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Carol

(GILDER)

11/20/87 - 11 A.M.

DROPBY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS
ON I.N.F. TREATY

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1987

THANK YOU. THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH AND
WELCOME TO THE OLD EXECUTIVE OFFICE
BUILDING.

IT IS WONDERFUL TO SEE SO MANY FAMILIAR
FACES -- SO MANY OLD FRIENDS AND SUPPORTERS.
TOGETHER WE'VE WON SOME REMARKABLE VICTORIES
IN THE LAST 7 YEARS. BUT AS I TOLD
CAP WEINBERGER THE OTHER DAY AT THE
PENTAGON, THE JOB ISN'T FINISHED, AND ANYONE
WHO THINKS WE'RE GOING TO BE JUST SITTING
AROUND ON OUR LAURELS THESE LAST 14 MONTHS,
BETTER GUESS AGAIN.

IT'S LIKE THE STORY OF WINSTON CHURCHILL TOWARD THE CLOSE OF WORLD WAR II. HE WAS VISITED BY A DELEGATION FROM THE TEMPERANCE LEAGUE AND CHASTISED BY ONE WOMAN WHO SAID, "MR. PRIME MINISTER, I'VE HEARD THAT IF ALL THE BRANDY YOU HAVE DRUNK SINCE THE WAR BEGAN WERE Poured INTO THIS ROOM, IT WOULD COME ALL THE WAY UP TO YOUR WAIST." CHURCHILL LOOKED DOLEFULLY DOWN AT THE FLOOR, THEN AT HIS WAIST, THEN UP TO THE CEILING, AND SAID, "AH, YES, MADAM, SO MUCH ACCOMPLISHED, SO VERY MUCH MORE LEFT TO DO."

WELL, ONE THING LEFT TO DO -- ONE OF THE GREAT CHALLENGES OF THESE NEXT MONTHS -- WILL BE SEEING IF WE CAN WORK OUT WITH THE SOVIET UNION A BETTER ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS YOU KNOW, I WILL BE MEETING HERE IN WASHINGTON WITH GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV.

IF ALL GOES WELL, WE WILL SIGN AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, ELIMINATE AN ENTIRE CLASS OF U.S. AND SOVIET MISSILES. IT'S A GOOD BARGAIN. FOR EVERY NUCLEAR WARHEAD OF OUR OWN WE REMOVE, THEY WILL GIVE UP FOUR.

IT WOULD, HOWEVER, BE HASTY TO ASSUME THAT WE'RE AT THE POINT WHERE WE ARE READY TO PUT PEN TO PAPER AND SIGN THE TREATY. FOR ONE THING, IN AT LEAST ONE IMPORTANT AREA -- VERIFICATION -- THE TREATY IS NOT YET COMPLETE.

ANY TREATY I AGREE TO MUST PROVIDE FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION, INCLUDING ON-SITE INSPECTION OF FACILITIES BEFORE AND DURING REDUCTION AND SHORT-NOTICE INSPECTION AFTERWARDS. THE VERIFICATION REGIME WE HAVE PUT FORWARD IN GENEVA IS THE MOST STRINGENT IN THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS.

WE HAVE COME THIS FAR ONLY BECAUSE WE HAVE BEEN PATIENT AND UNWAVERING IN OUR COMMITMENT TO A STRONG AND VITAL NATIONAL DEFENSE. CONTRARY TO WHAT SOME HAVE SAID, WE HAVE BEEN AT THIS FOR SOME TIME. AS I SAID AT WEST POINT, WE MADE THIS PROPOSAL NEARLY 6 YEARS AGO. OUR OPPONENTS DISMISSED IT AS UNREALISTIC BECAUSE IT WAS TOO ONE-SIDED IN OUR FAVOR. THEN THE SOVIETS TRIED TO GET US TO ELIMINATE THE S.D.I. PROGRAM. I REFUSED. THE MORAL IS THAT PATIENCE, CONSISTENCY, FIRM NEGOTIATING, AND CLEAR OBJECTIVES COUNT MUCH MORE WITH THE SOVIETS THAN GOOD INTENTIONS. I AM FOR THIS AGREEMENT, NOT BECAUSE I HAVE ANY ILLUSIONS ABOUT THE SOVIET SYSTEM, BUT BECAUSE IT IS A GOOD DEAL FOR THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES. THAT'S WHY I AM ASKING FOR YOUR SUPPORT AND HELP IN CONVINCING THE SENATE TO RATIFY THIS TREATY.

WE ARE ALSO MOVING AHEAD WITH NEGOTIATIONS ON OUR PROPOSAL TO REDUCE U.S. AND SOVIET STRATEGIC ARSENALS BY HALF. OUR GENEVA NEGOTIATORS HAVE MADE PROGRESS. THE SOVIETS MUST, HOWEVER, STOP HOLDING STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE MISSILE REDUCTIONS HOSTAGE TO MEASURES THAT WOULD CRIPPLE OUR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF S.D.I.

IT'S NO LONGER A SECRET THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS SPENT BILLIONS UPON BILLIONS OF DOLLARS DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING THEIR OWN ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN SOME PARTS OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM -- WE CALL IT THE "RED SHIELD" -- BEGAN MORE THAN 15 YEARS AGO. TODAY, SOVIET CAPABILITIES INCLUDE EVERYTHING FROM KILLER-SATELLITES TO THE MODERNIZED A.B.M. DEFENSES THAT RING MOSCOW.

MORE THAN 10,000 SOVIET SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ARE WORKING ON MILITARY LASERS ALONE -- WITH THOUSANDS MORE DEVELOPING OTHER ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES SUCH AS PARTICLE BEAM AND KINETIC ENERGY WEAPONS.

THE SOVIET RED SHIELD PROGRAM DWARFS S.D.I. YET, THERE HAS BEEN A STRANGE TENDENCY BY SOME IN CONGRESS TO DISCUSS S.D.I. AS IF ITS FUNDING COULD BE DETERMINED BY PURELY DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS, UNCONNECTED TO WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING. S.D.I. IS TOO IMPORTANT TO BE SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL LOG-ROLLING. IT IS A VITAL INSURANCE POLICY, A NECESSARY PART OF ANY NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY THAT INCLUDES DEEP REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IN DECADES TO COME, IT WILL UNDERWRITE ALL OF US AGAINST SOVIET CHEATING ON BOTH STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE AGREEMENTS.

S.D.I. LEADS US AWAY FROM THE DAYS OF MUTUAL ASSURED DESTRUCTION TO A FUTURE OF MUTUAL ASSURED SAFETY. IT GOES HAND-IN-HAND WITH ARMS REDUCTIONS. WE CANNOT -- WE WILL NOT -- BARGAIN IT AWAY TO GET STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS.

S.D.I. WILL ALSO PROTECT US AGAINST ACCIDENTAL MISSILE LAUNCHES AND BALLISTIC MISSILE THREATS -- WHETHER WITH NUCLEAR, CONVENTIONAL, OR CHEMICAL WARHEADS -- FROM OUTLAW REGIMES. IN THE DECADES AHEAD, WE CAN'T BE SURE JUST WHO WILL GET ACCESS TO BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY -- HOW COMPETENT THEY WILL BE OR HOW RATIONAL. WE MUST HAVE AN INSURANCE POLICY AGAINST THAT DAY, AS WELL.

NO, S.D.I. IS NOT A BARGAINING CHIP. IT IS A CORNERSTONE OF OUR SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE 1990'S AND BEYOND. WE WILL RESEARCH IT. WE WILL DEVELOP IT. AND WHEN IT IS READY, WE WILL DEPLOY IT. REMEMBER THIS: IF BOTH SIDES HAVE DEFENSES, IT CAN BE A SAFER WORLD. BUT IF WE LEAVE THE SOVIETS WITH A MONOPOLY IN THIS VITAL AREA, OUR SECURITY WILL BE GRAVELY JEOPARDIZED. WE MUST NOT LET THAT HAPPEN.

NOW, IF I MAY, I'D LIKE TO TURN TO ANOTHER ISSUE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE -- FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. WITH OUR AID, THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAVE MADE IMPRESSIVE GAINS IN THE FIELD AND BROUGHT THE COMMUNIST SANDINISTAS TO DO SOMETHING THAT THEY NEVER WOULD HAVE DONE OTHERWISE -- NEGOTIATE.

I HOPE THE MEMBERS OF OUR OWN CONGRESS WILL NOT FORGET THIS IMPORTANT FACT: WITHOUT THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, THERE WOULD BE NO ARIAS PEACE PLAN, THERE WOULD BE NO NEGOTIATIONS AND NO HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA. AN ENTRENCHED, HOSTILE COMMUNIST REGIME IN NICARAGUA WOULD BE AN IRREVERSIBLE FACT OF LIFE. THE SANDINISTAS WOULD HAVE PERMANENTLY CONSOLIDATED AND FORTIFIED A NEW CUBA ON THE AMERICAN MAINLAND.

WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, CONGRESS WILL HAVE TO VOTE ON FURTHER AID TO THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS. WITHOUT THAT AID, THE SANDINISTAS WILL KNOW ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS PLAY A WAITING GAME. THEY WILL HAVE NO INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE, NO INCENTIVE TO MAKE REAL CONCESSIONS TO FULFILL THE PEACE AGREEMENT.

IF CONGRESS PULLS THE PLUG ON THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS, THEY WILL HAVE ACCOMPLISHED WHAT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN SOVIET AID COULD NOT -- EXTINGUISHING ALL HOPE OF FREEDOM IN NICARAGUA AND LEAVING THE NEIGHBORING CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES NAKED TO COMMUNIST AGGRESSION.

IT'S THE NICARAGUAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS WHO BROUGHT THE SANDINISTAS TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE. IT IS THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS -- AND ONLY THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS -- WHO CAN KEEP THEM THERE. IF WE'RE SERIOUS ABOUT THE PEACE PROCESS, WE MUST KEEP THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS ALIVE AND STRONG UNTIL THEY CAN ONCE AGAIN RETURN HOME TO TAKE PART IN A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC NICARAGUAN SOCIETY. THEY ARE BRAVE MEN AND THEY HAVE SACRIFICED MUCH IN THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM. THEY DESERVE NO LESS.

