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
FINLANDIA HALL

FINLANDIA HALL is Helsinki's concert and conference centre. Its central but peaceful location in a park and its excellent concert, conference and exhibition facilities provide an ideal milieu for symphony and other concerts, light entertainment, small meetings or international congresses. About 200 concerts and 300 different conferences are held here each year. Finlandia Hall has proved its ability to serve its customers by hosting a number of world congresses in various fields, UN agency conferences and most notably the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. The building, designed by the world-famous Finnish architect Alvar Aalto, is a major attraction in itself and is visited by hundreds of thousands of Finns and tens of thousands of foreign visitors from all over the world each year.

– Shown here is a scene from a light-music concert given by the Helsinki Philharmonic Orchestra at Finlandia Hall.



Finlandia Hall was built in two stages: the main building, with its two concert halls, was completed in 1971, and the congress wing was opened in spring 1975. The facilities can easily be converted and used together or separate from one another. The two halls in the main building can accommodate 1700 and 350 persons, and the bright foyers have a combined area of nearly 2,000 square metres. The main building also contains rehearsal rooms and lounges for the orchestras, numerous rooms for artists, facilities for committees and group work, and offices. The main room in the congress wing can accommodate 550 participants at specially designed conference tables or 900 persons in conventional seating. The congress wing also includes facilities for committees, conference secretariat and the press. Conference organizers will find a wide range of equipment at their disposal in all of Finlandia Hall's facilities, including a six-language simultaneous interpretation system, a closed-circuit television network, a building-wide intercom system and all the necessary audio-visual aids.



Together both parts of Finlandia Hall contain over 2,500 square metres of exhibition space. There is also a 500-seat restaurant and a 600-space car park.

Total volume: 123,860 cu.m.
Floor space: 17,715 sq.m.

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ALVAR AALTO

The history of 20th century architecture in Finland is dominated by Alvar Aalto (1898-1976). In the 1920s Aalto was an adherent of Classicism, in the 1930s he was an exponent of Functionalism, and later he created his own distinctive form language. In his buildings, Aalto was adept at combining the multifarious needs of people with the demands of nature and the environment, fashioning them into a harmonious, human architecture.

Aalto's activity as a designer, however, is as important as his work as an architect, and his achievements in this field are an essential element of his thinking and development. As a young student and newly-graduated architect in the 1920s, Aalto was a prolific designer, producing church interiors (including lighting and candlesticks), furniture, medals, book covers, and even advertising signs and gravestones. The name of Aalto's first office—"The Alvar Aalto Office for Architecture and Monumental Art"—reveals the fusion of architect with designer.

Although most of Aalto's furniture and lighting fixtures evolved along with the building plans for a specific milieu, they quickly found a wider application. His best known piece of furniture—the *Paimio* chair—was designed for the Paimio Sanatorium in the early 1930s. This chair is a fine example of his sculptural treatment of moulded birch plywood, a procedure that served the practical demands of furniture design, being durable and flexible, clear and constructive. Aalto applied the technique most eloquently in his experimental constructions, two of which are shown in the present exhibition.

The bentwood chair leg arose as an alternative to the tubular steel furniture favoured by Functionalism. As Aalto continued to work on his bentwood technique in the 1940s, the decorative aspects began to appear alongside the purely practical features. The bent wood spread out like a fan, imparting a decorative expression to the stool or table. The fan stools were first on display in 1954 at an exhibition of Aalto's works held in Stockholm's NK department store.

Glass design constituted a separate chapter in Aalto's output. As early as 1932 he participated in a design competition for the Karhula-Iittala Glassworks. His all-time favourite—the *Savoy* vase—was also the result of a competition held by the Karhula-Iittala Glassworks for the Paris World's Fair in 1937. Aalto was awarded first prize for his entry, which comprised vases of different sizes linked by an organic, freely-curving form. Affiliations have been seen between the form of the vase and Finnish nature—the tortuous outlines of the lakes or the contours of the land.

A fresh application of the free-form vase took shape in the late 1930s, when Aalto designed a set of four vases that could be placed one inside the other. On display at the New York World's Fair in 1939, the set resembled a flower and was indeed known as *Aalto's Flower*. The *Flower* and the *Savoy* vase, objects that combine utility with a vigorous sculptural form, are still produced by the Iittala Glassworks.

Timo Keinanen
Helsinki, Finland

To be able to understand the architecture of Finlandia Hall, one must be familiar with the larger vision of Helsinki of which Finlandia Hall is only a part, a vision that may never fully materialize. At the beginning of the 19th century, Helsinki was granted the postition of capital of the newly established Grand Duchy of Finland, and the architect Carl Ludvig Engel designed the monumental central square, known today as the Senate Square, which is flanked by the Cathedral, Senate Palace and the University. Alvar Aalto was of the opinion that independent Finland should construct a central square of its own in the new centre of the city, which is in the vicinity of the Parliament House, the building that symbolizes the status won in 1917. It was a lucky coincidence that right in front of the Parliament there lay a large railway freight yard which was to be resited elsewhere, Aalto thought that this area would provide a unique opportunity for the realization of an idea, originally suggested by Eliel Saarinen in 1917, for the construction of a new traffic route called Freedom Avenue (Vapaudenkatu) from the northern suburbs right to the heart of the city.

Aalto envisaged a large, fan-shaped square terraced on three levels the topmost point of which would be where the equestrian statue of Mannerheim now stands. The square would open towards Töölönlahti Bay, and on one side it would be flanked by a concert and congress hall and further on by an opera house, an art museum, the city library and, possibly, other public buildings which would be erected in the midst of the greenery of Hesperia Park. Freedom Avenue was to be built on columns over the northbound railway track, and people approaching the centre by car would see the city opening up before them, a magnificient urban landscape with its facades mirrored in the waters of Töölönlahti Bay, a similar effect to the palaces of Venice. The fan-shaped square would welcome people in a wide embrace while the Parliament House and the Railway Station would provide a supporting flank to the sides. This first plan for the centre was drawn by Aalto in 1961. He modified it in 1964 and 1971 on the basis of criticism from various sources.

Finlandia Hall was designed in 1962 and built between 1967–72. The plan for the congress wing was drawn in 1970 and it was constructed between 1973–75. With the completion of the first stage of this large project, Aalto thought he had triumphed, and with this important part erected, he believed that the plan would proceed as he had designed it, at least in its broad outlines. He may have been right, for undoubtedly some kind of square will emerge on the east side of Finlandia Hall where the car park now lies. However, the planned public buildings for Töölönlahti Bay have been definitely deleted from the city plan, and Freedom Avenue is still under debate. The probable outcome is that a new competition for Helsinki city centre will be held and new radical proposals will again be under consideration.

As regards Finlandia Hall itself, it exhibits many of the ideas that Aalto experimented with during his lifelong preoccupation with monumental building construction. It is not a functional creation, if the term is taken to signify a building whose forms are dictated solely by its practical functions and associated structural solutions. In contrast it is a decoratively conceived composition of cubistic forms which constitutes a manyfaceted whole. None of these elements are, however, purely decorative. Aalto remained faithful to functionalism to the extent that he always sought a practical reason for his forms. The main idea of Finlandia Hall with its towershaped part and inclined roof rising over the whole structure was, as Aalto thought, to improve the acoustics of the concert hall by providing a resonance area overhead. The audience would not see it because of the suspended ceiling but it would be capable of creating the kind of acoustic effect that high churches possess. It is unfortunate that this attempt proved in practice to be partially unsuccessful. Yet, the result still provides us with the visual satisfaction of its monumental exterior.

There is a similar twofold reason for the marble which Aalto used both on the exterior, where it is contrasted with black granite, and in the interior. To him marble was an important link with the Mediterranean culture which he wanted to introduce into Finland. At the same time, however, marble requires little maintenance and can withstand Finland's harsh climate better than plastered surfaces.

The interior also provides typical examples of many of Aalto's hallmarks and motifs. The large asymmetrical auditorium is nearly void of right angles yet still tightly controlled with naturally harmonious and acoustically influenced wall reliefs and bol

balcony outlines. Thus it is a simplified version of Aalto's most magnificient auditorium in the Great Opera House, Essen. Between this closed hall for 1700 people and the small auditorium for 350 (its ceiling is borrowed from Aalto's church in Detmerode, Germany) lies the foyer which is like an open landscape. It is one of these spaces which lacks any overall form but is surrounded by powerfully designed elements which Aalto really could master. This foyer lay-out extends to, or is continued into the congress wing where the most conspicuous architectural feature is the wall which curves inwards in small sections. Even here the motivation was twofold: on the one hand Aalto wanted to save a number of trees growing on the original lot, and on the other, he wished to break the rigid uniformity characteristic of straight walls.

In addition to these general observations, a few words must be said about the preoccupation with detail and the high-quality construction work so typical of Aalto. Here in Finlandia Hall these details are stretched to the limit. Every lighting fixture, every piece of furniture as well as all mouldings, panels and flooring materials were specially designed and are a result of the experience of Aalto's long career as an architect. All materials and colours speak in nature's own subdued way without anything artificial to distract. This is in keeping with Aalto's conviction that architecture serves as a background for human beings. It is not startling forms or interiors with vivid colours that are supposed to attract attention, it is the audience and the performers. Therefore it cannot be denied that something is required of the people, too. The guests at Finlandia Hall need not be attired in the same way as the audiences in traditional opera foyers or gold-laced theatres but they should be as natural and as honest in appearance as the surroundings.

Göran Schildt, Ph D
author of a biography on Alvar Aalto



HELSINKI

Broad Avenues and Bright Prospects

Helsinki (Helsingfors to the Swedish-speaking minority) is very much a city of the sea, sprawling over peninsulas, curving round bays and spilling out across islands that are linked by bridges, causeways or even by boat to the central hub. This hub fills a chunky peninsula where, somehow, without overcrowding, are to be found the single-chamber Parliament, or Eduskuntatalo, the leading technical and educational institutes, art galleries, theaters, museums, business houses, the great Olympic Stadium (scene of the 1952 Olympic Games and 1983 World Athletics Championships), much outstandingly good architecture, the head offices of every big industrial enterprise—in fact all that constitutes the legislative, cultural, scientific, commercial and economic life of the country. And still there is space left for airy parks and broad streets.

Helsinki owes its origin to the chance whims of two monarchs, and its development has largely been the result of a series of accidents. Some 400 years ago King Gustav Vasa of Sweden ordered the citizens of four Finnish towns—Porvoo (Borgå), Tammisaari (Ekenäs), Rauma and Ulvila (Ulfsby)—to leave their homes and proceed to a place on the rapids of the river Vantaa. There they were to build a new town to attract the trade of the Estonian city of Tallinn, thus challenging the power of the Hanseatic League. Like many another city of this period, Helsinki's growth was interrupted by wars, plagues and fires. Not until 1809, when Finland became an autonomous Grand Duchy of Russia,

was Helsinki really able to start developing; then three years later, it became the capital of Finland, primarily because the Czar found Turku (Åbo) was too far away from Russia and too close for comfort to Sweden to remain the capital of his newly-acquired territory.

The first of the accidents which stimulated the new capital's growth was the Great Fire in Turku. So much of the latter city was gutted that the University was moved bodily to Helsinki, which at once became the cultural as well as the political center of the country. In 1808, thanks to chance again, another Great Fire played a part in the young city's future. This time it was Helsinki that burned, allowing the German-born architect, Carl Ludvig Engel, an opportunity to plan the rebuilding of the city practically house by house and stone by stone. It is to Engel and to his partner, Ehrenström, that Finland must be grateful for her beautiful capital.

Around the Senate Square which Engel designed stand the Tuomiokirkko or Cathedral, the University and the State Council Building—a group built in one of the purest styles European architecture can boast. Perhaps it was Engel's inspiration, but from his day Finland has always had good architects. Two of them, Eliel Saarinen and Alvar Aalto, became world famous. You can hardly walk down any street in Helsinki without seeing splendid examples of the work of modern architects whose fame is already spreading beyond the frontiers of Finland, such as Heikki and Kaija Sirén, Rewell, Ervi, Petäjä, Pietilä, Penttilä.

Under the protective shadows of the island fortress of Suomenlinna (Sveaborg), Helsinki developed rapidly during the 19th century. The lovely park-strewn suburb of Töölö, and the island residential districts of Lauttasaari, and Kulosaari came into being quite recently. Still newer suburbs grew up in the post-World War II period, and the city continues to expand, as indeed it must, for like most capitals, it has not enough accommodation for all who wish to live there.

Exploring Helsinki

From the visitor's point of view, Helsinki has the virtue of compactness. Once you have oriented yourself and found out where you are on the city map, it will be difficult to get lost. The piers where ships from abroad dock, the railway station and, to a lesser extent, the air terminal, are all in the center of the city. So, however you come, you can start wandering around on foot at once.

It's an idea to begin by finding a good viewpoint from which to make your first survey of the city—such as the top of the Olympic Stadium Tower, the hill of Tähtitorninmäki, or comfortably installed in a top floor bar or restaurant as in the Torni, Hesperia, Inter-Continental, Palace or Vaakuna hotels. Probably the first buildings you will notice are the Cathedral and the railway station, both in the center of the town, together with the House of Parliament and the Stadium Tower. The great broad street running from the center of town through the city and out to the main Turku road is Mannerheimintie, or Mannerheimvägen (*tie* in Finnish, and *vägen* in Swedish, mean street or road.) Along this broad avenue, named after Finland's great hero Marshal Mannerheim, you'll be able to pick out the Post Office, the House of Parliament, the National Museum (Suomen Kansallismuseo), the fine new Concert and Congress Center of Finlandia Hall, and the Olympic Stadium.

Another simple introduction to the city is to take the No. 3T or 3B tram which describes a figure of eight through the city, bringing you back to where you started. No. 3T has a commentary in several languages in summer (see "How to get around" in the *Practical Information*). After that, as good a way as any of planning your sightseeing is to start in the middle and work outwards. In point of fact, by far the greatest number of interesting sights are contained in the central part of the city, branching out from the Market Square (or Kauppatori).

The Helsinki Tourist Office have prepared a series of walking tours with maps, which you'll also find very helpful. Their premises are near the Market Square down by the South Harbor, a few hundred meters from some of the passenger quays. The colorful openair market flourishes each morning, ending around 1 P.M. and reopening in summer from 3.30–8, when the emphasis is more on arts and crafts. Grouped around the striking statue of Havis Amanda, by Ville Vallgren, are the flower sellers, and the fruit stalls with their mountains of strawberries, raspberries, blueberries, red currants and red whortleberries. You may even be fortunate enough to find the special cloudberry, *suomuurain*, which grows mostly north of the Arctic Circle and is ripened by the Midnight Sun. Fish are sold at the very edge of the harbor, straight from the boats in which they were caught earlier in the morning and so fresh they are still alive and flipping. Meat and dairy produce is sold in the covered market, just beyond the fish stalls.

Havis Amanda, incidentally, the beautiful lady loved by all Helsinkiites, is a center of *vapunaatto* (May Day Eve) revelry. She is crowned again and again on this festive night with the white caps of students who wade through the protective moat surrounding her and climb up to embrace her. Another statue of interest is the stone monument commemorating the time in 1833 when Nicolas I and his consort Feodorovna visited Finland. Known as the Empress Stone, it stands just opposite the quay used by the small boats which head out to the islands of the harbor archipelago. Follow the west side of the harbor southwards, past the arrival quay for ships from Sweden, Germany and Denmark and you come to the pleasant park and district of Kaivopuisto, where most of the embassies are to be found. On the shore, here and elsewhere, you will see small wooden structures from which some Helsinki housewives follow an old tradition of scrubbing their carpets in the sea (or lake, as the case may be).

Leading out of the Market Square are Pohjoisesplanadi and Eteläesplanadi (North and South Esplanades), with gardens running up the middle. Compositely known as Esplanadi, it is a favorite promenade and also features some of the display rooms and shops of Finland's top firms in porcelain, glass, fashion and crafts. Many of them are open on Sundays in July and August.

Along the edge of the Market Square facing the sea stands the President's Palace, with a sentry in field grey patrolling the entrance. Near it you can see the City Hall and various administrative buildings, and behind it towers Helsinki's most famous landmark, the Cathedral. A few steps in the direction of this impressive church bring you to the Senate Square, where facing you is Walter Runeberg's statue of Alexander II of Russia, the enlightened despot who was so well disposed to Finland.

Opposite the Cathedral the lively new Senaatti shopping center adds a new dimension to this gracious but rather quiet district. Most of the streets leading off the Senate Square contain government and administrative offices. Snellmaninkatu is named after J. V. Snellman, whose

statue stands in front of the Bank of Finland. Known as the awakener of the Finnish national spirit, he was instrumental in persuading the Russian overlords to accept the idea of a separate Finnish currency and officially recognizing the Finnish language. Nearby is the House of the Estates, site of Finland's Parliament during the Russian era, and now occupied by several scientific societies.

Snellmaninkatu leads into the district of the town known as Kruununhaka, a sleepy residential quarter built around the northern harbor, from which regular boats cross to the island of Korkeasaari on which lies Helsinki's zoo.

The Senate Square and Baron Mannerheim

But return to the Senate Square. With your back to the Cathedral and its enormous cupola, look left, and you will see the gleaming "onions" of the Orthodox Uspenski Cathedral towering high above the rocky island of Katajanokka. Connected to the mainland by bridges, old warehouses in this district are being renovated to house shops and restaurants.

On January 28, 1951, the great Marshal Baron Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, died in Switzerland. He was flown back to his native land and lay in state in the Cathedral for three days before his state funeral. The citizens of Finland were allowed to pay their last respects to him while he lay there in the dim vastness of this lovely church. Young war widows, children, officers and soldiers, who had fought in Finland's wars against Russia under Mannerheim's leadership, filed past in their thousands, and the only sound was one of weeping. Never in Finland's history has there been such an expression of national feeling.

But let us leave the Senate Square and the "Whitehall district" of Finland and take a stroll up Aleksanterinkatu, the main shopping center of Helsinki. At its top end, where it runs into Mannerheimintie, is Stockmann's, Finland's largest department store. At this corner is the famous statue of the Three Smiths by Felix Nylund, a common rendezvous for people who have to meet somewhere in town. Near the center of town, off Esplanadi, is the permanent Finnish Design Center at Kasarmikatu 19 (scheduled to move), where there is a changing display of the best in Finnish industrial art. Goods displayed here can be bought in Helsinki's departmental stores.

Where Mannerheimintie meets Esplanadi stands the Swedish Theater where plays are given in the Swedish language. To reach its Finnish-language rival, the older National Theater, you must turn around and go back down Aleksanterinkatu to the first street on your left, which leads into the huge square in front of the railway station, which is also the hub of the city's impressive new metro network. Here, however, the National Theater is overshadowed by the massive station itself, designed by Eliel Saarinen. Although he became an American citizen during the war, Saarinen's last wish was to be buried in his native country. His ashes were flown to Finland in 1950 and interred in the grounds of the beautiful home he built for himself along the shore of lovely Lake Hvittträsk.

Right opposite the Railway Station is the City Center, a complex of shops, restaurants, cafés, with underground passageway of shops leading to the railway station. Also on the opposite side of the Railway Square and facing the National Theater is the Art Museum of the Ateneum (Ateneum in Taidemuseo), which houses specimens of the

works of Finland's greatest painters. The paintings of Gallen-Kallela, Hugo Simberg, Albert Edelfelt, Eero Järnefelt, and Magnus Enckell are known far beyond the borders of Finland and are well worth a visit. You'll also find some sculptures by the world-famous Wäinö Aaltonen.

Just behind the railway station stands the Main Post Office. Opposite is Sokos House which contains a large hotel and restaurant, plus numerous business offices and shops. Nearby is one of Helsinki's latest shopping precincts, Kaivopiha, an attractive oasis linked to the railway station, with an entrance from Mannerheimintie.

The Post Office marks one boundary of the "downtown" part of the capital. Across Mannerheimintie from here is the bus station and, in the adjoining block, the glossy new Forum shopping center. A stone's throw north along Mannerheimintie is the House of Parliament, the impressive structure in red granite which seems so striking because of the ample space around it. It looks solid and, if you go inside you will agree that it is solid, built to withstand storms of debate within and criticism from without. It is lavishly and beautifully decorated inside, even to the special caucus room reserved exclusively for the three-score or more of lady representatives. Finland's 200 members of Parliament are elected by proportional representation.

National Museum and Olympic Stadium

A short distance west of Mannerheimintie in Tempeliaukio is the Temppeliaukion church, one of Europe's most unusual modern churches, built into the living rock. Designed by the brothers Timo and Tuomo Suomalainen, it is also used as a concert hall. Returning to Mannerheimintie, just a few hundred meters from the House of Parliament is an odd-looking edifice with a tower which gives it a church-like appearance. This is the National Museum, which houses a large collection of ethnographical exhibits illustrating Finland's history. This area, round the shores of Töölönlahti Bay, is the site of the big new city plan designed by Alvar Aalto. Part of this is Finlandia Hall, the Concert and Congress Center, designed by him, which opened in 1971, close to the shore of the bay and not far from the National Museum. The Intercontinental Hotel is nearby, while the ultramodern City Theater, designed by Timo Pentilä, is across the bay.

Further along Mannerheimintie, not half an hour's walk from the railway station and but ten minutes by tram, rises the imposing tower of the Olympic Stadium. One of the finest views of Helsinki can be obtained from the top of this tower. Further north still and to the east of Mannerheimintie, less than two miles from the city center, is Helsinki's fine new International Fair Center, which opened in 1975. Exhibition halls, a restaurant, cafeteria and well-planned open spaces make it a showplace of its kind.

The street leading off at right angles from Mannerheimintie, Helsinginkatu, leads to the beautiful Botanical Gardens and the Water Tower, from which there is a fine view. Nearby is Helsinki's Tivoli, or permanent amusement park, called Linnanmäki, offering top-class entertainment of universal family appeal. Continuing along this street we come to the "East End" of Helsinki where there is little to see except proof of the fact that Helsinki has indeed no slums.

If you return to Mannerheimintie and cross the street, you will find yourself in the hospital center of the capital. Actually, it is still Töölö, the biggest residential district, but in this little section are concentrated most of the city's biggest and newest hospitals.

Although it may seem a startling suggestion, you next ought to go and see the Hietaniemi Cemetery. When you get there, you will realize why it is a favorite rendezvous for a promenade, for it is a beautiful place. Marshal Mannerheim is buried in the military section. It is a custom to place candles on each grave on Christmas Eve, a moving sight.

Another place well worth visiting is Arabia. This is one of the largest pottery factories in Europe and can be visited by appointment. Although the Arabia plant is some distance out of town, a tram service runs practically to the gate.

Helsinki's Islands

A number of Helsinki's most interesting sights are on islands, a major one being the fortress of Suomenlinna. In fact, this covers a series of interlinked islands, and the entire Finnish army assisted in its construction, which began in 1748. Under the protection of this fortification, Helsinki first began to develop and flourish. Once called the Gibraltar of the North, it was indeed impregnable, never having been taken by assault. Twice, however, it was surrendered without a fight, first to the Russians in the war of 1808–1809, and then during Finland's war of independence when the German Baltic Division, assisted by the Finnish Civic Guard, captured the city of Helsinki. During the Crimean War a combined British and French fleet bombarded the fortress and the fires caused by the cannonade convinced the army that the fortress could not withstand modern artillery fire.

Yet Suomenlinna is more than an ancient military monument with several museums; its parks and gardens are lovely, especially in the spring. One of the forts near the historic King's Gate has an outstanding restaurant. Bearing the historic name of Walhalla, it has been changed as little as possible. This group of islands has now been developed into an all-purpose center for cultural and leisure activities. It includes the recently completed Nordic Arts Center, partly housed in a restored barracks dating from 1868, and focussing on exhibitions and the promotion and exchange of ideas on Scandinavian art.

Seurasaari, an island linked by bridge to the mainland, is another good spot to visit. It houses a delightful open-air museum which brings together houses, ranging from simple huts with turf roofs to lovely wooden villas furnished with original furniture, transported from various parts of the country. The President's residence is nearby.

Yet another island, Korekeasaari, houses Helsinki's zoo, reached by ferry from the North Harbor or by foot bridge from Mustikkamaa. The latter is the home of Helsinki's Summer Theater and is also an island, but accessible by road bridge. Close to Korkeasaari, the islet of Hylkysaari is the setting for the recently opened National Maritime Museum. Still more islands in this sea-girt city feature such amenities as bathing beaches, restaurants, yacht clubs.

Environs

A trip round some of Helsinki's suburbs will give you a fine idea of that special Finnish talent for creating imaginative residential districts in harmony with nature. These provide the theme for some sightseeing

THE SOUTH COAST AND ISLANDS

The Gateway for Finnish Culture

Anyone with a weakness for islands will find a magic world of them stretching along Finland's coastline. There, in the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic, over 30,000 islands form a magnificent archipelago. Westward from Turku ride the rugged but fascinating Åland Islands group, forming an autonomous province of their own. Turku, the former capital, was also the main gateway through which cultural influences reached Finland over the centuries. The coastal district of Porvoo, east of Helsinki, is another area stuffed with history and cultural associations.

In this section, where two place names are given for a center, the second is the Swedish one and it indicates that there is a substantial Swedish-speaking element in the population. An exception is the Åland archipelago, where the population is entirely Swedish-speaking and therefore preference has been given to Swedish names.

Exploring the South Coast

Fifty km. (31 miles) east of Helsinki and on the coast lies Porvoo (Borgå), one of the oldest towns in Finland. It was only Helsinki's privileged position, plus the usual run of fires and wars, that kept

Porvoo from growing into a great port. The major landmark of Porvoo Cathedral dates from the 15th century and it is famous as the setting for the first meeting of the Finnish Diet, called by Czar Alexander I in 1809, at which he proclaimed Finland an autonomous Grand Duchy. Today it is thought of as a town of poets and painters, for it has been the home of many of Finland's most famous names in the realm of arts and letters; the colorful wooden houses and shady alleys of the old district are enchanting. The greatest of Porvoo's sons was J. L. Runeberg, the national poet, whose home, kept as it was when he lived in it, stands at the corner of Runeberginkatu and Aleksanterinkatu in the new part of town. Also worth seeing are the old Town Hall, now a historical museum, and the Ville Vallgren Museum housed in typical 18th-century buildings.

Loviisa comes next, a rather charming summer resort; a special feature is its open-air theater with revolving auditorium, on a smaller scale to the famous one at Tampere.

Farther east are the two islands of Kotka and Hovinsaari, at the mouth of the Kymi river. Kotka was practically unknown until the naval battles of Ruotsinsalmi fought off its shore in 1789 and 1790 revealed its suitability as a harbor. (There is an open-air museum to the battle on Varissaari (Fort Elisabeth) reached by boat.) The Russians also saw the Kotka area as an excellent place to build frontier fortifications against attacks by land or sea from the west. Work on the fortifications was begun in 1791, and at the same time the fortress of Kyminlinna was built on the northern end of Hovinsaari. They were destroyed by a British naval force in 1855, but ten years later a thriving sawmill industry brought the town back to life, and today Kotka is Finland's largest export harbor for timber.

One of the most pleasant spots in the area is the Imperial Fishing Lodge by Langinkoski rapids, built in 1889. An idyllic haven, an hour away by motor boat, is the island of Kaunissaari, with beautiful beaches of fine sand.

West of Helsinki

Hvitträsk, 28 km. (17 miles) west of Helsinki, was the home of famous Finnish architects Eliel Saarinen, Armas Lindgren and Herman Gesellius. Today it is a museum, with an excellent restaurant attached, beautifully situated above Hvitträsk lake. There are Stone Age traces in the vicinity.

Next comes Tammisaari (Ekenäs). Predominantly Swedish-speaking, Tammisaari has little of historical interest, although like most towns along Finland's south coast, it, too, can produce a cannon ball that was fired at it by the British fleet during the time of the Crimean War. But it is a pretty town, with narrow old streets, and the drive to it from the capital is a pleasant one. The forests here are more of the broad-leaved variety, as opposed to the vast majority of Finland's forests, which are of pine and fir. Tammisaari also goes in for the cultivation of what the foresters term exotic plants and trees, and it is interesting to find oak trees here, some of the very few in Finland. An excursion from Tammisaari is to the ruins of medieval Raasepori (Raseborg) Castle, about 16 km. (10 miles) east.

An hour's drive farther to the west is the popular seaside resort of Hanko (Hangö), with its long stretch of sandy beach. This very popular

sailing center was once a major launching point for emigrants to the U.S.A., Canada and Australia.

Turku, the Old Capital

Finland's oldest city, founded in the 13th century, and its capital until 1812, Turku is situated on both banks of the Aura river. With a population of 162,000, it is the country's third largest city and is sometimes called "the cradle of Finnish culture". Commercially its great importance lies in the fact that its harbor is the most easily kept open throughout the winter. In fact, the very word, *turku,* means trading post. It is also widely known for its shipyards. It has both Finnish and Swedish Universities, the new buildings of the Finnish one being well worth a visit.

Called Åbo by the Swedish-speaking Finns, Turku is the center of the southwest part of the country, whose land is fertile and winters are milder. With a cathedral over 700 years old, the city is still the seat of the Archbishop of Finland. Although gutted by fire in 1827, the cathedral has been completely restored. In the choir can be seen R. W. Ekman's frescos portraying Bishop Henry (an Englishman) baptizing the heathen Finns, and Mikael Agricola offering the Finnish translation of the New Testament to Gustav Vasa of Sweden.

