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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

3522 Add-on

May 23, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS   
SUBJECT: President's Speech in Helsinki

We have reviewed the State Department's comments on the latest Helsinki draft (May 22, 10:00 a.m.). We attach our proposed fixes, taking into account State's suggestions.

We continue to support the "House of Democracy" idea. Unlike State, we do not see it as "exclusivist." With a slight fix, as indicated, we believe it can be made clear that the doors of this House are open to all. Nor is it inconsistent with the spirit of Helsinki for us to declare our own values. However, the discussion on page 11 might benefit from a few more sentences explaining more about what the House of Democracy is.

We believe the discussion on pages 7-9, of democracy rebounding in the contest with totalitarianism, is basically good, though we have made some suggestions for condensing it somewhat.

Our staff has also reviewed the CSCE discussion and recommended a fix (page 4).

Attachment

Thatcher

(Judge) *on State edits*  
May 22, 1988  
10:00 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ADDRESS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS  
FINLANDIA HALL  
HELSINKI, FINLAND  
FRIDAY MAY 27, 1988

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

*Let me express my sincere thanks to the President and the Finnish people for asking me to be a part of Finland's 100th anniversary.*  
It is a particular honor for me to come here today. This year -- the "Year of Friendship," as Congress has proclaimed it, between the United States and Finland -- this year marks the 350th anniversary of the arrival of the first Finns in America and the establishment of a small Scandinavian colony near what is today Wilmington, Delaware. An ancient people in a new world -- that is the story, not only of those Finns, but of all the peoples who braved the seas, to settle in and build my country, a land of freedom for a nation of immigrants.

Yes, they founded a new world, but as they crossed the oceans, the mountains, and the prairies, those who made America carried the old world in their hearts -- the old customs, the family ties, and, most of all, the belief in God, a belief that gave them the moral compass and ethical foundation by which they explored an uncharted frontier and constructed a government and nation of, by, and for the people.

And so, although we Americans became a new people, we also remain an ancient one, for we are guided by ancient and universal values -- values that Prime Minister <sup>Holkeri</sup> ~~Hokeri~~ spoke of in Los Angeles this February when, after recalling Finland's internationally recognized position of neutrality, he added that

Finland is "tied to Western values of freedom, democracy, and human rights."

And let me add here that for America, those ties are also the bonds of our friendship. America respects Finland's neutrality. We support Finland's independence. We honor Finland's courageous history. We salute the creative statesmanship that has been Finland's gift to world peace. And in this soaring hall -- which is the great architect <sup>Alvar</sup>~~Alvan~~ Aalto's statement of hope for Finland's future -- we reaffirm our hope and faith that the friendship between our nations will be unending. ✓

We are gathered here today in this hall because it was here, almost 13 years ago, that the 35 nations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed the Helsinki Final Act -- a document that embodies the same ethical and moral principles and the same hope for a future of peace that Finns and so many other European immigrants gave America. The Final Act is a singular statement of hope. Its ~~(so-called)~~ "three baskets" touch on almost every aspect of East-West relations, and taken together form a kind of map through the wilderness of mutual hostility to open fields of peace and to a common home of trust among all of our sovereign nations -- neutrals, non-aligned, and alliance members alike. The Final Act set new standards of conduct for our nations and provided the mechanisms by which to apply those standards. ✓

Yes, the Final Act goes beyond arms control -- once the focus of international dialogue. It reflects <sup>a</sup>~~the~~ truth that I ✓

State  
fix  
(we  
agree)

have so often noted -- nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. The Final Act grapples with the full range of our underlying differences and deals with East-West relations as an interrelated whole. It reflects the belief of all our countries that human rights are less likely to be abused when a nation's security is less in doubt; that economic relations can contribute to security, but depend on the trust and confidence that come from increasing ties between our peoples, increasing openness, and increasing freedom; and that there is no true international security without respect for human rights.

And beyond establishing these integrated standards, the Final Act establishes a process for progress. It sets up a review procedure to measure performance against standards. And -- despite the doubts of the critics -- for the past 13 years, the signatory states have mustered the political will to keep on working and making progress.

Let me say that it seems particularly appropriate to me that the Final Act is associated so closely with this city and this country. More than any other diplomatic document, the Final Act speaks to the yearning that Finland's longtime President, Urho Kekkonen, spoke of more than a quarter century ago, when he said, in his words, "It is the fervent hope of the Finnish people that barriers be lowered all over Europe and that progress be made along the road of European unity." And he added that this was, as he put it, "for the good of Europe, and thus of humanity as a whole." Those were visionary words. That vision inspired and

shaped the drafting of the Final Act and continues to guide us today.

Has the Final Act and what we call the Helsinki process worked or not? Many say it hasn't, but I believe it has.

In the security field, I would point to the most recent fruit of the process -- the Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe. This agreement lays down the rules by which our 35 states notify each other of upcoming military activities in Europe; provides detailed information on these activities in advance; lets the others know their plans for very large military activities one to two years in advance and agree not to hold such maneuvers unless this notice is given; invite observers to their larger military activities; and permit on-site inspections to make sure the agreement is honored.

I am happy to note that since our representatives shook hands to seal this agreement a year and a half ago, all 35 states have, by and large, honored both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm Document. The Western and neutral and non-aligned states have set a strong example in providing full information about their military activities. In April, Finland held its first military activity subject to the Stockholm notification requirements and voluntarily invited observers to it. The Soviet Union and its allies also have a <sup>generally</sup> good record of implementation, though ~~they have been less open in handling observers~~ <sup>less forthcoming than the West.</sup> Ten on-site inspections have been conducted so far, and more and more states are exercising their right to make such inspections. I

NSC  
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fix

can't help but believe that making inspections a matter of routine business will improve openness and enhance confidence.

Nor was Stockholm the end of the process. In Vienna, all 35 signatory states are considering how to strengthen the confidence- and security-building measures, <sup>in the context of a balanced outcome at the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting that includes</sup> ~~pending~~ progress on <sup>significant</sup> human rights.

In the economic field, as in the security field, I believe there has been progress, but of a different kind. Issues and negotiations regarding security are not simple, but military technology makes arms and armies resemble each other enough so that common measures can be confidently applied. Economic relations, by contrast, are bedeviled by ~~systemic~~ <sup>in our, ~~systemic~~</sup> differences. Perhaps increases in non-strategic trade can contribute to better relations between East and West, but it is difficult to relate the state-run economies of the East to the essentially free-market economies of the West. Perhaps some of the changes underway in the state-run economies will equip them better to deal with our businessmen, and open new arenas for cooperations. But our work on these issues over the years has already made us understand that differences in systems are serious obstacles to expansion of economic ties, and since understanding of unpleasant realities is part of wisdom, that too, is progress.

The changes taking place in the Eastern countries of the continent go beyond changes in their economic systems and greater openness in their military activities: changes have also begun to occur in the field of human rights, as was called for in the Final Act. The rest of us would like to see the changes that are

being announced actually registered in the law and practice of our Eastern partners, and in the documents under negotiation in the Vienna follow-up to <sup>the</sup> Helsinki conference. ✓

Much has been said about the human rights and humanitarian provisions in the Final Act and the failure of the Eastern bloc to honor them. Yet, for all the bleak winds that have swept the plains of justice since that signing day in 1975, the Accords have taken root in the conscience of humanity and grown in moral and, increasingly, in diplomatic authority. I believe that this is no accident. It reflects an increasing realization that the agenda of East-West relations must be comprehensive -- that security and human rights must be advanced together, or cannot truly be secured at all. But it also shows that the provisions in the Final Act reflect standards that are truly universal in their scope. The Accords embody a fundamental truth, a truth that gathers strength with each passing season, and that will not be denied -- the truth that, like the first Finnish settlers in America, all our ancient peoples find themselves today in a new world, and that, as those early settlers discovered, the greatest creative and moral force in this new world, the greatest hope for survival and success, for peace and happiness, is human freedom.

Yes, freedom -- the right to speak, to print, to assemble, to travel, the right to worship and believe, the right to be different, the right, as the American <sup>philosopher,</sup> ~~poet,~~ Henry David Thoreau, ✓ wrote, "to <sup>step to the music of</sup> ~~march to~~ a different drummer." This is freedom as most Europeans and Americans understand it and freedom as it is embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, yes,

Accuracy



in the Helsinki Accords. And -- far more than the locomotive or the automobile, the airplane or the rocket, more than radio, television or the computer -- this concept of liberty is the most distinct, peculiar, and powerful invention of the civilization we all share.

Indeed, without this freedom there would have been no mechanical inventions, for inventions are eccentricities. The men and women who create them are visionaries, just like artists and writers. They see what others fail to see and trust their insights when others don't. The same freedom that permits literature and the arts to flourish, the same freedom that allows one to attend church, synagogue, or mosque without apprehension, that same freedom from oppression and supervision is the freedom that has given us -- the peoples of Western Europe and North America -- our dynamism, our economic growth, and our inventiveness. Together with Japan, Australia, and <sup>many</sup> others, we have lived in this state of freedom, this House of Democracy since the end of the Second World War. <sup>The House of Democracy is a House whose doors are open to all.</sup> Because of ~~that~~, because of the liberty and popular rule we have shared, today we also share a prosperity more widely distributed and extensive, a political order more tolerant and humane than has ever before been known on earth.

To see not simply the immediate but the historic importance of this, we should remember how far so many of our nations have traveled -- and how desolate the future of freedom and democracy once seemed. There is a story that illustrates what I'm saying. It was shortly after the Second World War, and George Orwell

So it is clear the House is not exclusivemary

recalled saying to Arthur Koestler that "History stopped in 1936," to which Koestler "nodded in immediate understanding." Orwell added that "we were both thinking of totalitarianism."

For <sup>much of this century,</sup> ~~decades~~ the totalitarian temptation, in one form or another, has beckoned to mankind, also promising freedom -- but of a different kind than the one we celebrate today. This concept of liberty is, as the Czechoslovak writer Milan Kundera has put it, "the age-old dream of a world where everybody would live in harmony, united by a single common will and faith, without secrets from one another" -- the freedom of imposed perfection. ✓

Fifty, forty, even as recently as thirty years ago, the contest between this utopian concept of freedom on one hand and the democratic concept of freedom on the other seemed a close one. Promises of a perfect world lured many Western thinkers and millions of others besides. And many believed in the confident prediction of history's inevitable triumph.

Few do today. Just as democratic freedom has proven itself incredibly fertile -- fertile not merely in a material sense, but also in the abundance it has brought forth in the human spirit -- so too utopianism has proven brutal and barren.

Albert Camus once predicted that, in his words, "When revolution in the name of power and of history becomes a murderous and immoderate mechanism, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name of moderation and of life." Isn't this exactly what we see happening across the mountains and plains of Europe and even beyond the Urals today? In Western Europe, ✓

support for utopian ideologies -- including support among intellectuals -- has all but collapsed, while in the non-democratic countries, leaders grapple with the internal contradictions of their system and some ask how they can make that system better and more productive.

[ In a sense, the front~~line~~ in the competition of ideas that has played in Europe and America for more than 70 years has shifted East. Once it was the democracies that doubted their own view of freedom and wondered whether utopian systems might not be better. Today, the doubt is on the other side. ]

In just two days, I will meet in Moscow with General Secretary Gorbachev. It will be our fourth set of face-to-face talks since 1985. The General Secretary and I have developed a broad agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations -- an agenda linked directly to the agenda of the Final Act.

Yes, as does the Final Act, we will discuss security issues. We will pursue progress in arms <sup>reduction</sup> ~~control~~ negotiations across the board and continue our exchanges on ~~the~~ regional issues.

Yes, we will also discuss economic issues, although, as in the Helsinki process, we have seen in recent years how much differences in our systems inhibit expanded ties, and how difficult it is to divorce economic relations from human rights and other elements of the relationship.

And, yes, as our countries did at Helsinki, we will take up other bilateral areas, as well -- including scientific, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, where we have been hard at work

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identifying new ways to cooperate. In this area, in particular, I believe we'll see some good results before the week is over.

And like the Final Act, our agenda now includes human rights as an integral component. We have developed our dialogue, and put in place new mechanisms for discussion. The General Secretary has spoken often and forthrightly of the problems confronting the Soviet Union. In his campaign to address these shortcomings, he talks of "glasnost" and "perestroika" -- openness and restructuring, words that to our ears have a particularly welcome sound. And since he began his campaign, things have happened that ~~(we)~~ all of us ~~(in the House of Democracy)~~ applaud.

The list includes the release from labor camps or exile of people like Andrei Sakharov, Irina Ratushinskaya, Anatoliy Koryagin, Joslf Begun, and many other prisoners of conscience; the publication of books like Dr. Zhivago; the distribution of movies like Repentance, that are critical of aspects of the Soviet past and present; allowing higher levels of emigration; greater toleration of dissent; General Secretary Gorbachev's recent statements on religious toleration; the beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

All this is new and good. But at the same time, there is another list, defined not by us but by the standard of the Helsinki Final Act and the sovereign choice of all participants, including the Soviet Union, to subscribe to it. We need look no farther through the Final Act to see where Soviet practice does not -- or does not yet -- measure up to Soviet commitment.

give State this one

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and Children of the Arbat

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Thirteen years after the Final Act was signed, it is difficult to understand why cases of divided families and blocked marriages should remain on the East-West agenda; or why Soviet citizens who wish to exercise their right to emigrate should be subject to artificial quotas and arbitrary rulings. And what are we to think of the continued suppression of those who wish to practice their religious beliefs? Over three hundred men and women whom the world sees as political prisoners have been released. There remains no reason why the Soviet Union cannot release all people still in jail for expression of political or religious belief, or for organizing to monitor the Helsinki Act. ✓

The Soviets talk about a "common European home," and define it in terms of geography. But what is it that <sup>language</sup> ~~unifies the~~ <sup>cements the structure of</sup> ~~nations of Western Europe today~~ and also, I believe, <sup>unifies</sup> ~~Final Act?~~ <sup>clear purpose that all our nations pledged themselves to build by their signature of the</sup> ~~What is it but the belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of every single the peoples, though not the regimes, of Eastern Europe? What is it but the Judeo-Christian tradition and its teachings about the inalienable rights and dignity of all God's children?~~ What is it but a <sup>true,</sup> ~~Common~~ <sup>is it</sup> commitment to pluralist ~~democracy?~~ <sup>universally understood</sup> ~~What, but a~~ <sup>that evolved from the genius of European civilization?</sup> ~~Common~~ dedication to the <sup>democratic</sup> ~~democratic~~ concept of liberty? <sup>or should mark,</sup> ~~This is~~ what marks <sup>^</sup> the common European home. <sup>This body of values - -</sup>

Mr. Gorbachev has spoken of, in his words, "the artificiality and temporariness of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation and the archaic nature of the 'iron curtain.'" I join him in this belief, and ~~would~~ <sup>every</sup> welcome ~~the~~ sign that the Soviets and their allies are ready <sup>not only</sup> to embrace <sup>but to put into practice</sup> the values that ~~not only~~ <sup>and indeed</sup> unify ~~but~~ define contemporary Western European civilization and its grateful American offspring.

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Some 30 years ago, during another period of relative openness, the Italian socialist, Pietro Nenni, <sup>long</sup> ~~who was~~ a friend of the Soviet Union, warned that it was wrong to think that the relaxation could be permanent in, as he said, "the absence of any system of judicial guarantees." And he added that ~~(again in his)~~ <sup>words,</sup> ~~only (the complete restoration of)~~ "democracy and liberty" could prevent ~~(backsliding)~~ <sup>reversal of the progress underway.</sup>

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There are a number of steps <sup>which, if taken, would help ensure the</sup> ~~(in addition to human rights~~ <sup>deepening and institutionalization of promising reforms.</sup> ~~that the Soviet leaders can take if they wish to demonstrate that~~ <sup>glasnost and democratization are here to stay</sup> ~~glasnost and democratization are here to stay~~ First, <sup>the Soviet leaders could</sup> ~~they can~~ agree to tear down the Berlin Wall and all barriers between Eastern and Western Europe. They <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ join us in making Berlin itself an all-European center of communications, meetings, and travel, ~~(and allowing internal as well as external travel)~~

They <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ also give legal and practical protection to free expression and worship. Let me interject here that at one time Moscow was known as the "City of the Forty Forties," because there were ~~more than~~ 1,600 belfries in the churches of the city. <sup>The world welcomes the return of some churches to worship after many years. But</sup> ~~Today~~ there are few functioning churches, and almost no bells.

Mr. Gorbachev recently said, as he put it, "believers are Soviet people, workers, patriots, and they have the full right to express their conviction with dignity." I applaud

Mr. Gorbachev's statement. What a magnificent demonstration of goodwill it would be for the Soviet leadership for church bells to <sup>ring out</sup> ~~be heard~~ again not only in Moscow but throughout the Soviet Union.

State  
fixes

But beyond these particular steps, there is a deeper question. How can the countries of the East not only grant but guarantee the protection of rights? <sup>It. The thought and practice of</sup> ~~We know, of course, of a~~ ✓  
~~centuries has pointed the way.~~  
~~simple and profound starting places~~ As the French constitutional philosopher, Montesquieu, wrote more than two <sup>hundred years</sup> ~~centuries~~ ago, ✓  
 "There is no liberty, if the <sup>judiciary</sup> power <sup>of</sup> ~~judging~~ be not separated" ✓  
 from the other powers of government. <sup>And, like</sup> The complete independence ✓  
 of the judiciary, ~~is essential to the guarantee of human rights~~ ✓  
~~So, too, is~~ <sup>provides a vital, practical guarantee of human rights.</sup> popular control over those who make the laws, ✓  
~~secret ballots, and the freedom to form political parties and run~~ ✓  
~~candidates -- these are among the elements of a system in which~~ ✓  
~~human rights enjoy institutional protection~~ ✓

So does the  
secret ballots  
or for free collective bargaining.

I know that for the <sup>Eastern</sup> ~~East bloc~~ countries such steps are ✓  
 difficult, and some may say it is unrealistic to call for them. ✓  
 Some said, in 1975, that the standards set forth in the Final Act were unrealistic; that the comprehensive agenda it embodied was unrealistic. Some said, earlier in this decade, that calling for global elimination of <sup>an entire class of</sup> U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear ✓  
 missiles was unrealistic; that calling for 50 percent reductions <sup>US and Soviet</sup> in strategic offensive <sup>arms</sup> ~~weapons~~ was unrealistic; that the Soviets ✓  
 would never withdraw from Afghanistan. Is it realistic to pretend that rights are truly protected when there are no effective safeguards against arbitrary rule? <sup>It is</sup> realistic, ✓  
 when the Soviet leadership itself is calling for glasnost and democratization, to say that judicial guarantees, or the independence of the judiciary, or popular control over those that draft the laws, or freedom to associate for political purposes,

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are unrealistic? And, finally, is it realistic to say that peace is truly secure when political systems are less than open? (No) ✓

*late fix*  
~~If we believe that realism is on our side when we say that less an observer than Friedrich Engels wrote more than a century and a half ago of a now defunct autocratic regime that, indeed be achieved together if we are prepared to drive toward in his words, "As soon as Russia has... internal party struggles that goal. So did, [and] a constitutional form under which these party struggles may be fought without violent convulsions... the traditional Russian policy of conquest is a thing of the past.~~

The leaders who met in this room to sign the Final Act <sup>They</sup> were visionaries of the most practical kind. In shaping our policy toward the Soviet Union, in preparing for my meetings with the General Secretary, I have taken their vision -- a shared vision, subscribed to by East, West, and the proud neutral and non-aligned countries of this continent -- as my guide. I believe the standard the framers of the Final Act set -- including the concept of liberty <sup>it embodies</sup> ~~(they defined)~~ -- is a standard for all of us. We can do no less than uphold it and try to see <sup>turn, as the Soviets say, into "life itself."</sup> ~~it enforced~~

We in the West will remain firm in our values; strong and vigilant in defense of our interests; ready to negotiate honestly for results of mutual and universal benefit. One lesson we drew again from the events leading up to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was that, in the world as it is today, peace truly does depend on Western strength and resolve. It is a lesson we will continue to heed.