THERE WILL BE FEW MORE IMPORTANT VOTES IN CONGRESS THAN THIS ONE, AND AS I HAVE SO OFTEN IN THE PAST, I'LL BE COUNTING ON YOUR ACTIVE SUPPORT. WITH YOUR HELP, I KNOW WE CAN WIN THIS ONE.

NOW, AS YOU KNOW, ON FRIDAY WE ANNOUNCED A BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT ON THE BUDGET THAT WILL COVER NOT JUST 1 YEAR, BUT 2.

NOW, THIS MAY NOT BE THE BEST DEAL THAT COULD BE MADE -- BUT IT IS A GOOD, SOLID BEGINNING. IT PROVIDES THE NECESSARY SERVICES FOR OUR PEOPLE, MAINTAINS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, AND DOES SO AT A LEVEL THAT DOES NOT OVER-BURDEN THE AVERAGE AMERICAN TAXPAYER.

WE HAVE COMMITTED OURSELVES TO A FISCAL PATH THAT WILL LEAD TO CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY AND PROVIDE A SOLID BASE FOR ECONOMIC STABILITY IN THE FUTURE.

FINALLY, I'D LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT ANOTHER SUBJECT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ALL OF US -- THE CONFIRMATION OF JUDGE KENNEDY AS AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ON THE SUPREME COURT.

IN CHOOSING TO NOMINATE JUDGE KENNEDY TO THE SUPREME COURT, I KEPT IN MIND THE FACT THAT CRIMINAL CASES MAKE UP THE LARGEST CATEGORY OF CASES THE SUPREME COURT MUST DECIDE. THESE CASES ARE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT TO THE POOR, INNER CITY RESIDENTS AND MINORITY GROUPS, SINCE THESE AMERICANS ARE VICTIMIZED BY CRIME TO A DISPROPORTIONATE EXTENT.

JUDGE KENNEDY'S RECORD ON CRIMINAL LAW IS CLEAR -- INDEED, HE HAS PARTICIPATED IN HUNDREDS OF CRIMINAL LAW DECISIONS. HE HAS EARNED A REPUTATION AS A JURIST WHO IS TOUGH, BUT FAIR.

HIS DECISIONS HAVE HELPED, RATHER THAN HINDERED, THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH IN THE COURTROOM. AND HE'S BEEN SENSITIVE TO THE NEEDS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT PROFESSIONALS, WHO EACH DAY RISK THEIR LIVES IN THE REAL WORLD OF STREET CRIME AND VIOLENCE.

EVERY DAY THAT PASSES WITH THE SUPREME COURT BELOW FULL STRENGTH IMPAIRS THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS IN THAT CRUCIALLY IMPORTANT BODY. JUDGE KENNEDY HAS ALREADY WON BIPARTISAN PRAISE FROM THE SENATE -- AND I KNOW YOU JOIN ME IN LOOKING FORWARD TO PROMPT SENATE HEARINGS, CONDUCTED IN A SPIRIT OF COOPERATION.

WELL, OBVIOUSLY WE'VE GOT OUR WORK CUT OUT FOR US; AND AS I SAID, THERE WILL BE NO RESTING ON OUR LAURELS. IN POLITICS, AS IN LIFE, IF YOU'RE NOT MOVING FORWARD, YOU'RE SLIPPING BACK.

- 14 -

SO WE'RE TURNING ON THE GAS, PUTTING THE
PEDAL TO THE METAL, AS THEY SAY --
WE'RE MAKING TRACKS.

WELL, THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH AND GOD
BLESS YOU.

#

(Gilder/ARD)
November 19, 1987
6:30 p.m. ~~RP~~

*NSC + 12
for Foreign Affairs Foundation
T.R.
Gilder 11/23/87*

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS
ON I.N.F. TREATY
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1987

Thank you. Thank you all very much and welcome to the Old Executive Office Building.

It is wonderful to see so many familiar faces -- so many old friends and supporters. Together we've won some remarkable victories in the last 7 years. But as I told Cap Weinberger the other day at the Pentagon, the job isn't finished, and anyone who thinks we're going to be just sitting around on our laurels these last 14 months, better guess again.

It's like the story of Winston Churchill toward the close of World War II. He was visited by a delegation from the temperance league and chastised by one woman who said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I've heard that if all the whiskey you have drunk since the war began were poured into this room, it would come all the way up to your waist." Churchill looked dolefully down at the floor, then at his waist, then up to the ceiling, and said, "Ah, yes, madam, so much accomplished, so very much more left to do."

Well, one thing left to do -- one of the great challenges of these next months -- will be seeing if we can work out with the Soviet Union a better answer to nuclear weapons. As you know, I will be meeting here in Washington with General Secretary Gorbachev. If all goes well, we will sign an agreement that will, for the first time in history, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. It's a good bargain. For every

nuclear warhead of our own we remove, they will give up four. I wish I could negotiate a deal like that with Congress.

It would, however, be hasty to assume that we're at the point where we are ready to put pen to paper and sign the treaty. For one thing, in at least one important area -- verification -- the treaty is not yet complete.

Any treaty I agree to must provide for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reduction and short-notice inspection afterwards. The verification regime we have put forward in Geneva is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations.

We have come this far only because we have been patient and unwavering in our commitment to a strong and vital national defense. Contrary to what some have said, we have been at this for some time. As I said at West Point, we made this proposal nearly 6 years ago. Our opponents dismissed it as unrealistic because it was too one-sided in our favor. Then the Soviets tried to get us to eliminate the S.D.I. program. I refused. The moral is that patience, consistency, firm negotiating, and clear objectives count much more with the Soviets than good intentions. I am for this agreement, not because I have any illusions about the Soviet system, but because it is a good deal for the United States and its allies. That's why I am asking for your support and help in convincing the Senate to ratify this treaty.

We are also moving ahead with negotiations on our proposal to reduce U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals by half. Our Geneva negotiators have made progress. The Soviets must, however, stop

holding strategic offensive missile reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our research and development of S.D.I.

It's no longer a secret that the Soviet Union has spent billions upon billions of dollars developing and deploying their own anti-ballistic missile defenses. Research and development in some parts of the Soviet Strategic Defense program -- we call it the "Red Shield" -- began more than 15 years ago. Today, Soviet capabilities include everything from killer-satellites to the modernized A.B.M. defenses that ring Moscow. More than 10,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are working on military lasers alone -- with thousands more developing other advanced technologies such as particle beam and kinetic energy weapons.

The Soviet Red Shield program dwarfs S.D.I. Yet, there has been a strange tendency by some in Congress to discuss S.D.I. as if its funding could be determined by purely domestic considerations, unconnected to what the Soviets are doing. S.D.I. is too important to be subject to congressional log-rolling. It is a vital insurance policy, a necessary part of any national security strategy that includes deep reductions in strategic weapons. In decades to come, it will underwrite all of us against Soviet cheating on both strategic and intermediate-range missile agreements. S.D.I. leads us away from the days of mutual assured destruction to a future of mutual assured safety. It goes hand-in-hand with arms reductions. We cannot -- we will not -- bargain it away to get strategic arms reductions.

S.D.I. will also protect us against accidental missile launches and ballistic missile threats -- whether with nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads -- from outlaw regimes. In the decades ahead, we can't be sure just who will get access to ballistic missile technology -- how competent they will be or how rational. We must have an insurance policy against that day, as well.

No, S.D.I. is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990's and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we will deploy it. Remember this: If both sides have defenses, it can be a safer world. But if we leave the Soviets with a monopoly in this vital area, our security will be gravely jeopardized. We must not let that happen.

Now, if I may, I'd like to turn to another issue of vital importance -- freedom and democracy in Central America. With our aid, the Nicaraguan freedom fighters have made impressive gains in the field and brought the Communist Sandinistas to do something that they never would have done otherwise -- negotiate.

I hope the Members of our own Congress will not forget this important fact: Without the freedom fighters, there would be no Arias peace plan, there would be no negotiations and no hope for democracy in Nicaragua. An entrenched, hostile Communist regime in Nicaragua would be an irreversible fact of life. The Sandinistas would have permanently consolidated and fortified a new Cuba on the American mainland.

Within the next few weeks, Congress will have to vote on further aid to the freedom fighters. Without that aid, the Sandinistas will know all they have to do is play a waiting game. They will have no incentive to negotiate, no incentive to make real concessions to fulfill the peace agreement.

If Congress pulls the plug on the freedom fighters, they will have accomplished what billions of dollars in Soviet aid could not -- extinguishing all hope of freedom in Nicaragua and leaving the neighboring Central American democracies naked to Communist aggression.

It's the Nicaraguan freedom fighters who brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. It is the freedom fighters -- and only the freedom fighters -- who can keep them there. If we're serious about the peace process, we must keep the freedom fighters alive and strong until they can once again return home to take part in a free and democratic Nicaraguan society. They are brave men and they have sacrificed much in the cause of freedom. They deserve no less. There will be few more important votes in Congress than this one, and as I have so often in the past, I'll be counting on your active support. With your help, I know we can win this one.

(Budget Insert)

Finally, I'd like to say a few words about another subject of great importance to all of us -- the confirmation of Judge Kennedy as an Associate Justice on the Supreme Court.

In choosing to nominate Judge Kennedy to the Supreme Court, I kept in mind the fact that criminal cases make up the largest

category of cases the Supreme Court must decide. These cases are especially important to the poor, inner city residents and minority groups, since these Americans are victimized by crime to a disproportionate extent.

Judge Kennedy's record on criminal law is clear -- indeed, he has participated in hundreds of criminal law decisions. He has earned a reputation as a jurist who is tough, but fair. His decisions have helped, rather than hindered, the search for truth in the courtroom. And he's been sensitive to the needs of law enforcement professionals, who each day risk their lives in the real world of street crime and violence.

Every day that passes with the Supreme Court below full strength impairs the people's business in that crucially important body. Judge Kennedy has already won bipartisan praise from the Senate -- and I know you join me in looking forward to prompt Senate hearings, conducted in a spirit of cooperation.

