through Cuba. ■

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BEIRUT—Yasser Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, was quoted Tuesday as saying his group has sent pilots to Nicaragua and guerrilla fighters to El Salvador and Angola.

F: PLO - Lat. Am.

Thursday, July 26, 1979

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

## PLO hopes tie to Nicaragua will leave Israel out in cold

By Helena Cobban  
Special to The Christian Science Monitor

Damascus, Syria

Representatives of the new regime in Nicaragua have been visiting Libya and Algeria, and Arab officials are hoping the Sandinistas' victory could spark the erosion of Israel's traditionally warm relations with many Latin American countries.

One Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) official who has been in close contact over the past two years with the forces opposed to former Nicaraguan ruler Gen. Anastasio Somoza Debayle reports that he is confident the new Nicaraguan Government will break that country's diplomatic links with Israel.

The official quoted Sandinista military leader Eden Pastora ("Commandante Zero") as telling him back in March: "When I see one of Somoza's National Guardsmen, I feel I'm looking at an Israeli soldier. His clothes are Israeli, his arms are Israeli, and his training is Israeli. Therefore I have a spontaneous feeling that I am in the same trench as the Palestinians."

Israel became an important source of equipment for General Somoza's forces — particularly after the United States cut back on its military aid to Nicaragua because of General Somoza's poor human rights record.

The PLO official said he considered a move by the new Nicaraguan Government away from Israel would hurt the Jewish state by closing an important market for its military industries.

The political effects of such a break, the official said, would be no less grave for Israel. Nicaragua is one of the 12 South American countries that have maintained their embassies in Israel in Jerusalem rather than Tel Aviv — a mark of particular support for Israeli policies. And Nicaragua's voting record on Mideast issues at the United Nations over past decades consistently has followed the Israeli lead.

The PLO official, a fluent Spanish speaker who has studied in Latin American universi-

part of a trend throughout South America toward a more pro-Arab stance.

"Already Israel's relations with Costa Rica, another traditional friend, are deteriorating," he claimed.

He explained that he saw support for Israel eroding throughout Latin America, "because Israel has aligned itself with the most repressive and dictatorial regimes in the world — Somoza, South Africa, and General Pinochet's regime in Chile."

The Palestinian émigré community in Nicaragua has spawned two prominent leaders in the new revolutionary regime. Moisés Hassan Morales, whose father came originally from Gaza, was a key organizer of popular opposition to General Somoza, though he was not a Sandinista himself, and now is a member of the governing junta. Dr. Jacobo Freich, whose parents both are from Bethlehem, took charge of the opposition National Liberation Front's medical services.

The participation of American-educated Mr. Hassan in the new regime is considered particularly significant, since he is one of the key moderates whose presence is supposed to reassure the United States Government that post-Somoza Nicaragua will not rush to the extreme left.

His presence also could act as a public relations boost to the PLO, showing that though the PLO gives backing to third-world liberation movements, these need not always be of extremely radical hue.

The PLO source, speaking of PLO-Sandinista relations, affirmed the PLO had given "concrete material and political support" to the Sandinistas since 1977. "I don't think any decent human being could avoid taking a stand against the barbarism of Somoza," he explained.

The PLO official denied any knowledge of military aid flowing from the PLO to the Sandinistas. But in the last days of the Somoza regime, a shipment of arms was discovered aboard a plane supposedly flying medical supplies to Sandinista areas from Lebanon, and the plane was detained in Tunis, Tunisia.