But we are also prepared to work with the Soviets and their allies whenever they are ready to work with us. By strength we



do not mean diktat, that is, an imposed settlement; we mean confident negotiation. The road ahead may be long -- but not so long as our countries had before them 44 years ago when Finland's great President, J.K. Paasikivi, told a nation that had shown the world uncommon courage in a harrowing time: "A path rises up the slope from the floor of the valley. At times the ascent is gradual, at other times steeper. But all the time one comes closer and closer to free, open spaces, above which God's ever brighter sky can be seen. The way up will be difficult.... But every step will take us closer to open vistas."

I believe that in Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev and I can take another step toward a brighter future and a safer world. And I believe that, for the sake of all our ancient peoples, this new world must be a place both of democratic freedom and of peace. It must be a world in which the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act guides all our countries like a great beacon of hope <sup>to</sup> ~~and in which~~ ~~the House of Democracy shelters~~ all mankind for ages to come.

Thank you and God bless you, and bear with the wish  
onnea ja menestystä koko suomalaiselle kansalle.  
(This means: "Happiness and success to all the people of  
Finland.")


BARP

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

3522 Add-on

May 23, 1988

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HELSINKI, FINLAND  
FRIDAY MAY 27, 1988

Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen:

It is a particular honor for me to come here today. This year -- the "Year of Friendship," as Congress has proclaimed it, between the United States and Finland -- this year marks the 350th anniversary of the arrival of the first Finns in America and the establishment of a small Scandinavian colony near what is today Wilmington, Delaware. An ancient people in a new world -- that is the story, not only of those Finns, but of all the peoples who braved the seas, to settle in and build my country, a land of freedom for a nation of immigrants.

Yes, they founded a new world, but as they crossed the oceans, the mountains, and the prairies, those who made America carried the old world in their hearts -- the old customs, the family ties, and, most of all, the belief in God, a belief that gave them the moral compass and ethical foundation by which they explored an uncharted frontier and constructed a government and nation of, by, and for the people.

And so, although we Americans became a new people, we also remain an ancient one, for we are guided by ancient and universal values -- values that Prime Minister <sup>Holkeri</sup> ~~Hokeri~~ spoke of in Los Angeles this February when, after recalling Finland's internationally recognized position of neutrality, he added that

Finland is "tied to Western values of freedom, democracy, and human rights."

And let me add here that for America, those ties are also the bonds of our friendship. America respects Finland's neutrality. We support Finland's independence. We honor Finland's courageous history. We salute the creative statesmanship that has been Finland's gift to world peace. And in this soaring hall -- which is the great architect <sup>Alvar</sup>~~Alvar~~ Aalto's statement of hope for Finland's future -- we reaffirm our hope and faith that the friendship between our nations will be unending. ✓

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fix  
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Has the Final Act and what we call the Helsinki process worked or not? Many say it hasn't, but I believe it has.

In the security field, I would point to the most recent fruit of the process -- the Stockholm Document on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, This agreement lays down the rules by which our 35 states notify each other of upcoming military activities in Europe; provide detailed information on these activities in advance; let the others know their plans for very large military activities one to two years in advance and agree not to hold such maneuvers unless this notice is given; invite observers to their larger military activities; and permit on-site inspections to make sure the agreement is honored. ✓

I am happy to note that since our representatives shook hands to seal this agreement a year and a half ago, all 35 states have, by and large, honored both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm Document. The Western and neutral and non-aligned states have set a strong example in providing full information about their military activities. In April, Finland held its first military activity subject to the Stockholm notification requirements and voluntarily invited observers to it. The Soviet Union and its allies also have <sup>generally</sup> a good record of implementation, though <sup>less forthcoming than the West.</sup> ~~(they have been less open in handling observers)~~ Ten on-site inspections have been conducted so far, and more and more states are exercising their right to make such inspections. I ✓ ✓

NSC  
Staff  
fix

can't help but believe that making inspections a matter of routine business will improve openness and enhance confidence.

Nor was Stockholm the end of the process. In Vienna, all 35 signatory states are considering how to strengthen the confidence- and security-building measures, <sup>in the context of a balanced outcome at the CSCE Follow-Up Meeting that includes significant</sup> ~~pending~~ progress on human rights.

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In the economic field, as in the security field, I believe there has been progress, but of a different kind. Issues and negotiations regarding security are not simple, but military technology makes arms and armies resemble each other enough so that common measures can be confidently applied. Economic relations, by contrast, are bedeviled by systematic differences. Perhaps increases in non-strategic trade can contribute to better relations between East and West, but it is difficult to relate the state-run economies of the East to the essentially free-market economies of the West. Perhaps some of the changes underway in the state-run economies will equip them better to deal with our businessmen, and open new arenas for cooperations. But our work on these issues over the years has already made us understand that differences in systems are serious obstacles to expansion of economic ties, and since understanding of unpleasant realities is part of wisdom, that too, is progress.

The changes taking place in the Eastern countries of the continent go beyond changes in their economic systems and greater openness in their military activities: changes have also begun to occur in the field of human rights, as was called for in the Final Act. The rest of us would like to see the changes that are

being announced actually registered in the law and practice of our Eastern partners, and in the documents under negotiation in the Vienna follow-up to <sup>the</sup> Helsinki conference. ✓

Much has been said about the human rights and humanitarian provisions in the Final Act and the failure of the Eastern bloc to honor them. Yet, for all the bleak winds that have swept the plains of justice since that signing day in 1975, the Accords have taken root in the conscience of humanity and grown in moral and, increasingly, in diplomatic authority. I believe that this is no accident. It reflects an increasing realization that the agenda of East-West relations must be comprehensive -- that security and human rights must be advanced together, or cannot truly be secured at all. But it also shows that the provisions in the Final Act reflect standards that are truly universal in their scope. The Accords embody a fundamental truth, a truth that gathers strength with each passing season, and that will not be denied -- the truth that, like the first Finnish settlers in America, all our ancient peoples find themselves today in a new world, and that, as those early settlers discovered, the greatest creative and moral force in this new world, the greatest hope for survival and success, for peace and happiness, is human freedom.

Accuracy ✓  
Yes, freedom -- the right to speak, to print, to assemble, to travel, the right to worship and believe, the right to be different, the right, as the American <sup>philosopher,</sup> ~~poet,~~ Henry David Thoreau, wrote, "to march to a different drummer." This is freedom as most Europeans and Americans understand it and freedom as it is embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and, yes,



in the Helsinki Accords. And -- far more than the locomotive or the automobile, the airplane or the rocket, more than radio, television or the computer -- this concept of liberty is the most distinct, peculiar, and powerful invention of the civilization we all share.

Indeed, without this freedom there would have been no mechanical inventions, for inventions are eccentricities. The men and women who create them are visionaries, just like artists and writers. They see what others fail to see and trust their insights when others don't. The same freedom that permits literature and the arts to flourish, the same freedom that allows one to attend church, synagogue, or mosque without apprehension, that same freedom from oppression and supervision is the freedom that has given us -- the peoples of Western Europe and North America -- our dynamism, our economic growth, and our inventiveness. Together with Japan, Australia, and <sup>many</sup> others, we have lived in this state of freedom, this House of Democracy since the end of the Second World War. <sup>It is a House whose doors are open to all.</sup> Because of that, because of the liberty and popular rule we have shared, today we also share a prosperity more widely distributed and extensive, a political order more tolerant and humane than has ever before been known on earth.

To see not simply the immediate but the historic importance of this, we should remember how far so many of our nations have traveled -- and how desolate the future of freedom and democracy once seemed. There is a story that illustrates what I'm saying. It was shortly after the Second World War, and George Orwell

So it is clear the House is not exclusivary

✓

✓

recalled saying to Arthur Koestler that "History stopped in 1936," to which Koestler "nodded in immediate understanding." Orwell added that "we were both thinking of totalitarianism."

For <sup>much of this century,</sup> ~~decades~~ the totalitarian temptation, in one form or another, has beckoned to mankind, also promising freedom -- but of a different kind than the one we celebrate today. This concept of liberty is, as the Czechoslovak writer Milan Kundera has put it, "the age old dream of a world where everybody would live in harmony, united by a single common will and faith, without secrets from one another" -- the freedom of imposed perfection.

Fifty, forty, even as recently as thirty years ago, the contest between this utopian concept of freedom on one hand and the democratic concept of freedom on the other seemed a close one. Promises of a perfect world lured many Western thinkers and millions of others besides. And many believed in the confident prediction of history's inevitable triumph.

Few do today. Just as democratic freedom has proven itself incredibly fertile -- fertile not merely in a material sense, but also in the abundance it has brought forth in the human spirit -- so too utopianism has proven brutal and barren.

Albert Camus once predicted that, in his words, "When revolution in the name of power and of history becomes a murderous and immoderate mechanism, a new rebellion is consecrated in the name of moderation and of life." Isn't this exactly what we see happening across the mountains and plains of Europe and even beyond the Urals today? In Western Europe,

support for utopian ideologies -- including support among intellectuals -- has all but collapsed, while in the non-democratic countries, leaders grapple with the internal contradictions of their system and some ask how they can make that system better and more productive.

*Optimal cut* [In a sense, the front~~line~~ line in the competition of ideas that has played in Europe and America for more than 70 years has shifted East. Once it was the democracies that doubted their own view of freedom and wondered whether utopian systems might not be better. Today, the doubt is on the other side.] ✓

In just two days, I will meet in Moscow with General Secretary Gorbachev. It will be our fourth set of face-to-face talks since 1985. The General Secretary and I have developed a broad agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations -- an agenda linked directly to the agenda of the Final Act.

Yes, as does the Final Act, we will discuss security issues. We will pursue progress in arms <sup>reduction</sup> ~~control~~ negotiations across the board and continue our exchanges on the regional issues. ✓

Yes, we will also discuss economic issues, although, as in the Helsinki process, we have seen in recent years how much differences in our systems inhibit expanded ties, and how difficult it is to divorce economic relations from human rights and other elements of the relationship.

And, yes, as our countries did at Helsinki, we will take up other bilateral areas, as well -- including scientific, cultural and people-to-people exchanges, where we have been hard at work

identifying new ways to cooperate. In this area, in particular, I believe we'll see some good results before the week is over.

And like the Final Act, our agenda now includes human rights as an integral component. We have developed our dialogue, and put in place new mechanisms for discussion. The General Secretary has spoken often and forthrightly of the problems confronting the Soviet Union. In his campaign to address these shortcomings, he talks of "glasnost" and "perestroika" -- openness and restructuring, words that to our ears have a particularly welcome sound. And since he began his campaign, things have happened that ~~(we --)~~ all of us ~~(in the House of Democracy --)~~ applaud.

Give State this one

The list includes the release from labor camps or exile of people like Andrei Sakharov, Irina Ratushinskaya, Anatoliy Koryagin, Josif Begun, and many other prisoners of conscience; the publication of books like Dr. Zhivago; <sup>and Children of the Arbat;</sup> the distribution of movies like Repentance, that are critical of aspects of the Soviet past and present; allowing higher levels of emigration; greater toleration of dissent; General Secretary Gorbachev's recent statements on religious toleration; the beginning of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Optional

All this is new and good. But at the same time, there is another list, defined not by us but by the standard of the Helsinki Final Act and the sovereign choice of all participants, including the Soviet Union, to subscribe to it. We need look no farther through the Final Act to see where Soviet practice does not -- or does not yet -- measure up to Soviet commitment. ✓

Thirteen years after the Final Act was signed, it is difficult to understand why cases of divided families and blocked marriages should remain on the East-West agenda; or why Soviet citizens who wish to exercise their right to emigrate should be subject to artificial quotas and arbitrary rulings. And what are we to think of the continued suppression of those who wish to practice their religious beliefs? Over three hundred men and women whom the world sees as political prisoners have been released. There remains no reason why the Soviet Union cannot release all people still in jail for expression of political or religious belief, or for organizing to monitor the Helsinki Act. ✓

The Soviets talk about a "common European home," and define it in terms of geography. But what is it that <sup>cements the structure of</sup> ~~unifies the~~ clear purpose that all our nations pledged themselves to build by their signature of the ~~nations of Western Europe today~~ and also, I believe, unifies the Final Act? What is it but the belief in the inalienable rights and dignity of every single ~~the peoples, though not the regimes, of Eastern Europe?~~ What is ~~it but the~~ ~~Judeo-Christian tradition and its teachings about the~~ ~~inalienable rights and dignity of all God's children?~~ What is it but a <sup>true,</sup> ~~common~~ commitment to pluralist <sup>is it</sup> ~~democracy?~~ What <sup>universally understood</sup> ~~but a~~ <sup>that evolved from the genius of European civilization?</sup> ~~common~~ dedication to the ~~democratic~~ concept of liberty? This is <sup>or should mark,</sup> what marks the common European home.

Mr. Gorbachev has spoken of, in his words, "the artificiality and temporariness of the bloc-to-bloc confrontation and the archaic nature of the 'iron curtain.'" I join him in this belief, and ~~would~~ <sup>ever?</sup> welcome ~~the~~ sign that the Soviets and their allies are ready <sup>not only</sup> to embrace <sup>but to put into practice</sup> the values that ~~not only~~ unify <sup>and indeed</sup> ~~but~~ define contemporary Western European civilization and its grateful American offspring.

Possible compromise language

Ask for

Some 30 years ago, during another period of relative openness, the Italian socialist, Pietro Nenni, who was a friend of the Soviet Union, warned that it was wrong to think that the relaxation could be permanent in, as he said, "the absence of any system of judicial guarantees." And he added that ~~again in his~~ words, <sup>more</sup> only ~~(the complete restoration of)~~ democracy and liberty could prevent <sup>reversal of the progress underway.</sup> ~~backsliding~~.

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There are a number of steps <sup>which, if taken, would help ensure the</sup> ~~(in addition to human rights~~ deepening and institutionalization <sup>of promising reforms.</sup> ~~that the Soviet leaders can take if they wish to demonstrate that~~

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improvement.

~~(glasnost and democratization are here to stay)~~ First, <sup>the Soviet leaders could</sup> they can agree to tear down the Berlin Wall and all barriers between Eastern and Western Europe. They <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ join us in making Berlin itself an all-European center of communications, meetings, and travel, ~~(and allowing internal as well as external travel)~~.

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They <sup>could</sup> ~~can~~ also give legal and practical protection to free expression and worship. Let me interject here that at one time Moscow was known as the "City of the Forty Forties," because there were more than 1,600 belfries in the churches of the city. <sup>The world welcomes the return of some churches to worship after many years. But</sup> ~~Today~~ there are <sup>few</sup> ~~few~~ functioning churches, and almost no bells.

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Mr. Gorbachev recently said, as he put it, "believers are Soviet people, workers, patriots, and they have the full right to express their conviction with dignity." I applaud

Mr. Gorbachev's statement. What a magnificent demonstration of goodwill it would be for the Soviet leadership for church bells to <sup>ring out</sup> ~~be heard~~ again not only in Moscow but throughout the Soviet Union.

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But beyond these particular steps, there is a deeper question. How can the countries of the East not only grant but guarantee the protection of rights? <sup>The thought and practice of</sup> ~~We know, of course, of a~~ ✓  
<sup>centuries has pointed the way.</sup> ~~simple and profound starting place~~ As the French constitutional ✓  
philosopher, Montesquieu, wrote more than two <sup>hundred years</sup> ~~centuries~~ ago, ✓  
"There is no liberty, if the power of judging be not separated" ✓  
from the other powers of government. <sup>And, like</sup> The complete independence ✓  
of the judiciary, ~~is essential to the guarantee of human rights~~ ✓  
~~So, too, is~~ popular control over those who make the laws, <sup>provides a vital, practical guarantee of human rights.</sup> ✓  
~~secret ballots, and the freedom to form political parties and run~~ ✓  
~~or for free collective bargaining.~~ <sup>So does</sup> of citizens to associate and act for political purposes ✓  
~~candidates -- these are among the elements of a system in which~~ ✓  
~~human rights enjoy institutional protection.~~ ✓

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fixes

So does the

I know that for the <sup>Eastern</sup> ~~East bloc~~ countries such steps are ✓  
difficult, and some may say it is unrealistic to call for them. ✓  
Some said, in 1975, that the standards set forth in the Final Act ✓  
were unrealistic; that the comprehensive agenda it embodied was ✓  
unrealistic. Some said, earlier in this decade, that calling for ✓  
global elimination of <sup>an entire class of</sup> U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear ✓  
missiles was unrealistic; that calling for 50 percent reductions ✓  
<sup>US and Soviet</sup> in strategic offensive <sup>arms</sup> ~~weapons~~ was unrealistic; that the Soviets ✓  
would never withdraw from Afghanistan. Is it realistic to ✓  
pretend that rights are truly protected when there are no ✓  
effective safeguards against arbitrary rule? ~~It is~~ realistic, ✓  
when the Soviet leadership itself is calling for glasnost and ✓  
democratization, to say that judicial guarantees, or the ✓  
independence of the judiciary, or popular control over those that ✓  
draft the laws, or freedom to associate for political purposes, ✓

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fixes

N.B. weapons  
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are unrealistic? And, finally, is it realistic to say that peace is truly secure when political systems are less than open? ~~(No)~~ ✓

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~~If we believe that realism is on our side when we say that less an observer than Friedrich Engels wrote more than a century and a half ago of a now defunct autocratic regime that, indeed be achieved together if we are prepared to drive toward in his words, "As soon as Russia has... internal party struggles that goal. So did, [and] a constitutional form under which these party struggles may be fought without violent convulsions... the traditional Russian policy of conquest is a thing of the past."~~

The leaders who met in this room to sign the Final Act <sup>They</sup> were visionaries of the most practical kind. In shaping our policy toward the Soviet Union, in preparing for my meetings with the General Secretary, I have taken their vision -- a shared vision, subscribed to by East, West, and the proud neutral and non-aligned countries of this continent -- as my guide. I believe the standard the framers of the Final Act set -- including the concept of liberty <sup>it embodies</sup> ~~they defined~~ -- is a standard for all of us. We can do no less than uphold it and try to see <sup>turn, as the Soviets say, into "life itself."</sup> it ~~enforced~~ ✓

We in the West will remain firm in our values; strong and vigilant in defense of our interests; ready to negotiate honestly for results of mutual and universal benefit. One lesson we drew again from the events leading up to the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was that, in the world as it is today, peace truly does depend on Western strength and resolve. It is a lesson we will continue to heed.