Well, obviously we've got our work cut out for us; and as I said, there will be no resting on our laurels. In politics, as in life, if you're not moving forward, you're slipping back. So we're turning on the gas, putting the pedal to the metal, as they say -- we're making tracks.

Well, thank you all very much and God bless you.

The President has seen 11/26
(Gilder/ARD)
November 19, 1987
6:30 p.m.

TR

RR

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS
ON I.N.F. TREATY
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1987

Thank you. Thank you all very much and welcome to the Old Executive Office Building.

It is wonderful to see so many familiar faces -- so many old friends and supporters. Together we've won some remarkable victories in the last 7 years. But as I told Cap Weinberger the other day at the Pentagon, the job isn't finished, and anyone who thinks we're going to be just sitting around on our laurels these last 14 months, better guess again.

It's like the story of Winston Churchill toward the close of World War II. He was visited by a delegation from the temperance league and chastised by one woman who said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I've heard that if all the ~~whiskey~~ ^{BRANDY} you have drunk since the war began were poured into this room, it would come all the way up to your waist." Churchill looked dolefully down at the floor, then at his waist, then up to the ceiling, and said, "Ah, yes, madam, so much accomplished, so very much more left to do."

Well, one thing left to do -- one of the great challenges of these next months -- will be seeing if we can work out with the Soviet Union a better answer to nuclear weapons. As you know, I will be meeting here in Washington with General Secretary Gorbachev. If all goes well, we will sign an agreement that will, for the first time in history, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. It's a good bargain. For every

holding strategic offensive missile reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our research and development of S.D.I.

TR

It's no longer a secret that the Soviet Union has spent billions upon billions of dollars developing and deploying their own anti-ballistic missile defenses. Research and development in some parts of the Soviet Strategic Defense program -- we call it the "Red Shield" -- began more than 15 years ago. Today, Soviet capabilities include everything from killer-satellites to the modernized A.B.M. defenses that ring Moscow. More than 10,000 Soviet scientists and engineers are working on military lasers alone -- with thousands more developing other advanced technologies such as particle beam and kinetic energy weapons.

The Soviet "Red Shield" program dwarfs S.D.I. Yet, there has been a strange tendency by some in Congress to discuss S.D.I. as if its funding could be determined by purely domestic considerations, unconnected to what the Soviets are doing. S.D.I. is too important to be subject to congressional log-rolling. It is a vital insurance policy, a necessary part of any national security strategy that includes deep reductions in strategic weapons. In decades to come, it will underwrite all of us against Soviet cheating on both strategic and intermediate-range missile agreements. S.D.I. leads us away from the days of mutual assured destruction to a future of mutual assured safety. It goes hand-in-hand with arms reductions. We cannot -- we will not -- bargain it away to get strategic arms reductions.

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It is better than Soviet "Cosmos" Program;

Culvahouse

November 18, 1987
6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS
OF I.N.F. TREATY
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1987

Thank you. Thank you all very much and welcome to the Old Executive Office Building.

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It's like the story of Winston Churchill toward the close of World War II. He was visited by a delegation from the temperance league and chastised by one woman who said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I've heard that if all the whiskey you have drunk since the war began were poured into this room, it would come all the way up to your waist." Churchill looked dolefully down at the floor, then at his waist, then up to the ceiling, and said, "Ah, yes, madam, so much accomplished, so very much more left to do."

Well, one thing left to do -- one of the great challenges of these next months -- will be seeing if we can work out with the Soviet Union a better answer to nuclear weapons. As you know, I will be meeting here in Washington with Secretary Gorbachev. If all goes well, we will sign an agreement that will, for the first time in history, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. It's a good bargain. For every nuclear warhead of our

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own we remove, they will give up four. I wish I could negotiate a deal like that with Congress.

Recently, all seven living former Secretaries of Defense were asked if they would recommend this agreement to the President if they were still in office. All seven said yes -- it's a good ^{idea} ~~agreement~~.

It would, however, be hasty to assume that we're at the point where we are ready to put pen to paper and sign the treaty. For one thing, in ^{at least} one important area -- verification -- the treaty is not yet complete. Now, neither on this issue nor any other do I hold any illusions about the Soviets. It's said that for them, past arms control treaties were like diets. The second day was always the best, because that's when they broke them.

Any treaty I agree to must provide for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reduction and short-notice inspection afterwards. The verification regime we have put forward in Geneva is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. I will not settle for anything less.

We are also moving ahead with an agreement on reducing our two nations' strategic arsenals by half. Our Geneva negotiators have made progress. The Soviets must, however, stop holding strategic offensive missile reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our research and development of S.D.I.

It's no longer a secret that the Soviet Union has spent billions upon billions of dollars developing their own anti-ballistic missile defense. Research and development in some

parts of the "Cosmos" weapons program began more than 15 years ago. Today it includes everything from killer-satellites to the modernized A.B.M. defenses that ring Moscow. More than 10,000 scientists are working on military lasers alone -- with thousands more developing other advanced technologies such as particle beam and kinetic energy weapons.

The Soviet "Cosmos" weapons program dwarfs S.D.I. Yet some in Congress would bind us to an overly-restrictive interpretation of the A.B.M. treaty that would effectively block development of S.D.I., giving the Soviets a monopoly in anti-ballistic missile defenses. This effort to tie our hands makes even less sense when the Soviets aren't abiding by the A.B.M. treaty. Whatever interpretation you give the A.B.M. treaty, broad or strict, the Soviets are violating it. Two of the A.B.M. treaty's biggest proponents in this country -- Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy -- agree that the Soviet construction of the large, phase-array radar at Krasnoyarsk is almost certainly a violation of A.B.M.

Tying our hands to a treaty that the other side feels perfectly free to violate amounts to nothing more than unilateral disarmament. And as I promised Cap the other day in his farewell at the Pentagon -- we're not unilaterally disarming in this area, or any other area.

A recent report released by the Department of Defense called "The Soviet Space Challenge" warns that the Soviets are developing a space-launch capability much greater than that of the United States. The report estimates that the Soviet launch

requirements will be two to three times our own, while their proposed launch capability between 1990 and 2005 is nearly double any requirement we can identify. "Clearly," the Secretary of Defense states, "the Soviet program points in one direction -- the methodical pursuit of a war-fighting capability in space."

This report raises an ominous specter. Together with the long-standing "Cosmos" weapons program and the completion, with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, of an early warning and tracking system -- the Soviets may soon be in a position to "break out" of the A.B.M. Treaty, to confront us with a fait accompli which we will be totally and dangerously unprepared for.

There has been a strange tendency by some in Congress to discuss S.D.I. as if its funding could be determined by purely domestic considerations, unconnected to what the Soviets are doing. S.D.I. is too important to be subject to congressional log-rolling. It is a vital insurance policy, a necessary part of any national security strategy that includes deep reductions in strategic weapons. In decades to come, it will underwrite all of us against Soviet cheating on both strategic and intermediate-range missile agreements. It goes hand-in-hand with arms reductions. We cannot -- we will not -- bargain it away to get strategic arms reductions.

S.D.I. will also protect us against accidental missile launches and ballistic missile threats -- whether with nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads -- from outlaw regimes. In the decades ahead, missile technology will proliferate, just as nuclear-weapons technology already has. We can't be sure just

who will get it -- how competent they will be or how rational. We must have an insurance policy against that day, as well.

No, S.D.I. is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990's and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we will deploy it. Remember this: If both sides have defenses, it can be a safer world. But if we leave the Soviets with a monopoly in this vital area, our security will be gravely jeopardized. We must not let that happen.

My talks with General Secretary Gorbachev will cover the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations -- including human rights in the Soviet Union, exchanges between our peoples, and Soviet involvement in regional conflicts such as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua.

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- 6 -

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Numbers vary, but one study by the Rand Corporation estimated that in 1983 between 3.56 and 4.44 percent of the Soviet gross national product went to subsidize states supporting Soviet aims. It's estimated that the Soviet war on Afghanistan

costs them between \$5 billion and \$6 billion a year. The Soviet bloc has supplied some \$2 billion in military hardware to the Sandinistas alone.

Meanwhile, Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Angola have recently suffered devastating defeats at the hands of the freedom fighters in those nations. According to C.B.S. news, an operation by the Mujahadeen last spring, led by the courageous General Wardock, inflicted the heaviest losses on the Soviet Army since Stalingrad. ___ tanks, ___ troop carriers, and some ___ aircraft were destroyed, and ___ Soviet troops fell to the Afghan freedom fighters in just that one single operation.

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When I meet with General Secretary Gorbachev, I will ask him: Isn't it time that the Soviet Union put an end to these destructive, wasteful conflicts around the world? Without an end to Soviet efforts to impose totalitarian regimes through force of arms, I will tell him, there can never be a true glasnost, true openness, between this nation and ours.

I will also make it clear that the greatest stumbling block to increased cooperation and exchange between our two nations is Soviet support for Communist tyranny in Nicaragua. Here too, the

Soviet-backed forces are hurting. With our aid, the Nicaraguan freedom fighters have made impressive gains in the field and brought the Communist Sandinistas to do something that they never would have done otherwise -- negotiate.

If I can turn to the domestic side of this question for a moment, I hope the Members of our own Congress will not forget this important fact: Without the freedom fighters, there would be no Arias peace plan, there would be no negotiations and no hope for democracy in Nicaragua. An entrenched, hostile Communist regime in Nicaragua would be an irreversible fact of life. The Sandinistas would have permanently consolidated and fortified a new Cuba on the American mainland.

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The Sandinistas will know that Congress, by pulling the plug on the freedom fighters accomplished what they and their billions of dollars in Soviet aid could not -- the final extinguishment of all hope of freedom and democracy in Nicaragua.

It's the Nicaraguan freedom fighters that brought the Sandinistas to the negotiating table. It is the freedom

fighters -- and only the freedom fighters -- that can keep them there. If we're serious about this peace process, we must keep the freedom fighters alive and strong until they can once again return home to take part in a free and democratic Nicaraguan society. They are brave men ^{and women} and they have sacrificed much in the cause of freedom. They deserve no less. ✓

There will be few more important votes in Congress than this one, and as I have so often in the past, I'll be counting on your active support. With your help, I know we can win this one.