Where the Aura river flows into the sea stands Turku Castle, the city's second most important historical monument. The oldest part of the fortress was built at the end of the 13th century, whereas the newer part dates back to the 16th century. Once a prison, it has been attractively restored and contains today the Historical Museum, with collections of furniture, portraits, arms and implements covering 400 years.

Like Helsinki, Turku has a lively open-air morning market, which in summer reopens from 4–8 P.M. Among the city's other main sights is the Handicrafts Museum: a street of wooden houses that survived the 1827 fire and now features such craft workshops as the comb-maker, the weaver, and the potter, using equipment and techniques that date back a century and a half. In summer, visitors may also try their hand under expert guidance. Notable, too, is the Resurrection Chapel, one of the outstanding creations of modern Finnish architecture. Also well worth visiting in Turku are the Sibelius Museum and the Wäinö Aaltonen Museum, the latter devoted to the works of Finland's great sculptor and additionally featuring changing exhibitions of contemporary art. Both are on the banks of the River Aura as is the striking modern theater.

Besides several old churches erected during the Middle Ages not far outside the city, there is the Ruissalo National Park, located on an island though accessible by road; it has the largest oak woods in the country. There is also a pleasant sandy beach, modern accommodations and good sports facilities.

But one of the greatest attractions in the vicinity of Turku is the beach at the coastal resort of Naantali (Nådendal), where the President of Finland has his summer residence. Finland's oldest known author, Jöns Budde, was a monk in the 15th-century monastery whose chapel now serves as the church. There are water-bus trips on certain summer evenings from Turku to Naantali. Other good excursions from Turku include the Tour of Seven Churches, covering some of the delightful medieval churches of the area.

Åland Islands

From Turku there are air and sea connections to the Åland (Ahvenanmaa) islands, where rural calm combines with fine coastal scenery. In all, there are over 6,500 islands and skerries, a handful of them inhabited by a total population of 23,000. Virtually all of them are Swedish-speaking and the Ålanders are very proud of their largely autonomous status. Nearly half the population lives in the pleasant little capital of Mariehamn (Maarianhamina) which straddles a narrow peninsula, its two harbors linked by the shady main avenues of Norra Esplanadgatan and Storagatan. The Maritime Museum near the main harbor is well worth visiting for the islands have a very long seafaring tradition; nearby is the splendid four-masted barque *Pommern.*

Åland is particularly well organized for cycling and fishing packages, motor tours (you can go island-hopping on the network of car or passenger ferries), farmhouse holidays and self-catering cottages—2,000 of them scattered about the islands. These are marvelous sailing waters though, as yet, only a few yachts are available for rent.

There is much of historic interest for the archipelago has been inhabited since prehistoric times. Some of the medieval stone churches on the islands are particularly well preserved, notably those of Jomala, seven km. (four miles) north of Mariehamn; Finström, 25 km. (16 miles) north; Hammarland, 21 km. (13 miles) northwest; Eckerö, 37 km. (23 miles) northwest; Sund, 25 km. (16 miles) northeast; and Lemland, 13 km. (eight miles) southeast. Also of interest are the scattered ruins of a big naval fortress built by the Russians in the early 19th century and only half completed when it was blasted out of existence by Anglo-French forces during the Crimean War in 1854. These are at Bomarsund, about 35 km. (22 miles) northeast of Mariehamn and, only ten km. (six miles) away, is Kastelholm Castle built by the Swedes in the 14th century, though considerably damaged. The castle is currently being completely restored, a process which will take several years though parts of it, including the museum, can be visited. Very close is the excellent open-air museum of Jan Karlsgården, a collection of farm buildings from the mid-19th century. In the vicinity is a new golf course.

In prehistoric times, the Åland isles were—relatively speaking—heavily populated, as shown by traces of no less than 10,000 settlements, graves and strongholds from antiquity, though they are mostly difficult to find. One of the largest Viking cemeteries is near the 13th century ruins of Lemböte chapel in the parish of Lemland.

PRACTICAL INFORMATION FOR THE SOUTH COAST AND ISLANDS

TOURIST INFORMATION. Hanko. Bulevardi 15 (911–82 239). **Kotka.** (City) Kirkkokatu 8 (952–11 736). (Region) Keskuskatu 13 (952–13284). **Lohja.** Laurinkatu 46 (912–201 217). **Loviisa.** Brandensteinsgatan 13 (915–52 212). **Mariehamn.** Storagatan 18 (928–16 575). **Naantali.** Tullikatu 12 (921–755 388). **Porvoo.** Rauhankatu 20 (915–170 145); in summer also in the

THE CENTRAL PROVINCES

Way of Poets and Pioneers

Romantics sometimes speak of "the land of a thousand lakes," but they don't even come close. A recent re-count puts the figure at 187,888, comprising in all nearly a tenth of the Finnish countryside. Much of the rest of the land is covered with forests. In the midst of all this, the Finns have somehow managed to find space for their cities, homes and farms. Yet though they have built well and solidly, though they have bent the land to their will, Nature is still triumphant. Indeed the magnificent and sometimes wild country Finland possesses is perhaps its most notable attraction. The constant theme of lake and island, forest and ridge may sound potentially monotonous, but the variations are infinite, and the interplay of light and color at different seasons and different times of day provides endless permutations.

Since one of the greatest attractions this nation offers the visitor is the opportunity to come really close to nature, you would be wise to allow a little time to savor the true delight of life outdoors, even if it is just to slip away from your hotel and walk in the forests which will almost certainly be on the doorstep. For the more ambitious, there are plenty of marked trails.

Exploring the Central Provinces

On the way, stop off at Riihimäki's outstanding Glass Museum. You may also want to seek out other glass centers, such as Iittala, 20 km.

(12½ miles) north of Hämeenlinna. Guided factory tours are arranged and there is a museum and shop with glass bargains.

The town of Hämeenlinna, birthplace of Jean Sibelius, boasts a castle, the oldest part of which probably dates from the crusades which Birger Jarl led into Finland in 1249. Ten km. (six miles) away on the road to Tampere is Hattula Church, built of stone about the year 1250. The few remaining old country churches in Finland are well worth visiting because of their unique interior decoration, dominated by paintings covering the walls and ceilings. Artists of those days had a firm belief in all the horrors of hell fire, and spared no pains in depicting their beliefs with the brush. Hattula Church also has some fine wood carvings. Just outside Hämeenlinna is Aulanko National Park, where there is an excellent hotel.

Even closer to Helsinki is Hyvinkää, with its forested ridges, and one of Finland's most fascinating museums for railroad buffs, the Railway Museum. Among the exhibits are the two Imperial carriages used by the Russian czar. You could combine this with Ainola, home of Sibelius, near Järvenpää.

Tampere, the Weaving Wonderland

Almost every book, pamphlet, brochure, and guide will inform you that Tampere, the country's second largest city, is Finland's Pittsburgh. However, the resemblance begins and ends with the concentrated presence here of industry—the settings are quite incomparable.

From about the year 1,000, this part of Finland was a base from which traders and hunters set out on their expeditions to northern Finland and even to Lapland. But it was not until 1779 that a Swedish king actually founded the town of Tampere. Some 41 years later a Scotsman by the name of James Finlayson came to the infant city and established a factory for spinning cotton. This was perhaps the beginning of "big business" in Finland. The firm of Finlayson exists today and is still one of the country's leading industrial enterprises.

Artful location is the secret of Tampere's many factories. An isthmus little more than a kilometer wide at its narrowest point separates the lakes Näsijärvi and Pyhäjärvi, and at one spot the Tammerkoski Rapids provide an outlet for the waters of one to cascade through to the other. Called the "Mother of Tampere", these rapids provide the power on which the town's livelihood depends. Their natural beauty has been preserved in spite of the factories on either bank, and the well-designed public buildings of the city grouped around them enhance their general effect. Also in the heart of town is Hämeensilta bridge with its four statues by the well-known sculptor Wäinö Aaltonen.

The high ridge of Pyynikki forms a natural park near the center of town, and on its top is an outlook tower commanding a view of the surrounding countryside. Not far away, the even higher, modern observation tower of Näsineula soars above the lake, forest and town, topped by a revolving restaurant. The same building houses the first planetarium in Scandinavia and a well-planned aquarium. From these towers you can fully appreciate the truly amazing contrasts between the industry humming at your feet and the quiet lakes stretching out to meet the horizon. At one moment you are in the midst of a busy city, at the next you are confronted with a seeming wilderness. At the foot of this Pyynikki Ridge is the Pyynikki Open Air Theater with its revolving

auditorium which can be moved even with a full load of spectators to face any one of the sets, ready prepared by nature.

A number of museums include a pleasantly-situated provincial museum, a good art gallery, the charming Haihara Doll Museum just outside town, and the Lenin Museum (it was in Tampere that Lenin and Stalin first met in 1905). Most of the buildings in Tampere itself, including the cathedral, are comparatively modern. The latter was completed in 1907, but it houses some of the best known masterpieces of Finnish art, including Magnus Enckell's fresco, *The Resurrection,* and two works by Hugo Simberg, *Wounded Angel* and *Garden of Death.* Another modern building is the startling Kaleva Church, which was designed by Reima and Raili Pietilä. Just outside of town, there are one or two fine 15th-century characteristic small stone churches.

The "Poets' Way" boat tour along Lake Näsijärvi, north of Tampere, passes through the agricultural parish of Ruovesi where J. L. Runeberg, Finland's national poet, used to live. At Petoniemi Mansion he collected the material for his famous *Tales of Ensign Stål.* Not far away, artist Akseli Gallen-Kallela built himself a castle-like building in Kalevalan style. Shortly before the boat docks at Virrat you pass through the straits of Visuvesi, a place where many artists and writers today spend their summers. Not far north of Virrat is Ähtäri where Finland's first wildlife park has been established in a beautiful setting, with a holiday village, a good hotel and recreation facilities.

The center of a region considered by some to be even more beautiful than the "Poets' Way," Kangasala, southeast of Tampere, was immortalized in Z. Topelius' poem, *A Summer Day at Kangasala.* (The poem has been set to music and is one of the loveliest of many haunting Finnish songs.) It lies on one of the routes of the Finnish Silver Line, through Lakes Roine and Vanajavesi to Aulanko and Hämeenlinna.

Along the way, the modern water bus passes by Valkeakoski, a town typical of the many Finnish industrial communities which are set in idyllic surroundings. Here a plant of the great United Paper Mills combine provides practically the only livelihood. Here and there across the country, sometimes in the middle of a forest, but always on a waterway, you will find similar towns. Each has a factory and an old church, and around these two poles cluster the mill employees' dwellings. The factory provides recreation grounds, clubhouses, indoor tennis courts and gymnasiums, and supplies fresh vegetables from the firm's greenhouses all through the winter. Other places of interest along the Silver Line route include the home and studio of the sculptor Emil Wikström.

Lahti, Gateway to Central Finland

Let's look now at the center of the country, starting with a short trip to the modern town of Lahti. Located at the southern end of one of Finland's largest lake systems, Vesijärvi-Päijänne, this community is now the sixth biggest town in the country, with rapidly expanding industries. Its City Hall was designed by Eliel Saarinen. But there are a number of other notable modern buildings, including the Church of the Cross by Alvar Aalto, and a fine concert hall. The town is also noted for the nearby athletic academy of Vierumäki, possessing an international reputation and an unsurpassed location.

Lahti is better known, however, for winter sports. Good enough, in fact, to have been selected for the 1958 World Ski Championships. In

general, Finland is comparatively flat, but running across the country is the very prominent Salpausselkä Ridge formed during the Glacial Age. Where this crosses the town boundaries, it has given its name to winter games which attract thousands of Finns and many foreigners every March. A little to the northeast is Heinola, another delightful lakeland area.

At the northern end of Lake Päijänne lies Jyväskylä. Known as a cultural center Jyväskylä was the first to establish a secondary school that used Finnish as the language of instruction and now has its own university by Aalto, who also designed the City Theater. This brings up an interesting point. The schools of Finland may conduct their classes in either Finnish or Swedish, both of which share equal status guaranteed by law. Whichever school a child attends, he must learn the second official language of the country in addition to any other foreign tongues, included in the syllabus. Today, English is the most popular, and in many schools, is compulsory. German or French ranks next. Like the inhabitants of all small nations, the unfortunate Finns have to spend a lot of time learning to decline and conjugate. The town has an attractive openair museum and, on the outskirts, the well–equipped sports center of Laajavuori.

Jyväskylä is also an important woodworking center for it is right in the forested heart of Finland. The whole region and Viitasaari to the north has been developed as a holiday area with delightful holiday villages in log-cabin style scattered about the vast, deeply forested and lake-strewn region. The holiday villages offer sports facilities as well—and also a good opportunity to probe deep into Finland's "off-the-beaten-track." Jyväskylä's annual Arts Festival in summer has become a major event, and the town is also important as a starting point for the boat trip down Lake Päijänne, the second largest in Finland. During the early part of the journey south to Lahti, the scenery is wildly beautiful, with forest-covered ridges and completely uninhabited rocky shores. The landscape grows milder and more serene as you travel south, and numerous villas are scattered along the banks or built on the many islands that punctuate the lake throughout its 113 km. (70 miles) length. If you're traveling between Lahti and Jyväskylä by car, the eastern route is the more beautiful and takes you through Sysmä, near which is the delightful Suvi-Pinx open-air art exhibition (summer only) in a beautiful forest setting. It has a restaurant and amusements for children.

Saimaa Lake District

Now that we have explored some of the more interesting parts of central Finland, let's move on eastwards to the region known as the Saimaa Lake system. It is in this area that many of the most beautiful places in the country are concentrated, and it is here that some of the most interesting pages of Finnish history have been written. It might be a good idea to adopt Savonlinna as your new headquarters. It is an attractive lakeside resort also noted as a watering place and is a terminus of the Saimaa lake steamers. The healing baths are to be found in the Casino Park. The latter is on one of the many islands, all linked by bridges, which, together with a cape jutting out into the lake, constitute the town of Savonlinna. Besides its location and its baths, Savonlinna's outstanding attraction is the fortress of Olavinlinna, Finland's finest medieval castle and one of the best-preserved historical monu-

ments in Scandinavia. Still surrounded by the water that formed such an essential part of its defensive strength centuries ago, it is in the eastern part of the old section of town.

A Danish-born knight built this fortress with the object of providing a bastion for the eastern frontier of the then kingdom of Sweden-Finland to assist in repulsing attacks and invasions from the east. Apart from the important role it played in the wars of those days, Olavinlinna Castle helped to protect and support the Finnish colonists who began to develop the land for several miles around. During the numerous wars of the 18th century it changed hands repeatedly, but it lost its military significance when Finland became a Grand Duchy of Russia.

In recent years the main courtyard has been the setting for operatic and theatrical performances, and an Opera Festival is held here lasting three weeks in July. From mid-June onwards there also occur other events such as the annual Operatic Course, Savonlinna Music Days and a Music Summer Seminar, so the town becomes a veritable musical mecca for a month or so each summer. Arts and crafts are also strongly featured in studios and exhibitions around town in summer, including a special Opexpo near the castle during the festival.

Of special interest, too, is the *Salama,* a steam schooner, built in 1874, shipwrecked in 1898 and raised from the lake in 1971. Very well preserved, she has been turned into a museum showing the history and development of lake traffic, including the fascinating floating timber trains which are still a common summer sight on Saimaa today.

Until recently Savonlinna was the central hub of a network of regular lake traffic leaving for and arriving from the four points of the Saimaa compass each morning and evening. Some of these regular schedules have been replaced by sightseeing cruises, but the quaysides of Savonlinna still present a lively scene with the daily to-ing and fro-ing of these venerable vessels.

A short distance from Savonlinna is the famous ridge of Punkaharju; eight km. (five miles) long, it rises between the lakes and at some points is no more than eight meters (25 feet) wide though it manages to accommodate both a road and railway. A leisure and art center has been created in this area, including the unusual Retretti art gallery with its new "cavern" section. Nearby, Punkaharju's National Hotel, originally built in 1845 as a gamekeeper's lodge by Czar Nicholas I and subsequently enlarged, has been restored as a restful oasis in which to stay or simply enjoy a meal. At Kerimäki, 23 km. (14 miles) east of Savonlinna, is the world's largest wooden church from the 1840s, holding 5,000 people. Both areas offer good water sports facilities, and well equipped camp sites and holiday villages.

You can either continue farther to the north, or start your return, still a leisurely one, towards the capital, and in most directions you can still travel by boat. Helsinki-bound, the steamer runs through the Saimaa lake system to Lappeenranta. This is a lively resort and town on the southern shores of Saimaa and, from here, trips are available on the Saimaa Canal, re-opened a few years ago. The canal crosses into the Soviet Union to Viipuri (Viborg), but for the moment this route, which leads eventually to Leningrad via the Gulf of Finland, is not open to non-Scandinavian visitors. The old fortress area of Lappeenranta is of particular interest. A half-hour drive from here is Imatra whose magnificent rapids, tamed and diverted to help power the considerable local industry, are released as a tourist attraction on certain Sundays each summer. Other possibilities from Savonlinna are to take a ship in the opposite direction northwest to Kuopio, or train or bus northeast to

Joensuu. These routes pick their way through or beside an amazingly long and immensely intricate system of lakes, canals and narrow channels, all part of the Saimaa network, Finland's (and Europe's) largest lake system.

Joensuu and Koli

Joensuu is the only town of any size in the vast area known as North Karelia. Its chief claim to distinction is a town hall which, like the one at Lahti, was designed by Eliel Saarinen. Our objective, however, is Koli on the western shore of Lake Pielinen (Pielisjärvi), nearly 64 km. (40 miles) due north of Joensuu. By boat, three times a week, the journey takes a leisurely six to seven hours, but you can also go by train to Vuonislahti, on the lake's eastern shore, and take a motorboat across to Koli. Alternatively, there is a bus service from Joensuu to Koli.

As we mentioned earlier, Finland is relatively flat; thus, in comparison with the hills found in most parts of the country, Koli is considered a mountain. This is its great appeal. From the rocky summit of Ukko-Koli more than 300 meters (1,000 feet) up, there are some of the most magnificent views to be found anywhere. There is a modern tourist hotel near the hill top and holiday villages on the lake shore. Much has been done for the visitor to Koli in the way of well-marked footpaths and tracks for the hiker and other facilities. On the Pielisjoki river the canoeing is excellent. But it is for winter sports that this region is particularly noted.

The region to the east of Joensuu is little–known to foreign visitors though of special interest as a traditional stronghold of the Orthodox church. The summer calendar features a number of Pradznik festivals, traditional Orthodox church and folk celebrations, the most important being at Ilomantsi in July.

Kuopio

From Kuopio there are almost daily monastery cruises to the Orthodox convent of Lintula and monastery of Uusi-Valamo, which removed to these remote parts from Lake Ladoga when that region of Karelia was ceded to Russia. Kuopio itself is an interesting town and excellent ski center. It has an Orthodox as well as a Lutheran Cathedral. Housed in a modern building on the outskirts of town is a museum whose collections from Orthodox Karelia must be unique in the western world. Kuopio's market place is a colorful spot. The slender tower on Puijo hill offers superb views—and a revolving restaurant. To experience those views at close quarters, take a trip to Pielavesi, birthplace of Finland's late President Urho Kekkonen. Alternatively, go southwest of Kuopio to Rautalampi, and see an Engel-designed church, c. 1844, and a monument to Finnish emigrants to Delaware.

Farther north still, you come into the wilderness landscapes of Kainuu, with Kajaani as the main (and only!) town. It has 17th-century castle ruins and a town hall designed by Engel; but the region's chief claims for attention are its scenery and amenities for outdoor activities —especially for enthusiasts of fishing or canoeing or, in winter, cross-country skiing.

FINNISH LAPLAND

Arctic Contrasts

Lapland is a twofold miracle, a product of man and nature working in close harmony. Nature fashioned a wilderness of endless forests, fells, and great silences. So often the human footstep has obliterated all that came before, but here man has walked gently and left the virgin solitude of this country almost unspoiled. Now easily accessible by plane, train or bus, this Arctic outpost offers comfortable hotels and modern amenities, yet you won't have to go very far to find yourself in an almost primordial solitude.

Exploring Finnish Lapland

The oldest traces of human habitation in Finland have been found in Lapland, and hoards of Danish, English and even Arabian coins indicate trade activities many centuries ago. The origins of the Lapps themselves are lost in the mists of history. There are only some 2,500 pure Lapps still living here; the remainder of the provinces' population of some 220,000 are Finns. Until the 1930s, Lapland was still largely unexploited, still a region where any trip was an expedition of exploration. Then the Canadian-owned Petsamo Nickel Company (now in Soviet hands) completed the great road which connects Rovaniemi with the Arctic Sea. Building activities increased along this route (later to be known as the Arctic Highway), the land was turned and sown,

and a few hotels were built to cater to the increasing numbers of visitors.

Next came World War II with the Soviet Union still the enemy. In September, 1944, in conformity with the terms of the Armistice Treaty with their foe, the Finns started to drive out the considerable number of German troops then stationed in Lapland. Methodical to the last, they retreated destroying all they could. The capital Rovaniemi was levelled; almost every farmhouse, cottage and cattle-shed was burned down or blown up.

Barely giving the ruins time to cease smoking, the Finns started back again in a few weeks to create modern communities out of the desolation. Certain areas of Lapland had to be ceded to the Soviet Union (the Arctic coastline, Petsamo, and part of the Salla district on the east frontier), but their inhabitants were settled within the new boundaries. They included some 250 Skolt Lapps, a unique Lapp tribe, who were settled at Sevettijärvi on the northern shores of Lake Inari.

Along the Arctic Highway

To get down to rather more practical details for the intending visitor, let us find a base in Lapland itself from which we can explore the country. The southernmost town of the province, Kemi, is somewhat south of the Arctic Circle on the coast of the Gulf of Bothnia. But practically on the Arctic Circle is the "Gateway to Lapland," Rovaniemi, the administrative hub and communications center of the province where the Ounas and Kemi rivers meet.

In the process of post-World War II rebuilding, Rovaniemi's population shot up from 8,000 to its present 32,000, so don't expect to arrive in a backwoods shanty town. This modern city on the edge of the wilderness comes as a surprise to most people with its excellent architecture and amenities—quite a lot of it, including the layout of the town, the work of Alvar Aalto. Note especially Lappia Hall, the concert and congress center which also houses the Lapland Provincial Museum, the world's northernmost professional theater, and the Library, both beautifully designed by Aalto.

Quite a lot of light industry has come to Rovaniemi, too, and with all the varied amenities it has to offer, it attracts visitors from all over the province on business or pleasure, for health or further education, or simply because it has the best selection of shops of anywhere on or north of the Arctic Circle. Among other places to visit here are the modern church with its impressive mural, and various museum collections devoted to the region and its different features.

Local sightseeing also includes summer trips on the Kemi river and year-round ones to Pohtimolampi (28 km./17 miles) where the Sports and Excursions Center features the world's only reindeer-driving school.

But interesting though it is, Rovaniemi is by no means typical of Lapland and to explore the province you have two main alternatives. The first is to fly or take the Arctic Highway from Rovaniemi to Ivalo, the main artery of central and northern Lapland and, like other roads in the region, an important post-bus route. Ten kms. (six miles) from Rovaniemi, on the Arctic Circle, is a restaurant and—no less—Santa Claus' village and workshops where gifts can be bought in midsummer for mailing any day you like, with Santa Claus Land stamp. You'll find some reindeer here, too, and nearby a small museum concerned with

North Polar exploration. A lot farther north at Sodankylä (where there is also a Northern Lights Observatory) is an ancient wooden church under which mysterious mummies were discovered. The nearby fells have been developed into a holiday area; and at Vuotso, further north still, you can even try your hand at goldwashing for an hour, a day or several days under expert guidance at Tankavaara, about ½ km. (¼ mile) east of the Highway; there is now an extremely well arranged Gold Museum here, with a restaurant and self-catering accommodation.

Goldwashing is also practised on remoter parts of the Ivalojoki river to the northwest where a goldwashing station, built as long ago as 1870 at Kultala, still stands. Most of the Ivalojoki passes through remote landscapes, but from just south of Ivalo township it flows alongside the Arctic Highway for a while. It's an excellent canoeing river and there are now arrangements for renting canoes to paddle down to lake Inari, returning by bus to holiday centers such as Saariselkä.

The latter lies a little north of Tankavaara and is an expanding complex in a fine setting, with a varied range of accommodations from which to embark on lone or guided trips into the true wilderness. Over 2,500 square km. (965 square miles) of this magnificent area has recently been named the Urho Kekkonen National Park after Finland's former president. Further north, the sprawling small township of Ivalo is a main center for northern Lapland with a top class hotel and all the amenities of a modern community.

The huge island-studded expanses of Lake Inari, north of Ivalo, offer endless possibilities for wilderness exploration, and the village of Inari on its southwest shore is a good center from which to radiate in almost any direction. It has a charming modern church and sightseeing cruises on the lake are arranged in summer. West of it lies the Lemmenjoki (River of Love) where there is a small holiday village from which wilderness treks or boat trips are organized, including into a remote goldwashing district where a few hardy souls are still trying their luck.

In recent years, a growing number of small holiday villages have blossomed on or near the Arctic Highway near Inari and to the north of it, usually with a small restaurant and shop attached. Amenities are simple, but the situations are often magnificent and bring you very close to the true pulse of Lapland. Usually there will be a boat at your disposal, fishing possibilities and the experience of preparing your own sauna. From Kaamanen, north of Inari, a side road leads to Sevettijärvi, home of the Skolt Lapps, and eventually into Norway.

Further north still is Utsjoki, a most straggling village on the Norwegian border. This is the country's northernmost parish in which you can travel by boat on the Teno river—famed for its salmon waters and called Finland's most beautiful river. Should you wish to take a trip into Norway, you can drive over the border at Nuorgam northeast of Utsjoki, or from Karigasniemi over the Norwegian Arctic Highway, eventually returning into Finland at Kilpisjärvi in the far northwest, though this is a very long detour. However, Utsjoki and Karigasniemi are now also linked by a minor road following the Teno river, a road which continues further south still along the border with Norway to Angell from which you can return east to Inari, so that there are now several round-trip possibilities of various lengths.

To the Three Countries Boundary

The other alternative from Rovaniemi is to head via Kittilä or Pello and the Tornio valley into western Lapland, reaching right up to the meeting point with Norway and Sweden near Kilpisjärvi. The fells are higher and the scenery more impressive on this side of Lapland, and the fell group of Pallastunturi and the villages of Enontekiö and Kilpisjärvi are particularly recommended. A superb wilderness trail, about 96 km. (60 miles) long, links Pallastunturi and Enontekiö across the fells, with unattended huts along the way in which to overnight. To the east of the fells, a relatively recent minor road passes through Raattama and a number of hamlets whose remoteness at that time protected them from war devastation so that a number of farm buildings survive from quite ancient times. Enontekiö straggles along a lake shore and from it a road leads to Kautokeino in Norway, eventually linking up with the rest of the Norwegian road network. The road from Muonio to Kilpisjärvi, paralleling the Swedish border, is known as the Way of the Four Winds (after the four points of the male Lapp headgear). Along this route, Karesuvanto is well placed for excursions into the wilderness and trips over into Sweden. From Kilpisjärvi itself, a popular excursion is to the simple granite Stone of the Three Countries, marking the boundary of Sweden, Norway and Finland. There are marvelous views for those with energy to climb Saana fell, looming over Kilpisjärvi and, to the northwest, rise more fells including the highest in Finland, Haltia at over 1,220 meters (4,000 feet).

The Wild and not-so-wild

But what are those special features that draw some people back to Lapland again and again? It is difficult to put your finger on them for they are made up of many factors as intangible as the Northern Lights that send their flickering veils of color weaving across the winter sky. If you can take the intense but dry cold, winter is a fascinating time in Lapland, not only for the Northern Lights, but for experiences such as the unique reindeer round-ups.

Depending how far north of the Arctic Circle you go, the sun doesn't rise for anything up to several weeks around mid–winter. Don't imagine it is pitch dark, though. There is reflected light from the invisible sun below the horizon during the middle hours of the day, and a luminosity drawn from the ever–present snow.

From December to March, reindeer owners round up their herds all over the Lapland map, and collect them in their thousands into huge corrals. Sometimes dressed in their colorful costumes, the Lapps and also many Finns lasso the reindeer in true Wild West fashion, recognizing their own animals by brand marks on the ear. Once sorted into individual herds, they are counted, some selected for slaughter and the rest go free again. The round-ups are also attended by many buyers, for reindeer meat is considered quite a delicacy not only for eating locally, but for "export" to the south and even abroad.

To get to some of the remoter round-ups you may have to travel by taxi plane, though other corrals are near the road, especially around Ivalo, Inari and Enontekiö. Most Lapps and northern Finns get there on skis or by one of those motorized sledges which rather sadly have almost entirely replaced the much more attractive (and silent) reindeer-

drawn *pulkka* (a kind of boat-shaped sleigh on one runner). In southern Lapland especially, an increasing number of round-ups occur in the fall. Finding out exactly when and where a round-up is taking place is not easy, for much depends on the whims of the weather and the reindeer, so you must check locally. The information offices in Rovaniemi, however, will be able to give some guidance.

A few words should be said about the Lapps—a proud, sensitive and intelligent people some of whom, with justification, resent the attitude of those visitors who regard them as a tourist attraction put there for their benefit. The word for Lapp in their language is *Same* (pronounced Saa-me) and this is how they prefer to be known. Remember this is their country and they have an ancient culture, language and customs of their own. Modern influences (and intermarriage) have rather regrettably changed many aspects of their traditional way of life; for example, the attractive costumes are less frequently seen, except on festive occasions. The young especially have been affected by the changes and many of them are far more interested in becoming teachers, lawyers or engineers than breeding reindeer or hunting from their remote homesteads. Yet others have found profit from selling souvenirs to the tourists. But most prefer to go about their daily life minding their own business. The Lady Day Church Festival in Enontekiö in March and Easter Church Festival in Inari are particularly colorful events, attended by many Lapps in their most brilliant costumes, and usually featuring reindeer racing or lassoing competitions.

