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1	MEMO	KEN STRIBLING TO BLACKWELL RE PHONE CALL	1	7/7/1983	B6

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: MARY ANN MELOY

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell

SUBJECT: Thank You Letters

Enclosed are the thank you letters for Faith's signature. Inasmuch as she wants them promptly after the Outreach Meetings, I would appreciate your forwarding them to her at your earliest convenience.

MCB:jet

Enclosures a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1983

Dear Secretary Orr:

Thank you so much for agreeing to participate as a speaker for our White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. The information you provided was simply outstanding and I could tell from the audience reaction that they were most appreciative. Because I was sitting behind you, you couldn't see me taking notes as rapidly as possible and believe me, I will put the facts and figures you gave us to good use!

I have already heard a number of comments regarding your frankness in starting out your remarks by saying you were not an expert on Central America. However, by the time you had concluded your remarks, I can assure you that you could have fooled anyone.

I appreciated your personal observation that whereas you had spoken all around the country on the threat posed by the expanding Soviet space technology, heretofore you had not spoken on the Soviet/Cuban threat in Central America and believed that every Administration spokesman should make a speech on Central America a well-used part of his/her repertoire. I heartily concur with that statement!

I must warn you, however, that there is a major problem with giving such an outstanding talk -- you will be asked to do it again. I hope we can call on you at another time to assist in our effort to explain the Administration's policies on Central America.

Sincerely,

Faith Ryan Whittlesey
Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

The Honorable Verne Orr
Secretary of the Air Force
Suite 4E-871, The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20330

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1983

Dear Senor Calero:

Thank you so much for sharing your experiences and observations with the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. It is so meaningful to have you as one of our speakers and I sincerely appreciate your willingness to address our group.

As I am sure you can appreciate, it is not possible for someone who has not been so personally effected by Soviet-Cuban communism to give the same dimension to the situation in Central America as you. As an American, it concerns me deeply to hear you speak of Nicaragua as a "Soviet satellite." You said it with such finality. Hopefully, with your efforts and those of the other Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters, your country will be able to free itself from the shackles of communist oppression.

Sincerely,

Faith Ryan Whittlesey
Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

Senor Adolfo Calero
Director
Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense
11554 S.W. 109th Road
Miami, Florida 33176

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell
SUBJECT: Transcript of Vernon Walters Speech

Attached is a copy of the transcript of Ambassador Vernon Walters' remarks before the White House Outreach Working Group on Central America. Ambassador Walters has already edited the transcript and the attached is the copy edited and approved for release by Ambassador Walters.

We will have sufficient copies made to distribute at our Wednesday meeting.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MCB*
SUBJECT: Replacement for Richard Vigilante

I've given some thought to the matter of replacing Richard Vigilante and have concluded that some different structural arrangement is needed.

Good organizational structure requires that a staffer report through a single person. Richard came expecting to work through me, primarily to write on Central America. For the Outreach Working Group, he was excellent, particularly at the difficult process of quickly and diplomatically dealing with changes requested by the complex clearance system. The Bible (Matthew 6:24) wisely points out "No man can serve two masters." The rest of that sentence was also amply borne out.

I suggest that any of the following arrangements should be adopted:

1. Assign Richard's replacement to report to me and hold me accountable for such speech writing as he/she is required to do.
2. Assign the replacement to report to Mary Ann and hold her accountable for the White House Digest papers. This would require her to take an active role on Central America.
3. Totally split the functions of the Central American writer and the speech writer, getting different people for each responsibility.

In any case, we should move quickly because the Central American writing must be continued.

MCB:jet

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: NANCY RISQUE

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MB*

SUBJECT: July 27th Briefing for Outreach Working
Group on Central America

Thank you very much for clearing invitations to Congressman Mark Siljander and Congressman Vin Weber to address our meeting at 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 27th.

It occurred to me that it might be helpful if, as we introduced the Congressmen to those present that we mention that a number of the regular participants in these briefings specifically requested that we get Congressmen Siljander and Weber to come discuss their activities regarding Central America. We will do it that way unless you suggest otherwise.

Thank you for your cooperation.