Well, thank you very much, and God bless you all.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TR

November 19, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ANTHONY R. DOLAN
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF SPEECHWRITING

FROM: ARTHUR B. CULVAHOUSE, JR. 
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks: Dropby Briefing for
Reagan Activists of I.N.F. Treaty
(11/18 - 6:00 P.M. Draft)

Counsel's office has reviewed the above-referenced remarks and has indicated several minor edits on the attached draft.

We defer to NSC, as to whether the tough tone of the remarks is appropriate to this occasion.

Attachment

cc: Rhett B. Dawson

(Gilder/ARD)
November 18, 1987
6:00 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPHY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS
OF I.N.F. TREATY
MONDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1987

Thank you. Thank you all very much and welcome to the Old Executive Office Building.

It is wonderful to see so many familiar faces -- so many old friends and supporters. Together we've won some remarkable victories in the last 7 years. But as I told Cap Weinberger the other day at the Pentagon, the job isn't finished, and anyone who thinks we're going to be just sitting around on our laurels these last 14 months, better guess again.

It's like the story of Winston Churchill toward the close of World War II. He was visited by a delegation from the temperance league and chastised by one woman who said, "Mr. Prime Minister, I've heard that if all the whiskey you have drunk since the war began were poured into this room, it would come all the way up to your waist." Churchill looked dolefully down at the floor, then at his waist, then up to the ceiling, and said, "Ah, yes, madam, so much accomplished, so very much more left to do."

Well, one thing left to do -- one of the great challenges of these next months -- will be seeing if we can work out with the Soviet Union a better answer to nuclear weapons. As you know, I will be meeting here in Washington with Secretary Gorbachev. If all goes well, we will sign an agreement that will, for the first time in history, eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet missiles. It's a good bargain. For every nuclear warhead of our

own we remove, they will give up four. I wish I could negotiate a deal like that with Congress.

Recently, all seven living former Secretaries of Defense were asked if they would recommend this agreement to the President if they were still in office. All seven said yes -- it's a good ^{idea} ~~agreement~~.

It would, however, be hasty to assume that we're at the point where we are ready to put pen to paper and sign the treaty. For one thing, in ^{at least} one important area -- verification -- the treaty is not yet complete. Now, neither on this issue nor any other do I hold any illusions about the Soviets. It's said that for them, past arms control treaties were like diets. The second day was always the best, because that's when they broke them.

Any treaty I agree to must provide for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reduction and short-notice inspection afterwards. The verification regime we have put forward in Geneva is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. I will not settle for anything less.

We are also moving ahead with an agreement on reducing our two nations' strategic arsenals by half. Our Geneva negotiators have made progress. The Soviets must, however, stop holding strategic offensive missile reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our research and development of S.D.I.

It's no longer a secret that the Soviet Union has spent billions upon billions of dollars developing their own anti-ballistic missile defense. Research and development in some

parts of the "Cosmos" weapons program began more than 15 years ago. Today it includes everything from killer-satellites to the modernized A.B.M. defenses that ring Moscow. More than 10,000 scientists are working on military lasers alone -- with thousands more developing other advanced technologies such as particle beam and kinetic energy weapons.

The Soviet "Cosmos" weapons program dwarfs S.D.I. Yet some in Congress would bind us to an overly-restrictive interpretation of the A.B.M. treaty that would effectively block development of S.D.I., giving the Soviets a monopoly in anti-ballistic missile defenses. This effort to tie our hands makes even less sense when the Soviets aren't abiding by the A.B.M. treaty. Whatever interpretation you give the A.B.M. treaty, broad or strict, the Soviets are violating it. Two of the A.B.M. treaty's biggest proponents in this country -- Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy -- agree that the Soviet construction of the large, phase-array radar at Krasnoyarsk is almost certainly a violation of A.B.M.

Tying our hands to a treaty that the other side feels perfectly free to violate amounts to nothing more than unilateral disarmament. And as I promised Cap the other day in his farewell at the Pentagon -- we're not unilaterally disarming in this area, or any other area.

A recent report released by the Department of Defense called "The Soviet Space Challenge" warns that the Soviets are developing a space-launch capability much greater than that of the United States. The report estimates that the Soviet launch

requirements will be two to three times our own, while their proposed launch capability between 1990 and 2005 is nearly double any requirement we can identify. "Clearly," the Secretary of Defense states, "the Soviet program points in one direction -- the methodical pursuit of a war-fighting capability in space."

This report raises an ominous specter. Together with the long-standing "Cosmos" weapons program and the completion, with the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar, of an early warning and tracking system -- the Soviets may soon be in a position to "break out" of the A.B.M. Treaty, to confront us with a fait accompli which we will be totally and dangerously unprepared for.

There has been a strange tendency by some in Congress to discuss S.D.I. as if its funding could be determined by purely domestic considerations, unconnected to what the Soviets are doing. S.D.I. is too important to be subject to congressional log-rolling. It is a vital insurance policy, a necessary part of any national security strategy that includes deep reductions in strategic weapons. In decades to come, it will underwrite all of us against Soviet cheating on both strategic and intermediate-range missile agreements. It goes hand-in-hand with arms reductions. We cannot -- we will not -- bargain it away to get strategic arms reductions.

S.D.I. will also protect us against accidental missile launches and ballistic missile threats -- whether with nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads -- from outlaw regimes. In the decades ahead, missile technology will proliferate, just as nuclear-weapons technology already has. We can't be sure just

who will get it -- how competent they will be or how rational. We must have an insurance policy against that day, as well.

No, S.D.I. is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990's and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we will deploy it. Remember this: If both sides have defenses, it can be a safer world. But if we leave the Soviets with a monopoly in this vital area, our security will be gravely jeopardized. We must not let that happen.

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There will be few more important votes in Congress than this one, and as I have so often in the past, I'll be counting on your active support. With your help, I know we can win this one.

Well, thank you very much, and God bless you all.

ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

Special Program
EDITOR'S NOTE: PART I OF
A TWO PART SERIES

WETA-TV
PBS Network

October 23, 1987 10:00 PM

Washington, DC

Annual Conference of Former Secretaries of Defense

ANNOUNCER: This program was recorded live before an audience at the Atlanta Civic Center on September 25, 1987.

The Defense Secretaries discussed arms control, nuclear issues, and U.S.-Soviet relations.

The moderator is Edwin Newman.

EDWIN NEWMAN: Welcome to this Conference of Former Secretaries of Defense. This program is being brought to you by the Southern Center for International Studies, and marks the first time that all seven of these men have gathered in a public forum to discuss their views on defense issues. They were the leading advisers to five Presidents on defense matters during some of the most critical periods of our history. Three of these men served in democratic administrations, four in republican.

Robert McNamara was Secretary of Defense from 1961 to '68

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under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. He was president of the World Bank from 1968 until 1981.

Clark Clifford served as Secretary of Defense from 1968 to '69 under President Johnson. Before that, he had been a special counsellor to President Truman and a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Melvin Laird served as Secretary of Defense from 1969 until 1973 under President Nixon. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1952 and served there for eight consecutive terms.

Elliot Richardson served as Secretary of Defense in 1973 under President Nixon. He has also been an ambassador, Secretary of Housing, Education and Welfare, Secretary of Commerce, Attorney General, and Undersecretary of State.

James Schlesinger served as Secretary of Defense from 1973 to '75 under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He's also been Director of Central Intelligence and Secretary of Energy.

Donald Rumsfeld served as Secretary of Defense from 1975 to '77 under President Ford. Before that, he was Chief of Staff at the White House under President Ford, and later was President Reagan's Special Envoy for the Middle East.

Harold Brown served as Secretary of Defense from 1977 to 1981 under President Carter. He has also been Secretary of the Air Force, Undersecretary of Defense, and a member of the United

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States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

We will begin our discussion in a moment.

* * *

NEWMAN: Gentlemen, as we all know, the United States and the Soviet Union have at least tentatively and in principle reached an agreement covering nuclear weapons in Europe. This agreement will eliminate short-ranged ground-based missiles -- that is to say, missiles with a range of 300-to-600 miles within one year. It would eliminate missiles with a range of 600-to-3,000 miles within three years. It would eliminate the Pershing II missiles in West Germany, and it would provide for verification of all of this.

I would like each of you to tell me, briefly at first, if you would, whether you would have recommended such an agreement to the President.

Mr. McNamara?

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ROBERT McNAMARA: Indeed I would. It's militarily of little importance, but politically very significant. It'll lay the foundation for the major arms control agreements that lie ahead.

NEWMAN: Mr. Clifford?

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CLARK CLIFFORD: I support it without qualification. I do so in the knowledge, however, that each day we are continuing to manufacture more nuclear weapons, and so is the Soviet Union.

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This treaty that may be entered into applies to only approximately three percent of the nuclear weapons that exist in the world, so the big task still lies ahead.

NEWMAN: Mr. Laird?

MELVIN LAIRD: Yes, I would recommend this to the President. I think we have to give great credit to our allies in Western Europe, though, for going forward. This proposal was first made by President Carter. It was made in 1981 by President Reagan. If our Western European allies would not have gone ahead with the deployment, the Soviets would not be at the bargaining table today. This is a first step towards a major breakthrough in arms reductions.

NEWMAN: Mr. Richardson?

ELLIOT RICHARDSON: I would certainly recommend going forward with it, and I think it should be seen as a significant step toward further arms control measures. It's the first one that would actually reduce the number of existing weapons, not by a great amount, as Mr. Clifford points out, but even so it is a contribution to a better climate for additional arms control negotiations.

NEWMAN: Dr. Schlesinger?

DR. JAMES SCHLESINGER: It would be hard to recommend against the proposed agreement. Arms control is intended in the

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long run to ease strategic stability and discourage instability during a period of crisis. This arms control agreement does not do that. But one has to start some place, and this is the place to start.

NEWMAN: Mr. Rumsfeld?

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DONALD RUMSFELD: Possibly within the four corners of the agreement, it's a good agreement. I have the same concern that Jim just expressed, namely that our goal is peace and freedom and stability, and it's difficult to reach into one element of the spectrum of deterrence and not address very carefully the issue of instabilities that might be created with respect to the imbalance, for example, in conventional forces.

NEWMAN: We will return to that subject.

Dr. Brown?

