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Collection Name KOJELIS, LINAS J.: FILES

Withdrawer

JMN 11/19/2018

File Folder ICELAND MEETING 10/16/1986 (2)

FOIA

F05-0006/03

Box Number 18283

JOHANNESSEN

8

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	4	10/6/1986	B6
2	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	1	ND	B6
3	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	1	ND	B6
4	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	1	10/5/1986	B6
5	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	1	ND	B6
6	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	1	ND	B6
7	LIST	ATTENDEES/SSN	2	ND	B6

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 3, 1986

STATEMENT BY THE
PRINCIPAL DEPUTY PRESS SECRETARY

The U.S. approaches the Iceland meetings with a deep sense of serious purpose. Our goal in Iceland is to narrow the differences that separate the United States and the Soviet Union. The President believes that face-to-face private discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev are the best way to seek progress at this critical juncture in our relationship. The President's goal is that both sides will gain a better understanding of each other's position at this time and move forward toward a summit in the United States. We will be satisfied with the Iceland meetings if we accomplish better understanding.

Arms control is important to both nations, indeed, to the world. We will be diligent in our efforts to seek a common ground that can provide the basis for progress at Geneva. But our agenda is broader than arms control. On regional issues, the tensions in Afghanistan, Africa, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia contribute to tensions between the two superpowers and build mistrust that makes an arms buildup a dangerous fact of life in today's world. Elimination of regional tensions will go to the cause of mistrust between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

On human rights, as Americans we share with freedom-loving people everywhere a deep concern over human rights on a worldwide basis and human rights in the Soviet Union is a major cause of concern to the President.

Bilateral relations -- improving government-to-government and people-to-people exchanges -- in the fields of arts, education and science can improve understanding among the citizens and contribute to the cause of peace.

The President believes that this is not the time for public rhetoric but, instead, for private talk. The President goes to Iceland with a continuing commitment to seeking understanding that hopefully can lead to agreements that will benefit both the United States and the Soviet Union.

#

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Keeping America Strong



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by President Reagan to supporters of the Administration's defense policies in the Roosevelt Room of the White House, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1986.

Thank you all for coming here to the Roosevelt Room this morning. This room, of course, was named for two great Presidents, one a Republican, the other a Democrat. Both understood the vital importance of keeping America strong—something I know everyone in this room understands. Let me say how grateful all Americans are for the contributions that you and your organizations have made to building a stronger America.

Restoring America's strength has been one of our Administration's highest goals. When we took office, we found that we had ships that couldn't leave port, planes that couldn't fly—both for lack of trained men and women and adequate supplies of spare parts. We found that for years the United States sat on its hands while the Soviet Union engaged in a military buildup, the likes of which the world had never seen. The American nuclear deterrent, upon which world peace depends, had been allowed to slide toward obsolescence. And across the earth, Soviet-sponsored regimes had been imposed in countries as diverse as Angola, Afghanistan, and Nicaragua.

In the last 5½ years, we've begun to turn that desperate situation around. We've restored the morale, the training, and the equipment of our armed forces. And let me just say that around the world and here at home, I've met many of our young men and women in uniform over the last several years. It does something to you when you're standing

up there on the demilitarized zone in Korea and a young fellow standing there in uniform says, "Sir, we're on the frontier of freedom." Everyone who works with them will confirm what I've said about them, and those serving today are the best darn bunch who've ever served our country. I'm proud of all of them.

In the last 5½ years, we've begun the necessary modernization of our nuclear deterrent. We've begun research on strategic defense, the one great hope that we might some day rid the world of the prison of mutual nuclear terror. As I told the UN General Assembly yesterday, we're prepared right now to enter an agreement with the Soviet Union on research, development, testing, and deployment of strategic defense.

In pursuit of a safer world, we're determined to move toward a future of greater and greater reliance on strategic defense. The only question for the Soviets is, do we move toward strategic defense together or alone?

In the last 5½ years, America has also taken a stand with embattled defenders of freedom around the world. In Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Nicaragua, we've said that we stand with those who would turn back the night of totalitarian tyranny. And in this I wish I could say that we had united backing in the Congress. But, you know, the truth is different, particularly regarding our support of freedom fighters in this hemisphere. Even though both Houses of Congress have approved critically needed military assistance for the freedom fighters, this bill has been deliberately stalled on Capitol Hill. Freedom fighters will pay with their

lives for this politics of obstructionism. We're determined to bring their barricades down, to let the light of hope through to the Nicaraguan people—and we will.

But, all in all, in the last 5½ years, we've come a long way. You saw this when Mr. Gorbachev and I met in Geneva last November. As I said yesterday at the United Nations, despite differences, we resolved at that meeting to work together for real reductions in nuclear arms as well as progress in other areas. The Soviets are still relentless adversaries, as their totally unwarranted arrest of an innocent American reporter 3 weeks ago demonstrates—an action which jeopardizes all areas of our relationship. But at the arms reduction table, they now appear to treat meetings as more than just another propaganda forum. This, I believe, is because of the new will the United States has shown for the last 5½ years. The Soviets have been convinced that we're serious about rebuilding our strength.

But all this progress has now been placed in jeopardy by actions taken in the House of Representatives, actions just as serious as the attempt to block aid to the freedom fighters. If permitted to stand, these actions would pull the rug out from under our arms negotiators in Geneva and imperil our national security. The House voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research—an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table

in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II [strategic arms limitation talks], a treaty that couldn't be ratified, and that would've expired by now if it had been ratified, and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House would prohibit essentially all testing of nuclear weapons. Well, all of this is bad for our national security and for arms reduction talks. And if the defense budget arrives on my desk looking anything like that, I'll veto it.

All of these issues [applause]—thank you. You make vetoing even more pleasant than I find it. [Laughter.] But all of these issues are important. Each House action undermines our peace and security. But I'd like to use my time today—what's left of it—to discuss one area that I touched on yesterday that I believe needs more attention. With the Soviets orchestrating a major propaganda campaign to get us to declare a moratorium on nuclear testing, it's time to set the record straight on why we need that test. There are four important reasons.

First, nuclear testing is essential to guarantee that our weapons—the key to deterring nuclear aggression—actually work. We insist on the most rigorous field tests for non-nuclear weapons like airplanes, tanks, and guns, but nuclear weapons are far more complex, and they, too, must be tested. Some time ago, for example, we found that the safety on the warhead for the Polaris missile wouldn't release. Without the testing that helped us fix that, most of our sea-based deterrent would have been ineffective.

Without testing, we couldn't reduce the size and improve the effectiveness of our warheads and make them safer, as we have. So until we can negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons with the Soviets, we must have tests to make sure that our deterrent works and that it's safe.

Second, we use nuclear tests to design non-nuclear weapons and equipment—for example, satellites, ships, tanks, and sensors—so that they can better withstand a Soviet nuclear attack. This increases the chances that our military can survive and still fight, which reduces the Soviet incentive to attack us and our allies in the first place.

Third, testing helps us keep ahead of Soviet efforts, including non-nuclear efforts, to neutralize our deterrent. Several years ago, improved Soviet air defenses threatened to make our B-52s obsolete, so we began the production of the B-1, which can get through those defenses. But some weapons designed for the old B-52s weren't reliable at the altitudes and speeds that the B-1 flies. So testing was essential to developing weapons with a proven reliability.

And, fourth, testing ensures that the Soviets won't surprise us with breakthroughs that might alter the strategic balance. The Soviets have raced for years to modernize and expand their weapons systems. We're still playing catchup, and this imbalance is a threat to world peace. It'd be an even greater threat if the Soviets scored major breakthroughs.

Even if we were to agree to a moratorium or a test ban, we cannot be sure the Soviets would honor it or that it could be verified. In the early 1960s the Soviets broke out of a 3-year moratorium that they had agreed to with the most intensive series of nuclear tests in history. They had been planning all during the moratorium for the testing they were going to do, and when they were ready, they just violated the moratorium.

We, on the other hand, had abated, and so it took us more than a year to restore our testing facilities to their condition before the moratorium so we could begin to try and catch up.

Any agreement to limit testing must be verifiable. We've made a number of proposals to improve verification of current treaties. The Soviets should accept these proposals or make one of their own and stop playing propaganda games.

Our highest arms control priority is to get the Soviets to agree to deep arms reductions in the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. Soviet emphasis on the testing issue is a diversion from this urgent task. The House's ban on testing, on the other hand, is a back door to a nuclear freeze, which would make arms reductions almost impossible. Some Congressmen seem to believe that peace and American weakness mean the same thing. Didn't it ever occur to anyone what the Soviets must be thinking? They're thinking: if we wait long enough, they'll do our work for us.

So this is what we're up against and why I'm so grateful to all of you for what you are doing. Now I don't dare look at the gentleman sitting right over here, because I've been telling a story the last couple of days in some speeches that I like to tell that illustrates the attitude of those in Congress that are bringing this about.

It has to do with three fellows that came out to get in their car and found they'd locked themselves out. And one of them said, "Get a wire coat hanger, and we can straighten it out and manage to get in." And the other one says, "We can't do that. Somebody would think we're stealing the car." And the third one said, "Well, we'd better do something pretty quick. It's starting to rain and the top's down." ■

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: JUDY MANDEL, NSC
CARL ANDERSON, OPL
MAX GREEN, OPL

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS *LK* x6573

SUBJECT: Presidential Meeting with Human Rights
Leaders, October 7, 1986, 3:30 p.m.

Attached, for your review and comment is a draft of the briefing paper for tomorrow's meeting. Please provide your comments and suggestions to me by noon today.

cc: Walt Raymond, NSC
John Lenczowski, NSC
Paula Dobriansky, NSC

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 4, 1986

MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

October 6, 1986

Room 450 EOB

3:30 p.m.

FROM: Mari Maseng

I. PURPOSE

To advise U.S. human and religious rights leaders on your goals for the Iceland meeting with Mr. Gorbachev.

II. BACKGROUND

Our goal for the meeting between you and Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland, just as it was last November, is to promote a broad, four part agenda; arms control, regional conflicts, bilateral issues and human rights. The Soviets, on the other hand, wish to turn these meetings exclusively into arms control forums. We have invited representatives of groups which have worked for human rights and religious freedom in the U.S.S.R. to provide you an opportunity to clarify your goals at the Iceland meeting on human rights issues. The meeting will also signal the American public and the Soviet leadership that we are committed to raising the human rights issue, as part of our broad agenda, in Iceland.

III. PARTICIPANTS : Tab A

IV. PRESS PLAN: Wire service photographers only

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

You will escort Yuri Orlov from the Oval Office to the Cabinet Room, take your place at the table, make opening remarks and then open to Q&A. After the meeting, you will shake hands and pose for photographs with guests as they depart.

Attachments: Tab A -- Participants
Tab B -- Talking points

Coordination: NSC (J. Mandel)

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Participants

U.S. Government

Pat Buchanan
Peter Rodman, (Title)
Richardr Schifter, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights
Jack Mattlock, (Title)
Mari Maseng, Director, Office of Public Liaison
Linus Kojelis, Special Assistant for Public Liaison
Carl Anderson, Special Assistant for Public Liaison
Max Green, Associate Director, Office of Public Liaison
Judit Mandel, (Title)

Human and Religious Rights Representatives

Moris Abram, President of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Robert Blut, Past President of the United Jewish Appeals and Co-Chairman of the Campaign to the Summit
Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Director of Conference of President of Major Jewish Organizations
Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Bishop Pranas Baltakis, Bishop of Lithuanian Catholics in America
Metropolitan Stephen Sulyk, Head of Ukrainian Catholics in America
Juhan Simonson, President, Estonian American National Council
Aristides Lambergs, President, American Latvian Association
Ignatius Billinsky, President, Ukrainian Congress Committee of America
Dr. Ernest Gordon, Director, CREED
Paul Meek, International Parliamentary Group for Human Rights in the Soviet Union
Kent R. Hill, Institute for Religion and Democracy
Zinta Arums, Joint Baltic American National Committee
Dr. Ernest Lefever, Ethics in Public Policy Institute
James Finn, Freedom House
George Weigel, James Madison Foundation
Representative, Amnesty International
Representative, Helsinki Watch
Tom Kahn, AFL-CIO

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Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, National Conference on Soviet Jewry
Shoshana Cardon, President of Council on Soviet Jewry, Federation of Jewish Philanthropies
Bishop Pranas Baltakis, Bishop of Lithuanian Catholics in America
Metropolitan Stephen Sulyk, Head of Ukrainian Catholics in America
Juhan Simonson, President, Estonian American National Council
Aristides Lamberg, President, American Latvian Association
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Kent R. Hill, Institute for Religion and Democracy
Zinta Arums, Joint Baltic American National Committee
Dr. Ernest Lefever, Ethics in Public Policy Institute
→ James Finn, Freedom House
→ Representative, Amnesty International
→ Robert Bernstein, Helsinki Watch 212-572-2276
→ Tom Kahn, AFL-CIO
→ Valentin Turchin, former member of Moscow Helsinki Watch Group - 201/337-1761

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 4, 1986

MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

October 6, 1986

Room 450 EOB

3:30 p.m.

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Tab B -- Talking points

Coordination: NSC (J. Mandel)

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH
HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

- There has been much speculation in the press that my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Reykjavik will be primarily an arms control meeting.
- Let me assure you that our meeting can not focus on peace, unless it also focuses on the issue of freedom and human rights.
- This meeting is not to sign agreements but to prepare the way for a productive summit. A real improvement in the Soviet Union's human rights record is essential for such a summit.
- I will make it amply clear to Mr. Gorbachev that unless there is real Soviet movement on human rights, we will not have the kind of political atmosphere necessary to make lasting progress on other issues.
- And there is much room for improvement. The list of issues is long; the persecution of Catholics, Orthodox, Christians and Jews, the painful issues of family reunification and immigration.
- Now, I would welcome hearing from you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

October 6, 1986

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, DIRECTOR OF
PRESIDENTIAL SCHEDULING AND
APPOINTMENTS

FROM: MARI MASENG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
LIAISON

RODNEY McDANIEL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

REQUEST: Oval Office meeting with leaders of the
Soviet Jewry movement

PURPOSE: There is growing concern in the Soviet
Jewry movement that its issue will be
downplayed at the meeting in Iceland and
at the Summit meeting to follow. Only
the President can allay their concerns.

BACKGROUND: The President and the Administration
have enjoyed strong support in the
Soviet Jewry movement since 1981.
However, there have been signs of
slippage in the support over the past
months. If this process continues, very
serious political consequences will
result.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President has met with Soviet Jewry
activists on many occasions. For
example, he had a private meeting with
Anatoly Schransky. Also, on September
9, 1985 he met with a delegation from
the International Council of the World
Conference on Soviet Jewry.

DATE & TIME: October 7, 1985, 3:15 p.m.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Morris Abram, President of National
Conference on Soviet Jewry and
Chairman of the Conference of
President of Major Jewish
Organizations

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Loop

Shoshana Cardin, President of the
Council of Jewish Federations and
Co-chair of the Campaign to the Summit
Robert Bout, Past President of the
United Jewish Appeal and Co-Chair of
the Campaign to the Summit
Malcolm Hoenlein, Executive Director of
the Conference of Presidents of Major
Jewish Organizations
Jerry Goodman, Executive Director of the
National Conference on Soviet Jewry
(The first three are essential, the
other two are optional)
Patrick Buchanan, Assistant to the
President and Director of
Communications
Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the
President and Senior Director, Office
of European and Soviet Affairs,
National Security Council
Max Green, Associate Director, Office of
Public Liaison
Judy Mandel, Deputy Director,
International Communications and
Information, National Security Council

OUTLINE OF EVENT: The President greets the visitors and
makes very brief remarks. Morris Abram
responds and poses questions, which the
President answers. Guests depart.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Talking points

MEDIA COVERAGE: None

RECOMMENDED BY: Mari Maseng, Rodney McDaniel

PROJECT OFFICER: Max Green, x6270

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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October 6, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: JUDY MANDEL, NSC✓
CARL ANDERSON, OPL
MAX GREEN, OPL

FROM: LINAS KOJELIS ✓/x6573

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Representative, Helsinki Watch
Tom Kahn, AFL-CIO

Robert Bernstein
212 572 2276
Volentin Turkin, physicist 201 337 1761

*Moshana
Cardon -
Pres of Council
of Jewish
Philanthropies*

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SUGGESTED TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH HUMAN RIGHTS LEADERS

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Soviet Union's human rights record is essential for a productive summit.

-- And there is much room for improvement. The list of issues is long; the persecution of Catholics, Orthodox, Christians and Jews, the painful issues of family reunification and immigration.

-- Of course, sitting right next to me is a man who is perhaps the leading expert on Soviet human rights issues (Orlov). I have already had the pleasure of hearing his views and advice.

-- Now, I would welcome hearing from you.

Soviet movement -- I will make it ~~a~~ *clear* that unless there is real ~~improvement~~ *improvement* on human rights, ~~the political context of our relationship will remain this way.~~ *there can be no lasting progress* we will not have the kind of political atmosphere necessary to make lasting progress on other issues.

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away for a productive

170—in four stages beginning Oct. 1, but had left it to Moscow to choose whom to send packing.

The U.N. move, however, did nothing to quiet the ferocious criticism Reagan had to endure. Conservatives were most vehement in criticizing the President for even thinking about a summit or an arms-control deal while Daniloff awaits trial on a charge that could theoretically be punished by death. Columnist George Will sneered that the Administration had collapsed "like a punctured balloon," and the Washington *Times* editorially flung the conservatives' supreme insult: "Jimmy Carter, by comparison, was tough and crafty."

The thunder was not confined to the right. In Congress, liberal Democratic Senators Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio and George Mitchell of Maine insisted that no prospect of a summit deal is worth Daniloff's continued detention. Ironically, that is exactly the way Reagan used to talk as a candidate and in the early days of his presidency. Now, however, he is running not for election but for the history books. He wants to be remembered as the tough realist who negotiated the most favorable arms-control bargain the U.S. ever won from the Soviets. He has been encouraged in this by Nancy Reagan, who wants her husband to be remembered as a peacemaker, and by pragmatic advisers like Shultz. So Reagan has opted for a trying-to-have-it-both-ways policy: demanding Daniloff's freedom while continuing to negotiate on an arms bargain and a summit. Though Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Boris Pyadyshev expressed hope that the Daniloff affair could be settled "quietly," Gorbachev's nearly simultaneous comments in Krasnodar caused some Western diplomats in Moscow to fear that the Kremlin was digging itself into a position that would force it at least to put the journalist on trial. It is possible, of course, that Daniloff could then be sent home, expelled rather than released. But the only terms on which Moscow so far seems willing to do even that would be a trade of the reporter for Gennadi Zakharov, the Soviet U.N. employee whose arrest for espionage in New York City triggered the frame-up of Daniloff in Moscow a week later. And the Reagan Administration has sworn never to accept a straight swap of a real spy for an innocent American.

If the deadlock continues, Reagan will eventually have to deliver on his repeated warnings that continued detention of Daniloff will sour all U.S.-Soviet relations. But for the moment, the President is acting like anything but the hip-shooting cowboy of liberal legend and his own past oratory. That he is willing to risk alienating his own bedrock conservative constituency for the sake of keeping the hope of an arms-control deal alive says much about the pressure of presidential responsibility in reshaping the attitudes of any occupant of the Oval Office.

—By George J. Church.

Reported by James O. Jackson/Moscow and Johanna McGeary/Washington

Tough Talk at Riga

Amid the turmoil that engulfed Soviet-American relations last week, some 250 U.S. citizens traveled to Riga, the resplendent medieval capital of the Soviet Republic of Latvia, for a meeting with 2,000 carefully selected Soviets that was sponsored by the Chautauqua Institution, a New York organization that has sponsored cultural, educational and public-affairs groups around the world for 112 years. Among the American panelists who accompanied the group was TIME Washington Bureau Chief Strobe Talbott. His report.

Like the calibrated give-and-take over summitry and alleged spying that dominated Washington and Moscow, the gathering in Riga dramatized a basic principle of superpower relations: even in the worst of times, the two rivals seek to maintain competitive engagement in diplomacy rather than let their antagonisms get out of control. The reason is simple. In the nuclear age, the breakdown of diplomacy and the resort to war is not an option. Precisely because last week was a tense moment, it was a good week for the U.S. citizens who traveled to Riga.

People-to-people exchanges of this kind can all too easily arc off into the



Presidential Assistant John Matlock, right, with Soviet diplomat at Riga conference

stratosphere of goodwill. American participants are often at a curious disadvantage. They lean toward the view that both sides are to blame. Their Soviet counterparts agree with half of that proposition, eagerly endorsing any American self-criticism while promulgating the doctrine of Soviet infallibility.

The Riga meeting, by contrast, was dominated by tough talk on both sides rather than toasts to *mir i druzhba* (peace and friendship). Largely because of the Daniloff affair, which was repeatedly raised by both Administration officials and private U.S. citizens, the Chautauquans were given a crash course in old-fashioned Soviet stonewalling. After a particularly harsh counterattack on Daniloff by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky, one of the Americans in the audience commented, "It's like watching the machinery of the big lie in action—from the inside."

The Soviet spokesman on arms control, General Nikolai Chervov, delivered an attack on the U.S. that had all the subtlety of a 20-megaton warhead. He accused the Reagan Administration of holding "murderous positions" and of conducting "dishonest negotiations." Fending off American concerns over the U.S.S.R.'s 308 ten-warhead SS-18 ICBMs, he asserted that the comparable American MX "is already in a state of operational deployment." In fact, not until the end of the year are the first ten MXs expected to be operational.

Said Quintus Anderson, a businessman from Jamestown, N.Y.: "This conference has convinced a lot of us of the need for a strong defense, which is not the conclusion we expected to come to." Yet even the hard-line statements of Chervov and Petrovsky left room for a U.S. official in Riga to say, "If you listen closely, you can still hear them saying they are extremely eager to restrict SDI and they may be willing to pay a significant price in arms control to do so."

The conference had its share of lighter moments. In a program of informal exchanges, Maria Valsilyeva of Riga wanted to know about differences in men's and women's salaries in the U.S. Marilyn Levinson of Erie, Pa., wanted the recipe for *shchi*, a Russian cabbage soup. Later Anderson took his wife to a restaurant and they ended up dancing with a group of Ukrainian tourists from, of all places, Chernobyl. Said Anderson: "I'm sure those people will go home and tell their friends that we're not all that bad."

But these moments were the exception rather than the rule, just as they are in Soviet-American relations more generally, last week and every week.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/5/86

ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: -----

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☐	☒
MILLER - OMB	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
BALL	☐	☒	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☐	☒	SVAHN	☐	☒
CHEW	☐	☒	THOMAS	☐	☒
DANIELS	☐	☒	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☐	☒	WALLISON	☐	☒
KING	☐	☐	DOLAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☐	☒		☐	☐
MASENG	☐	☒		☐	☐

REMARKS: LThe attached has been forwarded to the President.

RESPONSE:

86 OCT 8 9 10 09

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David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

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(Dolan)
October 5, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION
MONDAY, OCTOBER 6, 1986

I am delighted we could meet today. First, this is a chance to say hello to all of you and compliment you on the work of the Executive Exchange Commission, an organization which remains one of the principal assets of America's private and public sector.

And second, I wanted to use this opportunity to offer a perspective -- the American perspective if you will -- on the meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and myself later this week in Reykjavik, Iceland. By the way, since we Americans have developed a reputation for being uncomplicated, straightforward and not especially long-winded, I want you to know I'll be trying to practice these national traits -- especially the last one -- in my remarks to you today.

Recently, as you know, there has been some speculation that the United States and the Soviet Union are about to sign important new arms control agreements. Now this sort of talk isn't all that unexpected; whenever leaders of countries are about to meet there are always those who predict landmark treaties and historical breakthroughs.

But, when I see such speculation I can't help but think of the first administrative post I held. I hope you'll forgive me for reminiscing here, but as a union president, I spent a good deal of time at the bargaining table and learned one valuable lesson: that it's the initial phase of the negotiating process -- laying the groundwork -- setting the agenda -- establishing

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areas of agreement as well as disagreement -- that pays off in the future.

Now if that's true of labor and management negotiations here, you can imagine how relevant it is to Soviet-American bargaining sessions; after all, we both have a little more separating us than, say, G.M. and the U.A.W. So, groundwork is essential.

And from the beginning we have tried to make this a hallmark of Administration policy; we've tried to take a prudent, realistic and, above all, deliberate approach toward Soviet-American relations. Instead of rushing unprepared into negotiations with the Soviets, the Administration took the time in its earliest days to make clear the essential elements of American foreign policy: our commitment to the twin goals of world peace and world freedom, our willingness to be realistic and candid about the Soviets, to publicly define the crucial, moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy and to actively assist those who are struggling for their own self-determination. Yet at the same time we also made plain another of our essential objectives -- our determination to seek ways of working with the Soviets -- to prevent war and to keep the peace. In pursuing this objective, we adopted a step-by-step approach towards Soviet-American negotiations, gradually expanding and intensifying the areas of both bilateral and multilateral discussion. And, as we've seen, eventually summit meetings themselves became a critical part of that effort.

Now this willingness to make painstaking preparations was what I believe made last year's talks in Geneva a success. Each

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side had a good idea of what to expect; there was an agenda; Mr. Gorbachev and I could be candid with each other. In short, we had something to work with, something to build on.

And we must continue in this spirit. That's why Iceland is not intended to be a signing ceremony or a media event but a pre-summit planning session, a chance to make preparations for the serious work Mr. Gorbachev and I will have to do when he visits the United States. As I've said, Iceland is a base camp before the summit.

And yet, while our emphasis will be on planning and preparation not treaty papers or publicity, part of the emphasis in Iceland will be on the broad-based agenda we have agreed to: discussion not only of critical arms reduction proposals but equally important questions such as Soviet human rights violations and military intervention by the Soviets and their proxies in regional conflicts.

On this point of the summit agenda, let me add another point of background. A few years ago in a speech to the United Nations I said that I shared the sense of urgency many felt about arms control issues. But I also suggested that placing the entire burden of Soviet-American relations on arms controls negotiations could be dangerous and counterproductive. I noted that problems in arms negotiations should not be permitted to thwart or imperil the entire Soviet-American relationship and, similarly, that sometimes negotiations in other areas could assist in speeding up the arms control process. In short -- doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. And so I

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proposed what I called "umbrella talks," negotiations with a broad-based agenda.

The summit process has reflected this approach and included a broad-based agenda; we have stressed in addition to arms reduction three other agenda items: respect for human rights, resolving regional conflicts, and improving bilateral contacts between the Soviets and ourselves.

Now that first area, human rights, takes on -- in view of the recent Daniloff incident -- a particular relevance. As you know, after a Soviet spy was arrested at the U.N., the Soviets retaliated by arresting an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff, on trumped-up charges. It was an act that held hostage not only an innocent American journalist but the future of Soviet-American relations.

That the arrest of a single spy could lead to such risk-taking by the Soviets again underscores the differences between our two systems. It was an extremely grave step but one that could hardly surprise us; after all human rights violations in the Soviet bloc remain unceasing because they are institutionalized and sanctioned by the state ideology.

It's worth noting here that shortly after Mr. Daniloff was freed we agreed to exchange the Soviet spy in question for the noted Russian human rights leader, Yuri Orlov and his wife. Mr. Orlov's service to humanity -- the record of his sufferings -- makes him a hero for our time; yet it is also worth noting he was persecuted simply because he led an effort to get the Soviet government to live up to the human rights agreements

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it signed at Helsinki in 1975. When the Soviet state's ideology makes it a crime to advocate living up to international commitments, the rest of the world has to take notice; this point as well as the entire range of Soviet human rights abuses must be addressed at future summits.

So too, there is the issue of regional conflicts. It would be simply unthinkable for world leaders to meet in splendid isolation even as the people of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and Southeast Asia undergo terrible sufferings as a result of Soviet invasion or military intervention. Again our proposals for resolving regional conflicts remain a critical agenda item. And on this point, you may have read last week that the Soviet Foreign Minister acknowledged that Afghanistan has to be discussed in Reykjavik. I wish we saw any evidence that the Soviets had made a decision to get out. They need to see that the only solution that can last is one providing self-determination for the Afghan people and a rapid, complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Short of that, the freedom fighters will struggle on, and let me promise you, they'll have the support they need from people around the world.

Finally, there is the issue of broader contacts between the Soviet and American peoples especially young people. We all welcomed the commitment made last year in Geneva to increase contacts, notably in the cultural exchange area. This was the result of careful pre-summit planning and it is our hope that our work in Iceland will speed up implementation of these programs and lay the groundwork for further progress at future summits.

These then are the difficult matters on our summit agenda, arms reductions, human rights, regional conflicts, bilateral contacts -- I think you can understand then when Mr. Gorbachev extended his invitation to a pre-summit discussion I accepted. With such grave and complex matters, there is no such thing as too much preparation.

So, I hope that in explaining all this I have done something to dispel some of the inaccurate speculation and false hopes raised about the Iceland talks. I expect these talks to be useful and successful but only as preparation for future summit conferences. Our view is that we will proceed as we have from the start -- step-by-step -- cautiously, prudently, and realistically.

And by the way, I hope this last point about our realism helps to answer some of the domestic criticisms recently of the summit process. Actually, I've got to confess that hearing suggestions that I'm getting soft on communism is for me a new -- and perhaps the word is titillating -- experience.

But, seriously, I would ask those of my old supporters who may have voiced doubts to simply consider three facts that I think make the current summit process very different from that of previous decades. First, the United States has made it plain we enter these negotiations without illusions; and that we will continue to be candid about the Soviet Union, the moral implications of its ideology, the grave danger of its geopolitical intentions. Second, part of this candid approach includes restatement of what I said in my 1982 speech at Westminster Palace in Great Britain: that the ultimate goal of

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American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom -- to see that every nation, every people, every person someday enjoys the blessings of liberty. And finally, I would ask that some note be taken of the historical tides. America is no longer under siege; far from it. Our economic and military power is resurgent, the Western democracies are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. In all of this, the United States continues to play its historical role and assist those who struggle for world freedom. And we believe the summit process can be useful in preventing war as we move towards a world of expanding personal freedom and growing respect for human rights. We believe the summit agenda reflects the helpful changes that have occurred in the world; we are discussing not just arms control, for example, but arms reductions.

Progress towards our twin goals of peace and freedom then will not be easy; as I mentioned in my Saturday radio talk -- we seek the support of all Americans. We need your help. And we also need, as I said, some careful preparation. And that is why we agreed to the talks in Iceland and will look forward to meeting Mr. Gorbachev there. And, come to think of it, it's also why I have to get back across the street to my homework and my briefing books.

Thanks for having me; again my compliments on your great work.

Thank you and God bless you.

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BALTIC AMERICAN FREEDOM LEAGUE

(818) 765-2587

P.O. Box 29657, Los Angeles, California 90029

September 30, 1986

Executive Board:

Avo Piirisild
President
(818) 765-2587

Dr. Ansis Blakis
Vice President
(213) 828-4613

Juozas Kojelis
Vice President
(213) 395-8355

Viivi Piirisild
Vice President
(818) 765-2587

Yanis Braukis
Secretary
(213) 662-6917

Heino Nurmberg
Treasurer
(714) 835-6676
(714) 667-3940

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Kaisa Randpere is the world's youngest political prisoner. She is three years old. Her father and mother defected to the West in 1984 and Baltic American Freedom League has been active in trying to obtain the release of Kaisa.

Directors:

Edward Antanitis	Los Angeles, CA
Saulis Anuzis	Lansing, MI
Ilmars Bergmanis	Chicago, IL
Aivars Jerumanis	Los Angeles, CA
Karlis Kalejs	Los Angeles, CA
Leo Keerberg	San Francisco, CA
Daiva Kezys	New York, NY
Dr. Petras Kisieliuss	Chicago, IL
Aristids Lambergis	Boston, MA
Rita M. Latsons	Washington, DC
Heikki Leesment	Washington, DC
Dr. Hendrik Leesment	Los Angeles, CA
Ted Liliensteins	Los Angeles, CA
Maris Mantenieks	Cleveland, OH
Jonas Matulaitis	Los Angeles, CA
Anthony Mazeika	Los Angeles, CA
Danute Mazeika	Los Angeles, CA
Bernard Nurmsen	Los Angeles, CA
Dr. Ants Paliop	New York, NY
Agris Pavlovskis	Los Angeles, CA
Valdis Pavlovskis	Los Angeles, CA
Valdek Roosna	Tacoma, WA
Dr. Dana M. Saliklis	Chicago, IL
Ivars Svanfeids	Chicago, IL
Jaak Treiman	Los Angeles, CA
Danguole Valentinaite	Chicago, IL

When you meet with Chairman Gorbachev, please ask for the release of Kaisa. There should not be any reason to prevent a three year old girl from being with her parents.

Sincerely yours,

Avo Piirisild

Tell Pat

Monday - Lunch w/ Senior Advisors. | Cabinet Room - noon

- Dep Sec. Taft.
- Chairman.
- All non-arms control stuff.] ←
- Buchanan (invited.)

→ a/c + other talking pts.

→ Orlov. ← Departs USSR Tomorrow. ←

Themes.

→

→ Communication Plan.

① Senior officials.

→ Peter Rodman. ← Dept. NSC. ←

4. - topics.

Regional issues.

3:30.

① Orlov.

② Photo at beginning / or end.

①. Gear up missile campaign.

②. Serious & quiet.

③. supportive of RR / approach.

③ Human Rights Activists.

①.

②.

③.

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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TALKING POINTS FOR
BRIEFING ON REGIONAL ISSUES
Iceland Meeting, October 1986

- We appreciate your taking time from your busy schedules to join us on such short notice this afternoon.
- I believe that you, like we, are looking forward to President Reagan's meeting with Mr. Gorbachev with great anticipation.
- The agenda, as you will hear, for the meeting in Reykjavik, as it was in Geneva, is a broad one, which will include: arms control, bilateral issues, regional conflicts and human rights.
- The Soviets are tough negotiators. That is why it is important for the President to go to Iceland with the strongest possible hand.

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- You have received this afternoon copies of the President's speech of September 23 and his radio address of last Saturday.
- In both speeches, the President called to task the liberal democratic leadership of the House for giving the Soviets, through Congressional action, concessions for which the Soviets had to give up nothing.
- In addition, the CR hurts U.S. efforts in at least one key regional conflict by holding back the \$100 million which both chambers have already approved for the Nicaraguan Freedom Fighters.
- We ask that you heed the President's request for support. It is important for the President

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to come to Rejkiavik with as strong
a negotiating hand as possible.

-- And now it is my pleasure to
introduce to you Jack Matlock,
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs and
Director of the Office for Eastern
European and Soviet Affairs.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 6, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
IN DROPBY MEETING OF THE
EXECUTIVE EXCHANGE COMMISSION

October 6, 1986

Room 450 OEOB

2:15 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. Well, thank you, and I'm delighted we could meet today. First, this is a chance to say to all of you -- hello to all of you, and compliment you on the work that you've been doing on defense and peace related issues. And second, knowing of your interest in this matter, I wanted to use this opportunity to offer a perspective -- the American perspective if you will -- on the meetings between Mr. Gorbachev and me later this week in Reykjavik, Iceland.

By the way, since we Americans have developed a reputation for being uncomplicated, straightforward and not especially long-winded, I want you to know that I'll be trying to practice these national traits -- especially the last one -- in my remarks to you today.

I can't resist. I used to -- I've wore out a story that expressed the -- (laughter) -- that expressed the importance of brevity in a speech. It was told to me by a minister -- Bill Alexander -- used to do the invocation for the Republican National Conventions. And he heard me speak once. And after he'd heard me speak, he told me about his first experience as a preacher. And I've always thought there was a connection.

He said that he had worked for weeks on that first sermon. He'd been invited to preach at a little country church out in Oklahoma, and he went there well-prepared, and stood up in the pulpit for an evening service, and looked out at one lone little fellow sitting out there among all the empty pews. So he went down, and he said, "My friend, you seem to be the only member of the congregation that showed up, and I'm just a young preacher getting started. What do you think? Should I go through with it?" And the fellow says, "Well, I don't know about that sort of thing, I'm a little old cowpoke out here in Oklahoma. But I do know this -- if I loaded up a truckload of hay, took it out in the prairie and only one cow showed up, I'd feed her. (Laughter.)

Well, Bill took that as a cue. (Laughter.) And he said -- and hour and a half later, he said amen. And he went down, and he said, "My friend, you seem to have stuck with me. I'm just a young preacher getting started. What do you think?"

"Well," he says, "like I told you, I don't know about that sort of thing, but I do know this -- if I loaded up a truckload of hay and took it out in the prairie and only one cow showed up, I sure as hell wouldn't give her the whole load." (Laughter and applause.)

But recently, as you know, there's been some speculation that the United States and the Soviet Union are about to sign

MORE

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important new arms control agreements. Now, this sort of talk isn't all that unexpected; whenever leaders of countries are about to meet, there are always those who predict landmark treaties and historical breakthroughs.

Yet, when I see such speculation, I can't help but think of the first administrative post that I held. And I hope you'll forgive me for reminiscing here, but as a union president, I spent a good deal of time at the bargaining table and learned one valuable lesson -- now, that it's the initial phase of the negotiating process, laying the groundwork, setting the agenda, establishing areas of agreement as well as disagreement -- that pays off in the future.

Now, if that's true of labor and management negotiations here, you can imagine how relevant it is to Soviet-American bargaining sessions; after all, we both have a little more separating us than, say, General Motors and U.A.W. So, groundwork is essential.

And from the beginning we have tried to make this a hallmark of administration policy; we've tried to take a prudent, and a realistic and, above all, deliberate approach toward Soviet-American relations. Instead of rushing unprepared into negotiations with the Soviets, the administration took the time in its earliest days to make clear the essential elements of American foreign policy -- our commitment to the twin goals of world peace and world freedom, our willingness to be realistic and candid about the Soviets, to publicly define the crucial, moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy and to actively assist those who are struggling for their own self-determination.

Yet, at the same time we also made plain another of our essential objectives -- our determination to seek ways of working with the Soviets to prevent war and to keep the peace. In pursuing this objective, we adopted a step-by-step approach towards Soviet-American negotiations, gradually expanding and intensifying the areas of both bilateral and multilateral discussion. And, as we've seen, eventually summit meetings themselves became a critical part of that effort.

Now, this willingness to make painstaking preparations was what I believe made last year's talks in Geneva a success. Each side had a good idea of what to expect; there was an agenda; Mr. Gorbachev and I could be candid with each other. In short, we had something to work with, something to build on.

And we must continue in this spirit. And that's why Iceland is not intended to be a signing ceremony or a media event but a pre-summit planning session, a chance to make preparations for the serious work Mr. Gorbachev and I will have to do when he visits the United States. Iceland is a base camp before the summit.

And yet, while our emphasis will be on planning and preparation, not treaty papers or publicity, part of the emphasis in Iceland will be on the broad-based agenda that we've agreed to -- discussion not only of critical arms reduction proposals, but equally important questions such as Soviet human rights violations, military intervention by the Soviets and their proxies in regional conflicts.

On this point of the summit agenda let me add another point of background. A few years ago in a speech to the United Nations, I said that I shared the sense of urgency many felt about arms control issues. But I also suggested placing the entire burden of Soviet-American relations on arms control negotiations could be dangerous and counterproductive. I noted that problems in arms negotiations should not be permitted to thwart or imperil the entire Soviet-American relationship and, similarly, that sometimes, negotiations in other areas could assist in speeding up arms control process.

In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed in my 1984 U.N. address what I called "umbrella talks," negotiations with a broad-based agenda.

The summit process has reflected this approach and includes a broad-based agenda. We've stressed in addition to arms reduction three other agenda items -- respect for human rights, resolving regional conflicts, and improving bilateral contacts between the Soviets and ourselves.

Now, that first area, human rights, takes on, in view of the recent Danilooff incident, a particular reference -- or relevance, I should say. As you know, after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested the Soviets retaliated by arresting an American journalist, Nicholas Danilooff, on trumped up charges. It was an act that held hostage not only an innocent American journalist, but the future of Soviet-American relations.

The United States took action in response to the Soviet use of the U.N. for intelligence activities by ordering the expulsion of 25 Soviet personnel known to be involved in such activities.

MORE

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That the arrest of a single spy could lead to such risk-taking by the Soviets again underscores the differences between our two systems. It was an extremely grave step, but one that could hardly surprise us; after all, human rights violations in the Soviet bloc remain unceasing because they're institutionalized and sanctioned by the state ideology.

It's worth noting here that we agreed to exchanged the Soviet spy in question for the noted Russian human rights leader, Yuri Orlov, and his wife. Mr. Orlov's service to humanity -- the record of his sufferings -- makes him a hero for our time. Yet, it is also worth noting he was persecuted simply because he led an effort to get the Soviet government to live up to the human rights agreements it signed at Helsinki in 1975.

When the Soviet state's ideology makes it a crime to advocate living up to international commitments, the rest of the world has to take notice. And this point, as well as the entire range of Soviet human rights abuses must be addressed at future summits.

So, too, there is the issue of regional conflicts. It would be simply unthinkable for world leaders to meet in splendid isolation even as the people of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and Southeast Asia undergo terrible sufferings as a result of Soviet invasion or military intervention. Again, our proposals for resolving regional conflicts remain a critical agenda item. And on this point, you may have read last week that the Soviet Foreign Minister acknowledged that Afghanistan has to be discussed in Reykjavik. I wish we saw any evidence that the Soviets had made a decision to get out.

They need to see that the only solution that can last is one providing self-determination for the Afghan people and a rapid, complete withdrawal of Soviet forces. Short of that, the freedom fighters will struggle on, and let me promise you, they'll have the support they need from people around the world. (Applause.)

Finally, there is the issue of broader contacts between the Soviet and American peoples, especially young people. We all welcome the commitment made last year in Geneva to increase contacts, notably in the cultural exchange area. This was the result of careful pre-summit planning, and it's our hope that our work in Iceland will speed up implementation of these programs and lay the groundwork for future progress at future summits.

These then are the difficult matters on our summit agenda: arms reduction, human rights, regional conflicts, people-to-people contacts. I think you can understand, then, when Mr. Gorbachev extended his invitation to a pre-summit discussion, I accepted. With such grave and complex matters, there's no such thing as too much preparation. So I hope that in explaining all this, I've done something to dispel some of the inaccurate speculation and false hopes raised about the Iceland talks. I expect these talks to be useful and successful, but only as preparation for future summit conferences. Our view is that we will proceed as we have from the start -- step-by-step -- cautiously, prudently, and realistically.

And by the way, I hope this last point about our realism helps to answer some of the domestic criticisms recently of the summit process.

Actually, I've got to confess that hearing suggestions that I'm getting soft on communism is for me a new -- and perhaps the word titillating -- (laughter) -- is proper for that experience.

But, seriously, I would ask those of my old supporters who may have voiced doubts to simply consider three facts that I think may make the current summit process very different from that of previous decades.

First, the United States has made it plain we enter these negotiations without illusions, and that we will continue to be candid about the Soviet Union, the moral implications of its ideology, the grave danger of its geopolitical intentions.

Second, part of this candid approach includes restatement of what I said in my 1982 speech at Westminster Palace in Great Britain -- that the ultimate goal of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war, but the extension of freedom -- (applause) -- to see that every nation, every people, every person someday enjoys the blessings of liberty.

And finally I would ask that some note be taken of the historical tides. America is no longer under seige -- far from it. Our economic and military power is resurgent, the Western democracies are revitalized, and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. In all of this, the United States continues to play its historical role and assist those who struggle for world freedom.

And we believe the summit process can be useful in preventing war as we move toward a world of expanding personal freedom and growing respect for human rights. We believe the summit agenda reflects the helpful changes that have occurred in the world. We are discussing not just arms control, for example, but arms reduction, as well as human rights and regional conflicts.

Progress toward our twin goals of peace and freedom then will not be easy. As I mentioned in my Saturday radio talk, we seek the support of all Americans. We need your help, and we also need, as I said, some careful preparation.

And that is why we agreed to the talks in Iceland and will look forward to meeting Mr. Gorbachev there. And, come to think of it, it's also why I have to get back across the street to my homework and my briefing books.

You know, I have taken to collecting stories that I can tell that show the cynicism of some of the people in the totalitarian states for their government. Stories that I can confirm are actually told by those people to each other. So I'm going to share the last one with you, and then it's back to work.

Evening, or darkness in the Soviet Union. A citizen walking along the street. A soldier yells, "Halt." He starts to run, the soldier shoots him. Another citizen says, "Why did you do that?" And the soldier says, "Curfew." "But," he said, "it isn't curfew time yet." He said, "I know. He's a friend of mine. I know where he lives. He couldn't have made it." (Laughter and applause.)

You know something? In the summit meetings I tell some of those stories to the other side. (Laughter.)

Thank you all very much. God bless you. (Applause.)

END

2:33 P.M. EDT

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2	LIST	1	ND	B6
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REPORT NO: WAV034BS

WAVES

PAGE NO: 1

RUN DATE : 10/05/86

UIN : U48869 DATE: 861006 TIME: 1345 CANCEL DATE: CANCEL TIME:

VISITEE: POTUS

TOTAL VISITORS: 36

AGENCY:

LOCATION: OECB

AREA/ROOM: 450

REQUESTOR: BUREIKA

ROOM:

PHONE: 000-6573

CHECKS: ID X NCIC/CCH X

COMMENTS: POTUS DROPBY AT 1415 HOURS

NAME	SSN	DOB
ARUMS	ZINTA	07/25/63
BENEDI	CLAUDIO	07/25/19
BOLUDA	MIGUEL	03/14/31
BRIGHT	CHRISTOPHE	10/08/65
BRIGHT	TIMOTHY	09/18/64
BRUNELLI	SAMUEL	02/13/43
CASANOVA	ALICIA	03/02/37
CASANOVA	JOSE	08/14/30
DAMMANN	ROLF	11/11/59
GENYS	JOHN	08/12/23
GOMEZ	FERNANDO	10/10/63
HUETER	JOAN	06/10/23
JANAREEF	ESHAN	01/01/50
KIRK	BETTY	05/10/44
KIRK	DAVID	02/08/70
KIRK	DAVID	04/03/44
KOHISTANY	KABIR	12/15/52
MAWHORTER	CHRISTOPHE	03/04/58
MAY	NINA	04/14/52
MCCARDLE	JOHN	09/02/67
METZGER	LEIGH	09/07/62
OBRIEN	ANA	11/16/38
PALUBINSKAS	GINTA	02/24/64
PROLYK	LUBA	05/03/23
PROLYK	STEPHEN	05/25/21
READJUSTIZ	ROBIN	03/07/43
REID	THOMAS	04/18/62
RIKKEN	MARIANN	06/26/46
RIVERO	EMILIO	04/05/28
SABAS	EDWARD	11/21/63
SALEHI	MOHAMMED	06/20/28
SANFORD	ELIZABETH	03/22/14
SCHLAFLY	PHYLLIS	08/15/24
SELLERS	RICHARD	10/28/51
SLAVOFF	RADI	10/07/26
ZEIDLICKIS	DAGNIA	02/23/65

TOTAL VISITORS: 36

Handwritten note:
I think these are supposed to be proxy.

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