

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Speechwriting, White House Office of:
Research Office, 1981-1989
Folder Title: 10/03/1986 Radio Talk [Pre-Summit
Meeting] (2)
Box: 287

To see more digitized collections visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

Mike

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

7173

October 2, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *BoL for*
SUBJECT: Radio Talk

Attached are comments from the NSC staff on the 2 October draft radio address. We understand there will be an 8:30 a.m. meeting tomorrow morning to close on the draft. We will be happy to discuss any changes, as required, at that time.

Attachment

Tab A Revised radio address

cc: David Chew

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/2/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. 10/3/86

SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: PRE_SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER - OMB	☒	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
BALL	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	DOLAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☒	☐		☐	☐
MASENG	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan by 10:00 Friday morning, October 3rd. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland ~~and~~ and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by ^{[partisan] divisions} ~~grasping politicians~~ here at home, so I do think it's ^{a problem} ~~a problem~~ you can help me ^{solve} ~~solve~~.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ^{DF '85 P. 865} ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas:

^{Put this first} ~~Strategic~~ arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, ^{and expanded} ~~the improvement of~~ bilateral contacts, ~~between our Nation and the~~ ^{respect and observance} recognition of human rights,

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe ^{personal meetings between our leaders can be} ~~summit conference~~ are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

[On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. ^{Our experts thought} the scheduling of any future ^{meetings} ~~conferences~~ was ~~considered~~ ~~by our experts~~ a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; ^{which} is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in ^{third} ~~a neutral~~ country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their ~~Geopolitical~~ intentions.

Optional
cut

(May brag
about this
agreement
when they
may be
breaking it?!)

Iceland is
NATO ally, not
neutral

Esoteric
word!

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

 This now has changed. ^{Just last month} ~~Earlier this month~~ -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we ~~were~~ prepared. ~~Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct,~~ ^{make clear to them the} ~~consequences of such actions, candid and forceful.~~

And we ^{did.} ~~were~~ That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

~~And~~ That's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic ^{and} firm ⁻⁻ and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

Shouldn't
brag too
much about
this either

Key was
the 25,
not verbal
protests

Really 2
separate
points.
Give more
emphasis
to the 2d

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible ^{legislative restrictions} ~~resolutions~~ they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by ^{trying to enact} ~~passing~~ the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense ^{initiative, a research program that underpins our} ~~research, an initiative that helped~~ ^{negotiating position in Geneva and our hopes for strategic arms reduction.} ~~bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva.~~ They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Government wide appropriations bill
Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the ~~budget resolution~~ that is being ~~sent this way~~ *debated in Congress* -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress' left-wing league of ~~would-be~~ *unilateral* ~~disarmers.~~ *disarmers.* ~~Hottelrichs.~~

None
knows
who he
is!

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without ~~the meddling cries and~~ *crippling* ~~(partisan) obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters"~~ in the Congress.

unilateral disarmers in the Congress
It won't be easy to make the ~~richard liberals~~ listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; eventually they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/2/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. 10/3/86

SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: PRE_SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☒	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER - OMB	☒	☐	RYAN	☐	☒
BALL	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
CHEW	☒	☒	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	DOLAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☒	☐		☐	☐
MASENG	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan by 10:00 Friday morning, October 3rd. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in ^{our nation's} ~~the~~ capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland ^{next weekend} ~~and~~ and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's ^{a problem} ~~a problem~~ you can help me ^{solve} ~~solve~~.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the ^{peoples} nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation and the recognition of human rights.

don't list this one last all the time.

And, to achieve progress on ^{direct discussions} ~~such a broad~~ agenda, we believe ^{summit conferences} ~~are~~ very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

-- Assumed --
all phases of this

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a neutral country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during ^{our} ~~the~~ talks in Iceland, ~~we~~ ^I will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

If space is
a problem
I suggest
reducing
or cutting
things graph.
It's been
said before.
And while
it adds
color, it's
not essential
to the Iceland
message.

Expand this
section a bit
to give the
personal
flavor of
accepting the
meeting

in a letter

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an ^{innocent} American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there ^{may well} ~~will~~ be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as ^{any such} ~~each~~ obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our ~~lack of illusions about them, and our~~ resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

→ Needs to be a paragraph on what ^{in "expert"} ~~from~~ Iceland - in general terms. ^{No agreements, no big announcement but, Progress on the issues to lead to a summit here in U.S.}

"Will" implies further Bad Acts by USSR. We shouldn't pre-judge that, but we shouldn't Rule it out either, so I suggest "may well"

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a ~~highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress~~ ^{Some in the Congress who seek partisan advantage where there must only be American unity.}

In the first place, ~~this liberal coalition has~~ ^{Some have} done everything ~~it~~ ^{they} could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by ^{those in} Congress! ~~left wing league of would be Metternichs.~~

~~must not have to face the Soviets with~~ The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are ^{because I can't do what's right for America.} important. I ~~can't and I won't~~ have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help ~~in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership~~ to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell ^{those in Congress} them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress.

^{I'm afraid it} ~~It~~ won't be easy to make ^{that group} ~~the richard liberals~~ listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; eventually ^{You} ~~they~~ will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people. These discussions are too important, to our future And our children's future.