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DR. HAROLD BROWN: On balance, this is certainly in the U.S. interest. It produces a military situation within the intermediate range force area. It's better for the U.S. and the allies than we could have anticipated in 1979 when we -- when NATO approved these deployments. It helps U.S.-Soviet relations in terms of possible future negotiations on the more important strategic area -- strategic arms area. There are some political problems that it creates as well as giving us political advantages, but I think those can be managed and, so, on balance I think it cer-

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tainly should be approved. It's much better than having no agreement.

NEWMAN: What are the political problems it creates?

DR. BROWN: It creates some problems in perceptions in Europe, concerns that this may be the beginning of a denuclearization of of Europe, which would, I think, create some real military/political difficulties.

NEWMAN: Dr. Schlesinger?

DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, the Europeans vary between two states, one in which they fear that they will be dominated by the United States, and the other state is that they will be abandoned by the United States, and this has led to the latter fear. The Soviets are exploiting it. The Soviets are saying this is the first step towards the denuclearization of Europe, and we as a country — the government should be very clear in saying to the Europeans, no, there is no plan for the denuclearization of Europe and, in addition, we will continue to rely upon the nuclear deterrent until such as we have developed adequate conventional capabilities. This will relieve much of the European anxiety.

DR. BROWN: Well, except that European leaders also have to say the same thing to their publics, and they have some difficulty doing that because anti-nuclear feeling in Europe, and sometimes in some parts of the United States, is very great. European lead-

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ers have failed to speak out to say that for the foreseeable future part of our security will depend upon the existence of nuclear weapons, and this was, of course, not at all helped by the events at Reykjavik which -- in which the U.S. Government -- at least some parts of it -- was saying a denuclearized world is a safer world.

LAIRD: Harold, I think one of the points that's being overlooked in our discussion thus far -- this puts a certain responsibility on the United States as well as our European allies to go forward and to support conventional forces. It puts a greater reliance on conventional forces.

RICHARDSON: I think it's true, as Mel Laird said, that -- that this moves the INF treaty and focuses new emphasis on the importance of strengthening Western conventional capability. But I think it also ought to be remembered that this is a proposal originally launched by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as a way of getting Soviet SS-20s aimed at Western Europe eliminated. It was he who proposed the zero-to-zero based proposition from the outset under which we would go forward with deployment only if the Soviets did not agree to eliminate those weapons.

It was clear from the Western point of view that this deployment never had a military function except as a way of creating a bargaining chip, and that remains true. We simply reverted to

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the status quo ante leaving the overall deterrent balance as it was before the Soviets began to substitute SS-20s for their earlier intermediate range missiles.

NEWMAN: Mr. Rumsfeld, you appeared in your first reply to have had some reservations.

RUMSFELD: I do. You know, if you set as your goal the elimination of nuclear weapons, then you begin to test your behavior against that goal, and you begin to do things that help you move in that direction. Conversely, if you set as your goal peace, the protection of our security and our freedom, stability in the world, and then test your behavior against that, it may or may not involve reducing or even increasing a given type of nuclear weapon at any given moment. And it seems to me that the real goal is peace and security, and I worry about the context of the debate and discussions that's going to take place in the world, not just in Western Europe, but in the United States and the rest of the world, because to the extent we start chasing the wrong rabbit, namely proceeding on the fallacy that any reduction of nuclear weapons is necessarily good, which it may or may be in terms of stability, then we make a terrible mistake.

McNAMARA: This agreement lays the foundation for strategic arms reduction which is likely to lead to a cut of 50 percent of numbers of warheads, say eliminating 6,000 strategic warheads on

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each side, which is not the major objective. The major objective should be to eliminate 6,000 of the warheads that today add to crisis instability. That's what we've got to watch.

RUMSFELD: I don't have that kind of certainty that he has, that Bob has. I look at the United States' capabilities from a military standpoint, and it's clear over the past 20, 30 years we today, as someone said -- and I don't know who said it, but it's not unreasonable with me -- that we have a small proportion of the sum total of power in the world, and we do, political, economic and military. It seems to me that that argues for us developing stronger, not weaker, relationships with like-thinking nations, and certainly that have principally in Western Europe. And I don't think it's written or clear what our respective directions will be following this agreement. And I think it's going to take a great deal of attention to see that those relationships remain strong and healthy, and I'm not certain what will happen.

NEWMAN: Mr. Clifford?

CLIFFORD: This discussion brings us closer to a fundamental principle that I don't think we've gotten into, so let's get into it now.

There's a great deal of loose conversation in the nuclear field about the aim of the world being to destroy all nuclear weapons. I consider that wholly unrealistic, and I'm not even in

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favor of it, so I'm going to inject this rather controversial subject.

I believe that in addition to the nuclear forces constituting the greatest threat to the world, they also have constituted in a curious way a strange defense and protection. Before anybody would launch a nuclear attack, they must recognize today that they could destroy the world. I'm in favor of cutting down on nuclear weapons. I am unable now to foresee the day when there would not be a nuclear competence in this country that could protect us and warn others against attack.

NEWMAN: Are you saying that there is a definable minimum of nuclear weapons that this country could have without regard to what the Soviet Union has?

CLIFFORD: I'm not saying that at all. I'm saying that as time goes on, for us to hold out an illusion to the American people that the day will come when there are no nuclear weapons in the world is false, and I think we should face up to that and do what we can to correct that misimpression.

NEWMAN: Mr. McNamara, you have said more than once that nuclear weapons have no use except to deter the use of nuclear weapons by others. How far would you go in agreeing with Mr. Clifford?

McNAMARA: My view is, as you've expressed it. I am in a

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very small minority. The majority of security experts, civilian and military of the Western World, believe as Clark does.

Let me make four propositions, because they relate directly to this:

Number one, unlimited nuclear war would destroy our nation.

Number two, it's highly unlikely that once nuclear operations started they could remain limited. Even if they did, it would inflict unacceptable damage on us.

But, number three, as all of my associates believe and as majority security experts believe, the foundation of NATO's strategy today is nuclear deterrence, the threat of the use of these weapons to deter the Soviet use of nuclear weapons and to deter their conventional strike. However, no human being knows how to use them without the high risk of destroying our society. That is a very, very dangerous situation.

I suggest to you that over the next decade or two we should reduce that risk. There are ways to do so.

LAIRD: I agree with both Secretary Clifford and Secretary McNamara. I do think, however, that the day will never come when the Soviet Union and the United States do not have a proper nuclear deterrent. It's necessary for the two super powers to have nuclear weapons, not in the numbers that we have them today, but there could be some third country or some dictator or someone else

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cropping up in some third country in the world, and in order to keep peace and stability I think Clark Clifford is absolutely right. And these people who talk about zero-zero-zero as far as nuclear weapons are concerned are just fooling the people of this world.

NEWMAN: May I put a question here to Dr. Schlesinger because I got the impression -- have the impression from what you said earlier that you thought it was necessary to retain nuclear weapons or perhaps to use nuclear weapons in the event of a Soviet conventional attack in -- in Europe.

DR. SCHLESINGER: That is -- that is, as Bob McNamara has indicated, the strategy of the alliance. It has been the strategy for some 30 years, and it will continue for the foreseeable future to be the strategy.

Mr. McNamara is quite right that we should diminish, if we can, the role of nuclear weapons and deterrence, but they cannot be eliminated, and the United States has pledged to its allies in the intent to preserve the freedom within the alliance that if there is an overwhelming conventional attack by the East that the United States will initiate the use of nuclear weapons. This is the "first use" doctrine. Some, like Bob McNamara, oppose it. I see no alternative for the foreseeable future and, therefore, I do not want to undermine the deterrent effect it undoubtedly has on

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

the Soviets by decrying it.

DR. BROWN: It does have a deterrent effect because the Soviets can't launch a conventional attack with certainty that nuclear weapons will not be used. That is another capability of nuclear weapons beyond the value that they have in preventing nuclear weapons from being used against you. To some extent, they also have made conventional war, at least between the U.S. and the Soviet Union much less likely.

RICHARDSON: I think for the reasons that Don Rumsfeld touched on that we -- we need to see ourselves as exerting leadership towards the development of the kinds of broad-based arrangements that can contribute to preventing conflict, and among these certainly are various measures for crisis stability, early warning systems, confidence building measures, together with the continuing effort to -- to create a better bridge of communication, especially between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, that might make -- even make the Security Council of the U.N. better able to fulfill the original promise held out for it. I think we see a little encouragement.

Nevertheless, though, this is a -- remains an area of priority that doesn't get, I think, enough focus in the context in which we're dealing with -- with only at best marginal contributions, and through peace, and through arms control.

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

CLIFFORD: We sit here in the tranquility of this meeting and discuss rather logically the nuclear threat that exists in the world. There's one phase of it that to me seems complete insanity.

Everyday in our country we are making more nuclear weapons. Everyday in the Soviet Union they're making more nuclear weapons. I can't understand it.

DR. SCHLESINGER: I think it is very important for us to understand why it is that the United States makes additional nuclear weapons.

In the 1940s and '50s, after the discovery of nuclear explosives, those weapons tended to be unsafe. At the time of Palamaris, when a B-52, if I recall it, dropped some weapons we were concerned about the effect.

Over the course of the last 15 years we have been increasing the security and the safety of nuclear weapons to reduce the risk of accidental detonation, and nobody, not even the most enthusiastic arms controller can object to increasing security and safety.

NEWMAN: If I may just ask this question.

Why have the numbers gone down? Have they gone down for technical reasons?

RUMSFELD: They're being reduced because it is possible,

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

with the advances in technology, to have a safer nuclear deterrent with fewer numbers.

McNAMARA: Mr. Moderator, we're spending much too much time on numbers. The problem isn't numbers. We've got 25,000, they've got 25,000 -- 50,000. No human being knows how to launch 100 of those things without the likelihood of destroying our nation. So the problem isn't numbers, *per se*; the problem is, (a) how do we avoid crises; (b) how do we manage them to avoid any use of these.

RUMSFELD: I would make the comment that we're spending....

[Applause].

DR. SCHLESINGER: Well, I cannot bear so much applause for....

McNAMARA: I thought that was very little.

[Laughter].