Of other winter attractions such as skiing, reindeer safaris and dog sledge tours, more has been said under *Winter Sports* at the end of this section. Summer has the blessing of daylight up to 24 hours long, and often beautiful weather to go with it, but beware of the mosquitoes. In the fall—usually early September—the colors are so fabulous that the Finns have a special word for it—*ruska.*

So the new and the old intermingle in this remote northern corner of Europe. The new Lapland is a place of modern techniques in which careful management is gradually driving back the wilderness and creating cornfields beyond the Arctic Circle. The forests are being exploited and managed with expert care, and light industry and hydro-electric projects have added their mark to the Lapland map. Yet goldwashers still wash the gravel of the Lemmenjoki river, cut off from the world except for occasional visitors and the aircraft that swoop down with their mail and provisions, and the rhythm of the seasons still governs the life of all those connected with reindeer. And the experienced traveler who would like to roam through the wilds for days on end without meeting a fellow human being can still do so without any problem at all. Be warned, however, that climatic conditions change rapidly and often unpredictably, especially on those lonely Arctic fells. Always seek and heed local advice, and tell your hotel or friends where you are heading and how long you intend to be away. An attractive alternative is provided by organized canoeing or hiking trips with nights in huts or tents in the wilderness.

FINLAND

Introductory Survey

Location, Climate, Language, Religion, Flag, Capital

The Republic of Finland lies in northern Europe, bordered to the far north by Norway and to the north-west by Sweden. The USSR adjoins the whole of the eastern frontier. Finland's western and southern shores are washed by the Baltic Sea. The climate varies sharply, with warm summers and cold winters. The mean annual temperature is 5°C (41°F) in Helsinki and −0.4°C (31°F) in the far north. There are two official languages: 93.5% of the population speak Finnish and 6.3% speak Swedish. Finnish is a member of the small Finno-Ugrian group of languages, which includes Hungarian. There is a small Lapp population in the north. Almost all of the inhabitants profess Christianity, and more than 90% belong to the Evangelical Lutheran Church. The Orthodox Church has the status of a second national church, while there are small groups of Roman Catholics, Methodists, Jews and other religious sects. The national flag (proportions 18 by 11) displays an azure blue cross (the upright to the left of centre) on a white background. The state flag has, at the centre of the cross, the national coat of arms (a yellow-edged red shield containing a golden lion and nine white roses). The capital is Helsinki.

Recent History

Finland was formerly an autonomous part of the Russian Empire. During the Russian revolution of 1917 the territory proclaimed its independence. Following a brief civil war, a democratic constitution was adopted in 1919. The Soviet regime which came to power in Russia attempted to regain control of Finland but acknowledged the country's independence in 1920.

Demands by the USSR for military bases in Finland and for the cession of part of the Karelian isthmus, in south-eastern Finland, were rejected by the Finnish Government in November 1939. As a result, the USSR attacked Finland, and the two countries fought the 'Winter War', a fiercely contested conflict lasting 15 weeks, before Finnish forces were defeated. Following its surrender, Finland ceded an area of 41,880 sq km (16,170 sq miles) to the USSR in March 1940. In the hope of recovering the lost territory, Finland joined Nazi Germany in attacking the USSR in 1941. However, a separate armistice between Finland and the USSR was concluded in 1944.

In accordance with a peace treaty signed in February 1947, Finland agreed to the transfer of about 12% of its pre-war territory (including the Karelian isthmus and the Petsamo area on the Arctic coast) to the USSR, and to the payment of reparations which totalled about US $570m. when completed in 1952. Meanwhile, in April 1948, Finland and the USSR signed the Finno-Soviet Pact of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (the YYA treaty), which was extended for periods of 20 years in 1955, 1970 and again in 1983. A major requirement of the treaty is that Finland repel any attack made on the USSR by the Federal Republic of Germany, or its allies, through Finnish territory. Finnish policy, however, is one of neutrality in foreign affairs. Finland's trade agreement with the European Communities, signed in October 1973, was followed by the signing of a 15-year trade agreement with the USSR in May 1977. Finland joined the United Nations and the Nordic Council in 1955, became an associate member of EFTA in 1961 and a full member in 1985.

Since becoming independent in 1917, Finland has had more than 60 governments, including numerous minority coalitions. Political instability has been characterized by a succession of caretaker governments and premature elections.

Disputes over economic policy caused the dissolution of the Government of National Emergency, a five-party coalition led by Martti Miettunen (Centre Party), in September 1976, after 10 months in office. Miettunen then reluctantly agreed to lead a new three-party minority coalition, excluding the Social Democrats and Communists, to implement measures intended to overcome the country's economic crisis. At the President's request for a majority government, this coalition resigned in May 1977; a new five-party government was formed by Kalevi Sorsa, leader of the Social Democratic Party and a former Prime Minister. Sorsa embarked on a plan to stimulate domestic demand by assisting private business through tax relief, and thereby to combat Finland's growing unemployment.

In February 1978, when the Finnish markka was devalued for the third time within a year, disagreements within the Council of State over the extent of the devaluation led to the resignation of the Government. The majority coalition was re-formed under Sorsa in March, but did not include the Swedish People's Party. In the face of dissent from trade unions over the effects of the devaluation, and the possibility of a general strike, the new four-party coalition implemented a 1.5% pay rise which had been due in January 1979, and slightly relaxed the stringent financial policy. Although the Conservative opposition gained significant support at a general election in March 1979, a new centre-left coalition government was formed in May by Dr Mauno Koivisto, a Social Democratic economist, ex-Premier and former Governor of the Bank of Finland. This four-party Government, comprising the Centre Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Swedish People's Party and the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), continued to pursue deflationary economic policies, although crises arose within the Council of State in 1981 because of disagreements over social welfare policy and budgetary matters.

In October 1981 the 81-year-old President, Dr Urho Kekkonen, who had held office since 1956, resigned, and in January 1982 Dr Koivisto was elected President. By the time of his resignation, Dr Kekkonen had established significant presidential influence over foreign affairs, particularly concerning the maintenance of stable relations between Finland and the USSR. He died in August 1986. The new President Koivisto was succeeded as head of the coalition by former Prime Minister Sorsa, who reshuffled the Council of State in January and again in July. In October a crisis arose when three ministers belonging to the SKDL refused to support austerity measures which had been adopted to counteract the effects on the Finnish economy of a Swedish currency devaluation. A further refusal by SKDL ministers to support an increase in defence spending led to the re-formation of the coalition on 30 December, without the SKDL, until the general election of March 1983.

At this election the Social Democrats won 57 of the 200 seats in Parliament (compared with 52 in the 1979 election), while the opposition National Coalition Party lost three seats. In May Sorsa formed another centre-left coalition, comprising the Social Democrats, the Swedish People's Party, the Centre Party (which had merged with the Liberal Party in 1982) and the Rural Party: the coalition parties had a total of 122 parliamentary seats. The aims of the new Government, which retained office throughout 1984 and 1985 without any major disruption, were to reduce inflation and unemployment, to curb the rise in gross taxation, to limit state borrowing, and to expand trade with Western countries. In May 1985 the coalition was threatened when the Government announced that it would resign if an anti-nuclear parliamentary motion, introduced by the Rural Party and the Swedish People's Party, was not withdrawn. The motion, which demanded the dismantling of Finland's four nuclear reactors, was subsequently withdrawn by both parties. The Government also survived a motion of 'no confidence', proposed by the Conservative opposition, for its alleged failure to provide accurate information following the accident in April 1986 at the Chernobyl nuclear power station in the USSR, which resulted in radio-active fall-out over Finland.

In 1985 relations between Finland and the USSR were threatened when the Communist Party of Finland (SKP) expelled several groups of pro-Soviet dissidents. Nevertheless,

in April 1985 the Centre Party had announced its support for President Koivisto in his efforts to develop better relations with Moscow. In April 1986 the pro-Soviet groups that had been expelled from the SKP announced the formation of a separate electoral organization, called the Democratic Alternative, and elected a separate central committee of the Committee of SKP Organizations. Further expulsions were made in June, by both the SKP and the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL), of pro-Soviet groups and deputies. The Democratic Alternative was officially registered as a political party in July, when it formally severed its links with SKP.

Government

Finland has a republican constitution which combines a parliamentary system with a strong presidency. The unicameral Parliament (Eduskunta) has 200 members, elected by universal adult suffrage for four years (subject to dissolution by the President) on the basis of proportional representation. The President, entrusted with supreme executive power, is elected for six years by a college of 301 electors, chosen by popular vote in the same manner as members of Parliament. Legislative power is exercised by Parliament in conjunction with the President. For general administration, the President appoints a Council of State (Cabinet), which is headed by a Prime Minister and is responsible to Parliament. Finland has 12 provinces, each administered by an appointed Governor.

Defence

The armed forces of Finland are restricted by treaty to 41,900, and in July 1986 numbered 34,900 (of whom 25,000 were conscripts serving up to 11 months), comprising an army of 30,000, an air force of 2,900 and a navy of 2,000. There were also about 700,000 reserves and 4,400 frontier guards. Estimated defence expenditure in 1986 was 5,146m. markkaa.

Economic Affairs

Apart from extensive forests and large reserves of copper ore, Finland has few natural resources. The country also has a harsh climate (no port is ice-free throughout the year) and a rugged terrain. Nevertheless, the people of Finland enjoy a high standard of living and the benefits of a modern welfare state. In 1984, according to estimates by the World Bank, Finland's gross national product (GNP) per head, measured at average 1982–84 prices, was US $10,770, having increased at an average rate of 3.3% per year, in real terms, since 1965.

Forests cover 65% of Finland's land area, and forestry products (mainly wood, pulp and paper) provided over 36% of export earnings in 1985. Increased competition from the USA and Sweden, in particular, and a shortage of timber for industrial use reduced Finland's share of the world market in forestry products from 25% in the 1960s to only 9% in 1983. Between 1983 and 1985, the annual capacity of Finnish sawmills declined by 2m. cu m, as the result of a decrease in exports, owing to reduced international demand for some forest products. This affected both the pulp and the paper industries, where export prices fell sharply during the second half of 1985 and the volume of exports declined. At the end of the logging year 1984/85 a 20% increase in felling was recorded, but during the year 1985/86 felling of marketable timber declined by 14%, employment in the sector was reduced by around 20% and 21 large sawmills stopped production. However, export prices recovered and the volume of exports increased during the first half of 1986.

The metal and engineering sector (particularly ship-building and the manufacture of machinery for the paper industry) accounted for 35% of total exports in 1984. During 1985, however, a sharp fall in the export of ships, particularly to the USSR, caused a decline in the growth of exports in the sector. The capacity for expansion in Finland's industry is limited by a lack of skilled labour and by the need to import some raw materials and energy. Apart from hydroelectric power and peat, there are no indigenous forms of energy, and all of Finland's gas, coal and petroleum requirements must be imported. Energy accounted for around 24% of total imports in 1985. Finland annually imports about 4,000m. kWh of electricity and 85% of its crude petroleum from the USSR. A 400-km natural gas pipeline linking Finland and the USSR was extended westwards from Kouvola to Tampere and Helsinki during 1985 and 1986, and was officially put into service in November 1986. It was expected that 1,200 m. cu m of gas would be imported from the USSR by the end of 1986.

In 1985 41% of electricity was generated by nuclear power, and four nuclear power stations were in operation. In May 1986 the Government announced that the construction of a proposed fifth power station was to be postponed indefinitely, reflecting the widespread negative attitude to nuclear power, following the accident at the USSR's nuclear power station at Chernobyl in April. Plans were being discussed during 1986 for an increase in imports of coal, to be used for electricity generation. Construction work was due to begin in 1987 on a peat-fired power station at Haapavesi in Oulu Province. It was expected to be in operation by 1990. Two coal-fired power stations were also to be built.

Cereal and dairy farming are highly mechanized. State subsidies are provided to encourage exports, and by late 1985 the country had a grain surplus of 800,000 metric tons, despite a system of levies and taxes, aimed at curbing over-production. The export of grain was begun in 1986.

A trade agreement between Finland and the EEC countries came into effect in 1974, leading to the abolition of tariffs on most goods by 1977. Finland has also participated in a trade agreement with the CMEA since 1973, and in 1985 CMEA countries took about 23% of Finnish exports and provided 24% of imports. In 1985 EEC member-states together provided 37% of Finnish imports and took 36% of exports; EFTA countries accounted for 18% of imports and 20% of exports. The abolition of all trade restrictions on industrial goods between the EEC and EFTA, with effect from 1 January 1984, was expected to increase Finland's trade with western Europe. The USSR accounted for 26% of both imports and exports in 1983, and in September 1984 a new five-year trade agreement was signed, envisaging an expansion of 12% in trade between the two countries.

Despite being sheltered, to some extent, from the effects of world recessions by its bilateral trade agreement with the USSR, the Finnish economy was adversely affected by cyclic recessions which occurred following the sharp rises in world petroleum prices in 1974 and 1979. Economic policies, aimed at stimulating domestic demand when export markets weakened, enabled Finland to sustain a relatively high rate of growth between 1977 and 1982. During this period GDP increased, in real terms, by an average annual rate of 4.0%, although depressed markets and high energy costs limited growth to 1.8% in 1981. The average annual growth rate between 1982 and 1985 was 3%.

A revival in world trade in the mid-1980s led to a marked expansion in exports, particularly to Western countries. In 1984 exports to the USSR fell by 13%, while those to Western markets increased by 27%. Exports totalled 80,904m. markkaa in 1984, compared with under 70,000m. markkaa in the previous year, while the value of imports increased by 4.4%, giving an overall trade surplus of 6,200m. markkaa. Finnish exports to Western markets decreased by 2% during 1985, owing mainly to a decline in demand for forest products towards the end of the year and a fall in the US dollar in relation to the markka, which reduced the competitiveness of Finnish industries. Although the annual growth in GDP was estimated at 4% during the first half of 1985, it subsequently fell to 2%. However, exports to CMEA countries increased in value by 16%, and the volume of total exports rose by 1%. Despite an increase in imports, an overall trade surplus of 2,616m. markkaa was achieved.

A sharp fall in the price of petroleum in December 1985 caused a disruption in trade with the USSR during the first half of 1986. Negotiations took place between the two countries to adjust the terms of the bilateral trade pact for 1986–90 in order to offset the reduced value of Finnish oil imports and to reduce the widening surplus in the trade account. Contracts were concluded in June for increased imports of coal, electricity and chemical raw materials. However, the reduction in imports between January and July, from 9,786m. markkaa to 6,515m., led to a reduction in exports to the USSR, with the metal, engineering, textile, clothing and footwear industries being particularly badly affected. Tax reforms relating to energy were announced in June, in an effort to reduce costs for export industries by shifting from excise-based taxation to a value-added sales tax. Major strikes during March, April and May

disrupted economic activity, and, although some recovery was expected during the second half of the year, GDP growth was not expected to be above 2%.

Despite the rapid economic growth that occurred in the late 1970s, unemployment rose considerably in 1977, and reached a peak of nearly 9% of the labour force in the first quarter of 1978. The level of unemployment was gradually reduced, and stood at 5% in the latter half of 1981. In 1983 and 1984 the Government made financial allocations to stimulate employment, and temporarily lowered employers' social security contributions. There was also a reduction in working hours. However, by 1984 the average rate of unemployment stood at 6.2%. In 1985 a works and employment programme costing an estimated 7,100m. markkaa was approved, with employment projects being focused particularly on areas of high unemployment, such as northern Finland. Total employment rose by 1% but labour supply also increased and the unemployment rate rose slightly, to 6.3%. Unemployment at the end of July 1986 stood at 6.7%.

In March 1986 a 58-hour strike was staged by 250,000 members of the Central Organization of Finnish Trade Unions (SAK), to support demands for pay increases and the introduction of a 35-hour working week. A two-year wage settlement was reached, whereby average wages would rise by 2.4% in 1986 and by 2.6% in 1987. The average working week was to be reduced from 40 to 37½ hours by 1990. A 45-day strike by state employees during April and May affected air and rail transport and communication services. The Union of State Employees had been demanding pay increases of 20% and eventually accepted a settlement providing basic increases of 20%, spread over two years.

Since 1976 the central bank has followed an unyieldingly tight credit policy, aimed at checking escalation in foreign debt. Devaluations of the markka in 1977 and 1978 led to a trade surplus of 2,800m. markkaa in 1978, and a brief revival followed, causing the markka to be revalued by 3% in 1979. By 1981, however, deteriorating terms of international trade had exacerbated rising inflation, which reached 11.8%. By late 1982 deflationary measures (including a two-year national wage agreement implemented in 1980, reductions in planned public spending, and regulated prices) had reduced inflation to 9.25%. The expiry of the wage agreement in February 1983, however, slowed the rate of decrease, and inflation stood at 8.5% by the end of the year. The markka was devalued twice in October, by 4.3% and again by 6%, in response to a 16% devaluation of the Swedish krona. The result was an increase of 5% in Finland's export competitiveness, but the markka value of Finland's international debt was also increased, reaching 53,220m. markkaa by the end of 1984 and 53,500m. markkaa by the end of 1985 (equivalent to 18% of annual GDP). The Government's policy of borrowing to sustain economic growth had also increased the state's share of the foreign debt from 15% in 1977 to about 44% in 1983. In 1984 a further national wage agreement was introduced, and government expenditure rose by only 2.5% in comparison with the 1983 figure. As a result, inflation declined from an annual average of 8.4% in 1983 to 7.1% in 1984, and continued to fall, reaching 5.9% in 1985. In the year ending September 1986 it fell even further, to 3.3%.

In May 1986 intense speculation against the markka in foreign exchange markets, as a result of industrial strikes and the devaluation of the Norwegian krone, led to a devaluation of the currency by about 2%. Finland's reserves of foreign exchange totalled 22,650m. markkaa in December 1985, but they fell during 1986 to below 11,000m. markkaa by mid-August, with the net outflow especially high during the first week of August. In an effort to stabilize the reserves, the annual rate of interest payable on 'call money' was temporarily raised to 40%. The interest rate was subsequently lowered in September, and a series of measures was announced, aimed at stimulating the development of the money market.

The budget for 1987 envisaged a rise in government spending of 8%, with total expenditure projected to reach 109,500m. markkaa. The annual rate of inflation was expected to fall to around 2.5%.

Social Welfare

Social policy covers social security (national pensions, disability insurance, sickness insurance), social assistance (maternity, child, housing, education and other allowances and accident compensation) and social welfare (care of children, the aged, disabled and maladjusted, including residential services). Sickness insurance covers a considerable part of the costs of medical care outside hospital, while the general hospitals charge moderate fees. The National Health Act of 1972 provided for the establishment of health centres in every municipality, and the abolition of doctors' fees. In 1984 Finland had 61,103 hospital beds. In the same year there were 9,979 physicians working in the country.

Education

Compulsory education, introduced in 1921, lasts for nine years between seven and 16 years of age. By the 1977/78 school year, the whole country had transferred to a new comprehensive education system. Tuition is free and instruction is the same for all students. The compulsory course comprises six years at primary school, beginning at the age of seven, followed by three years at secondary school, beginning at the age of 13. After completing compulsory education, the pupil may transfer to an upper secondary school or other vocational school or institute for a further three years. In 1982 the total enrolment at all primary and secondary schools was equivalent to 98% of the school-age population. After three years in upper secondary school, a student takes a matriculation examination. Students who pass this examination are entitled to seek admission at one of the 22 universities and colleges of further education.

Tourism

Vast forests, Europe's largest inland water system, magnificent unspoilt scenery and the possibility of holiday seclusion are the chief attractions for the visitor to Finland. The winter sports season is long. The number of tourists visiting Finland has increased substantially since the early 1970s, with most visitors coming from other Scandinavian countries, the Federal Republic of Germany and the USSR. Tourist receipts totalled 2,845m. markkaa in 1983.

Public Holidays

1987: 1 January (New Year's Day), 10 January (for Epiphany), 17 April (Good Friday), 20 April (Easter Monday), 1 May (May Day), 23 May (for Ascension Day), 6–7 June (Whitsun), 20 June (Midsummer Day, Flag Day), 31 October (for All Saints' Day), 6 December (Independence Day), 25–26 December (Christmas).

1988*: 1 January (New Year's Day), 8 January (for Epiphany), 1 April (Good Friday), 4 April (Easter Monday), 2 May (for May Day), 12 May (Ascension Day), 21–22 May (Whitsun), 19 June (Midsummer Day, Flag Day), 1 November (All Saint's Day), 6 December (Independence Day), 25–26 December (Christmas).

* Public holidays for 1988 may be subject to alteration.

Weights and Measures

The metric system is in force.

Currency and Exchange Rates

100 penniä=1 markka (Finnmark).

Exchange Rates (30 September 1986):
£1 sterling=7.0945 markkaa;
US $1=4.907 markkaa.

The Europa Year Book 1987

A WORLD SURVEY

VOLUME I

PART ONE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

PART TWO AFGHANISTAN–JORDAN

EUROPA PUBLICATIONS LIMITED

blisters! Arms around shoulders, lightly-clad
friends, giggling late at night
on the gravel under the chestnut trees
It takes time to learn something.
In the wind a vapor of lakes and waterweed
What you saw today no one has seen
and you will remember, or forget.
But the impact remains.

When the Streets Change their Colors

by Jarkko Laine

translated from the Finnish by Herbert Lomas

When the streets change their colors,
whatever the season,
I'll remember you
in this city,
where shadows turn aside from shadows.

I know all this is ending,
I'm packing my bag,
I'm ready again,

I'll be back when the trains are ready to go,
and the clock's still asleep,

I'll knock softly on your door
in this city
where sounds are shocked by sounds.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twelfth.

Ronald Reagan

[*Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 8:54 a.m., September 21, 1987*]

Note: *The proclamation was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on September 18.*

National Year of Friendship with Finland, 1988

Proclamation 5704. September 17, 1987

By the President of the United States of America

A Proclamation

Finnish settlers first arrived in this country in 1638, when Nordics, many of them natives of Finland or Swedes who spoke Finnish, established the colony of New Sweden in present-day Delaware. They introduced European civilization to the Delaware River Valley and began the transformation of a vast wilderness. Theirs were the pioneer spirit and virtues that are the foundation of our national character. The 350th anniversary of their landing is a most fitting time to celebrate the legacy of America's Finnish pioneers and their descendants and to recall that the friendship of the United States and Finland has deep historical roots.

To commemorate the relationship between the peoples of Finland and the United States on the 350th anniversary of New Sweden, the Congress, by Public Law 99–602, has designated 1988 as "National Year of Friendship with Finland," and has authorized and requested the President to issue a proclamation in its observance.

Now, Therefore, I, Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim 1988 as National Year of Friendship with Finland. I call upon all Americans to observe the year with appropriate ceremonies and activities.

In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand this seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and twelfth.

Ronald Reagan

[*Filed with the Office of the Federal Register, 8:55 a.m., September 21, 1987*]

Note: *The proclamation was released by the Office of the Press Secretary on September 18.*

Soviet Union-United States Diplomatic Talks

Joint Statement. September 18, 1987

Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze have completed three days of thorough and useful discussions on all aspects of the relationship between the two countries.

The Secretary and the Foreign Minister reviewed the full spectrum of questions regarding nuclear, conventional and chemical weapons arms control. In particular, the two ministers, together with their advisers, conducted intensive negotiations on the question of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. This resulted in agreement in principle to conclude a treaty. The Geneva delegations of both sides have been instructed to work intensively to resolve remaining technical issues and promptly to complete a draft treaty text. The Secretary and the Foreign Minister agreed that a similarly intensive effort should be made to achieve a treaty on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms within the framework of the Geneva Nuclear and Space Talks.

Having discussed questions related to nuclear testing, the two sides agreed to begin, before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. They approved a separate statement on this subject.

40

(Dolan edit)
February 19, 1988
6:30 p.m.

PRESIDENTIAL TAPING: 350TH ANNIVERSARY OF FIRST FINNISH SETTLEMENT IN U.S.
MONDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1988

My friends, it gives me great pleasure to greet you as we celebrate the ~~National~~ Year of Friendship ~~between~~ with Finland and the United States of America. This year marks the 350th anniversary of the arrival of the first Finns in the New World with the founding of the Delaware colony.

The ties between our two peoples span three and a half centuries. In 1638, Finnish settlers helped to establish the New Sweden Colony in the Delaware River Valley. They introduced European civilization to what had been a vast wilderness. Their spirit and the "sisu" [SEE-sue; translation: "guts"] of these pioneers are part of the very foundation of our own national character. We owe a great deal to these early Finnish settlers. But the Finnish contribution to America by no means ended with this colony. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of Finnish immigrants came to the United States. And Finnish-Americans today continue to make important contributions to our national life and culture.

Although few traces of that Delaware colony remain, its legacy lives on. The heritage of Western civilization that those first settlers brought to the New World is one we still share today.

Finns and Americans share common goals, aspirations, and values. We believe in a peaceful world, in individual freedom, in respect for human rights and for the rule of law. As Western

nations, we share a culture as well as a democratic tradition. We are good friends and close partners.

Finland is highly regarded in my country. Finland is famous for the talents of its artists, its designers, its sportsmen; for the style and the quality of its products; and for the natural wonder of its landscape of lakes and forests.

We Americans admire Finns for the courage, hardiness, and steadfastness you have shown throughout your history. We know that these qualities remain just as strong today as ever. We support and respect Finland's independence and your policy of neutrality. And you can be proud that Finland plays a positive and constructive role in the world.

I am glad to have had this opportunity to speak to you on this important occasion. Let me conclude, if I may, by saying "Onneksi Olkoon" [ON-nex-see OL-cone; translation: congratulations] to those of you gathered in Finlandia Hall and to all citizens of Finland. God bless you.

Landscapes loom large in Finnish life and art. Before painting Kaukola Ridge at Sunset *(1889), Albert Edelfelt wrote in a letter to his mother: "I must see wilder terrain... summer light, and real Finnish Finns. Tar boats, wilderness* [*and*] *rapids... are beginning to take hold of me."*

Finland

Finland, as Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson observed, emerges "only occasionally and for brief moments above the horizon of international news media." Yet Finland, with no more people (4.9 million) than the state of Wisconsin, maintains a unique position on the world scene: a prosperous Western democracy living next door to the Soviet Union. To Americans, says Jakobson, this looks like an Indian rope trick: "a clever thing to do, but not quite believable." Here, Keith W. Olson surveys the Finns' turbulent history as innocent bystanders repeatedly caught between the great powers. Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen explains how, after the ordeals of World War II, the Soviets and the Finns finally learned, more or less, to get along.

BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

by Keith W. Olson

In the early morning of November 30, 1939, the roar of Soviet bombers startled the rural folk living among the birch forests and fields of eastern Finland. From the Karelian Isthmus in the south to Petsamo in the north, 600,000 Soviet troops pushed across the 800-mile border. Joseph Stalin's advisers believed that Finland would fall in just 12 days. But they failed to reckon with the deep snows, the minus-40-degree temperatures, and the determination of 300,000 Finnish troops fighting for their country's survival.

Though ill-equipped and outnumbered, the hastily mobilized Finns defended themselves brilliantly. Sheltered in 20-man dugouts beneath the snow, the *sotilaat* held fast to the Mannerheim Line, an 88-mile fortified strip that ran across the Karelian Isthmus from the Gulf of Finland to Lake Ladoga. Soviet armored columns fell prey to Finland's "invisible wall"—white-clad, forest-wise ski troops, armed with submachine guns, backed up by artillery. Moving through forests of birch and spruce, the Finns repeatedly caught the Soviets by surprise. Small towns and villages such as Summa, Kolla, Tolvajärvi,

and Suomussalmi would become, as a Finnish colonel later recalled, "Finland's small Stalingrads."

Stalin's 46 divisions eventually wore down the Finns. For a time, Great Britain and France, already at war with Hitler's Germany, contemplated sending 100,000 troops as a rescue force to Finland via Norway and Sweden; wanting to remain neutral, both Oslo and Stockholm refused to allow the Allied forces to cross.* The Russians finally captured Viipuri, Finland's second largest city, on March 5, 1940. By the time President Kyösti Kallio sued for peace, some 25,000 Finns had perished, and 450,000 had been driven from their homes. From the front, *Life*'s Carl Mydans reported: "The symbol of Finland has become the blackened stalk of a chimney standing without its house."

Sod and Birchbark

As a result of peace negotiations in Moscow, the Soviets pushed Finland's eastern border 70 miles westward, to 90 miles from Leningrad. They also won key ports on the Gulf of Finland, such as Uuraa and Koivisto, and the valuable sawmills of Karelia. But few Russians rejoiced over the victory. Nikita Khrushchev exaggerated the numbers—but not the enormity of the suffering—when he wrote, in his memoirs, that the Winter War had cost the Soviets one million men. Said one Russian general at the time, "We have won enough ground to bury our dead."

Finland had lost the war, but gained the respect of the world. On January 20, 1940, five months before he became prime minister of his own embattled country, Britain's first sea lord, Winston S. Churchill, observed, "Finland alone—in danger of death, superb, sublime Finland—shows what free men can do."