I know I've taken longer than usual today, but I thought this subject was important. Thank you: ~~to B. G.~~
God Bless you.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUMDATE: 10/2/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 a.m. 10/3/86SUBJECT: RADIO TALK: PRE_SUMMIT MEETING WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☒	MILLER - ADMIN.	☐	☐
REGAN	☐	☒	POINDEXTER	☒	☐
MILLER - OMB	☒	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
BALL	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☒
BARBOUR	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SVAHN	☒	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	THOMAS	☒	☐
DANIELS	☒	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	WALLISON	☒	☐
KING	☐	☐	DOLAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☒	☐		☐	☐
MASENG	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS: Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan by 10:00 Friday morning, October 3rd. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland ~~and~~ and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by ^{Porter} grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's ^{a problem} ~~something~~ you can help me ^{solve} ~~something~~.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe summit conferences are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a neutral country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but [this time] we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

*at that time
want to say what
they suggest is
irresponsible*

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. *notes, not done* They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress. [left-wing league of would-be Metternichs.]

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress.

It won't be easy to make [the diehard liberals] listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; [eventually] they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- [one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.]

let negotiate
with the Soviets -
not with ourselves.

MIKE

(Dolan)
October 2, 1986
4:30 p.m. SS

PRESIDENTIAL RADIO TALK: PRE-SUMMIT MEETING WITH
GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV

My fellow Americans: I'm sure many of you have heard that a week from now in Reykjavik, Iceland, I will be meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. Though the meeting will be relatively brief, our discussions will be of critical importance: we'll be laying the groundwork for Mr. Gorbachev's upcoming visit to the United States and the summit talks that will take place then.

Now as President, I get all sorts of briefings when talks like these are scheduled but I thought today I'd change things around a bit and give a briefing of my own to those I think are equally important participants in the summit process -- you the people.

Now I know it's true that some here in the capital think the people can't be trusted with such complex matters as foreign policy. But along with our Founding Fathers, I've always believed that the intuitive wisdom of the people is far more dependable over the long run than the temporary insights or parochial pursuits of the Washington experts. That's why I've said right from the start that the first obligation of democratic leaders is to keep the people informed and seek their support on public policy.

So today I want to take a few moments to bring you up to ~~date~~ ☒ date on the pre-summit conference in Iceland ~~with~~ and ask your support for our objectives there. In particular, I want to ask

your help in removing a grave obstacle to our chances for progress at these talks and the others to follow. It's an obstacle created by grasping politicians here at home, so I do think it's something you can help me eliminate.

Perhaps you remember Mr. Gorbachev and I first met a year ago in Geneva. We spent about 5 hours alone; and more than 15 hours together with the rest of our delegations. Believe me, we learned again the truth of the statement: nations don't mistrust each other because they are armed; they're armed because they mistrust each other. On this point, I was very blunt and candid with Mr. Gorbachev and told him that in our view the source of that mistrust was the Soviet Union's record of seeking to impose its ideology and rule on others.

But I also made it clear that while the United States remains committed to freedom and self-determination for all the nations of the world, we also want to work with the Soviet Union to prevent war and maintain peace. We believe the twin goals of world peace and freedom can be furthered by making progress with the Soviet Union in four thorny but closely-related areas: strategic arms reductions, the resolution of regional conflicts, ☒ the improvement of bilateral contacts between our Nation^S and the recognition of human rights.

And, to achieve progress on such a broad agenda, we believe summit conferences are very useful. First, as I said, to dispel illusions -- to make sure the Soviets avoid miscalculation, that they know where we stand. And second, the simple fact is that

heads of state can frequently resolve matters far more quickly than other negotiators can.

On this point, I like to tell a story about the Geneva summit. The scheduling of any future conferences was considered by our experts a difficult, delicate subject best left to later in the discussions. Yet as we were walking together after one of our meetings, I mentioned to Mr. Gorbachev how much I would like him to visit the United States. So, I invited him; and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union. So he invited me. And I said: "I accept." And there it was: an agreement that the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union; just as simple as that.

So face-to-face talks can be helpful; which is why when Mr. Gorbachev extended an invitation a few weeks ago to meet him in a neutral country like Iceland -- for preparatory talks on the upcoming summit here in the United States -- I accepted.

I want you to know that next week during the talks in Iceland, we will be taking the same balanced approach we took in Geneva. On one hand, we will make it clear we seek negotiations and serious progress with the Soviets on a wide range of issues. On the other, we will make it clear that we will not sacrifice our values, principles or vital interests for the sake of merely signing agreements. And that's just another way of making it clear to the Soviets we harbor no illusions about them or their geopolitical intentions.

This last point is important. You see, in the past, when agreements were reached with the Soviets, this led to much unrealistic talk about the great thaw in Soviet-American relations and even predictions about the end of the cold war. And then when the Soviets reverted to form -- such as the invasion of Afghanistan -- the result was shock and policy paralysis in Washington.