MCB:jet

cc: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell. *MM*

SUBJECT: National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

There is little wrong with the Executive Order. It is a good idea to preempt Congressional action on the Jackson-Mathias proposal. There is, of course, no possibility of a national consensus on U.S. policy for the region. Too many organized elements want a Marxist victory there.

The predicted appointment of Henry Kissinger as chairman, however, would be a disaster for our efforts to generate grassroots support for the President's policy in Central America.

This morning, one conservative leader very supportive until now of the President's Central American policy said he had no intention of working for a policy crafted by Kissinger. Paul Weyrich described Kissinger as "a mortician of U.S. national interests. He applies cosmetics and then buries them."

A Kissinger appointment would tend to dry up contributors to favorable grassroots lobbying appeals. It was the conservative grassroots, after all, who roared their approval when candidate Reagan in 1976 promised a new Secretary of State. A Kissinger appointment would display a lack of understanding of the nature of the President's constituency. We would lose a lot of badly needed support.

MCB:jet

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell, *MCB*
SUBJECT: Agenda for Outreach Working Group Meeting,
Wednesday, July 27, 1983

The attached Agenda presumes that the President is confirmed for 11:15 a.m. on Wednesday, July 20th.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

OUTREACH WORKING GROUP ON CENTRAL AMERICA

Meeting of:
Wednesday, July 20, 1983
10:00 a.m.
Room #450 - OEOB

A G E N D A

- 10:00 a.m. Announcements of Upcoming Activities
- 10:15 a.m. Speaker - Rabbi Morton Rosenthal,
Anti-Defamation League
"Persecution of Jewish People in
Central America"
- 10:30 a.m. Speaker: Mr. Isaac Stavisky, a
Nicaraguan Jewish Refugee
"The Sandinistas Against
the Jews"
- 10:50 a.m. Speaker - Ms. Jacqueline Tillman,
Executive Assistant to
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick
"PLO and Libyan Activities in
Central America"
- 11:15 a.m. THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
(Brief Remarks)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MB*
SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal for Vice President

It is important that this be expedited.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

July 15, 1983

TO: JENNIFER FITZGERALD
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: Attend reception in conjunction with
July 19th "Conference on Democracy for
Nicaragua."

PURPOSE: To emphasize Administration concerns with
regard to Nicaragua and U.S. security.

BACKGROUND: The fourth anniversary of the Sandinista
takeover in Nicaragua will occur on
July 19, 1983. The Ad Hoc Committee on
Democracy for Nicaragua will hold a major
conference in Washington on this day to
point out the results of four years of
Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, and to spot-
light the betrayal of the promise of
democracy that brought them to power. Many
respected Nicaraguan leaders and heads of
organizations will be participants in the
conference (see listing attached). The
conference will also feature a segment on
the role of the Sandinistas in the de-
stabilization efforts toward Nicaragua's
neighbors.

The Conference will be opened by Senator
Henry M. Jackson; Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick will be the luncheon speaker.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: July 19, 1983, 6:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m.

DURATION: Five minutes.

LOCATION: Washington, D.C. Dirksen Senate Office
Building, Room #106.

PARTICIPANTS: The reception will be attended by conference
participants (150-200).

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Vice President makes informal remarks
stressing the importance of democracy in
Nicaragua.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Informal
MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press.
RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey
OPPOSED BY:
PROJECT OFFICER: Morton C. Blackwell

1 Attachment: Listing

SELECTED LISTING OF PARTICIPANTS

- Humberto Belli - Former editorial page editor of La Prensa, the respected independent newspaper. An expert on Nicaraguan religious matters.
- Frank Bendana - A charismatic and respected leader of the private sector organization (COSEP). Bendana took over the leadership of the organization when the Sandinistas killed Jorge Salazar. Bendana was forced into exile two months after taking over the leadership of COSEP.
- Adolfo Calero - Businessman. Member of the Political Directorate of the Anti-Sandinista group (FDN) operating in northern Nicaragua.
- Gonzalo Fascio - A distinguished past Foreign Minister of Costa Rica who has been a vocal and active opponent of Sandinista attempts to subvert Costa Rica.
- Alejandro Bolanos Gayer - Respected Nicaraguan historian.
- Jose Esteban Gonzalez - Former head of Nicaraguan human rights organization. When he began "blowing the whistle" on the Sandinistas, they jailed him, and forced him into exile.
- Odanel Ortega Mendoza - Formerly with the CUS, an affiliated labor organization of the AFL-CIO. He has been forced into exile.
- Wilfredo Montavan - Head of the Social Democratic Party in Nicaragua; tried to accommodate Sandinismo, got disgusted and left the country.
- Stedman Fagoth Mueller - Leader of the Miskito Indians.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

July 7, 1983

TO: JENNIFER FITZGERALD
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: Address to the July 19 "Conference on Nicaragua"

PURPOSE: To speak on Administration concerns with regard to Nicaragua and U.S. security.