Churchill may have been impressed—but could not have been surprised—by Finland's determination. Nestled between the Gulf of Bothnia and the Gulf of Finland on the Baltic Sea, Finland had always offered what the Russians wanted: a military buffer against the West, and an opening to the Baltic. Thanks to this geography, the two neighbors had fought over the same territory many times. In victory or in defeat, the Finns had always stood their ground with tenacity; somehow they had managed to hang on to their language, their culture, their distinctive identity.

*The Finnish resistance won popular admiration in the West; in New York City, all but one of Broadway's playwrights pledged one night's box-office receipts to Finnish war relief. The holdout was Lillian (*The Little Foxes*) Hellman, who, like some other American leftists, sided with Moscow.

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The Swedish legacy: A statue of Sweden's Count Per Brahe (1602–80) stands before the medieval cathedral at Turku (Åbo in Swedish). Brahe, twice Finland's governor-general, founded the University of Åbo in 1640.

Finland's chronicle begins relatively late in the history of the West. The Finns' forebears first started to migrate into Finland from the south shore of the Gulf of Finland—today's Estonia—around 2,000 years ago. They settled in three different groups: the Suomalaiset* along the southwestern coast; the Hämelaiset in the western lake district; and the Karjalaiset, or Karelians, along the western shore of Lake Ladoga. As the new settlements grew, the indigenous Lapps migrated northward, above the Arctic Circle.

During the short summers and long winters, the typical *talonpoika*, or pioneer-farmer, eked out a meager subsistence. To clear the wooded terrain, he felled trees in the autumn, and burned them the following spring. A birchbark roof, weighted with sod for insulation, covered his one-room log cabin. The small plots he tilled produced barley, oats, and rye. He raised a few horses, cattle, sheep, pigs, and goats. During the spring and autumn, the *talonpoika* ventured into the woods to hunt and fish. He trapped lynx, marten, and fox, and sold or bartered their furs along the coast. Small Finnish trading vessels, hugging the jagged coastline, carried the goods to

*Finns today call themselves Suomalaiset and their country Suomi after this region.

Tallinn, Gdansk, and other ports along the Baltic coast.

Since the 12th century, Finland has stood between East and West. Legend has it that King Erik and Bishop Henry of Uppsala led the first major Christian crusade to Finland around 1155. (Henry, later martyred by an ax-wielding peasant named Lalli, became the Church of Finland's patron saint.) Church officials in Rome made the first written reference to Finland in 1172, while compiling a list of Swedish provinces. But Finland did not yet belong to the Swedish crown; it was still missionary territory, beyond Stockholm's reach. In 1216, Pope Innocent III authorized the Swedish king to bring Finland within his realm. The bishops of Turku ruled Finland as an autonomous ecclesiastical state and dispatched missionaries to spread Christianity across the peninsula. By 1540, the Church of Finland watched over more than 100 churches, adorned with statues of their saints—Olav, Lawrence, Anna, and Martin of Tours.

Sweden's *Österland*

Western Christianity, however, did not go unchallenged. In 1227, missionaries under Novgorod's Duke Jaroslav ventured westward, forcing the Karelians to be baptized into the Eastern Church. Russian and Swedish forces clashed for decades before the two sides negotiated, for the first time, Sweden's (and Finland's) eastern border. The Treaty of Nöteborg (1323) delineated not only Swedish and Russian spheres of influence but also the boundaries of western and eastern Christianity, of Rome and Constantinople.

For the next 500 years, Finland would be Sweden's *österland*, her eastern territory. The arrangement was benign. Finns enjoyed all the privileges of Swedish citizens, including the right to help elect the Swedish king and to be represented in the Riksdag, the Swedish parliament. Finns joined the Swedes in their repeated military expeditions on the Continent; some 25 percent of all Swedish troops were Finns, who became known, like the Scots and the Swiss, for their qualities as warriors. Prayed the trembling Catholic followers of the Hapsburgs in the 17th century: "From the horrible Finns, dear Lord, deliver us."

Thus, for a half-millennium, the fates of Sweden and Finland were bound together. Swedish kings, by design or accident, shaped Finland's future. One of them, Gustav I Vasa, acceded to the throne in 1523. Vasa tried to govern Sweden-Finland as his private estate. He broke relations with Rome in 1524, transferred church lands to the crown, abolished the Mass, and banned the use of Latin in church services. Vasa even decreed that each church give the crown one of its bells—which, of course, could be bought back by the congregation at a suitable price.

Inadvertently, Vasa's eccentricities made Sweden-Finland fertile



Nearly the size of California, Finland (130,119 square miles) is Europe's fifth largest country. Only 200,000 Finns live above the Arctic Circle, where, in winter, the sun does not appear at all for seven straight weeks.

ground for the spread of another faith—Lutheranism. Foremost among the many Swedes and Finns who had fallen under Martin Luther's teachings at Wittenberg was Mikael Agricola, the bishop of Turku. By translating various religious writings into the vernacular—including the New Testament—Agricola brought the gospel of Christ to the common man. A well-known jingle testified to the popularity of Agricola's ABC primer and his *rukouskirja*, or Book of Prayers: *Kun ABCkirja ensin on / Siitä alku opista uskon* (When the ABC book came into being / The people began to learn the faith).

Despite the efforts of Vasa and his grandson, Gustavus II Adolphus (1594–1632), to give Sweden a centralized regime, Swedish kings allowed Finnish culture to flourish. Clergymen delivered their sermons in Finnish. Courts normally permitted the use of Finnish in oral proceedings. The Swedish army included separate Finnish-speaking regiments. A Finnish Diet, established in 1617, helped the King govern the Finnish-speaking provinces.

All in all, the link to Sweden proved extraordinarily fortunate for Finland. From the Swedes, Finns acquired a preference for democratic and constitutional government, for humanistic values, and for free speech and religion. In large part, this legacy explains why Finns identify with the West rather than the East today. "The Finlander," wrote the ethnologist James Latham in 1856, was "united with the Swede rather than subjected to him . . . his civilization is that of western Europe rather than eastern Europe."

'The Great Wrath'

Finland might well have remained attached to the Swedish crown. But time and again, geography would cast Finland in the role of Europe's innocent bystander, brought willy-nilly into political and military contests by the Continent's great powers.

Between 1700 and 1721, Peter the Great fought and defeated Sweden's King Charles XII in the Great Northern War. Peter sought, as he put it, "a cushion" upon which his newly established imperial capital, St. Petersburg (now Leningrad), "might be secure." As Sweden's eastern frontier, Finland suffered the most during the war. Nearly one-quarter of Finland's 400,000 inhabitants perished in the last eight years of fighting, later known as "The Great Wrath." Helsinki, Lappeenranta, Porvoo, and Pietarsaari were burnt to the ground. During the conflict, one Swedish official observed, "All the thrusts received by Sweden from her worst enemy have gone right through Finland's heart."

In the 19th century, Finland again became entangled in the great power maneuverings on the Continent. The peace that Napoleon and Tsar Alexander I made on a raft in the middle of the Niemen River at Tilsit also brought war to faraway Finland. Under the Treaty

of Tilsit (1807), Russia was obliged to bring her nominal ally Sweden into Napoleon's naval blockade against England. But Sweden's King Gustavus IV Adolphus refused to go along, forcing the tsar to declare war on Sweden.

On February 21, 1808, Russian troops struck across the Karelian Isthmus. With his troops underequipped and outnumbered, the Finnish commander-in-chief, W. M. Klingspor, ordered his men to retreat. Poet Johan Ludvig Runeberg immortalized the heartwrenching march northward through the snow:

> He scans the frozen contour of Siikajoki's plain,
> As desolate as a corpse before interment,
> But sadder is the thought of the army in his train,
> That fled from Russian war-cries of triumph and disdain.

After 13 months of resistance, the Swedes sued for peace. Under the terms of the armistice, Gustavus surrendered his Finnish territories to the tsar. As soon as the fighting ended, Alexander I convened the Finnish Diet at the village of Porvoo, 30 miles east of Helsinki. There, on March 25, 1809, the Diet pledged loyalty to the tsar, the "Grand Duke of Finland." In turn, Alexander accepted Finland into his empire as a self-governing constitutional state. Thus, 19th-century Finns would fare better than their Polish counterparts, who suffered under both Russian and Prussian oppression. On April 4, 1809, Alexander promised "to confirm and secure to them the maintenance of their religion and fundamental laws." The Diet managed to do what Finns had done before and would do again: preserve Finland's culture and identity in the aftermath of defeat.

Fennomania

In retrospect, Finns might well have greeted Russia's victory with a sigh of relief. It was ironic that as a satrapy of Imperial Russia, Finland's traditional nemesis, the country would enjoy its longest period of uninterrupted peace. Passports read: "Finnish Citizen, Russian Subject." Although the tsar's personal representative, the governor-general, sat in Helsinki, Finns would experience little interference from St. Petersburg. Russian military conscription stopped at the border (though many Finns volunteered for the Imperial Army). As one governor-general, F. L. Heiden, remarked, it would be futile to force Finnish youth, "accustomed to eating salted herring, to eat buckwheat porridge."

Indeed, many Finns did not like the "taste" of Russian nationality, the tsar's restrained attitude notwithstanding. Finnish journalist and nationalist Adolf Iwar Arwidsson complained of feeling like a "squatter in a rotten province governed by stupid asses and sly

THE *YKSINKERTAINEN* FINNISH LANGUAGE

In French, the word is *téléphone*; in Italian, it is *telefono*; in Russian, *telefon*; but in Finnish it is *puhelin*. Indeed, most Finnish words look and sound strange to many Europeans. That fact has helped Finns to preserve their own national identity, despite centuries of Swedish and Russian rule.

Finnish stands well apart from English, French, Spanish, German, and other Western tongues because it belongs to the Finno-Ugric—not to the Indo-European—family of languages. The Finns' ancestors, anthropologists believe, began to disperse from their homeland in the southern Ural mountains around 3000 B.C. The Uralians divided into two groups; some eventually settled in present-day Hungary, while others migrated to Estonia and Finland. With some practice, modern Finns and Estonians can understand each other; Hungarians and Finns cannot.

•

Just how different is Finnish? Imagine an American student in Helsinki, learning a language with no gender, no articles, few prepositions, 15 cases, and words that seem to stretch halfway across the page. Even "simple" is not: *yksinkertainen*. The Finnish language relies heavily on a bewildering array of prefixes, suffixes, and infixes (particles within a word). Thus, *pöytä* means "table" and *pöydällä* means "on the table." One noun with several particles can express what would need a whole phrase in English. "Let's have a look" equals *katsotaanpa* in Finnish. And thanks to the oddities of the Finnish transliteration, our student would even find imported words such as *pankki* (bank) impossible to recognize.

Nor does mastery of Finnish pronunciation come easily. The sole difference between saying *tapaamme* (we meet) and *tapamme* (we kill), for example, is that pronouncing the first word requires a slightly longer "a."

As a literary language, Finnish is young, and has matured slowly. Finnish was not an official language until Tsar Alexander II so declared it in 1863. And the University of Helsinki—where classes had long been taught exclusively in Swedish—did not become bilingual until 1923.

The task of fashioning everyday Finnish into a literary form fell to assorted scholars and amateur linguists. The physician and future University of Helsinki professor Elias Lönnrot (1802–84) was one of them. While practicing medicine in the Karelian village of Kajaani, Lönnrot transcribed thousands of verses from Karelian cantos, or *runes*. From these he constructed a single long, connected oral poem, which he called the *Kalevala* (1835). Here was an epic work, many thought, an expression of the genius of ordinary Finns. As it turned out, Lönnrot had written many of the verses himself. "I myself began to conjure," he later admitted. "I myself began to sing."

In any case, the 12,000-line *Kalevala*, with its vivid descriptions of Finnish landscapes, nature, customs, and folk life, spurred a sense of pride—the quintessence, it seemed, of Finnish culture and nationhood:

> O thou lovely little village, / Fairest spot in all the country! / Grass below, and cornfields over, / In the midst between the village. / Fair the shore below the village, / By the shore is gleaming water, / Where the ducks delight in swimming, / And the water-fowl are sporting.

Not surprisingly, the *Kalevala* played a central role in Finland's national awakening, and inspired the paintings and frescoes of Akseli Gallén-Kallela (1865–1931) and the pastoral moods of Jean Sibelius's *Finlandia* (1899) and other musical compositions.

foxes." Now was the time, he said, for Finns to create their own nation: "We are no longer Swedes; we cannot become Russians; we must be Finns."

Central to Fennomanian aspirations was the fate of the Finnish language. While 85 percent of the population spoke one of the many Finnish dialects, few were educated in that tongue. The Finnish elite learned Swedish, the language of the schoolroom, the lecture hall, and the bureaucracy. But with Finns no longer taking guidance from Stockholm, Swedish and Finnish would be, in the view of Finnish nationalist Johan Vilhelm Snellman, like the shell and the kernel. While the shell would rot, the kernel "will not spoil during the long winter, and will germinate when the time comes."

The Fennomanians, however, feared that the tsar would impose the Russian language. But again the tsar proved accommodating. In fact, St. Petersburg required that clergymen and judges appointed to Finnish parishes and districts be conversant with the vernacular. And in 1863, Tsar Alexander II signed an edict that elevated Finnish to the status of "official language" [see box, above].

As a Grand Duchy of Russia, Finland moved forward on all fronts. Geographically, the country expanded when, in 1812, Alexander I restored to Finland territories that had been lost to Russia after the Great Northern War. At the same time, public education became much more available. Between 1875 and 1917, the number of public school students soared from 15,000 to over 200,000. Thousands of boys and girls, once busy only with domestic chores, found themselves reading Finnish literary classics, such as Elias Lönnrot's *Kalevala*, a compilation of Karelian poems and songs, and Johan Runeberg's patriotic *Tales of Ensign Stål* (1848).

Under the tsars, the Finns would enjoy material progress. Lacking large deposits of coal and iron ore, 19th-century Finns, it seemed, would be forever dependent on fishing, farming, and fur trading. In 1850, 90 percent of all Finns still tilled the soil. But industrialization in Western Europe soon spurred demand for Finland's wide range of timber products—pit props for coal mines, plywood for crating and packaging, poles for telegraph companies. Lumber-hauling paddle steamers snaked through Finland's 3,000-mile web of interconnect-

ing canals and lakes. Steam-powered ferries took lumber and dairy products from Finland's southwest coast to Stockholm. Icebreakers, first launched from Finnboda wharf at Stockholm in 1890, kept the ports in the Gulfs of Bothnia and Finland open all year round. By the turn of the century, dozens of steamships, many operating out of Helsinki and Hanko, hauled textiles from Tampere and Turku and glassware from Nuuttajärvi to other European metropolises, such as Hamburg and Stettin.

The belated Finnish economic boom may have been too much of a good thing. Seeing advantages in bringing a prosperous Finland more directly under the empire's control, Tsar Nicholas II set out to Russify the peninsula. His February Manifesto of 1899 essentially ended the lawmaking powers of the Finnish Diet. Finland's ruling elite—mostly Swedish-speaking liberals—were shocked and angered. Within 10 days, some 523,000 Finns (half of the country's adult population) signed a petition protesting the Manifesto, which a delegation of Finnish luminaries presented to the tsar in St. Petersburg. Nicholas paid no attention.

Courting the Kaiser

The tsar's resistance deepened the crisis. Increasingly, events in Helsinki paralleled those in St. Petersburg. The burgeoning working class nudged the new Social Democratic Party further and further to the Left, while Russian political exiles in Finland propagated the ideologies of Karl Kautsky and Karl Marx. Students and intellectuals joined in forming secret societies, such as the Kagal, which exhorted young male Finns to resist passively the newly expanded Russian military conscription. Less than half of all Finns summoned for duty showed up to serve. In 1904, one member of the Finnish Activists, Eugen Schauman, assassinated the governor-general, Nikolay I. Bobrikov, in his office in Helsinki. Suddenly, Finland—so quiet, remote, passive, and parochial—began to look like anywhere else.

By the time World War I began in 1914, Finnish nationalists were courting Russia's enemies, notably Kaiser Wilhelm's Germany, as logical allies in their own struggle to liberate Finland. Some 2,000 young Finns received military training at Hamburg's Feldmeister School. As members of the 27th Royal Prussian Jaeger Battalion, they eventually fought alongside German troops, against the Russians near the Gulf of Riga. Finnish novelist Joel Lehtonen wrote that the atmosphere in Helsinki before World War I was "like the period before a thunderstorm, stifling, suffocating, making one restless, almost as if longing for some sort of explosion."

The first thunderclap sounded on March 15, 1917, when Tsar Nicholas II abdicated; his regime was later replaced by Aleksandr Kerensky's provisional government. In Finland, the end of Russia's 1,000-year-old monarchy raised more questions than it answered. Who now would inherit the power of the absent tsar?

In Petrograd, the Kerensky government refused to let the semi-autonomous Finnish parliament, or Eduskunta, the new unicameral assembly that had replaced the old Diet in 1906, establish home rule. But when Lenin's Bolsheviks toppled the Kerensky regime on November 7, 1917, most Finns were ready to insist that their country should be sovereign. On December 6, 1917, the Eduskunta, led by a coalition of nonsocialist parties, proclaimed Finland independent with "the legislature the repository of supreme power."

Finnish socialists, however, were not going to let power slip into bourgeois hands so easily. Buoyed by Lenin's triumph in Petrograd, they were eager for their own Bolshevik revolution in Helsinki. Social Democratic Party leaders sanctioned the formation of Red Guard units, and, on November 13, had proclaimed a nationwide strike. The Eduskunta responded by setting up its own police force—the Civic, or White, Guards—to expel the 40,000-man Russian garrison from Finland and restore order. Suddenly, Finns—normally unified in the face of a Russian threat—found themselves both divided and mired in a nasty civil war.

Fighting broke out on January 19, 1918, when the Whites at-



West meets East at the Finno-Soviet border, near Terijoki (1930s). Reads the Soviet banner on the frontier bridge: "Workers of the World, Unite!"

tempted to break up Red Guard gunrunning between Petrograd and Viipuri. On the same day, Gen. Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim traveled incognito, as the merchant "Gustaf Malmberg," to the city of Vaasa on the Gulf of Bothnia. From there he would command the White troops—a "farmer's army" of 70,000, mostly small landholders and country lads. Nine days later, the Red Guards—now some 100,000 strong—occupied the government offices in Helsinki, forcing chief executive Pehr Svinhufvud and other White leaders to join Mannerheim in Vaasa. Mannerheim's counterrevolutionary forces, buttressed by 12,000 German troops and the Finnish Jaegers, eventually managed to re-establish order and take control of Red strongholds in the south. On May 16, 1918, the victorious White forces paraded through the streets of Helsinki.

Finally, Finland belonged to itself. But the price had been high. Cruelties on both sides left deep psychological wounds. Some 21,000 Finns had died in the civil strife. More than 8,000 Reds were executed in the war's aftermath; nearly 10 times as many were herded through prison camps during the summer of 1918. Many died of disease and starvation. Others fled to Sweden, the Soviet Union, or the United States. Those who returned to their towns and villages did so bearing the onus of having sided with those who had tried to overthrow the government.

Now a sovereign nation, Finland, for the first time in its history, would conduct its own foreign affairs. The privilege, of course, brought commensurate burdens. During the 1920s and '30s, Finnish presidents found themselves in roughly the same position as the early Swedish kings: maintaining a guarded, uneasy relationship with the big eastern neighbor. Not even the 1939–40 Winter War would reconcile, as Finnish diplomat Max Jakobson has put it, "Finnish will to independence with the great power ambitions of Russia."

Hitler's Co-Belligerent

Indeed, just weeks after the Winter War ended, Finland found itself afflicted once more by geography, caught between two great powers. On April 9, 1940, Nazi troops invaded Denmark and Norway, and quickly occupied Oslo, Bergen, and Narvik, the tiny port from which the Nazis exported Swedish iron and Finnish nickel to Germany. The Finns later allowed German troops and materiel to transit through Finland, to and from northern Norway. In July, the Soviets won *their* concessions: transit rights for military supplies on Finnish railroads from the Soviet border to the Soviets' Hanko naval base on the southern coast.

Clearly, each totalitarian power had designs on Finland. From November 10 to 12, the Soviet and German foreign ministers, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop, met in Berlin to



Field Marshal Carl Gustaf Mannerheim (1867–1951), Swedish-born aristocrat, is shown here at his wartime command post at Mikkeli in 1942.

discuss the future of Finland. Russia's interest in applying "a settlement on the same scale as in Bessarabia to Finland" collided with Hitler's desire to secure supplies of Finnish nickel needed for his war effort. By June 1941, the Germans had deployed five divisions in Finnish Lapland, with the approval of Helsinki.

On June 22, 1941, Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa, attacking Russia all along its western border. On June 25, the Red Air Force bombed Kerimaki, Turku, Porvoo, and other Finnish cities. Two days later, Finland's 400,000-man army counterattacked; some 60,000 German troops joined in the advance in northern Finland. Hitler wasted no time in bragging that his Wehrmacht was fighting "side by side with their Finnish comrades."

But the Finns did not quite see it that way. Their military effort was a "continuation of the Winter War"; Germany and Finland, as "co-belligerents" (not allies), shared nothing more than a common enemy. Hitler demanded that the Finns join in the Wehrmacht siege of Leningrad, and in a planned attack on the Murmansk-to-Moscow railway, along which came boots, blankets, and other supplies for the Red Army, carried by Allied convoys to Murmansk. In both campaigns, the Finns refused to participate. Finland's leading Social Democratic daily, the *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti*, claimed that co-bellig-

erency with Germany would not "limit Finland's freedom of action; it does not change our relations with other countries; it does not tie us to any foreign ideology."

Nevertheless, Great Britain and the United States could not dismiss the reality that Finland was fighting alongside the Germans, against an ally. And Finnish operations, contrary to their claims, were not entirely defensive. By August 1941, Finnish troops had crossed the pre–Winter War frontiers into Soviet territory. On December 6, 1941, Finnish Independence Day, Churchill declared war on Finland. Allied suspicions seemed confirmed when Finland's President Risto Ryti wrote to Hitler on June 26, 1944 that he would not "make peace with the Soviet Union except in agreement with the German Reich." Four days later, U.S. officials lowered the American embassy's flag in Helsinki; the U.S. ambassador went home. "Most Americans," according to an editorial in the *New Republic*, were "badly troubled in their minds about Finland."

As the Third Reich crumbled, Finland's Continuation War ended in much the same fashion as the Winter War: The Soviets captured the Karelian Isthmus (in June 1944) and forced Finland to sign an armistice. This time, Finland would have to surrender not only much of the Karelian frontier zone but also its valuable nickel mines near the far northern city of Petsamo. The Finns were forced to lease the Porkkala Peninsula—which lay just 18 miles west of Helsinki—to the Soviets for 50 years.

The peace settlement also stipulated that the Finns expel 200,000 German troops remaining in Lapland—which they did, between September 1944 and March 1945. As the Germans retreated under Finnish harassment into Norway, they left behind a wasteland, destroying buildings, bridges, and telephone poles.

Thus, Finland was the only nation involved in World War II to fight both Germany and the Soviet Union. It was also the only European nation bordering on the Soviet Union to remain a Western-style democracy after Hitler's demise.

Why the Soviet Union never simply took over Finland—as it did the Baltic republics and parts of Poland and Romania to the south—remains a matter of scholarly debate. Stalin may have judged such a step too costly in terms of possible Western reactions in 1944–45. Or perhaps the Soviets' study of Finnish history imparted a lesson, which has not been forgotten by the Kremlin today. "The Russians have learnt," as British historian Paul Winterton observed, "that the Finns are an indigestible people, but [the Russians] also know that they do not have to swallow Finland in order to get what they require."

THE FINNISH SOLUTION

by Pekka Kalevi Hamalainen

In Helsinki, the summer sun rises at about 4 A.M., and sets after 10 P.M. The *pitkiä päiviä*, or long days, compensate for the short, gloomy days of November and December. Summer tourists find the Finns savoring the season: families, couples, and groups of students from the University of Helsinki throng the Esplanade, a broad park that stretches five blocks from Mannerheimintie, the city's main boulevard, to South Harbor. Some stroll through the landscaped common; others sit and talk near a bronze statue of Johan Ludvig Runeberg, Finland's national poet.

Two blocks away, patrons browse through the Academic Book Store. With 12 miles of shelves and a white marble interior, it is one of Europe's largest and most luxurious book outlets. Meanwhile, down at Market Square, at South Harbor, farmers hawk fresh fruits and vegetables under orange canvas tents. Out on the water, red-hulled ferries shuttle tourists and their cars to and from Stockholm, Travemünde in West Germany, and other Baltic ports.

Nearby, at the Kappeli, a popular outdoor restaurant, patrons sip coffee, "long drinks" (gin and tonics), or one of Finland's beers—Lahden A, Lapin Kulta, Karjala. A small passenger ferry from South Harbor takes couples to Suomenlinna, an 18th-century island-fortress in South Harbor, to dine at Walhalla, an open-air terrace restaurant. Entrées might include roasted breast of ptarmigan (an arctic grouse) and grilled smoked eel.

Like Geneva or Bonn, Helsinki is an efficient business center, where bureaucrats and executives drive to their offices in Volvos, Saabs, and Toyotas; almost everyone else uses the punctual commuter transit system.* The city's architecture is handsome but unprepossessing; no International-style glass high-rises dominate the skyline. "I found it a sensible, always honest city," wrote one American reporter from Helsinki, "perhaps even chaste among the shopworn capitals of Europe."

With so much of the good life to offer, it is little wonder that Helsinki has become a civilized refuge for Western diplomats, journalists, and students who dwell in the bleak austerity of Moscow and Leningrad. Westerners in the Soviet Union travel to Helsinki on weekends, often by plane from Moscow, or by train from Leningrad.

*Japanese automakers hold the largest single share (38 percent) of the Finnish market for imported automobiles; the Russians rank only fourth, despite a television ad campaign and large roadside billboards for the Soviet-made Lada.

They come to shop for Arabia china, Ettalia glassware, Marimekko fabrics. Stockmann—Helsinki's fashionable five-floor department store—maintains a 15-member export staff to handle some $2 million in annual sales to Westerners and high-level Soviet party officials in the Soviet Union alone. When Soviet Premier Yuri V. Andropov died on February 10, 1984, Stockmann delivered a funeral wreath to the U.S. embassy in Moscow within 24 hours.

Prosperity is by no means limited to Helsinki (pop. 484,000) and its tidy suburbs. Indeed, while many Americans consider affluent Sweden the model of Scandinavian society, it would be difficult to argue that Finns are significantly worse off. Although their wages are lower than those in other Nordic lands, Finns enjoy the world's ninth highest gross national product (GNP) per capita ($10,740)—ranking well behind the United States ($14,110) and Sweden ($12,470), but slightly ahead of France ($10,500) and Japan ($10,120). Partly because Helsinki discourages "guest workers"—fewer than 20,000 foreigners live in Finland—unemployment hovers around a modest six percent; inflation is less than three percent.

Prayer in the Schools

Like Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, Finland supports a generous welfare state. The government provides a wide array of benefits for the unemployed, the sick, the disabled, and the retired. National health insurance pays 80 percent of all medical expenses—including the cost of contraceptives and abortions. The state also subsidizes university education and the nation's amateur sporting clubs, newspapers, orchestras, and theater companies; it even picks up the tab for political party functions.

Yet Finland's social welfare system has not grown as large as others in Europe. Government spending in Finland accounts for just 36.2 percent of the country's gross domestic product—compared to 59.8 percent in Sweden and 58 percent in Denmark (and 36.9 percent in the United States). Helsinki has nationalized a sizable slice of the economy. About 14 percent of all employees work for state-owned companies—compared with 16 percent in France and seven percent in Sweden. But most government firms, such as Finnair (the airline), Imatran Voima (the power utility), and Alko (the state alcohol business), operate as profit-making corporations.

An egalitarian tradition, a common culture, and a small homogeneous population have given Finns a highly civilized society. Streetcars, buses, and public parks are neat and well-kept. Graffitti are unknown, even in the tough industrial cities of Tampere and Turku. Finns can brag—though they seldom do—that they have the *lowest* rate of infant mortality in the world. Virtually all adults are functionally literate, thanks to the demanding school system and a public consensus on high standards of education. Known as voracious readers, Finns borrow some 72.3 million books—about 15 per person—from the nation's network of 1,600 public libraries and 200 bookmobiles every year.

Above all, Finns have more of what middle-class urban Americans seem to miss most: free time. Although widely regarded as diligent workers, most employees in Helsinki leave the office after no more than a seven-hour day. By law, all working Finns are entitled to five weeks of vacation. Many spend three weeks in the summer at the lake or seaside, one week in the autumn hunting moose or fox, and one week cross-country skiing in the winter. Thus, at first glance, Finns would seem to have it all—a sentiment expressed not long ago by Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa before a group of Finnish bankers. "Can you please name a country," Sorsa asked, "where market forces operate so freely as to frighten some firms, where there is no international terrorism, and never has been, where [Lutheran] prayer in the schools has been part of daily life for decades?"

Yet Finland is no paradise. Like their Icelandic counterparts, many Finnish academics and scientists feel isolated from the wider world by language and geography. The country is too small to support the level of scientific and technological research that is taken for granted in countries like Sweden or West Germany.

Good-bye to Cohabitation

Two years ago, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, based in Cambridge, Massachusetts, asked leading Scandinavian intellectuals for frank appraisals of their respective countries.* These anonymous "Nordic Voices," as published in *Daedalus*, included the comments of 10 Finns. All of them held forth in English. They pondered certain ailments in Finnish society: drunk driving, the relatively high rate of homicide, and the burgeoning government. "Finland's bureaucracy is smaller than Sweden's," said one of the interviewees, "but it's beginning to seem excessive."