This now has changed. Earlier this month -- after a Soviet spy at the U.N. was arrested -- the Soviets retaliated by taking hostage an American journalist, Nicholas Daniloff in Moscow. It was an act of international outrage; but this time we were prepared. Because we understood that the Soviets are relentless adversaries, they could not surprise us nor derail our policy initiatives. We knew what we had to do. We had to be direct, candid and forceful.

And we were. That's why Nicholas Daniloff is freed and back in the United States. And that's why we can now go forward to Iceland. Believe me, as we proceed along the path of negotiations there will be other such obstacles. But let me assure you: as each obstacle arises, we will again make clear to the Soviets our lack of illusions about them, and our resolve to hold them accountable for their actions.

And that's the bottom line to this briefing: in order to be successful in negotiations, an American President must be perceived by the Soviets as realistic, firm and, above all, a President speaking for a united people, a united country.

In the past, this has rarely been a problem. When it came to matters of national security, politics usually stopped at the water's edge, Americans stood together -- the fabric of bipartisan cooperation was untearable, the bond of national unity unbreakable.

But in recent years the willingness to put aside partisan difference for the sake of national security has been gravely eroded -- eroded by a highly ideological and entirely irresponsible liberal core in the Congress.

In the first place, this liberal coalition has done everything it could to oppose our 5-1/2 year old military buildup, the very buildup that has done so much to bring the Soviets to the bargaining table in the first place.

But they are hardly satisfied with just opposing defense spending. By passing the irresponsible resolutions they have in the House of Representatives -- they have gone on to jeopardize the entire summit process by passing the Soviet negotiating position into American law, by giving the Soviets the very victories that they could not win at the conference table.

The House, for example, voted to ban tests of antisatellite systems, even though the Soviets have a system in operation and we don't. They voted to stop us from producing a deterrent to modern Soviet chemical weapons. They voted to slash our request for the strategic defense research, an initiative that helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table in Geneva. They voted to deny funds to move beyond the limits of SALT II, a treaty that couldn't be ratified and that would've expired by now

if it had been ratified and that the Soviets have repeatedly violated. And finally, the House has prohibited essentially all testing of nuclear weapons.

Many of these preposterous proposals are now included in the budget resolution that is being sent this way -- believe me, it will be vetoed quickly. But there is an even larger issue: the message that is being sent to the Soviets about our lack of unity here at home. Every single one of these issues is under discussion with the Soviets -- so you can see why if you were the Soviet negotiator you would not get down to serious business. You would simply sit back and wait to see how much of your work would be done for you by Congress' left-wing league of would-be Metternichs.

The upcoming negotiations with the Soviets are important. I can't and I won't have my hands tied. Today I'm asking your help in calling on Speaker O'Neill and the rest of the Democratic leadership to return to the spirit of national unity and bipartisan cooperation, to let me carry out the constitutional duty of the Presidency. I'm asking you to tell them I need to conduct American foreign policy without the meddlesome cries and partisan obstructionism of the "Blame America Firsters" in the Congress.

It won't be easy to make the diehard liberals listen. Many of them believe that the only way to score political points on this Administration is to manipulate the arms control issue and engage in scare talk about our relationship with the Soviets. But, as I said at the beginning, over the long run the people are

the experts; eventually they will see through such callous disregard of national security for the sake of partisan advantage. So, please help me remind these Members of the Congress who are jeopardizing our negotiations with the Soviets that theirs is a narrow and unworthy course to follow -- one for which they will be held accountable by both history and the American people.

MIKE

Radio Address -- Outline

Subject -- Iceland Meeting/house language on Arms Control

Iceland Meeting:

Define why going

- * Suggested by Gorbachev
- * RR said no unless Danilooff freed
- * Danilooff freed/we agreed
- * Want to discuss issues of importance in preparation for Summit here in U.S.

Outline Issues:

- * Regional Conflicts
- * Human Rights
- * Arms Reduction

Goals:

Move closer to agreements on major issues/instructions to negotiators

Narrow agenda for United States Summit meeting

House Language:

Need to make sharp attack on House Democrats restrictive language on ASAT/et al

- * Irresponsible/jeopardizes possibility of successful arms reduction talk
- * Signals to the Soviets -- just wait, you will obtain better deal at Congressional Committee ~~Table~~ than you will obtain at Geneva Arms Table.
- * There is one President/one Secretary of State -- "I will not have my hands tied/peace talk too important to play politics"
- * We should be negotiating with the Soviets/not ourselves
- * Call on Speaker to control those in his party who are attempting to torpedo talks
- * If he won't -- I will/promise ^a quick veto if restrictive language stays in or if suggest a short term extension -- because this only says to Soviets wait -- you might do better later.

To: Tony Dolan
From: Sestanovich

MIKE
possibly for
radio:

the four issues that President Reagan identified as being crucial for the future of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in his closing statement at the summit meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev last November 22. The questions asked by the President were: a) "Will we join together in sharply reducing offensive nuclear arms and moving to nonnuclear defensive systems to make this a safer world?"; b) "Will we join together to help bring about a peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa, and Central America so that the peoples there can freely determine their own destinies without outside interference?"; c) "Will the cause of liberty be advanced?"; and d) "Will the treaties and agreements signed, past and future, be fulfilled?"