LAIRD: I really think that was bad. You should have gotten a bigger hand.

DR. SCHLESINGER: Admittedly, Bob, I thought it was excessive.

[Laughter].

DR. SCHLESINGER: The fact of the matter is as long as the Western World depends for its security upon the nuclear retaliatory capability that the United States must continue to threaten to initiate the use of nuclear weapons, and we cannot forget that

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

fact.

DR. BROWN: Well, the existence implies the threat.

NEWMAN: Is that a realistic threat, the threat of "first use" by the United States.

DR. SCHLESINGER: Yes. It sure looks good in Moscow.

RICHARDSON: What you have less, though, intact is the theory of mutually assured destruction, MAD. That's exactly where you come out, because you're both right. In my view you have to maintain the threat of possible use of nuclear weapons as long as you have a conventional imbalance, but the use of any weapons is virtually certain to escalate to a total nuclear exchange. The result is, therefore, that you remain under the threat of -- sort of damacles(?) total worldwide destruction, guiding you back to the essentialities of the measures necessary to prevent conflict in the first place.

If conflict breaks out in Western Europe, there is no assurance whatsoever that it will stop short of....

DR. BROWN: It hasn't broken out in Western Europe, but it has broken out elsewhere. It's been less clear there that it would escalate.

DR. SCHLESINGER: Elliot, you moved from absolute certainty to there is no assurance. Now, Bob introduced this as a second proposition. We all hypothesize about what happens when two,

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

three or five nuclear weapons may be used. You have both asserted that inevitably it's going to lead to all-out war.

McNAMARA: I said it's unlikely that one can limit it. I didn't say inevitably.

DR. SCHLESINGER: Right.

RICHARDSON: I'll say inevitably.

DR. SCHLESINGER: You did say inevitably.

[Laughter].

[Confusion of voices].

DR. SCHLESINGER: I submit that if political leadership remains in communication that there will be a remarkable silence after those first three, or four, or five weapons are used. Now, it may well be that we never have proof of which hypothesis is right. We will be happy, indeed, under those circumstances, but we should not assume, particularly while we remain dependent upon the nuclear retaliatory capability that it will inevitably lead to the suicide of the West. That is self-defeating.

McNAMARA: Mr. Moderator, I am unwilling to assume that the East and the West can engage in a nuclear exchange and limit it. I think that is unlikely, and I think it is very important that each one of us, including everyone in this room, come to a judgment on that. This is not to suggest we give up our nuclear deterrent until we get a conventional alternative. It is to suggest

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CONFERENCE...CONTINUED

that everyone at this table, when he's applied military, has been subject to misinformation, miscalculation, misjudgment, misperception, and it's serious when it leads to the shoot-down of the Korean aircraft 007. It would be disastrous if we are dependent upon that kind of a foundation for stopping a nuclear exchange.

NEWMAN: Mr. Rumsfeld?

RUMSFELD: You know, you started out this discussion on the INF agreement, and very quickly it is -- it has been roaming far afield, and it seems to me it's a useful thing to point that out.

I don't know whether it's because of television and the press, or because of political leadership, but arms control has begun to be seen as the central element in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and it seems to me it's not. It seems to me that's a multi-faceted relationship that involves a lot of things, as others have been saying at this table, and that it's useful to remind ourselves that the -- that the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union involves a whole [word unintelligible] pattern in other parts of the world. It involves things well beyond arms control, and the setting up of arms control as -- as the central thing that will improve the relationship, it seems to me, is questionable historically.

That's not to say we shouldn't be involved in arms control. It is only a matter of putting it in perspective because there are other aspects of that relationship that could lead to the kinds of problems that have been discussed.

3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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November 2, 1987, Monday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A17

LENGTH: 895 words

HEADLINE: UNITA Rebels Defeat Thrust By Angola;
U.S. Arms Said to Help Inflict Heavy Losses

BYLINE: David B. Ottaway, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

U.S. officials say that rebel forces in Angola -- using sophisticated antiarmor and anti-aircraft weapons supplied by the United States -- turned back the Angolan Army's biggest effort in 12 years of sporadic fighting to capture the rebels' headquarters.

In several weeks of fighting that subsided in mid-October, the rebels inflicted heavy losses on the Angolan Army, which is supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union, the officials said.

The success has strengthened administration support for its covert military aid program to the rebel forces of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), according to these officials.

Some senior U.S. officials suggest that the administration increase its annual \$ 15 million in aid to reduce UNITA's dependence on South Africa, whose long-range artillery and air power played a role in turning back the latest government offensive.

The administration has been providing UNITA with Stinger missiles and this year sent TOW antitank missiles and other weapons to help it cope with the expected heavy use of armor in the Angolan Army's offensive.

At the same time, the administration has decided to take a tough stand on Angola's recent request for admission into the International Monetary Fund. Both the State Department and Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker III wrote to Sen. Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) in mid-October assuring him of U.S. opposition to Angola's IMF application -- at least until it reaches an agreement with Washington on withdrawal of Cuban troops and adopts "market-oriented policy reforms" in its economy.

The administration appears determined to keep up military and political pressure on the Luanda government, which has recently shown signs of flexibility in negotiations with the United States about a timetable for withdrawal of the 37,000 Cuban troops.

In a recent briefing, U.S. officials said Savimbi's forces seized from the Angolan Army "very substantial" quantities of recently delivered Soviet weapons -- including "dozens of tanks," armored personnel carriers, trucks "galore" and a few SA8 and SA13 anti-aircraft missiles.

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The rebels, with some South African artillery and air support, also "decimated" the Angolan Army's 47th Brigade, and "seriously beat up" three or four other brigade-sized units in the three-pronged attack on Mavinga, the gateway to UNITA's main stronghold in far southeastern Angola, according to the officials.

The fighting began in late August and ended in mid-October with the retreat of six to seven Angolan Army brigades to their main base at Cuito Cuanavale, 125 miles northwest of Mavinga.

The Angolan government spent two years preparing for the offensive, which U.S. officials said involved about 10,000 troops. The Soviet Union provided about \$ 1 billion in arms, and Soviet and Cuban advisers also were more involved than ever before in planning and executing the offensive, according to these officials. However, no Cuban combat troops were involved, the officials said.

UNITA said it captured two Cuban pilots -- Lt. Col. Manuel Rocas Garcias and Capt. Ramos Kassadas -- whose MiG23 jet fighter the rebels shot down Oct. 28 over eastern Angola. It was not clear whether the rebels used a Stinger missile.

"We're going to present them [the Cubans] at a press conference in Jamba Nov. 11, the 12th anniversary of our independence from Portugal," said Marcos Samondo, a UNITA spokesman here. Jamba is the UNITA headquarters.

"We're going to show all the equipment that has been captured. We captured 20 T55 tanks in good condition and six SA8 and SA13 missiles," he added.

U.S. officials said Angolan government and South African press reports of South Africa's military involvement on the side of UNITA probably were exaggerated. But they said there is "little doubt" that South African artillery guns, as well as "some" South African aircraft, played a role in UNITA's victory.

In an Oct. 15 report, the Luanda government said it had shot down six South African Impala planes, three Mirages, four other unidentified planes, at least four helicopters and one light reconnaissance aircraft. It also said four regular South African battalions and its "Buffalo Battalion" of special forces crossed into Angola.

U.S. officials said they believe only one South African spotter plane and maybe one Mirage were shot down. They said both the South Africans and the Angolans and their Cuban allies, fearful of each other's improved air defense capabilities, were generally "less aggressive" in the air.

These officials say they are uncertain what role South African ground forces may have played in the fighting but think Angolan claims are probably exaggerated.

As it was preparing its offensive, Angola renewed negotiations with the United States over a withdrawal of Cuban troops and was showing a new flexibility on setting a timetable. Whether the failed offensive will affect its willingness to dispense with Cuban troops will not be clear until the next round of U.S.- Angola negotiations, U.S. officials said.

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A delegation of top Angolan officials is now visiting Havana and Moscow for what are presumed to be consultations on this issue, as well as on the Cuban and Soviet willingness to continue to provide massive supplies of arms and assistance for further military offensives against UNITA.

GRAPHIC: PHOTO, JONAS SAVIMBI.

TYPE: NATIONAL NEWS, FOREIGN NEWS

SUBJECT: SOUTH AFRICA; CUBA; UNITED STATES; ARMED FORCES; DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS;
GOVERNMENT AID TO FOREIGN NATIONS; SPECIAL WARFARE (EG, GUERILLA WARFARE);
ANGOLA

ORGANIZATION: NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA; UNITA

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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October 4, 1987, Sunday, Final Edition

SECTION: FIRST SECTION; PAGE A29

LENGTH: 1082 words

HEADLINE: Rebels Turn Back Major Drive by Angola

BYLINE: William Claiborne, Washington Post Foreign Service

DATELINE: CUNJAMBA, Angola

BODY:

Anticommunist rebels have blunted a major government offensive against their strongholds in southern Angola but are bracing for a second, more massive assault that could determine the outcome of the 12-year-old civil war, according to guerrilla leader Jonas Savimbi.

Savimbi, who receives U.S. and South African support, said his 8,000 guerrillas face two columns of at least 18,200 Soviet -directed government troops along the vital Lomba River. He predicted that before the rainy season begins in the next three weeks, "There will be thousands and thousands of bodies in Lomba."

Savimbi, leader of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), spoke with reporters at front-line positions near the Lomba River and at a news conference at his bunker headquarters in Mavinga, 30 miles southeast of here.

The expected battle would be decisive, Savimbi said, because the Angolans have committed their best troops to the two columns, backed by 150 tanks and more than 200 armored vehicles.

He said that UNITA is prepared to bring up reserves to match the enemy strength and that he was relying on U.S.-supplied antiaircraft missiles to limit the effectiveness of air support by Cuban - and Angolan-piloted MiG23s and MiG21s.

Savimbi said that a "spectacular" battle had taken place on the Lomba River near here on Sept. 13, when UNITA forces drove back two battalions of government troops who had fought their way to the south side of the waterway and encamped for a week.

However, casualty figures given by his aides suggested a battle of less ferocious proportions had taken place. They said that while three government battalions had been routed and three tanks destroyed, only 70 dead government soldiers had been counted, compared to 10 UNITA dead.