Nearly all the Finns compared themselves to the self-assured Swedes, who think, as one commentator put it, that "they know how to solve all the problems." Indeed, Finns retain an uneasy blend of

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*Finns are not traditionally known for loquacity. One story has it that a Finn and a Swede went to a Helsinki bar and ordered beer. Raising his glass, the Swede said: "Skål." Replied the Finn: "Did we come here to drink or to talk?"



envy and disdain toward their rich western neighbor and former colonizer. "Swedes have the influence of a monarchy and a landed aristocracy to live down," said one Finn. "But Finland was always dominated by farmers. It's an egalitarian state, with no tradition of wealth." Said another interviewee: "[As exporters] Finns operate on a world scale. Sweden imagines that it does, but its real influence is—or was—in Scandinavia.... The Swedish ambassador arrives imagining that he is our big brother."

Whatever Finns say about the Swedes, they are proud to be Finnish themselves. "People are all very patriotic. No one makes much of the class struggle," said one. "The call is to think of ourselves as a nation, and not as a separate interest group." Others noted the Finnish respect for authority ("We are used to the law. We obey it.") and family values ("We are home-centered. We [have] already passed through the phase of unmarried cohabitation.").

What strikes outsiders (including the Soviets) most about the Finns is their *sisu*—a word which expresses, all at once, toughness, resilience, fierceness, and inner moral strength. "They love to pit themselves against the elements and endure the worst that winter can offer," observes a former *Time* correspondent, Donald S. Connery. "They bake like lobsters in the sauna and then plunge naked through a hole in the surface of a frozen lake."

First and foremost, Finns regard themselves as Westerners, despite the fact that their country lies farther east than Poland and

Helsinki: Mannerheimintie (left), the city's main thoroughfare; two "diinarit," disciples of James Dean. Some of the city's wealthy live offshore on Vartio and other nearby islands. On summer mornings, businessmen, clad in three-piece suits, can be seen rowing to work.

Czechoslovakia, and that it belonged to Imperial Russia for more than a century (1809–1917). As Swedish citizens for some 500 years, until 1809, Finns grew accustomed to constitutional government, a free press, and Western Christianity. More than 300,000 Swedish-speaking Finns live in Finland today—most along the southern and western coasts and in the Aland Archipelago, a string of islands that stretches out into the Gulf of Bothnia. Like the Swedes, more than 90 percent of all Finns adhere to the Lutheran faith (though only four percent attend services on a regular basis); only 1.3 percent belong to the Eastern Church. "The rugged individuality of Martin Luther's movement," former president Urho Kekkonen once said, "seemed as if made to order for the way of life that was growing up here amidst the dark forests."

Like most other Western European nations, Finland is a democratic republic, complete with a popularly-elected president, a prime minister, and a 200-seat parliament, or Eduskunta, in Helsinki. Power is diffused. The Eduskunta includes representatives from nine different parties. In fact, no single party has ever won a majority of seats in parliament since the founding of the republic in 1919. Consequently, Finnish prime ministers have been forced to assemble shaky, sometimes minority, coalition governments representing various segments of Finnish society. The Social Democrats draw their support from the southern industrial working class; the Center Party is most popular among farmers in the rural north; the conservative National Coalition

THE FINNS IN AMERICA

Finns, by reputation, are stolid and pragmatic. Yet the 360,000 Finns who immigrated to the United States between 1860 and 1920 ranked among America's most politically radical newcomers.

The first Finns in the New World arrived as Swedish subjects. In 1638, Stockholm sent its more undesirable Finns—lawbreakers and draft dodgers—to help settle New Sweden, on the west bank of the Delaware River. But Finnish immigration did not begin in earnest until the 1860s. The Quincy (copper) Mining Company of Hancock, Michigan, recruited impoverished Finns who were fishing, mining, and farming in the northern reaches of Norway. Word quickly spread to Vaasa, Turku, and Helsinki that jobs for unskilled laborers were waiting in the mines and forests of the United States.

The Finns favored rural towns, especially in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Michigan's Upper Peninsula, though many settled elsewhere. Finns loaded iron ore in Conneaut, Ohio; netted Chinook salmon along the Columbia River near Astoria, Oregon; manufactured textiles in Worcester, Massachusetts. The young women labored as domestics. "The Finnish servant," reported the *Nation* in 1918, "is one of the most sought for and best paid on account of her nature, intelligence, and efficiency."

Like the Danes and the Swedes, the Finns were organizers. In Calumet, Michigan, they founded an Apostolic-Lutheran Church, the Finnish Mutual Aid Society, the weekly newspaper *Amerikan Suomalainen* (Finnish-American), a saloon, and nine public saunas. Throughout the Midwest, the Finns turned warehouses, cheese factories, and boarding houses into consumer cooperatives. In 1917, representatives of 65 Finnish co-ops set up the Cooperative Central Exchange (CCE) in Superior, Wisconsin. The CCE marketed its own Red Star brand of products, emblazoned with the Russian Revolution's hammer and sickle.

The cooperatives spurred the burgeoning Finnish socialist movement. Newspapers like *Raivaaja* (Pioneer) of Fitchburg, Massachusetts, and *Toveri* (Comrade) of Astoria, Oregon, spread the word. By 1913, the Finnish Socialist

Federation could boast 260 chapters and more than 12,000 members. Many of them had helped to raise money for the 1908 presidential race of Socialist Eugene V. Debs.

Today's Finnish-Americans, as a group, are probably more conservative and more Republican than the nation at large. Only a few predominantly Finnish communities remain in the United States, some of them in the South. The 15,000 Finnish-Americans who live in Lake Worth and Lantana, Florida, run one Finnish newspaper, *Amerikan Uutiset* (America's News, circ. 3,000), 17 motels, three churches, and a Kenttä Haali, or "social hall," used for Finnish dances and dinners—but no drinking or betting.

Finnish-Americans, notes Timo Poropudas, editor of the Superior, Wisconsin, newsweekly *Työmies Eteepäin* (Working Man Forward), "think of themselves as quiet, stubborn, hard-working and honest—and most of them are."

Party includes much of the country's white-collar, upper-middle class; and the communist People's Democratic League comprises a dwindling population of aging laborers. With so many parties representing contrasting social and economic interests, it is not surprising that Finnish post-war governments have lasted, on average, only about one year. The present "center-left" cabinet—made up chiefly of Social Democratic and Center Party ministers—has proved more durable than most. First formed in May 1983, the four-party coalition is expected to endure until the parliamentary elections of March 1987.* But the recurring debates over budgets and the jockeying of party politicians tend to mask an underlying Finnish consensus on the welfare state, on policy toward the Soviet Union, and on cultural and psychological adherence to the West.

Finland's Western orientation is most pronounced among the younger generation, which avidly follows British and American pop culture. Nearly all (96 percent) Finnish high school students pick English as the first of the two foreign languages they must study. Less than one percent choose the language of the neighboring superpower. Finns, young and old, regularly watch the "Cosby Show," "Dynasty," and other American programs on the state-run TV network. Nearly half of the movies shown in Finland every year are American products. *Rocky IV*, *Out of Africa*, and *White Nights*—often dubbed in Finnish with Swedish subtitles—have numbered among the recent box office hits. One American movie star has at-

*Since 1966, the Social Democratic Party has held more seats in parliament than any other party. Fifty-seven Social Democrats now sit in the Eduskunta. Other parties represented include the People's Democratic League (27), the National Coalition Party (44), the Center Party (38), the Swedish People's Party (11), the Christian League (3), the Rural Party (17), the environmentalist Greens (2), and the ultrarightist Constitutionalists (1).

tracted his own following in Finland; some of the teenagers who loiter in downtown Helsinki call themselves *diinarit*—disciples of Hollywood's James Dean.

That the Finns enjoy an open, free society may not surprise most Americans. But in 1945, just after World War II, the odds seemed good that Finland, under pressure from Moscow, would be drawn behind the Iron Curtain. "We shall no doubt hope that Finland will be left some degree of at least cultural and commercial independence," said British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in August 1944, "[but] Russian influence will in any event be predominant in Finland, and we shall not be able . . . to contest that influence."

Watching from Porkkala

Like Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Finland found itself in dire straits after the war. Some 85,000 men had died in five years of combat against the Russians; another 425,000 Finns were uprooted when the Soviets annexed the Karelian territories along Finland's eastern border. In addition, the Soviets demanded huge reparations, the actual amount of which cannot be determined: The indemnity was paid not in currency but in 199 categories of goods. Russian orders included, for example, 5,500 freight cars, 500 steam locomotives, and four papermills—all of which had to be built according to rigorous specifications and timetables. Keeping watch was the Soviet garrison of the Porkkala naval base, near Helsinki, which the Soviets had "leased" from the Finns for 50 years.

The Soviet Union might have tried to impose its will on the Finns. It did so everywhere else in Eastern Europe where the Red Army had stood victorious. But Finland survived. The Soviets had learned to respect the Finns' toughness, their *sisu*, in five years of combat. They could not occupy Finland without another war, and, possibly, a showdown with the West. For their part, the Finns had learned that they could not depend on the Americans, the British, or anyone else for help; they had to bury the hatchet and get along with the Soviets. Even so, survival was not easy.

Thus, in 1946, as reconstruction began, Juho Paasikivi, Finland's 76-year-old president, argued that Finland "must not direct itself against the Soviet Union." Nor should the country, he believed, compromise its sovereignty, or allow the Soviets to meddle in Finland's internal affairs. "The composition of the [Finnish] government," he said, ". . . is not the business of the Communist Party or the Soviet newspapers, radio, or in general of the Soviet Union."

This middle way, between conflict and co-optation, was dubbed by Finnish journalists and politicians the "Paasikivi Line," and still steers Finnish foreign policy today.

The Paasikivi Line meant being both flexible and tough. As

prime minister, Paasikivi, in 1944, kept the Soviets happy by legalizing the Finnish Communist Party, which had been outlawed since 1930. When he became president in 1946, Paasikivi appointed Mauno Pekkala, a Communist, as prime minister. Various "war criminals," including former president Rysto Ryti, were brought to trial. (Ryti was convicted and sentenced to 10 years in jail; he served only half that long, and was later restored to a position of honor.) Paasikivi, however, was no lackey of the Kremlin. In the face of Soviet pressure, for example, he stood by Social Democrat Karl August Fagerholm's first government (1948–50), which had eliminated Communists from the cabinet.

Holding the Line also meant making painful choices. After the war, Finland quietly received some $120 million in U.S. aid through the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank. But Helsinki felt it had to refuse more American dollars that would have been available under the Marshall Plan for European reconstruction (named after U.S. Secretary of State George C. Marshall). On July 10, 1947, Finland's parliamentary Foreign Relations Committee declared that "the Mar-

Famous Finns: architect Alvar Aalto (1898–1976), whose designs resemble those of Frank Lloyd Wright; composer Jean Sibelius (1865–1957); and Paavo Nurmi, the "Flying Finn," winner of six gold medals in three Olympics (1920, '24, and '28).

shall Plan [has] become the source of serious differences of opinion among the Big Powers.... Desiring to remain outside the areas of conflict in Big Power politics, [Finland] regrets that it does not find it possible to participate."

Finland's rejection of Marshall Plan aid pleased the Kremlin. But pressure from the East did not cease. In 1948, Finns watched Soviet moves elsewhere in Europe and wondered what would happen to them. On February 4, 1948, Stalin signed a mutual defense pact with Romania, formally bringing that country within the Soviet orbit. Hungary agreed to a similar accord two weeks later. On February 20, 1948, Czech Communists, with Stalin's backing, toppled their country's democratic government. And three days after that, Stalin sent a letter to President Paasikivi, urging "a mutual assistance pact" between Finland and the USSR. With Finnish Communists arguing that "the road of Czechoslovakia" was the road for them, many Finns feared a Communist coup.

A coup did seem possible. In 1948, the People's Democratic League was one of the strongest parties in Finland. It held six of 18 cabinet posts, including the powerful Ministry of the Interior, which controlled the Valpo, a state police force. President Paasikivi warned Finnish Communists, privately, against any reckless moves. "We are not Czechs," he said. "Such events may not take place in Finland, and will not take place, before I am shot."

Whether or not Finnish Communists actually planned a coup remains a matter of debate; in any case, nothing materialized. Instead, Stalin settled for a treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance that Finnish Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov signed in Moscow on April 6, 1948. The treaty, said Molotov, stood "as a convincing example of the lack of aggressiveness in Soviet foreign policy."

Pravda Protests

Indeed, the Soviets, for the most part, allowed Paasikivi to dictate the terms of the accord. If "Germany, or any state allied with [her]," should invade Finland—or the Soviet Union, through Finland—the treaty said, Helsinki was obliged to repel the attack. If necessary, the Soviet Union would aid Finland, but only by "mutual agreement." Both sides pledged that they would respect the "sovereignty and integrity of the other." The treaty stipulated that neither power could "conclude any alliance or join any coalition" directed against the other.

Thus the Soviets did not seek directly to control Finland. What they wanted more than anything was to prevent a recurrence of what had happened in World War II: an enemy attack against the Soviet Union from Finnish soil. Finland's role, as Soviet Premier Nikita

Showing sisu *at the Polar Bear Club in Helsinki (1965). Most Finns prefer a hot sauna or cross-country skiing.*

Khrushchev would later emphasize, was to "preserve the Baltic Sea as a perpetual zone of peace."

In any case, the treaty made Western leaders apprehensive, partly because it had been initiated by the Soviets, partly because it was signed right after the Czech coup. The Cold War was entering its harshest phase. "The tragic death of the Czechoslovak Republic has caused a shock throughout the civilized world," observed U.S. President Harry S Truman. "[The] pressure is now directed toward Finland, in a threat to the whole Scandinavian peninsula."

Truman's fears notwithstanding, Finland escaped the fate of other regimes in Eastern Europe. Yet the country's geography and peculiar circumstances—a Western democracy bordering on a Communist superpower—placed its leaders in a recurring predicament: How could Helsinki develop fruitful economic and political relations with Washington, London, Stockholm, and Bonn without the Kremlin taking offense?

The answer to that question has never been simple. Finland has approached Western organizations tentatively, only after checking with Moscow. Finland, for example, was eager to join the low-key Nordic Council, which was organized for nonmilitary purposes by Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway in 1952. But anything re-

sembling a Scandinavian alliance has always made Moscow uneasy. "The history of Finland's independence," *Pravda* warned at the time, "is full of examples of how the 'idea of the North' is used in aggressive policy against the Soviet Union."

Finland did not become a member of the Council until 1955, two years after Stalin died. Relations between Moscow and Helsinki improved dramatically under Khrushchev. In 1955, the Soviets gave up the Porkkala naval base. The Finns, in return, agreed to a 20-year extension of the 1948 mutual assistance treaty. Finland has never joined the European Economic Community (Common Market). After weighing Soviet objections, Helsinki signed a free-trade agreement with the Common Market in 1973. Not by coincidence, Finland entered into a similar arrangement with the Soviet-run Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. Thus Moscow is willing to allow Finland to remain in the capitalist world, as long as its leaders take heed of Soviet security interests.

Not suprisingly, Finnish voters have elected to high office only those leaders who could guarantee good relations with Moscow. When President Paasikivi's term expired in 1956, Finland chose the 56-year-old Agrarian candidate, Urho Kekkonen, to replace him. As *New York Times* reporter Werner Wiskari put it, Kekkonen was "a proud man with an imperious bearing, as though always aware that the mantle of the presidency was on his shoulders." While not personally popular, the hearty, athletic Kekkonen was well known in Helsinki and Moscow as a stout supporter of the Paasikivi Line. "The superior force of the Soviet Union is absolute and continuing," he had once said. "Honest recognition of this will be the condition and touchstone of our national existence."

Meeting with Khrushchev

Kekkonen's often chummy ties to Soviet leaders helped to smooth Finno-Soviet relations during his 25 years in office. At tense moments, Kekkonen and Khrushchev, for example, would talk over matters while hunting elk in Siberia or while baking in the Finnish president's sauna.

Kekkonen, critics have said, often went too far to please the Russians—e.g., during the Night Frost Crisis of 1958. In nationwide elections held that year, Finnish Communists won a plurality in the Eduskunta. But when Social Democratic Prime Minister Karl August Fagerholm formed his third government, he left out the Communists and included Conservative ministers instead. Moscow responded to Finland's new "rightist" government by withdrawing its ambassador from Helsinki, suspending credits it had just extended to Finland, and ending negotiations on a joint Finno-Soviet canal. The new regime in Helsinki, Khrushchev charged, would "first and foremost serve the

circles in the West [interested in] drawing Finland into their military-political maneuvers." Under Soviet pressure, and with Kekkonen's approval, five Agrarian ministers quit the three-month-old Fagerholm government, causing it to collapse.

The Kremlin pressured Helsinki again during the Note Crisis of 1961. This episode grew out of Soviet suspicions about West German military activity in the Baltic region, which had steadily increased since Bonn joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1955. When West German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauss—in the midst of the Berlin Wall Crisis—traveled to Denmark and Norway to discuss setting up a joint American-German-Nordic sea command within NATO, the Soviets took action. On October 30, 1961, the Kremlin presented the Finnish government with a long note, railing against the "Bonn military junta," and warning against "West German militarist and revanchist penetration into North Europe." The communiqué concluded by proposing consultations with Finland "about measures to secure the defense of the borders of both countries" against a possible West German attack.

Meeting with Khrushchev in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk, Kekkonen convinced the Soviet leader to withdraw his request for "consultations." Still, Soviet pressure made an impact in Helsinki.

South Harbor farmer's market in Helsinki. Sweden's King Gustav I Vasa founded the city in 1550 as a rival to Estonia's Baltic port at Tallinn.

Aware of the Soviet need for reassurances that neither Finland's leadership nor her policies would change anytime soon, presidential candidate Olavi Honka, backed by a coalition of five Finnish parties, called off his challenge to Kekkonen. The move surely found favor in Moscow. As Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko saw it, the Honka Front represented a "certain political grouping" bent on preventing "the continuation of the present foreign policy course."

Critics of Finland's foreign policy have accused the government and press of self-censorship to avoid offending the Soviet Union. Finnish newspaper editors do not avoid covering sensitive issues. But in the name of "politeness," they have played down articles on controversial topics—such as human rights in the Soviet Union—by, say, burying them on an inside page. The Finnish State Film Censorship Board can ban a movie that "may be considered a slur on a foreign power." The board prohibited the film *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* (1971). The book by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn on which the film was based, however, was sold in Finnish bookstores.

No Pawns, Please

As a rule, the Finnish government avoids criticizing *either* Washington or Moscow.

Unlike Sweden's late prime minister, Olof Palme, President Kekkonen did not condemn U.S. military involvement in Vietnam. Nor did politicians in Helsinki join Western European condemnation of the U.S. air strike last April against Libya.

In similar fashion, when Soviet troops occupied Czechoslovakia in August 1968, Finland's foreign minister, Ahti Karjalainen, said only that he hoped that "all external restraints will be removed as soon as possible in accordance with the wishes of the people of Czechoslovakia." Finland also quietly abstained from the 1980 United Nations vote calling for total withdrawal of "foreign troops" from Afghanistan. And most recently, when a radioactive cloud from the Chernobyl nuclear power plant drifted west across Finnish territory last April, Helsinki let Stockholm do the complaining in public. "In situations like this, we are not the first to criticize," Foreign Ministry spokesman Jouni Lilja told a crowd of journalists. "We try to take a constructive approach."

From such episodes has come the American and Western European notion of Finlandization—the complaisant submission by a small nation to the wishes of a more powerful neighbor. Many Finns, of course, angrily reject the term. "Uttering the word in a Helsinki living room," observes writer Joyce Lasky Shub, "is like dropping Koo Stark's name at Buckingham Palace."

Finland's former United Nations ambassador, Max Jakobson, is probably the best-known defender of his country's prudence. Big

Skiing presidents: Urho Kekkonen (left), whose critics called Finland "Kekkoslovakia" during his presidency (1956–81), and the incumbent, Social Democrat Mauno Koivisto (1982–).

powers like the United States, he complains, tend to treat small ones as "objects of policy . . . pawns to be gained or lost in the conflicts between the great powers." Finland, he believes, acts in its own best interest toward the Soviet Union, preferring to assert "the supremacy of national egotism over the claims of ideological solidarity."

Given the realities, one could say that Finland and the Soviet Union now maintain a fairly balanced relationship. There is give-and-take. The Soviets have, on many occasions, made concessions. In 1971, Soviet Ambassador Aleksei S. Belyakov tried to settle a dispute among Finnish Communists. Outraged by such meddling in Finland's domestic politics, Kekkonen demanded—and obtained—the ambassador's recall. In 1976, Kekkonen rejected a Soviet proposal that the two nations celebrate their upcoming 70th anniversary together. And in 1978, Kekkonen also said No to a proposal from

Dmitri F. Ustinov, the Soviet minister of defense, to conduct joint maneuvers involving Soviet and Finnish armed forces.*

Whatever American pundits may think about the politics of Finlandization, one thing is clear: The Finno-Soviet relationship has satisfactorily served Finland's economic interests, enabling the country to trade heavily with both East and West. Finland receives most of its oil and natural gas through a barter arrangement with the Soviet Union. Soviet oil helped Finland weather the oil shocks of 1973 and 1979 that rocked other European nations and the United States. In turn, the Finns send more of their exports (28 percent) to the Soviet Union than to any other country.

But that relationship does not stop Finland from shipping more than half of its exports to Common Market countries. And, significantly, Finland no longer exports only timber products, such as wood, paper, and pulp. While such goods made up 75 percent of the country's exports in 1960, they account for only 35 percent today. The Finnish firm Oy Wärtsilä manufactures half of the world's icebreakers, as well as ferries and cruise ships (including the liner used in the American TV series "Love Boat"). Nokia ranks as Scandinavia's largest producer of personal computers and color television sets. Rauma-Repola Oy is the world's leader in forest-harvesting equipment.

Up from the Docks

Like other Scandinavian nations, Finland must now decide how to provide a welfare state without crippling the private enterprises that pay for it. In Finland, despite a popular consensus on larger matters, labor and management are often at odds. Workers have been accustomed to good times. Employers are worried about price competition in export markets. This year, the slowing economy has been riven by strikes. *Sisu* does not make for easy compromises. Stalled negotiations between the Finnish Employers Confederation and the Central Trade Union Confederation nearly shut down all manufacturing last March. Eventually, management awarded the workers modest salary increases and a gradual shortening of the work week, from 40 to 37.5 hours by 1990. One month later, 40,000 civil servants walked off their jobs, crippling the nation's air, rail, and postal services for seven weeks.

Still, Finland has come a long way both politically and economically since its "years of danger" immediately after the war. Finns last worried about their country's survival in October 1981, when President Kekkonen became ill, and could no longer govern. It was a

*Under the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France, Finnish active-duty forces are limited to 41,900 troops. Every Finnish male must serve—8 months for enlisted men, 11 months for officers and special units. The nation can mobilize 700,00 trained reserves within four to five days. Finland spends less than any other Nordic nation on defense: about two percent of its GNP.

moment many Finns had feared. "After Kekkonen comes the deluge," wrote Mauri Sirno, a columnist for the Communist Party organ, *Kansan Uutiset* (People's News), shortly before Kekkonen's health failed. "Then all the dikes will burst."

But nothing of the sort happened. There was no Soviet influence in the ensuing election. In fact, the Kremlin's apparent favorite, Center Party candidate Ahti Karjalainen, never even won nomination. Instead, Finns elected, on January 17, 1982, a Social Democrat, Mauno Koivisto, by an overwhelming margin. With his quick, dry wit, the tall, rugged-looking Koivisto has become by far the most popular Finnish president since the war. Unlike Kekkonen—who won his first election by just one electoral vote, and was continually re-elected with Soviet support—Koivisto was clearly the people's choice. Wrote one Finnish commentator: "The Russians didn't choose him, the boys in the back room of the electoral college didn't choose him, the party bosses didn't choose him, and Kekkonen didn't choose him."

Koivisto—who grew up in a modest working-class home, and made his way from working on the docks in Turku to a Ph.D. in sociology—has become a symbol of national dignity and self-reliance. This is important in Finland, where the words and deeds of the president do much to set the tone of national life. On his first official visit to the Soviet Union, in March 1982, the new president took the leaders of all major parties with him—including those leaders earlier deemed "unacceptable" to the Kremlin. Koivisto thus quietly made it clear: He would not be pushed around.

Still, Koivisto remains keenly aware of Finland's past ordeals. He realizes that, quite aside from whatever else fate may bring, Helsinki must get along with Moscow. Otherwise, the Finns and their good society cannot survive. "For Finland," Koivisto said last year, "it has been a natural principle in a divided world to deal with all sides, to be open in all directions, to show others the confidence that we hope others will show us."

FINLAND
Life in the Soviet Shadow

THE FINNS AND HUNGARIANS tell opposite versions of the same joke. An Asian tribe wandered into Europe and came to a crossroads. The Hungarians say those who could read followed the sign north to Finland and the others trudged on into Hungary. The Finns say those who had some sense about the weather settled in the Danube plains and the foolish ones kept going as far north as they could. The languages are related, both of them members of the Finno-Ugric group, which seems to have developed in the lands around the Urals. They are not mutually comprehensible. Some scholars consider the difference about the same as that between English and Persian.

Whether the people are actually related is more of a question. Certainly, they are not descendants of Slavonic, Teutonic or Viking tribes. Their emergence from Central Asia is lost in misty time. Most Finns are blue-eyed blonds, but others are short and dark-haired, with high cheekbones, oblique eyes and straight or flat noses, a slightly Oriental look that is quite different from their Scandinavian neighbors. And their temperament is different, more passive, simpler, more defensive.

In 1155, the newly Christianized kingdom of Sweden launched a crusade to convert the pagan nomads in the marshes to the east and absorb them into the realm. The Swedes called them Finns, presumably "the people of the fens," and the country Finnmark. The Finns call themselves Suomi, which in their own language means "the people of the marshes." The language and the character persisted, despite pervasive Swedish overlordship.

The language is spoken also by the Lapps of northern Sweden and Norway, though they are a quite different people, also of Asian origin, who seem to have something in common with the Eskimos of North America. There are groups of people who speak Finnish in Russian Karelia, the eastern half of the great inverted V which juts out from the Eurasian land mass into the Arctic. (The western side comprises Norway and Sweden.) And there are groups in the Volga basin and the Urals whose language is related. History offers no guide, but some common traditions have been handed down through legends of nature worship, ancestor worship, a belief in magical spells and great skill at hunting. The Finns' cultural survival attests to a deep, stubborn clannishness, since there were no records, no monuments, no important urban centers to sustain it.

Finland itself is a daunting country of brooding, rugged beauty, but it is not bountiful. It is shaped like a torso, with only 3 percent of the land arable and another 5 percent grassland. The rest is forests, lakes and swamps. Publicists call it the "land of a thousand lakes." Actually, there are 60,000, many connected by canals forming great inland waterways to make up for the shortage of land transport. The climate is harsh, except in the south and southwest, where it is moderated by warming winds from the sea. The population of nearly 5 million is gradually becoming urbanized. Living standards have risen dramatically in recent years, but a hard peasant life with little to relieve the drudgery is not far in the past.

Helsinki, the capital, is a quiet-provincial-looking city in the midst of birch woods. But it has endowed itself with some of the world's loveliest modern architecture, clean, bare surfaces of wood, glass and marble carefully set to harmonize with surroundings for scenic harmony. The great Finnish architect Eero Saarinen was the leader of a school of modern design which springs from the sweep and simplicity of the countryside, exalting the natural texture of materials, especially wood, and the open plane of the pale sky. Foreigners in Moscow flock to Stockman's, the major department store in Helsinki, to buy all the Western comforts and provisions they cannot get in the Soviet Union. Stockman's has the biggest bookstore in the world. Finns flock to Leningrad by boat or by train for weekend vodka binges because of the extremely high prices the temperance movement has imposed on alcohol at home.

Their glum history has not been kind to the Finns, but they have made the best of minimal opportunity. Long a backwater of Sweden,

which introduced Lutherism in 1528, Finland was embroiled in repeated Swedish wars and sent men to fight with Swedish armies in Germany and elsewhere. From 1710, when Peter the Great set out to conquer the land, it was recurrently contested by the Russians and the Swedes, suffering the famine and pestilence which are the ghoulish companions of war. The Tsar won in the war with Sweden of 1808–09, transferring Finland to his empire but as an autonomous grand duchy with special rights.

Alexander I granted a constitution, and in 1863 Alexander II convoked the Diet, which had not been allowed to meet for fifty-six years. It was a period when cultural nationalism was stirring throughout the empires of Europe. The national saga *Kalevala* by Elias Lonnrott, called the Finnish Homer, was the first major work to establish a literary language; until then, Swedish had dominated among the educated. The tale became a much loved and important base of national identity. The first Finnish novel, *The Seven Brothers* by Aleksis Kivi, paid tribute to the Finnish soul, the woods, the land, and so helped define the Finns for themselves.

But there was also a move toward Russification in the late ninteenth century. Tsarist officials adopted the motto "One law, one church, one tongue" to combat both Swedish influence and rising Finnish national consciousness. At the end of the century, Nicholas II took matters brutally in hand. He wiped out Finland's semi-independence in a series of measures which culminated with the Russian governor, General Nikolai Bobrikov, assuming dictatorial power. Helsinki was subjected to the St. Petersburg system of spies, police raids, illegal arrests, banishment and suppression of newspapers. The Finns put up dogged resistance. In November 1905, they added a national strike to the Tsar's other problems—the attempted revolution at home and defeat in the war with Japan.