BACKGROUND: The fourth anniversary of the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua will be on July 19, 1983. The Ad Hoc Committee on Democracy in Nicaragua will on this day hold a major conference in Washington to point out the results of four years of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, and to spotlight the betrayal of the promise of democracy that brought them to power. Many respected Nicaraguan leaders and heads of organizations will be participants in the conference. The conference will also feature a segment on the role of the Sandinistas in the destabilization efforts toward Nicaragua's neighbors.

The Vice President will address the luncheon session of the conference. Senator Henry Jackson will also speak at this session.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: July 19, 1983, 12:30 p.m.

DURATION: Twenty minutes.

LOCATION: Washington D.C., Dirksen Senate Office Building Room 106.

PARTICIPANTS: The luncheon will be attended by participants in the conference.

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Vice President gives address to conference participants.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Address.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Full press.

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

OPPOSED BY:

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

July 7, 1983

TO: FRED RYAN, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

REQUEST: Meeting with several Nicaraguans that are participants in the July 19 "Conference on Nicaragua".

PURPOSE: To discuss matters of mutual concern involving Nicaragua.

BACKGROUND: The fourth anniversary of the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua will be on July 19, 1983. The Ad Hoc Committee on Democracy in Nicaragua will on this day hold a major conference in Washington to point out the results of four years of Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, and to spotlight the betrayal of the promise of democracy that brought them to power. Many respected Nicaraguan leaders and heads of organizations will be participants in the conference. The conference will also feature a segment on the role of the Sandinistas in the destabilization efforts toward Nicaragua's neighbors.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: July 20, 1983, time flexible.

DURATION: Fifteen to thirty minutes.

LOCATION: White House.

PARTICIPANTS: (see attached list)

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: President makes brief remarks highlighting his concern for Nicaragua, entertains brief response from the participants.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks.

MEDIA COVERAGE: None.

RECOMMENDED BY: Faith Ryan Whittlesey.

OPPOSED BY:

PROJECT OFFICER: Morton Blackwell

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: Second White House Digest Paper

Yes, we want to release this as a White House Digest paper at our Working Group meeting with supportive outside groups, at 2:30 p.m. on Wednesday, July 6. I am relying on you to get the material to Mike Baroody at the Communications Office so that he can have it printed up by the time of our meeting.

Attached is a copy of the current text you sent me. We have obtained better copies of the graphs and map. So the retyped paper should include these illustrations at the appropriate places.

Thank you very much for processing this.

On another item, I am hopeful that the piece entitled, "Central America: Facts Not Widely Known" which we gave you last week has also been cleared and could be printed up for distribution at the same meeting.


1 Attachment a/s

cc: Michael E. Baroody

SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA




RADIUS OF ACTION FOR MIG AIRCRAFT STATIONED IN CUBA, NICARAGUA AND GRENADA



SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA (\$ IN MILLIONS)

MILLIONS OF
U.S. DOLLARS
1000
(1B)



38
JUN 22 PM 9:25
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM:

ROBERT M. KIMMITT 

SUBJECT:

Second White House Digest Paper

Attached herewith is an edited version of the proposed second White House Digest paper on Central America. The editings have been made on the original text. It has been concurred in by the NSC staff, State and CIA for factual accuracy.

Attachment

Tab I White House Digest paper

cc: Adm. Poindexter

Soviet/Cuban Threat and Buildup in the Caribbean

Since 1978 we have seen an ever increasing Soviet presence in the Caribbean Region. The USSR through its surrogate--Cuba--has been able to establish a permanent presence in the Western Hemisphere.

The Characteristics of the Soviet/Cuban Build-up: Men, Money, Material


- The Soviet Union maintains and reinforces its presence by:
 - Deploying its long range Bear reconnaissance and anti-submarine warfare aircraft to the region on a regular basis.
 - Deploying its naval combatants for joint training exercises with Cuba.
 - Providing a Soviet Brigade of approximately 3,000 men stationed near Havana and an additional presence of 2,500 military advisors.
 - Providing Cuba with 8,000 civilian advisors.
 - Maintaining the largest intelligence monitoring/telecommunications facility outside the USSR.
- In 1982, the Soviets and Cubans had 50 times as many military advisors in Latin America as did the US. Last year the Soviets increased their military advisors in Cuba by 500.
- The USSR has also provided a steady stream of military equipment to Cuba. In 1981 alone, Moscow provided 66,000 metric tons in military assistance valued at \$600 million. Deliveries in 1982 exceeded 1981 by 2,000 metric tons and amounted to over \$1 billion in military assistance in the last two years.
- Cuban armed forces have grown to a size disproportionate for defensive needs:
 - Cuba possesses an Army of over 225,000; a Navy of 11,000 and air defense forces of 16,000, not including 500 thousand paramilitary troops.
 - Cubans have well over 200 MIG fighter aircraft.
 - Castro has about 65,000 Cubans serving overseas: 40,000 military (25,000 troops in Angola, about 12,000 in Ethiopia) and 25,000 civilian technicians.
 - Cuba has 2.3% of its population in the regular armed forces, one of every 20 Cubans participates in some security mission.
- Moscow underwrites the activities of its Cuban surrogate at a cost exceeding \$4 billion annually (1/4 of Cuba's GNP) and supports efforts to collect funds, arms, and supplies from the communist bloc for guerrilla activities in Central America and the Caribbean.

- The number of Soviet Bloc academic grants offered annually to Latin American students jumped from 400 in the 1960's to about 7,000 now. In 1979 Moscow admitted to sponsoring 7,000 Cubans for studies in the Soviet Union. Last year 700 Nicaraguans were reported studying there and an additional 300 scholarships were being provided. Scholarships include free room, board, tuition, transportation, medical care and a small stipend.

- About 3,000 Latin American students, including 1,600 Nicaraguans, are studying in Cuba. Cuba has constructed 17 schools for foreigners, each costing about \$2 million to build and about \$600,000 to operate annually.

SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO CUBA

THOUSANDS
OF TONS



Spreading Soviet/Cuban Intervention Throughout The Region

- The implication of the Soviet/Cuban buildup is that it provides a platform for spreading subversion and supporting guerrillas throughout the region.

- It was Cuba that acted as the catalyst to organize and unify the far-left groups in El Salvador, assisted in developing military strategy, and encouraged the guerrillas to launch the ill-fated "final" offensive in January 1981. Cuba continues to be vital in training and supporting continuing offensives in El Salvador by funneling weapons and supplies via Nicaragua to rebel forces in El Salvador.


- Castro is actively engaged in converting Nicaragua into another Cuba. There are approximately 5,500 Cuban civilian advisors and about 1,750 Cuban military and security advisors in Nicaragua.

- The Sandinistas themselves have about 75,000 men under arms in their active armed forces, reserves, militia, police and security forces. At its present strength, the Sandinista Army represents the largest military force in the history of Central America. The Sandinistas have built 36 new military garrisons since Somoza's downfall.

- Approximately 70 Nicaraguans were sent to Bulgaria for training as pilots and mechanics. Existing landing strips in Nicaragua are being lengthened and will be able to accommodate the most sophisticated Soviet jet aircraft. MIGs could be flown in quickly from Cuba.

- In Grenada, which has a strategic location in the eastern Caribbean, we are concerned because the Soviets and Cubans are constructing facilities, including an airfield, the eventual use of which is unknown.

- In Suriname, the Cuban Ambassador is a senior intelligence officer who was formerly Chief of the Caribbean Section of the Americas Department of the Cuban Communist Party. The Americas department is responsible for Cuban covert activities, and is much more important in formulating Cuban policy toward Latin America than is the Cuban Foreign Ministry. The Cuban Ambassador maintains a very close relationship with LTC Desire Bouterse, Suriname's military leader, and has continuous access to key leaders.




The Threat Posed by Soviet Expansionism

- Such communist expansion could lead to an extensive and permanent Soviet presence and an increased Soviet strategic capability in the region. This would create significant military consequences for the US:
- It could place hostile forces and weapons systems within striking distance of targets in the US.
- It could provide bases for use in covert operations against the US and our neighbors.
- It could provide for prepositioning of Soviet equipment, supplies and ammunition in our hemisphere.
- It could allow the Soviet Pacific and Atlantic fleets to operate near our shores without having to return to the USSR for maintenance.
- It could threaten our Caribbean Sea Lines of Communication through which a large volume of our goods pass; thus endangering the economic well-being of our nation.
- And finally, it could cause the US to divert scarce resources in manpower and materiel from other areas of the world to protect an area previously considered militarily secure.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO LATIN AMERICA (\$ IN MILLIONS)

MILLIONS OF
U.S. DOLLARS

1000
(10)



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Ronald Reagan Library

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WHITE HOUSE OUTREACH WORKING GROUP ON
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1 MEMO

1 7/7/1983 B6

KEN STRIBLING TO BLACKWELL RE PHONE
CALL

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON
July 6, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

FROM: Richard Vigilante

SUBJECT: Op-ed Piece *John V. L.*

For what this is trying to do, I thought the simple, personal style appealing and made only minimal changes. Great for your hometown paper -- good for others.

I will do a version to which the Post might be more receptive.

1 Attachment a/s

DRAFT OP-ED FOR FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY

I have long believed that analyzing public opinion is a complicated and subtle art, and that one should treat sweeping generalizations about what that public "really" thinks with care and circumspection. Nevertheless, as a result of my experience since coming to the White House in March, I would like to offer a sweeping generalization of my own. The American public, I am firmly persuaded, is very poorly informed about the policy its government is pursuing in Central America.

This conclusion results from the contacts which my office has had with scores of private groups about our Central American policy. My job is to help explain the President's policy to the American people -- a task which, on the face of it, does not appear too difficult. Yet, time and again, I have discovered that people entertain the most serious misconceptions about what the United States is doing in Central America.

Take the most frequent objection to U.S. policy: the Reagan Administration, we are repeatedly told, is concentrating too heavily on a military solution to the conflict in El Salvador; it should recognize that the problems in that country have deep rooted social causes, and adjust its assistance programs accordingly. Whenever someone confronts

me with this particular insight, I reply that three-quarters of our assistance to El Salvador is, in fact, economic in character, designed to help solve precisely those deep seated social problems that our critics keep pointing to. The almost invariable response is revealing: "Oh, I didn't know that."

Again, critics often say that the United States is "on the wrong side of history" (whatever that pretentious phrase means) in El Salvador. We should, it is argued, be on the side of reform in that country. When I respond to such criticisms by pointing out that the United States does indeed support reform, including the most important reform -- nurturing a fledgling democracy -- the usual reaction is one of incredulity: "Then why hasn't the President said that we favor democratic change?" I'm asked over and over again.

In fact, President Reagan has repeatedly stressed this country's commitment to democratic reform throughout Central America. In his address to a Joint Session of Congress on April 27th, the President summarized the four goals which we are pursuing in that region. "First," he said, "in response to decades of inequity and indifference, we will support democracy, reform, and human freedom." The three other goals cited by the President were support for economic development, security assistance, and "dialogue and negotiations -- both among the countries of the region and within each country."

The question of U.S. support for negotiations in El Salvador is another topic that frequently comes up in

criticism from private groups. By now, I shouldn't be too surprised at the problem: hardly anyone I speak to (outside of the U.S. government) seems to realize that the government of El Salvador has already offered to negotiate with the guerrillas' political front, the FDR, over the FDR's participation in El Salvador's forthcoming elections. That offer, after all, was not given very wide play in the American press. (The Salvadoran government's decision to grant amnesty to 500 Salvadorians who had been interned as a result of the conflict has been similarly ignored.

Still, I am more than a little taken aback when people demand to know why the Reagan Administration doesn't favor negotiations in El Salvador. When I tell them that we do favor negotiations over the terms and conditions of participation in elections, and that the President himself said so before a Joint Session of Congress, an awful lot of people seem genuinely surprised.

I am willing to grant that the situation in El Salvador, and indeed throughout Central America, is unusually complex. Although I firmly believe that the best way of protecting human rights in El Salvador is by empowering the people through free elections, it is nevertheless clear that honorable men and women can have serious disagreements over what should be done there. But what I can neither understand nor forgive is the apparent unwillingness of a good many of the Reagan Administration's critics to inform themselves about our policy. Perhaps if they did so, a clearer consensus

for promoting democracy and development while resisting guerrilla violence would emerge, and the policy debate would be more productive.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell
SUBJECT: Request for the Services of Constantine Menges

I have prepared the attached memorandum for your signature in coordination with Constantine Menges.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 30, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO WILLIAM J. CASEY,
Director
Central Intelligence Agency

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey,
Assistant to the President
for Public Liaison

SUBJECT: Dr. Constantine G. Menges

I would like to request the services of Dr. Constantine G. Menges, of your Agency, on an "as needed" basis to present selective unclassified briefings to public groups sponsored by the White House Office of Public Liaison in support of the President's policy on Central America. Dr. Menges already serves as an ad hoc member of our public Outreach Working Group where his participation has been splendidly helpful.

I do not envision an inordinate demand on Dr. Menges' time should you agree to this request.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: FAITH RYAN WHITTLESEY
THROUGH: Jonathan Vipond, III
FROM: Morton C. Blackwell
SUBJECT: Memorandum to Jim Baker, III

I suggest that you send the attached to Jim Baker.

MCB:jet

1 Attachment a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: Faith Ryan Whittlesey

SUBJECT: Proposed Telephone Call to Melvin Laird

At our meeting of the Outreach Working Group on Central America, June 27, we learned that Ambassador Middendorf had contacted a writer for the Readers' Digest to suggest they publish a story on Miguel Bolanos Hunter, the Sandinista defector who was the subject of a recent Washington Post story, copy attached.

The reporter came back to Ambassador Middendorf with a negative. He said his editors felt the Washington Post story adequately covered the matter.

We know that the Post story only touched the surface of the information which Bolanos is prepared to share with the American people. We are having him speak to our Working Group and outside guests at our June 29th meeting, 2:30 p.m. in the Indian Treaty Room.

The Working Group strongly believes that it would be helpful for you or Ed Meese to telephone Mel Laird at the Readers' Digest. Laird would be likely to understand the import and the newsworthiness of Bolanos' story. He can speak authoritatively about Soviet and Cuban influences, Marxist-Leninist disinformation about Central America and the increasing stranglehold the Sandinistas are applying to Nicaragua's society. If you approve of this idea, you could reach Mel Laird in Washington at: 223-1642.

1 Enclosure a/s

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO KARNA SMALL

FROM: Morton C. Blackwell *MB*
SUBJECT: Briefing for Friendly Media

Pursuant to our discussion this morning, our Outreach Working Group would like to work with the Communications Office in handling an in-depth briefing on Central America for friendly columnists, reporters, and editors.

The time is not set, but should be a couple of weeks from now. Since the President's "Certification Date" on human rights progress in El Salvador is July 22nd, we can expect that there will be a massive left-wing media effort in the two weeks preceding.

We would have the briefing opened by Judge Clark or Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and have reasonably high level briefers such as the following:

Nestor Sanchez, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of Defense speaking on the "Military Situation in Central America"

Roger Fontaine, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council speaking on "Developments Inside El Salvador"

Dr. Constantine C. Menges, National Intelligence Officer of the Central Intelligence Agency speaking on "Soviet and Cuban Activities in Central America"

Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs speaking on "Where the Refugee Problem is Headed"

Ambassador Richard Stone or Otto Reich, Assistant Administrator, Bureau of Latin America and the Caribbean, Agency for International Development to speak on "American Policy in Central America."

Very often friendly people in the media have told us that they have a lack of authoritative fresh information regarding Central America. The left has its own channels of communication, our media friends tell us they need some help in getting the facts they need to be supportive of the President.

Dolf Droge, who is now putting together briefings for our Outreach Working Group on Central America would be in charge of assembling the program. If you agree, the Communications Office would issue the invitations to the appropriate people.

MCB:jet

cc: Faith Ryan Whittlesey