UNITA claims that since the first tentative probes of the current dry season offensive began three months ago, 1,023 government troops have died in fighting, compared to 86 UNITA dead. It also claims to have destroyed 56 tanks and shot down 11 government helicopters and three MiG fighters.

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Two Soviet military personnel were killed and four injured in recent fighting, UNITA intelligence officers said. They offered no evidence to substantiate their claim.

In an attempt to prove that UNITA forces had stemmed a major assault near here and that another was imminent, Savimbi on Friday took a group of South African-based correspondents by plane, truck and foot to a point 12 miles north of the river in an area defended by camouflaged infantry, artillery and antitank positions.

There, UNITA chief of staff Gen. Ben Ben pointed across a shallow valley two miles to the north, which he said was the front line of the battle where several thousand government troops were dug in. But the reporters could see no evidence of Angolan troops from that distance and no sign of the Sept. 13 fighting.

For the benefit of photographers, UNITA guerrillas fired off salvos of rockets in the direction of the government positions, but there was no reply.

Later, two MiG fighter-bombers were seen making a bombing run near Mavinga, sending up spirals of black smoke that appeared to be from burning oil.

Ben said that in the battle three weeks ago, UNITA forces routed government infantry units that advanced ahead of Soviet-made T55 and T54 tanks, leaving the tanks vulnerable to rocket and antitank missile fire as they approached the UNITA defensive positions.

Ben and Savimbi denied reports by the Angolan government that South African air and ground forces were involved in the fighting on UNITA's side.

South African Defense Minister Magnus Malan was quoted by the state-run South African Broadcasting Corp. last night as confirming that South Africa maintains a presence in southern Angola, although he did not explicitly confirm that the forces have been used against Angolan troops in the current offensive.

Malan, the broadcast said, pledged South Africa's continued "material and humanitarian" support of UNITA, saying the rebels are in the forefront of blocking Soviet expansionism in Angola.

UNITA intelligence chief Brig. Peregrino Chindondo played a tape recording of what he said were Soviet pilots speaking with ground observers during an air-support mission along the Lomba River.

In his bunker headquarters near Mavinga, Savimbi said he expects that before the dry season ends, government forces will mount major offensives against UNITA positions near Chaminga, about 13 miles east of Cuito Cuanavale, and again against the defensive line near here.

On July 30, in an interview in Mavinga, Savimbi predicted a final, decisive government assault against Chaminga would begin imminently.

On Friday, the UNITA leader told reporters that the outcome of the expected battles, which he predicted would be the largest in his 12-year-old campaign to overthrow the Marxist government in the capital, Luanda, "will affect southern Africa for years to come.

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"This will be the last offensive. If they lose, the Soviets will have to take stock of lessons learned and then negotiate with UNITA. If UNITA is wiped out, the Russians will turn Angola into a base for their next offensive in the region," Savimbi said.

He added, "We never said we beat the offensive. We say we have the upper hand of the situation, and that we can determine the fate of these brigades on the Lomba."

Savimbi said the expected government thrust against Chaminga will be aimed at driving toward Mavinga, which is strategically important not only because it is the gateway to UNITA's main headquarters in Jamba, 170 miles to the southeast, but because it produces virtually all of the food for the UNITA-controlled southeast corner of Angola.

In each of the past several years, government forces have tried to take Mavinga and have been repulsed. In 1985, government troops approached Mavinga but were stopped when South Africa intervened with massive air support.

Savimbi said he was not anticipating a military solution to the civil war, because there is no possibility for one by either side. Instead, he said, he is aiming at a major victory either here or at Chaminga that will force the government of President Eduardo dos Santos to negotiate a settlement with UNITA.

He argued that a power-sharing agreement between UNITA and the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola would weaken Soviet and Cuban influence in Angola and remove obstacles to independence for neighboring Namibia (South West Africa).

GRAPHIC: MAP, ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT PILOT, CAPTURED FRIDAY, STANDS AMID HELICOPTER WRECKAGE. DAVE COOK; PHOTO, AP

TYPE: FOREIGN NEWS

SUBJECT: ANGOLA; SPECIAL WARFARE (EG, GUERILLA WARFARE)

ORGANIZATION: NATIONAL UNION FOR THE TOTAL INDEPENDENCE OF ANGOLA; UNITA

NAME: JONAS SAVIMBI

Let me just take a moment here to say something about the repeat tragedy that seems to be taking shape in Ethiopia. Two years after the devastating famine that galvanized world attention, that poor country seems to be sliding agonizingly into another that health officials predict could be even worse.

Once again, we hear that the cause of the famine threatening Ethiopia is poor weather. No doubt that plays a role; but there is real question if it is the major culprit. This year, the neighboring countries of Sub-Sahara seem little effected. The sad fact is, Ethiopia's agonizing situation is directly attributable to the policies of its Communist rulers. More than one relief agency has accused the Ethiopian Communists of manipulating the famine and relief efforts in the civil war against their own people.

Last time, the United States was generous in responding to the emergency, sending more food, supplies, and logistical support than any other nation. If -- the good Lord forbid -- famine returns to Ethiopia, we will again do what we must to save innocent lives. But we will also insist that the Soviets do their part. Last famine, while the rest of the world sent food and medicine, the Soviets sent their clients in Ethiopia weapons of war.

When I meet with General Secretary Gorbachev, I will say directly to him that it's past time the Soviet Union accept its responsibility to save lives in Ethiopia. They must move immediately to pressure their client rulers in Ethiopia to institute the reforms that will prevent the horror of famine from happening again. THE first time

The first time it was a tragedy -- the second will be a crime.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TK

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: FRANK DONATELLI (FD)

RE: DROP-BY BRIEFING FOR REAGAN ACTIVISTS ON INF

Good Speech. The tone of the speech is appropriate. In the last couple of weeks we have confused our troops and it is vital that the President reassure them that he is still "hard-line" and anti-communist and that he has not changed. I believe it is only in that context that we can sell INF. A couple of suggestions:

I would suggest that the Contra portion be moved to the front of the speech. By putting Contras at the end, it symbolically looks like an afterthought.

Page 2, insert the following between the third and fourth paragraphs:

Contrary to what some have said, we have been at this for some time. We made this proposal nearly five years ago. Our opponents dismissed it as unrealistic because it was too one-sided in our favor. Then the Soviets tried to get us to eliminate the SDI program. I refused. The moral is that tough negotiating tactics, clear objectives and determination count much more with the Soviets than good intentions. I am for this agreement not because I have any illusions about the Soviet system, but because it is a good deal for the United States. I am asking for your support and help in convincing the Senate to ratify this treaty.

own we remove, they will give up four. I wish I could negotiate a deal like that with Congress.

Recently, all seven living former Secretaries of Defense were asked if they would recommend this agreement to the President if they were still in office. All seven said yes -- it's a good agreement.

It would, however, be hasty to assume that we're at the point where we are ready to put pen to paper and sign the treaty. For one thing, in one important area -- verification -- the treaty is not yet complete. Now, neither on this issue nor any other do I hold any illusions about the Soviets. It's said that for them, past arms control treaties were like diets. The second day was always the best, because that's when they broke them.

Any treaty I agree to must provide for effective verification, including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reduction and short-notice inspection afterwards. The verification regime we have put forward in Geneva is the most stringent in the history of arms control negotiations. I will not settle for anything less.

We are also moving ahead with an agreement on reducing our two nations' strategic arsenals by half. Our Geneva negotiators have made progress. The Soviets must, however, stop holding strategic offensive missile reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our research and development of S.D.I.

It's no longer a secret that the Soviet Union has spent billions upon billions of dollars developing their own anti-ballistic missile defense. Research and development in some

Contrary to what some have said, we have been at this for some time. We had this proposal nearly five years ago. Our opponents dismissed it as unrealistic because it was too one-sided in our favor. Then the Soviets tried to get us to eliminate our SDI program. I refused. The mark is that tough negotiating tactics, ~~clear~~ clear objectives, and determination will lead the Soviets to good intentions. I am for this agreement. Not (over)

They said

parts of the "Cosmos" weapons program began more than 15 years ago. Today it includes everything from killer-satellites to the modernized A.B.M. defenses that ring Moscow. More than 10,000 scientists are working on military lasers alone -- with thousands more developing other advanced technologies such as particle beam and kinetic energy weapons.

The Soviet "Cosmos" weapons program dwarfs S.D.I. Yet some in Congress would bind us to an overly-restrictive interpretation of the A.B.M. treaty that would effectively block development of S.D.I., giving the Soviets a monopoly in anti-ballistic missile defenses. This effort to tie our hands makes even less sense when the Soviets aren't abiding by the A.B.M. treaty. Whatever interpretation you give the A.B.M. treaty, broad or strict, the Soviets are violating it. Two of the A.B.M. treaty's biggest proponents in this country -- Robert McNamara and McGeorge Bundy -- agree that the Soviet construction of the large, phase-array radar at Krasnoyarsk is almost certainly a violation of A.B.M.

Tying our hands to a treaty that the other side feels perfectly free to violate amounts to nothing more than unilateral disarmament. And as I promised Cap the other day in his farewell at the Pentagon -- we're not unilaterally disarming in this area, or any other area.

A recent report released by the Department of Defense called "The Soviet Space Challenge" warns that the Soviets are developing a space-launch capability much greater than that of the United States. The report estimates that the Soviet launch

because I have an illusion about the Soviets, but I hate because this treaty is clearly in the interests of the United States and I am asking you to support it when I submit it to the Senate for notification

SOVIET MISSILES

Rather: The Soviet Union confirmed today it is deploying the SS-24, the world's first mobile, multiple-warhead, long-range nuclear missile. It can be launched from Soviet railroad cars and reach U.S. territory. The Soviets boast these missiles can survive a first-strike attack by the U.S. The Soviets deny their missiles violate the 1979 SALT II treaty. (CBS-6)

Rather reports that not far from the Persian Gulf the Soviet military finds itself bogged down in some of the bloodiest action in seven years of fighting the Afghan rebels. Western diplomats said today that Soviet warplanes have opened a new offensive, bombing targets near Kabul, in their heaviest attacks on rebels this year. The rebels finally have a weapon that helps even the odds somewhat: U.S. shoulder-fired Stinger missiles. In the first of a two-part series with extensive combat footage, the rebels ambushed Soviet troops recently in what may have been their biggest loss of men since World War II. (CBS-2)

EPA/CHLORDANE

Jennings: The EPA moved today to cut back on the use of a potentially dangerous chemical which is used against termites. The EPA did not go nearly as far as environmentalists and some health officials had hoped. The only company that makes the chemical Chlordane won't make any more of it. But some that is already on the market may continue to be sold.