St. Petersburg hastily restored the Finnish duchy's privileges, and a new constitution was drawn up with universal suffrage and freedom of the press, speech and association. But the respite was short-lived. Russification began again in 1908. The Finnish Diet was twice dissolved, killing its social reforms, including child welfare, state insurance, old-age pensions, provisions for landless workers and prohibition of alcohol. When war broke out in 1914, Russia made some concessions in an attempt to appease the Finns and persuade them to volunteer for the Russian armies. But the Finns feared a Russian victory would bring renewed oppression. Only two thousand offered to fight for the Tsar,

no more than those who fled and enlisted to fight against him on the German side.

Finland itself was spared the carnage. But the Allied blockade caused suffering to those who were not involved in military supply industries, which prospered hugely. After Nicholas II was forced to abdicate in the Kerensky revolution of 1917, the Russian Provisional Government quickly restored representative government to Finland. There was a split in the Diet, with the Social Democrats prepared to accept an autonomy that would leave defense and foreign policy in Russian hands, while others sought complete independence. It was a time of turmoil, with many strikes, food shortages and outbreaks of rioting. The Bolshevik Revolution in October 1917 sharpened the division of sympathies.

Finally, that December, the Finns declared independence, recognized by the new Bolshevik government and confirmed by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war against Germany in March 1918. But it did not shield Finland against the Russian civil war which followed. Starving Red Guards, reinforced by rebellious Russian troops, began to overrun the country. Baron Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim quickly organized a White army to oppose them. It was not enough to restore order. Sweden was asked for help and refused, so the government turned to Germany, which sent 12,000 troops. The Whites and Germans defeated the Reds and drove out the Russians, proceeding to a counterterror which cost thousands more lives. A Finnish throne was offered to Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, brother-in-law of Kaiser Wilhelm II. He never went north to be crowned. Germany's defeat in November 1918 turned Finnish aspirations away from the quarrel between sympathizers of the Bolsheviks and the Kaiser. They looked then to the British-American model of constitutional government. Mannerheim was still keen to intervene on the White side in the Russian civil war, but neither the Allies nor Finnish moderates offered support.

A republic was established on June 17, 1919, with a new constitution. A peace treaty was signed with Russia in 1920. The experience left a strong strain of pro-German sentiment, especially among conservatives. It flared up again after the Stalin-Hitler pact and the outbreak of World War II. Stalin took half of Poland and the Baltic states in agreement with Hitler, and then sought to press the advantage by demanding territorial concessions from Finland. The Finns refused.

In November, the Soviets launched the "winter war" of 1939–40. The

Finnish defense was vigorous and determined, despite the greatly superior strength of the Soviet forces. Britain and France, at war with Germany and fearful that the Finns might call Nazi troops to their aid, offered help. Sweden gave assistance, but it and Norway would not allow passage of foreign troops for fear of being drawn into the war, and Helsinki refrained from the public appeal for an expeditionary force which the Allies considered necessary. On March 13, 1940, the Finns signed a treaty in Moscow ceding 10 percent of their territory in return for peace. But when the Germans invaded the Soviet Union a year later, Finns went to the front to fight the Russians again.

The Allied victory in World War II not only confirmed Soviet territorial gains, it established a tacit but firm new Soviet right of surveillance in Finnish affairs. But the Red Army attempt to occupy Finland in 1944 was stopped short of the 1940 border, so there was room for a kind of diplomatic maneuvering that became impossible for the countries of Eastern Europe as the wartime Allied agreements hardened into hostile Cold War. The Finnish statesmen who found the way to appease the Soviets without surrendering basic national rights were the conservative President, Juho Kusti Paasikivi, and his cautious but clever successor, Urho Kekkonen. They devised a policy of bear-soothing which consisted of assurances that Finland would never be an invasion route into Soviet territory nor the ally of an invader, but a friendly outsider with the right to be different. They called it the "new realism." It has never been seriously challenged within the country, though people in the West came to call the arrangement "Finlandization." The Finns find the term offensive because of its failure to recognize their remarkable achievement of maintaining freedom under the Soviet shadow. For people in Eastern Europe, it represents a dream far beyond their horizon as they struggle to maintain a national existence under Soviet weight.

To show its willingness to be considerate of Soviet interests, Finland followed Stalin's lead in rejecting the Marshall Plan of American aid for European reconstruction in 1947. In 1948, the year of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia, Finland obtained a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviets which stopped short of initial Soviet demands. It was not in the pattern of the pacts Moscow signed with the countries absorbed into the Soviet bloc, though it obliged Finland to help the Soviet Union "with all the forces at its disposal in the event of aggression by West Germany or any of its allies" and to hold "consul-

tations" in case of danger. But its preamble also recognized "Finland's aspiration to remain outside great-power conflicts," and the Soviets gained no right to station troops within the new Finnish borders.

More important than the formal agreements, however, was the intricate way the new relationship evolved. Finnish diplomats point out that, although the country was deeply disturbed, Finland did not vote for the United Nations resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Neutral Sweden and Austria did. But then, neither did Finland condemn the United States during the Vietnam War, as Sweden did. "Our idea of neutrality," an official said, "is never to take sides." Juridically, Finland is not absolutely neutral, because of its obligation to come to the aid of the Soviet Union. But though it carefully sets a line that never goes beyond what the Russians are likely to consider provocative, Finland still tilts toward the democratic countries whenever that is possible. With quiet diplomacy, President Kekkonen provided important support for Austria when the Soviets sought to block its membership in the British-sponsored European Free Trade Association in the 1960s. Finland was a member. Later, it was able to sign a trade agreement with the European Common Market, balanced by a similar agreement with the Soviet-led Comecon, though two-thirds of Finland's trade remains with EEC and EFTA countries.

The constitution of 1919 was maintained, with its religious rights and its requirement for a five-sixths legislative vote to prevent restriction on the right to private property. There is no censorship, but self-censorship is practiced widely and rigorously as a requirement of "responsible patriotism." When pressure does come, it is accommodated as reservedly as possible, resisted when that seems feasible.

There are Finns who resent the need to bow this much, but there is no alternative and they recognize that. The Soviet treaty was extended for twenty years in 1970. There is already concern about renewal in 1990, lest Moscow make new demands when the time comes for renegotiation. Looking ahead, the Finns made in 1974 what many consider a shameful understanding to return any defectors who escape from the Soviet Union into their territory. Looking away, they have managed not to notice those refugees who make their way all across Finland to asylum in Sweden.

The Russians got on well with Kekkonen, an important reason why he remained at the helm for twenty-five years. When he retired in 1981 at the age of eighty-one, the Finns proceeded to the choice of a new

leader with great delicacy. They did not pick the Soviet favorite, Ahti Karjalainen, who like Kekkonen was a member of the Center Party but unlike Kekkonen was not very popular. Instead, in early 1982 they picked Mauno Koivisto, a stocky, rock-faced Social Democrat who had been Prime Minister. He had already signaled his determination to hold Finland's foreign policy steady, and Moscow made no objection. He was the first foreign head of state received after Yuri Andropov's accession to power in Moscow, a reminder that Andropov's own climb to the top began in Soviet Karelia as a protégé of the veteran Finnish Communist Otto Kuusinen.

The Soviets interfere with a heavier hand in the politics of Finland's Communists, members of the inevitable coalition government, than in other areas of Finland's political life. There is a minority pro-Soviet faction and a majority nationalist faction, whose retiring chairman, Aarne Saarinen, attacked the minority in 1982 for relying on Moscow support instead of on Finnish workers. The Russians publicly came out for the minority leader, accusing his rivals of deviationism and anti-Soviet tendencies, a thorough whacking in Soviet jargon. The Communist party congress chose a young man in the middle of the split, the thirty-nine-year-old Minister of Labor, Jouko Kajanoja. But on his way out, Saarinen openly accused the Russians of "provocative activity" and, in an unprecedented tongue-lashing, said, "The Soviet Communist Party can sometimes be in error. We are now faced with one such error." This kind of blunt exchange delights Finns with its fresh air of freedom, but also worries them lest it bring a Soviet crackdown. They are always attentive to the straw in the wind. But the party has been steadily declining of late and no longer is significant to Finnish politics.

The Helsinki negotiations, concluded with a summit conference of European, Canadian and American leaders in 1975, was a reinforcement of Finland's position. It was an acknowledgment that the West as well as East accepts Finland's position outside their rivalry, allowing it to be a little more neutral than the treaty with the Soviets suggests. From Moscow's point of view, the main significance of the Helsinki accords was that it ratified postwar borders in Europe in the absence of a German peace treaty. This seemed to imply that the special Finnish role and Finnish borders were also ratified by all the signatories.

In one of the rare Soviet territorial retreats, Nikita Khrushchev had returned the Porkkala Peninsula in 1956 when he was seeking to ease international tensions. It was in the same post-Stalinist period that he

approved the Austrian State Treaty, withdrawing Soviet troops from their occupation zone in Austria and making Austrian neutrality an international obligation, and made his remarkable trip to Belgrade for a reconciliation with Marshal Tito. No such Soviet withdrawals have taken place since, not even from the four small northern Japanese islands whose disputed ownership has prevented a Soviet-Japanese peace treaty and encouraged Japanese friendship with China, to Moscow's unease. In comparison with others who fought the Soviets and lost, the Finns did well. On balance, Moscow has endorsed the Kekkonen line that if Finland maintains friendly relations with the Soviet Union, it will be free to govern itself and develop economic relations with the West.

The military-political issue is the central one, but Finland also has serious economic interests in the East. Soviet orders have kept its specialized shipyards—mainly icebreakers—busy when shipbuilders elsewhere were having to shut down. The Soviets provide a guaranteed supply of petroleum at world market prices and buy Finnish machinery, which would have trouble finding other markets. The decline of oil prices in the mid-1980s left Finland with a huge trade surplus with the Soviets, beneficial in terms of jobs but worrisome in terms of dependence. It tries to keep at least three-fourths of its trade directed westward, but the competition is tight with other Scandinavian countries. By far the largest export is wood and wood products, including paper, which account for 60 percent of hard-currency earnings. It is a very modern industry, with new equipment and high productivity. But there is a conflict with farmers who own those forests that have not been nationalized and drive up the price of wood.

Still, life has improved so dramatically in a generation that Finland is no longer one of the countries which send a high proportion of their youth abroad in search of a living. There is social welfare, without the astringency of Swedish socialism, and encouragement to enterprise. Young people travel, mostly in search of the sun during the dark winter, and return home with a new pride in their quiet, unpolluted, uncrowded, very clean country. Happiness is tranquil solitude beside a shimmering lake.

The Finns are dedicated sports fans and they read a lot, winter nights are so long. They worry when world tensions rise—it could easily affect them—but the trouble spots are usually far away. From what seemed an extremely precarious situation, they have built a sense of security

and optimism in a young, future-looking society. People in other countries sometimes warn of the risk of being "Finlandized" and of the need to face down the Soviets, but the essentially moderate Finns tried that and failed. They are aware that the guarantee of their success in finding a tolerable balance depends on the existence of strong defenses in the West. But they are pleased with themselves. Matti Virtanen, a young clerk in an export company who likes to drink beer in an English-style pub, and who jogs, plays darts and follows the news of disasters around the world, summed it up, "Being born in this country is like winning the lottery of life."

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FLORA LEWIS

ALSO BY FLORA LEWIS

CASE HISTORY OF HOPE (1958)
RED PAWN (1963)
ONE OF OUR H-BOMBS IS MISSING (1965)

EUROPE

A TAPESTRY OF NATIONS

SIMON AND SCHUSTER
NEW YORK/LONDON/TORONTO/SYDNEY/TOKYO

in their enthusiasm: 'If this were not good, the Prince and his boyars would not have accepted it.' On the morrow, the Prince went forth to the Dnieper River with the priests of the Princess and those from Kherson, and a countless multitude assembled. They all went into the water: some stood up to their necks, others to their breasts, and the younger near the bank, some of them holding children in their arms, while the adults waded further out. The priests stood by and offered prayers. There was joy in heaven and upon earth to behold so many souls saved...

"When the people were baptized, they returned each to his own abode." (Laurentian Text, year 988, "Primary Chronicle," trans. and edit. by Samuel Cross and Olgerd P. Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Medieval Academy of America, Cambridge, Mass., 1953).

Two generations, however, before Prince Vladimir (vars. Wolodymyr, Volodymyr), Christianity made its first entrance, albeit tentative, into the ruling family of Rus-Ukraine in the person of Princess Olha. The wife of Prince Ihor of Kiev (914-945) this remarkable woman was baptized as a Christian around 955, although the place and circumstances of the ceremony are not certain. Various accounts of her journeys to Constantinople as the Head of the Kievan State in 955 and 957 already regard Olha as a Christian. Although her religious influence on her son Sviatoslav, Prince of Kiev from 964-972, was negated by his insistence on remaining a pagan, Olha's new-found Faith was eventually and formally accepted by her grandson, Prince Vladimir the Great (980-1015). The Primary Chronicler fondly referred to Saint Olha as "the Dawn before the Sun," the latter being, of course, Saint and Prince Vladimir.

This great Prince, who died July 15, 1015, was recognized as a Saint first in Novhorod in 1254 according to the Ipatsky Chronicle. The

St. Olha
by Yakiw Hnizdowskyj

first mention among Christians of Prince Vladimir as a Saint can be found in the Laurentian Chronicle under the year 1263. His official sainthood title is "Equal to the Apostles."

The official introduction of Christianity in 988 was only the beginning of St. Vladimir's heroic labors. His work continued through the building of churches and the promotion of Christian charity.

As early as 989 he began the construction of the Dormition of Mary Church in Kiev, setting aside one-tenth of his royal income for this purpose. The number of churches he built and the funds he sacrificed for this purpose are both beyond counting. In fact, Metropolitan Hilarion of Kiev some 60 years later wrote in his "Slovo": "Throughout the entire land of Rus Prince Vladimir raised up churches to Christ and sent ministers to serve thereat."

St. Vladimir's zeal in providing churches and priests for his people was matched by his personal works of charity of both the physical and spiritual nature. Widows, orphans, unlettered, poor, hungry, homeless and slaves were all objects of his concern and largess. Schools and shelters were established, homes for the abandoned and hospices for the ailing were founded. The Monk Jacob wrote: "It is impossible for me to describe all (Vladimir's) merciful deeds. He gave merciful aid not only to his own court but to the entire city. And not only in Kiev alone, but throughout the land of Rus." St. Vladimir laid the Christian groundwork that enabled Kiev to become, some 40 years later, the most civilized and cultured city of all Europe.

The immediate legacy of St. Vladimir, who took the name Wasyl (In English "Basil") upon his Baptism, was striking and profound. Two of his sons, Borys and Hlib chose Christian martyrdom over internecine mayhem and murder in the dynastic wars that followed his death. The two young princes, whose feastday

Coin of Prince Vladimir

is July 24, were slain in 1015 by the hirelings of a jealous half-brother, Sviatopolk. Princes Borys and Hlib were the first native-born to be regarded as saints in Rus-Ukraine.

It did not take long for the labors and loves of St. Vladimir to reach full fruition in Rus-Ukraine. The long and relatively peaceful reign of his son, Yaroslav the Wise (1019-1054) guaranteed not only the growth but the blossoming of the seeds of Christianity. Yaroslav built the citadel of Kiev, the Golden Gate, the Cathedral Church of Hagia Sophia, Church of the Annunciation and Monasteries of St. George for men and St. Irene for women. Above all else, he himself pursued and fostered among others the study and translation of church books. History remembers him with his title "The Wise". Besides sharing in the foundation of the world-famous Monastery of the Caves, Yaroslav convoked the first assembly of native bishops in 1051 and nominated Hilarion, a son of Rus-Ukraine, to be the Metropolitan of Kiev. It is no empty praise that the Laurentian Chronicler writes under the year 1037: "For as one man, Vladimir plows the land, and another sows, and still others eat and reap food in abundance, so did Prince Yaroslav. His father Vladimir plowed and harrowed the soil when he enlightened Rus through Baptism, while this Prince Yaroslav sowed the hearts of the faithful with the written word, while we in turn

reap the harvest by receiving the teaching of books."

St. Vladimir died of natural causes at his palace in Berestovo, a few miles from Kiev on July 15, 1015. The Laurentian Chronicler says that "when the people heard of this, they assembled in multitude and mourned him, the boyars as the Defender of their country, the poor as their Protector and Benefactor. They placed him in a marble coffin, and buried the body of the Sainted Prince (in the church of Mary's Dormition) amid their mourning. He is the new Constantine of mighty (the second) Rome who had himself baptized and his subjects; for the Prince of Rus imitated the deeds of Constantine himself."

For the people of Rus-Ukraine, St. Vladimir's deeds of 988 and the introduction of the Christian Faith and Church were the beginning of a new age. In 1988 the sons and daughters of Rus-Ukraine will celebrate the 1,000th anniversary (Millennium) of this man, this Faith and this Church.

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Reprinted through the generosity of Ukrainian priests.



Prince Yaroslav the Wise

The Millennium of the Christianization of Ukraine

988—1988

St. Vladimir
by Wasyl Masiutyn

Archdiocese of Philadelphia
Millennium Commission

Mosaic of Mary in Hagia Sophia Cathedral, Kiev

BAPTISM OF UKRAINE

The year 1988 for Ukrainians all over the world will be one of jubilation and joy, as they celebrate their 1,000th anniversary-millennium of the official introduction of Christianity into their country. As Ukrainian people prepare for this truly historical event, the commemoration of the Baptism of Rus-Ukraine, it seems only appropriate to inform people everywhere of the chronicle of events surrounding the Baptism of Ukraine.

* * *

"When Prince Vladimir arrived at his capital Kiev, he directed that the idols should be overthrown, and that some should be cut to pieces and others burned with fire. He thus ordered that Perun should be bound to a horse's tail and dragged down Borichev Path to the River...

"Thereafter Vladimir sent heralds throughout the whole city to proclaim that if any inhabitants, rich or poor, did not betake themselves to the river, they would risk the Prince's displeasure. When the people heard these words, they wept for joy, and exclaimed

Special
Report
No. 159

Soviet Repression of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

January 1987

The following report was prepared by the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in January 1987.

During the nearly seven decades that have elapsed since the Bolsheviks seized power, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has sought to eliminate religion or, failing that, utilize it for the purposes of the state. In this deliberate attack on religion, no institution has suffered more than the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Claiming the devotion of millions in western Ukraine, the church—leaders and laity alike—has been systematically repressed by Soviet rule. Official Soviet historiography even goes as far as to claim that the church "liquidated itself" in 1946, that its followers "voluntarily joined" the Russian Orthodox Church.[1]

But the Ukrainian Catholic Church lives on, in the catacombs, as witness numerous *samizdat* documents and repeated discussions in Soviet publications of the need to repress it. This paper sets forth an account of that repression.

Church and State in the Soviet Union: 1917–46

Situated primarily in western Ukraine, which the Soviets forcibly annexed from Poland in 1939, the Ukrainian Catholic Church traces its modern lineage to the 1596 Union of Brest, through which it affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church while preserving its Byzantine form of worship and spirituality. Thus, unlike the Russian Orthodox Church or the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church that arose after the revolution in eastern Ukraine, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has looked to the West, recognizing the authority of the Pope from its inception.

Western Ukraine poses a particular problem for the Soviet regime, since, according to Soviet sources, nearly half of the officially permitted religious congregations in the Soviet Union are located there.[2] In addition, there are many unofficial groups which include Ukrainian Catholics. Furthermore, the Ukrainian Catholic Church has served as a focus for the development of a distinct Ukrainian national and cultural identity in western Ukraine. Not surprisingly, these characteristics have marked the church in Soviet eyes.

In its first years the Soviet regime attacked all religious institutions, accusing them of political opposition to the regime and collusion with its internal and external enemies. All religious groups suffered from discriminatory Soviet legislation, beginning with the Soviet Decree of February 5, 1918, on the Separation of Church From State and School From Church. The new laws transferred all church property, including all houses of worship, to the state. Clergy and their families were stripped of their civil rights. Organized religious instruction of minors was made a criminal offense, and all theological schools were closed, as eventually were all monasteries and convents. The regime sponsored abusive antireligious campaigns which were accompanied by the harassment of believers and their exclusion from all positions of importance.

During the 1920s, however, the regime shifted its tactics in the direction of "sovietization" of individual churches and sects. "Disloyal" religious leaders were replaced by others who were willing to accept a platform of loyalty to the Soviet state and were prepared to submit to far-reaching controls over the external and internal activities of their groups. By 1927 these conditions were accepted by the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in return for a limited and uncertain tolerance; but the price was the alienation of many Orthodox bishops, clergy, and believers who considered such a compromise with the atheist state to be incompatible with the integrity and spiritual mission of their church.

These early won concessions did not last long, however. By 1929 Stalin's regime had embarked on a violent, widespread antireligious campaign. More and more churches and prayer houses of all faiths were closed down by the authorities, often on the basis of fabricated "demands of workers." Growing numbers of bishops and clergy were banished, imprisoned, or executed. This situation worsened during the late 1930s, culminating by the end of the decade in the near total suppression of institutional religion throughout the Soviet Union. Soviet authorities destroyed what remained of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church during this period, killing most of its bishops and many thousands of its followers.[3] They also drew up plans for the liquida-

tion of the Ukrainian Catholic Church; these became reality with the Soviet acquisition in 1939 of western Ukraine and western Belorussia, which had large congregations of Catholics. With Soviet occupation, there immediately followed the abolition or state takeover of longstanding church institutions—including schools, seminaries, monasteries, and publishing houses—and the confiscation of all church properties and lands. Finally, as the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Soviet secret police rounded up a large number of Ukrainian Catholic priests who were either murdered or deported to the east.

Following the Nazi attack on the U.S.S.R., Stalin altered substantially his tactics toward religious communities. Fearing for the very survival of the Soviet regime, he reduced antireligious propaganda and offered significant concessions to the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as other denominations, in the hope of harnessing all the potential of the Soviet Union in its struggle against Nazi Germany. But with the Soviet reoccupation of Ukraine in 1944, repression of Ukrainian Catholics, already suffering under Nazi occupation, was resumed once again, culminating in the official "liquidation" of the church in 1946.

Liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, 1946

From the very beginning of the Soviet reoccupation of western Ukraine, measures aimed at liquidating the Ukrainian Catholic Church were undertaken. In the winter of 1944–45, Soviet authorities summoned Catholic clergy to "reeducation" sessions conducted by the secret police, the NKVD. On April 5, 1945, the Soviet media began an anti-Catholic campaign. Then on April 11, 1945, the NKVD began arresting the entire Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy of western Ukraine, including the secular and monastic clergy—a program that would last for the next 5 years. Along with Metropolitan Yosyf Slipyj, the NKVD arrested Bishop Nykyta Budka, the Vicar General of the Metropolitan; Gregory Khomyshyn, the Bishop of Stanislav, and his Auxiliary Bishop, John Liatyshevsky; Paul Goydych, the Bishop of Priashiv, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Basil Hopko; Bishop Nicholas Charnetsky, Apostolic Visitator of Volyn; Monsignor Peter Verhun, Apostolic Visitator for Ukrainian emigrants in Germany; and Josaphat Kotsylovsky, the Bishop of Peremyshl, and his Auxiliary Bishop, Gregory Lakota. (All but one of these either died in prison or died shortly thereafter, their health ruined by the abuse they had suffered; only Metropolitan Slipyj, through the efforts of Pope John XXIII, was finally released from prison in 1963 and allowed to leave for Rome.) According to eyewitnesses, in Lvov alone there were about 800 priests imprisoned at that time; and in Chortkov about 150 priests from the district of Ternopol were deported to Siberia.[4]

Meanwhile, in late May 1945, as these mass arrests of Catholic clergy were being carried out, Soviet authorities sponsored the so-called Initiating Committee for the Reunification of the Greek Catholic Church With the Russian Orthodox Church. This was a preparatory committee, which subsequently convened a pseudosynod—the authorities proclaimed it a "Sobor"—in Lvov on March 8–10, 1946. In that "Sobor" an end was proclaimed to the 1596 Union of Brest, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church was declared "reunified" with the Russian Orthodox Church.

This entire exercise was planned and guided by Soviet authorities. Knowledge of the "Sobor" was withheld from the public; no advance election of delegates was held, and only 216 clerics and 19 laymen—allegedly representing the Ukrainian Catholic Church—brought about "reunification." Not surprisingly, the NKVD was entrusted with the task of coercing the remaining Catholic clergy to join the Russian Orthodox Church.

Both the Vatican and the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the West have refused to recognize this forced reunification, considering it to be uncanonical and illegal: according to Catholic and traditional Russian Orthodox canon law, to be valid, a synod must be called by the Pope or by a patriarch and must be attended by bishops. Yet Soviet authorities consider this "Sobor" and its decisions binding on all Ukrainian Catholics in the U.S.S.R. to this day.[5] The protests of almost 300 Ukrainian clerics and the 1946 and 1952 encyclicals of Pope Pius XII in defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church have gone unheeded. Moreover, the same fate met the Catholic Church in Transcarpathia, a part of Czechoslovakia incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. at the end of World War II, where the Mukachiv eparchy was liquidated and subordinated to the Russian Orthodox Church in 1947. Its bishop, Theodor Romza, was killed.[6]

The following table, comparing the situation of the Ukrainian Catholic

Situation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church

Number in 1939		Losses Suffered by 1950
Dioceses	4	All dioceses liquidated.
Territory of Apostolic Visitator	1	Liquidated.
Bishops	8	All imprisoned, condemned, died in prison, killed, or exiled.
Parishes	2,772	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church; some liquidated.
Churches and chapels	4,119	Taken over by the Russian Orthodox Church or closed.
Monasteries and convents	142	Confiscated and closed by the authorities; a few transferred to the Russian Orthodox Church.
Other church institutions		All liquidated.
Secular priests	2,638	Fewer than half forced into Russian Orthodox Church; others imprisoned or in hiding.
Monastic clergy	164	Dispersed, imprisoned together with three Provincial Superiors.
Brothers	193	Dispersed or imprisoned.
Seminarians	229	Dispersed or refugees.
Nuns	580	Dispersed.
Faithful	4,048,515	Many imprisoned or deported for their faith; majority resisting passively.

Church prior to World War II with the situation in 1950, offers a graphic picture of the losses suffered by the church from its forced reunion.[7]

The Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs

Forty years after the official abolition of their church, Ukrainian Catholic communities continue to exist in the Soviet Union, as even Soviet sources attest. The most telling evidence of the survival of the Catholic Church is to be found in Soviet propaganda, which wages a vigorous campaign against the church through books, pamphlets, periodicals, television programs, movies, lectures, and exhibits, all designed to falsify the historical record, defame Catholic leaders and clergy, and intimidate church members. To this day, the great Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who led his church for four and one-half decades (1900–44), saving the lives of thousands of Jews during World War II, is maligned by Soviet officials.

At the outset, the priests of the Catacomb Church were those who did not rejoin Russian orthodoxy during the 1945–49 period but remained Catholics, giving up any public exercise of their clerical duties. After 1946, a significant portion of Catholic laymen continued to depend on the services of these "illegal" priests and monks, whose numbers increased after the mid-1940s with the return of what the Soviets called "recalcitrant" clergymen—those who had completed their sentences or had benefited from the post-Stalin amnesties.

The hope that de-Stalinization would lead to the restoration of the Ukrainian Catholic Church produced a marked intensification of covert Catholic activities. By the late 1950s, however, as more and more "converts" to the church began to repudiate orthodoxy, communist authorities dispelled any hope for a change in official policy toward the church by arresting even more priests and unleashing a new wave of anti-Catholic propaganda. Notwithstanding this widespread antireligious campaign, the number of priests increased in western Ukraine in the 1950s and thereafter, due in part to secret ordinations in exile. In addition, the existence of secret theological "seminaries" in Ternopol and Kolomyia was reported in the Soviet press in the 1960s in connection with the arrests of their organizers.

Today, the underground Catholic Church is said to embrace hundreds of priests, headed by a number of secret bishops working under the authority of their primate in Rome. Religious women in orders working throughout Ukraine number more than 1,000. Many former Catholic and non-Orthodox priests have retained a spiritual allegiance to the Pope as well, while others have taken up civilian professions and continue to celebrate the sacraments in private. A certain number of Ukrainian Catholic priests live in exile outside western Ukraine or as free settlers in Siberia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and eastern Ukraine, often serving their faithful from afar. Members of religious communities and monastic orders have maintained close contact with each other, and most have remained faithful to their vows. In 1974, a clandestine Catholic convent was uncovered by police in Lvov.

Almost invariably, these clergymen and monastics hold full-time secular jobs or have retired from such employment. The identities of the older clergy seem to be known to the Soviet police, who frequently subject them to searches, interrogations, and fines but stop short of arrests unless they have extended their activities beyond a narrow circle of friends in private homes. It appears, however, that Soviet authorities are much more ruthless in dealing with new, secretly ordained priests.

In 1968, apparently in connection with the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in Czechoslovakia, the harassment of "recalcitrant" clergy escalated into a large-scale campaign against "illegal" Ukrainian Catholic clergy. Many of these clergymen were subjected to searches, interrogations, fines, and beatings. In January 1969, the KGB arrested an underground Catholic bishop named Vasyl' Velychkovskiy and two Catholic priests, sentencing them to 3-years imprisonment for alleged violations of the "law on cults."

Religious activities that are "illegal" when performed by Catholic priests or members include holding religious services; educating children in the Catholic faith; performing baptisms, wedding rites, and funerals; hearing confessions; anointing the ill; copying religious materials; and possessing prayer books, icons, church calendars, religious books, and other sacred objects. Soviet sources reveal numerous examples of arrests for such activities. One is the case of Reverend Ivan Kryvy, who was arrested in 1973 for organizing the printing of a Ukrainian Catholic prayer book (actually a reprint of a prayer book published in Canada in 1954) in three consecutive editions (1969, 1971, and 1972) totaling 3,500 copies. The work was done by two employees of the Lvov state printing shop who also were arrested in 1973 together with another person involved in the distribution of these materials. In the same manner, the clandestine printers also produced 150 copies of a "Carol and Church Songs" book and 150 copies of the "Missal."

The most active lay people and clergy of the "illegal" church have tried to use legal means to defend their church. By 1956–57, there were cases in which believers had tried to legalize their Ukrainian Catholic communities according to Soviet law by petitioning the proper authorities to permit their parish congregations to operate openly. A number of such petitions were sent in the late 1960s and early 1970s, including an appeal from the Ukrainian Catholics of the city of Stryi, which reached the West in 1972. All of these petitions were refused. In 1976 a Ukrainian Catholic priest named Reverend Volodymyr Prokopiv was arrested for accompanying a delegation of Ukrainians to Moscow with such a petition, signed by a large number of Catholics from the Lvov region. The Soviet response to these petitions has been to sharpen repressive measures against the activist clergy, monastics, and lay people and to intensify their propaganda.

In recent years, the cause of persecuted Ukrainian Catholics has been taken up by the dissident movement in Ukraine. Since 1970, the movement's organ, the *Ukrainian Herald*, has carried accounts of the harassment, searches, arrests, and trials of Catholics and has editorially condemned "wanton liquidation" of the church as "illegal and unconstitutional." A leading Ukrainian dissident, historian Valentyn Moroz, devoted part of his *Chronicle of Resistance* to the nation-building role of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine; he equated the regime's anti-Catholic struggle with an attack upon "the spiritual structure of the nation."

Lithuanian Catholic dissidents also have raised their voices in recent years. In their petitions to Soviet authorities and in their underground *Chronicle of the Lithuanian Catholic Church*, they have joined Ukrainian dissidents in calling for the lifting of the illegal ban on the Ukrainian Catholic Church. Likewise, in September 1974, a leading Russian Orthodox dissident named Anatoliy Levitin-Krasnov appealed to Sakharov's human rights committee in Moscow to raise its voice in defense of Ukrainian Catholics and other persecuted religious groups. "The Union in Western Ukraine," wrote Levitin-Krasnov, "is a massive popular movement. Its persecution means not only

religious oppression, but also restriction of the national rights of Western Ukraine."[8]

Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine

At the beginning of 1984, a group of Ukrainian Catholics began to publish and disseminate a *samizdat* publication, the *Chronicle of the Catholic Church*. To date, *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty* in Munich has received and broadcast nine numbered issues of the *Chronicle* plus one special issue. The 10th edition of the *Chronicle* was published in June 1986 and had a significant change in title: *Chronicle of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in the Catacombs*. The *Chronicle* is published by members of the "Initiative Group for the Defense of the Right of Believers and the Church in Ukraine," which was established in 1982 and spearheads the campaign of Ukrainian Catholics for the legalization of their church.[9]

It was the years of abortive demands by believers that authorities legalize the activities of the Catholic Church in western Ukraine that brought about the emergence of an organized human rights movement among believers. In early 1982 the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics was formed, and Yosyf Terelya was elected its chairman. In a statement about the formation of the Initiative Group, addressed to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Terelya wrote:

> This was the response of Ukrainian Catholics to increasing repression against the Ukrainian Catholic Church. From now on, all information about the Ukrainian Catholic Church will be passed on for scrutiny by the world public. The Catholics of the world should know and be reminded in what conditions we exist.[10]

The first three issues of the *Chronicle* are varied, although they deal largely with the lives of believers—Catholics, Orthodox, Baptists, Pentecostals, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Seventh-Day Adventists—giving accounts of repressive measures taken against them and naming the camps and psychiatric hospitals in which they are confined. The journals also devote considerable attention to the sociopolitical situation in Ukraine and discuss such diverse subjects as the Raoul Wallenberg case, Russification, and the Polish workers' movement. Most of the information contained in the *Chronicle*, however, relates to the lives of members of the banned Ukrainian Catholic Church, especially to violations of their human rights. These journals underscore the needs of the people to worship freely in their own rite, to have their own churches with free access to them, and to have their own priests and their own language.[11]

The founder of the Initiative Group and moving force behind the *Chronicle*, Yosyf Terelya, was arrested on February 8, 1985, and sentenced on August 20, 1985, to 7 years imprisonment and 5 years exile for his religious activities. He had already spent years in various camps, prisons, and psychiatric institutions. He is currently serving his sentence in Camp #36 near Kuchino, the so-called death camp where, since May 1984, four prominent Ukrainian prisoners have died—Ukrainian Helsinki Monitors Vasyl' Stus, Oleska Tykhy, Yuriy Lytvyn, and journalist Valeriy Marchenko.

Terelya's successor as chairman of the Initiative Group, Vasyl' Kobryn, also was sentenced in March 1985 to 3 years imprisonment for "anti-Soviet slander." The plight of Terelya and Kobryn is just one example of the persecution of countless numbers of Ukrainian Catholics who have suffered harassment, illegal searches, beatings, and arrests solely because of their attempts to practice their religious beliefs.

Grounds for Repression

Clearly, the Ukrainian Catholic faithful who were driven underground following the forced 1946 "reunion" have posed an especially complicated problem for Soviet authorities. Enjoying massive support from believers in the western Ukraine, as well as from the strong Ukrainian Catholic diaspora in the West, the faithful have survived despite repeated repressive measures. They have survived both within the formal Orthodox Church—so-called secret Catholics—and as an "illegal" church with a succession of its own bishops and a network of secular and monastic clergy, performing clandestine religious rites in private homes, at cemeteries, and even in officially "closed" churches. Among young people, in particular, there has been a growing acceptance of religious traditions and symbols as important links with the past and as integral elements of national culture.

The reaction of the regime has been to renew its emphasis on mass, antireligious propaganda, especially in western Ukraine. Conferences have been organized on the subject of perfecting the methodology to combat Ukrainian Catholicism in western Ukraine.[12] Numerous publications have appeared that attempt to discredit the union of the congregations in Ukraine and what is now Belorussia with Rome in 1596; these go to great pains to prove the allegations that the Catholic Church conducted activities that were directed against the population of Ukraine during the first half of the 20th century.

The growth of interest in Ukrainian Catholicism has to be understood in relation to the general rise of interest in religion, spiritual values, and ethics among the younger generation in Ukraine. Complaints by Soviet officials and their publications attest to this revival. A letter by an avowed atheist published as part of an article on religious belief and atheist propaganda in a 1984 issue of *Nauka i Religiya (Science and Religion)* states:

> If you could only imagine how difficult it is for us atheists in Ukraine. For many years now, I have been involved in the thankless propagandizing task of Soviet ritualism. I have ploughed through mountains of literature, observed, pondered, and spent many hours in the churches where religious rites are practiced. I have come to the conclusion that Soviet official statistics are very far from reality.[13]

The problem of religious practices in western Ukraine also was raised by the first secretary of the Lvov Komsomol, Oleksiy Babiychuk:

> . . . in this oblast, particularly in the rural areas, a large number of the population adheres to religious practices, among them a large proportion of youth. In the last few years, the activity of the Uniates [Ukrainian Catholics] has grown, that of representatives of the Uniates as well as former Uniate priests; there are even reverberations to renew the overt activity of this Church.[14]

Another important factor in the steady growth of interest in Catholicism in Ukraine has been the proximity of the Solidarity movement and the election of a Slavic Pope. It is worth noting that for some years now the Polish dissident movement—particularly members of Solidarity—has supported Ukraine's quest for self-determination in its official statements and publications and, conversely, members of the dissident movement in the Ukraine, like Vasyl' Stus and Yosyf Terelya, have praised Solidarity in their activities. In an open letter, published in 1981 in the journal of Catholic opposition in Poland, *Spotkanie*, Ukrainian Catholics registered their joy on the occasion of the election of Cardinal Wojtyla as Pope.[15]

At the same time, Soviet authorities have launched a related propaganda campaign in Ukraine, disseminating publications that criticize the Vatican's support for believers in Soviet-bloc countries. The mass media also has stepped up its attacks on Pope John Paul II,

especially his support of Ukrainian Catholics.[16] The antireligious journal *Liudyna i Svit (Man and the World)*, published in Kiev, stated the following:

> Proof that the Church is persistently striving to strengthen its political influence in socialist countries is witnessed by the fact that Pope John Paul II gives his support to the emigre hierarchy of the so-called Ukrainian Catholic Church.... The current tactic of Pope John Paul II and the Roman Curia lies in the attempts to strengthen the position of the Church in all socialist countries as they have done in Poland, where the Vatican tried to raise the status of the Catholic Church to a state within a state. In the last few years, the Vatican has paid particular attention to the question of Catholicism of the Slavonic nations. This is poignantly underscored by the Pope when he states that he is not only a Pope of Polish origin, but the first Slavic Pope, and he will pay particular attention to the Christianization of all Slavic nations.[17]

These same themes were stressed at a 1981 symposium in Bratislava for specialists in antireligious propaganda in the Warsaw Pact countries. One of the papers dealing with Ukrainian Catholicism stated the following:

> Pope John Paul II has approved certain additional measures, directed in support of the Uniates.... [The] Head of the Vatican underscored his "dedication" to the Uniates by approving the claims of Cardinal Slipyj to represent and speak on behalf of all the faithful of the Western province of the Ukrainian S.S.R.[18]

However, Ukrainian Catholicism, seen as the strongest and most representative exponent of cultural and spiritual ties with the West, remains an obstacle to the Soviet goal of creating a single Soviet people. The Soviet regime has officially liquidated the church and also has attempted to erase it from historic memory. To enable Moscow to achieve its goals, all signs of the religion's ongoing revival are continuously repressed.

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[1]See note 4.

[2]*Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma*, publication no. 24, Moscow, 1979, p. 46. *Stanovleniya i rozvytok masovoho ateizmu v zakhidnykh oblastiakh Ukrainskoi RSR*, (Kiev, 1981), p. 51.

[3]Soviet repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in eastern Ukraine in the 1920s and 1930s was a portent of its later repression and liquidation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in western Ukraine. Shortly after the revolution, a number of Ukrainian Orthodox bishops separated themselves from the Russian Patriarchal Church, creating in 1920 an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Autocephalous Church. By 1924, the church embraced 30 bishops, 1,500 priests and deacons, and 1,100 parishes in the Ukrainian S.S.R. From 1922, however, Soviet authorities began imposing restrictions on the Autocephalous Church, attempting to split it from within by supporting a splinter faction. In 1926 they arrested its Metropolitan, Basil Lypkivsky, along with a number of other leaders and ordered the dissolution of its central body, the All-Ukrainian Church Council. Then in 1929, massive repressive measures were taken against the bishops, clergy, and faithful, culminating in the dissolution of the church in 1930. The remnant of the church was allowed to reconstitute itself at the end of 1930 but was progressively decimated until the last parish was suppressed in 1936. According to Ukrainian Orthodox sources, two metropolitans of the church, 26 archbishops and bishops, some 1,150 priests, 54 deacons, and approximately 20,000 lay members of the church councils as well as an undetermined number of the faithful were all killed. See *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Vol. II, University of Toronto Press, pp. 170–71.

[4]Analecta O.S.B.M., *First Victims of Communism White Book on the Religious Persecution in Ukraine* (Rome, 1953) pp. 42–44. This book was composed by Ukrainian Catholic priests resident in Rome; it was translated from Italian with Ecclesiastical Approbation.

[5]See, for example, K. Kharchev, Chairman of the Council of Religious Affairs attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, in an interview for the Warsaw weekly, *Prawo i zycie*, February 8, 1986, p. 13. The current stand of the Russian Orthodox Church regarding the Lvov "Sobor" is presented in detail in "The Moscow Patriarchate and the Liquidation of the Eastern Rite Catholic Church in Ukraine," *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 1985, pp. 182–188. Compare the article of Metropolitan Nikodimus of Lvov and Ternopol, published in *Visti z Ukrainy*, No. 5, January 1986, with the article in *Moskovskyye novosti*, No. 22, June 1986, and the article of K. Dmytruk in *Radianska Ukraina*, May 31, 1986.

[6]Analecta, *First Victims*, pp. 30–59.

[7]*Soviet Persecution of Religion in Ukraine*, Human Rights Commission World Congress of Free Ukrainians, Toronto, 1976, p. 28.

[8]*Ibid.*, pp. 33–34.

[9]Because of the potential for intentionally planted disinformation, it is impossible to be certain that all items in the *Chronicle* were written by or reflect the opinions of Ukrainian Catholics in Ukraine today. However, enough of the facts have been substantiated by other sources to make the *Chronicle* on the whole a credible source of information about the true status of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

[10]Yosyf Terelya, "Declaration to the CC CPU on the formation of the Initiative Group of the Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine," *Arkhiv Samizdata* (AS) 4897, *Radio Liberty*, Munich, 1983.

[11]On the *Chronicle*, see *Radio Liberty* 3/85, "Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine," January 7, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "The Church Rumbling Beneath the Kremlin," *The Times*, January 12, 1985; Maxine Pollack, "KGB Crackdown in the Ukraine," *The Sunday Times*, January 27, 1985; Bohdan Nahaylo, "Persecuted Ukrainian Catholics Speak Out," *The Wall Street Journal* (European edition), February 18, 1985; Ivan Mhul, *"La resistance tenance des catholiques clandestines d'Ukraine," Le Monde*, March 1, 1985; George Zarycky, "Soviet Journal on Religious Dissent May Embarrass Kremlin," *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 6, 1985; *Radio Liberty* 71/85, "Moscow Still Putting Pressure on Ukrainian Catholics to Break with Rome," March 8, 1985; and *Radio Liberty* 101/85, "First Issue of New *Samizdat* Journal Put Out by Ukrainian Catholics (Uniates)," March 26, 1985.

[12]In November 1982 a conference was held in Kiev on the topic "The Anti-Communist Essence of Uniate-Nationalistic Falsification of the History of the Ukrainian Nation," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 2, February 1983, p. 21). Toward the end of 1983, in the city of Kalush, Ivano-Frankovsk Oblast, a conference was held dealing with "Uniatism and Ukrainian Bourgeois-Nationalism," (*Liudyna i Svit*, No. 1, January 1984, p. 33). In April 1985 a conference was held in Lvov on "Critique of the Catholic Uniate Ideology in Atheist Propaganda," (*Nauka i Religiya*, No. 11, November 1985, p. 34).

[13]*Nauka i Religiya*, Moscow, No. 10, October 1984, p. 11.

[14]*Ibid.*, No. 1, January 1985, p. 10.

[15]Ivan Hvat, "The Ukrainian Catholic Church, the Vatican and the Soviet Union During the Pontificate of Pope John Paul II," *Religion in Communist Lands*, Vol. 11, No. 3, (Winter 1983), pp. 264–280.

[16]*Ibid.*, pp. 277–278; See also L.F. Shevtsov, *Sotsializm i Katolitsizm*, (Moscow: Nauka, 1982), p. 39.

[17]I. Tykhonov, "Catholic Church: New Trends, Old Goals," (in Ukrainian) *Liudyna i Svit*, No. 10, October 1982, pp. 53–54.

[18]B. Lobovik, I. Myhovic, *"Zlopovestne tiene minulosti," Ateizmus*, No. 4, Bratislava, 1981, pp. 361–469. ■

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Richard Schifter

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Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy

United States Department of State
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Following is an address by Richard Schifter, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, before the Institute for International Affairs, Stockholm, Sweden, May 18, 1987.

It is somewhat of a challenge for an official of the U.S. Government to come to Sweden and deliver a talk on aspects of U.S. foreign policy. It is a challenge, I believe, not because we are in fundamental disagreement. On the contrary, I believe we are in fundamental agreement, but there are misunderstandings between us. The challenge, it seems to me, is to use this opportunity to make a contribution, be it ever so slight, to the efforts to clear up our misunderstandings.

There is, of course, one basic difference between your approach to world affairs and ours, which is directed by our relative size. Anyone who knows the American people well is aware of the fact that we do not particularly relish our position of leadership in the world. But our numbers—in terms of population, economic strength, and military power—have thrust a role on us from which we cannot escape. Our actions can powerfully affect the course of history. We must live with that fact and act accordingly.

Let me now focus on the specific topic of this talk: human rights as an aspect of foreign policy. In recent years we have become so accustomed to human rights discussions at the international level that we sometimes do not focus on the fact that the introduction of human rights into foreign policy debates is of very recent origin.

The concept of human rights, the notion that the powers of government are limited by the inherent rights of the individual, stems in its modern setting from the writings of the thinkers of the 18th century. But for two centuries the issue of human rights was deemed a matter of purely domestic concern, to be asserted by political groups within a given country in the context of demands for democratic government. Diplomats, even the diplomats of democracies, shied away from involvement in such matters. They continued to adhere to the notion that what a sovereign power does within its borders to its own citizens is not appropriately a matter of concern to other countries.

It was only in the wake of World War II that consideration came to be given to the idea that the issue of human rights should be elevated to the international level. Language to that effect was incorporated into the Charter of the United Nations. But it takes a long time for diplomatic traditions to die. The prevailing view after the adoption of the Charter was that the language contained therein was hortatory rather than operational. Nor did adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 effect an immediate change in this outlook. The barrier was finally broken a few years later, when the United Nations began to discuss the issue of racial discrimination in South Africa.

In retrospect it may not be surprising that, of all the human rights violators of that time, the United Nations would single out South Africa for special opprobrium. After all, the commitment to the cause of human rights in the Charter had been prompted largely by Nazi atrocities, which had been based on a racist ideology. South African racist practices were uncomfortably reminiscent of Nazi prewar policies even if not of the wartime murders.

As it is, it took the United Nations a long time to progress beyond its single-minded attention to South Africa as the one domestic human rights violator. Other human rights violations were approached most gingerly until the Soviet bloc, after 1973, pounced on Chile, not really for violations of human rights but because of the Brezhnev Doctrine. The rest of us, who sincerely do believe in human rights, joined the effort because of that belief. Thus you can say that an East-West consensus was established even though there was a fundamental difference in motivation.

It was only toward the end of the 1970s and at the beginning of the 1980s that the list of states subjected to comprehensive criticism in international fora was lengthened to include some as to whose inclusion there was no overwhelming majority consensus.

Beginning with the Belgrade followup meeting under the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the scope of discussion was, indeed, extended to include human rights violators within the Soviet bloc. The precedent set in the CSCE process was thereafter followed in the United Nations as well. Thus, only within the last 10 years can we speak of a full-scale, across-the-board discussion of human rights violations in international fora, discussions in which a good many

participating states have put aside the traditional inhibitions against such discussion.

In the United States the 1970s also witnessed the development of and, even more significantly, the application of a bilateral human rights policy, a human rights policy which would not only be reflected in speeches at international gatherings but in direct contacts between the United States and the country in question. The Congress of the United States passed a series of laws which linked human rights conditions in specific countries to specific actions by the U.S. Government. Statutory linkage was thus established to most-favored-nation status with regard to tariffs, U.S. governmental credits and credit guarantees, economic and military assistance, U.S. votes on loans from international banks, licenses for the export of equipment used by law enforcement agencies, etc.

In order that it be guided in voting on foreign assistance programs, Congress also enacted a law during the 1970s which required the State Department to submit an annual report reviewing human rights practices throughout the world, country by country. As I have just noted, the objective of the law was to provide the Congress with fuller information on the state of human rights in specific countries. However, this law had, in my opinion, a highly significant and perhaps totally unintended impact on the U.S. State Department.

It was decided early on that the first draft of a country human rights report was to be prepared by the U.S. embassy located in that country. This resulted in ambassadors appointing, in each of our embassies, persons responsible for the preparation of such reports. These persons became known, over time, as our "human rights officers."

Preparing a human rights report on a country such as, for example, Sweden is a rather simple task. It can be done quickly prior to the annual deadline set for the submission for such reports.

But the situation is vastly different in many other states. Where massive human rights violations take place, it may be necessary to have a full-time human rights officer. As the information on human rights violations will often not be readily available, the human rights officer will have to go out to look for it. This will necessarily mean that he must be in contact with persons not particularly well liked by the government in power. Here we have, thus, another break with tradition. Throughout the world in states in which human rights violations occur, the U.S. embassy is consistently in touch with persons who are in disagreement with the policies of their governments. In many locations the U.S. embassy is the only foreign mission that is regularly in touch with these dissenting individuals or groups.

Though the reports are prepared only once a year, a human rights officer in a country which does have human rights problems must necessarily keep watch across the year. He will try to collect information on human rights violations so as to be able, when the time comes, to write a report that is both comprehensive and accurate. Keeping watch does not, in our State Department, mean writing notes to oneself for ready reference at the time the annual report is written. A Foreign Service officer responsible for a particular subject matter will tend to report on matters in his field as they develop. Human rights officers will, therefore, send telegraphic messages to Washington, which we usually call "cables," letting the State Department know about the latest developments in the human rights field in the country in question. He might even add a recommendation as to what we should do in light of the latest development. And so, day in, day out, throughout the year, there arrive at the State Department in Washington messages from embassies throughout the world, messages prepared by human rights officers, reporting on human rights violations.

Whether or not the embassies recommend specific steps to be taken in consequence of these human rights violations, a report of such a violation will cause the responsible officers in Washington to reflect on these developments and try to reach a conclusion as to what to do about the problem. Through this process, as you can readily see, the entire bureaucracy is sensitized to the human rights issue, sensitized to the point that it almost instinctively seeks to respond.

A report of a human rights violation will occasionally cause us to make a public statement critical of the violating country. In many other instances it will cause us to deliver a demarche or make a less formal representation in the capital of the country in question or with the country's ambassador in Washington or both. The latter type of practice has become known as "quiet diplomacy." Let me emphasize to you that quiet diplomacy concerning human rights can be quite forceful. The term "quiet" means in this context merely that we do not make a public statement on the subject. Quiet diplomacy, I can assure you, is being pressed by the United States most actively and is a truly effective tool in advancing the cause of human rights.

I must emphasize that injection of human rights considerations into the practice of foreign policy in the United States has not meant that our national security concerns can or should be put aside or relegated to second place. Like every other country, we must, in the first instance, be guided by our need for self-preservation. As, because of our size and status, our security can be affected by developments anywhere in the world, security implications must necessarily be weighed in *all* our foreign policy moves. What might be needed to protect our security can and is on many occasions the subject of argument. However, few people will argue over the basic principle that we have a right to preserve our security.

Having made the point about the supremacy of national security concerns, let me add that the United States consistently subordinates commercial concerns to human rights considerations. Beyond that, I would say that there are times when we put security considerations at risk in order to advance the cause of human rights. This may be hard to believe, but I can think of a number of situations which would prove the correctness of the observation I have just made.

I recognize that not only this last remark but a good deal of what I may have said to you today runs counter to the description of American foreign policy methods and objectives as described in the media. Let me simply say that that is where our misunderstandings may start. I, for one, believe in and respect the idealistic motivation of Swedish foreign policymakers. As we share these motives, I believe there is a sound basis for dialogue between us and for action along parallel lines. Ambassador Newell [U.S. Ambassador to Sweden], too, fully subscribes to this belief. That is why he urged me to visit Sweden, and that is why I am here today. ■

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Warren Zimmermann

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The Evolving Soviet Approach to Human Rights

United States Department of State
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Following are addresses by Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, Chairman of the U.S. delegation, before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) followup meeting, Vienna, Austria, on January 27 and February 20, 1987.

JANUARY 27, 1987

Over 5 weeks have passed since our last plenary meeting in Vienna. It is, thus, a good time to take stock, to record what has happened in the intervening period, and to assess its meaning for the obligations undertaken at Helsinki and Madrid.

I begin with a candid assertion: it is idle to assume that significant developments are not unfolding within the Soviet Union.

First, we see a country which seems to be trying to come to grips with its past. It is reported that a Georgian film depicting the evils of Stalinism will soon be shown to the public. It is reported that Boris Pasternak's *Dr. Zhivago* will soon be published in one of the few countries in which it is banned: his own. And it is also reported that Pasternak's house—the house where that great novel was written and where Pasternak's friend, Svyatoslav Rikhter, played the piano from dusk till dawn in homage on the day he died—will soon be opened as a museum. We hope these reports prove to be true because they appear to represent an effort to return to the Soviet people a priceless gift: their own history.

Second, the Soviet press describes what has, heretofore, seemed a contradiction in terms: the arrest of a KGB official for abuse of his official duties.

Third, Soviet cultural authorities are coming to realize that the greatness of Russian culture does not stop at the border. It is reported that the Kirov ballet star, Mikhail Baryshnikov, currently in New York, and the former director of the innovative Taganka Theater, Yuriy Lyubimov, currently in Washington, have been or will be invited to perform again in the Soviet Union.

These examples make an important point—that the Soviet Union is a different place from what it was 2 years ago. But how different? Is what we are seeing superficial or profound? Is it the reality, or just the appearance, of change? The answer is not obvious. The picture remains mixed. Based on events of the past 5 weeks, let me describe that picture as I see it today.

Recent Developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc

Political Prisoners. In my statement at the end of the first round of the Vienna meeting, I expressed concern that Mustafa Dzhemilev, who had been convicted six times for his work on behalf of his fellow Crimean Tatars, would be resentenced. I am glad to note that Dzhemilev has since been released. But the fate of most other political prisoners in the Soviet Union remains the same. With the death of Anatoliy Marchenko, over 35 Helsinki monitors remain incarcerated, some in serious physical condition. And yet, these monitors make up only a small percentage of the political prisoners in the Soviet Union. Other human rights monitors, such as those connected with the human rights journal, *The Chronicle of Current Events*, and those who fought for genuine trade union rights, are similarly imprisoned.

Will another Marchenko die in detention? Will it be Anatoliy Koryagin, the courageous psychiatrist who spoke out against the abuses of psychiatry and has been weakened by hunger strikes? Will it be Iosif Begun, a scientist who has already served 9 years for his efforts to preserve the Jewish culture and the Hebrew language? Both are now confined to Chistopol Prison,[1] where Marchenko died. All here have noted Andrey Sakharov's appeal for the release of all political prisoners in the Soviet Union, and we have also noted Ambassador Kashlev's hints to the *New York Times* that there might be a response. May it be soon, may it be all-inclusive, and may it be untrammeled by limits and restrictions which could vitiate its effect.

In the period since this meeting recessed, the existence of a new Helsinki Monitoring Group in the Soviet Union has been confirmed. Calling itself "Helsinki 86," it was formed last summer in the city of Liepaja in Latvia and

[1]Koryagin and Begun were subsequently released on February 18 and February 20, 1987, respectively.

has appealed to Pope John Paul II, to General Secretary Gorbachev, to the Soviet and Latvian Communist Party Central Committees, to the United Nations, to the American delegates at the September 1986 Chautauqua conference in Latvia, and to Latvian "countrymen in foreign lands." The signers of the letter to Mr. Gorbachev said, "We want to believe you that you will build a foundation for a democracy. Everyone will benefit from that, and there will not be any losers." Three of those signers have been reported arrested. The formation, for the first time, of an independent Latvian Helsinki Monitoring Group proves again the dictum of the British historian, Lord Acton, that "progress in the direction of organized and assured freedom is the characteristic fact of Modern History."

Freedom to Travel and Emigrate. In early January, 50 Soviet emigrants were permitted by the Soviet authorities to return from the United States to the Soviet Union, many after several years of trying. It is understandable that the move from Soviet to American culture—cultures based on such different principles—could cause serious problems of adjustment. If, as the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman has said, there are a thousand more in the United States who desire to return, then we can only hope that the Soviet Union will abandon its former practice of treating them as pariahs and will permit them to exercise their right, guaranteed by the Final Act, to leave their country and return to it. After all, a few thousand emigrants desiring to return constitute less than 1% of the 400,000 who have left the Soviet Union in the last decade and a half. We must hope, as well, that the Soviet Government will honor its obligations to allow foreign citizens in the Soviet Union to return to their countries—Abe Stolar, for example: an American in his 70s who has been trying for decades to return his family from Moscow to the United States.

On a related issue, I referred earlier in my remarks to efforts apparently underway to bring back to the Soviet Union cultural figures who had left it. Why not go further and respect their right to leave in the first place and the right of others to leave as well? Last December, I cited the case of Vladimir Feltsman, a brilliant young pianist, whose application to emigrate 7 years ago has cost him the right to perform his musical art in the Soviet Union. Last year, in a letter to General Secretary Gorbachev, Feltsman asked:

> Why does the problem of leaving the Soviet Union exist at all? Why do the authorities regard people who, for one reason or another, want to leave the Soviet Union, as virtual traitors? Why can't citizens of the U.S.S.R. leave their country and return to it without hindrance?

Why, indeed?

In the area of family reunification, there has been some progress. Of the American cases announced by Ambassador Kashlev in Bern, three-quarters have been resolved, although it remains a mystery why one-quarter of them are still unresolved after 9 months. During the Vienna recess, favorable decisions were made in several cases, and hints were made about several more. So far, the hints outnumber the decisions. We fail to see why the issues of divided spouses and blocked marriages cannot be settled once and for all. The numbers are not large, but the human cost is heavy. For example, Yuriy Balovlenkov, whose wife lives in Baltimore, Maryland, has now been separated from her for 8 years; he has never seen his younger child.

Many in this room have appealed for Soviet action to enable several Soviet citizens suffering from cancer to seek treatment in the West. Fortunately, those appeals seem to have been heard. Of the five cancer victims frequently named, three have been allowed to leave, and we understand that a fourth, Leah Maryasin, has exit permission. A fifth, Benjamin Charny, is in urgent need of help and—although he has a close relative, a brother, in the United States—he remains in the Soviet Union against his will.

I will refer to one of those cases, in particular, because it illustrates a disturbing paradox in Soviet conduct. Inna Meiman arrived in Washington 8 days ago; she suffers from cancer of the spine, a condition whose extreme seriousness was confirmed last week by the Georgetown University Hospital. Unbelievably, Mrs. Meiman was not allowed to be accompanied by her son, Lev Kittroskiy, and his family or by her husband, Naum Meiman. Naum Meiman is a 75-year-old man, a retired mathematician, and a former Helsinki monitor. He has congestive heart failure and quite possibly suffers from cancer himself. He also has an American citizen daughter living in the United States, a fact that qualifies him for emigration even under the most restrictive interpretation of the new Soviet legislation. The reason given for his many visa denials is that he did classified work 30 years ago; for that "reason," an old, sick man is not permitted to join a suffering wife and a daughter in the United States. The Kafkaesque quality of this story can only make one wonder how much has really changed in the Soviet Union.

The end of the year 1986 set a record of sorts in the field of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Those allowed to emigrate numbered fewer than 1,000—under 100 a month, the lowest figure since accurate statistics have been kept. The new Soviet legislation, which took effect January 1, shows no sign of alleviating this crisis in emigration and may even exacerbate it. The law is inherently restrictive, limiting the right to leave to those with close family abroad, and so far, it seems to be being applied restrictively. Applications for exit visas, which were previously at least accepted, are now being refused.

Broadcast Jamming. Finally, in the area of information, the BBC [British Broadcasting Corporation] Russian service has, for the last few days, reached the Soviet Union unjammed. We hope that this is the harbinger of a trend and that the Soviet Union will finally recognize the illegality of jamming by keeping the jammers off the BBC permanently and taking them and keeping them off the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, and the other stations prevented from reaching the Soviet people.

Czechoslovak Developments. A constant concern during our Vienna meeting has been the fate of the members of Charter '77 and of the Jazz Section in Czechoslovakia. Fortunately, in the past several weeks, five members of the Jazz Section have been released from detention. Two, however, remain in prison, and apparently some variety of trial awaits all seven. Thus Czechoslovakia's obligations under the Final Act remain squarely at issue in this sorrowful affair.

Inconclusive Evidence

In closing, let me return to the questions with which I began. We have heard predictions and promises from Soviet officials—on a cultural renaissance, on the release of political prisoners, on genuine openness. They seem to be telling us that Soviet society is at a turning point. But will it turn? The evidence is not conclusive.

We will know whether Soviet society will turn in a positive direction only when predictions become reality, when promises become performance, when gestures become practices, when episodes become patterns, when isolated steps become a long march. Only then will we know.

FEBRUARY 20, 1987

The Vienna meeting has just moved into a new stage. From agenda item five, which encompassed a review of implementation and the examination of proposals, we have now passed on to agenda item eight, which foresees drafting of a concluding document. According to the text of agenda item eight, such drafting will include decisions relating to the above-mentioned items. Those items include, of course, implementation review and examination of new proposals—two subjects which, therefore, remain clearly within the competence of this new stage of our meeting. In fact, it could hardly be otherwise, since our concluding document must refer to both implementation and to new proposals.

As we enter this new stage, it is, thus, entirely appropriate, with a view to drafting, to take stock of progress that was made in implementation of Helsinki and Madrid obligations and proposals that were introduced to improve such implementation. I intend to do so today and in the future as well.

Positive Trends in the Soviet Union

In my first statement to this Vienna meeting, I referred to violations of the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. I said that these violations must be reversed because they are a threat to the Helsinki process and because they will make it impossible for the violating states to have the kind of dialogue and relationship which they profess to want with their Western neighbors. And I stated that positive action to reverse violations will find a positive response from the American people and from the American Government.

Since the Vienna meeting began, the Soviet Union and some of its allies have continued to violate important elements of their Helsinki and Madrid obligations and have even committed new violations. These have been described by the American delegation and many other delegations. Today, I want to recognize, with equal openness, that there has been some progress toward improved compliance with commitments. In Poland, the release of nearly all political prisoners, together with other positive steps, has caused the U.S. Government to review and to lift its economic sanctions. And in the Soviet Union, some fresh winds have begun to blow.

Since our 35 delegations first assembled in Vienna, we have witnessed the following positive actions:

- Irina Ratushinskaya, the noted Orthodox Christian poet, was released from prison and allowed to emigrate to the West.
- Of the five cancer victims about whom many of us spoke, three were finally permitted to seek medical treatment in the West and a fourth has exit permission. Others desiring to emigrate for humanitarian reasons, such as Dr. David Goldfarb, have been allowed to depart.
- Of the American divided family cases which the Soviet government promised at Bern to resolve, some three-quarters have now been successfully resolved.
- There has been progress in bringing divided spouses together; 18 of the 28 cases on record at the time of the Geneva summit have now been settled.
- Nearly 100 former Soviet citizens have received permission to return permanently to the Soviet Union.
- Dr. Andrey Sakharov has been allowed to return to an unfettered life in Moscow, and his wife, Yelena Bonner, has been pardoned and also allowed to return to Moscow from exile.
- Mustafa Dzhemilev, an activist on behalf of his fellow Crimean Tatars, was released from prison.
- Significant new initiatives in the area of culture, particularly in the publication of previously banned books and the release of previously censored films, have been launched.
- Jamming has ceased on the BBC Russian service.
- Finally, a number of prisoners of conscience have been released from detention. So far, we can document about 35 who have actually returned, including 10 individuals whom the U.S. delegation has mentioned at the Vienna meeting. Andrey Sakharov believes that the total number is about 60.

There is another category—a category of assertions and promises—which at least offers a potential for positive results. For example, Soviet officials have announced that 142 political prisoners have been released and that others will follow. Massive changes in the penal code have been promised. It is also asserted that the new legislation on entry/exit will liberalize emigration, although the restrictive text of the legislation and the initial use of it imply the reverse. If these potential steps forward are actually taken, they, too, will be worthy of note. At present, however, they remain simply assertions and promises.

In the catalogue of constructive actions, I have not referred to the reverse side of this progress—to its partial nature, to parallel actions which undercut it, to the fact that so much remains to be done to bring the Soviet Union into compliance with its obligations. There will no doubt be a need to return to these persistent problems in the near future. The point I want to make now is that certain positive trends are visible in the Soviet Union. We recognize them, we welcome them; we encourage them.

Implementation and New Proposals

General Secretary Gorbachev, in his address last Thursday, denied that the new Soviet approach on humanitarian problems is the result of Western pressure. Rather, he said, it is the result of a new way of thinking. It is not for this meeting to analyze the motivation for the actions we have observed; our interest is in deeds, not motives. But it would be a welcome fact if these actions are, indeed, the result of a new way of thinking, since that means they should be followed by more comprehensive and more significant actions to comply with commitments.

There is a necessary connection between implementation and new proposals. In the view of the United States, implementation is the key element in the entire Helsinki process. New proposals are valuable insofar as they underline this vital principle. New proposals can be an incentive to implementation; they must not be a substitute for it.

In that spirit, the United States and 16 other Western countries have, during the past two weeks, introduced 16 proposals covering the entire human dimension of the Helsinki Final Act. They constitute the most comprehensive set of proposals on the human dimension ever put forward at a CSCE followup meeting. And they are focused on a single objective: implementation.

Fourteen of these proposals are textual—that is, they describe obligations which could become part of the final document of this meeting. They cover virtually all the major human elements of the final act: freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief; national minorities; the contribution of individuals and groups to the Helsinki process; persons in confinement; freedom of movement; human contacts; information; culture; and education. In

addition, two followup proposals—one a multifaceted conference on the human dimension, the other an information forum which would involve working journalists—are a means of extending our focus on the human dimension beyond this Vienna meeting.

These proposals build upon our experience in Ottawa, Budapest, and Bern, reflecting the best ideas from these meetings. They also spring directly from the problems and issues discussed during the implementation phase of our Vienna meeting. They represent no threat to any states devoted to a new way of thinking about human issues. On the contrary, they offer a test of the extent to which these states are prepared to put new thinking into practice. They would not undermine the political system of any state, but they would require all states to live up to commitments which they have undertaken of their own free will. ■

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place to work. Morale is high and productivity excellent.

It is very unfortunate that some tough issues we have had to handle resulted in negative publicity which has beclouded the significant accomplishments of the last six years. Despite this you will find that our reputation for *performance* and *integrity* is excellent. Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle, businessmen, labor leaders, professionals (architects, engineers, etc.), other Federal agencies and GSA employees at all levels will attest to that fact.

Every assignment I have had in public service has been a tough one requiring difficult decisions. I accepted all assignments and made the tough decisions. I have no regrets in this regard because I always knew what I was getting into and tough decisons were necessary to get things done.

My career in public service has been exciting, challenging and rewarding. There have been some rough times and some frustrating moments. But I realize that you cannot really have one without the other.

I feel very fortunate to have been associated with you as Minority Leader, Vice President, and now President. I think you are on the "right track" for America and that you will stay there.

Lastly, I want you to know that after 12 years in public service, I have great confidence in our democratic system of government. There were moments when I had my doubts, but overall, we have the best system known to man.

Respectfully,

ARTHUR F. SAMPSON
Administrator

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Address in Helsinki Before the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. *August 1, 1975*

Mr. Chairman, my distinguished colleagues:

May I begin by expressing to the Governments of Finland and Switzerland, which have been superb hosts for the several phases of this Conference, my gratitude and that of my associates for their efficiency and hospitality.

Particularly to you, President Kekkonen, I must convey to the people of the Republic of Finland, on behalf of the 214 million people of the United States of America, a reaffirmation of the longstanding affection and admiration which all my countrymen hold for your brave and beautiful land.

We are bound together by the most powerful of all ties, our fervent love for freedom and independence, which knows no homeland but the human heart. It is a sentiment as enduring as the granite rock on which this city stands and as moving as the music of Sibelius.

Our visit here, though short, has brought us a deeper appreciation of the pride, industry, and friendliness which Americans always associate with the Finnish nation.

The nations assembled here have kept the general peace in Europe for 30 years. Yet there have been too many narrow escapes from major conflict. There remains, to this day, the urgent issue of how to construct a just and lasting peace for all peoples.

I have not come across the Atlantic to say what all of us already know—that nations now have the capacity to destroy civilization and, therefore, all our foreign policies must have as their one supreme objective the prevention of a thermonuclear war. Nor have I come to dwell upon the hard realities of continuing ideological differences, political rivalries, and military competition that persist among us.

I have come to Helsinki as a spokesman for a nation whose vision has always been forward, whose people have always demanded that the future be brighter than the past, and whose united will and purpose at this hour is to work diligently to promote peace and progress not only for ourselves but for all mankind.

I am simply here to say to my colleagues: We owe it to our children, to the children of all continents, not to miss any opportunity, not to malinger for one minute, not to spare ourselves or allow others to shirk in the monumental task of building a better and a safer world.

The American people, like the people of Europe, know well that mere assertions of good will, passing changes in the political mood of governments, laudable declarations of principles are not enough. But if we proceed with care, with commitment to real progress, there is now an opportunity to turn our peoples' hopes into realities.

In recent years, nations represented here have sought to ease potential conflicts. But much more remains to be done before we prematurely congratulate ourselves.

Military competition must be controlled. Political competition must be restrained. Crises must not be manipulated or exploited for unilateral advantages that could lead us again to the brink of war. The process of negotiation must be sustained, not at a snail's pace, but with demonstrated enthusiasm and visible progress.

Nowhere are the challenges and the opportunities greater and more evident than in Europe. That is why this Conference brings us all together. Conflict in Europe shakes the world. Twice in this century we have paid dearly for this lesson; at other times, we have come perilously close to calamity. We dare not forget the tragedy and the terror of those times.

Peace is not a piece of paper.

But lasting peace is at least possible today because we have learned from the experiences of the last 30 years that peace is a process requiring mutual restraint and practical arrangements.

This Conference is a part of that process—a challenge, not a conclusion. We face unresolved problems of military security in Europe; we face them with

very real differences in values and in aims. But if we deal with them with careful preparation, if we focus on concrete issues, if we maintain forward movement, we have the right to expect real progress.

The era of confrontation that has divided Europe since the end of the Second World War may now be ending. There is a new perception and a shared perception of a change for the better, away from confrontation and toward new possibilities for secure and mutually beneficial cooperation. That is what we all have been saying here. I welcome and I share these hopes for the future.

The postwar policy of the United States has been consistently directed toward the rebuilding of Europe and the rebirth of Europe's historic identity. The nations of the West have worked together for peace and progress throughout Europe. From the very start, we have taken the initiative by stating clear goals and areas for negotiation.

We have sought a structure of European relations, tempering rivalry with restraint, power with moderation, building upon the traditional bonds that link us with old friends and reaching out to forge new ties with former and potential adversaries.

In recent years, there have been some substantial achievements.

We see the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin of 1971 as the end of a perennial crisis that on at least three occasions brought the world to the brink of doom.

The agreements between the Federal Republic of Germany and the states of Eastern Europe and the related intra-German accords enable Central Europe and the world to breathe easier.

The start of East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions demonstrate a determination to deal with military security problems of the continent.

The 1972 treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union to limit antiballistic missiles and the interim agreement limiting strategic offensive arms were the first solid breakthroughs in what must be a continuing, long-term process of limiting strategic nuclear arsenals.

I profoundly hope that this Conference will spur further practical and concrete results. It affords a welcome opportunity to widen the circle of those countries involved in easing tensions between East and West.

Participation in the work of détente and participation in the benefits of détente must be everybody's business—in Europe and elsewhere. But détente can succeed only if everybody understands what détente actually is.

First, détente is an evolutionary process, not a static condition. Many formidable challenges yet remain.

Second, the success of détente, of the process of détente, depends on new behavior patterns that give life to all our solemn declarations. The goals we are stating today are the yardstick by which our performance will be measured.

The people of all Europe and, I assure you, the people of North America are thoroughly tired of having their hopes raised and then shattered by empty words and unfulfilled pledges. We had better say what we mean and mean what we say, or we will have the anger of our citizens to answer.

While we must not expect miracles, we can and we do expect steady progress that comes in steps—steps that are related to each other that link our actions with words in various areas of our relations.

Finally, there must be an acceptance of mutual obligation. Détente, as I have often said, must be a two-way street. Tensions cannot be eased by one side alone. Both sides must want détente and work to achieve it. Both sides must benefit from it.

Mr. Chairman, my colleagues, this extraordinary gathering in Helsinki proves that all our peoples share a concern for Europe's future and for a better and more peaceful world. But what else does it prove? How shall we assess the results?

Our delegations have worked long and hard to produce documents which restate noble and praiseworthy political principles. They spell out guidelines for national behavior and international cooperation.

But every signatory should know that if these are to be more than the latest chapter in a long and sorry volume of unfulfilled declarations, every party must be dedicated to making them come true.

These documents which we will sign represent another step—how long or short a step only time will tell—in the process of détente and reconcilation in Europe. Our peoples will be watching and measuring our progress. They will ask how these noble sentiments are being translated into actions that bring about a more secure and just order in the daily lives of each of our nations and its citizens.

The documents produced here represent compromises, like all international negotiations, but these principles we have agreed upon are more than the lowest common denominator of governmental positions.

They affirm the most fundamental human rights: liberty of thought, conscience, and faith; the exercise of civil and political rights; the rights of minorities.

They call for a freer flow of information, ideas, and people; greater scope for the press, cultural and educational exchange, family reunification, the right

to travel and to marriage between nationals of different states; and for the protection of the priceless heritage of our diverse cultures.

They offer wide areas for greater cooperation: trade, industrial production, science and technology, the environment, transportation, health, space, and the oceans.

They reaffirm the basic principles of relations between states: nonintervention, sovereign equality, self-determination, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers, and the possibility of change by peaceful means.

The United States gladly subscribes to this document because we subscribe to every one of these principles.

Almost 200 years ago, the United States of America was born as a free and independent nation. The descendants of Europeans who proclaimed their independence in America expressed in that declaration a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and asserted not only that all men are created equal but they are endowed with inalienable rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

The founders of my country did not merely say that all Americans should have these rights but all men everywhere should have these rights. And these principles have guided the United States of America throughout its two centuries of nationhood. They have given hopes to millions in Europe and on every continent.

I have been asked why I am here today.

I am here because I believe, and my countrymen believe, in the interdependence of Europe and North America—indeed in the interdependence of the entire family of man.

I am here because the leaders of 34 other governments are here—the states of Europe and of our good neighbor, Canada, with whom we share an open border of 5,526 miles, along which there stands not a single armed soldier and across which our two peoples have moved in friendship and mutual respect for 160 years.

I can say without fear of contradiction that there is not a single people represented here whose blood does not flow in the veins of Americans and whose culture and traditions have not enriched the heritage which we Americans prize so highly.

When two centuries ago the United States of America issued a declaration of high principles, the cynics and doubters of that day jeered and scoffed. Yet 11 long years later, our independence was won and the stability of our Republic was really achieved through the incorporation of the same principles in our Constitution.

But those principles, though they are still being perfected, remain the guiding lights of an American policy. And the American people are still dedicated, as they were then, to a decent respect for the opinions of mankind and to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness for all peoples everywhere.

To our fellow participants in this Conference: My presence here symbolizes my country's vital interest in Europe's future. Our future is bound with yours. Our economic well-being, as well as our security, is linked increasingly with yours. The distance of geography is bridged by our common heritage and our common destiny. The United States, therefore, intends to participate fully in the affairs of Europe and in turning the results of this Conference into a living reality.

To America's allies: We in the West must vigorously pursue the course upon which we have embarked together, reinforced by one another's strength and mutual confidence. Stability in Europe requires equilibrium in Europe. Therefore, I assure you that my country will continue to be a concerned and reliable partner. Our partnership is far more than a matter of formal agreements. It is a reflection of beliefs, traditions, and ties that are of deep significance to the American people. We are proud that these values are expressed in this document.

To the countries of the East: The United States considers that the principles on which this Conference has agreed are a part of the great heritage of European civilization, which we all hold in trust for all mankind. To my country, they are not cliches or empty phrases. We take this work and these words very seriously. We will spare no effort to ease tensions and to solve problems between us. But it is important that you recognize the deep devotion of the American people and their Government to human rights and fundamental freedoms and thus to the pledges that this Conference has made regarding the freer movement of people, ideas, information.

In building a political relationship between East and West, we face many challenges.

Berlin has a special significance. It has been a flashpoint of confrontation in the past; it can provide an example of peaceful settlement in the future. The United States regards it as a test of détente and of the principles of this Conference. We welcome the fact that, subject to Four-Power rights and responsibilities, the results of CSCE apply to Berlin as they do throughout Europe.

Military stability in Europe has kept the peace. While maintaining that stability, it is now time to reduce substantially the high levels of military forces on both sides. Negotiations now underway in Vienna on mutual and balanced

force reductions so far have not produced the results for which I had hoped. The United States stands ready to demonstrate flexibility in moving these negotiations forward, if others will do the same. An agreement that enhances mutual security is feasible—and essential.

The United States also intends to pursue vigorously a further agreement on strategic arms limitations with the Soviet Union. This remains a priority of American policy. General Secretary Brezhnev and I agreed last November in Vladivostok on the essentials of a new accord limiting strategic offensive weapons for the next 10 years. We are moving forward in our bilateral discussions here in Helsinki.

The world faces an unprecedented danger in the spread of nuclear weapons technology. The nations of Europe share a great responsibility for an international solution to this problem. The benefits of peaceful nuclear energy are becoming more and more important. We must find ways to spread these benefits while safeguarding the world against the menace of weapons proliferation.

To the other nations of Europe represented at this Conference: We value the work you have done here to help bring all of Europe together. Your right to live in peace and independence is one of the major goals of our effort. Your continuing contribution will be indispensable.

To those nations not participating and to all the peoples of the world: The solemn obligation undertaken in these documents to promote fundamental rights, economic and social progress, and well-being applies ultimately to all peoples.

Can we truly speak of peace and security without addressing the spread of nuclear weapons in the world or the creation of more sophisticated forms of warfare?

Can peace be divisible between areas of tranquillity and regions of conflict?

Can Europe truly flourish if we do not all address ourselves to the evil of hunger in countries less fortunate than we? To the new dimensions of economic and energy issues that underline our own progress? To the dialog between producers and consumers, between exporters and importers, between industrial countries and less developed ones?

And can there be stability and progress in the absence of justice and fundamental freedoms?

Our people want a better future. Their expectations have been raised by the very real steps that have already been taken—in arms control, political negotiations, and expansion of contacts and economic relations. Our presence here offers them further hope. We must not let them down.

If the Soviet Union and the United States can reach agreement so that our astronauts can fit together the most intricate scientific equipment, work together, and shake hands 137 miles out in space, we as statesmen have an obligation to do as well on Earth.

History will judge this Conference not by what we say here today, but by what we do tomorrow—not by the promises we make, but by the promises we keep.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:30 a.m. in Finlandia Hall. He was introduced by Walter Kieber, Foreign Minister of Liechtenstein and chairman of the plenary session of the Conference.

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was signed by the representatives of 35 nations participating in the Conference in a ceremony in Finlandia Hall at 5 p.m. on August 1, 1975. The text of the document is printed in the Bulletin of the Department of State (vol. LXXIII, p. 323).

Earlier in the day, the President met with Prime Minister Aldo Moro of Italy at the U.S. Embassy.

Following his address before the Conference, the President held a luncheon meeting with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France. He then attended the afternoon session of the Conference and later met with Carlos Arias Navarro, President of the Government of Spain.

In the evening, the President attended a dinner with President Kekkonen on board the Finnish icebreaker *Urho*.

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Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Board Air Force One en Route to Bucharest, Romania. *August 2, 1975*

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

REPORTER. [1.] Mr. President, can you tell us where you made progress on SALT, and do you think that we will have a SALT agreement by the end of the year?

THE PRESIDENT. I don't think I should get into the details of where we made progress, but the two sessions with Mr. Brezhnev and myself [1] resulted in progress. We have referred to the technicians in Geneva our areas of agreement, and they are going to work out the details.

I am encouraged—it was constructive and friendly—and our plans are no different today for any subsequent meetings than they were before.

Q. Mr. President, progress is a bit of a vague term. Can you characterize it as significant progress, minor progress, and specifically, do you still hope for an agreement to be signed by the end of this year?

[1] In addition to their meeting on July 30, 1975, the President and General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev met at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki on August 2, prior to the President's departure for Romania.

the legitimate concerns raised by Members of the Congress during the very lengthy discussions which have been held on this problem.

This plan will gradually phase out price controls over a 39-month period—through November 30, 1978. As part of the decontrol plan, a price ceiling of $11.50 per barrel will be imposed on all domestically produced oil.

Although this represents a rollback on all current uncontrolled oil prices, the $11.50 ceiling will gradually increase by 5 cents per month over the length of the program. However, this ceiling will assure that future increases in the price of imported oil will not affect our domestic market prices.

This plan is a critical first step in reversing our growing dependence on foreign oil. Combined with a windfall profits tax on oil companies and rebates of energy taxes to the American people, this plan will not hinder our economic recovery nor raise prices during 1975. It will not allow unfair gains or produce undue hardships.

After Congress rejected the 30-month decontrol plan I submitted last week, I was faced with two choices: to either veto the proposed extension of price controls scheduled to expire August 31 or seek a compromise with the Congress.

I strongly urge the Congress to accept this program and simultaneously enact a simple 3-month extension of the law.

To achieve energy independence, the Congress and the President must work together on this and other parts of my comprehensive energy program. I strongly urge the Congress to accept this compromise so that we can get on with the solution of this most pressing problem.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:18 a.m. in the Briefing Room at the White House.

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Text of Remarks at a Meeting With Representatives of Americans of Eastern European Background Concerning the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. *July 25, 1975*

I AM glad to have this opportunity, before taking off for Europe tomorrow, to discuss with you frankly how I feel about the forthcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki.

I know there are some honest doubts and disagreements among good Americans about this meeting with the leaders of Eastern and Western European countries and Canada—35 nations altogether.

There are those who fear the Conference will put a seal of approval on the political division of Europe that has existed since the Soviet Union incorporated the Baltic nations and set new boundaries elsewhere in Europe by military action in World War II. These critics contend that participation by the United States in the Helsinki understandings amounts to tacit recognition of a status quo which favors the Soviet Union and perpetuates its control over countries allied with it.

On the other extreme, there are critics who say the meeting is a meaningless exercise because the Helsinki declarations are merely statements of principles and good intentions which are neither legally binding nor enforceable and cannot be depended upon. They express concern, however, that the result will be to make the free governments of Western Europe and North America less wary and lead to a letting down of NATO's political guard and military defenses.

If I seriously shared these reservations, I would not be going, but I certainly understand the historical reasons for them and, especially, the anxiety of Americans whose ancestral homelands, families, and friends have been and still are profoundly affected by East-West political developments in Europe.

I would emphasize that the document I will sign is neither a treaty nor is it legally binding on any participating State. The Helsinki documents involve political and moral commitments aimed at lessening tensions and opening further the lines of communication between the peoples of East and West.

It is the policy of the United States, and it has been my policy ever since I entered public life, to support the aspirations for freedom and national independence of the peoples of Eastern Europe—with whom we have close ties of culture and blood—by every proper and peaceful means. I believe the outcome of this European Security Conference will be a step—how long a step remains to be tested—in that direction. I hope my visits to Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia will again demonstrate our continuing friendship and interest in the welfare and progress of the fine people of Eastern Europe.

To keep the Helsinki Conference in perspective, we must remember that it is not simply another summit between the super powers. On the contrary, it is primarily a political dialog among the Europeans—East, West, and neutral—with primary emphasis on European relationships rather than global differences. The United States has taken part, along with Canada, to maintain the solidarity of the Atlantic Alliance and because our absence would have caused a serious imbalance for the West.

We have acted in concert with our free and democratic partners to preserve

our interests in Berlin and Germany and have obtained the public commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers—a major concession which runs quite contrary to the allegation that present borders are being permanently frozen.

The Warsaw Pact nations met important Western preconditions—the Berlin Agreement of 1971, the force reduction talks now underway in Vienna—before our agreement to go to Helsinki.

Specifically addressing the understandable concern about the effect of the Helsinki declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure you as one who has long been interested in this question that the United States has never recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our official policy of nonrecognition is not affected by the results of the European Security Conference.

There is included in the declaration of principles on territorial integrity the provision that no occupation or acquisition of territory in violation of international law will be recognized as legal. This is not to raise the hope that there will be any immediate change in the map of Europe, but the United States has not abandoned and will not compromise this longstanding principle.

The question has been asked: What have we given up in these negotiations and what have we obtained in return from the other side? I have studied the negotiations and declarations carefully and will discuss them even more intensely with other leaders in Helsinki. In my judgment, the United States and the open countries of the West already practice what the Helsinki accords preach and have no intention of doing what they prohibit—such as using force or restricting freedoms. We are not committing ourselves to anything beyond what we are already committed to by our own moral and legal standards and by more formal treaty agreements such as the United Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights.

We are getting a public commitment by the leaders of the more closed and controlled countries to a greater measure of freedom and movement for individuals, information, and ideas than has existed there in the past, and establishing a yardstick by which the world can measure how well they live up to these stated intentions. It is a step in the direction of a greater degree of European community, of expanding East-West contacts, of more normal and healthier relations in an area where we have the closest historic ties. Surely this is the best interest of the United States and of peace in the world.

I think we are all agreed that our world cannot be changed for the better by war, that in the thermonuclear age our primary task is to reduce the danger

of unprecedented destruction. This we are doing through continuing strategic arms limitations talks with the Soviet Union and the talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. This European Security Conference in Helsinki, while it contains some military understandings such as advance notice of maneuvers, should not be confused with either the SALT or MBFR negotiations. The Helsinki summit is linked with our overall policy of working to reduce East-West tensions and pursuing peace, but it is a much more general and modest undertaking.

Its success or failure depends not alone on the United States and the Soviet Union but primarily upon its 33 European signatories—East, West, and neutral. The fact that each of them, large and small, can have their voices heard is itself a good sign. The fact that these very different governments can agree, even on paper, to such principles as greater human contacts and exchanges, improved conditions for journalists, reunification of families and international marriages, a freer flow of information and publications, and increased tourism and travel, seems to me a development well worthy of positive and public encouragement by the United States. If it all fails, Europe will be no worse off than it is now. If even a part of it succeeds, the lot of the people in Eastern Europe will be that much better and the cause of freedom will advance at least that far.

I saw an editorial the other day entitled: "Jerry, Don't Go." But I would rather read that than headlines all over Europe saying: "United States Boycotts Peace Hopes."

So I am going, and I hope your support goes with me.

NOTE: The President held the meeting at 11 a.m. in the Cabinet Room at the White House with seven Members of Congress and representatives of American organizations with Eastern European ethnic backgrounds.

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Letter Accepting the Resignation of Secretary of the Interior Stanley K. Hathaway. *July 25, 1975*

Dear Stan:

I have your letter, and it is with my deepest regrets that I accept your resignation as Secretary of Interior, effective upon the appointment and qualification of your successor. In so doing, I want you to know that I fully understand and sympathize with the health considerations which have prompted your decision.