But we are also prepared to work with the Soviets and their allies whenever they are ready to work with us. By strength we



do not mean diktat, that is, an imposed settlement; we mean confident negotiation. The road ahead may be long -- but not so long as our countries had before them 44 years ago when Finland's great President, J.K. Paasikivi, told a nation that had shown the world uncommon courage in a harrowing time: "A path rises up the slope from the floor of the valley. At times the ascent is gradual, at other times steeper. But all the time one comes closer and closer to free, open spaces, above which God's ever brighter sky can be seen. The way up will be difficult.... But every step will take us closer to open vistas."

I believe that in Moscow, Mr. Gorbachev and I can take another step toward a brighter future and a safer world. And I believe that, for the sake of all our ancient peoples, this new world must be a place both of democratic freedom and of peace. It must be a world in which the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act guides all our countries like a great beacon of hope and in which the House of Democracy shelters all mankind for ages to come.

Thank you and God bless you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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April 22, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR TOM GRISCOM

FROM: JOHN D. NEGROPOL 

SUBJECT: President's Speech in Helsinki

The State Department has sent us a proposed draft of the President's address in Helsinki on the way to Moscow. I enclose this draft for your and the speechwriters' consideration. We have made a few marginal comments to note passages which we particularly like or dislike.

Recognizing that you may want to start from scratch, we also enclose three other things that may be helpful: some general guidance on what we believe the Helsinki speech should discuss; a page of bilateral themes relating to Finland; and a paper from Warren Zimmerman in Vienna summing up where things stand currently in the Helsinki process.

Attachments

Tab A NSC Guidance on the Helsinki Speech  
Tab B Bilateral Themes for the Helsinki Speech  
Tab C Statement by Zimmerman on status of Helsinki process  
Tab D State Draft of the Helsinki Speech

## NSC Guidance on the President's Helsinki Speech

The speech should open with some bilateral (U.S.-Finn) themes. See accompanying paper.

The main subject should be the Helsinki (CSCE) process, which symbolizes the important philosophical theme of the link between human rights and European security. The Helsinki process has been an inspiration to all (including in Eastern Europe) who seek a real openness, which means tearing down all the barriers that remain in Europe.

(Some of the material in the State draft will be useful, but the speech should not be focused narrowly on U.S.-Soviet relations and our four-part agenda. It should be more broadly East-West, as indicated, focusing on human rights and security.)

The speech should review the 15 years of the Helsinki process (beginning in 1973 but culminating in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act). The President should note where things now stand in Vienna, particularly the problems (see the Zimmerman paper), and pledge that he will stress human rights while in Moscow.

The President should also counter the Soviet line about the "common European home" (from which the U.S. is excluded). The U.S. and most of Europe share political values, culture, and

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joined in encouraging the coordinator to compile a list of paragraphs which could be accepted, then spent weeks refusing - alone among 35 states - to agree to the result.

In summary, we have made very little progress during a round which could have given us a critical impulse forward. The mathematicians among us can argue that 50 per cent or 60 per cent or 70 per cent of the final text has been agreed. Such facile computing ignores the fact that our final document depends on political commitments, not arithmetic. The reality is that after nearly a year and a half we have not yet agreed on adequate language in a single major category of human rights or human contacts.

Outside Vienna, where real people are affected by adherence to - or violation of - Helsinki obligations, gaps between commitment and compliance remain unbridged. In the Soviet Union promises and assurances made voluntarily, even pridefully, are still unfulfilled. For example, Soviet citizens are still waiting for promised revisions of the criminal code, the law on religious association, and emigration restrictions. Recent legislation affecting psychiatric practises has yet to have a noticeable effect on the abuse of psychiatry for political purposes; some 100 Soviet citizens are still detained in psychiatric institutions for political reasons.

While institutional changes lag, repressive practises continue. Over 300 political prisoners have been released by Soviet authorities, but a similar number are known to be imprisoned, 13 of them Helsinki monitors. About half of these prisoners of conscience, contrary to high-level Soviet assertions, are persons incarcerated for exercising their right to freedom of religion. Emigration levels, particularly for Soviet Jews, have ceased to rise. General Secretary Gorbachev's repeated statements that access to state secrets is the only bar to emigration is not observed in practice. Adults still require permission of relatives to emigrate, despite the expressed hope of Soviet officials that they shall be able to seek redress. The first-degree relative requirement remains a threatening part of current Soviet emigration regulations, though we are of course glad that the decision has been taken to interpret it flexibly. And even the secrecy regulations continue to be applied arbitrarily. Just last week I received a letter from a Soviet citizen whose exit permission was refused because his father-in-law had once had access to secrets.

It is encouraging that few new cases of long-term political imprisonment by authorities in Eastern countries have come to

must be visibly greater progress along that road before the Vienna meeting can end successfully.

Here in Vienna major issues await resolution - issues of human rights and fundamental freedoms, issues affecting the security of our citizens. The United States has been ready to assist in resolving these issues since the very beginning. So have other delegations from all groupings. The next round could be our last but only if those who have been stalling, and those who have been supporting those who have been stalling, get down to serious business.

My delegation will return to Vienna in April ready to contribute to a balanced, substantive, and early result. In our view such a result should contain the following key elements:

First, in military security, the path must be cleared for two distinct negotiations after the conclusion of the Vienna meeting. They should take place within the framework of the CSCE process, with the conventional stability negotiation retaining autonomy as regards subject matter, participation and procedures. For us autonomy means the following:

-- It means that, while the two future negotiations may begin at the same time, the stability talks of the 23 cannot be controlled by the calendar of the CSBM negotiation of the 35.

-- It means that, while the talks are held in the same city, the negotiations of the 23 should take place in distinct - that is separate - facilities from those of the 35.

-- It means that, while the 23 will regularly exchange views and information with the other CSCE participants during the stability negotiations, and will inform the next follow-up meeting of progress made, the 23 will make their own decisions.

The U.S. delegation has played an active role in seeking to generate progress in the military security area, in clear refutation of the charge that we have been holding military security hostage to Basket Three. We still hope before the end of this round to reach agreement on an explicit reference to resuming the CDE and thereby break out of the impasse that has held us back since October. Then, when we return, we can focus fully on the difficult issue of how the 23 participants in the conventional stability talks relate to the 12 non-participants.

Second, in Basket Two we will work for commitments which enable business representatives, scientists, environmentalists, and tourists to pursue their vocations and their interests. We

human rights. It is our strong preference to secure such a result during the next round, but it is our equally strong commitment to stay as long as is required to secure it. A minimal or one-sided conclusion to the Vienna meeting would set back the cause of both security and human rights and could damage the Helsinki process irreparably. The alternative to such a disaster is not only preferable; it is available. The United States will continue to work for it.



Draft Speech: Helsinki

On the eve of my first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985, I told the American people that my mission, simply stated, was a mission for peace. I wanted to sit down across the table from Mr. Gorbachev in Geneva and try to set out with him a basis for peaceful discourse and cooperation between our two countries. I will go to Moscow next week to continue that mission.

At Geneva, General Secretary Gorbachev and I charted an ambitious agenda. We have met twice since then, and we can take pride in accomplishments that will contribute to a safer world. But the discussions in Moscow will not be about those achievements. They will be about the unfinished business on our agenda.

Nothing reminds me how vital is this unfinished business than the holiday that Americans will celebrate next week while I am in Moscow. Monday is Memorial Day, the day when Americans honor the hundreds of thousands of their countrymen who have fallen in battle around the globe. Many of these Americans lie buried here in Europe. They sacrificed their lives not for territorial conquest, but to restore peace and advance human liberty for all peoples.

Not so  
much  
US-Soviet  
bilateral  
focus.  
More  
East-West  
in general

These principles are not just abstractions -- they are rights that all people of East and West must be able to exercise. Europe cannot be truly reunited until it is truly open. Europe cannot be truly healed until the peoples of the East find that the principles of the Helsinki Final Act are not just a faraway dream, but rather are rights that can be practiced in their daily lives.

*Too  
pbeat*

The strength of our common values and shared vision of freedom have enabled the countries of the West to meet every challenge and to command our destiny. Our belief in open societies, open economies and open borders -- and our willingness to act on that belief -- have brought a level of security, creativity, opportunity and prosperity which prior generations could only dream of. They are allowing us to shape the conditions that will strengthen peace and advance freedom.

#### U.S.-Soviet Affairs

The United States has taken the "spirit of Helsinki" to heart in our effort to forge a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. Helsinki is the birthplace of what we call our four-part agenda -- our effort to deal with the root sources of tension and mistrust in East-West affairs. It was

Last month, the United States and the Soviet Union signed in Geneva an agreement providing for the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces, creating the conditions for the people of Afghanistan to determine their own destiny and for the refugees to return home with honor. Those Soviet withdrawals have now begun, and must continue.

We have seen trends toward greater freedom of expression in the Soviet Union. We have noted steps by the Soviet government to deal more forthrightly with longstanding humanitarian cases of great concern to the West. Emigration levels are higher than what they were several years ago but still are artificially restricted. Much, much more remains to be done, but it would be wrong to pretend that these first steps are without significance.

We have seen an unprecedented expansion of bilateral contacts between American and Soviet citizens. Over time, these opportunities should serve to lessen misapprehensions, break down old barriers, and increase understanding between our two societies.

These are remarkable and welcome developments. They hold out the promise of a more stable and satisfactory relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. They are a good beginning.

*Good*

The effort to create a better future must begin with full respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms. The objective is straightforward -- that the Soviet Union fully live up to the standards of the Helsinki Final Act. Thirteen years after the Final Act was signed, there is no reason why cases of divided families and blocked marriages should remain on the East-West agenda. There is no reason why Soviet citizens who wish to exercise their right to emigrate should be subject to artificial quotas and arbitrary rulings. There is no justification for the continued suppression of those who wish to practice their religious beliefs. We see no reason why the Soviet Union cannot release all prisoners of conscience.

Progress in these areas would not solve all the problems, but it would strengthen hope that the moral division of Europe can be healed over time.

We must also pursue vigorously the effort to lower the risk of conflict. The United States will do its part to achieve equitable, verifiable agreements that reduce military forces and enhance stability. In Moscow next week, General Secretary Gorbachev and I will review progress toward conclusion of a Treaty which would reduce strategic nuclear arms by half. Such a Treaty would be a monumental step toward a safer world. We are determined as well to explore the possibilities for a stable peace that relies more on defenses than on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Mr. Gorbachev has said that a political settlement in Afghanistan would provide "an important rupture in the chain of regional conflicts." I hope that is so. Clearly a critical first step is full Soviet implementation of its commitment to withdraw its military forces from Afghanistan, to return the fate of Afghanistan to the Afghan people, and to contribute to conditions that permit national reconciliation, the return of refugees with safety and honor, and economic reconstruction. I will make clear to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States stands ready to contribute to peace in Afghanistan and to political settlement of other regional conflicts. These solutions must be based on genuine self-determination, national reconciliation, and an end to outside military involvement. These are the principles that have guided American efforts to bring peace to troubled regions; if the Soviet Union is willing to pursue peace on that basis, then peaceful solutions can be found.

Mr. Gorbachev and I will also examine ways to continue expanding opportunities for American and Soviet citizens to know each other better. Like progress in human rights, advances in our bilateral cooperation directly touch the people of both countries. Since the Geneva summit in 1985, tens of thousands of Soviet and American citizens have exchanged

*Tone of  
Springfield  
Speech is  
better*

The steps taken over the last two years should give everyone hope that a more secure and peaceful future can be ours, if we work hard enough at shaping the circumstances where greater openness and freedom are the norm of international relations. That is the task set out in this city 13 years ago. It is the task I hope to advance next week.

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SUBJECT: ISOLATION OR OPENNESS: SOME ASPECTS OF POLITICAL  
CULTURE AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR IN FINLAND

1. SUMMARY: THE FOLLOWING REPORT IS AN EFFORT TO PUT INTO PERSPECTIVE SOME MAJOR ASPECTS OF FINNISH POLITICAL BEHAVIOR. THE KEY WORD USED TO DESCRIBE SUCH BEHAVIOR OVER THE PAST TWO DECADES HAS BEEN "CONSENSUS". IN FACT, FINLAND HAS BEEN GOVERNED BY A KIND OF "COMPULSORY CONSENSUS" IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT WAS AN OUTGROWTH OF THE COUNTRY'S DEFEAT IN WORLD WAR II AND WAS REFLECTED IN THE POLITICAL COALITIONS THAT EXISTED FOR MOST OF THE FOUR DECADES AFTER THE ARMISTICE. AT THE SAME TIME, A DOMESTIC CONSENSUS HAS DEVELOPED ON ECONOMIC ISSUES INVOLVING THE ACCEPTANCE OF COOPERATION AMONG WORKER, MANAGEMENT, AND GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES AROUND COMMON INCOMES POLICIES. CONSENSUS HAS BEEN POSSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOVIET FACTOR COMBINED WITH STRONG-WILLED FINNISH PRESIDENTS. BUT IT HAS ALSO BEEN THE OUTGROWTH OF CHANGES IN FINNISH SOCIETY WHICH HAVE REDUCED THE DISTANCE AMONG SOCIAL GROUPS AND DIFFUSED INTER-PARTY DIFFERENCES.

2. FINNISH POLITICAL CULTURE MAY BE SEEN THROUGH THE DIMENSION OF OPENNESS AND CLOSEDNESS, AS WELL AS WHAT ONE MAY CHARACTERIZE AS THE "SMALL NATION" PERSPECTIVE -- THE TENDENCY TO DIFFERENTIATE STATES ACCORDING TO THEIR SIZE, RATHER THAN THEIR POLITICAL SYSTEM OR IDEOLOGY. SUCH A FOCUS MOTIVATES BEHAVIOR ON SUCH ISSUES AS EAST-WEST CONFLICTS, THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS, ATTITUDES TO FOREIGNERS, AND THE FINNS' OWN SELF VIEW OF THEIR PLACE IN THE FAMILY OF NATIONS. THUS, ON THE ONE HAND, THERE HAS BEEN A STRONG DESIRE TO "PRESERVE" THE NATION FROM THE PERCEIVED PERNICIOUS EFFECTS OF FOREIGN CULTURAL AND OTHER INFLUENCES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FINNS WANT TO BE PART OF THE ONGOING PROCESS OF INTEGRATION, AND HAVE DEFINED THEIR FOREIGN POLICY THROUGH SUCH PROJECTS AS THE EUROPEAN COOPERATION PROCESS. THIS HAS LED TO A SOMEWHAT SHIZOPHRENIC WAY OF LOOKING AT THE WORLD, WHERE FINNS WANT ON THE ONE HAND TO TAKE PART, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME MAINTAINING THEIR SEPARATENESS AND "NEUTRALITY".

3. LOOKING IN THE LONG TERM, PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT TREND IN FINNISH POLITICS MAY BE DESCRIBED AS THE GRADUAL "NORMALIZATION" OF POLITICS IN BOTH THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS. ALTHOUGH THE FINNS CLEARLY CARRY THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BAGGAGE ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR OWN FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL, THE PROBLEM IS HOW TO ADJUST TO CHANGING WORLD CONDITIONS RATHER THAN TO SIMPLY SURVIVE AS A NATION. THIS MEANS THAT CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT "WHAT THE SOVIETS WILL SAY" ARE MORE RELAXED, WHILE IN THE INTERNAL SPHERE, THE POLITICAL ICE ACCUMULATED IN 25 YEARS OF RULE BY THE AUTHORITARIAN URHO KEKKONEN IS DISSIPATING.

I. INTRODUCTION: PERSISTENT FEATURES OF FINNISH NATIONAL IDENTITY

4. ONE OF THE MOST COMMON THEMES WITH WHICH FINNS ADDRESS THEIR OWN SITUATION IS TO EMPHASIZE THEIR OWN IDENTITY AS A

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SMALL NATION. THIS CHARACTERISTIC IS MORE RELATED TO AN ESTIMATE OF POWER AND POPULATION (ABOUT FIVE MILLION) THAN SIZE, SINCE THE COUNTRY ACTUALLY ENCOMPASSES AN AREA LARGER THAN THE BRITISH ISLES, AND IS EXCEEDED IN SIZE ONLY BY THE USSR, SWEDEN, FRANCE, AND SPAIN.

5. THE "SMALL NATION" COMPLEX HAS A PROFOUND INFLUENCE ON THE WAY IN WHICH THE FINNS RELATED TO THE REST OF THE WORLD. ON THE ONE HAND, IT ENTAILS A DEFENSIVE POSTURE ROOTED IN THE HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF BEING BETWEEN SWEDISH AND RUSSIAN INFLUENCES, SOMETIMES BENIGN, BUT ALSO OPPRESSIVE. THE FINNS ARE NOT OUT TO CONVERT OTHERS TO THEIR WAYS BUT RATHER SEEK TO INSURE THAT OUTSIDE POWERS WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH THEIR OWN WAY OF LIFE. EVEN THOUGH THEIR POSITION HAS BECOME CONSOLIDATED AFTER FOUR DECADES OF PEACE, THE BASIC DRIVE STILL REMAINS. WHEREAS AMERICANS TYPICALLY DIVIDE THE WORLD IDEOLOGICALLY ("FREE WORLD" VS. ALL OTHER STATES), THE FINNS TEND TO DIVIDE THE WORLD BY SIZE, LOOKING AT THE "SUPERPOWERS" (OR "GREAT POWERS," INCLUDING CHINA, THE U.K., FRANCE, AND INDIA) FIRST, AND ALL OTHER STATES SEPARATELY. U.S. ACTIONS IN SUCH PARTS OF THE WORLD AS CENTRAL AMERICA, THEREFORE, ARE CONSIDERED A SUPERPOWER'S ACTS IN DEFENSE OF ITS OWN INTERESTS (WHETHER JUSTIFIED OR NOT), RATHER THAN A FELLOW DEMOCRACY'S CONCERN FOR THE RIGHT OF ALL MEN TO LIVE IN FREEDOM. WHEREAS WE TEND TO USE PUBLIC OCCASIONS TO STRESS OUR OWN COMMON IDEOLOGICAL HERITAGE WITH THE FINNS, THEY RARELY REPLAY THE COMPLIMENT. FOR EXAMPLE, WHEN PRESIDENT KOIVISTO RECENTLY NOTED THE "YEAR OF FRIENDSHIP" WITH THE U.S. IN THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT, RATHER THAN UNDERScore COMMON VALUES WITH THE U.S., HE STATED HIS HOPE THAT HIS COUNTRY WOULD USE THE OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE ITS SALES ON THE U.S. MARKET. A RARE EXCEPTION WAS MADE IN FEBRUARY IN A SPEECH IN LOS ANGELES BY PRIME MINISTER HARRI HOLKERI, WHO REFERRED TO HIS LAND AS A "NEUTRAL COUNTRY, WHICH IS CLEARLY TIED TO WESTERN VALUES OF FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS". NEEDLESS TO SAY, SUCH LABELS ARE NOT USED WHEN FINNISH OFFICIALS VISIT THE USSR.

6. AT THE SAME TIME, FINNISH POLICIES ESCHEW ANY OVERT ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE THE VALUES ON WHICH THEIR SOCIETY IS BASED. THE FINNS ARE LESS READY THAN OTHERS TO MAKE JUDGEMENTS ON OTHER COUNTRIES' POLICIES. WHEN THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IS BROUGHT UP, THE GENERAL CONCLUSION THAT IS DRAWN IS THAT SUCH MATTERS ARE A COUNTRY'S "INTERNAL AFFAIR" AND ARE NOT PROPER FOR FINNS TO ATTEMPT TO MANIPULATE, EVEN THOUGH THEY ADMIT THAT HUMAN RIGHTS ARE "ONE FACTOR" THE FINNS USE TO DETERMINE THEIR RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.

7. ONE MAY LOOK A BIT CYNICALLY ON ANOTHER COROLLARY OF THIS POLICY IN USING THE "DRIFTWOOD" THESIS. IN FINNISH POLITICAL DEBATES, THE THESIS HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP TO SUGGEST THAT THE COUNTRY "GOES WITH THE CURRENTS" RATHER THAN EXERTING A WILL OF ITS OWN. IN THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, THE THESIS WAS STRONGLY CHALLENGED BY CENTER PARTY CANDIDATE PAAVO VAYRYNEN, WHO ARGUED THAT FINLAND IS AN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY WHICH CAN AND DOES MAKE INDEPENDENT DECISIONS ABOUT ITS OWN FUTURE. VAYRYNEN



HAS ALSO BEEN ONE OF THE LEADING SPOKESMEN FOR THE VIEW THAT FINLAND MUST "GUARD" ITS HERITAGE FROM NEGATIVE FOREIGN INFLUENCES, BOTH IN THE CULTURAL SENSE AND IN THE DIMENSION OF INTERNATIONAL "STRUCTURAL CHANGE," WHICH BRINGS IN THE POSSIBILITY THAT FINLAND WILL BE SUBJECT TO DECISIONS AFFECTING ITS ECONOMY WHICH ARE MADE OUTSIDE ITS BORDERS. HOWEVER, TO SOME DEGREE THERE IS A BASIS FOR THE DRIFTWOOD ARGUMENT. ON SOME ISSUES, THE FINNS CLEARLY TAKE THE PATH OF LEAST INTERNATIONAL RESISTANCE. ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN BOYCOTT ISSUE, ONE CHURCH OFFICIAL ADMITTED TO US IN 1986 THAT HIS ORGANIZATION BECAME ACTIVE AFTER ITS BRETHERN IN THE OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES DID THE SAME. FINNISH POSITIONS ON THIRD-WORLD ISSUES ALSO HAVE A FLAVOR OF BEING FORMULATED FIRST AND FOREMOST TO INSURE THE COUNTRY'S POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY; CHARACTERISTICALLY, UNTIL THE 1960'S, THE FINNS ABSTAINED ON U.N. SOUTH AFRICA RESOLUTIONS BECAUSE OF THE VIEW THEY WERE DEALING WITH A COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIR. WHEN IT BECAME OBVIOUS THAT THIS POSTURE WOULD BE NO LONGER UNDERSTOOD IN BLACK AFRICA, THE FINNS SHIFTED THEIR POSITION. TAKING A STRONG POSITION ON SOUTH AFRICA (OR CHILE) CAN ALSO BE USED AS EVIDENCE OF A "MORAL COMMITMENT" IN GENERAL, WITHOUT THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN TAKING SUCH A COMMITMENT TO CLOSER AND MORE SENSITIVE AREAS SUCH AS THE USSR AND EASTERN EUROPE.

8. THE SEARING EXPERIENCE OF WORLD WAR II, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL LEARNING EXPERIENCE THAT FINLAND MUST RELY ON ITSELF RATHER THAN ON OUTSIDE SUPPORT TO MAINTAIN ITS INDEPENDENCE AND VIABILITY, ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO A DUALISTIC SELF-IDENTITY. THUS, WHILE THE FINNS ARE PART OF THE WESTERN VALUE SYSTEM, THEY ALSO MAINTAIN ONE FOOT OUTSIDE THAT SYSTEM BOTH PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND INSTITUTIONALLY. IN MOST GENERAL TERMS, THEY LACK THE SENSE OF SOLIDARITY THAT COMES FROM BEING A MEMBER OF THE WESTERN COMMUNITY. THIS IS PARTLY EVIDENCED BY THE FACT THAT POLLS SHOW THE FINNS ARE THOSE EUROPEANS WHO ARE LEAST LIKELY TO FEEL THAT AN AMERICAN PRESENCE IN EUROPE IS NECESSARY TO DETER AN ATTACK ON THEIR COUNTRY. BUT ALSO, FINNS ARE RELUCTANT TO PARTICIPATE IN COMMON WESTERN EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL END. EVERY ATTEMPT TO APPROACH THE WEST INSTITUTIONALLY, SUCH AS FULL MEMBERSHIP IN EFTA, HAS BEEN TAKEN AFTER LONG AND CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. EVEN NOW FINNISH POLITICIANS ARE NOT YET INCLINED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO FULL MEMBERSHIP IN THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE. THIS IS TRUE EVEN WHILE NO ONE CAN POINT TO ANY POLITICAL OBSTACLES. FEAR OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET REACTION ONLY PARTLY EXPLAINS THIS VIEW; OPINION POLLS SHOW THE FINNS OF ALL THE NORDIC NATIONS TO HAVE THE LOWEST ESTIMATION OF THE BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION IN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION.

9. ANOTHER ASPECT OF THE FINNISH IDENTITY IS THE TENDENCY TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH THE "WEAK" STATES OF THE WORLD. CHARACTERISTICALLY, THE FINNS ARE MORE AROUSED BY THE IMAGE OF A "FELLOW SMALL STATE" NICARAGUA LOCKED IN CONFLICT WITH THE AMERICAN SUPERPOWER THAN BY THE IDEA THAT THE PERSONS STRUGGLING FOR DEMOCRACY WITHIN NICARAGUA DESERVE THEIR SUPPORT. FINNISH LEFTISTS WHO ATTEMPT TO MOULD PUBLIC OPINION

ON THIS ISSUE HAVE OPENLY SUGGESTED THAT THEIR SUPPORTERS ESCHEW IDEOLOGICAL SLOGANEERING ABOUT "U.S. IMPERIALISM" AND SIMPLY PORTRAY THE CONFLICT AS ONE OVER A SMALL STATE'S RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION.

10. SUPPORT FOR THE "WEAK" SIDE OF A CONFLICT HAS ALSO MADE THE FINNS INCREASINGLY SYMPATHETIC TO THE PALESTINIANS (ESPECIALLY WITH THE RECENT PUBLIC IMAGES OF UNARMED PERSONS BEATEN BY ISRAELI SOLDIERS) OR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS (WHO ARE SEEN AS "VICTIMS" OF THE ILLEGAL INTERVENTION OF A LARGER OUTSIDE POWER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY THEMSELVES ARE THE DOMINANT NATION IN THEIR ISLAND). THE TENDENCY TO VIEW THE WORLD AS COMPOSED OF WEAK STATES DOMINATED BY LARGER OUTSIDE POWERS ALSO TAKES STRANGE TWISTS. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING HER RECENT VISIT TO FINLAND, NORWEGIAN PRIME MINISTER BRUNDTLAND MADE A SPECIAL POINT IN HER PUBLIC STATEMENTS TO REMIND THE FINNS THAT HER COUNTRY JOINED NATO OUT OF ITS OWN FREE WILL. A NORWEGIAN EMBOFF EXPLAINED THAT, ALTHOUGH THE POINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN OBVIOUS, THERE WERE STILL MANY FINNS WHO HELD THE VIEW THAT NORWAY WAS AN UNWILLING TOOL OF NATO AND THE U.S. DISCUSSION ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE NORDIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS-FREE ZONE ALSO ENTERS INTO SIMILAR KINDS OF LOGICAL EXCURSIONS. ONE OFTEN HEARS THE VIEW THAT, IF IT WERE LEFT UP TO THEM, THE NORWEGIANS AND DANES WOULD AGREE TO THE ZONE PROPOSAL WITHOUT FURTHER ADO. HOWEVER, IT IS "NATO PRESSURE" THAT CAUSES THE IDEA TO GET STUCK. THE NOTION THAT BOTH STATES HAVE A WILL (AND SECURITY INTERESTS) OF THEIR OWN SOMEHOW GETS LOST.

11. A KEY DIMENSION IN CONSIDERING FINLAND'S INTERNATIONAL POSITION IS THAT OF OPENNESS VS. CLOSEDNESS. INDEED, BOTH SIDES OF THE SAME SCALE SEEM TO COEXIST IN THE COUNTRY. ON THE ONE HAND, FINNS LIKE TO SEE THEIR COUNTRY AS A BRIDGE-BUILDER BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. A CORE PART OF THE OFFICIAL POLITICAL LITURGY INCLUDES MENTION OF PRESIDENT KEKKONEN'S ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY AND FINLAND'S FOSTERING OF THE CSCE PROCESS. BUT ON THE OTHER HAND, FINLAND IS ALSO ONE OF THOSE RARE WESTERN COUNTRIES WHERE OFFICIALS CAN SPEAK WITH CONVICTION (ALBEIT PRIVATELY) ABOUT THEIR COUNTRY'S ISOLATION AND DO SO IN A POSITIVE, RATHER THAN NEGATIVE SENSE. WHILE ISOLATION INVOLVES THE FEELING THAT THE COUNTRY IS SOMEHOW AT THE FRONTIER OF THE WESTERN WORLD, IT ALSO IMPARTS A SENSE OF SECURITY IN BEING ABLE TO AVOID SOME OF THE ILLS OF THAT WORLD, SUCH AS VIOLENT CRIME AND TERRORISM. WHEN FINNS GO ABROAD, THERE IS OFTEN A FEELING OF LEAVING THE WOMB -- THE PROTECTED ATMOSPHERE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY.

12. IN RECENT POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS, SOME FINNS HAVE STRONGLY CRITICIZED THE INWARD-LOOKING NATURE OF THEIR OWN POLITY. THE FINNS HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED FOR MAINTAINING AN UNSOLICITOUS, NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARD OUTSIDERS. TO SOME EXTENT THIS ATTITUDE IS BORN OUT OF INSECURITY. IN TODAY'S WORLD OF TERRORISM, INDIVIDUALS FROM THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO BE STOPPED AND CLOSELY SCRUTINIZED WHEN ARRIVING IN THE COUNTRY (BUT EVEN EMBASSY POLCOUNS WAS ASKED FOR HIS "RESIDENCE PERMIT" WHEN HE FIRST ARRIVED IN THE COUNTRY!). THE IDEA THAT LARGE NUMBERS OF FOREIGNERS WOULD SOMEHOW DISUPT THE FINNISH WAY OF

LIFE IS JUST BELOW THE SURFACE.

13. THE FINNS SHOW THEIR LUKEWARM ATTITUDE TOWARD OUTSIDERS IN A NUMBER OF WAYS. WHEREAS IN NEIGHBORING SWEDEN, ABOUT 50 INHABITANTS PER THOUSAND ARE FOREIGNERS, IN FINLAND THE NUMBER IS A TENTH OF THAT FIGURE -- THE LOWEST ANYWHERE IN WESTERN EUROPE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO GET PERMISSION TO STAY IN FINLAND. THIS SITUATION COMES FROM THE TRADITION DATING FROM INDEPENDENCE TIME WHEN IT WAS FELT NECESSARY TO DEFEND NATIONAL IDENTITY BY REGULATIONS (AS WELL AS FORCE OF ARMS) AGAINST REAL AND IMAGINED THREATS. IN FINLAND, THE POLICE HAVE THE SOLE RIGHT TO GRANT RESIDENCE PERMITS, AND THERE IS NO APPEAL FROM A REFUSAL. FOREIGNERS ARE RESTRICTED IN THE RIGHT TO OWN REAL PROPERTY, PUBLICATIONS, OR FORM SOCIETIES. THEY CANNOT OWN MORE THAN 20% OF FINNISH COMPANIES' SHARES, NOR CAN THEY PARTICIPATE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES.

14. TYPICALLY, IN A SURVEY OF FINNISH ATTITUDES PUBLISHED IN EARLY 1987, ONLY 20% OF A REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE WAS POSITIVE ABOUT THE IDEA THAT AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBER OF FOREIGNERS WORKING IN FINLAND WOULD "BRING OUR COUNTRY BENEFICIAL INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES". THE OPPOSITE VIEW WAS HELD BY 53%. CHARACTERISTICALLY, TEEN-AGERS WERE THE MOST OUTGOING ON THIS QUESTION, AND VIEWS GOT PROGRESSIVELY MORE RESTRICTIVE WITH INCREASED AGE. ADHERENTS OF RURAL-ORIENTED PARTIES SUCH AS THE CENTER OR RURAL PARTY ARE ESPECIALLY NEGATIVE ON THIS SCORE. IN A SIMILAR VEIN, ABOUT 74% OF ALL FINNS (ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE OLDER AND IN LOWER SOCIAL STRATA) WANT TO STRENGTHEN FINNISH CULTURAL IDENTITY AGAINST "RISING INTERNATIONALIZATION". SOME CRITICS OF THIS VIEW REFER TO THE "ALBANIAIZATION" OF THEIR COUNTRY.

15. A FURTHER INDICATION OF THE ENCLOSED NATURE OF THE FINNISH POLITY COMES IN THE AREA OF REFUGEE POLICY. IN 1986, 23 FOREIGNERS APPLIED FOR REFUGEE STATUS IN THE COUNTRY, OF WHICH FOUR WERE ACCEPTED. EVEN ADDING THE 200 PLACES GIVEN TO VIETNAMESE BOAT PEOPLE EACH YEAR, FINLAND IS ONE OF THE MOST INHOSPITABLE COUNTRIES IN THE WORLD FOR REFUGEES, AND ITS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ON REFUGEES IS IN SHARP CONTRAST TO THE LARGESSE OF OTHER NORDIC COUNTRIES, NOT TO MENTION THE REST OF THE CONTINENT. REFUGEE POLICY IS ONE WHERE FINNISH OFFICIALS HAVE HAD NO INTEREST IN TRYING TO LEAD PUBLIC OPINION. INSTEAD, IN DISCUSSIONS BOTH ON A PRIVATE AND PUBLIC LEVEL, THEY HAVE FALLEN BACK ON THE CLASSICAL "EXCUSES" WHICH HAVE SERVED WELL:

(A) THE KARELIANS: THE TRADITIONAL EXCUSE GIVEN BY FINNS FOR THEIR UNWILLINGNESS TO TAKE IN MORE REFUGEES RELATES TO THE BURDENS THEY SUFFERED IN 1940 AND AGAIN AFTER 1944 IN HAVING TO TAKE IN 400,000 OF THEIR FELLOW-CITIZENS FROM KARELIA WHO FLED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF THEIR PROVINCE. THAT THE KARELIANS THEMSELVES WERE NOT ACCEPTED WITH OPEN ARMS, OR THAT THEIR RESETTLEMENT TOOK PLACE OVER FOUR DECADES AGO SEEMS TO BE OVERLOOKED.

(B) CULTURAL DIFFERENCES: MORE RECENT EXCUSES FOCUS ON ALLEGED CULTURAL DIFFERENCES WITH REFUGEES -- THEIR INABILITY TO LEARN THE FINNISH LANGUAGE OR TO STAND THE HARSH FINNISH WINTERS.

16. THE EXCUSE WHICH FINNISH SPOKESMEN NEVER BRING UP -- EXCEPT TO REFUTE IT -- CONCERNS ALLEGED SOVIET PRESSURES. TYPICALLY, IN A DISCUSSION OF REFUGEE POLICY LAST YEAR, FOREIGN MINISTER SORSA DECRIED THOSE WHO SEE "OUR RELATIONSHIP TO THE USSR" AS DETERMINING THE FINNISH VIEWPOINT ON THIS MATTER, AND WHO SUGGEST THAT "THE SOVIET UNION DICTATES EVERYTHING". HOWEVER, DESPITE SORSA'S PROTESTS, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE SOVIET FACTOR IS EVIDENT IN REFUGEE POLICIES. WHILE THERE IS NO QUESTION ABOUT SOVIET "PRESSURE" ON THE FINNS TO ADOPT A CERTAIN POLICY, IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT A RESTRICTIVE REFUGEE POLICY IN GENERAL AVOIDS THE PROBLEM OF HAVING TO MAKE DETERMINATIONS ABOUT DEFECTORS -- REAL OR NOT SO REAL -- FROM THE USSR. THUS, THE FINNS AVOID POSSIBLE SECURITY PROBLEMS, AS WELL AS DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM HAVING LARGE NUMBERS OF SOVIET "REFUGEES" APPEAR AT THEIR BORDERS. MORE RECENTLY, REFUGEES HAVE BECOME A MAJOR TOPIC OF PUBLIC DISCUSSION, WITH PRESSURE EXERTED BY SOME "PEACE" ORGANIZATIONS. THE TROUBLE FOR THE COUNTRY, HOWEVER, IS THAT MANY POTENTIAL REFUGEES, SUCH AS THOSE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST, PRESENT UNACCEPTABLE SECURITY RISKS.

17. ALTHOUGH MOST FINNS WILL TEND TO AGREE WITH THE STATEMENT THAT TO BE BORN A FINN IS AN "HONOR" (OR EQUIVALENT TO A "VICTORY IN A LOTTERY"), THEY ALSO SHOW CONSIDERABLE SENSITIVITY OVER HOW THE COUNTRY IS PORTRAYED BY OTHERS AND PERCEIVED ABROAD. SOME OF THIS SENSITIVITY SOMETIMES BREAKS TO THE SURFACE IN A LINGERING FEELING THAT THE SWEDES TREAT THEM AS "COUNTRY COUSINS," TO WIT, PRESIDENT KOIVISTO'S OUTBURSTS AGAINST THE SWEDES AFTER THEIR CRITICISM OF FINNISH INFORMATION POLICY AFTER THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT OR HIS JIBES ABOUT HOW, OPPOSITE TO HIS OWN COUNTRY, THE SWEDES SEEM TO TRY TO HAVE "EQUALLY BAD" RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD.

18. FINNISH WRITING DIRECTED TOWARD FOREIGN AUDIENCES IS DESIGNED TO DISPROVE THE "FINLANDIZATION" THESIS -- THE IDEA THAT THE COUNTRY IS SOMEHOW SUBJUGATED TO SOVIET WILL. HOWEVER, EVEN SUCH A PERSON AS FINNISH LONDON PRESS SPOKESMAN LASSE LEHTINEN ADMITTED THAT HIS COUNTRY FEEDS SUCH SPECULATIONS BY FAILING TO GIVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION WHEN INCIDENTS ARISE INVOLVING THE USSR, SUCH AS CHERNOBYL, OR THE 1985 FALL OF A SOVIET CRUISE MISSILE INTO LAKE INARI. OTHERWISE, THE FINNS SEEK TO CULTIVATE A "GOOD GUY" IMAGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, THROUGH SUCH MEANS AS PARTICIPATING IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE-KEEPING, OFFERING THEIR KNOW-HOW TO HELP CONTROL A CHEMICAL WEAPONS TREATY, OR INVOLVEMENT IN THE CSCE PROCESS.

19. AS A SMALL COUNTRY, THE FINNS ARE ALSO ESPECIALLY PROUD OF THEIR OWN SUCCESSES IN INTERNATIONAL FORA. A SYMBOLIC PICTURE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH SUCCESSES WAS GIVEN BY ONE NEWSPAPER

CARTOONIST LAST FEBRUARY DURING THE VOTING IN THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE FOR PRESIDENT. HE DREW A PICTURE OF THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT, WHERE THE VOTING TAKES PLACE, AND INSTEAD OF THE TRADITIONAL NAMES OF THE CANDIDATES BEING READ OUT AS THEY WERE COUNTED, HE DREW THE NAME "NYKANEN," A REFERENCE TO THE GOLD MEDAL-WINNING OLYMPIC HERO. WHEN THE FINNISH OLYMPIC TEAM RETURNED HOME FROM CALGARY, IT WAS USHERED INTO AN IMMEDIATE RECEPTION HOSTED BY THE FINNISH PRESIDENT HIMSELF. FINNISH ARTISTS WHO APPEAR ABROAD ARE ALSO GIVEN PRIDE OF PLACE.

## II. DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF POLITICAL CULTURE: THE CONSENSUS SOCIETY

20. IN CONSIDERING THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION OF POLITICAL CULTURE IN FINLAND, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF THEMES WHICH DESERVE MENTION: (A) THE GRADUAL TREND AWAY FROM AUTHORITARIAN-BASED POLITICS; (B) NARROWING POLITICAL DISTANCE AND INCREASED STABILITY; (C) THE DISCUSSION AND MEDIA CLIMATE IN THE COUNTRY; AND (D) CHANGING PATTERNS OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

21. PRESIDENTIAL DOMINATION: FINNISH DOMESTIC POLITICS WERE DOMINATED AFTER WORLD WAR II BY THE STRONG PERSONALITIES OF PRESIDENTS J.V. PAASIKIVI AND URHO KEKKONEN. AS PAASIKIVI PUT IT, IN HIS COUNTRY, FOREIGN POLICY GOES BEFORE DOMESTIC POLICY, WHILE, IN THE WORDS OF FORMER FINNISH UN AMBASSADOR MAX JACOBSON, THE BORDER BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS WAS LIKE A "LINE DRAWN IN THE WATER". THUS THE FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT COALITIONS WAS DICTATED IN LARGE PART BY FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS. THE POST-WAR REPUBLIC WAS INFLUENCED BY THE REALITY OF BALANCE, WHICH REQUIRED KEEPING THE RIGHT-WING NATIONAL COALITION PARTY (NCP) OUT OF POWER WHEN THE COMMUNISTS THEMSELVES WERE IN OPPOSITION, BUT ALSO USUALLY WHEN THE COMMUNISTS WERE THEMSELVES IN GOVERNMENT. A SECOND ASPECT OF THE KEKKONEN DOMESTIC LINE WAS THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG FEELING AGAINST DIVIDING THE COUNTRY IN TWO IDEOLOGICALLY -- IN OTHER WORDS, THE NEED TO INSURE THAT COALITIONS, WHICH ARE THEMSELVES UNAVOIDABLE DUE TO ELECTION MATHEMATICS, INCLUDE BOTH THE SOCIALIST AND NON-SOCIALIST PARTIES. IN ALL COALITIONS FROM 1937 TO 1987, THE CENTER PARTY PLAYED THE ROLE OF "BOURGEOIS" PARTNER, USUALLY WITH THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS COMPLETING THE CORE. CURIOUSLY, FINLAND DOES NOT HAVE A TRADITION OF "BOURGEOIS" COALITIONS; IT HAS BEEN RARE THAT THE CENTER PARTY AND NCP HAVE BEEN TOGETHER. WHAT HAS CHANGED IN THE POST-KEKKONEN ERA IS THE DESIRE OF HIS SUCCESSOR MAUNO KOIVISTO TO REDUCE THE PRESIDENT'S DOMESTIC ROLE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF PARLIAMENT. KOIVISTO, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS TAKEN A MUCH MORE RESTRICTIVE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S POWER TO DISSOLVE PARLIAMENT THAN HAS HIS PREDECESSOR. AFTER HIS OWN EXPERIENCES AS KEKKONEN'S PRIME MINISTER, KOIVISTO HAS REJECTED THE IDEA THAT A SITTING GOVERNMENT CAN BE DISMISSED BY A PRESIDENT SO LONG AS IT ENJOYS THE CONFIDENCE OF PARLIAMENT.

22. ECONOMIC MODERNIZATION AND POLITICAL CHANGE: FROM INDEPENDENCE THROUGH THE 1960'S, FINNISH POLITICAL CULTURE WAS STRONGLY VERTICALLY FRAGMENTED. THE BOUNDARIES BETWEEN

POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES, ESPECIALLY IN THE SOCIALIST-BOURGEOIS DIMENSION, WERE STRONG. THIS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY A MARKED INSTABILITY IN GOVERNING COALITIONS THAT WAS MORE TYPICAL OF SOUTHERN THAN NORTHERN EUROPEAN POLITICS. NOT UNTIL 1987 DID A FINNISH GOVERNMENT LAST ITS ENTIRE ELECTORAL PERIOD. IN THE LAST TWO DECADES, THE BORDERLINE BETWEEN IDEOLOGICALLY-SEGMENTED SUB-CULTURES HAS BECOME CLOSER.

23. INDUSTRIALIZATION HAS HAD A STRONG EFFECT ON FINNISH SOCIETY. AS LATE AS 1960, 36% OF THE POPULATION WAS INVOLVED IN AGRICULTURE. THIS FIGURE FELL TO 13% IN 1980 AND IS STILL DECLINING. THE EFFECT OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE ON VOTING IS CONTINUING TO DECLINE WITH THE WEAKENING OF DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN BLUE-COLLAR AND WHITE-COLLAR OCCUPATIONS. THE TRADITIONAL CLASS PARTIES HAVE BEEN APPEALING TO WIDER SOCIAL GROUPS, OBSCURING THE DISTINCTIONS AMONG THEM.

24. IN THE TRANSFORMATION TO A POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY, SOME OF THE FOLLOWING CHANGES HAVE BEEN TAKING PLACE. FIRST, THE COMMUNISTS HAVE BECOME POLITICALLY "ACCEPTABLE" EVEN WHILE THEIR OVERALL SUPPORT HAS SLOWLY DECLINED FROM ITS HIGH POINT IN 1958. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATS CONSIDER THE COMMUNISTS (MAJORITY WING) AS THE PARTY WHICH IS CLOSEST TO THEM AND THE MOST DESIRABLE COOPERATION PARTNER (EVEN THOUGH THEY AGREED TO COOPERATE WITH THE NCP INSTEAD). THE COMMUNISTS ARE SEEN AS A SOMEWHAT MORE RADICAL VERSION OF OTHER PARTIES, BUT NOT AS A FORCE SUBVERSIVE TO THE SYSTEM ITSELF. ALONG WITH THIS TREND, ACCEPTANCE OF THE MARKET ECONOMY IN FINLAND HAS INCREASED MARKEDLY IN RECENT YEARS, FROM 63% IN 1978 TO 82% FIVE YEARS LATER. IDEOLOGICAL DISTANCE HAS ALSO DECREASED AMONG THE MAIN PARTIES. WHEREAS IN 1975, THE COMMUNISTS' MEAN SCORE ON A 1-10 SCALE WAS 2.3, BY 1984, IT HAS INCREASED TO 3.1. AT THE SAME TIME, THE RIGHT-WING NCP HAD DECREASED FROM 8.1 TO 7.7. NO DOUBT TODAY, THE NCP SCORE WOULD BE EVEN LOWER, INDICATING ITS CONTINUING EFFORTS TO MOVE TO THE POLITICAL CENTER. IN RECENT FINNISH ELECTIONS, PARTY PROGRAMS HAVE BECOME SO BLAND THAT IT IS DIFFICULT FOR VOTERS TO TELL THEM APART.

25. ONE ASPECT OF THIS INCREASED POLITICAL CONSENSUS IS THAT THE LEVEL OF TOLERANCE SEEMS TO BE HIGH IN THE SYSTEM. IN THE LAST PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, ALL CANDIDATES CONDUCTED A "GENTLEMANLY" CAMPAIGN. AS ONE RESEARCHER DESCRIBED THE SITUATION, "IN PRINCIPLE, ALL OPINIONS ARE ACCEPTED, FROM DEVA (THE COMMUNIST MINORITY) TO THE NCP. NO ONE IS 'DANGEROUS' AND EVERYONE HAS 'INTERESTING' VIEWS, EVEN IF THEY CANNOT BE REALIZED. THE BORDERS OF TOLERATION ARE QUITE WIDE". ONE REASON FOR THIS SITUATION IS THE FACT THAT THERE HAS BEEN A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO LOOK FOR COMMON VIEWS AND TO IGNORE DIVISIVE ONES. IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, FOR INSTANCE, THE MINORITY COMMUNIST CANDIDATE WAS LOOKED UPON AS A CURIOSITY, WHEREAS THE MAJORITY'S CANDIDATE BASED HIS APPEAL TO THE VOTERS ON HIS "HUMANISTIC" REPUTATION, WHILE ESCHEWING ATTACKS ON HIS COMPETITORS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE POLITICAL TREND WHICH HAS DEVELOPED ON THE RIGHT INVOLVES RESPONDING TO LEFTIST DOGMAS BY

IGNORING THEM RATHER THAN GETTING INVOLVED IN A FRONTAL ATTACK. THE TERM "ANTI-COMMUNISM" ITSELF HAS A NEGATIVE RING IN FINLAND, IMPLYING A WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SHARP IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION WITH THE FAR LEFT. SOCIAL DEMOCRATS IN PARTICULAR SEEM TO HAVE INTERNALIZED THE VIEW THAT THE BEST WAY TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS IS TO TRY TO COOPERATE WITH THEM AT LEAST IN LIMITED AREAS, INSTEAD OF INCREASING TENSIONS THROUGH POLITICAL "STRUGGLE". AS A RESULT, FEW, IF ANY, POLITICALLY ACTIVE FINNS ARE WILLING TO ENGAGE IN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGES ON SUCH MATTERS AS AID TO NICARAGUA.

26. OF COURSE, THE NEED TO FORM COALITIONS, COMBINED WITH THE PROVISIONS FOR QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING IN PARLIAMENT WHICH ARE PART OF THE FINNISH CONSTITUTION, FORCE ALL PARTIES TO COMPOSE THEIR DIFFERENCES AND ARE CONSIDERED TO BE THE GUIDING ELEMENT BEHIND THE FINNISH CONSENSUS. THE FACT THAT NO PARTY CAN GOVERN ALONE, AND THAT A TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY VOTE IS NEEDED ON FINANCIAL BILLS AND FOR AVOIDING A SITUATION WHERE A BILL CAN BE DELAYED UNTIL THE NEXT PARLIAMENT MEANS NOT ONLY THAT GOVERNMENT HAVE TO HAVE FUNCTIONING MAJORITIES THAT HAVE COMPROMISED FROM WITHIN, BUT THAT THEY NEED TO INSURE THAT THERE ARE NO SIGNIFICANT MINORITIES IN DISAGREEMENT WITH PROPOSED LEGISLATION.

27. ALONG WITH THE FALL-OFF IN IDEOLOGICAL CONFRONTATION IN FINLAND HAS COME A REDUCTION IN POLITICAL INTEREST, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE YOUNG. INDEED, THOSE AT THE LOW END OF THE SOCIAL SCALE EITHER IN TERMS OF AGE OR INCOME ARE LEAST LIKELY TO GO TO THE POLLS. A STUDY OF THE 1987 ELECTION SHOWED THAT IN SOME HELSINKI SUBURBAN AREAS, VOTING PARTICIPATION WAS AS LOW AS 38% AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE. A GENERAL TURNING AWAY FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS, RATHER THAN WILLINGNESS TO JOIN ALTERNATIVE MOVEMENTS OR PARTIES, SEEMS TO BE THE RESULT OF POLITICAL ALIENATION. IN THE EIGHT YEARS PRIOR TO THE ELECTION, YOUTH PARTICIPATION DECREASED BY 15%. WHILE THE OVERALL VOTING PERCENTAGE OF YOUTHS IN THEIR LATE TEENS AND EARLY 20'S WAS AROUND 60%, IT WAS 75% AMONG THOSE IN THEIR EARLY 30'S AND 86% AMONG THOSE IN THEIR 60'S. BUSINESSMEN AND HIGHER-RANKING EMPLOYEES VOTED AT A RATE OF UP TO 90%, WHILE WORKERS WERE AT ABOUT 70%. SYMPTOMATICALLY, A RECENT INTERVIEW WITH A NUMBER OF 18 YEAR-OLDS CONDUCTED IN THE INDEPENDENT "HELSINGIN SANOMAT" SHOWED HARDLY ANY INTEREST IN POLITICS AND NOT A SINGLE RESPONDENT ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHICH MISSILES THE U.S. AND USSR HAD AGREED TO REMOVE FROM EUROPE.

28. DISCUSSION CLIMATE: EVEN IF THE FINNS ARE ENJOYING A POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH GENERAL AGREEMENT IS APPARENT ON MOST FOREIGN AND MANY DOMESTIC ISSUES, THE REVERSE SIDE OF THE EQUATION HAS BEEN THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE DISCUSSION CLIMATE IN THE COUNTRY. THE PRICE WHICH HAS BEEN PAID FOR THE SURFACE CALMNESS IS A LACK OF ABILITY TO LOOK AT BOTH SIDES OF MANY ISSUES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHICH INVOLVE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY. ESPECIALLY WHERE MORE SENSITIVE POLITICAL ISSUES ARE INVOLVED, THE FINNISH PARLIAMENT AND ACTIVE POLITICIANS SEEM TO BE "NOTEABLE BY THEIR ABSENCE" IN DEBATE. INSTEAD, THE FINNISH

MEDIA TAKE ON A MORE IMPORTANT ROLE IN LAUNCHING DISCUSSIONS ON CERTAIN ISSUES. SOME COLUMNISTS, SUCH AS FORMER U.N. AMBASSADOR MAX JAKOBSON, PLAY A SPECIAL ROLE AS "LIGHTENING ROD" IN INITIATING DEBATE ON ISSUES THAT DO NOT GET ADEQUATELY TREATED OTHERWISE. YET, JAKOBSON SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS SOMEONE TRYING TO MOULD THE DISCUSSION CLIMATE MORE IN THE SENSE EXISTING IN OTHER WESTERN COUNTRIES. SYMBOLIZING AN INATE CONSERVATISM IN FINNISH POLITICAL CULTURE, HE CALLS OPENLY (AND UNASHAMEDLY) FOR THE CONTINUED OBSERVATION OF SELF-CENSORSHIP IN THE PRESS AS NECESSARY FOR THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY INTERESTS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME PRAISING THE COUNTRY'S RESTRICTIVE IMMIGRATION POLICIES FOR SAVING FINLAND FROM THE SOCIAL AND OTHER ILLS EXPERIENCED BY COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE "OPENED THE FLOOD GATES". WHILE HIS VIEWS HAVE BEEN SHARED BY SUCH OFFICIALS AS RETIRING U.N. AMBASSADOR KEIJO KORHONEN, WHO WARNED AGAINST "SWEDENIZATION" OF THE FINNISH PRESS, OTHER COMMENTATORS HAVE NOTED THAT BOTH THE SWEDISH AND NORWEGIAN PRESS HAVE A MORE "INDEPENDENT AND CONFLICT-FILLED" RELATIONSHIP TO THEIR GOVERNMENT.

29. TYPICALLY, DISCUSSIONS DEALING WITH SOVIET AND EAST-WEST ISSUES OFFER LESS THAN A FULL AIRING OF THE FACTS. "PEACE" ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BEEN ABLE TO EXPLOIT THIS SHORTCOMING BY MONOPOLIZING MUCH OF THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION ON ISSUES DEALING WITH SECURITY, DEVELOPMENT AID, OR HUMAN RIGHTS. NO PERSONS PROMINENT IN POLITICAL LIFE CHALLENGE THE BASIC POSTULATES OF SUCH ORGANIZATIONS (EXCEPT ON SUCH ISSUES AS THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A STRONG VIABLE DEFENSE FORCE). ON THE RARE OCCASION WHEN THEY DO, THEY FIND THEMSELVES THE SUBJECT OF UGLY CAMPAIGNS. ONE FINNISH GENERAL, FOR EXAMPLE, EXPRESSED HIS NEGATIVE VIEWS ABOUT "PEACE EDUCATION" IN A VERY DIRECT FASHION. THE RESULTING UPROAR REQUIRED THAT THE FORCES COMMANDER ISSUE A STATEMENT MASSAGING PEACE GROUPS.

30. THE FINNISH SYSTEM ALLOWS ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE COMMUNIST-DOMINATED "PEACE DEFENDERS" TO POSE AS THE CHAMPIONS OF PEACE AND THE OPPRESSED. CURIOUSLY, EVEN VAYRYNEN, WHO IS NOMINALLY A MEMBER OF THE ORGANIZATION'S BOARD, AND WHO HAD PRESIDED OVER A PARTY CONFERENCE THAT URGED MEMBERS TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH ORGANIZATIONS' ACTIVITIES, PRIVATELY TOLD THE ~~AMBASSADOR~~ NOT TO TAKE THE WORDS OF SUCH ORGANIZATIONS TOO SERIOUSLY. A FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL ALSO ADVISED US TO UNDERSTAND THE FUNCTIONING OF THE FINNISH COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY (STETE). STETE WAS FOUNDED AS PART OF THE SOVIET-FOSTERED BRUSSELS MOVEMENT AND STILL LISTS AMONG ITS BOARD MEMBERS SUCH STALWART COMMUNISTS AS WORLD PEACE COUNCIL SECRETARY GENERAL JOHANNES PAKASLAHTI. IN THE OFFICIAL'S VIEW, STETE TODAY HAS BECOME PART OF THE FOREIGN POLICY CONSENSUS; IT ALLOWS PEOPLE LIKE PAKASLAHTI TO SPOUT FORTH THEIR VIEWS, BUT ALSO BRINGS TOGETHER A WIDE RANGE OF OTHER POLITICAL VIEWPOINTS. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THESE KINDS OF ORGANIZATIONS APPEAR TO FULFILL THE FUNCTION OF PRIMARILY CATERING TO THEIR MEMBERS' OWN NEEDS TO FEEL THEY HAVE A ROLE TO PLAY IN SOCIETY, RATHER THAN ACTUALLY PROVIDING SUCH A ROLE WITH THE REAL DECISION-MAKERS, WHO TREAT THEM WITH AN ATTITUDE SOMEWHERE



BETWEEN CONTEMPT AND TOLERATION.

31. IN GENERAL, ANY POLITICAL PRONOUNCEMENT ON SENSITIVE ISSUES ALWAYS GETS WRAPPED IN A CERTAIN PHRASEOLOGY WHICH LIMITS THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF SUCH A STATEMENT. THERE ARE MANY EXAMPLES OF THIS AESOPIAN LANGUAGE, ESPECIALLY ON SECURITY MATTERS. ADMIRAL JAN KLENBERG, FOR INSTANCE, ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF WHY THE FINNS REFRAIN FROM POINTING TO A SPECIFIC COUNTRY AS A "THREAT" TO THEIR OWN. HE NOTED THAT, "FROM HISTORY, WE KNOW THAT THE EVALUATION OF A CERTAIN COUNTRY AS AN AGGRESSOR HAS LED TO A CERTAIN POLICY AND DEFENSE SYSTEM WHICH HAVE FOSTERED DISTRUST AND HAVE HELPED TO ACTUALIZE THIS THREAT". IN OTHER WORDS, TO POINT OUT THE USSR AS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FINLAND COULD BECOME A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY.

32. IN DOMESTIC POLITICS AS WELL, THERE IS A TENDENCY TO AVOID DIRECTNESS. LEIF SALMEN, A NOTED TELEVISION JOURNALIST WHO TRIES TO PRY REAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS ON THE ISSUES DELIVERED TO CANDIDATES DURING POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS, BELIEVES THAT THE LAST THING FINNISH POLITICIANS DESIRE IS "AN OPEN DIALOGUE, FACE TO FACE, AND WORD AGAINST WORD". SALMEN SAW ONE SIDE OF THIS PROCESS IN A TENDENCY TO USE TECHNICAL JARGON THAT FEW WOULD UNDERSTAND, AND THE OTHER SIDE IN TRYING TO DEAL IN SUCH AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING MANNER WITH AN ISSUE THAT ONE COULD BE IN FAVOR OF OPPOSITE GOALS -- ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND MORE POLLUTING INDUSTRY, HIGHER TAXES AND TAX RELIEF -- IN THE SAME BREATH. HIS OWN ATTEMPT TO ACT AS "PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE" DURING PRE-ELECTION DEBATES WON HIM ACCUSATIONS OF "ARROGANT AND IMPOLITE BEHAVIOR". OUR OWN EXPERIENCE SUGGESTS THAT FINNISH JOURNALISTS DO NOT CONSIDER IT THEIR OWN TASK TO ENGAGE IN PROBING QUESTIONS. A RECENT COMMENT ON THIS MATTER IN A SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY SUGGESTED THAT ONE PROBLEM IS THAT DEFERENCE TO RULERS IS AN INGRAINED HABIT IN FINNISH POLITICAL CULTURE. THE PAPER NOTED THAT THE TOP-CIRCULATION DAILIES IN THE COUNTRY HAVE TURNED INTO A "CRITICAL BRIDGE OF EMPATHY AND UNDERSTANDING TO THE GOVERNMENT".

33. ANOTHER ASPECT TO THE PROBLEM IS THAT THERE IS NO TRADITION IN FINLAND OF DEALING WITH TWO SIDES OF AN ISSUE. IF ONE LANDS ON THE WRONG SIDE OF "CONSENSUS," ONE SIMPLY HOLDS A POSITION THAT IS NOT "LEGITIMATE". THIS HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN THE CASE IN REPORTING ON INTERNATIONAL QUESTIONS; THOSE WHICH INVOLVE DISPUTES GIVE THE VIEWER ONE SINGLE SIDE OF THE EQUATION, WHETHER THE MATTER IS NICARAGUA, SDI, OR CYPRUS. ONE RECENT ATTEMPT WAS AN UNUSUAL EXCEPTION TO THE RULE, WHICH INVOLVED A DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE HEADS OF THE FINNISH ARAB AND ISRAELI FRIENDSHIP SOCIETIES ON THE SITUATION IN THE WEST BANK.

34. DESPITE THIS SHORTCOMING, THERE HAVE BEEN SOME SIGNS OF CREEPING PLURALISM IN THE FINNISH MEDIA. THE RECENT PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION WAS COVERED IN BOTH NATIONAL LANGUAGES ON THREE TELEVISION AND THREE RADIO CHANNELS, AS WELL AS BY A NUMBER OF LOCAL RADIO STATIONS WHICH HAVE SPRUNG UP OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A MAJOR INROAD FROM SATELLITE AND CABLE BROADCASTING WHICH BRINGS FOREIGN-ORIGIN

BROADCASTING INTO AN INCREASING NUMBER OF VIEWERS' HOMES. WHEN THIS TREND STARTED A DECADE AGO, THERE WERE FEARS AROUSED THAT THE COUNTRY'S CULTURAL IDENTITY OR EVEN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AFFECTED.

35. UP TO NOW, THE REACTION TO THIS INCREASED INTERNATIONALIZATION HAS BEEN LIMITED TO LEGAL PROVISIONS REQUIRING A MINIMUM OF LOCAL CONTENT ON FINNISH TELEVISION CHANNELS AND FORBIDDING THE RENTAL OF VIDEO CASSETTES OF FILMS BARRED TO MINORS. WHILE THE LAW SEEMED TO BE A POPULAR WAY OF SHOWING ONE'S INDIGNATION AT "VIOLENT FOREIGN (ESPECIALLY ANGLO-AMERICAN) CULTURE," IT ALSO WAS ROUNDLY CONDEMNED BY MORE LIBERAL-MINDED ELEMENTS IN SOCIETY AS TYPIFYING A MENTALITY OF "WARDER AND CENSOR".

### III. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

36. IN ONE SENSE, POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN FINLAND MAY BE SAID TO HAVE LED TO A GRADUAL "NORMALIZATION" OF POLITICAL CONDITIONS IN THE COUNTRY. THIS PROCESS HAS INCLUDED A MORE BALANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT. IT HAS ALSO MEANT THE OPENING UP OF THE COUNTRY TO FOREIGN INFLUENCES. TO BE SURE, THE PROCESS HAS WORKED IMPERFECTLY. KOIVISTO HAS SOUGHT TO RETAIN HIS PREROGATIVES VIS-A-VIS THE PRESS AND HAS NOT SHIED AWAY FROM TAKING EDITORS (OR RESEARCHERS) TO TASK FOR ARTICLES WHICH, IN HIS VIEW, IMPINGE ON HIS OWN PRESIDENTIAL PREROGATIVES OR THE COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. HOWEVER, KOIVISTO LACKS THE ABILITY TO COW HIS POLITICAL OPPONENTS THAT KEKKONEN POSSESSED. AT ANY RATE, THE FAIRLY OPEN AND RELAXED INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH KOIVISTO HAS SERVED ALSO MEANS LESS PRESSURE FOR CONFORMITY AT HOME.

37. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET UNION HAVE HAD A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THIS PROCESS. THE SOVIETS HAVE LEARNED TO TREAT THE FINNS MORE DELICATELY THAN IN THE PAST, AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES HAS SUFFICIENTLY SOLIDIFIED TO ALLOW THE POSSIBILITY OF CRITICAL VIEWS TO BECOME AN ACCEPTED PART OF THE LANDSCAPE THAT DOES NOT PUT FINLAND'S SECURITY INTERESTS INTO JEOPARDY.

38. AT PRESENT, THE FINNS STAND AT A CROSSROADS IN THEIR POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT. MANY SIGNS INDICATE THAT THEY ARE BECOMING MORE LIKE THE REST OF WESTERN EUROPE, IN ITS POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DIMENSIONS. BEING PART OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CULTURAL CLIMATE, THE FINNS ARE LIKELY TO BE SUBJECT TO THE SAME INFLUENCES AS THEIR WESTERN NEIGHBORS. IN THE EXTERNAL SENSE, THE MAJOR QUESTION IS HOW MUCH FURTHER THE FINNS ARE WILLING TO GO TO IDENTIFY WITH THE REST OF EUROPE. CERTAINLY, AS FAR AS ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IS CONCERNED, THE QUESTION HAS ONLY BEGUN TO BE DEBATED. NOW THE MAJOR ISSUES IN THAT AREA INCLUDE THE PURELY ECONOMIC ONE OF COMMON PRODUCT STANDARDS AND THE POLITICAL ONE OF HOW TO ASSOCIATE WITH A POLITICAL BODY WITHOUT SACRIFICING ONE'S NEUTRALITY. IN THE FUTURE, THE FINNS MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO FACE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THEY ARE

WILLING -- ASSUMING THE POLITICAL QUESTION CAN BE WORKED OUT -- TO BECOME ASSOCIATED WITH A PROJECT WHICH COULD REQUIRE THEM TO PARTICIPATE IN A FREE LABOR MARKET. OUR OWN CONTACTS WITH FINNS SUGGEST THAT THIS IS AN IDEA WHOSE TIME IS STILL LONG IN COMING; THE INATE FEAR OF BEING OVERWHELMED BY ALIEN CULTURAL INFLUENCES WILL STILL BE TOO GREAT. THE FINNS ARE READY TO MAKE SOME COMPROMISES WITH, BUT NOT TO GIVE UP THEIR "SPLENDID ISOLATION". EVEN THOUGH YOUNGER FINNS ARE PENETRATING MORE AND MORE INTO THE OUTSIDE WORLD (EXCHANGE PROGRAMS FOR HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS ARE ESPECIALLY IN VOGUE), THERE IS SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THIS EXPOSURE WILL HAVE MORE THAN A MARGINAL EFFECT IN LIFTING THE DEFENSIVENESS THAT STILL LURKS WITHIN.

39. WHILE NO ONE IS PREDICTING THAT THE CONSENSUS SOCIETY WILL LEVEL ALL DIFFERENCES OF OPINION IN THE COUNTRY, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION NOW GOING ON AS PART OF THE SHIFT TO A POST-INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE AN EFFECT. AS ONE SDP POLITICIAN RECENTLY TOLD US, THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF THE COUNTRY BELONGS TO THOSE PARTIES WHICH CAN SUCCESSFULLY IDENTIFY WITH THE NEEDS AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE VOTERS WHO WILL EMERGE FROM THESE CHANGES. CLASS-BASED PARTIES WHICH APPEAL TO THE "OUTS" OF SOCIETY MAY FIND THEIR CONSTITUENCIES SHRINKING INTO OBLIVION.

40: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES: IN ANALYZING AND UNDERSTANDING FINNISH BEHAVIOR, IT WILL ALWAYS BE INCUMBENT ON US TO KEEP IN MIND THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A COUNTRY THAT IS NOT READY TO AUTOMATICALLY IDENTIFY WITH US AS A FELLOW DEMOCRACY. THE FINNISH CONCEPTION OF DEMOCRACY SEEMS TO BE HEAVILY WELFARE-STATE ORIENTED, AND THEREFORE THE U.S. DOES NOT NECESSARILY COME OUT AS A PARAGON. WHILE THERE SEEMS TO BE A BROAD, ALBEIT INNATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. AS THE "COUNTRY OF FREEDOM" (A LOCAL AMNESTY GROUP RECENTLY EXCHANGED LETTERS WITH US ON THE DEATH PENALTY. WHILE CRITICAL OF U.S. PRACTICE, THEY NONETHELESS EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR OUR WILLINGNESS TO OPENLY DISCUSS THESE ISSUES WITH THEM AND FOR OUR OWN TRADITIONS OF FREE DISCUSSION). IT IS ALSO TRUE THAT OUR OWN EFFORTS TO MAKE OUR VIEWS UNDERSTOOD ON CERTAIN SUBJECTS WHERE THERE IS A PERCEIVED "BIG POWER-SMALL STATE" COLLISION OF INTERESTS WILL RUN UP AGAINST A BASIC CULTURAL BIAS.

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## FINAL ACT OF EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE

August 1, 1975

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*After 22 months of negotiations the 35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) reached final agreement Aug. 1 on general principles "guiding their mutual relations." These principles were spelled out in a lengthy document, known as the conference's Final Act, which was adopted at the conclusion of a summit meeting in Helsinki, Finland.*

*In effect, the document legitimized all national boundaries established in the aftermath of World War II. The pact pledged signatories to endeavor to resolve future disputes "by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security..." It was signed by heads of government of the United States, Canada, and every Eastern and Western European nation except Albania.*

*Major provisions confirmed the "inviolability" of national frontiers and prohibited intervention by one state in the affairs of any other. The inclusion of both these provisions had been a longstanding goal of the Soviet Union. A third feature of the act which had been sought by the Western nations was a set of broadly worded measures committing participating states to "take positive action" in the sphere of personal liberties. These were aimed at relaxing restrictions on travel and communications for journalists and other individuals, at facilitating the reunion of families and the issuance of entry or exit permits to persons wishing to marry a citizen of another nation. Soviet-bloc governments had enforced stringent limitations in such areas, as indicated by protests of prominent Eastern European and Soviet dissidents published in the West (see p. 915).*

### American Reaction

*How effective the CSCE Act would be was open to question. It was non-binding and had no legal status. United States participation in the conference had stirred considerable criticism among conservatives and opponents of détente, who feared that American prestige had been traded for what they viewed as empty Soviet pledges. Emigrants from Soviet-bloc nations deplored the treaty's apparent confirmation of the current status of the Baltic states, East Germany and other areas that had come under Moscow's domination during or after World War II. Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D Wash.) called American acceptance of the agreement a retreat from "a crucial point of principle"—the right of self-determination for states currently under Soviet hegemony. Exiled novelist Alexander Solzhenitsyn warned that the good intentions expressed in the act were unlikely to ease Soviet policies on human rights (see p. 481). Many critics questioned whether the Soviet Union, which had invaded Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, would respect the non-intervention clauses.*

*Supporters of the treaty said that it was an important first step toward easing international tensions. The "ratification" of postwar national boundaries was defended as a practical recognition of longstanding realities.*

*The night before he left for Helsinki to sign the agreement, President Ford cited the non-binding nature of the act as proof that the United States had not abandoned its position on Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, the three Baltic states whose absorption by the Soviet Union had never been formally recognized by the United States. The strength of CSCE lay in its "political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West," Ford said. The President reiterated a widely publicized opinion that merely to obtain a "public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom...for individuals..." would be beneficial.*

### Origins of CSCE

*Efforts to bring about such a pact date from 1954 when the Soviet Union called, at a conference of foreign ministers in Berlin, for liquidation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its replacement by a security pact open to all European nations "irrespective of their social systems." Exclusion of the United States blocked this scheme, but East European governments continued to advance various European security plans. All such efforts foundered on the issue of German reunification. Not until 1969, when Willy Brandt became chancellor, did West Germany begin to move toward acceptance of the status quo. By 1972 East-West agreements ratifying existing boundaries between the two Germany's and Poland were in place. The Nixon administration, pushing for overall East-West détente, then indicated interest in European security talks. Preliminary talks began that year and negotiations started in 1973.*

*Incidents occurring after the Helsinki conference seemed to support skeptical views of the effectiveness of the CSCE humanitarian clauses. By mid-August, two Soviet citizens had been permitted to join relatives in the United States, according to State Department records, but the records also indicated that as many as 641 individuals known to the American Embassy in Moscow wished to emigrate. Prospects for freer circulation of Western publications behind the Iron Curtain were dimmed by a vigorous Soviet press campaign against their alleged "decadence" and their inflammatory character. And Soviet authorities in November turned down a visa application of Physicist Andrei Sakharov to visit Norway to receive the Nobel Peace Prize that had been awarded him. Sakharov was a prominent critic of what he considered to be repressive policies of the Soviet government. (See p. 915.)*

*The CSCE agreement called for a final session in 1976 to review the measure's effectiveness.*

*Excerpts from Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), adopted in Helsinki, Finland, Aug. 1, 1975:*

1.

**Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations  
Between Participating States**

The participating States,

Reaffirming their commitment to peace, security and justice and the continuing development of friendly relations and co-operation;

Recognizing that this commitment, which reflects the interest and aspirations of peoples, constitutes for each participating State a present and future responsibility, heightened by experience of the past;

Reaffirming, in conformity with their membership in the United Nations and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations, their full and active support for the United Nations and for the enhancement of its role and effectiveness in strengthening international peace, security and justice, and in promoting the solution of international problems, as well as the development of friendly relations and co-operation among States;

Expressing their common adherence to the principles which are set forth below and are in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, as well as their common will to act, in the application of these principles, in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

Declare their determination to respect and put into practice, each of them in its relations with all other participating States, irrespective of their political, economic or social systems as well as of their size, geographical location or level of economic development, the following principles, which all are of primary significance, guiding their mutual relations:

## **I. Sovereign Equality, Respect for the Rights Inherent in Sovereignty**

The participating States will respect each other's sovereign equality and individuality as well as all the rights inherent in and encompassed by its sovereignty, including in particular the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other's right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its right to determine its laws and regulations.

Within the framework of international law, all the participating States have equal rights and duties. They will respect each other's right to define and conduct as it wishes its relations with other States in accordance with international law and in the spirit of the present Declaration. They consider that their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement. They also have the right to belong or not to belong to international organizations, to be or not to be a party to bilateral or multilateral treaties including the right to be or not to be a party to treaties of alliance; they also have the right to neutrality.

## **II. Refraining From the Threat or Use of Force**

The participating States will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to serve to warrant resort to the threat or use of force in contravention of this principle.

Accordingly, the participating States will refrain from any acts constituting a threat of force or direct or indirect use of force against another participating State. Likewise they will refrain from any manifestation of force for the purpose of inducing another participating State to renounce the full exercise of its sovereign rights. Likewise they will also refrain in their mutual relations from any act of reprisal by force.

No such threat or use of force will be employed as a means of settling disputes, or questions likely to give rise to disputes, between them.

## **III. Inviolability of Frontiers**

The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from assaulting these frontiers.

Accordingly, they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating State.

#### **IV. Territorial Integrity of States**

The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States.

Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State, and in particular from any such action constituting a threat or use of force.

The participating States will likewise refrain from making each other's territory the object of military occupation or other direct or indirect measures of force in contravention of international law, or the object of acquisition by means of such measures or the threat of them. No such occupation or acquisition will be recognized as legal.

#### **V. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes**

The participating States will settle disputes among them by peaceful means in such a manner as not to endanger international peace and security, and justice.

They will endeavour in good faith and a spirit of co-operation to reach a rapid and equitable solution on the basis of international law.

For this purpose they will use such means as negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice including any settlement procedure agreed to in advance of disputes to which they are parties.

In the event of failure to reach a solution by any of the above peaceful means, the parties to a dispute will continue to seek a mutually agreed way to settle the dispute peacefully.

Participating States, parties to a dispute among them, as well as other participating States, will refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation to such a degree as to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security and thereby make a peaceful settlement of the dispute more difficult.

#### **VI. Non-intervention in Internal Affairs**

The participating States will refrain from any intervention, direct or indirect, individual or collective, in the internal or external affairs falling within the domestic jurisdiction of another participating State, regardless of their mutual relations.

They will accordingly refrain from any form of armed intervention or threat of such intervention against another participating State.

They will likewise in all circumstances refrain from any other act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another participating State of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.

Accordingly, they will, inter alia, refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State.



## **VII. Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Including the Freedom of Thought, Conscience, Religion or Belief**

The participating States will respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

They will promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the human person and are essential for his free and full development.

Within this framework the participating States will recognize and respect the freedom of the individual to profess and practise, alone or in community with others, religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of his own conscience.

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

The participating States recognize the universal significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly relations and co-operation among themselves as among all States.

They will constantly respect their rights and freedoms in their mutual relations and will endeavour jointly and separately, including in co-operation with the United Nations, to promote universal and effective respect for them.

They confirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights and duties in this field.

In the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms, the participating States will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They will also fulfil their obligations as set forth in the international declarations and agreements in this field, including inter alia the International Covenants on Human Rights, by which they may be bound.

## **VIII. Equal Rights and Self-determination of Peoples**

The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States.

By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cultural development.

The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this principle.

### **IX. Co-operation Among States**

The participating States will develop their co-operation with one another and with all States in all fields in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

In developing their cooperation the participating states will place special emphasis on the fields as set forth within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, with each of them making its contribution in conditions of full equality.

They will endeavour, in developing their co-operation as equals, to promote mutual understanding and confidence, friendly and good-neighbourly relations among themselves, international peace, security and justice. They will equally endeavour, in developing their co-operation, to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations through, inter alia, the benefits resulting from increased mutual knowledge and from progress and achievement in the economic, scientific, technological, social, cultural and humanitarian fields. They will take steps to promote conditions favourable to making these benefits available to all; they will take into account the interest of all in the narrowing of differences in the levels of economic development, and in particular the interest of developing countries throughout the world.

They confirm that governments, institutions, organizations and persons have a relevant and positive role to play in contributing toward the achievement of these aims of their co-operation.

They will strive, in increasing their co-operation as set forth above, to develop closer relations among themselves on an improved and more enduring basis for the benefit of peoples.

### **X. Fulfilment in Good Faith of Obligations Under International Law**

The participating States will fulfil in good faith their obligations under international law, both those obligations arising from the generally recognized principles and rules of international law and those obligations arising from treaties or other agreements, in conformity with international law, to which they are parties.

In exercising their sovereign rights, including the right to determine their laws and regulations, they will conform with their legal obligations under international law; they will furthermore pay due regard to and implement the provisions in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The participating States confirm that in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations and their obligations under any treaty or other international agreement, their obligations under the Charter will prevail, in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter of the United Nations.

All the principles set forth above are of primary significance and, accordingly, they will be equally and unreservedly applied, each of them being interpreted taking into account the others.

The participating States express their determination fully to respect and apply these principles, as set forth in the present Declaration, in all aspects, to their mutual relations and co-operation in order to ensure to each participating State the benefits resulting from the respect and application of these principles by all.

The participating States, paying due regard to the principles above and, in particular, to the first sentence of the tenth principle, "Fulfilment in good faith of obligations under international law", note that the present Declaration does not affect their rights and obligations, nor the corresponding treaties and other agreements and arrangements.

The participating States express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of normal and friendly relations and the progress of co-operation among them in all fields. They also express the conviction that respect for these principles will encourage the development of political contacts among them which in turn would contribute to better mutual understanding of their positions and views.

The participating States declare their intention to conduct their relations with all other States in the Spirit of the principles contained in the present Declaration.

## 2.

### **Document on Confidence-building Measures and Certain Aspects of Security and Disarmament**

The participating States,....  
Have adopted the following:

#### **Prior notification of major military manoeuvres**

They will notify their major military manoeuvres to all other participating States through usual diplomatic channels in accordance with the following provisions:

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independently or combined with any possible air or naval components (in this context the word "troops" includes amphibious and

airborne troops). In the case of independent manoeuvres of amphibious or airborne troops, or of combined manoeuvres involving them, these troops will be included in this total. Furthermore, in the case of combined manoeuvres which do not reach the above total but which involve land forces together with significant numbers of either amphibious or airborne troops, or both, notification can also be given.

Notification will be given of major military manoeuvres which take place on the territory, in Europe, of any participating State as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea area and air space....

Notification will be given 21 days or more in advance of the start of the manoeuvre or in the case of a manoeuvre arranged at shorter notice at the earliest possible opportunity prior to its starting date.

Notification will contain information of the designation, if any, the general purpose of and the States involved in the manoeuvre, the type or types and numerical strength of the forces engaged, the area and estimated time-frame of its conduct. The participating States will also, if possible, provide additional relevant information, particularly that related to the components of the forces engaged and the period of involvement of these forces....

#### **Exchange of observers**

The participating States will invite other participating States, voluntarily and on a bilateral basis, in a spirit of reciprocity and goodwill towards all participating States, to send observers to attend military manoeuvres....

#### **Questions relating to disarmament**

The participating States recognize the interest of all of them in efforts aimed at lessening military confrontation and promoting disarmament which are designed to complement political détente in Europe and to strengthen their security. They are convinced of the necessity to take effective measures in these fields which by their scope and by their nature constitute steps towards the ultimate achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and which should result in strengthening peace and security throughout the world....

### **Co-operation in the Field of Economics, of Science and Technology and of the Environment**

The participating States,

Will encourage the expansion of trade on as broad a multilateral basis as possible, thereby endeavouring to utilize the various economic and commercial possibilities;....

Will endeavour to reduce or progressively eliminate all kinds of obstacles to the development of trade;....

Recognize that possibilities exist for further improving scientific and technological co-operation, and to this end, express their intention to remove obstacles to such co-operation, in particular through:

—the improvement of opportunities for the exchange and dissemination of scientific and technological information among the parties interested in scientific and technological research and co-operation including information related to the organization and implementation of such co-operation;

—the expeditious implementation and improvement in organization, including programmes, of international visits of scientists and specialists in connexion with exchanges, conferences and co-operation;

—the wider use of commercial channels and activities for applied scientific and technological research and for the transfer of achievements obtained in this field while providing information on and protection of intellectual and industrial property rights;

## Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

### 1. Human Contacts

The participating States,...

Make it their aim to facilitate freer movement and contacts, individually and collectively, whether privately or officially, among persons, institutions and organizations of the participating States, and to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian problems that arise in that connexion,

Declare their readiness to these ends to take measures which they consider appropriate and to conclude agreements or arrangements among themselves, as may be needed, and

Express their intention now to proceed to the implementation of the following:

#### (a) Contacts and Regular Meetings on the Basis of Family Ties

In order to promote further development of contacts on the basis of family ties the participating States will favourably consider applications for travel with the purpose of allowing persons to enter or leave their territory temporarily, and on a regular basis if desired, in order to visit members of their families.

Applications for temporary visits to meet members of their families will be dealt with without distinction as to the country of origin or destination: existing requirements for travel documents and visas will be applied in this spirit. The preparation and issue of such documents and visas will be effected within reasonable time limits....

#### (b) Reunification of Families

The participating States will deal in a positive and humanitarian spirit with the applications of persons who wish to be reunited with members of their family, with special attention being given to requests of an urgent character—such as requests submitted by persons who are ill or old.

They will deal with applications in this field as expeditiously as possible.

They will lower where necessary the fees charged in connexion with these applications to ensure that they are at a moderate level.

Applications for the purpose of family reunification which are not granted may be renewed at the appropriate level and will be reconsidered at reasonably short intervals by the authorities of the country of residence or destination, whichever is concerned; under such circumstances fees will be charged only when applications are granted.

Persons whose applications for family reunification are granted may bring with them or ship their household and personal effects; to this end the participating States will use all possibilities provided by existing regulations....

**(c) Marriage Between Citizens of Different States**

The participating States will examine favourably and on the basis of humanitarian considerations requests for exit or entry permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen from another participating State.

The processing and issuing of the documents required for the above purposes and for the marriage will be in accordance with the provisions accepted for family reunification.

In dealing with requests from couples from different participating States, once married, to enable them and the minor children of their marriage to transfer their permanent residence to a State in which either one is normally a resident, the participating States will also apply the provisions accepted for family reunification.

**(d) Travel for Personal or Professional Reasons**

The participating States intend to facilitate wider travel by their citizens for personal or professional reasons and to this end they intend in particular:

—gradually to simplify and to administer flexibly the procedures for exit and entry;

—to ease regulations concerning movement of citizens from the other participating States in their territory, with due regard to security requirements....

They confirm that religious faiths, institutions and organizations, practising within the constitutional framework of the participating States, and their representatives can, in the field of their activities, have contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information....

—grant to permanently accredited journalists of the participating States, on the basis of arrangements, multiple entry and exit visas for specified periods;

—facilitate the issue to accredited journalists of the participating States of permits for stay in their country of temporary residence and, if and when these are necessary, of other official papers which it is appropriate for them to have;

—ease, on a basis of reciprocity, procedures for arranging travel by journalists of the participating States in the country where they are exercising their profession, and to provide progressively greater opportunities for such travel, subject to the observance of regulations relating to the existence of areas closed for security reasons;


—ensure that requests by such journalists for such travel receive, in so far as possible, an expeditious response, taking into account the time scale of the request;

—increase the opportunities for journalists of the participating States to communicate personally with their sources, including organizations and official institutions;

—grant to journalists of the participating States the right to import, subject only to its being taken out again, the technical equipment (photographic, cinematographic, tape recorder, radio and television) necessary for the exercise of their profession;....



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DOCUMENTS  
OF  
1975

Cumulative Index 1972-75

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## U.S.-Soviet Quality of Life: A Comparison

by Richard Schifter

*Address before the Human Rights Experts' Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Ottawa, Canada, on May 22, 1985. Ambassador Schifter is head of the U.S. delegation to the CSCE.*

Ever since this conference began, we have returned, from time to time, to a discussion of what is perceived to be the distinction between political and civil rights on one hand and economic and social rights on the other hand. I shall, therefore, at the outset of this statement, set forth the thoughts of the U.S. delegation on this issue.

### Rights of the Individual

Those of us who trace our views of government to the writings of the English and French thinkers of the 18th-century Enlightenment subscribe to the proposition that government derives its mandate from the consent of the governed, such consent being expressed in free elections. The government, thus, reflects the will of the majority. In this context of majority rule, the philosophers on the subject defined certain rights of the individual which are so basic that no government may deprive him of them, irrespective of the size of the popular majority by which it was installed in office. These rights of the individual are what we understand principally under the term "human rights." They define and clarify the fundamental relationship between the individual and his government, and they consist, essentially, of limitations on the powers of government. Like the biblical "Thou shall not," the beginning phrase of the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the beginning phrase of our Bill of Rights, is "Congress shall make no law"—a phrase followed by the subjects on which Congress shall make no law, such as abridgment of freedom of speech or the press.

When we use the term "right," we think of a claim which can be enforced in the courts. The rights guaranteed in the U.S. Constitution, which in CSCE terminology are referred to as political and civil rights, are rights which every citizen can call upon the courts to protect.

We view what are here referred to as economic and social rights as belonging in an essentially different category.

They are, as we see it, the goals of government policy in domestic affairs. Government, as we see it, should foster policies which will have the effect of encouraging economic development so as to provide jobs under decent working conditions for all those who want to work at income levels which allow for an adequate standard of living. These goals should be attained in a setting which allows freedom of choice of his work to everyone. For those who are unable to find jobs we provide unemployment compensation and, if that is unavailable, other forms of social assistance. The economic system which is now in place in our country is fully in keeping with the relevant articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The U.S. delegation, in selecting issues for discussion at this conference, decided deliberately to limit itself to problems which, though of great concern to the American public, would not require systemic changes in the Soviet Union to effect correction. Every one of the problems we have raised so far about conditions in countries which describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist could be eliminated while staying within the system.

It so happens, therefore, that the Soviet human rights problems of greatest concern to the American public are the problems which could be most easily solved by the Soviet Union. They concern, as we have pointed out, the incarceration of persons guilty only of giving expression to their thoughts, the persecution of religious believers, the commitment of sane persons to institutions for the mentally ill, cultural repression, and discrimination against certain people on the grounds of ancestry. The Soviet State could, as I have said, correct these problems without effecting fundamental structural change.

We had not intended to engage in discussions of economic and social conditions in the Soviet Union, both because the American public is not as deeply aware of or concerned about them and because correction of any shortcomings which we would have to point out would, indeed, require systemic change in the Soviet Union. We see such changes occurring gradually in some other countries which had initially adopted the Soviet economic model. However, we did not think this meeting to be an appropriate forum for a discussion of such issues. Nevertheless, as the Soviet delegation has clearly insisted that we engage in a discussion of social and

economic issues, let me say that we are prepared to join in that debate. To begin with, I shall respond in detail to the concerns expressed by the Soviet delegation as to social and economic problems in the United States.

### U.S. Social and Economic Problems

**Unemployment.** First of all, let me discuss the problem of unemployment in the United States. Our present unemployment rate is 7.3%. It reached a peak of 10.5% in 1982 and has declined significantly since then. Millions of new jobs have been created in recent years, offering new opportunities to the unemployed as well as to persons newly entering the job market. While we agree that an unemployment rate of 7.3% is still too high and further efforts need to be made to reduce the unemployment level, we believe that any person analyzing our unemployment rate should note the following:

- About two percentage points are attributable to so-called frictional unemployment, i.e., persons in transit from one job to another.

- A significant number of the job opportunities which are available in the United States at any one time go unfilled because no one in the locality in which the jobs are available is interested in doing the kind of work available at the wages which are being offered; as we don't have a system under which people can be compelled to work, unfilled jobs thus exist side by side with unemployment.

- We do not have an anti-parasitism law; some persons prefer to draw unemployment insurance payments or welfare benefits rather than take jobs which they deem unsuitable.

- The percentage of our adult population looking for work in the productive sector of the economy is enlarged by the fact that we have significantly fewer people than the Soviet Union in our military forces, in our police forces, and, for that matter, in prison or performing forced labor; specifically, though the Soviet population is only 12% greater than that of the United States, its military forces are almost 200% greater, its police forces more than 100% greater, and its prison population, including forced labor, over 1,100% greater than the corresponding figures in the United States.

I have made these points only to explain what the 7.3% figure means, not to suggest that it can and should be ignored. Our government is committed to the proposition that everyone who want

to work should have an opportunity to do so. Government policy is dedicated to the stimulation of economic growth, to the creation of more jobs, to the raising of standards of living, to the reduction of poverty. In a country such as ours, there is often disagreement as to what might be the best policy to effect economic growth. Different political groupings advocate different solutions to the problems we face. But there is an overwhelming consensus that unemployment must be reduced and that it should be reduced within our present economic framework.

When we compare our economic model to alternate approaches, we must note that, to some extent, unemployment in our country is a consequence of our ideas of individual freedom. We do not assign people to jobs or prosecute them for parasitism if they fail to take an available job. As I have noted, there are people in our country who pass up job opportunities because they don't like the jobs that are being offered or consider the wage offers too low. There are others who are unemployed and might be able to get a job of their liking and at a satisfactory wage at a substantial distance from their home, but they are loathe to move.

Much of the latter kind of unemployment is created by the fact that the economy adapts itself to market conditions. Uneconomic enterprises are thus compelled to close, sometimes causing serious dislocation in the communities dependent on them. In the long run, such adjustments enable the economy to adapt itself to change and to increase its overall productivity. But in the short run, it creates serious hardships for the people directly and adversely affected. To deal with these hardships and to bridge the periods of difficulty is a continuing challenge to our Federal, State, and local governments. We recognize it for the problem it is and seek to deal with it. For reasons which I shall state later, the overwhelming majority of our people are not at all attracted to the solution to this problem which the Soviet Union offers.

There is one other point that needs to be made with regard to the issue of employment. We need to emphasize the role which a free labor movement has played in the United States in strengthening the role of the worker, achieving increases in wages and improvements in working conditions. The existence of a free labor movement, accountable only to its members and not under the control of employers or governments, is, we believe, essential to the protection of the

interests of working people. It has succeeded in the United States in setting standards not only for its own members but for unorganized workers as well. As I noted yesterday, workers in certain states which profess to have been founded for the benefit of the working people are deprived of the ability to assert their interests through the operation of free and independent labor unions.

**Homelessness.** The distinguished Soviet representative has raised the issue of homelessness in the United States. We recognize the existence of homelessness in our society. This is a complex and difficult problem for us, in large part because in recent years our laws have not allowed us to incarcerate or commit to mental institutions persons who insist on living on the sidewalks of our cities as long as they are not threats to themselves or society. Many of these people refuse to make use of the wide range of accommodations available to them. In some societies they would be charged with vagrancy, parasitism, or forced into mental institutions. In our cities they remain on the streets, quite understandably causing many visitors to wonder whether there is, in fact, no housing available for them.

The fact is that our Federal Government and our State governments have spent and continue to spend hundreds of millions of dollars to provide shelter for the homeless. Those who cannot be self-sufficient, such as the elderly, are given priority in assistance programs. Furthermore, the tradition of voluntarism in the United States has resulted in the creation of a great number of nonprofit groups which have specialized in helping those in need of what our laws call safe and sanitary housing. Particular efforts have been made to assist the elderly.

I should also make it clear that there are quite a number of people in our country who live in housing which we deem substandard. We are interested in improving such housing, though we know that what is substandard in the United States may be standard in countries which are among our severest critics.

**Discrimination.** We readily concede that persons were for a long time discriminated against in our country on the grounds of their ancestry, and we recognize that government at all levels shares culpability with regard to this problem. However, beginning 40 years ago, policies on the subject of race began to change in our country and have changed at an ever-accelerating pace. Over this period the Federal Government as well

as State and local governments have succeeded in stamping out all officially sanctioned forms of discrimination based on ancestry. Beyond that, laws have been enacted that require the private sector to conform to fundamental principles of nondiscrimination.

What I have just said does not mean that we can overnight overcome the results of generations of discrimination and disadvantage. I have not carefully checked all the statistics which our distinguished Soviet colleague has recited, but they may very well be correct. What is important to note is the change in the figures in recent years, as groups of our population which were previously discriminated against have seen the barriers fall and have used the opportunities which have been afforded them.

Nothing that I have said is designed to suggest that we have eliminated racial and ethnic antagonisms within our population. They do exist, and government is not able to change that fact. But here, too, we have witnessed change. Through the activities of various institutions—including, particularly, religious organizations—younger people have increasingly been imbued with a commitment to human brotherhood. We, therefore, have reason to believe that over time these antagonisms will continue to diminish.

My remarks about nondiscrimination generally apply to Indians as well. But our Indian people have a special problem, which they share with indigenous peoples elsewhere in the world—indigenous peoples whose culture and economies differ markedly from those of the surrounding society. Many of our Indian reservation residents are only a few generations removed from a hunting and fishing culture. They have found it much more difficult to fit into industrial society than do the descendants of families engaged in agriculture.

The unusually large unemployment rate on Indian reservations is related to this problem. It is, let me emphasize, the unemployment rate not of Indian people but for Indian reservations. Indian people who have decided to leave the reservations can find and have found jobs elsewhere in the country. But there is no doubt that Indian reservations have found it difficult to attract industry and thereby create job opportunities for Indian people at reasonable wage levels in their home communities. It happens to be a problem with which our government has concerned itself and continues to concern itself. I readily concede that the problem has not been solved. In fact, I have personally worked and written on this subject.

I shall complete this discussion of discrimination by noting again that the United States has served as a magnet for immigrants of all races to achieve a higher standard of life for themselves and for their children. The fact that a majority of recent immigrants to the United States are nonwhites from non-European areas and that they have integrated into our society at a truly amazing speed is clear evidence of the strength of the well-recognized American acceptance of a variety of ethnic groups into our social and economic system.

**The Role of Women.** Much has also been said here as to the role of women in the United States. As to the point made concerning the Equal Rights Amendment, let me note again that the courts of the United States have construed the 5th and 14th amendments to the U.S. Constitution so as to require legal equality between the sexes.

Admittedly, what is required by law takes time to be translated into reality in day-to-day life. The entry of women into our economic life on a basis of parity occurred only quite recently, after 1970. It has, however, progressed at amazing speed. To cite one item of statistics that comes to mind, in 1970, 2% of all law school students were women. Today they are 50%.

But new entries do not come in at the very top. That is why we find average women's wages to be below the average earned by men. It was 60% in 1980; it is 64% today and is expected to continue to rise as the years go by. Here, too, we do not suggest that we have reached our goal of full actual rather than purely legal equality, but we are clearly on our way toward that goal.

## Soviet Economic Progress Since the October Revolution

As I said earlier, we had not intended to engage here in a debate on the respective advantages of the U.S. and Soviet models, but as the Soviet Union has initiated this discussion, we want to make it clear that we are not inclined to shrink from it. Let me say also that we recognize that the Soviet Union started to industrialize later than we did and that the Soviet Union suffered devastation during World Wars I and II. But let us also remember that we recalled earlier in this session that the war in Europe ended 40 years ago. How far has the Soviet Union been able to travel in this period on the way to its economic goals?

In the early 1960s, Nikita Khrushchev predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in living standards by 1980. Yet studies of comparative per capita consumption conducted by University of Virginia professor Gertrude Schroeder and others show that today, 25 years after Khrushchev spoke and 67 years after the October Revolution, the Soviet standard of living remains barely one-third of the U.S. level. These same studies show that Soviet living standards are much lower than in any developed Western country.

The average Soviet citizen, in fact, lives less well than someone living at the official U.S. poverty line. An American family living at that level, for example, lives on an income which is 41% of the U.S. average. About 15.2% of our population lives at or below that level. By comparison, as indicated, the average Soviet citizen lives at about one-third of the U.S. average, which gives us some idea of the percentage of the Soviet population which lives below the U.S. poverty line. As suggested earlier by our distinguished Spanish colleague, equally dramatic comparisons can be made between the average Soviet citizen and the average unemployed worker in the West. In the recession year of 1982, for example—the worst since World War II—the median per capita income for unemployed workers in the United States was about \$5,000. The average income of a family with an unemployed worker was \$20,000. We do not deny that such an income in many cases reflected a substantial decline in living standards. But a Soviet family living on the equivalent of \$20,000 a year would be quite well off, even after we have adjusted for differences in the cost of basic needs.

In making these comparisons, I do not mean to suggest that the Soviet Union has made no economic progress since the October Revolution. But the limited success the Soviet economy has enjoyed in the past was dependent on constant additions to the labor force and on the availability of plentiful and inexpensive resources. Now that the Soviet Union has used up its surplus labor pool and its resources are more costly, its growth rates have plummeted. The Soviet Union, in fact, is no longer closing the gap between itself and the developed West. The per capita consumption comparisons I cited earlier have remained constant over the last decade. Given low Soviet labor productivity, the gap can reasonably be expected to widen in the future.

## Shortcomings of the Soviet Economic System

**Consumer Shortages and Corruption.** The Soviet economy today is characterized by pervasive shortages of consumer goods and the widespread corruption these shortages generate. These features, moreover, are not temporary problems which will solve themselves through continued progress over time. Rather, they are problems endemic to the Soviet system of centralized economic planning. This system, based on the notion that a small group of planners can efficiently allocate resources for an entire economy, has created instead an economy of bottlenecks, shortages, and waste.

In the Soviet Union, unlike anywhere in the developed West, the most basic consumer goods are in continuous short supply and rationing remains a common fact of Soviet life. The situation has been so bad in some localities in recent years that food riots have reportedly occurred. In 1981, *Izvestia* reported the introduction of rationing in 12 major Soviet cities, including Irkutsk, Kazan, Tbilisi, Vologda, and Nalvarezhnye (Chelny (now called Brezhnev)). We have learned that meat and butter have both been formally rationed in the closed city of Sverdlovsk and its surrounding villages for several years. Presumably, the same is true of many other areas closed to foreign visitors.

The long lines of people lining up for scarce items on Soviet city streets have become famous throughout the world. The production and distribution system is so capricious that it is impossible to tell what will be available from one day to the next. This is why Soviet housewives frequently join lines without inquiring what is for sale. They simply assume they had better get whatever it is while it's available. This is also one important cause of Soviet productivity problems, since working people are typically obliged to take unauthorized absences from their jobs to chase after scarce necessities. These endless shortages force the average Soviet family to spend 2 hours shopping every day just to obtain the basic necessities of life.

The endless waiting is bad enough, but the Soviet consumer often finds that the product waiting for him at the front of the line is hardly worth the wait. The quality, variety, and design of the consumer goods available in the Soviet Union are, in fact, notoriously poor by both Western and East European standards, and retail trade and personal service facilities are scarce, primitive, and inefficient.

As one might expect, the chronic shortage of basic consumer goods has fostered the creation of an enormous black market in scarce items. This, in turn, has led to widespread official corruption as persons with administrative control over scarce commodities divert them for personal gain. Corruption exists in all societies, but in the Soviet Union it is a pervasive and normal part of life. Stealing from the state is so common that the Soviet people have come to take it for granted. Anecdotes about corruption and bribery have become a staple of Soviet humor.

The leaders of the Soviet Union are aware of the problem, of course. It has been frequently raised at party plenums, and the Soviet media are replete with stories of corruption, bribery, and the executions of those unfortunate enough to be selected as examples of equal justice under law. What the Soviet leadership seemingly fails to realize or simply will not face is that an economy of shortages inevitably breeds corruption. Some estimate that as much as 25% of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) is diverted to the black market every year.

It must be emphasized once again that the chronic shortages and widespread corruption which characterize contemporary Soviet life are fundamental features of the Soviet economic system. They reflect the systemic inflexibility of a centralized economic planning system which breeds bottlenecks and inefficiencies.

The Soviet consumer is further disadvantaged by the Soviet preference for spending on defense and heavy industry at the expense of the consumer sector. Soviet per capita spending for defense, for example, is in relative terms, at least twice as high as in any developed Western country. Though we have heard a great many reminders from some of our colleagues here of the importance of the right to life and appeals for an end to the arms race, let us remember that in the 1970s the Soviet Union was the only runner in that arms race, continuing its buildup while the United States was, in effect, engaging in unilateral arms reduction. Today, the Soviet Union spends at least 14% of its GNP on defense, compared to only 7% for the United States. Given the Soviet Union's systemic economic problems and its emphasis on heavy industry and weapons procurement, it is little wonder that Soviet authorities and press commentators chronically complain about the evils of "consumerism" and against the excessive accumulation of material goods.

**Effects of Agricultural Collectivization** The Soviet system of collectivized agriculture also contributes to the harshness of Soviet life. Much of the problem in food supply stems from the collectivized nature of Soviet agriculture. As is well known, the forced collectivization of agriculture in the early 1930s divested Soviet farmers of their land. What is not so well known is that the forcible confiscation of grain supplies that accompanied it resulted in a widespread famine that killed as many as 6 million in the Ukraine alone. Collectivization not only killed 6 million people but it permanently crippled Soviet agriculture.

The Soviet Union—in prerevolutionary days the world's largest grain exporter—is now the world's largest grain importer. Twenty percent of the Soviet work force works in agriculture, compared to 3% in the United States. Yet the Soviet Union often has had to import up to 25% of its grain. American farmers, who own their own land, are 10 times more productive than their Soviet counterparts. Each year, approximately 20% of the grain, fruit, and vegetable harvest and as much as 50% of the Soviet potato crop perishes because of the poor storage, transportation, and distribution system.

Soviet farmers have not lost their ability to grow crops. They just lack the incentive to do so on a *kolkhoz* [collective farm]. By contrast, even though private plots, which are farmed by individuals in the early morning and late evening hours, occupy only 4% of the Soviet Union's arable land, they produce 25% of the Soviet Union's total crop output.

**Housing Shortages and Deficiencies.** Housing in the Soviet Union is in as short supply as most consumer goods. At least 20% of all urban families must share kitchen and toilet facilities with other families. Another 5% live in factory dormitories. Young married couples are typically forced to live with their parents and must wait years for housing of their own.

The housing that does exist is extremely cramped, more so than in any other developed country in the world. The average Soviet citizen has 14 square meters of living space, for example, compared to the 49 square meters available to the average American. This means that there are approximately two people for every room in the Soviet Union, compared with two rooms for every person in the United States. Soviet statistics reveal that in 1983, 32% of all urban housing had no hot water, 23% was without gas, 19% without indoor baths, 12% without central heating,

11% without sewage facilities, and 9% without water.

The housing situation is much worse in the countryside and contains many features reminiscent of the 19th century—or even the 18th. There, for the most part, heating is with fireplaces, food is cooked on wood stoves, out-houses provide the toilet facilities, and water frequently is from a well.

Although there has been much new housing built in the Soviet Union in recent years, almost all of it consists of poorly constructed high-rise apartment buildings, which are even more poorly maintained. At the current rate of construction, the per capita space available to Soviet citizens will begin to approach the Western standard in approximately 150 years. Soviet housing woes should come as no surprise, given the fact that the Soviet Union spends less than one-fifth as much on housing as the United States and well under half of what is spent in Spain and Japan.

**Status of Soviet Women.** Women in the Soviet Union usually occupy the lowest status and lowest paying jobs in Soviet society. One-third of all working Soviet women, for example, are employed as agricultural laborers. By contrast, only 1.5% of American women are so employed.

Soviet authorities often point to the liberal maternity benefits accorded to Soviet women. Yet the Soviet Union is currently suffering from a severe labor shortage brought on by declining birth rates. This reduction in birth rates, in turn, is due to the extraordinarily high abortion rate. Many women have a history of five or more abortions. The fact is that the low Soviet standard of living compels women to work to supplement the family income. Maternity benefits, with extra mouths to feed and bodies to clothe, are, in many instances, simply not enough to encourage a family to let a child be born.

Unlike Soviet men, the working day of a Soviet woman does not end as she leaves the field or the factory. Soviet women are expected to do the cooking and the housework and the waiting in line.

In the West, women have effectively banded together to fight discrimination and sexism, but Soviet women have no access to effective political power. In its entire history, only one woman has ever served on the Politburo; none serves there now. Fewer than 5% of Central Committee members are female. Interestingly, only one-fourth of Communist Party members are female.

## Medical Care and Health Problems

Soviet authorities are often fond of pointing out that health care in the Soviet Union is free. As with so much that is free or subsidized in the Soviet Union, however, you often get what you pay for. Although there are plenty of beds in Soviet hospitals, the people who lie in them frequently receive substandard care. **One-third of them, for example, develop postoperative infections due to unsanitary conditions.** Most of the doctors who care for them, moreover, are poorly trained by Western standards. Medicine is not a high-prestige occupation in the Soviet Union, and doctors are among the lowest paid workers in Soviet society. Significantly, 70% of these low-paid physicians are women.

Soviet medicine is not immune to the same shortages that afflict the rest of Soviet society. Medical equipment and many medicines are in extremely short supply. One-third of all Soviet hospitals, for example, do not have adequate facilities for blood transfusions. Basic items such as bandages, aspirin, and syringes are often difficult to find. Food rations are so small that patients must supplement their diet with food from home. In Novosibirsk, for example, which is home to many leading Soviet academic institutes and where one would expect supplies to be significantly better than normal, only 11% of the ~~210~~ standard drugs to be prescribed for specific illnesses are actually available. These shortages are not surprising in light of the fact that Soviet per capita expenditures on health care are less than one-third the U.S. level.

Although the problems in the Soviet health care delivery system are serious, they are not the most serious medical problem facing the Soviet Union today. Dramatically, over the course of the past two decades a significant deterioration has occurred in the overall health status of the Soviet population. Recent studies show that there has been an increase in Soviet death and morbidity rates over the past 20 years. The life expectancy of Soviet males has decreased during that period by a little over 4 years, from 66 in the mid-1960s to just under 62 years today. In the United States during the same period, male life expectancy increased from 66 to 71 years. Infant mortality in the Soviet Union has increased from 26.2 per 1,000 live births in 1971 to about 40 per 1,000 today. U.S. infant mortality during the same period has decreased from 24.7 per 1,000 to 10.7.

The Soviet figure for infant mortality is necessarily an estimate since Soviet authorities stopped publishing infant mortality statistics after 1973 when the rate had risen to 81.9 per 1,000. This rate was already much higher than in any developed Western country. The Soviet Union also has stopped publishing life expectancy figures. The reason why this has been done is obvious enough.

The decrease in male life expectancy and the increase in infant mortality in the Soviet Union are historic events. Never before has a developed, industrialized nation suffered a decline in these demographic indicators in time of peace.

The reasons for this decline are even more disturbing for anyone tempted to look to the Soviet Union as a model for social and economic development. Factors such as poor health care, increased smoking, and frequently unregulated industrial pollution are important, but perhaps the most important contributor is alcohol. This would appear to be the view of Soviet authorities themselves.

The Soviet Union leads the world in the per capita consumption of hard liquor. Much of it is consumed in the form of home-brewed moonshine known as *samogon*. Alcohol consumption in the Soviet Union has more than doubled over the past 25 years. The death rate from alcohol poisoning in the Soviet Union is 88 times the U.S. rate, and alcohol and its effects may be the leading cause of death among Soviet males.

Alcohol abuse in the Soviet Union is not simply a male problem. Alcohol abuse is the third leading cause of illness among Soviet women and is a key factor in both the alarming rise in birth defects and the increased infant mortality rate. By 1980 the net social cost of alcohol abuse in decreased labor productivity in the Soviet Union amounted to a staggering 8%-9% of the total national income.

Much of the heavy drinking in the Soviet Union occurs in the work place. Professor R. Lirmyan of the Soviet Academy of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Internal Affairs, writing in a 1982 issue of *Molodoy Kommunist*, reported that 33% of the male work force is chronically drunk. Not surprisingly, drunkenness is the leading cause of industrial accidents.

A poll cited in a March 1984 edition of a Soviet journal, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, revealed that half the Soviet population regards drunkenness as the number one social problem in the Soviet Union. Seventy-four percent said they were alarmed over the extent of public drunkenness. These statistics make clear that the Soviet Union now suffers from an

alcohol abuse problem of epidemic proportions, serious enough to cause a significant rise in the national death rate.

As I remarked earlier, even the Soviet leadership concurs with this assessment. Vitaliy Fedorchuk, the Soviet Minister for Internal Affairs, interviewed in the August 29, 1984, issue of *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, candidly acknowledged that Soviet mortality and sickness rates have been on the increase, and he specifically cited alcohol abuse as the cause.

We note with interest that the Soviet authorities only last week announced yet another campaign against the abuse of alcohol. Production is to be cut back, the drinking age raised, and penalties against the manufacture of home brew increased. While it is possible that these measures may meet with some limited success, we note that similar campaigns have always failed in the past. Our suspicion is that alcohol abuse in the Soviet Union will remain an alarmingly serious problem until the Soviet leadership begins to come to grips with the profound social malaise that gave rise to the problem in the first place. In saying this, I do not mean to deny that there are drug and alcohol abuse problems in the United States and in other countries which deserve our serious attention. But I am suggesting that in the Soviet Union we are dealing with a problem of an entirely different order of magnitude.

## Egalitarianism in the Soviet Union

I have been talking at length here about some serious difficulties in the Soviet social and economic system. But there is one more problem I would like to discuss. As we know, Marxist-Leninist ideology claims to be based on the notion of egalitarianism. This, we are told, is what the great October Revolution was all about. One would, therefore, expect that whatever problems the Soviet Union might have, the Soviet authorities would ensure that no class or group or individuals would ever be accorded privileges not available to other members of Soviet society.

But the truth is that certain groups in Soviet society (the party, the military officer corps, the diplomatic corps, the scientific-technical intelligentsia, the cultural and sports establishments) have deliberately shielded themselves from the social and economic hardships faced by the rest of the population. A privileged 5% of the Soviet population,

## Maintaining Momentum in the Middle East Peace Process

by Richard W. Murphy

*Address before the American Council of Young Political Leaders on June 27, 1985. Ambassador Murphy is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*

I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our policy in the Middle East. The current terrorist hijacking of TWA Flight #847 reminds us that peace in the Middle East has enemies. Extremists and terrorists seek to undermine the forces of moderation in the region. The tragic violence in Lebanon highlights and makes more urgent the need for a negotiated peace settlement in the region. That key—to the stability and security of the Middle East—is the peace process.

The United States has been actively involved for more than two decades in the search for peace in the Middle East. We have had some success, but there is still a difficult road ahead to reach our goal of direct negotiations and peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. There has recently been positive movement in this direction, much of it due to King Hussein's courageous initiatives.

### The Movement Toward Negotiations

Let me share with you some ideas on where we are in the peace process and where we are likely to be going in the months ahead. The two key themes which are at the heart of our efforts are pragmatism and process. We are now seeing concrete proposals from both sides which address the problem of getting negotiations started rather than focusing on a desired outcome. We now see a willingness to face the hard, practical steps that lie ahead. I would like to explore with you how these concepts relate to recent developments and our expectations for the future.

A new momentum began to develop late last year. At that time, and for the first few months of this year, the key parties in the region seemed content for us to step back a bit and let them work out some of their immediate problems. On the Israeli side, this was largely a result of domestic political considerations. The results of the last election in Israel were inconclusive in many respects and led to a unique experiment in power-sharing between Likud and Labor.

known as the *Nomenklatura*, has access to special "closed" stores that are specially stocked with foreign goods not available in regular stores, as well as bountiful supplies of Soviet goods that are in short supply elsewhere. The average Soviet citizen is forbidden from entering these stores, which are unmarked and have opaque windows to prevent the curious from looking in. Housing space is allocated by state authorities on the basis of social status. Many leading Soviet organizations have their own housing facilities, which are of good standard and centrally located.

The Fourth Directorate of the Ministry of Health runs a closed system of hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries for the *Nomenklatura*, providing far better services than those available to the general population. The Soviet ruling oligarchy also has access to such special benefits as foreign travel, automobiles, admission to the best schools, country houses, access to cultural events, and paid vacations in choice resorts, which are not available to the average citizen. Even the center lanes of certain roads are closed off for their exclusive personal use. To quote from George Orwell's *Animal Farm*: "All animals are equal, but some are more equal than others."

### Conclusion

In an earlier intervention, the distinguished Soviet representative suggested that we were reluctant to discuss social and economic issues in this forum. I hope I have succeeded in dispelling this impression. Despite our many problems, we believe that we in the West, with our pluralistic, mixed-market economies, have gone further toward meeting basic human social and economic aspirations than has the system now in place in the Soviet Union.

More than 35 years ago, there was published a collection of essays authored by prominent former communists or fellow travelers, including Ignazio Silone, Andre Gide, Richard Wright, and Arthur Koestler. The book was entitled *The God That Failed*. Each of these prominent writers explained in his own words why he had concluded that the price in terms of personal freedom was not worth paying to attain the promised goal of a future paradise. The decades that passed have demonstrated that the image of paradise off in the distance was only a mirage. ■

For the new Israeli C getting Israeli forces out was a primary consideration across clearly during the was one of the issues on was consensus within Isr

The second priority t electorate was the need t the economy. Inflation ra reached, in the month of annual rate of 1,200%. A Israelis have taken severa steps, they still have furti achieve a comprehensive reform plan. This may se separate question and un peace process, but it dem mediate attention of Isra reduces their ability to de problems.

The Arab states, part cited the Israeli military Lebanon as one of the re of movement on negotiat "cold peace" between Egi Other issues noted by the inhibiting progress were status of Taba, a small p property on the border, a tian desire to focus great tion on the quality of life tinian inhabitants of the ritories. There has been : on these issues, too. The Israelis have resumed di status of Taba, and the I government has been tak steps toward amelioratin residents of the West Ba Improvement in this rela portant for the psycholog would have on the climat the region.

On the Arab side, th some very encouraging d new sense of pragmatism have opened up unique p movement. These develo last October with Jordan resume formal diplomati Egypt. In November, th ponied Palestine National meeting was held in Am the prospects for cooper Jordan and the PLO [Pa tion Organization]. King dressing the PNC, called join him in seeking a ne ment based on UN Secu Resolution 242. The PL Hussein's call out of han