ABC's Bill Greenwood reports until last year it was the only effective killer of termites. But government studies found when not applied properly, there's a higher risk of cancer. The potential risk was discovered a decade ago. And EPA says 30 million homes were sprayed with the chemical.

(John Moore, EPA assistant administrator: "I don't think there's anything to worry about, as long as you don't have any reason to believe that the home was treated in an improper fashion when that material was applied.") (ABC-8, CBS-3)

FAA/NEAR MISSES

Rather: Federal Aviation officials today released cockpit-to-air controller tapes of the latest close-call in the sky. This one happened Monday on approach to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport. A Delta Airlines 727 jet made a sharp right turn to avoid hitting a single-engine Cessna. The two planes came within a few hundred feet of each other. This near-miss over Texas was the fourth reported in the nation's air space since Saturday. (CBS-5)

**The Costs and Benefits
of the Soviet Empire,
1981-1983**

Charles Wolf, Jr., Keith Crane, K. C. Yeh,
Susan Anderson, Edmund Brunner

Rand

R-3419-NA

The Costs and Benefits of the Soviet Empire, 1981-1983

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August 1986

Prepared for the
Director of Net Assessment,
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Rand

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


Fig. 3—Costs of the Soviet empire in billions of constant 1980 rubles, 1971–1983

With respect to the aggregate cost estimates, it is worth noting that the ruble estimates are probably more significant than the dollar ones, for two reasons: First, the method used in converting the hard-currency components of empire costs into rubles results in more accurate estimates of the real economic costs of the empire than the estimates obtained by using the official exchange rate to arrive at the dollar estimates; and second, the Soviet leadership probably thinks in terms of rubles, not dollars, in its decisionmaking.

This does not imply that hard-currency sources and uses do not merit the attentive concern of the leadership. In fact, the method used in our conversion of hard currency to rubles reflects the particular importance of hard-currency earnings to finance Soviet imports from the West.

EMPIRE COSTS COMPARED WITH SOVIET GNP AND MILITARY SPENDING

To size Soviet empire costs, it is useful to compare them with Soviet GNP and Soviet military spending. This is done for the ruble and dollar empire costs in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively, for 1981–1983 and for selected years in the previous decade.

Table 4

SOVIET EMPIRE COSTS COMPARED WITH SOVIET GNP
AND MILITARY SPENDING, 1971-1983
(In billions of current rubles)

Item	1971	1976	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983
1. Total CSE ^a	6.66- 7.78	18.44- 20.31	19.66- 22.77	31.66- 37.08	42.20- 49.69	44.11- 50.39	35.74- 42.26	26.92- 33.57
2. GNP ^b	404.6	529.8	592.8	612.0	635.2	675.4	733.9	756.4
3. Soviet military spending ^c	50.8	68.2	73.8	79.1	84.6	87.8	95.4	98.3
4. CSE as ratio to GNP (row 1/row 2) (%)	1.64- 1.92	3.48- 3.83	3.32- 3.84	5.17- 6.06	6.64- 7.82	6.53- 7.46	4.87- 5.76	3.56- 4.44
5. CSE as ratio to military spending (row 1/row 3) (%)	13.11- 15.31	27.04- 29.78	26.63- 30.85	40.03- 46.88	49.88- 58.74	50.24- 57.39	37.46- 44.30	27.39- 34.15

^aFrom Table 3.

^bFigures for 1971 through 1980 derived from Soviet GNP in 1970 rubles converted to current rubles using Soviet GNP deflator based on premise that deflator rose 1.6 percent per annum during 1971-1976 and 2.4 percent per annum during 1977-1980. See *USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-1980*, Joint Economic Committee, Washington, D.C., 1982, p. 54; and CIA, *Soviet GNP in Current Prices, 1960-1980*, 1983, p. 6. For 1981 through 1983, the figures for current GNP were derived by estimating the growth of Soviet GNP in current prices based on CIA estimates of real GNP growth and the Consumer Price Index (1980 = 100) as a measure of inflation (CIA, *Handbook of Economic Statistics*, 1985, pp. 39, 53), and using that current price growth rate to extrapolate from the original 1980 estimate. If, instead of using the CIA estimates of real GNP growth, we use the growth rate of Soviet GNP in constant (1984) dollars to estimate Soviet GNP growth in current prices, the corresponding current GNP figures are 664.0 billion rubles in 1981, 713.2 billion rubles in 1982, and 726.5 billion rubles in 1983. The relatively narrow range of the estimates provided by the two different methods is reassuring, in light of the general uncertainty of such calculations. In addition, when GNP in 1982 prices was derived in another manner, by assuming that the same relationship between Net Material Product and GNP that prevailed in 1976 and 1980 still applied in 1982, the rough estimate was 720 billion rubles, which falls nicely within the range discussed above.

^cSoviet military spending estimated using same sources and procedures described in note (b) above. For 1981-1983, military spending was assumed to be 13 percent of GNP. See also Table 5, footnote (c).

Figure 4 shows the time path for the ratios of ruble empire costs to GNP and to military spending, together with the corresponding logarithmic regressions and compound growth rates for these ratios that result from splitting the 1971-1983 period into two segments: the first segment covering 1971-1980, when empire costs generally increased as a ratio to GNP and to military spending; and the second segment covering 1981-1983, when these ratios decreased significantly.

MEMORANDUM TO TONY DOLAN/JOSH GILDER

From: Tom Griscom

Re: INF briefing remarks (attached)

Date: November 19, 1987

cc: Rhett Dawson
Colin Powell

Not knowing all of the information that was put into these remarks, let me comment from a position of limited knowledge.

As we have discussed previously, the speech that Peter Robinson did for the President at West Point laid out the critical elements of the arms control/summit agenda. A key part of that is SDI and the fact that it is not a bargaining chip. But also the fact that SDI is a key element of President Reagan's philosophy to provide a defensive shield and get away from the notion of mutual assured destruction.

Several events have been scheduled leading up to the Dec 7-10 summit, to lay out the messages and to speak to important support groups. This briefing should afford the President the chance to talk about patience to get an agreement, rebuilding our military strength, the reality of INF, verification and a commitment to go forward with SDI. That is the arms control message that we want this group to leave with: this President will not take a bad deal; he had been patient, dealt from strength, and is now on the verge of signing the first arms reduction agreement. Take SDI as what it means, why it is important and that it offers the chance to provide a defensive system.

Then, there should be some comment on Kennedy, budget and Central America. There should be an urging from the President to work with me to complete the agenda.

Research

TR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPEECHWRITERS

THROUGH: FRANK J. DONATELLI ^{FJD}
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR POLITICAL
AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

FROM: REBECCA S. MCMAHAN
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: INF BRIEFING, NOVEMBER 23

On Monday, November 23 at 1:30 p.m. the President will address a briefing for approximately 200 Reagan activists in Room 450. This briefing is to update this group on current Administration issues. The President's remarks should be approximately ten minutes, with the focus being the upcoming Summit and INF negotiations. Below I have listed background information and some suggested points for inclusion. Please contact me at x7983 if you have any questions.

Background on Reagan Activists

*This group is a mixture of original RR supporters, Reagan-Bush campaign leadership from '76, '80 and '84, present Republican National Committee members and current state and local government office-holders. While they are strong supporters of the President who support him on virtually all issues, they are not all Republicans.

*The attendees are grassroots activist types--not necessarily big contributors. These people are the ones who spread the good word about the Reagan Revolution. They have worked to keep the flame alive and will continue to do so.

*Everyone in this audience is a somebody, so we're better off not mentioning any names in the speech. If we find out someone stellar is appearing that the President should point out, we'll advise you.

*The President last addressed this group on June 29, so you may want to refer to those remarks to avoid any duplication.

Suggested Issues to Address

The main focus of the President's remarks should be on the proposed INF Treaty and the upcoming summit. What he hopes to accomplish and the impact it will have on future generations of Americans should be discussed.

Specific points to emphasize on the INF Treaty should include:

- President's commitment to SDI
- Verification
- The President should ask for their support.
- "Now more than ever, to secure peace not only our generation, but for generations to come, I need your help and support to get this treaty that we have so carefully crafted, approved."
- Use the themes of peace and prosperity: "These are the goals that we have worked so hard for since 1980"

Aside from this topic, other suggested points for inclusion are as follows:

* The President's commitment to the freedom fighters in Nicaragua.

*This is a group of dedicated Reagan loyalists. Talk of what "we've accomplished in my Presidency" and your loyal and steadfast support" would be appropriate.

*A plug for Judge Kennedy, the new Supreme Court nominee should be mentioned.

*The President wants to leave a legacy to the nation of conservative ideals, international respect and fiscal restraint filled with compassion. He will continue to push for items such as a balanced budget amendment and pursuit of the Nicaraguan Peace Plan.

*The President should encourage this group to keep doing what they do best -- working on the grassroots level to support the Administration and its policies. He needs their help now more than ever in this last year of his Presidency.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11/9/87

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Teresa

MEMORANDUM

TO: FRANK DONATELLI

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FJR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Drop by Briefing for Reagan Activists on INF Treaty

DATE: November 23, 1987

TIME: 1:30 pm

DURATION: 15 minutes

LOCATION: Indian Treaty Room

BACKUP LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

M. Archambault
W. Ball
J. Courtemanche
E. Crispen
R. Dawson
F. Donatelli
D. Dellinger
A. Dolan
J. Erkenbeck
L. Faulkner
C. Fuller
M. Fitzwater
T. Griscom

Advance Office
J. Hooley
J. Kuhn
J. Lamb
J. Manning
J. McKinney
N. Risque
D. Johnson
R. Shaddick
G. Walters
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations