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
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Implementation of Helsinki Final Act

April 1, 1987–October 1, 1987



United States Department of State
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Washington, D.C.



*Twenty-third Semiannual Report by
the President to the Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe
on the Implementation of the
Helsinki Final Act, April 1,
1987–October 1, 1987.*

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Chapter One

General Assessment of the Implementation of the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document

OVERVIEW

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) represents a continuing framework for the 35 participating states to work to resolve the humanitarian, economic, political, scientific, and military issues that divide Europe. The Final Act underscores that each area is of equal importance to the goal of genuine security and cooperation in Europe. The Western objective has been to preserve and strengthen this process by a thorough review of implementation of the Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document and by achieving agreement on balanced and constructive steps forward.

The Final Act recognizes that followup meetings are essential for maintaining the Helsinki framework as a vigorous means of addressing problems in Europe. The Vienna CSCE followup meeting, the third such review conference, began on November 4, 1986. The second followup meeting, held in Madrid from November 11, 1980, until September 9, 1983, adopted a concluding document which confirmed and elaborated upon the original Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It included significant new provisions in the area of human rights, trade union freedoms, human contacts, free flow of information, access to diplomatic and consular missions, and measures against terrorism.

This is the 23d semiannual report submitted by the President to the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe under the provisions of Public Law 94-304 of June 3, 1976. It surveys the implementation of CSCE principles during the period April 1, 1987, through October 1, 1987. The purpose of the report is to assist the Commission in its task of monitoring and encouraging compliance with the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document. These reports are themselves an important element of the U.S. Government's efforts to assess both the progress and shortcomings in achieving the CSCE goals of strengthening security, expanding cooperation, building mutual confidence, and promoting human rights.

Review of Implementation

While positive trends continued and some dramatic steps were taken by some Warsaw Pact nations, the overall record of compliance of these governments with their CSCE commitments in the areas of human rights and economic cooperation remained seriously flawed. The East did implement CSCE security commitments, sticking to the letter of the 1986 Stockholm document.

In the international arena, continued Soviet prosecution of the war against the Afghan people was in flagrant violation of the basic principles guiding relations between states. (Although the Soviets have stated that a decision has been made, in principle, to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, they have failed to produce an acceptable timetable for withdrawal at the UN proximity talks.) The Soviet Union has also undermined these key principles by continuing to support the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance.

At home, Soviet human rights policy was in flux during the reporting period; while the situation improved dramatically in some cases, human rights violations continued, and the structural and legal apparatus that makes official repression possible remained in place.

The Soviet leadership's campaign for more "openness" (*glasnost*) in and "democratization" of Soviet society improved the ability of Soviet citizens to express their views in both official and unofficial channels and gave impetus to possible future liberalization of the legal code and other reforms. Release of some political prisoners continued. However, this period was also marked by continued abuse of political prisoners and repression of lesser-known nationalist and religious activists. Since Soviet authorities appeared to be more willing to tolerate some forms of dissent, there was an increase in the number of demonstrations, petitions, and letters of protest. While some demonstrations were allowed to proceed peacefully, others were forcibly broken up, with participants detained, sometimes beaten, and often interrogated.

Significant improvements were seen in Soviet policy toward family reunification, although problem areas remained. Jewish emigration increased significantly, and a number of long-standing Jewish refuseniks were given permission to emigrate. Even so, many more Soviet Jews still wait for permission to emigrate.

Progress was also made in U.S.-Soviet "divided families" cases, and, in a significant change, most of the Soviets processed for immigration by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow were not on the U.S. representation list because they received exit permission on their first application to Soviet authorities. The number of persons receiving U.S. immigration visas increased by 200% over the previous 6 months, and the number of those processed by the U.S. Embassy as refugees (90% of which were Armenians) by nearly 1000%.

Soviet authorities continued to exercise tight control on travel outside the country, but there was notable liberalization during this period in two areas: some Soviets were permitted to travel abroad to visit not only first-degree relatives but also more distant relatives, and some were permitted to travel to the U.S. to visit relatives who had emigrated from the Soviet Union with permission to emigrate to Israel, but who, upon leaving the U.S.S.R., chose to go to the U.S.

There has been a noticeable increase in the availability of outside information in the Soviet media, including reprinting articles by U.S. commentators and U.S.-Soviet telebridges, which feature debates between Americans and Soviets. Soviet media also carried interviews and opinion pieces by, and arranged press conferences for, U.S. officials.

Among the other members of the Warsaw Pact, implementation of CSCE human rights commitments was uneven. There were some gains in some countries, but the overall record remains unsatisfactory.

The Romanian Government's overall human rights performance continued to fall short of its CSCE commitments, although the total number of Romanians emigrating to the U.S., F.R.G., and Israel increased. Travel for professional reasons continued to be difficult.

Some academic experts have had difficulty obtaining exit permission, and the Romanian Government has continued to limit the number of individuals traveling on cultural exchange programs.

Treatment of religion in Romania remained a major concern for the U.S. during this period. Particularly troublesome were continued demolition of churches and unfulfilled commitments to permit church reconstruction or repair. Members of "unrecognized" faiths continued to maintain a low profile but were apparently spared special harassment or interference. There were no reports of anti-Semitic articles appearing in the press. The Baptist General Union received 5,000 of a promised 10,000 Cornilescu Bibles.

While there were no reports of new political trials, there were several cases of Romanians detained on political grounds. Ion Puiu, former leader of the outlawed Romanian National Peasant Party, was arrested before the visit of Soviet leader Gorbachev and reportedly detained for several weeks before his release. A Romanian citizen was arrested and subsequently imprisoned when he attempted to demonstrate in front of the American Embassy for increased respect for human rights.

Romania continues its efforts to control and influence the media, including the writings of visiting Western journalists. The government remained sensitive to outside criticism, particularly regarding the treatment of the Hungarian minority. It refused permission for several U.S. and European correspondents to enter the country during the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

In Poland, while there was no known backsliding on the 1986 amnesty, the uneasy stalemate between the government and the opposition remained. Opposition groups disagreed on whether any political prisoners remained incarcerated; there were no reports, however, of individuals being detained longer than 48 hours for politically motivated reasons. Government harassment of opposition activists continued in the form of sizable fines and detentions lasting up to 48 hours. "Warning conversations," in which authorities cautioned activists on the consequences of participating in controversial activities, became an increasingly popular means of discouraging dissent. Many opposition activists remain unemployed or underemployed as a result of their political activities.

Large demonstrations by the opposition took place during the Pope's visit in June, on the May 1 and May 3

holidays, and on the August 31 anniversary of the signing of the Gdansk accords. The handling of these demonstrations by local authorities varied significantly from city to city, and many activists claim that police employed undue force in smaller cities not easily accessible to Western observers.

The Consultative Council to the Chairman of the Council of State met twice during the reporting period. While it is difficult to establish a direct link between its deliberations and actions by the government, the authorities have taken some steps to address concerns raised by Council members. In January 1988, a law will take effect creating an ombudsman, or "spokesman for citizens' rights." This official ostensibly will have the power to review legal proceedings and challenge the constitutionality of Polish laws.

The Roman Catholic Church remains the only large and powerful independent institution in Poland, acting as a strong advocate of human rights and freedom of association. The Church and the authorities worked closely together to plan the Pope's June visit.

The human rights situation in Hungary remained relatively less repressive than in the other Warsaw Pact states. Numerous vacancies in the religious hierarchies were filled expeditiously, with government concurrence, during the reporting period. However, problem areas persisted. Some members of the opposition were denied passports and then, following appeals, approved for much shorter stays abroad than requested. In one case, passport denial and subsequent approval for only 3 months prevented an individual from taking up a year's teaching invitation at a U.S. university.

Some underground newspapers (*samizdat*) continued to function with little hindrance, but publishers and distributors of other *samizdat* were periodically subjected to house searches, fines, and confiscation of printing presses, materials, and printed matter.

German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) implementation performance showed positive movement on freedom of travel by its citizens to the West and in church-state relations. However, the overall situation with respect to human rights, fundamental freedoms, and humanitarian cooperation remained clearly unsatisfactory. Contacts with westerners, family reunification, binational marriages, emigration, and travel to the West remain difficult for most East German citizens.

The easing of G.D.R. travel restrictions, discernible over the last 2 years, permitted record numbers of East Ger-

mans to travel West in 1986. At the same time, the number of those allowed to emigrate has declined considerably, and, if current trends continue, the total of emigres in 1987 would be less than half that for the previous year. Emigration procedures remain arbitrary; only a fraction of those who desire to leave have been allowed to do so, and many emigration applicants face reprisals ranging from harassment to imprisonment.

There has been no relaxation of G.D.R. vigilance along the heavily guarded frontier. In spite of the installation of a sophisticated early warning system referred to in the previous semiannual report, isolated cases of successful escape are reported. The number of unsuccessful escape attempts is a matter of conjecture. It appeared that, in light of the Berlin anniversary celebrations and the Honecker visit to the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), authorities instructed the border forces not to open fire on escapees except in cases of military or police deserters or armed attack. The last known shooting incident during the reporting period was on July 29.

Several positive developments occurred regarding religious practice. Large public Lutheran and Catholic gatherings were held during the reporting period in Berlin and Dresden, respectively. The authorities not only made no attempt to interfere with these events but provided logistical support. Both events enjoyed wide coverage by government-controlled media as well as by foreign press. For the first time since 1967, the East German Jewish community has its own rabbi.

In July, the G.D.R. announced that between October 12 and December 12, 1987, in honor of the 38th anniversary of the founding of the state on October 7, 1949, it would release almost all prisoners in a general amnesty. It is anticipated that essentially all political prisoners will be released this fall. It is not clear whether any significant proportion of them will be allowed to emigrate quickly to West Germany, which is the offense for which, in effect, many were imprisoned.

Czechoslovak performance on CSCE implementation over the past 6 months showed limited improvement, although it remains, on the whole, seriously flawed. Freedom of conscience remains severely restricted, and the persecution of political, religious, and cultural activists continues. The government maintained its ban on certain proselytizing groups outright (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses) and intervened arbitrarily in the operation of all other

religious bodies. While theological seminars were permitted continued increased enrollment, they will not be able to keep up with attrition within the population of priests. A priest's license can be revoked at any time and without explanation. The supply of religious literature is inadequate, and the government actively combats efforts to supplement it by "underground" printing or unauthorized imports.

Political and cultural repression continued. For example, the Prague City Court confirmed the March 10-11 convictions and sentencing of the leadership of the Jazz Section. Of the five individuals tried, Section Chairman Karel Srp remains in prison. Vladimir Kouril was released in early July, after serving his sentence. The remaining Executive Board members—Josef Skalnik, Tomas Krivanek, and Cestmir Hunat—received suspended sentences and remain on probation. The government's hard line against independent cultural initiatives has not been consistent through the period. Certain independent cultural events and art exhibits have occurred without interference; others have been disrupted by the police. In the case of the Jazz Section, representatives of the Ministry of Culture have taken up negotiations with Jazz Section representatives regarding the possibility of establishing a new, mutually acceptable organization to replace it.

There was no substantial change in the performance of the Bulgarian Government during the reporting period in the implementation of its CSCE commitments. It continued to pursue policies that deny and suppress the ethnic identity of the country's Turkish minority, that inhibit the free practice of religion, and that discourage and penalize dissent against the regime. Several family visitation and reunification cases were resolved positively, although in some other cases, substantial delays have occurred in issuing travel documents after positive decisions in principle were announced. There were several reports of American citizens of Bulgarian origin being denied visas to visit Bulgaria, although many former Bulgarians have been allowed to return for visits.

In spite of increased talk about and some examples of *glasnost*, tight party and government control of the media and the flow of information continued, for the most part, as in the past. Working conditions for foreign journalists were difficult, but modestly improved over the previous period. Progress was made in the area of bilateral cultural

relations, highlighted by a U.S.-Bulgarian cultural exchange agreement which will permit the exchange of an American design exhibit and a Bulgarian graphics exhibit in late 1987.

The overall record of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in the implementation of Basket II remained poor. Continued sub-par economic performance led to efforts to improve productivity. The Soviets, and some of the East Europeans, showed a great deal of interest in economic restructuring. The resulting changes were directed toward obtaining Western investment, technology, and management skills and not toward improving general business conditions.

The record on business contacts and facilities was mixed. The various reorganizations in trade and economic ministries resulted in confused lines of responsibility and thereby hampered access to end-users. Hotel accommodations and other facilities generally increased in quantity and quality, although prices charged approximated those in major Western industrial capitals.

There was no real improvement in the availability or quality of economic and commercial information, and countertrade demands continued to grow. The demand for countertrade was accompanied by the promotion of joint ventures. Seen by the East as a way to gain Western investment and technology without having to pay hard currency, joint ventures still did not offer Western firms the security, ability to repatriate profits, or other economic incentives which are required to make these ventures attractive.

Interest remained high in increasing cooperation in the fields of science and technology, and the number of bilateral agreements continued to grow. While the Soviets and East Europeans showed a growing awareness of the environmental problems they face, they did little on their own to improve a situation that is rapidly worsening.

In the security area, the East's initial record of implementation of the detailed provisions of the Stockholm document has been encouraging. Although some technical difficulties were experienced during this initial implementation period by all participating states, Eastern practice met the letter and, in some cases, the spirit of the Stockholm document. During the reporting period, all provisions of the document, including the right of onsite inspection, were exercised.

The Vienna CSCE Followup Meeting

The third followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which opened November 4, 1986, in Vienna, Austria, continued beyond the target concluding date of July 31, 1987.

In this reporting period, most of the significant developments at the Vienna meeting took place during the third round, which ran from May 5 to July 31. Participating states continued to submit proposals, and some effort was made to begin drafting a final document. As of October 1, 152 proposals had been tabled in the course of the meeting.

A major step was made when, on July 10, the West tabled its proposal for security negotiations. The Western proposal calls for two distinct security negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process:

- Resumed negotiations among all 35 participating states to build on and expand the results of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs); and
- An autonomous negotiation among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact designed to achieve conventional stability in Europe at lower levels of forces.

Informal discussions of a mandate for the autonomous conventional stability talks among the members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are under way in Vienna and have made some progress.

Progress in Basket II/economic issues was slow during the third round. Although formal sessions in Vienna were punctuated by calls from Warsaw Pact states to begin drafting language for the concluding document, major differences remained on trade and industrial cooperation issues.

It had been hoped that, with the submission of the Western security proposal, the East would begin to address seriously Western proposals on the human dimension. Unfortunately, that was not to be the case. During the third round, the positions of East and West remained far apart on key issues across the board, but especially with regard to human contacts and human rights questions. The U.S. and its NATO allies—with important support from some of the neutral and non-aligned countries—have continued to highlight compliance problems and stress the need for positive action to correct them, including credible mechanisms to institutionalize needed reforms.

Discussion continued on the Soviet proposal to hold a humanitarian cooperation conference in Moscow as part of the

post-Vienna, follow-on activities. The NATO countries, including the U.S., reiterated their demand that the Soviets provide credible guarantees of access and openness to anyone interested in participating in such a meeting, including individuals, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the press. Ambassador Warren Zimmermann, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the meeting, posed a series of very specific questions about access and openness, including, among others, queries about: freedom of movement within the U.S.S.R. for Soviet citizens wishing to attend the meeting; attendance of Soviet Helsinki monitors; attendance of foreign human rights activists, including former Soviet citizens; organization of public and private meetings and activities; access of Soviet citizens to delegations, NGOs, and journalists; and access by NGOs and press to lodging, office space, communications fa-

cilities, and the like. As of the end of the reporting period, the Soviet delegation had yet to provide any detailed answers to these questions. Also, the U.S. reiterated its criterion that the Soviets must significantly improve their human rights record before Moscow could be considered a credible contender to host such a meeting.

Deputy Secretary of State Whitehead was the highest ranking U.S. visitor to the meeting during the reporting period. He addressed the plenary on June 23. The Deputy Secretary stressed the U.S. position that security is more than just a question of military balance; human rights and fundamental freedoms are equally important elements of the security equation. In particular, Deputy Secretary Whitehead questioned Soviet willingness to honor all of its Helsinki commitments. Reviewing areas of progress and lack of progress, he concluded that the balance sheet was still unsatisfactory.

Following a summer break, the fourth round began on September 22, with hopes that a start of serious drafting early in the round would permit the Vienna CSCE meeting to finish by the end of the year. Compromise papers tabled by neutral and nonaligned coordinators, together with existing nonpapers and proposals, provided a solid basis for serious negotiation on the text of a concluding document. Due to Eastern stalling, however, virtually no progress has been made on human rights issues, although language has been registered on security issues. It is the U.S. position that the concluding document must reflect balance in each dimension—security, economic, and human. The U.S. is prepared to stay as long as it takes to obtain improved compliance and expanded commitments by the Eastern states in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Chapter Two

Implementation of Basket I: Questions Relating to Security in Europe

The first section or "basket" of the Final Act has two main parts. The first part is the declaration of 10 principles guiding relations among states. It sets forth generally accepted precepts of international behavior which the CSCE participating states agree to observe in their relations with one another and with other states. The second part of Basket I is devoted to security issues. Here the participating states endorse certain confidence-building measures that are designed to remove some of the secrecy surrounding military activities; they also make certain more general pledges with respect to the importance of arms control and disarmament. This basket of the Final Act was updated and enhanced at the Stockholm meeting of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which ended in 1986.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES GUIDING RELATIONS AMONG STATES

Principle One: Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty;

Principle Two: Refrain from the threat or use of force;

Principle Three: Inviolability of frontiers;

Principle Four: Territorial integrity of states;

Principle Five: Peaceful settlement of disputes;

Principle Six: Nonintervention in internal affairs;

Principle Seven: Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief;

Principle Eight: Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;

Principle Nine: Cooperation among states; and

Principle Ten: Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

The Madrid Concluding Document contains complementary principles which strengthen and extend the Final Act. These include pledges to take effective measures against terrorism; to prevent territories from being used for terrorist activities; to assure constant, tangible progress in the exercise of human rights; to reaffirm the right of the individual to know and act upon his

rights and freedoms; to consult with religious organizations in order to enhance individual freedom to practice and profess religion; to consider favorably applications for registration by religious communities; to ensure respect for the rights of workers freely to establish and join trade unions and the right of trade unions freely to pursue their activities; and other rights.

Implementation of Principle Seven

The implementation record of the East European countries remained unsatisfactory, particularly with respect to Principle Seven. This principle calls on the participating states to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, as well as the right to "know and act upon" one's rights.

The following section provides a detailed survey of implementation of the Helsinki principles and related provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document. It treats specific cases in an illustrative rather than comprehensive

fashion. Lack of information detailing abuses in a given country may not imply their absence.

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union continues its illegal occupation of Afghanistan, in direct and willful violation of the principles set forth in the Helsinki Final Act. The Soviets have stated that a decision has been made, in principle, to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan, but have failed to produce an acceptable timetable for withdrawal at the UN proximity talks. Despite the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan regime's declared ceasefire and policy of "national reconciliation," the war continues to produce extensive civilian casualties from antipersonnel weapons and use of air forces to destroy villages and crops. The Soviet Union also supports the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia and Vietnam's war against the Cambodian resistance. These actions violate Helsinki Final Act principles regarding respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty; refraining from the use of force; inviolability of frontiers; territorial integrity; peaceful settlement of disputes; and nonintervention in internal affairs.

Soviet performance in the field of human rights (Principle Seven) improved during the reporting period, although many problem areas remained. On the positive side, Moscow continued to release some political prisoners, and a number of political prisoners have had their sentences reduced under the terms of the amnesty in honor of the 70th anniversary of the Revolution. There were few political arrests and numerous detentions in the major cities, although there were virtually no reports of house searches for political materials in Moscow or Leningrad. Communist Party General Secretary Gorbachev's campaign for more "openness" in and "democratization" of Soviet society improved the ability of Soviet citizens to express their views and criticize their government; unofficial organizations and publications burgeoned during this period. The Soviet authorities showed unprecedented tolerance of public demonstrations at the beginning of the period.

On the negative side, many political and religious prisoners remain incarcerated, while those released have, in some cases, been refused residence permits in their home cities or have not been allowed to work, and the articles of the criminal code under which they were convicted are still in force. Some arrests and trials were reported, particularly of religious activists, outside

the major cities. Unofficial organizations and demonstrators were sometimes harassed and strongly attacked in the press.

The Supreme Soviet continued to pass decrees releasing and pardoning political prisoners, particularly those convicted under criminal code "political" article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) and to a lesser degree under article 190 (anti-Soviet slander). A number of prisoners convicted under article 64 (treason), which is often applied to those who attempt to cross the border illegally, were also released in this period (e.g., Ivanov and Simenov). Four prisoners from Perm Camp 36-1 were released (Borodin, Horyn, Arshakyan, and Navasardyan). By the end of this review period, Western and Soviet dissident sources had documented the early release of approximately 200 political prisoners this year. These included individuals who had been active in the struggle for national, religious, and human rights. Among those released were: the Russian Orthodox priest Gleb Yakunin; Helsinki monitors Mykola Rudenko and Myroslav Marynovich (Ukrainians); Feliks Serebrov (Russian); Merab Kostava and Eduard and Tengiz Gudava (Georgians); Ukrainian Catholic activist Sofiya Belyak; and Hebrew teacher Yuliy Edelshteyn.

These releases were marred, however, by the requirement in many cases that prisoners sign promises acknowledging guilt or abjuring future "anti-Soviet" behavior and requesting pardon. Some refused to sign such documents on the grounds that to do so would imply an admission of guilt. As a result, some prisoners were returned to labor camps after being held for some time in remand prisons. Of these, some have since been released; others remain incarcerated. Some of those who were freed continued to have difficulties obtaining residence permits in their home cities or in finding work. Others were told they would be allowed to emigrate in exchange for signing such documents but had not received exit permission by the end of reporting period.

While the prisoner releases signaled positive progress in Soviet human rights policy, inadequate legal protection of individual rights continued to permit the arbitrary use of power by Soviet authorities. The Soviet criminal code was under revision, but at the end of the reporting period, the "political" and "religious" articles under which these prisoners were convicted were still in force. The prisoner releases

shed further light on the abuse of political prisoners by prison and labor camp authorities. Former prisoners reported mistreatment in the form of inadequate diet, poor or no medical treatment, beatings by guards, repeated 10- to 15-day sentences in punishment cells, and curtailment of family visits and correspondence.

Despite the well-publicized prisoner releases, only a few dissidents were freed from special psychiatric hospitals. These institutions had been under the control of the Interior Ministry but reportedly were shifted to the Ministry of Health during this review period, a development which may lead to a lessening of psychiatric abuse. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Adamishin announced that problems were being addressed in Soviet psychiatric practice, although he denied the existence of political abuse of psychiatry. Four releases from special psychiatric hospitals (SPH) were reported this period: Vladimir Bazdyrev and Vladimir Sytinskiy from Leningrad SPH, Valeriy Tyurichev from SPH No. 5 in Moscow, and Nizametdin Akhmetov from Alma Ata SPH. Psychiatrist and human rights activist Anatoliy Koryagin, released from prison in February, emigrated to Switzerland in April.

The Soviet leadership's pursuit of the "democratization" of Soviet society, along with the avowed policy of *glasnost*, improved the ability of Soviet citizens to criticize their government and its policies. The Soviet press published more articles critical of various aspects of Soviet society and politics, as well as a few foreign articles and opinions. This, perhaps combined with the political prisoner releases, seemed to spark more willingness among the public to discuss formerly taboo topics and made it possible for some dissidents to air their views publicly. For example, after pressure from Western peace groups, a member of the "Group to Establish Trust Between East and West" (Trust Group), Irina Krivova, was permitted to address an official gathering of peace groups in Moscow in May.

Perhaps the most striking development in this area was the proliferation of unofficial social/political organizations and periodicals. Unofficial organizations, such as Moscow's *Perestroika* Club, the Social Initiative Group, the *Glasnost* Press Club, Leningrad's *Epitsentr*, and various ecological organizations, provide a forum where both dissidents and nondissidents can discuss political and social problems. Unofficial periodicals include *Glasnost*, edited by recently released political

prisoner Sergey Grigoryants; *Bulletin of the Christian Community*, edited by recently released Orthodox activist Aleksandr Ogorodnikov; Leningrad's *Merkuriya*; Riga's *The Third Modernization*; and the Ukrainian *Visnyk*. Unofficial organizations held a conference in Moscow in August, and numerous unofficial publishers planned to gather in October.

In late September, *Glasnost* Press Club members were invited to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss their application to arrange a seminar in Moscow to discuss human rights and the officially proposed humanitarian affairs conference. This invitation, to a club composed primarily of former political prisoners, was in itself a sign of new openness in Soviet society. The seminar was scheduled to take place after the end of the review period.

While this proliferation of forums where ordinary citizens could express political opinions was a sign of an opening up of Soviet society, it should be noted that there were still significant limits to what could be expressed in these forums and that those who published relatively outspoken journals like *Glasnost* were sometimes harassed and strongly attacked in the press.

Soviet officials indicated that the ongoing reform of the criminal code would probably lead to the removal of article 190 (anti-Soviet slander) and the revision of article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation). They also indicated that the criminal code as well as the "Law on Religious Association" would be revised to permit greater freedom for religious believers. As of the end of this review period, however, these changes had not materialized. Officials spoke of increased independence by the courts, although there were no concrete signs of such change.

Despite the positive developments, Soviet authorities continued to use repression to curtail dissent. Among the tactics used were: exile abroad (forced emigration); interrogations; surveillance; short detentions; physical intimidation; arrests (primarily outside Moscow and Leningrad); call-up for reserve duty; and, in a limited number of cases, confinement to (or threat of confinement to) psychiatric hospitals. A hippie demonstration in May was broken up by the militia, who treated the demonstrators very roughly, resulting in the hospitalization of at least two demonstrators. The militia responsible were later reported to have been "punished."

There was a stronger response to the commemoration of the anniversary of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact in Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius on August 23. Besides press attacks on the organizers, there were persistent harassment and numerous detentions on the day of the commemoration. Some demonstrators may still be under arrest; at least 11 of the organizers have been given a choice between imprisonment and emigration. Still, thousands of people succeeded in gathering to commemorate the anniversary. On September 13, approximately 17 Jews in Moscow were detained for several hours in order to prevent a demonstration against anti-Semitism in the U.S.S.R., despite the fact that the demonstration had been canceled by the organizers. Also on September 13, ten Trust Group members were detained and interrogated by the militia for several hours after they attempted to collect signatures supporting the release of Mathias Rust.

Another tactic used during this review period was calling up activists for reserve duty in order to prevent their activities. For example, Latvian activists Linards Grantins, Raimonds Bitenieks, and Martin Bariss were called up for 55 days of reserve training on June 9, just before the planned June 14 demonstration in Riga commemorating the forced Soviet deportation of Latvians in 1941. Grantins was arrested June 9 for not reporting for duty and sentenced to 6 months in prison. Ukrainian Catholic activist Mikhail Havriliv was called up for service on September 21, after he signed an appeal to the Pope to help the Ukrainian Catholic Church obtain legal status in the U.S.S.R.

Dissidents continued to be placed in psychiatric hospitals or threatened with hospitalization on the basis of their convictions. Leningrad Trust Group member Igor Barylnik was placed in a Leningrad psychiatric hospital on September 11, and Moscow artist Aleksandr Kalugin was threatened with another confinement to a psychiatric hospital in late August.

At the same time, the authorities exercised restraints in dealing with a number of notable protest actions. Latvians, Lithuanians, and Estonians staged a demonstration on June 14 commemorating the forced deportation of Latvians under Stalin in 1941; authorities did not break up the demonstration. The Crimean Tatars staged a number of peaceful demonstrations in the heart of Moscow in July. Soviet authorities showed tolerance in permitting them to demonstrate. Finally,

however, the demonstration organizers were expelled from Moscow.

Regarding imprisoned Helsinki monitors, the Ukrainians Mykola Rudenko and Myroslav Marynovich were released early from exile. Former Moscow Helsinki monitor Feliks Sebrebrov was released early from exile, while his colleague, Viktor Nekipelov, emigrated from the U.S.S.R. on September 27. Georgian Helsinki monitors Merab Kostava and Tengiz and Eduard Gudava were released early from labor camps. The Gudava brothers both emigrated in early July. Other Helsinki monitors remained in prison, exile, or psychiatric hospitals, including Ukrainians Mykola Matusevych and Mykola Horbal; Lithuanians Balys Gajauskas and Viktoras Petkus; and Latvian Linards Grantins (rearrested June 9).

Members of the Trust Group were subject to official harassment during the review period. Leningrad Trust Group member Igor Barylnik was confined to a psychiatric hospital on September 11, after demonstrating for the release of Mathias Rust. He had planned to be in Moscow 2 days later to collect signatures in the Trust Group's campaign to free Rust. Other Trust Group members were detained for several hours after a demonstration in support of Yugoslav conscientious objectors April 24 and after attempting on September 13 to collect signatures supporting Rust's release.

On the positive side, Trust Group member Irina Krivova was permitted to address an international peace gathering sponsored by the official Soviet Peace Committee in May (although only as a result of pressure from Western groups) and, also in May, Trust Group member Sergey Svetushkin was released from prison.

Over the last several years, Soviet Jews—especially those actively pursuing their own religious and cultural traditions or the right to emigrate—have suffered particularly severe treatment with arrests, trials and convictions, harassment, loss of employment, surveillance, and occasional short detentions. During the 6-month period under review, some positive as well as negative developments took place.

Four Hebrew teachers (Yuliy Edelshteyn, Iosif Berenshteyn, Leonid Shrayer, and Aleksey Magarik) were released from prison, three of them ahead of schedule. Edelshteyn and Shrayer emigrated this summer. Hebrew teacher Iosif Zisels remained in labor camp and was expected to be released October 19, at the end of his sentence.

Emigration increased substantially compared to the previous review period, and a number of longtime Jewish refuseniks were permitted to emigrate, including Iosif Begun, Viktor Brailovskiy, Arkady Mai and Helen Seidel, Vladimir Prestin, Lev Sud, and Vladimir Lifshits. However, many Jews (for example, Naum Meiman, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak, and Leonid Volvovskiy) continued to be refused exit visas for "security" reasons, many of which appeared to be unfounded or outdated. (Note: After the end of this reporting period, Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak were granted exit visas and subsequently emigrated.)

There were few positive developments concerning religious activists during the review period. Government control of religious institutions continues, and antireligious legislation is still in force. Soviet officials continued to stress the need to control religion and spread atheism, while authorities continued to harass believers. There has, however, been somewhat more favorable coverage of Russian Orthodoxy in the mass media. Konstantin Kharchev, Chairman of the Council on Religious Affairs, told Senator Richard Lugar that there would be no religious prisoners by November 1987.

A number of religious communities responded to *perestroika* and *glasnost* by offering suggestions on how the criminal code and other Soviet legislation might be restructured to guarantee the rights of believers and by forming unofficial organizations dedicated to church renewal. Latvian Evangelical Lutheran priests and theologians, for example, formed a group in June called "Rebirth and Renewal" and made suggestions for change. Soviet authorities responded by relieving some of the leaders of the group of their positions, including theological seminary rector Roberts Akmentinsh, seminary lecturer and pastor Modris Plate, and seminary professor Ayvar Vehmanis.

Although some Baptists belong to the registered Baptist Church, many others are members of unregistered groups which have been severely persecuted. During the reporting period, some Baptist activists were released early from exile or labor camp, including Nikolay Bobarynkin, Korney Kreker, Nikolay Minayev, Andrey Volf, Egor Volf, and Pavel Zichenko. Vladimir Khaylo, released in February from a psychiatric hospital, was permitted to emigrate to the Netherlands with 12 other family members in August. The remaining 14 family members

expect to receive exit permission once the first group is settled abroad. Yelena Belous was sentenced April 23 to 2 years imprisonment, according to reliable dissident sources. Jacob Steinle of Stavropol Kray was sentenced July 2 to imprisonment, but the judge determined that Steinle was a beneficiary of the amnesty in honor of the 70th anniversary (of the Revolution) and he was set free. In general, unregistered Baptists live outside the major cities, and information on arrests is not readily available. It appears, however, that the situation has not improved for the vast majority.

A number of Orthodox and Catholic activists were released early from labor camps, psychiatric hospitals, or exile, including Aleksandr Ogorodnikov (Orthodox), Gleb Yakunin (Orthodox priest), Sofiya Belyak (Ukrainian Catholic), and Iosif Swidnikcki (Catholic priest). Orthodox activist Igor Ogurtsov received permission to emigrate. Among the new unofficial journals which appeared were Ogorodnikov's *Bulletin of the Christian Community* and an Orthodox journal called *Vybor (Choice)*.

On the other hand, Lithuanian Catholic priests Alfonsas Svarinskas and Sigitas Tamkevicius, along with Orthodox deacon Vladimir Rusak, remained in labor camps, reportedly for refusing to sign statements rejecting their previous activities, which they saw as tantamount to being asked to renounce their faith. There was also a report of a search of Lithuanian Catholic Berute Prilyute's home September 8 in Kibartay, Lithuania, and an issue of the *Lithuanian Catholic Chronicle* was reportedly confiscated.

The Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate) Church remained outlawed. In August, Ukrainian Catholic clergy and laity appealed to the Pope for support and declared they were coming "out from underground." Since then, there have been reports of harassment, including a call-up for reserve duty of 46-year-old activist Mikhail Gavriliv. Activist Iosip Terelya emigrated September 17.

Pentecostals throughout the U.S.S.R. continued to be severely harassed, and only a handful of the reportedly large numbers of Pentecostals who have petitioned to be allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. have received exit permission. Repression in Chuguyevka in the Soviet Far East continued to be especially harsh. Eight community members were serving sentences, including the pastor, Viktor Val-

ter, who has been denied family visits since the beginning of his term 2½ years ago. His Bible was confiscated April 4. This community of approximately 300 people, mostly ethnic Germans, seeks to emigrate to West Germany.

Soviet authorities continued to exert steady pressure to encourage Muslim inhabitants of Central Asia and Azerbaijan to abandon their religion. Few mosques were opened for use, and there were few officially recognized clergymen. News of arrests and convictions of unofficial imams, mullahs, and Muslim laymen continued to reach Moscow, although with some delay. There were reports of at least 14 convictions of Muslim activists.

Tiny religious groups were subjected to particularly severe pressure. The Soviet authorities refuse to allow some groups to register—Jehovah's Witnesses and Hare Krishnas, for example. The fact that they are not registered makes them susceptible to official harassment. Krishna followers continue to be confined to Soviet prisons and psychiatric institutes. On August 17, about 15 Hare Krishnas were detained for up to 12 hours after praying in downtown Moscow; Hare Krishnas in Riga and Leningrad were detained the same day. Militia broke up a demonstration in Moscow on August 29 at which approximately 100 Hare Krishnas were demanding that they be permitted to register as an official religious group and that incarcerated Hare Krishnas be released. Demonstrators were detained at militia stations.

The process of "Russification" in Ukraine continued. Longstanding neglect of Ukrainian cultural and historical traditions has given rise to ferment among cultural intelligentsia, who are striving to increase instruction in and use of the Ukrainian language as well as to focus attention on Ukrainian culture and history. One of the main purposes of a new organization, the "Commission for Ties between the Ukrainian Writers' Union and Educational Institutions," is promotion of the Ukrainian language. Some imprisoned Ukrainian nationalists were released (during the reporting period), including Mykhaýlo Horyn. Ukrainian Catholic activist Iosif Terelya was permitted to emigrate in September. Many other Ukrainians remain incarcerated, however; in the notorious Perm 36-1 camp for recidivists convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," 10 of the 16 known prisoners are Ukrainians (the remaining six are Balts).

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, whose forced annexation by the Soviet Union in 1944 has never been recognized by the U.S., are areas where the assimilation of Russian language and culture have long been resisted. The government has been quick to suppress both religious and nationalist dissent in the Baltic republics.

During the review period, some jailed nationalist or religious dissenters were released, several of whom were encouraged to emigrate. Among those released were Latvian Lidia Doronina-Lasmane and Lithuanians Edita Abrutiene and Algimantas Andreika. Latvian Rolands Silaraups and Estonian Tiit Madisson were forced to emigrate. Latvian Janis Rozkalns was also told to depart but was not expected to leave the U.S.S.R. before mid-October. Since around the time of the August 23 demonstrations (see p. 7), all but one of the 11 members of the Latvian "Helsinki 86" organization have been given the choice of emigration or imprisonment and have been under constant surveillance and subjected to daily harassment. **Latvian activist and poet Gintautas Iesmantas remained in labor camp** because he refused to sign a statement pledging "to refrain from illegal actions" on the grounds that such a statement would have been an acknowledgment that his previous activities were illegal. Many other Baltic religious and nationalist activists remained in prison or exile, including six in Perm Camp 36-1.

Evicted from their homeland in 1944, Crimean Tatars continued to insist on their right to return home. During this review period, Crimean Tatars came to Moscow to press for re-establishment of a Crimean Tatar Autonomous Republic. Senior Soviet officials, including Politburo candidate member Demichev, received Crimean Tatar representatives and, on July 9, established a commission headed by Politburo member Gromyko to look into their concerns. Soviet authorities permitted the Tatars to demonstrate on at least three different occasions (July 6, July 23, and July 25-26). The last occasion included an attempted march to Red Square, which was prevented by a cordon of Soviet militia and plainclothesmen, who acted with restraint. After this march was blocked, the demonstrators staged a vigil on the square near Saint Basil's through the night of July 25-26, after accepting an appointment with Gromyko, who received 21 of their representatives on July 27.

The Crimean Tatars held a press conference July 27 at which they described their lack of confidence in the Gromyko commission and again pressed for resolution of the 43-year-old problem. A last public demonstration was staged at Pushkin Square July 30, when demonstrators were taken forcibly into custody. The Crimean Tatars in Moscow, estimated at around 800, were forced to return to their places of residence, and Crimean Tatars outside Moscow were prevented from entering. A local branch of the Gromyko commission was established in Tashkent; however, none of the protest leaders who had demonstrated in Moscow was permitted to serve on it. At the end of the review period, the commission had made no recommendations on the Crimean Tatars' request for the re-establishment of a Tatar Autonomous Republic in the Crimea and was not expected to do so until next spring. A variety of contacts reported that the commission was, in fact, at work.

Independent labor unions are not allowed under the Soviet system. Existing "unions" are completely controlled by the party-state apparatus and serve largely to promote ideological indoctrination, workforce mobilization, and labor discipline. Strikes are not permitted. Official unions are expected to respond rapidly to changing political priorities, as in the case of the current Soviet antialcohol campaign. Although the 18th All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions Congress, held in February 1987, adopted new statutes pointing to possible modifications in union electoral procedures and the ability of the rank and file to criticize union leadership, it remains to be seen how these measures will be put into practice. Severe repression of past sporadic attempts to organize independent labor unions has apparently been effective: there were no reports of such activity during the current review period. The prisoner releases affected two labor activists who were committed to psychiatric hospitals for attempting to organize an independent union: Vladimir Sytinskiy and Aleksandr Skobov. Other labor union activists remain in prison or psychiatric institutes, including Vladimir Gershuni, who is in a Moscow psychiatric hospital.

A new Ministry of Foreign Affairs administration for humanitarian and cultural affairs, with a separate office of human rights, was established last year. To date, it has focused on seeking cooperation in the human rights field with foreign governments and organizations.

Romania. The Government of Romania continues to highlight the first six Helsinki principles as key elements of its own national and foreign policy, sponsoring UN resolutions on the peaceful settlement of disputes and emphasizing the need for military spending cuts. Romania has been among the most strongly in favor of the 25% military budget cuts for NATO and Warsaw Pact countries proposed by the Warsaw Treaty Organization summit meeting in Budapest last summer. The Romanian Government has continued to seek support for its proposal for 5% military cuts as well as for more sweeping disarmament. In April, it authorized and distributed in the name of its Warsaw Pact allies a declaration calling for a freeze in military budgets.

While the Romanian Constitution contains guarantees of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Romania's observance of basic human rights continues to be poor. The Romanian Communist Party and Government tolerate no significant opposition, and all forms of mass media are tightly controlled. Freedom of conscience is seriously inhibited by the widespread belief that public criticism of the leadership or political system will be reported to police and punished. Freedoms of association and assembly are limited by these same fears and by government policies that allow assembly only for officially approved purposes.

The practice of religion in Romania, although widespread, continues to be circumscribed by the government. Government authorities officially recognize 14 denominations; in addition, the Roman Catholic Church enjoys *de facto* recognition. Among the denominations not officially recognized are the Jehovah's Witnesses, Christian Scientists, Eastern Rite Catholics (Uniate), and the Nazarenes. The press campaign against religion in general continues but was less strident during the reporting period. Generally, religious activists, particularly devout and vocal Protestants, remain under scrutiny by the authorities and are occasionally subject to loss of jobs and social benefits or other forms of harassment and intimidation.

Government control over clergy salaries, building permits, seminary admissions, and printing of religious materials is routinely used to limit the growth and breadth of activities of these organizations. Government actions restrict the activist "neo-Protestant" faiths more than the Romanian

Orthodox Church (to which the great majority of Romanians belong) and other long-established denominations. The growth of these activist, proselytizing churches in Romania during the last 15 years has led to continued friction between their congregations and authorities.

During the reporting period, 5,000 Cornilescu Bibles (out of 10,000 promised by the government) were delivered to Baptist churches around the country. There was no firm commitment to a timetable for printing the remaining 5,000, but the Baptist leadership is optimistic since the materials for the remainder were on hand.

During this reporting period, there was been no overall improvement in the granting of permission for church repair and construction. A large Seventh-Day Adventist congregation in Bucharest had still not received permission to replace its church which was demolished in August 1986. In Oradea, the authorities remained firm in their decision to revoke approval previously granted for the Second Baptist Church to construct a new building. The congregation remained in its temporary location, which is too small and in need of extensive repair. In Timisoara, however, approval was given for a Baptist congregation to purchase a new and larger replacement for its current building, which is scheduled to be demolished to make way for an urban renewal project. Approval was finally received to rebuild the Baptist Church in Bistrita, which was partially demolished in 1984, but the agreement required the church to employ a construction crew provided by the local authorities, and work has proceeded very slowly. Romanian Orthodox churches and other facilities continue to face destruction as a result of expanding urban renewal programs. In June, the historic Sfintu Vineri Church was destroyed in a matter of days, despite strong vocal opposition. In September, the 18th-century Sfintu Spiridon church was demolished.

Romania's small remaining Jewish community encountered no major new difficulties during the reporting period. There were no reports of anti-Semitic articles in the press. The government gave formal assurances that the three remaining historic Jewish buildings in Bucharest—the Choral Temple, the Great Synagogue, and the Jewish Museum—will not be demolished.

One well-known human rights case has been resolved, while others remain undecided. The case of Ioan Ruta ended happily. Ruta was charged with bribery

shortly after he applied to join his wife in the U.S. and was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment. Observers at the trial found the evidence questionable and inconclusive, and defense witnesses were too intimidated to appear in court. Ruta was released in June and in July was reunited with his family in the U.S. Religious activist Ilie Neamtu, released from prison after charges of corruption were dropped, has still not been issued a passport to emigrate. He also has not been permitted to return to his former job, causing considerable hardship to his family. Also of concern is the case of Pastor Victor Opris, of the Pentecostal Church of Satu Mare. Opris had originally been sentenced to 5 years for bribery, but was released during a general amnesty in June 1986. However, he was subsequently retried and sentenced to 9 years. As of the end of the reporting period, his case was under appeal in the Supreme Court.

Labor unions are controlled by the Communist Party and the state. Romanian President and party chief Nicolae Ceausescu is chairman of the National Labor Organization. The official labor union is the only labor organization permitted and serves primarily as an organizational channel for imposing government and party doctrine upon the workers. In 1987, Romania lost its eligibility for U.S. generalized system of preferences (GSP) tariff treatment, after the U.S. Government found, in applying newly revised legislation, that Romania's labor practices did not assure internationally recognized workers' rights.

Nationalism remained an important force in Romania, which has always had a large number of ethnic minorities. Despite public pronouncements to the contrary, the government continued its efforts to assimilate minorities into a single Romanian culture. Government actions to centralize and economize by combining education, social, and cultural facilities continued to cause substantial losses of ethnic minority cultural opportunities (especially for ethnic Hungarians and Germans). Gypsies remained an underclass in Romanian society.

Primary and secondary schooling continued to be available in minority languages (Hungarian and German); Romanian law provides for instruction in these languages if requested by at least 26 pupils. As minority populations emigrate or are dispersed, it has become more difficult to bring together the requisite number of pupils. In some cases, even though the legal minimum

is met, the schools have been unable to provide an appropriate teacher. The Hungarian community, in particular, continued to voice complaints about the decreased opportunities for high school study in their native language. Heightened attention to the issue of minority rights in the West and in Hungary has resulted in an intensive Romanian media campaign in response, denying any form of discrimination against Hungarian-Romanians in particular and attacking alleged distortions in outside reports.

Poland. Despite the release of political prisoners and the claim that Poland had returned to normal, Polish authorities continued, during the reporting period, to restrict most forms of independent political, trade union, or professional association activities, although some independent associations were legalized in the past year. Several hundred persons were harassed, briefly detained, and fined for free expression of their ideas.

None of the political prisoners released under the September 1986 amnesty were reincarcerated during the review period. Within opposition circles, there was some disagreement as to whether authorities continue to hold purely "political prisoners." Some human rights activists and Solidarity leaders asserted that political prisoners do remain in jail, but the cases they cited were frequently those of individuals convicted of criminal offenses which were politically motivated, those who have been imprisoned for refusing to perform compulsory military service, or those who have refused to take the military oath, which contains a provision pledging loyalty to the Soviet Union. Other Solidarity leaders stated categorically that no one remains incarcerated for purely political reasons. Roman Catholic Church officials stated flatly that there were no political prisoners in Poland.

Polish authorities continued to utilize their legal power to detain citizens for periods of up to 48 hours without bringing formal charges against them. Several opposition activists reported that they were held in "preventive detention" for periods up to 48 hours shortly before they were scheduled to engage in activities considered "hostile" by the authorities, e.g., demonstrations, unauthorized press conferences, and meetings with representatives of Western governments. Opposition sources charged that approximately 100 people were detained for 48 hours in order to prevent them from participating in events connected to the Pope's

visit in June. The "Freedom and Peace Movement," a group largely concerned with the issues of military conscription and environmental protection, sponsored an international peace seminar in Warsaw in May. In the 2-day period immediately preceding the seminar, 27 activists scheduled to attend were detained for 48 hours, effectively preventing their participation in the event. Approximately 150 demonstrators were detained for several hours following a demonstration in Krakow marking the anniversary of Poland's Liberal Constitution of May 3, 1791.

In addition, Polish authorities seemed to rely more heavily on "warning conversations" in which they cautioned activists of the consequences of participating in controversial events. Activists were reportedly subjected to such "conversations" before the Pope's visit and before the May 1 and May 3 holidays. The apartments of approximately 40 "Freedom and Peace" members were searched 2 weeks before the start of their peace seminar and the group members subjected to "warning conversations."

The levying of heavy fines for opposition activities such as participating in demonstrations is seen by opposition activists as an effective means by which the Polish authorities curb public expression of dissent without causing the international outcry that extended prison sentences would invite. Some activists claimed that, although they steadfastly refused to pay these fines, no attempts were made to enforce the sentences.

As a result of their political activities, many activists (estimates run as high as several thousand) remained unemployed or employed in jobs not suited to their qualifications. In some instances, activists who lost their jobs in state-run enterprises were able to find work in small private workshops. Some reported that their new employers, threatened with the loss of contracts from state enterprises, were subsequently pressured into terminating their employment. The long-term unemployment or underemployment faced by opposition activists led some of them to seek opportunities to emigrate.

Official reaction to opposition protests varied but appeared to be determined by the venue. Significant

demonstrations occurred in several cities in connection with the May 1 and May 3 holidays and during the Pope's visit in June. Several demonstrations also took place on the anniversary of the August 31, 1980, signing of the Gdansk accords. Opposition activists claimed that in those cities such as Warsaw and Gdansk, where Western reporters and diplomats are regularly present, local authorities act with greater discretion in handling and breaking up demonstrations. They alleged that force is applied earlier and more indiscriminately in cities not frequently visited by outsiders. This was borne out on August 31, when a large Solidarity demonstration in Gdansk was peacefully dispersed by riot police with no demonstrators taken into custody. On that same weekend, eight demonstrators in Wroclaw and 12 in Lubin were detained. All were released within 48 hours, but some were fined amounts ranging from 15,000 to 50,000 zlotys. However, following an outdoor mass by the Pope in Gdansk, a peaceful procession by Solidarity supporters was set upon by police and roughly handled.

The Consultative Council to the Chairman of the Council of State met on May 18 and July 17. Among the members of the council, established in December 1986, are several truly independent voices, although no Solidarity activists participate. It is difficult to establish a direct link between discussions at the council and government actions, but the government took some steps to meet concerns expressed by council members, e.g., the July 1 liberalization of passport policy for Poles residing abroad. The council provided a forum for the discussion of topics which would not otherwise have been aired publicly. At the May 18 meeting, the rector of Warsaw University read aloud a resolution passed by the university Senate supporting four intellectuals alleged by the Polish authorities to have had ties to an American diplomat accused of espionage. At the same meeting, another council member called for Polish schools to be free of "political content," disputed the government's contention that Poland was in "mortal danger" before the imposition of martial law in 1981, questioned the Polish military oath which demands loyalty to the Soviet Union, and commented on the inaccuracy in the official media in its coverage of opposition demonstrations. Proceedings of the council were published and provided a wider commentary on the current Polish situation than was available from most other official sources.

The *Sejm* (Parliament) passed a bill July 15 creating the institution of an ombudsman ("spokesman for citizens' rights") who ostensibly will have the power to evaluate decisions made by other state organs. The ombudsman theoretically will have the right to review legal proceedings in administrative, penal, and misdemeanor cases and will also have the right to challenge the constitutionality of laws. The ombudsman law will come into effect on January 2, 1988; no one has yet been named to the post. It remains to be seen if the ombudsman will, indeed, perform the watchdog function promised by the wording of the legislation creating the position or if it will merely be a rubber stamp for government decisions.

The Polish Government tolerates a high degree of religious freedom. The Roman Catholic Church is the predominant religious force and the single largest independent institution in Poland. A substantial majority of all ages and social groups participate regularly in Catholic religious services. The next largest community is the Orthodox Church, which claims approximately 800,000 adherents. While social prejudice may exist against non-Polish, non-Catholic faiths such as the Orthodox and the Ukrainian Catholic churches, it does not appear to be government inspired. Approximately a dozen other religious denominations exist in Poland, and, for the most part, the government allows them to practice their faiths freely as long as they avoid political activities.

Churches continued to be free to preach, proselytize, and, to a lesser extent, publish. While church construction remained relatively extensive by Warsaw Pact standards, the regime continued to be obstructive. Religious publications were still subjected to censorship. The Roman Catholic Church continued to broadcast Sunday mass on state-run radio; the small Protestant groups did so on a rotating basis. The government also allowed religious gatherings, such as pilgrimages and conferences, without significant interference. The Pope's third pilgrimage to Poland in June 1987 was jointly planned by the government and the Church, and his public events received widespread media coverage. Although the vast majority of Poles are religious adherents, persons who openly profess religious belief usually find it difficult to rise to leading positions in government and industry, largely because these are party

controlled. The government continued its attempts to introduce the study of religions into the elementary and high school curriculum, a measure opposed by the Roman Catholic Church, which viewed the course as an ill-disguised propagation of atheism.

The Polish Government, while restricting independent political activity, permitted a relatively free intellectual life within certain limits. Poles were able to meet openly with Western diplomats and reporters and were permitted, among themselves, to hold wide-ranging debates on religion, politics, and Polish society. The government strongly encourages public participation in state- and party-sanctioned consultations on a variety of issues and decisions, occasionally producing lively results. The underground press, though still illegal and its publishers subject to fines, remained strong, and unofficial cultural events took place in churches and private homes around Poland.

The government proscribes trade union pluralism, and the officially sanctioned National Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ) remained the only legal labor organization in Poland. Despite its official imprimatur, the OPZZ demonstrated some opposition to government proposals affecting workers. In this reporting period, OPZZ leadership strongly criticized proposed changes to the country's labor code which would decrease job security for the wage earner. Because of criticism from the OPZZ and the independent and still illegal trade union, Solidarity, the labor code is being revised. Workers continued to be strongly encouraged and coerced by the regime to join the new unions founded after the outlawing of Solidarity, and the OPZZ claimed to have nearly 7 million members. The OPZZ belongs to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and also represented Poland at the June 1987 conference of the International Labor Organization (ILO), where its credentials were challenged. The ILO Credentials Committee upheld OPZZ credentials but found that the Polish delegation was not representative and should be broadened next year to include other voices in the labor movement. Subsequent reports indicated the OPZZ's intention to participate in future ILO conferences, although no mention was made of any intention to share the spotlight with other labor groups.

Attempts by Solidarity supporters to win legal registration for their union in the cities of Torun, Swinowjscie, Warsaw, Wroclaw, Walbrzych, and Szczecin

met with failure. Solidarity members remained active on many worker self-management councils, however, and they achieved some successes in defending the rights of workers.

The Polish Government officially subscribes to the principle of equality for all citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious background, age, or sex. Though generally ethnically homogeneous, Poland has some ethnic and linguistic minorities, most prominently Belorussians and Ukrainians. Many of these two groups are of the Orthodox or Ukrainian Catholic faith. There are a number of small Protestant communities, as well as a very small group of Muslims and a few thousand Jews. The Polish Government has traditionally been reluctant to give minorities cultural rights; for example, apart from one weekly newspaper, there is virtually nothing published in the Ukrainian language.

Though women have equal rights under the law in both theory and practice, traditional social views have somewhat retarded the advancement of women to high positions in Polish society. However, a large majority of working-age women are employed in Poland, and equal opportunity in education and the professions have enabled women to reach positions of responsibility in a number of spheres.

Hungary. During the past 6 months, Hungary continued to enjoy its reputation as one of the least repressive regimes among the Warsaw Pact states. Nevertheless, problems regarding full compliance with Principle Seven remained. Hungary's most publicized event of the reporting period, the September 16-19 parliamentary session which approved the government's income and value-added tax proposals, illustrated the highly limited extent of progress toward pluralism in Hungary. Even the most outspoken participants in the debate refrained from what might, in the U.S. Congress or West European parliamentary systems, qualify as criticism of the government. The lopsided vote on the tax proposals—a show of hands indicated 10 opposed and 21 abstentions, with some 350 in favor—appeared to be out of proportion to the depth of public concern, particularly over the imposition of an income tax.

Limits on fundamental freedoms in Hungary were publicly discussed in two documents circulated by intellectuals and opposition groups during the reporting period: the 60-page special edition of the *samizdat Beszelo* entitled

"The Social Contract: Prerequisites for Resolving the Political Crisis," and a September 8 open letter to members of the Hungarian Parliament from over 199 prominent intellectuals, including some members of the opposition. "The Social Contract" called for a law to bring the Communist Party under legal checks and controls; reform of parliamentary procedures and electoral practices; increased press freedoms; an end to arbitrary censorship; formation of independent, cooperative trade unions; and legal guarantees of freedom of association. The open letter criticized the government's economic proposals and called for reform of the political system to encourage greater democracy. In a press conference September 18, Prime Minister Grosz said he was open to dialogue with the opposition, but not with those "who do not respect the laws." The Prime Minister said that "in general, we take it as our point of departure that those who hold other views want to serve the development of the country on the basis of their own best convictions, with different methods and tools than we are doing." Despite these positive statements, at least three signers of the September 18 open letter were warned of disciplinary measures for having joined in a public act of opposition.

Developments regarding the availability of passports for critics of the government were mixed during the reporting period. Sandor Racz, former 1956 labor leader, traveled to the U.S. during the reporting period, and populist poet Sandor Csóri left for the U.S. On the other hand, *Beszelo* editor Janos Kis was denied a passport to travel to the U.S.; following appeals and official expressions of concern by the U.S. Government, his travel was approved, but not in time for him to take up a teaching appointment for the period originally proposed.

The authorities' attitude toward *samizdat* has not changed during the reporting period. Periodic house searches continue, and fines are levied for distributing illegal publications, but *samizdat* remains impressively available. The fledgling *samizdat* journal *Egtajak Kozott* was raided twice during the reporting period.

A stable church-state relationship continued during the reporting period. All faiths which are willing to recognize the government and accept socialism are officially recognized. This excludes only the Jehovah's Witnesses and other very small religious groups. Various church activities continued to be restricted by the Hungarian Government,

such as the number of students in schools, the number of religious orders, and new church construction. While opportunities exist for alternate service for sects whose faiths specifically prohibit bearing arms, Roman Catholic and other conscientious objectors to military service continued to be arrested, with over 100 individuals serving prison terms for refusing military duty. The Vatican and the Hungarian Government successfully negotiated to fill numerous vacant bishoprics.

German Democratic Republic.

The G.D.R. continued to restrict the fundamental freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, and belief among its people. The activities of the state security police (STASI) are pervasive. The police may install listening devices, open private mail, and interrogate whomever they choose because there are no judicial controls. There is no legal appeal from administrative decisions.

As a rule, church groups are not allowed to organize events outside church grounds without official approval. During the reporting period there were exceptions, however; some 1,000 members of the unofficial peace movement, predominantly associated with the youth ministry of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, participated independently in the Olof Palme Peace March in Berlin in September without police approval. Similar events took place in Wittenberg and Dresden. However, these seem to have been exceptional developments.

There were reports of numerous G.D.R. violations of human rights and basic freedoms during the reporting period. For example, several hundred persons among the large crowd that had assembled near the Brandenburg Gate to listen to a rock concert held west of the Berlin Wall in June were interrogated. Olaf and Detlaf Matthes were arrested in the aftermath of the above incident, and police interfered with West German correspondents covering the event.

There were also some positive developments. In July, the G.D.R. announced that between October 12 and December 12, 1987, in honor of the 38th anniversary of the founding of the state on October 7, 1949, it would release almost all prisoners in a general amnesty. It is anticipated that essentially all political prisoners will be released this fall. It is not clear whether any significant proportion of them will be allowed to emigrate quickly to West Germany, which is the offense for which, in effect, many were imprisoned.

Travel restrictions were further relaxed, and the order to shoot would-be refugees as a last resort to prevent escape appeared to remain in a state of suspension. The G.D.R. and the F.R.G., in the aftermath of the Honcker visit to West Germany, agreed to facilitate private import of certain types of specialized West German publications. However, literature "directed against the preservation of peace or containing other agitation," "contravening the interests of the socialist state or its citizens," or having pornographic content will continue to be banned. The import agreement does not cover general newspapers or magazines or other periodicals with any political content.

During the reporting period, the small Jewish community in Berlin and the G.D.R. obtained permission to engage a rabbi, whose residence and salary in East Berlin will be subsidized by the G.D.R. The rabbi, an American citizen, assumed office in September and conducted high holy day services, which were attended by representatives of the government, the diplomatic corps, and the Christian churches.

The government facilitated the massive Lutheran Kirchentag (Church Day) in Berlin—the first since the building of the Berlin Wall—and the first ever G.D.R.-wide Catholic Assembly (*Katholiken-Treffen*) in Dresden. Media coverage was extensive for both events, at which many issues were discussed critically and in an open manner unusual for G.D.R. public discourse.

A joint paper was issued by the F.R.G.'s Social Democratic Party (SPD) and by the East German ruling party, the SED. The document, published in full in the G.D.R. media and the subject of an unusual, live television, intra-German discussion by the main authors, outlined areas where cooperation and consultation in the interests of peace might be possible between parties with differing ideologies; it also committed the G.D.R. to the need to undertake reforms consistent with CSCE principles and not to reject Western human rights criticism as interference in internal affairs.

Self-determination by means of democratic elections is not practiced in the G.D.R. Every 5 years, G.D.R. citizens are presented with a list of candidates, most unopposed for the People's Chamber (*Volkskammer*) and various local assemblies (*Volkvertretungen*). Though a 1975 election law states that voting is secret, it is not, in fact, always so. East Germans who refuse to vote or who reject entire ballots may suffer reprisals.

Only government-controlled unions are allowed. Strikes are not permitted, and union assemblies are strictly controlled by the state. Unions are a political arm of the government and are used to transmit and carry out official government and party policy.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak performance on CSCE implementation over the past 6 months showed some limited improvement, although it remained, on the whole, seriously flawed.

Freedom of conscience continued to be severely restricted, and the persecution of political, religious, and cultural activists continued. The government bans certain proselytizing groups outright (e.g., Jehovah's Witnesses) and intervenes arbitrarily in the operation of all other religious bodies. Religious education of children and future members of the clergy is strictly controlled, and unofficial gatherings, such as privately celebrated masses, prayer meetings, or educational sessions, are forbidden. Male religious orders have been banned since 1950, and women's orders are barred from accepting new members. All clergymen require state licenses, and all promotions must be approved by the authorities. Only a small number of new candidates are granted licenses. A previously reported increase in enrollment into theological seminaries continued, but this increase in the number of licensed Catholic clergy will not keep up with attrition from the population of priests. Also, a priest's license can be revoked at any time and without explanation. Clergymen who continue to follow their calling after losing their licenses are subject to criminal sanctions. The supply of religious literature is inadequate, and the government actively combats efforts to supplement it by "underground" printing or unauthorized imports.

Specific human rights cases that have come to light or have shown developments since the last report include those of:

The Jazz Section: On May 12, 1987, the Prague City Court confirmed the March 10–11 convictions and sentencing of the leadership of the Jazz Section. The government brought criminal charges against this organization last year for engaging in illegal economic activities associated with the independent promotion and publication of music and cultural works. Of the five individuals tried, Section Chairman Karel Srp remains in prison. He is due to be released January 2, 1988. Vladimir Kouril was released in early July, after

serving his sentence. The remaining Executive Board members—Josef Skalnik, Tomas Krivanek, and Cestmir Hunat—received suspended sentences and remain on probation.

Pavel and Jiri Wonka: The Wonka brothers were tried in late May on charges connected with Pavel Wonka's independent candidacy in a 1986 election campaign. Pavel was held in pre-trial confinement for over a year. He was charged with subversion for trying to distribute campaign material and with attacking a public official (he reportedly pulled at the clothes of an unidentified individual who was trying to open the door to his apartment). He was sentenced to 21 months imprisonment and 3 years protective supervision. Jiri Wonka was charged with incitement in connection with the affair and was sentenced to 1 year imprisonment.

Jan Dus: Dus was detained in May 1986 for functioning as an Evangelical priest without the appropriate state license. He was released in June, but without trial or explanation. He remained under indictment for subversion, harming the interests of the republic abroad, attack on a state organ, attack on a public official, and false accusation.

Petr Pospichal: During the reporting period, Czechoslovak authorities also released Petr Pospichal. He had been charged with subversion in connection with the distribution of Charter 77 documents and for contact with independent Polish organizations, including Solidarity, and with Czechoslovak emigres resettled in the West.

Stefan Javorsky: On April 6, Javorsky, a 63 year-old Catholic priest, was sentenced to 6 months imprisonment on charges of obstructing state supervision over churches and religious societies. Javorsky's crimes reportedly included celebration of a mass in a private home.

Frantisek Adamik: Adamik's November 6, 1986, conviction on charges of subversion and his sentencing to 2 years imprisonment for the distribution of religious materials and possessing a duplicating machine were overturned in June. The court lowered the charges to preparations for incitement and sentenced him to 14 months imprisonment, suspended for 3 years.

Inside Czechoslovakia, implementation of the Helsinki Final Act is monitored by a small group of private

citizens who are signatories of "Charter 77." An associated group, the "Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted" (VONS), gathers and publicizes information concerning human rights abuses. Despite official persecution, Charter 77 has existed for 10 years and VONS for 9. Charter 77 signatories and their families face discrimination in employment and education, particularly access to higher education. Five signatories are currently serving prison terms ranging from 2 to 12 years. These include: Walter Kania, serving 2 years for harming the interests of the republic abroad; Herman Chromy, serving 2 years for subversion; Ervin Motl, serving 3 years for subversion; Frantisek Veis, serving 12 years for espionage; and Jiri Wolf, serving 6 years for subversion. Two other signatories (Jiri Gruntorad and Peter Cibulka) who were previously imprisoned are subject to "protective supervision," which involves travel restrictions, curfews, and a requirement to report regularly to the police. This kind of regime is normally imposed on habitual, violent offenders.

Independent organizations are not permitted in Czechoslovakia. Membership in the state trade union, the "Revolutionary Workers' Movement" (ROH), is virtually compulsory, and the ROH is controlled from the top. Independent trade unions are forbidden, as are strikes and other forms of independent labor activity. Intellectuals such as artists, writers, and others are organized in professional associations, which are under strict party control.

The government's general unwillingness to tolerate independent initiatives on the part of its citizenry was demonstrated during the reporting period in the cases of the Jazz Section, discussed above, and the "Society of Friends with the United States of America" (SPUSA). SPUSA is an independent citizen's initiative seeking to develop closer ties to the U.S. The organization applied to authorities for formal registration in May. The Ministry of Interior rejected the application, but an appeal of the decision was pending at the end of the reporting period.

The government's hard line against independent cultural initiatives has not been consistent through the period. Certain independent cultural events and art exhibits have occurred without interference; others have been disrupted by the police. In the case of the Jazz Section, representatives of the Ministry of Culture began negotiations

with Jazz Section representatives regarding the possibility of establishing a new, mutually acceptable organization to replace it.

Bulgaria. Bulgaria continued to violate Principle Seven through its implementation of policies designed to suppress the ethnic identity of the country's Turkish minority, to inhibit the free practice of religion, and to discourage and penalize dissent.

Governmental repression in the ethnic Turkish areas of the country continued, and an atmosphere of fear and resignation prevailed. Despite official denials that the use of the Turkish language in public was prohibited, there was considerable evidence that such a ban was broadly enforced. Some authorities even denied the existence of the Turkish language in Bulgaria. Restrictions on Islamic rituals traditionally observed by the ethnic Turkish population also remained in force. There is evidence that the government began the forced resettlement of at least some ethnic Turks to non-Turkish areas of the country, although there are no reliable estimates of the number of people involved.

Many ethnically Turkish areas remained closed to diplomatic and other travelers. In May, the zone permanently closed to diplomatic travel, while reduced in size, was changed to include the areas along Bulgaria's southern and southwestern borders. Heavy surveillance and intimidation of potential interlocutors were the usual concomitants of diplomatic travel even to nominally "open" areas.

More evidence surfaced regarding the government's campaign to force ethnic Turks to change their names to Bulgarian names. Following the defections to Turkey in 1986 of former National Assembly Deputy Halil Ibishev (renamed in Bulgaria Lyubomir Avdzhiev) and world champion weight lifter Naim Suleymanov, Bulgaria's international credibility on the Turkish minority issue was damaged again in August 1987 when another athlete, wrestler Ilya Mitev (who told the press he had been forced to change his name from Ilyas Sukruyev), defected to Turkey.

Parallel to the government's suppression of ethnic Turkish identity are its restrictions on the exercise of the Muslim religion. While some mosques remained open—often only for Friday prayers—many others remained closed. Only one mosque continued to operate, for instance, in the city of Kurdzhali (population about 70,000). Muslim rites (e.g., circumcisions, weddings, burials)

are forbidden. The Koran is not published locally and cannot be imported. Bulgarian Muslims are not allowed to participate in the annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church, on the other hand, enjoyed a relatively privileged status and publicly supported the government's domestic and foreign policies. Even so, the government's official policy remained one of discouragement of religious practice, and it kept a close watch on church activities. As with the Koran, the importation of Bibles is forbidden, and no Bibles have been printed in Bulgaria since 1982. Bulgarian news accounts indicated that customs officials seized Bibles and other religious literature that foreign travelers sought to bring into Bulgaria.

Armenian Christian, Jewish, Roman Catholic, and some Protestant denominations also exist in Bulgaria, with relatively small numbers of adherents. While ethnic Armenians and Jews claimed no conflicts with the government, the state's relations with Catholic and Protestant groups continued to be strained.

The case of Pavel Ignatov illustrated government policies on religion. After his officially unrecognized Church of God congregation tried unsuccessfully for years to obtain permission to operate as a church, Ignatov was arrested in January 1987 and exiled for 3 years to a remote village. According to Bulgarian authorities, Ignatov's "crime" was that he had "obstructed" the activities of officially recognized Protestant churches in Sofia since many members of his congregation had left those churches to join his. His case provoked international concern, particularly on the part of Church of God members in the U.S. During the summer of 1987, Ignatov was allowed to return to Sofia, but his congregation continued to be denied official recognition as a church. Ignatov's activities were denounced in an August 1987 newspaper article that also criticized Stanislav Todorov, one of Ignatov's followers. There were reports that Todorov was sentenced in June 1987 to 3 years internal exile in the village of Orlyak in Verna Oblast.

Bulgaria remained a tightly controlled society in which dissent or opposition, however peaceful, was firmly suppressed. The government's approach appeared to be successful in preventing popular dissatisfaction from crystallizing into organized opposition or active dissidence on a broad scale.

A positive departure from general Bulgarian practice was the government's decision to allow dissident Dimitur Penchev and his family to emigrate to France in July 1987. According to foreign press reports, Penchev had been imprisoned at various periods since the 1960s for such offenses as attempted illegal departure from Bulgaria and activities deemed prejudicial to the state. His case was brought to Western public attention in early 1987 by French journalists, after which permission for him to emigrate followed quickly.

On the negative side, reports indicate that Grigor Simov Bozhilov, one of seven Bulgarian signers of an appeal to the CSCE meeting in Vienna early in 1987, was sent into a 3-year internal exile in the remote village of Kaynardzha, near the Romanian land border. Two other signatories, Bozhidar and Minka Statev, continued their efforts to emigrate from Bulgaria with their children, but there was no response to their requests for permission to leave.

There were also reports that two other Bulgarians, Stefan Dimitrov Cholakov and Angel Sokolarsky, were penalized for "improper" political activities. Cholakov was imprisoned in the early 1980s for sending opinions on political matters to persons and institutions outside Bulgaria. Sokolarsky, a lawyer, reportedly was disbarred for attempting to defend Cholakov. By the end of the reporting period, both Cholakov, who reportedly wants to emigrate from Bulgaria, and Sokolarsky were facing penal proceedings, nominally on other than political grounds. Dissident Yanko Yankov, jailed for "anti-state activities" in 1985, reportedly remained imprisoned.

IMPLEMENTATION OF PRINCIPLE VI AND ASSOCIATED MADRID CONCLUDING DOCUMENT COMMITMENTS ON TERRORISM

Principle Six of the Helsinki Final Act commits the signatories to refrain "from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities, or to subversive or other activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another participating State." The Madrid Concluding Document contains language strengthening this commitment and expressing determination to "broaden and reinforce mutual cooperation to combat such acts." The participating states agreed to "take all appropriate measures" to, *inter alia*,

"prohibit on their territories illegal activities of persons, groups and organizations that instigate, organize or engage in the perpetration of acts of terrorism."

Compliance by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies with the relevant Helsinki and Madrid commitments concerning the prevention and suppression of terrorism has been mixed during the reporting period, and serious flaws remain in their performance. Several Eastern states continue to have dealings with some terrorist organizations or possibly tolerated their presence, are restrained in condemning terrorist incidents, or use the occasion of terrorist incidents to trumpet "national liberation struggles" and to criticize Western policies. Some Eastern states have, however, shown some signs of cautious movement toward policies on terrorism which are more in line with Western views.

Soviet Union. The Soviet approach to terrorism now involves declaratory opposition to terrorism, including increasing condemnation of specific terrorist acts, in contrast to Soviet silence in previous years. It also includes vague statements calling for increased international cooperation against terrorism. The Soviets seem to view this, however, in a legalistic context primarily linked to multilateral organizations. They are reluctant to take concrete political steps aimed against national liberation movements or states which employ terrorism and with which Moscow has influence. Soviet efforts at the United Nations have rested heavily on broad calls to improve the general international situation. They support a resolution in the United Nations which is ambiguous with regard to some terrorist practices undertaken in the guise of "national liberation" actions. On a more positive note, the Soviets appear to support new legal instruments in the areas of civil aviation and maritime security.

Romania. The Government of Romania officially condemns terrorism and seeks to prevent its territory from being used for the operation, organization, or commission of terrorist activities. Romania's public condemnation of terrorism has increased to include condemnation of "state terrorism" as well as specific rejection of the use of terrorism in struggles for national liberation. Romania does, however, openly support a number of "national liberation movements" with extremist

elements that resort to terrorism. Romanian authorities continued to keep tight security against terrorism at Bucharest's international airport and at diplomatic missions during the current reporting period.

Poland. In its public statements, the Polish Government generally condemns all forms of terrorism. Poland is not known to maintain facilities for the training of terrorists, nor has it been the base of any terrorist attacks.

Hungary. As a matter of principle, Hungary opposes terrorism for any reason in all forms. In practice, the Hungarian Government has taken increasingly effective steps to prevent the use of its territory by terrorists or for purposes of terrorism. Following the January 1987 attempted assassination of the Colombian Ambassador to Hungary, Enrique Parejo, by killers hired by narcotics dealers, Hungarian police efforts to track down the killers—who were subsequently arrested in Italy—were serious and thorough.

German Democratic Republic. Like its allies, the G.D.R. publicly proclaims its staunch opposition to terrorism. Nonetheless, the G.D.R. maintains close relations with states that support terrorist activities.

Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia publicly maintains its opposition to all forms of international terrorism. It is not clear, however, to what extent official internal policy and actions mirror this public stance. The Western press has reported that there are terrorist training camps located in Czechoslovakia and that Czechoslovak territory has been used by terrorists for transit and other purposes.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government appears to be more willing to share information with Western governments about known or suspected terrorists and has cooperated with the West on some occasions. The Bulgarians have appeared to be more willing in recent months to initiate a dialogue on these matters.

DOCUMENT OF THE STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE

The Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was mandated in 1983 by the Madrid CSCE Followup Meeting

as a substantial and integral part of the CSCE process, with the aim to undertake, in stages, new, effective, and concrete actions designed to make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament. The first stage of the conference opened in Stockholm in January 1984 and adjourned in September 1986 with the adoption of the Stockholm document, a set of mutually complementary confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) designed to reduce the risk of military confrontation in Europe. In keeping with the conference's mandate, these measures are militarily significant, politically binding, verifiable, and apply to the whole of Europe, as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Madrid Concluding Document.

The CSBMs agreed in Stockholm include:

Notification: 42 days prior notification of military ground force activities taking place within the whole of Europe whenever they involve at least 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, if organized into a divisional structure or at least two brigades/regiments. In the case of amphibious and airborne activities, the notification threshold is 3,000 troops.

Observation: Mandatory invitation of observers from all participating states to notified military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops. For amphibious and airborne activities, the observation threshold is 5,000 troops.

Forecasting: The exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities, with large-scale activities (over 40,000) prohibited unless announced 1 year in advance and activities over 75,000 prohibited unless forecast 2 years in advance.

Inspection: Onsite inspection from the air or ground or both as the means of verifying compliance with the agreed measures, with no right of refusal. However, no state need accept more than three inspections on its territory per calendar year or more than one inspection per calendar year from any individual participating state.

The Stockholm conference also agreed on a reaffirmation of the non-use of force principle, which reflects the Western approach to security, and its concluding document includes references to human rights, antiterrorism, compliance with international commitments, and an implicit denial of the validity of the so-called Brezhnev doctrine.

Implementation

The East's initial record of implementation of the detailed provisions of the Stockholm document has been encouraging. Although some technical difficulties were experienced during this initial implementation period by all participating states, Eastern practice met the letter and, in some cases, the spirit of the Stockholm document. During the reporting period, all provisions of the document, including the right of onsite inspection, were exercised.

Warsaw Pact countries had forecast 25 military activities for 1987, of which 16 were national exercises and nine were combined Warsaw Pact activities. The Soviet Union forecast its participation in 18 of these activities—11 to be conducted solely by Soviet forces and seven to be carried out in conjunction with other Warsaw Pact states. By the end of the reporting period, all forecast Warsaw Pact activities had been notified 42 days or more in advance, as required. The East also provided two voluntary notifications—the Soviet Union's notification of its participation in an exercise in Hungary in which only 12,500 Soviet troops took part, and Hungary's notification of an exercise to take place in October involving only 8,000 troops. During the same period, NATO countries provided prior notification for the 15 distinct military activities which they conducted during the reporting period. The U.S. notified all five of its forecast activities, including voluntary notifications of two exercises which had been included on the U.S. annual calendar but which were subsequently reduced below the notification threshold. As host state, the F.R.G. also provided voluntary notifications of these activities. The U.S. and F.R.G. also notified one activity carried out without advance notice to the troops involved at the time it commenced, as required by the document. One forecast U.K. activity was not notified as subsequent refinements in exercise planning brought it below the notification threshold. No neutral and nonaligned states conducted notifiable activities during the reporting period, although a Yugoslav notification which was due prior to September 30 was delayed until October due to "technical reasons."

Although some interpretative questions arose over the level of detailed information contained in some Soviet, Polish, and Bulgarian notifications (e.g., lack of geographic coordinates for each phase of activities in Polish and some Soviet notifications, lack of infor-

mation on number of divisions participating in a Bulgarian notification), Warsaw Pact notifications were consistent with the requirements of the Stockholm document and provided valuable information about Pact military activities.

Warsaw Pact states carried out five military activities above the observation threshold during the reporting period and met their requirements to invite observers from all participating states. Of these activities, one was in Czechoslovakia, two were in the G.D.R., and two took place in the Soviet Union. The Soviet exercises marked the first time since 1978 that U.S. observers had observed activities on Soviet territory, and a September exercise involving 18,000 Soviet troops in the Transcaucasus Military District provided NATO members with the first observation of a military activity in the part of the CDE zone of application which has been added to the more limited zone defined in Helsinki Final Act. As indicated for the last reporting period, the Eastern observation programs have met the letter of the Stockholm document but, in most instances, not the spirit. U.S. observers have noted that the activities observed appeared rehearsed and conducted solely for the observers' benefit. Little real training has been observed, and it has been extremely difficult for observers to get a clear view of the scope of activities. In some instances, it appeared that the events had been orchestrated solely to demonstrate Eastern compliance with the observation provisions of the Stockholm document. However, as additional observation experience has been gained, there is some sense that the stilted nature of Eastern activities may reflect actual differences in the way the Warsaw Pact trains, with less force-on-force and free-play action than in NATO exercises. The Soviets, in particular, have not been responsive to observers' questions or requests for changes in the observation program.

Opportunities for contact with participating troops also have been limited with regard to Soviet forces. Western observers, however, have noted a more positive attitude among non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states. For example, the G.D.R. has been the most responsive to observers' requests, and the difference from Soviet handling was most sharply noticed during the two observation programs for joint G.D.R./Soviet exercises.

NATO member states invited observers to seven military activities during the reporting period. Soviet

observers attended all of these activities. Extensive observation was held for the U.S. "Reforger"-related activities in September, including a major NATO exercise in the F.R.G.—"Certain Strike"—which involved 78,300 allied troops. Observers also attended the first bilateral exercise between France and the F.R.G. in September, which involved 80,000 troops. Allied observation programs generally exceeded the openness requirements of the Stockholm document in terms of information provided, observation opportunities, and opportunities for direct contact with participating troops.

The provisions of the Stockholm document providing for onsite inspection as a means of verification (a critical component of the CSBMs regime) were exercised twice during the reporting period: an August 28–30 U.S. inspection of a Soviet military activity near Minsk and a September 10–12 U.K. inspection of a G.D.R./U.S.S.R. exercise near Cottbus, G.D.R. The U.S. and the U.K. were satisfied with the conduct of the inspections by the receiving states. Although some questions of interpretation were raised regarding restricted areas and minor technical problems were experienced (particularly as regards required telecommunications among the U.K. inspectors in the G.D.R.), both the G.D.R. and the Soviet Union met fully their responsibilities in receiving an inspection. In both instances, inspection proved helpful in resolving uncertainties and verifying compliance. In required reports to all CSCE participating states, both the U.S. and the U.K. determined the activities inspected did conform to the information contained in the prior notifications and to the requirements of the Stockholm document.

Soviet Union. Up through the end of 1986, the Soviet Union generally complied with the letter of the confidence-building provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. It usually provided the minimum information within the time required but gave few discretionary notifications of smaller-scale maneuvers and rarely invited Western observers. The more comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures of the Stockholm document came into effect on January 1, 1987, and initial Soviet implementation has been encouraging.

During the reporting period, the Soviet Union, in accordance with the Stockholm document, provided advance notifications of 11 military activities included in its annual calendar for 1987. These notifications were provided in a

timely manner to the U.S. via diplomatic note to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. With the exception of exercise designation, the notifications included the information required by the Stockholm CDE document, (when asked, Soviet officials maintained that the exercises had no particular designation). The activities notified by the Soviets during the reporting period included activities in that part of the CDE zone which has been added to the more limited zone defined in the Final Act.

Two of the 11 notified activities in the Soviet Union—the August 17–22 Carpathian and September 22–27 Transcaucasus exercises—exceeded the threshold for observation, and the Soviets invited observers to those activities. During the observations, the Soviets complied with the provisions of the Stockholm document but did not go beyond its minimum requirements. The August exercise appeared to be a planned training demonstration and not a tactical field exercise. Less than 20% of announced personnel and 30% of tanks were actually observed during the exercise. Observers were allowed to talk to soldiers and move about fairly freely; however, most of the soldiers were evasive and gave very general answers to questions posed. The September exercise offered more opportunities for observers but appeared to be a training demonstration rather than a tactical field exercise.

As mentioned above, on August 26, the U.S. requested an inspection of a Soviet exercise being conducted in the Belorussian military district which had been notified as involving 16,000 troops and 425 tanks. The Soviets granted the request within the prescribed time, and the inspection was carried out by four U.S. military officers August 28–30 in accordance with the provisions of the CDE document. The inspection went well, with the Soviets providing the four-person U.S. inspection team two observation helicopters and two ground vehicles with connecting communications systems. While there were some questions of procedure, the U.S. was generally satisfied by the positive approach demonstrated by the Soviet Union in its treatment of the inspection request and of the inspection team. Based on an all-source assessment conducted by the U.S. intelligence community as well as the findings of the inspection team, the U.S. believes that the activity did not exceed the participation levels contained in the Soviets' notification and that the purpose of

the activity was in conformity with the purpose contained in the notification.

Romania. During the reporting period, no Romanian military activities requiring notification took place. For the first time, Romania accepted an invitation to send observers to a NATO military activity, a joint French-German exercise in September. To date, Romanian observers have not accepted invitations to U.S. exercises.

Poland. As exemplified by their conduct of exercise "Friendship '87" in July, the Polish Government continues to adhere to the letter of the CDE accord. Initially, the activity was forecast to have over 18,000 participants; however, a subsequent announcement lowered the number of participants to 13,500. This action removed the requirement to invite observers from all CSCE participating states, and there were some indications from informal discussions with Polish officials that it was taken solely for that purpose. It is also noted that the notification for this exercise was issued late as the result of technical difficulties experienced by Poland.

Hungary. Hungary provided prior notification of a joint Hungarian/Soviet military activity conducted in September involving 14,500 troops. Prior to the end of the reporting period, the Hungarian Government also issued a voluntary notification of an 8,000-man exercise to take place in October. The scale of Hungarian activities this year did not require invitation of observers.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. notified and conducted four military activities during the reporting period, of which three were joint exercises with Soviet forces. Observers were invited to the two activities which exceeded the 17,000 troop observation threshold. Of Warsaw Pact states, the G.D.R. continued to be the most forthcoming in its conduct of observation programs. As mentioned in the previous report, the G.D.R. attempted to use the invitation to send observers to its first two exercises of the year as a challenge to Berlin's demilitarized status. In September, British authorities requested and conducted an onsite in-

spection of a joint G.D.R./U.S.S.R. exercise near Cottbus. The U.K. reports that the conduct of the inspection was satisfactory.

Czechoslovakia. One military activity was notified by Czechoslovakia during the reporting period, a joint Czech/Soviet activity involving 17,000 troops (16,500 Soviet) in July. Observers from all participating states were invited to this activity.

Bulgaria. During the reporting period, Bulgaria notified and conducted its two forecast military activities for 1987 (in May and August). Questions arose, however, regarding the Bulgarian notification of the exercise "Balkan '87," which did not provide required information on the number of divisions participating in the activity. The notification also did not explicitly indicate that the starting date of the activity had moved outside the envisaged 2-week period for its start forecast in the Bulgarian annual calendar. The U.S. indicated its concern about these discrepancies to the Bulgarian Government.

Chapter Three

Implementation of Basket II: Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, of Science and Technology, and of the Environment

The overall record of the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe in the implementation of Basket II remained poor during the reporting period. Continued sub-par economic performance led to efforts to improve productivity in their nonmarket economies. A great deal of interest was shown by the Soviets, and, to an extent, by some of the East Europeans, in economic restructuring. This was accompanied by the promotion of joint ventures both in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. These changes were basically directed toward obtaining Western investment, technology, and management skills and not toward improving business conditions in Eastern Europe.

The record on business contacts and facilities was mixed. Access to end-users was hampered by the various reorganizations in trade and economic ministries; no one knows who is in

charge. Western business representatives continued to be denied access to plants in Romania; lack of access to plants continued to be a problem in other East European countries as well. In general, hotel accommodations and other facilities increased in quantity and quality. Prices charged approximated those in major Western industrial capitals.

There was no real improvement in the availability or quality of economic and commercial information. For example, while the Soviet Union included some agricultural production data for the first time since 1980 in Soviet statistical publications, since the beginning of 1987 the quality of statistics published appears to have declined. In Romania, statistical data is almost unobtainable, and in other Eastern countries, the data is always at least 3 months behind in publication.

Countertrade demands continued to grow. The Soviets exerted visible pressure for increased countertrade, and these demands remained strong in all of the Eastern countries. This increased pressure on Western firms stemmed, to an extent, from the loss of hard currency earnings, resulting from lower world oil prices.

The demand for countertrade was accompanied by the promotion of joint ventures. Seen by the East as a way to gain Western investment and technology without having to pay hard currency, joint ventures still did not offer Western firms the security, ability to repatriate profits, or other economic incentives which are required to make these ventures attractive.

Interest remained high in increasing cooperation in the fields of science and technology (S&T). The number of bilateral agreements continued to grow. The Soviets and East Europeans also

showed a growing awareness of the environmental problems they face. However, while calling for multilateral efforts to address these problems, the East did little on its own to improve a situation that is rapidly worsening.

Soviet Union

General Assessment. Soviet implementation of Basket II provisions remained inadequate. Sweeping domestic economic reforms have been enacted but, at this writing, remain largely unimplemented. These reforms may make it more attractive and easier for foreign firms to do business with the Soviets. General business conditions remained largely unchanged during the reporting period. Substantial turnover and reorganization in the Ministry of Foreign Trade continues to create problems for foreign businessmen.

Business Operating Conditions.

U.S. business representatives were generally able to obtain appointments with Soviet trade officials and had few complaints of interference by the Soviet Diplomatic Services Bureau (UPDK), Customs, or the Ministry of Finance in their office operations. Firms are still required to wait for UPDK to identify replacement office workers. Access to Soviet end-users is more difficult because of the continuing reorganization of the Soviet foreign trade structure. Small and mid-sized companies still have problems gaining access to Soviet officials as telexes and letters often go unanswered. The economic/trade reorganization has made foreign trade difficult for businessmen since many old contacts have been broken due to personnel turnover. Uncertainty over the restructuring has made it difficult for businessmen to develop working relationships with Soviet officials. U.S. firms generally reported the same level of inquiries from Soviet foreign trade organizations (FTOs) as in the previous year.

At the end of the review period, there were 28 U.S. firms, including the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, with accredited offices in Moscow.

In September 1987, American businesses received notice of office space rent increases of up to 40%. High rents at the Sovincenter International Trade complex continued to create serious difficulties for many small firms which have established nonaccredited offices in Sovincenter's residential wing. In the absence of other office options, these firms had to pay the high rents. Firms

desiring to move from one location to another are still reporting that waiting lists are up to 2 years long. As in the past, most nonaccredited firms continued to experience problems in meeting their requirements for office equipment, vehicles, and clerical support. The annual charge for having a direct-dial long-distance telephone line was quadrupled from 100 to 400 rubles. This fee is exclusive of charges for the calls themselves, which remained at 9 rubles (\$14) per minute. Direct dial for accredited companies has been reinstalled to the U.K., France, F.R.G., Austria, and the Netherlands.

Hotel and housing conditions for businessmen worsened. Visiting businessmen often had difficulties obtaining hotel space in Moscow. During large trade exhibitions, it is virtually impossible to obtain a hotel room in the city. As a rule, lodging for resident foreign businessmen remained in short supply, but satisfactory.

Business representatives lodged some complaints about visas being issued late, but generally travel and visa restrictions were essentially unchanged from the previous report. There were some indications, however, that there might be a liberalizing trend in this area as well. For instance, during a regular Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) press briefing for foreign journalists on August 13, an MFA consular official informed the press corps that the Soviet Union had unilaterally undertaken measures to facilitate business contacts by introducing multiple entry-exit visas for foreign business representatives engaging in joint ventures. Although several new joint ventures between Soviet enterprises and American companies are under consideration, this measure would not affect most American businessmen. At the same conference, the MFA spokesman also announced that the Soviet Union was considering easing the in-country travel regime of foreign business representatives (no details were provided). And finally, the same official announced that Soviet missions abroad had been instructed unilaterally to issue visas for business travel within 8 days.

There were no major difficulties reported for accredited firms in renewing individual applications, although the Soviets have instituted an annual 250-ruble fee for accreditation renewal.

Access to Soviet agricultural officials remains difficult. Our ambassador did meet *Gosagroprom* Chairman Murkhovskiy (who is also a first deputy prime minister), but only on a farm tour arranged for the diplomatic corps.

A June 1986 request for a meeting remains unfulfilled. Access to working-level officials by U.S. Embassy officers was improved somewhat, but long delays are still encountered when dealing with *Gosagroprom*, and information provided is rarely that requested. *Gosagroprom* has also failed to provide information on its new foreign trade organization, hampering attempts to make trading contacts for commercial reasons. U.S. business and agricultural representatives reported similar difficulties in obtaining information from and access to *Gosagroprom* officials.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The availability of economic and commercial information remained poor during the reporting period. Information on the economy remained limited, and the quality of data was often poor. Recently, Western and Soviet economists have raised serious questions about the reliability of Soviet macroeconomic data. In August 1987, the former U.S.S.R. Central Statistical Administration was renamed to become State Committee for Statistics (*Goskomstat*). At the end of the review period, it was unclear what effect, if any, this change will have on the quality and timeliness of statistical data.

Access to Soviet officials for discussion of current economic developments remains restricted, though continued improvement was noted.

The situation for agricultural information is similar. Since the beginning of 1987, the quality of some published agricultural statistics has declined. On the other hand, access to working-level economists and specialists has improved a bit, enabling Embassy officers to gain a few new insights. Overall, however, access to information is far below the desired level.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Soviet officials are encouraging U.S. firms to consider cooperation arrangements of all types. They are soliciting proposals from U.S. firms for industrial cooperation and joint venture arrangements as a way of generating more hard currency. Western companies have already submitted numerous joint venture proposals for consideration. Recently, there was also substantial renewed Soviet interest in barter and countertrade.

Official Visits. There were none during the reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Pressures increased for Western firms to link sales and purchases during the reporting period, as a result of the loss of hard currency revenues from lower oil prices.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Policies affecting small and medium-sized enterprises remained no different from those affecting other companies. The practicality of doing business in the U.S.S.R., however, severely limits the prospects for small and medium-sized enterprises because of the long lead times and high costs associated with trading with the Soviets.

The Soviets have been expanding contacts with American agribusiness in areas relating mainly to transfer of technology to the U.S.S.R. via joint ventures or pilot projects. More emphasis has been placed on contacts with private firms in sensitive areas such as biotechnology, bypassing government exchanges. However, the Soviets have expanded the number of government-to-government programs in agricultural cooperation, both with CEMA [Council for Mutual Economic Assistance] members and with countries of the industrialized West.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. U.S.-Soviet S&T cooperation continued to expand with the initiation of exploratory talks on cooperation in the basic sciences and the establishment of working groups under the new space agreement. Ongoing cooperation in the field of nuclear nonproliferation was marked by high-level consultations in Moscow, and joint work under the housing agreement was highlighted by the participation of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development at the Sixth Joint Commission Meeting in Moscow. Growing cooperation in the atomic energy sector continued with high-level exchanges in the fields of fusion power research and nuclear reactor safety. Some progress was achieved in the health sector when, during high-level bilateral discussions in Moscow, the Soviets promised to halt the publication of disinformation claiming that the AIDS virus was artificially created in a U.S. military laboratory; the Soviet Government was informed that the U.S. remains unwilling to cooperate on AIDS research as long as the disinformation continues to appear in Soviet media. The U.S. Ambassador took concrete steps to improve contacts in the

Soviet science community by paying initial calls on the chairmen of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Hydrometeorological and Environmental Affairs.

In July 1987, a decree revamping the role of the State Committee for Science and Technology was adopted as part of the broader economic reform process. It is unclear what these changes imply for S&T cooperation with foreign countries.

Press discussions of science policy issues—ranging from ecology to the social sciences—have continued to widen in scope.

The Soviets continue a long tradition of secretiveness in discussing S&T advances by restricting the flow of information and direct scientist-to-scientist contacts. Moscow continues to host a variety of international conferences and often presses foreign delegations to make public statements and sign conference decrees supporting Soviet positions on arms control and other foreign affairs initiatives.

The agricultural cooperation agreement, covering science and economics, saw renewed activity in September when a working group met to map out team exchanges due to resume in early 1988.

Romania

General Assessment. Romania's overall performance under Basket II did not improve during the reporting period. While calling for greatly increased technology transfer, the Romanian Government continued to neglect existing scientific exchange mechanisms. The government's foreign trade policies remained based on strategies for rapid retirement of the country's foreign debt, drastic restriction of hard currency imports, and insistence that, wherever possible, Western sales to Romania be paid by counterpurchase of Romanian goods. An aggressive export expansion program continued to be blunted by internal secrecy controls and by reorganizations of trade ministries and institutions. Business facilitation suffered in favor of maximizing hard currency intake even from marginal sources.

For the most part, U.S. Government officials and business representatives have adequate access to Romanian officials. However, access to factory production areas remains difficult to obtain. There continue to be instances of Romanian foreign trade organizations failing to adhere to contracts with their U.S. partners. Addi-

tionally, costs of doing business in Romania, already high, have further increased.

Although Romania is not very active in international environmental cooperation, it attends some multilateral meetings and is among the signatories to a Danube River antipollution convention.

Business Operating Conditions.

U.S. Government officials continue to have adequate access to Romanian Government officials concerned with U.S.-Romanian trade and economic relations, although not always in a timely fashion. Visiting U.S. officials and businessmen obtain appointments with their Romanian counterparts in most instances. Senior-level U.S. officials and businessmen have adequate access to directors of FTOs and their staffs, but due to recurring personnel changes at ministries, institutions, and FTOs connected with foreign trade, businessmen have difficulty pinpointing responsible decisionmakers for negotiations.

Access to plants and production lines is very restricted, with permission for visits frequently denied without explanation. Submission of written requests 3-4 weeks in advance can occasionally facilitate visits of foreigners to production facilities.

Failure by FTOs to adhere to terms of contracts with longstanding U.S. partners remained a problem during this reporting period. Such practices discourage foreign business even further and place Romanian manufacturers at a severe disadvantage in seeking foreign markets. In addition, Romanian customs authorities continued to apply the sixteenfold increase in import duties, imposed in January 1987, on personal items and office supplies imported by resident Western businessmen. This increase violates the spirit of Article IV ("Business Facilitation") of the 1975 U.S.-Romanian Trade Agreement, but, despite repeated U.S. representations, it has not so far been withdrawn.

During the reviewing period, two new firms opened offices in Bucharest. Authorities continue to take 6-8 months or longer to process Western firms' applications to open business offices. Commercial office space in one of the several downtown hotels in Bucharest is commonly offered to Western firms. Firms may also rent space on premises owned by the government agency, *Argus*. Romanian employees of foreign businesses must be hired through *Argus*. The cost of maintaining business offices in Romania is high.

Rents charged by official Romanian agencies are comparable to market rates in major world commercial centers. The extremely high cost of telecommunications services is also an impediment to the development of commercial relations.

Acceptable hotel accommodations are available in Bucharest for transient businessmen, but at rates matching top-class accommodations in world commercial centers. Resident businessmen are referred to the National Tourist Office (ONT) to locate housing. The search for adequate housing is difficult and time consuming. Prices for residential space are comparable to those in Western European capitals, though utilities, furnishings, and facilities available here generally fall far below those standards. Rental charges have remained steady in the reporting period, except for the effects of exchange-rate changes, but utility prices have risen markedly.

Visa restrictions are minimal, and business travel is not impeded.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Romanian statistical data are very poor and are noteworthy for their unreliability and their omission of basic information common elsewhere. While some information is made public each February for the preceding year, organized data on the performance of the domestic economy are published only once a year, generally 12-14 months after the close of the year covered. Data often are not comparable from year to year, and indices are neither reliable nor adequately defined. Except in the context of debt or loan negotiations, Romania is reluctant to provide even basic financial information to foreign banks, governments, and international organizations. This reluctance, together with the unreliability of Romanian statistics, makes it difficult for business representatives to track even the most basic trends in the economy.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The Romanian Government promotes the concept of joint ventures and production collaboration and is interested in cooperation with American firms in third-country markets.

Official Visits. The Joint American-Romanian Economic Commission met in Bucharest in April. A substantial U.S. delegation, headed by Deputy Secretary of Commerce Clarence Brown, met with President Ceausescu and other key officials. This was the

only high-level official trade visit during the reporting period. A number of senior Romanian officials traveled to the U.S. on trade-related matters during the 6-month period, including Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Nicolae Andrei. A meeting of the Romanian-U.S. Economic Council is scheduled to be held in Romania in October 1987. Discussions will center on expanding bilateral trade.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Romania employs a strict system of countertrade aimed at reducing its foreign debt. Romanian purchases of Western goods without countertrade have continued to decline significantly. Romanian enterprises continually ask Western firms seeking to sell goods in Romania to take 10% payment in counterpurchases of Romanian-made goods from the machine building and machine tools industry and occasionally seek counterpurchases in excess of the original purchase price. In those few cases where U.S. firms buying Romanian goods have sought to pay through "barter" arrangements of their own products, Romanian organizations have refused, insisting on hard currency payment.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Romania trades regularly with small and medium-sized U.S. firms. Such companies are often represented in Bucharest by agency firms, which helps reduce the cost of establishing representation. Agency firms are also better able to deal with Romanian pressures for counterpurchase, which might otherwise force smaller firms out of the market.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The U.S. and Romania signed an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation in 1979 which provided for exchange visits by scientists, joint scientific projects, and exchange of information. The volume of activity under this agreement has been small. Arrangements for exchange of visits and information in some fields under the agreement have never been implemented and, in one field, were terminated for lack of activity.

In addition to minimal activity under the Scientific and Technological Cooperation Agreement, the U.S. and Romania maintain informal, *ad hoc* scientific contacts. Since at least 1977, seismologists in the U.S. and Romania have maintained contact and a program of information sharing. Still, various factors in the Romanian business cli-

mate, which were discussed previously, inhibit commercial channels for cooperation in science and technology.

Poland

General Assessment. During the past 6 months, economic relations between Poland and Western countries have continued to improve. Negotiations aimed at investment protection agreements have been initiated with Western countries, and Polish authorities signed one such agreement with Belgium. The joint venture law, which took effect on July 1, 1986, has so far resulted in five joint ventures; discussions on other possible joint ventures are taking place. Difficult internal Polish economic conditions and the difficult debt situation continue to discourage Western commercial interest in Poland. The Polish Government has not been successful in rescheduling loan payments due Western governments in 1986 and 1987, and efforts are continuing in the Paris Club. There has been full cooperation in permitting travel of U.S. business, commercial, and agricultural representatives to Poland. The U.S. participated in the Poznan Trade Fair in June 1986, after an absence of 5 years. The U.S. has negotiated a new S&T agreement with Poland; it was signed during the Vice President's visit in September.

Business Operating Conditions. Access to Polish business contacts and commercial officials remains relatively easy, with both private U.S. business representatives and U.S. Government officials able to arrange meetings directly with their counterparts, without brokering by protocol or foreign relations departments of the given Polish organization. Factory visits can be difficult to arrange, depending on the sensitivity of the installation.

No new companies opened branch offices during the reporting period. Polish policy toward Western offices remains largely unchanged.

U.S. owners continue to operate "Polonia" businesses with varying degrees of success, depending on their rates of income taxation. The firms number about 700, with 10% owned by U.S. citizens.

Hotel accommodations for visiting business representatives remain relatively scarce; the fixed rates are five times higher than for Polish citizens. Permanent housing is generally available but expensive. There are no restrictions on business travel within

Poland, and business visas are not difficult to obtain. Air service to and from Poland is adequate.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The government publishes regular economic statistics. Most of the disaggregated data are not current and do not contain enough detail to permit thorough economic analysis or adequate market research.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. There were no changes in Poland's policies and attitudes concerning economic and commercial cooperation during the reporting period. Poland continues to seek foreign investment in underutilized or idle industrial capacity, and passage of a joint venture law to attract such foreign investors indicates an additional emphasis on this goal. Licensing arrangements remain possible, as is joint production in and for third markets, in goods and especially in services.

Official Visits. Representative Dan Rostenkowski represented President Reagan at the opening of the U.S. Pavilion at the Poznan International Trade Fair.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. The Polish Government officially neither encourages nor discourages countertrade, though several U.S. firms have been pressured to countertrade by individual foreign trade organizations. The frequency and nature of these countertrade arrangements vary and generally are possible only in products of which Poland possesses an oversupply.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. Small and medium-sized enterprises have not experienced any particular problems during the reporting period, with the exception of certain firms operating under the "Polonian" law. The Polish Government levies up to 85% income tax on earnings by these firms, thus making it difficult for many of them to operate profitably. Despite these obstacles, many Polonia firms continue to prosper, and their existence enjoys official backing when their operations help fulfill government economic aims. (Firms which would compete directly with a Polish enterprise or exporting agency are usually denied permission to operate.) During the reporting period, there has been no new legislation affecting these small and medium-sized enterprises' participation in trade and industrial opportunities.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The reporting period included major developments in bilateral cooperation in S&T and environmental protection. A new umbrella agreement on scientific and technological cooperation was initiated *ad referendum* upon completion of a second round of negotiations in June. Several lingering difficulties in the realm of intellectual property rights were resolved subsequently, and the agreement was signed in September during a visit to Warsaw by Vice President Bush. A separate agreement on cooperation in environmental protection was signed earlier during a visit to the U.S. by the Polish environmental minister. Discussions continued between the National Science Foundation and the Polish Academy of Sciences concerning a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Basic Sciences; signature is anticipated by the end of this year. The two sides also made progress in defining cooperation in medical research and public health, possibly to include AIDS epidemiology. (Through all these discussions, Polish interlocutors demonstrated sincerity, flexibility, and openmindedness. Assuming questions of financial support can be resolved to the satisfaction of both sides, prospects are good for initial implementation of S&T cooperation on a broad front in 1988.) Meanwhile, unofficial exchanges of individual scientists proceed vigorously; an estimated 300 Poles applied for U.S. visas in connection with scientific or technical subjects during the reporting period.

Hungary

General Assessment. Economic reform remains the key to Hungary's relatively tolerant domestic policies and relaxed cultural atmosphere. Because of a small increase in the volume of exports, a planned cutback in imports, and some improvement in financial flows, a slight drop is projected over last year's whopping \$1.4-billion current account deficit. Despite the positive movement, however, most estimates of the year-end current account deficit still range between \$900 million and \$1.2 billion.

The disappointing economic results of 1986 led the government to reorient its economic program toward increased economic austerity. New government plans project decreased domestic consumption, higher exports, tighter domestic credit, decreased subsidies to investment and consumption, higher in-

flation, and a decline in the government budget deficit. The revised program was presented to the Hungarian Parliament in September 1987, along with a plan for a new personal income tax system and a value-added tax. After much debate, and some true opposition, the government program and the new tax package were accepted by the Parliament. The new taxes will go into effect January 1, 1988.

Despite the increased austerity called for by the new program, many Hungarian economists believe more reform will be required. Among the changes being considered are further wage and price reforms. The leadership, however, has been sending mixed signals regarding its willingness to liberalize prices and allow greater wage differentiation, particularly at a time of economic austerity. Slow progress also is being made in industrial restructuring efforts, but to date, few unprofitable firms have actually been closed down. Concern is growing about possible unemployment if unprofitable firms are closed down.

Business Operating Conditions. Working conditions for Western business representatives remained satisfactory during the reporting period. Business access remains generally good, and access to end-users is not a problem. The number of enterprises with foreign trading rights has surpassed 300, and development of contacts within these enterprises occurs without government interference. Opening of representational offices requires compliance with formal procedures which are lengthy, bureaucratic, and not always clear. Nevertheless, applications for such offices are often encouraged. Recently, 3M and Honeywell High Technology Trading received Ministry of Foreign Trade approval to open representational offices in Budapest. Bechtel and Occidental Petroleum are exploring possibilities. Hiring of local personnel to represent Western firms has been liberalized, although the scope of activities which these representatives can perform remains limited.

Deluxe and first-class hotel accommodations for business travelers, as well as for convention and tourist purposes, are quite good and reasonably priced. Most first-class hotels also offer business services, including typing and translation services. The availability of medium-level, medium-priced hotel accommodations is also good and continues to expand. Office space available

to Western firms is expected to increase with the implementation of plans to construct a second office building comparable to the Budapest International Trade Center, which opened in 1985. No restrictions are placed on legitimate business travel, and business visas can be obtained without difficulty at airports and highway border crossings. Business representatives, however, continue to be hampered by the need to work through a government "facilitative" office which is highly bureaucratic and ineffective. Costs of operations remain high in comparison to Western capitals, and delays continue to plague requests for telephone and telex services, both of which remain below Western standards.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Business and commercial information, while only sporadically available in forms such as Western-style annual reports, is disseminated fairly freely in newspapers, journals, and specialized economic publications. Enterprise and plant visits continue to provide detailed information since Hungarian commercial representatives and managers have shown a disposition to discuss matters freely when specific questions are posed. Government economic indicators and other data are widely available and reasonably accurate.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The number of active cooperative arrangements between U.S. and Hungarian firms continues to grow; they currently number around 70. Western companies are encouraged to explore new ways of doing business beyond traditional buying and selling and one-time-only commission work. Long-term industrial cooperation arrangements continue to be touted as the basis for Hungary's trade expansion program. The government has increased its commitment to promote joint ventures by issuing an amended joint venture law in January 1986, which provides greater tax incentives and more flexible operating rules. The number of joint ventures now registered in Hungary stands at more than 70, and there are more than 10 potential joint venture possibilities currently under negotiation. Foreign bilateral investment guarantees have also been signed with the U.K., Italy, F.R.G., Sweden, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium-Luxembourg.

Official Visits. Deputy Secretary of Commerce Clarence Brown visited Hungary in April and was received by

the Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers for Trade and Industry, and other government representatives. U.S. Commerce Department Assistant Secretary for International Economic Policy Louis Laun participated in the meeting of the U.S.-Hungarian Joint Economic and Commercial Committee held in Budapest in May and was also received by high-level Hungarian officials.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Hungarian enterprises continue to require substantial countertrade arrangements for almost all new business, although banking and official Hungarian sources downplay strict countertrade arrangements as true business enhancers. Movement toward a convertible forint is still the government's official policy, but economic and financial conditions make it unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. There are no official Hungarian policies toward small and medium-sized enterprises that differ significantly from the general pattern described above. The preference of Hungarian enterprises to work solely with large multinationals which can provide opportunities for assistance in production and marketing has changed somewhat. Hungarian business development programs planned for November in Atlanta, Boston, and Denver will put a special emphasis on attracting small and medium-sized American companies to Hungary. Hungarian enterprises are slowly coming to realize that small and medium-sized firms offer a great deal of potential for cooperation and possible joint venture participation.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The exchange of publications in respective S&T activities between U.S. Government departments and institutes and counterpart Hungarian organizations is satisfactory. These exchanges have been carried out officially, as well as informally, between respective government agencies and through the U.S. Embassy's science attache. Domestic dissemination of S&T information has expanded substantially. Hungary, on a monthly basis, under a 1985 license with *Scientific American*, publishes *Tudomány (Science)*, which essentially is a Hungarian-language reprint of articles from the American publication. The publication is of high quality, with a circulation of about 30,000. *Tudomány's* publisher also has a joint venture with U.S. Computer

World Communications to publish *Computer Technology*, a monthly in 20,000 copies, as well as three other newsletter-type publications in English and Hungarian.

The exchange program between several U.S. agencies (National Bureau of Standards, U.S. Geological Survey, National Institutes of Health, National Science Foundation, National Academy of Sciences, and National Aeronautics and Space Administration) and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) and its various institutes is relatively active. The MTA maintains close working relations with the National Science Foundation, the National Academy of Sciences, and various universities in the U.S. The Hungarian Government has indicated a strong desire to expand exchanges in all S&T areas. Cooperation between MTA institutes and NASA is low-key but mutually beneficial.

An international seminar on nutrition, chronic diseases, and health, given in October 1987, was a followup to the successful International Cancer Congress of 1986. In 1987, overall, Hungary expects to host about 150 international meetings and conferences on a broad spectrum of scientific topics. Hungary's internationally renowned John van Neumann Society for the Computing Sciences hosts or supports several international conferences each year. Indigenously manufactured and imported computers have been displayed at these conferences, as well as at Budapest's annual international fall and spring fairs. U.S. electronic equipment, including computers, has also been featured.

German Democratic Republic

General Assessment. There has been no significant change over the past 6 months in the G.D.R.'s cooperation in implementing Basket II.

Business Operating Conditions. Despite continued improvement in American businessmen's access to G.D.R. trade officials and enterprise managers during the past 6 months, there is still considerable room for improvement. The G.D.R. often requires that its citizens obtain prior approval for contacts with Western businessmen, and the requirement that foreign businesses deal through government foreign trade service organizations also limits access to managers at the enterprise level.

Operating conditions for establishing business offices in Berlin remain unchanged. Five U.S. companies have

offices there; three are staffed by East German citizens, one by a West German national, and one by a Swiss national. Western firms wishing to establish an office in East Berlin are required to rent space either in the International Trade Center, which has strict access control, or in a building which is used by the firm alone.

Restrictions on travel and visas for foreign business representatives have not caused problems. Persons in possession of G.D.R. hotel vouchers are generally issued visas upon arrival at border crossing points. In addition, visas for day visits to Berlin (East) are obtainable at designated Berlin sector-to-sector crossing points with little delay. Western business representatives residing or maintaining offices in the G.D.R. are often issued multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year. Nonresident business representatives generally receive one-entry visas unless multiple-entry visas have been requested on their behalf by an East German trading partner.

As is the case for virtually all visitors, nonresident foreign business representatives are required to exchange approximately \$13.50 per day into G.D.R. marks during their visit. Of this sum, any unspent marks cannot be converted back into Western currency upon departure, but must be either forfeited or deposited in a special account for use upon the visitor's return.

Visiting business representatives must normally stay in expensive hotel accommodations, which require payment in convertible currencies. In cities without such hotels, accommodations are less expensive, and payment may be made with marks. Subject to these conditions, however, travel is otherwise virtually unrestricted. There have been no reports of complaints by U.S. business representatives about unavailability of hotel accommodations.

Resident business representatives are allowed to rent, but not buy, housing. Available housing is usually expensive, and standards vary, although some is quite good. All housing services must be obtained through a state-operated agency, which determines the rent as well as the location of housing for foreigners.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. The type, quality, and timeliness of economic and commercial information released by the government is considered unsatisfactory by Western businesses. The main source of G.D.R. economic data is the Annual Statistical Yearbook published

by the State Central Administration for Statistics. The yearbook is not published on a timely basis; it appears about 10 months after year's end. The small portion of the report devoted to foreign trade usually lumps export and import figures together in one number. Thus, the user normally knows only the total amount of trade between two countries, not how much the G.D.R. purchased or how much it sold. Furthermore, Western business representatives and economists often question the reliability of the figures given.

The Foreign Trade Bank's (*Deutsche Aussenhandelsbank*) annual report offers only highly aggregated information on the hard currency value of G.D.R. imports and exports and provides no specifics on foreign debt. In general, it does not serve the needs of banks and firms seeking to evaluate potential business relationships. Moreover, the G.D.R. does not provide information on the total balance of payments, aggregate net and gross foreign debt, projections of international financial flows, and statements of sources and uses of funds for the banking sector.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Joint ventures, in the sense of joint membership within the G.D.R. and foreign ownership of business undertakings, are prohibited by law. Although the G.D.R. has entered into a few cooperative production agreements with Western firms, it has shown less interest in developing these cooperative ventures than most other Eastern-bloc countries.

Official Visits. There were no important economic or commercial visits during this reporting period.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Often the G.D.R. will purchase goods from abroad only on the condition that at least partial payment be made in East German goods rather than hard currency. Also, cooperation agreements for production within the G.D.R. are often coupled with countertrade or "buy-back" features. Aside from opposing countertrade as a matter of principle, most U.S. firms are also inhibited from such arrangements by difficulties in obtaining the quantity and quality of goods desired, limitations on what the G.D.R. can or is willing to supply, and the unmarketability of some G.D.R. products offered.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In general, small and medium-sized enterprises do

not encounter problems different from those faced by larger enterprises.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The G.D.R. continues to be extremely interested in sending scientists and technical experts to the U.S. for advanced training, but it has shown much less enthusiasm for promoting reciprocal exchanges. There are also few areas in which G.D.R. science and technology is sufficiently advanced to make research in the G.D.R. of interest to U.S. scientists.

Due to its increasing use of lignite as the primary source of energy (80%), the G.D.R. is the largest producer of sulphur dioxide in Europe. The government has taken few significant steps to improve air quality, nor does there seem to be much hope for a change, given the concentration on economic growth at the expense of environmental quality. It seems unlikely that the G.D.R. will satisfy its Helsinki commitments to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 30% by 1990. Preliminary measures have been taken to reduce water pollution. An important motive in this regard is the relatively low supply of fresh water per capita. However, much work remains to be done in removing phosphates from southern rivers and streams. This is a political issue with the F.R.G., which is the downstream recipient of this effluent. It is uncertain to what extent an environmental cooperation agreement signed during Chairman Honecker's visit to Bonn in September will lead to meaningful new cooperative policies.

G.D.R. custom regulations restrict the importation of printed material with the word "German" in the text or in the address. This has continued to create certain problems when business literature containing this word arrives and cannot be distributed.

Czechoslovakia

General Assessment. Czechoslovak cooperation with other CSCE signatories in the implementation of Basket II remains overwhelmingly focused on the Soviet Union and other member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation. For the last several years, about 80% of Czechoslovakia's foreign trade has been conducted with socialist countries; the Soviet Union alone accounts for 45%. The long-term, complex program for scientific and technological development up to the year 2000 and various bilateral science

and technology agreements with CEMA states will likely preoccupy a considerable portion of Czechoslovakia's applied science resources for the foreseeable future. However, Czechoslovakia has reached modest agreements with Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany (as well as with Poland) on environmental cooperation and, most recently, stated interest in membership in the Joint European Research Program, EUREKA. The eighth five-year plan (1986-90) calls for an acceleration of economic growth. It foresees a restructuring of the Czechoslovak economy away from high energy and raw material use and toward production which emphasizes technology and research-oriented production. Though emphasis on trade with the Soviet Union and CEMA countries will continue, imports from the West and other non-socialist countries are increasing.

Czechoslovakia continues to be adverse to increasing the level of its foreign borrowing, despite a generally recognized need to modernize its industrial plant and equipment with Western technology. Bilateral political relations between Czechoslovakia and the U.S. have shown a slight improvement over the reporting period. There was also some improvement in U.S.-Czechoslovak bilateral trade. In 1986, trade totaled \$165 million, up 11.6% from 1985. U.S. exports were up 15% and imports rose about 9%. So far in 1987, U.S. exports have dropped marginally, while imports from Czechoslovakia have continued to rise. The U.S. and Czechoslovakia conduct a significant amount of trade through U.S. subsidiaries in Austria, West Germany, Switzerland, and other Western countries. The lack of most-favored-nation tariff status, absence of Export-Import Bank credits, and U.S. export controls remain sore points in bilateral economic relations.

Contacts between foreign businessmen and their counterparts in this country remain under the control of the central authorities. Foreign businessmen often report difficulty in establishing responsible contacts and locating accurate information about investment plans, hard currency spending priorities, and economic performance. Countertrade, commonly 25%-40% or more of the value of the original sale, is a consistent and probably growing feature of Western trade with Czechoslovakia.

Business Operating Conditions.

The number of American business offices did not change during this period. Pan American Airways, which resumed service to Prague in 1986, is working to

expand its presence. U.S. firms with representation in Prague appear to have adequate space, but one business has spent months trying to identify more appropriate office space without success. This experience appears to be typical for Western firms. There are no resident American businessmen in Czechoslovakia. Foreign businessmen in Prague appear to have suitable housing obtained through official channels or private arrangements.

Due to the shortage of tourist and visitor facilities in Prague and other major Czechoslovak cities, foreign businessmen report increased problems with hotel accommodations and other impediments to visits here. Visas for foreign businessmen are generally not a problem and are rarely denied. The only exceptions usually involve individuals born in Czechoslovakia who were once recognized as Czechoslovak citizens but who subsequently left. Some foreign businessmen complain that they cannot obtain multiple-entry visas and must apply for a reentry visa each time that they plan to travel outside Czechoslovakia.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Foreign businessmen regard the range and timeliness of economic and commercial information available in Czechoslovakia as inadequate. Monthly statistical reports in the official press provide little useful information, and information on foreign trade is particularly insufficient for market research purposes. Many foreign observers believe the data published by the government are unreliable.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. Most foreign trade must be conducted through one of a number of foreign trade organizations, each of which enjoys a monopoly over both imports and exports for particular product lines. In addition, a number of foreign trade representation firms handle local representation for Western companies.

At the beginning of 1987, the government announced plans to "restructure" its domestic economy so as to allow greater decentralization and independence for individual enterprises. In connection with this general restructuring, authorities have announced plans to modify the foreign trade sector. In fact, over a dozen domestic firms have already received foreign trade privileges, but the effect and extent of this reorganization is not yet clear.

In mid-1985, the Czechoslovak Government made a decision to allow the formation of joint venture corporations with Western companies. Two joint ventures have already been signed, one with a Danish medical equipment firm which is a subsidiary of an American company. Czechoslovak officials have discussed the possibility of joint ventures with several dozen Western companies, and it appears possible that at least several other joint ventures, including one involving a large American company, could be formed within the next 2 years. At present, joint ventures are negotiated within the framework of existing commercial laws. Officials have indicated that a new joint venture law may be introduced in the near future.

In the context of its efforts to modernize and accelerate economic development, Czechoslovakia expects to increase the purchases of Western technology via licenses. A fairly large number of license production agreements exist, including two with U.S. firms for refining oil and manufacturing color television tubes. At least one U.S. drug manufacturer has a coproduction arrangement in this country, and a few U.S. construction-engineering firms have contracts with Czechoslovak firms for the supply of generator turbines and other heavy machinery.

Official Visits. During the reporting period, several technical-level economic and trade meetings took place. In September, the eighth Joint Economic Council was held in Prague. The council brings Czechoslovak and U.S. businessmen and bankers together for a discussion of bilateral commercial relations.

During her April 1986 visit to Czechoslovakia, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway proposed formation of a bilateral working group to facilitate development of business and economic ties, in tandem with a similar working group on humanitarian issues. The first sessions of the working groups took place in January and June, respectively.

A new U.S.-Czechoslovak Bilateral Air Transport Agreement was signed on June 29, 1987.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Czechoslovakia appears to have no specific legislation concerning countertrade arrangements, but the demand for countertrade on foreign trading partners is consistent and widespread. Countertrade demands commonly run about 25%-40% of the

value of the original sale. Some businessmen report having been quoted a "new regulation" putting countertrade demands at 40% for their industries and also spelling out both the categories of goods and the FTOs from which the Western firm must purchase. U.S. and other Western firms report that the main problems with countertrade concern product quality and availability.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. Czechoslovakia and the U.S. signed an exchanges agreement in April 1986 which covers the fields of culture, education, science, and technology. The S&T provisions of the agreement provide for implementation through agency-to-agency contacts between the two countries. Such exchanges have been slow to materialize. The National Academy of Sciences has an existing exchange program with the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, and the National Science Foundation is expected to conclude a similar arrangement in the fall of this year.

Bilateral S&T cooperation usually takes place under the control of the Czechoslovak Government, particularly the Czechoslovak Academy of Science. Private contacts are limited.

Bulgaria

General Assessment. Economic growth continued to lag behind planned targets during the first half of 1987. Official statistics published July 25 included no estimate for overall growth in the first half of the year but indicated that net production had increased by 4.6% and nonagricultural labor productivity by 3.8%. Industrial output was reportedly up by 3.7% over the comparable period in 1986. No overall figure for agricultural production was available, but the official report acknowledged a number of "negative tendencies" in that area, most notably a 1.5% decrease in the production of livestock.

Production shortfalls were noted in the quantity and quality of consumer goods, housing construction, livestock, and processed foods. The production of electrical energy increased slightly, while investment was below the target level. Foreign trade fell by 2% compared to the first half of 1986, due largely to a 6% drop in imports. Exports rose by 3.5%. However, despite improved performance in exports to the West, Bulgaria still posted a \$375-million trade deficit with the West.

Business Operating Conditions. Business conditions for Western businessmen remained difficult, and access to information was limited. Countertrade pressures from the Bulgarian side reportedly increased, as hard currency for the acquisition of Western technology became scarcer.

Although the bulk (approximately 80%) of Bulgaria's foreign trade is with the Soviet Union and other CEMA countries, Bulgaria has sought increased trade and investment from the West in order to obtain the technology and know-how needed to increase productivity. Western businessmen generally have ready access to authorized business contacts and trade officials, but not necessarily to end-users. Virtually all foreign trade is channeled through foreign trade organizations.

Since the beginning of 1986, the government has introduced a number of economic reforms intended to decentralize economic decisionmaking and boost productivity. In theory, self-managing enterprises are now free to choose and deal directly with trading partners, determine what to produce and how to produce it, seek bank financing, and dispose of profits as they see fit. Additional reforms are to be introduced or phased in through the end of 1987 and possibly continuing into 1988. In practice, the reforms have introduced an element of confusion in trade relations but, so far, have had little positive impact on the conduct of foreign trade.

Visiting businessmen have reported no problems in acquiring hotel accommodations or restrictions on business travel. However, there are occasional complaints about delays in the issuance of visas to business visitors.

Housing accommodations are inadequate by Western standards. The scarcity of high-quality consumer goods and services, environmental pollution, and a generally indifferent bureaucracy combine to make Bulgaria a challenging assignment for resident foreign businessmen. Visitors have to pay high hotel fees for generally mediocre accommodations and inferior service, as the government seeks to exploit every possible source of hard currency.

Western airlines receive cramped space at Sofia Airport but are required to pay fees similar to those charged at large, modern Western airports.

Availability of Economic and Commercial Information. Bulgaria regularly publishes economic performance data and foreign trade figures. However, information is reported selectively and often in insufficient detail for

meaningful economic analysis. For example, percentages are often given in lieu of raw data, and bases for comparisons are carefully selected to enhance the presentation of current figures. Officials are reluctant to share their opinions and are prone to hide negative information from Western businessmen. Under the current economic reform, however, the government has pledged itself to provide more and better information on its economy.

Policies Concerning Economic and Commercial Cooperation Arrangements. The Bulgarian Government actively courts Western firms to establish joint venture projects in Bulgaria. To that end, revisions to the joint venture law were introduced in mid-1987. Bulgaria now claims to have the most liberal joint venture law in Eastern Europe. A Western business is still likely to have more success and fewer problems, however, in negotiating a licensing agreement. Free enterprise zones were authorized in May 1987, but implementing regulations have not yet been introduced.

Official Visits. There were several exchanges of experts between Bulgaria and the U.S. during 1986 in connection with a bilateral program in the agricultural sector. These visits were not directly trade-related but, in a few instances, led to commercial transactions.

Policies Toward Countertrade Arrangements. Pressure for countertrade has continued as the Bulgarian Government seeks to acquire new technologies with minimal hard currency expenditure. The Bulgarians have little to offer by way of countertrade, although Western businessmen will sometimes accept the often inferior merchandise as a way to establish a niche in the Bulgarian market. Unless there is a sharp improvement in Bulgaria's foreign trade balance or its requirements for expensive Western technology decrease, even more countertrade demands can be expected.

Policies Affecting Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises. In a reversal of previous policies, the government now officially recognizes the potentially valuable contributions of small and medium-sized enterprises, particularly in the service sector and in the production and merchandising of consumer goods. Expansion of this type of activity, however, awaits implementing regulations.

Development of Forms and Methods of Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Technology, and the Environment. The Bulgarian scientific establishment is a highly bureaucratized system which places the needs of the state—both strategic and economic—above the advancement of scientific inquiry for its own sake. The intercourse between Bulgarian scientists and their counterparts abroad is carefully controlled. International cooperative efforts in S&T, and in particular with the U.S. and other Western countries, have expanded somewhat in recent years. This increased cooperation stems from the government's emphasis on integrating S&T advances into the national economy, a program that is presented as a national imperative. In

addition, scientific exchanges increase Bulgarian access to high-technology systems, processes, and methodologies that are otherwise limited by Western export restrictions.

In the period under review, Bulgaria hosted several international scientific conferences. Through joint research projects with Western counterparts, a number of Bulgarian scientists have made significant contributions in their fields. Exchange agreements between the Bulgarian Academy of Science and, *inter alia*, the U.S. National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and U.S. Department of Agriculture are in force and fully subscribed.

The concept of scientific or academic freedom, as understood in the West, is far from being a reality in Bul-

garia. The controlling bodies of S&T institutions are staffed by party officials who often place national prestige or state security ahead of purely scientific concerns. Researchers who enjoy world-class reputations or receive funding from international organizations comprise a privileged class of scientists, while their less exalted colleagues must scramble for funding or permission to travel. Even if a middle-ranking researcher possesses the funds to pay his own way to an international congress, he may find it impossible to obtain the clearance to travel. Political motives also intrude into funding allocations; enormous sums are expended on showcase projects of questionable practical value, while many laboratories struggle with hopelessly outdated equipment.

Chapter Four

Implementation of Basket III: Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields

Basket III contains specific measures to foster human contacts, improve access to information, and promote cultural and educational exchanges.

Basket III and Principle Seven of Basket I, strengthened by provisions of the Madrid Concluding Document, constitute the principal human rights provisions of the Helsinki process.

HUMAN CONTACTS

In the Final Act, participating states commit themselves to facilitate family reunification and meetings, marriage between citizens of different states, and expansion of contacts and travel, especially in the areas of tourism, business, sports, and among young people.

In addition, the Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions that strengthen and extend the human contacts commitments in the Final Act. The participating states have pledged: to deal favorably with applications for family meetings, reunification, and marriage; to decide upon marriage and family reunification applications within 6 months; to ensure that rights of applicants for family reunification are not prejudiced; to provide necessary forms and information to applicants for emigration; to reduce emigration fees;

to inform emigration applicants of decisions expeditiously; to assure access to diplomatic missions; and to facilitate contacts among representatives of religious faiths.

Family Visits

To some extent, the Helsinki process has led to freer travel policies in the East, but much remains to be done to achieve CSCE goals. In general, Eastern countries maintain a policy of limiting and controlling their citizens' movement abroad. It should be noted that the U.S.S.R. and other Warsaw Pact countries have ratified the UN Charter and other international documents on human rights, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, in which the right to leave one's country and return thereto is articulated. The right of any person to leave any country, including his own, is also spelled out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This provision was incorporated into the Helsinki Final Act by reference, since all participating states committed themselves (in Principle Seven) to "act in conformity with the Universal Declaration." However, in practice, the Soviet Union denies its citizens this right. Restrictive practices in the other countries of Eastern Europe vary considerably.

Soviet Union. Soviet practice in the area of family meetings reflected some of the other liberalizing changes that took place in Soviet society during the period of the report. The number of people who applied for and received visitors' visas for private family trips to the U.S. was more than 2,800 for the April 1-September 30 reporting period—more than double the figure for the same period in 1986 (1,050).

While the U.S. host must still provide the Soviet traveler with a notarized invitation which guarantees all expenses incurred outside the Soviet Union, Soviet citizens are being allowed to visit more distant relatives. An additional liberalization is that private Soviet visitors now appear to be receiving permission to visit relatives in the U.S. who emigrated from the Soviet Union with permission to go to Israel, but who changed course in Vienna to the U.S. The number of Soviets allowed to visit friends is small but growing. More young people and more families appear to be traveling together to the U.S. Statistics on the number of Soviet citizens granted exit permission to visit the U.S. are not available.

Soviet authorities still often arbitrarily refuse visas to U.S. citizens seeking to visit relatives in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, for the first time

in a decade, the Soviets are granting visas to large numbers of Soviet emigrants who left the Soviet Union in the last great wave of emigration in the late 1970s. According to Intourist officials, the return visit of the emigrant is a new, officially encouraged, and growing phenomenon.

While Soviet authorities claim that they are encouraging those who have the time off from work and the financial resources to travel to the West to visit relatives, routine permission to do so is still a long way from a commonplace reality. Lengthy formalities, an unresponsive bureaucratic infrastructure, and arbitrary denials for reasons of security discourage many from attempting a trip. Additionally, obstruction by other family members often frustrates even short private visits of Soviets to the U.S.

Romania. While there has been significant improvement in the area of exit permits for visits abroad or emigration, Romanian policies are still calculated to restrict the contact of Romanian citizens with foreigners. Citizens are aware that they are required to report any contact with foreigners to the authorities within 24 hours and that failure to do so can result in interrogation by police. Foreign embassies report that their Romanian militia guards have been known to deny entry to Romanians, even those who pose no threat to security.

The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest was the site of two disturbing incidents in September of this year. On September 22, a man and woman were forcibly deterred by Romanian militia from entering the embassy and beaten. In another instance, a man who attempted to demonstrate in favor of human rights in front of the embassy was severely beaten, then jailed. The individual did not appear to be seeking entrance but presumably was trying to inform the embassy of human rights violations.

The Romanian Government has more than doubled the number of exit permits issued for temporary visits to family members in the U.S. during this reporting period. The number of Romanians emigrating to the U.S. has increased in all categories, as has immigration to West Germany and Israel.

The U.S. Embassy issued roughly 1,285 nonimmigrant visas to Romanian citizens for visits to relatives in the U.S. in this reporting period. Romanian authorities issued an estimated 600 visas to Americans for family visits during the same period.

The difficulties in obtaining exit permits mentioned in previous reports still exist, and opportunities for travel abroad for most Romanians remain strictly limited. Passport issuance procedures are arbitrary, unpredictable, and expensive. Only those persons approved by party-controlled "workers' committees" are allowed tourist passports. Those who receive tourist passports often do so only after months or years of waiting. Rarely are entire families issued passports at the same time for a visit abroad; usually at least one member of the immediate family must remain behind.

Americans generally encounter few problems in obtaining visas to visit relatives in Romania, unless they themselves are former Romanians who left the country illegally or are considered "undesirable" for other reasons. Most Americans arrive at Romanian frontiers without visas and receive entry permission on the spot.

Poland. The Polish Government has a relatively liberal passport issuance policy. Most Poles who apply for passports eventually obtain them. Polish tourists applying for a passport must present a letter of invitation signed by a relative or friend abroad and notarized by a Polish Consulate. This letter of invitation is considered valid for 6 months from the date of notarization. Trained professionals such as engineers, doctors, and skilled artisans are considered essential personnel and sometimes cannot obtain passports for personal travel. The number of exit permits issued for visits to family members in the U.S. during the reporting period is estimated at more than 40,000. The number of visas issued to Poles by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw and the U.S. Consulates in Krakow and Poznan for visits to family members was approximately 28,000 from April 1, 1987, to September 30, 1987.

In general, Americans do not experience restrictions or significant difficulties visiting their relatives in Poland.

Hungary. Hungary continues to follow a relatively liberal travel policy for its citizens, allowing legal visits to the West at least once each year if financial support is available from friends or relatives. Hungarians can purchase hard currency for one family visit every year (2,000 forints per person) and one more extensive visit every 3 years (15,200 forints per person). The length of exit permission reflects the amount of leave time authorized by the place of employment; permission is usually issued in increments of 30 days.

The U.S. Embassy in Budapest noted several cases in the past few years in which permission was granted for trips of 1 year or more to visit friends or relatives in the West. Those affected were primarily elderly or of school age, but many were of working age, which may reflect the growing problems of employment in Hungary. The government has announced that these regulations will be liberalized, but new measures have not yet been implemented.

The U.S. Embassy issued 4,761 visas for family visits to the U.S. during the reporting period. Exit permits are frequently denied Hungarians who have traveled in the previous year, who cannot prove financial support, or who wish to visit relatives or friends who left Hungary illegally within the previous 5 years (especially if the potential visitor is considered to be responsible for a close relative having remained abroad illegally). Draft-age young men sometimes, though not always, are refused, especially when service is to begin within 6 months. Only rarely are reasons of public interest or state security invoked. About two dozen Hungarians have been denied passports for reasons of "national interest." In one case, passport denial prevented an individual from taking up a year-long teaching invitation at an American university for the dates offered, although authorities finally issued the passport. Permission is not always granted for the requested length of stay in the West.

Visas are seldom denied to Americans for family visits to Hungary. The Foreign Ministry never supplies reasons for the five to six such refusals annually but will consider the U.S. Embassy's request for review, sometimes with positive results. Favorable reconsideration is often granted to such applicants for demonstrable humanitarian concerns such as the illness of a close relative. Most denials involve people who were prominent in the 1956 uprising or those who on previous visits have been convicted of violations of Hungarian law, often related to customs matters.

German Democratic Republic. While the G.D.R. continued to impose arbitrary restrictions on travel by its citizens to the U.S. or other noncommunist countries for family visits unless the applicant was a pensioner (age 60 or over for women and 65 for men), there was a notable improvement over the reporting period.

In 1986, a total of 1,733,000 East Germans of all ages traveled West. A record 573,000 of them were under re-

tirement age. The trend is continuing, and West German sources estimate that the total number of travelers will easily exceed 3 million in 1987, including 1 million under retirement age. Persons with access to state secrets—at least several million in number—are considered by the government to be ineligible to travel abroad. However, there are now plausible reports that the categories of persons refused permission to travel for that reason will be substantially reduced. Still, approval or denial of any travel application is a political decision made by G.D.R. authorities, and the criteria for these decisions are not made public.

Whereas in the past, visits had only been permitted to first-degree relatives (parents, children, and spouses), the trend to consider applications to visit second-degree relatives (aunts, uncles, and grandparents) and even friends is continuing. Furthermore, G.D.R. authorities now often accept applications to attend a wider range of family events in the West than they have in the past. In all cases, the applicant wishing to travel must provide documentation confirming both the relationship and the purpose of travel. The total number of applications submitted and denied is not publicly available, but there are many cases of applicants in the above categories who are refused permission to travel.

The more relaxed travel restrictions also continued to apply to travel to the U.S. During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin issued 1,620 visas for family visits. Of these, 716 were issued to nonpensioners.

The G.D.R. continued to restrict travel into East Germany. In particular, emigrants from the G.D.R. generally must wait 5 years before they can return for family visits.

Czechoslovakia. Travel of Czechoslovak citizens to the West continues to be severely restricted. The number of visas issued by the U.S. Embassy in Prague for visits to family members in the U.S. was 3,210 for the reporting period. This represents no increase over the same period a year ago. The majority of Czechoslovak citizens allowed to travel to the U.S. to visit relatives are retired and elderly. Persons in the workforce are not normally allowed to travel abroad with all members of their immediate family.

Most U.S. citizens obtain visas to visit Czechoslovakia without difficulty, often in 1 day. However, many U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak origin continue to

be refused visas with no explanation given, sometimes after having received several visas in the past. The U.S. Embassy has made representations to the government on behalf of six such citizens during this reporting period.

Bulgaria. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued 426 tourist visas to Bulgarian nationals during the reporting period, a 40% increase over the same period in 1986. Since the Bulgarian Government in most cases will not issue passports for travel to the U.S. unless a relative there (not necessarily a member of the nuclear family) has submitted an affidavit of financial support for the Bulgarian visitor, most (394) of the tourist visas issued were for family visitation in the broad sense.

There are no reliable estimates of how many Bulgarian citizens may have been refused passports for temporary visits to the U.S., notwithstanding the presence of close relatives there. However, by the end of the period, the U.S. Embassy had approached the Bulgarian Government about nine such cases. One case, regarding a request—pending since 1974—by a Bulgarian for a passport to visit his American citizen father, was favorably resolved. Four similar cases that had been pending for substantially shorter periods of time were also favorably resolved during the period. However, in another pending case, the government declared in November 1986 and again January 1987 that a favorable decision had been made to allow the Bulgarian involved to travel to the U.S. to visit his parents, but the passport authorities in the city of Vidin continued to deny him travel documents. The government said another visitation case will be resolved, but travel documentation has not been issued. In several other cases, the government, without providing reasons, declared that no family visitation would be allowed.

An unknown but substantial number of American citizens of Bulgarian origin received visas to visit family members in Bulgaria during the period. The Department of State continued to receive a small stream of complaints, however, from others who were denied visas for family visitation in Bulgaria. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia intervened in three cases. In two cases, the Bulgarian Government said its prior visa refusals would be reversed; it is not known whether the individuals in these cases have actually traveled to Bulgaria.

Family Reunification

Because of its restrictive definition of family reunification, bureaucratic roadblocks for intending emigrants, and generally arbitrary practices, poor Soviet performance in this area continues. Some of the states in Eastern Europe are as restrictive as the Soviet Union, while others pose fewer obstacles to allowing their citizens to emigrate to join family members abroad.

The U.S. Government regularly intercedes with Eastern governments on behalf of relatives of U.S. citizens who have been refused permission to emigrate to the U.S. to join their families. The accompanying table shows the number of such cases being monitored officially by the U.S. as of October 1, 1987.

Soviet Union. The prior semianual report noted that "Soviet performance on reunification of Soviet-U.S. divided families has improved significantly." But that report could not have anticipated the further improvements that have been made in family reunification during the present reporting period. The U.S. Embassy in Moscow processed 28 families representing 105 people who had been on the divided family representation list. In a significant change, most of the Soviets processed for immigration visas have not been on the representation list, and many are receiving exit permission on their first application to the Soviet authorities.

From April 1, 1987, to September 30, 1987, 180 Soviet nationals received U.S. immigrant visas to join first-degree relatives for permanent residence. An additional 1,251 were preprocessed for U.S. entry under the accelerated third country processing program for refugees. This represents a 200% increase in persons receiving immigrant visas over the previous 6 months and nearly a 1000% increase in refugees. More than 90% of Soviet refugees during this upsurge were ethnic Armenians.

In spite of this progress, Soviet emigration practices and policies remain very restrictive. Emigration is essentially nonexistent for all but ethnic Germans, Jews, and Armenians. Most of those who are processed by the U.S. Embassy are Armenians, although some Jews are receiving permission to join their relatives in the U.S. Families continue to receive refusals on ambiguous grounds such as "no purpose served," "contrary to state interests," or "grounds of state security."

It is difficult to estimate the number of Soviet citizens who were refused Soviet exit permission during this period. The embassy will have processed almost 500 families during the period, many of whom had never applied for emigration previously. The number of families applying at this time appears to be steadily growing. In a related trend, access to the embassy by Soviets seeking information about emigration or those who have legitimate business concerning an ongoing emigration case are facing less harassment by Soviet guards. Applicants escorted into the embassy no longer face interrogations by the Soviet guards if met outside by U.S. officers. Soviets with any evidence of permission to leave, even invitations from relatives in the U.S., are often allowed in unescorted.

With 9 months of experience under the new Soviet emigration legislation, which went into effect on January 1, 1987, it now appears that, at least in this early phase, its overall effect and/or application is less restrictive than expected. There has been great concern about the restrictions the legislation places on the type of relative who may invite a Soviet relative to emigrate. We continue to see, however, a small but steady flow of people granted exit permission whose invitations have come from uncles, aunts, and cousins—relatives who, by the letter of the legislation, would not be sufficiently close for the invitation to be considered. There are no reliable figures on the number of Soviets whose applications are refused based on present or previous access to state secrets or because family members object to the foreign travel. These overly broad discretionary categories will continue to give all levels of the Soviet emigration hierarchy the leeway to deny worthy family reunification cases.

Romania. The Romanian Government officially opposes emigration but allows a number of departures under the rubric of family reunification. The government continues to hinder many people applying to leave in order to discourage overall interest in emigration. It does allow, however, a relatively large number of ethnic Germans to emigrate to West Germany; 5,322 persons emigrated to Germany during the reporting period, and for the calendar year, there is an overall increase of 25% in such departures. Romanian Jews have also emigrated to Israel in increasing numbers: 625 left in this reporting period. Calendar year totals show emigration to Israel up 38% over 1986.

Divided Family Cases

	Nuclear Families		Non-Nuclear Families	
	Cases	Individuals	Cases	Individuals
Soviet Union	126	495	0	0
Romania	143	171	963	2177
Poland	66	147	221	641
Hungary	0	0	0	0
G.D.R.	8	20	5	13
Czechoslovakia	36	75	1	4
Bulgaria	9	15	14	16

An estimated 2,899 applications for immigration were received by the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest during the reporting period. The total number of U.S. immigrant visas issued, virtually all of which were for family reunification purposes, was 237. The number of humanitarian parole cases processed was 12. The number of persons documented to join a family member in either refugee or asylum status was 697. The number of persons issued refugee documentation was 509, of which approximately 339 are believed to be family reunification cases. The total U.S. documentation issued for family reunification purposes was, therefore, 1,285.

Exact figures for the number of persons who have been unsuccessful in their application for permission to emigrate are difficult to obtain. The U.S. has approximately 1,600 persons listed who have been unsuccessful in obtaining exit permission. While some cases have been pending for some time, a large part of the list changes every few months as a result of government approvals for old cases and refusals for new applicants. The U.S. Embassy presents a list of qualified persons seeking exit permission to the government on a monthly basis. The process, while cumbersome and lengthy, often ultimately results in permission being granted.

Poland. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw periodically presents lists of all divided family cases to the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In December 1986, the U.S. Government's approach to family reunification was modified to achieve greater concentration on divided nuclear families. At that time, approximately 60 cases of divided nuclear families (husbands, wives, and children of asylees, legal permanent residents, and U.S. citizens) were presented to the Polish authorities

as being of primary importance. A second list of approximately 250 non-nuclear cases was also prepared for representation. During the visit to Poland of Deputy Secretary Whitehead in January 1987, the Polish Government made the unprecedented move of inviting U.S. officials to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to discuss the nuclear family list. Subsequent to the announcement of liberalization of Polish passport issuance, the U.S. presented a list of 88 cases of divided families to the ministry in June. The ministry then informed the U.S. that 38 of the cases were resolved and the applicants were already in possession of passports. To date, 20 of the 38 have confirmed that they have received their passports and are ready to proceed with their immigration visas.

The Polish Government indicated that Poles returning to Poland, particularly to pursue U.S. immigrant visas, will be issued passports and multiple entry-exit stamps in order to do so. However, official confirmation of this has not been received from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy issued 1,079 immigrant visas for the purpose of family reunification, and travel documents were issued to 360 spouses and children of asylees and refugees in the U.S. for reunification. In addition, 18 "K" (fiance) nonimmigrant visas were issued to prospective spouses who wished to enter the U.S. on a temporary basis before their marriage.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be good. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest processed 79 applications by Hungarians for immigrant visas for family reunification during the reporting period. This figure includes applicants processed to join refugees. In February, the embassy presented a list of three families who had been unsuccessful in their applications for permission to emigrate for family

reunification. Since that time, one family has been allowed to leave, and the others were asked to submit new applications. Currently, there are no divided family cases involving the U.S.

German Democratic Republic.

During 1986, approximately 21,500 East Germans were granted exit visas to emigrate to the F.R.G. This pace has slackened considerably. Only 5,821 emigrant visas had been issued as of July. Many of these people left for family reunification, others for economic and political reasons. Only a fraction of those desiring to leave the G.D.R. have been allowed to do so; reliable Western sources estimate that as many as 300,000-500,000 applications are still pending.

An October 1983 G.D.R. law on emigration addresses only emigration for the purpose of reunification with "first-degree" relatives (parents and children) or a spouse. However, some applicants with no first-degree relatives in the West have been allowed to emigrate, and there are indications that this number is increasing. It is still too early to tell whether a sustained trend toward liberalization has developed.

The experiences of exit visa applicants vary. In some cases, applicants wait at least a year for exit permission from the G.D.R., but other cases have taken 3 or more years. While some East Germans have been able to lead normal lives after submitting an exit visa application, others have been subject to reprisals of varying degrees of severity. Some applicants have lost their jobs or have had to take menial work. G.D.R. authorities sometimes visit the homes of exit applicants to try to intimidate them into withdrawing their applications, and occasionally their children face discrimination and harassment in school. Successful applicants must usually renounce their G.D.R. citizenship and accept a stateless passport, but East German citizens can readily obtain West German passports once they reach the West.

West German human rights groups as well as F.R.G. officials seem to agree that half of the political prisoners in the G.D.R. were imprisoned after filing for exit permission or attempting to leave the G.D.R. illegally; however, estimates of the number of political prisoners vary widely. West German human rights groups estimate the total to be between 4,000 and 10,000 people. The F.R.G. Inner-German Ministry gives a more conservative estimate of "more than 1,000" East Germans known by name to have been imprisoned for indicating a desire to leave the G.D.R.

G.D.R. officials commonly tell applicants that it is "not possible" to submit an exit application, but if applicants persist with submission of a written statement, it will generally be accepted by G.D.R. authorities as a *de facto* application. Applicants are usually not informed of the status of their case until a final decision is made. Denial of the application is given orally without explanation. Some people thus refused are advised that any future applications could lead to difficulties with the police or worse.

A few G.D.R. citizens who have applied for emigration to the F.R.G. or West Berlin intend eventually to join relatives in the U.S. Others apply for emigration directly to the U.S., though they intend to remain in the F.R.G. or West Berlin. It is, therefore, difficult to know the exact number of persons allowed to leave the G.D.R. for family reunification in the U.S.

The continued G.D.R. practice of severely limiting access to Western diplomatic missions has inhibited potential emigrants from visiting these missions to inquire about emigration procedures. Virtually all nonofficial visitors to the U.S. Embassy in East Berlin can expect to be stopped by the police and have identification cards checked. Many have been warned to have no contact with Western missions under threat to their well-being, and some people have been required to sign a document acknowledging that visiting a foreign mission without permission is a violation of law which makes them subject to prosecution.

The U.S. Embassy makes representations to the G.D.R. by periodically presenting a list of emigration cases of direct interest to U.S. citizens. Of the 19 cases (involving 47 people) on the family reunification list during the reporting period, six families (14 people) were permitted to leave the G.D.R. to join relatives in the U.S. Thirteen cases (33 people) remained unresolved, three of which had been refused exit permits with no reason given.

Emigration fees are not burdensome. A passport costs about \$4, and a single exit visa about \$2.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on family reunification is generally poor. The Czechoslovak Government does not regard married sons and daughters or siblings of U.S. citizens as needing reunification since, in its view, the basic family unit is with them in Czechoslovakia. The record on spouses,

minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens is relatively good, although they face the same bureaucratic and regulatory delays faced by other persons wishing to emigrate.

During this period, the U.S. Embassy in Prague received 21 new immigrant visa applications (two fewer than in this period last year). Of 182 pending immigrant visa cases, the embassy issued 34 visas to family members of U.S. citizens and permanent resident aliens during this period (an increase of seven cases). The embassy also received eight new cases (representing 11 individuals) of spouses and children seeking to join a family member who came to the U.S. as a refugee, compared to three cases (four persons) during this period last year. Five cases involving relatives of refugees were processed.

Czechoslovak policy discourages emigration of the workforce. Adult sons and daughters, married sons and daughters, or siblings of U.S. citizens frequently experience great difficulty in obtaining exit documents and often must wait many years before receiving exit permission. Decisions on exit documentation often seem arbitrary and appear to be as dependent on where the application is made as on the merits of the case. Of the 182 pending immigrant visa cases, the embassy has received no word from most of those concerned, presumably because of the difficulty in obtaining exit documentation since the time they were notified of their petition approval. Families of refugees can expect lengthy waits. Indeed, almost all have to wait until the refugee is a U.S. citizen before they can obtain exit permission. In the past, some beneficiaries have had to renounce Czechoslovak citizenship in order to receive exit documentation. Assembling the documents needed to apply for emigration usually takes a minimum of 6 weeks. This includes obtaining statements of "no objection" from local authorities, without which an application is incomplete and unacceptable. Processing of an emigration application takes from 6 weeks to 6 months from the date the completed application is submitted, although the average time is 3 months. If the applicant is refused, it is possible to file an appeal within 15 days. If it is refused a second time, the applicant must wait 3 months before submitting a new application. In some cases, people are told it is useless to reapply, although according to Czechoslovak law, they have a right to do so. An emigrating Czechoslovak's largest expense is often the education payment levied, ostensibly, to reimburse the government for university and postgraduate education.

Some applicants have had to pay up to the equivalent of \$1,000 (in excess of 3 months of the average wage).

Bulgaria. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued seven immigrant visas in family reunification or binational marriage cases during the period. There are no reliable estimates of how many additional Bulgarians with close relatives in the U.S. want to join them permanently but are unable to obtain passports for emigration. The embassy made representations on behalf of nine family reunification cases (involving 14 people) to the Bulgarian Government at the close of the reporting period. In one such case, involving a Bulgarian woman and her son wishing to be reunited with their husband/father in the U.S., the government declared in January 1987 that the case was being favorably resolved, but the passport office in Plovdiv continued to deny them passports and exit visas. There have been indications that two other cases will be favorably resolved, but Bulgarian travel documentation has not yet been issued. Alleged delay or refusal by local authorities to issue travel documents, even after the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has said the cases are resolved, continue to impede family reunification.

Binational Marriages

In accordance with the Final Act, the participating states pledged to consider favorably applications for entry or exit permits from persons who have decided to marry a citizen of another participating state. In the Madrid Concluding Document, the participating states committed themselves to deal favorably with binational marriage applications and to decide on applications normally within 6 months. There is a mixed record of implementation of these commitments by the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The following chart indicates the number of cases the U.S. was monitoring as of October 1, 1987.

Soviet Union	13
Romania	41
Poland	0
Hungary	0
G.D.R.	13
Czechoslovakia	0
Bulgaria	1

Soviet Union. During the review period, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow approved 15 U.S. immigrant visa petitions filed by American citizens on behalf of their Soviet citizen spouses. Three of these were petitions filed by former Soviet citizens who had emigrated in the late 1970s and were now returning to the Soviet Union to remarry spouses they were forced to divorce in order to receive exit permission. Four petitions were approved in the U.S. and forwarded to Moscow during this period.

The embassy received 11 new petitions to allow Soviet spouses of U.S. permanent resident aliens to emigrate to the U.S. Of the 97 spouses of American citizens and permanent resident aliens who received U.S. entry documents at the embassy during this 6-month period, 82 received Soviet exit permission upon first application. Fifteen individuals had previously applied and been refused (this includes spouses of three dual nationals, who had waited an average of 8 years for exit permission, and two longstanding divided spouse cases). Of these 97 spouses, 62 were joining U.S. citizen spouses, and 35 were joining permanent resident aliens. The figure for the U.S. citizen spouses is equal to the figure for the previous 6 months; the permanent resident alien spouses figure is up from 23 cited in the previous report.

From April 1 through September 30, 1987, 35 American citizens requested embassy assistance in marrying their Soviet fiances (this figure is up from 24 during the last review period). This does not accurately reflect the number of American citizens who marry Soviets, as many complete the marriage process without embassy intervention.

The U.S. Consulate in Leningrad reported 10 marriages between Soviets and Americans during this review period. The Soviets issued nine visas to Americans for the purpose of coming to Leningrad to marry Soviets and gave exit permission to 13 Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens. Of these 13, five had been waiting more than 6 months, and one had waited 9 years. The Soviets also issued temporary exit permission to three Soviets to visit U.S. citizen spouses in the U.S.

Progress on the divided spouses representation list was disappointingly slow during this period. American citizens Susan Graham and Keith Braun were reunited with their Soviet spouses, Matvey Finkel and Svetlana Braun, respectively, but nine other couples are still divided, and Soviet au-

thorities have prevented four other marriages from taking place.

Romania. Marriage to foreigners is officially discouraged, and obtaining approval is difficult. Although most applicants are eventually successful, securing official approval for a marriage is a time-consuming undertaking which typically requires a wait of 8-16 months. The U.S. Embassy in Bucharest currently has 40 cases of persons who have appealed for assistance in obtaining approval for a binational marriage. Twenty-two persons obtained marriage permission in this reporting period, as opposed to only two in the previous 6 months. Six persons received permission for travel to the U.S. for the purpose of marriage. Normally, exit permission is not granted until after marriage to a foreigner. Most exit documentation, once a binational marriage is approved and takes place, is issued within 90 days.

Poland. It is easier for American citizens to marry Polish citizens in the U.S. than in Poland. Polish courts usually require documentation showing that an American citizen is legally free to marry, especially if the American involved has been divorced. The process of obtaining a waiver of this requirement can take as long as 4 months. In addition, as the Polish authorities do not recognize divorces granted abroad involving Polish nationals, a divorce promulgated in the U.S. must be officially recognized in a Polish court, a process which can take up to a year.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be good during the reporting period. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest received 52 petitions for binational marriage immigrant visas for both Hungarian spouses of American citizens and spouses of U.S. permanent residents. None was refused an exit permit or was delayed for more than 6 months. There was no need for U.S. intervention during the reporting period.

German Democratic Republic. The G.D.R. appears to be following the letter of the October 1983 law, which provides that applications for binational marriage cases be settled within 6 months of a completed application. The G.D.R. does not consider an application to have been made until all required documents have been presented, and assembly of documentation in requisite formats can cause significant delay. Once the documents are accepted, permission to marry and emigrate is gen-

erally granted within 6 months, provided the couple marries in the G.D.R. Before mid-1983, applicants were permitted to emigrate to marry a foreigner in his/her home country. With the October 1983 law, this permission was generally restricted, forcing applicants to apply first for permission to marry in the G.D.R. Now emigration is normally granted only after marriage in the G.D.R. The U.S. Embassy in East Berlin currently has 18 binational marriage cases pending, 16 of which were reported to the embassy after October 1986.

Czechoslovakia. Although the processing of the marriage application is lengthy (3-6 months), the Czechoslovak record on binational marriages is generally good. The Czechoslovak Government holds that the marriages must take place in Czechoslovakia. In the past, there have been cases of U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak birth being refused entrance visas and of the Czechoslovak fiances being refused exit visas for the purpose of marriage. During this reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Prague issued 17 immigrant visas to the spouses of U.S. citizens.

Bulgaria. The record of the Bulgarian Government has been generally positive. There were four emigration cases involving marriages of Bulgarian and American nationals during the period. Three of these cases were resolved by the issuance of passports and exit visas without need for U.S. intervention. In one recent case, however, a Bulgarian married to an American citizen has been refused a passport for emigration to the U.S., and the U.S. Embassy in Sofia is preparing to take the case up with the Bulgarian Government.

Travel for Personal and Professional Reasons

Although the Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate travel for personal or professional reasons, the Soviet Union and most other East European states basically do not permit such travel except under conditions of strict government control. While they generally encourage visitors from the West, those who attempt to see dissidents or who bring in religious or literary materials are subject to harassment.

Soviet Union. As a general matter, the Soviet Union encourages tourism by westerners as a source of hard currency and potential ideological benefit. Relatively inexpensive rates are offered

to large groups, which are less troublesome to program and easier to control than individual tourists, who pay premium rates for comparative liberty. Soviet authorities continue to prefer tourists who concentrate on the sights and who meet only with "official" Soviet citizens by prearrangement through their Soviet hosts. As in previous reporting periods, Soviet authorities have occasionally harassed American citizens who have contact with Soviet citizens refused permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union. Also during the period, at least one tourist complained that Soviet customs authorities had confiscated religious articles, in this case Russian-language Bibles.

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow has no means of estimating the total number of tourist and other visitor visas issued to Americans by Soviet embassies and consulates in the U.S. and abroad. Recently, one New York-based travel company estimated it dealt with a volume of 10,000-15,000 American tourists to the Soviet Union per year. Intourist officials have said that U.S. tourism to the U.S.S.R. should top 100,000 in 1988. American tourism to the Soviet Union is up significantly, compared to the same period in 1986. This appears to be due in part to the fading from public consciousness of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster and in part to increased press coverage, much of it in a positive vein, about the regime of General Secretary Gorbachev and his policy of *glasnost*. During the summer period, Pan American Airways operated three flights per week, up from two per week during the winter.

Travel within the Soviet Union by American tourists and all other foreigners is extremely restricted. Large portions of the country are closed entirely to foreigners. Virtually all tourists must plan their itineraries and pay for transportation, accommodations, and even meals in hard currency before a visa is issued. As a result, Soviet authorities have no currency conversion requirements for tourists. Once a tourist has arrived in the U.S.S.R., changing a previously arranged itinerary becomes practically impossible. Further barriers to normal tourism are imposed by overly restrictive customs regulations. The U.S. Embassy intervenes with Soviet customs and tourist officials when difficulties experienced by Americans and returning emigres come to its attention, but it has no means of knowing how many customs abuses or confiscations actually occur. In the case of Americans who lose their Soviet

customs declaration, a letter of explanation provided by the embassy usually smooths the path for the American's departure. The official Soviet tourist agency, Intourist, which actively solicits Western tourist business, does not always take the responsibility for assisting its customers when they fall into difficulty.

Americans applying for visitor visas must wait varying lengths of time before receiving their Soviet visas. Most commonly, a visitor from the U.S. must wait 2-3 weeks before learning whether the application has been granted or denied. In a number of cases, the traveler only learns of the Soviet consulate's decision on the eve of departure. In a few cases, however, visas are authorized in as little as 2 days. U.S. visitor visas for private family visits to Soviet citizens are almost always issued on the day of application. To reciprocate for the Soviet practice of charging a \$10 fee for tourist and business visa applications, the U.S. in February 1985 introduced a \$10 charge for issuing visitor visas for tourists and business travelers. The U.S. has proposed that visa fees for tourists be mutually abolished. Soviet citizens must pay 200 rubles for a foreign travel passport, and adults must pay 500 rubles to renounce their Soviet citizenship if this is made a condition of their departure. This compares to an average monthly income of about 250 rubles.

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued 2,538 visas and the U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad 314 visas to private Soviet visitors during the 6 months from April 1 through September 30, 1987. The Moscow figure represents more than a 200% increase over the same period in 1986, when 1,099 visas were issued. This rising trend is clearly a result of the implementation of the August 1986 legislation on entry and exit, which went into effect January 1, 1987. The previous semiannual report described this legislation in general terms.

A total of 3,160 visas were issued from April 1 through August 31, 1987, to Soviet citizens whose applications were submitted under cover of a note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These included diplomatic, UN Secretariat, journalist, business, airline crewmember, exchange, and transit visas, as well as visas for officially sponsored tourist trips. This number represents a 156% increase over the 6 months of the previous reporting period.

Romania. U.S. tourist visas were issued to 2,355 persons in this reporting period. This represents an increase of 103% over the previous reporting period. Since the reporting period included summer vacation time, it is more significant that this number represents a 47% increase over the same period in 1986. Other nonimmigrant visas issued in the period include 3,318 official and business visas, plus 14 exchange students, 4 journalists, and 6 fiances.

Romania issued an estimated 2,000 tourist and other temporary visas to Americans in this period. Americans may obtain entry visas at airport or border ports of entry in a short period of time.

Americans and other foreigners are required to exchange at the port of entry \$10 for every day spent in Romania. Persons who leave before completing their expected time in the country are not refunded a corresponding amount. The \$10 daily conversion can be waived if evidence that one is visiting family or friends is submitted. Romania does not impose restrictions on travel in Romania by U.S. citizens, other than travel to or near military installations.

Most U.S. visas issued for tourist purposes are completed the same day. Visas that involve real or suspected membership in the Communist Party (about 30% of all tourist visas issued) may involve a delay of 5 working days so that waivers can be obtained to overcome this ground for inadmissibility. The cost of visas for Romanian citizens remains \$18 for a single-entry visa and \$47 for multiple entries, which is officially the same amount charged to Americans by Romanian authorities. Romanians also must pay exit fees of approximately \$96 (one-third of the average monthly income) in order to travel abroad.

Poland. The Polish Government actively promotes tourism from the U.S., as this is a source of hard currency for the Polish economy. American tourists in Poland during the reporting period generally experienced no difficulties with local authorities, other than problems involving customs or currency regulations.

There are no reliable estimates of the number of tourist visas and other nonimmigrant visas issued to Americans desiring to visit Poland. The estimated average duration of the visa application process for Americans visiting Poland is 2 weeks, most of which is mail turnaround time. A tourist visa for

an American costs \$18 for a single entry to Poland. American visitors to Poland are required to exchange \$15 per day at the official rate of exchange. If they are visiting relatives in Poland, only half that amount must be exchanged.

For Polish visitors to the U.S., the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw can process a nonimmigrant visa application within 3 hours—even more rapidly in urgent cases—unless waivers of ineligibility or clearances are required. Such waivers normally require 10–15 days for processing. Tourist visas for Poles cost \$16 or the equivalent in local currency. The U.S. Embassy and the consulates in Krakow and Poznan issued approximately 25,000 nonimmigrant visas during the reporting period, approximately 22,000 of which were tourist visas.

Hungary. Hungarian performance continued to be good. Travel to and from the West continues at a relatively high level, though the number of U.S. tourists was down. Since mid-1983, more liberal provisions for Hungarians to work abroad for up to 5 years have been in force. The Hungarian press reported that several hundred applications to work abroad were approved, mainly to the F.R.G. and Austria, during the reporting period. While the new regulations require that the individual have a firm job offer or contract before application is made, they help to foster Hungarian compliance with the commitment in the Helsinki Final Act to increase the opportunities for travel for professional as well as personal reasons. The program is designed to be comparable to the West European nations' guest worker systems.

The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued 10,578 nonimmigrant visas to Hungarians during the reporting period. Seventy percent of Hungarian applicants received visas in 1 or 2 days. Thirty percent, for whom waivers of ineligibility or clearances from Washington were required, received visas within 2 weeks; some of these cases were issued visas within 1 day because of emergencies. U.S. nonimmigrant visa fees for Hungarians (based on reciprocity) are \$10 for single entry, \$20 for double entry, and \$40 for multiple entry.

Generally, passports for tourism to the West are issued after a 30-day waiting period. Processing of passport applications for visits to socialist countries takes 2 weeks. An exit permit for tourism, whether to the West or to socialist countries, costs 350 forints (\$7). A passport costs 100 forints (\$2).

Hungary has agreements for the reciprocal waiver of visas with six nations which are not members of the Warsaw Pact: Sweden, Austria, Finland, Malta, Nicaragua, and Tunisia (only for diplomats). Negotiations are underway with the F.R.G. for a similar agreement. The Hungarian Government issued approximately 76,000 tourist and other nonimmigrant visas to Americans in the period from April to September 1987. Hungary has no currency conversion requirement for U.S. visitors, but applicants may have to produce proof of sufficient funds to cover planned stay and departure, particularly when extensions of stay are requested. Recently, when submitting requests for extensions of stay, foreigners have been asked to change the equivalent of \$10 per day for the period, but this requirement is often waived for those staying with relatives or able to show other continuing availability of resources.

The Hungarian Consulate in New York generally issues visas within 24–48 hours to nonofficial visitors. Visas are available at the Budapest airport and some border entry points, but the embassy is aware of five to six refusals annually to Hungarian-Americans. The U.S. and Hungarian Governments have agreed, in most cases, to issue visas to one another's official visitors within 7 days.

German Democratic Republic. In spite of a more liberal travel policy, many G.D.R. citizens are still unable to travel abroad. Only pensioners can obtain permission to travel to the West with relative ease. Exit formalities for G.D.R. citizens usually take 4–10 weeks. The total cost of a G.D.R. passport and exit visa is about \$6.

During the reporting period, the G.D.R. sharply reduced the very limited amount of marks that travelers to the West may exchange for Western currencies at the official rate. Travelers to the F.R.G. may exchange only 15 marks (about \$8). The previous maximum had been 70 marks (about \$40). No export or import of G.D.R. currency is permitted. These severe currency exchange restrictions also have the effect of limiting travel. G.D.R. citizens traveling to the West are almost totally dependent on the largesse of friends and relatives and certain small West German subsidies. Many pensioners, who technically may travel, decline to do so because they are embarrassed to be dependent on Western friends and relatives. For travel to the U.S., nonpensioners may exchange

70 marks (about \$40) and pensioners 30 marks. Currency exchange restrictions are somewhat more relaxed when travel is undertaken within socialist-bloc countries; however, G.D.R. citizens still complain that the 30 marks a day they are allowed to exchange for such travel only barely meet the cost of accommodations and meals.

Conversely, the relatively high currency exchange requirements for westerners diminishes travel and tourism to the G.D.R. and East Berlin. Westerners can, however, generally obtain visas to visit the G.D.R. after a long wait. Exceptions are those who have emigrated recently from the G.D.R. or who wish to visit East German relatives who have filed exit applications.

The processing of G.D.R. tourist and business visa applications takes about 6 weeks if the application is made in the U.S. and less time if made in the F.R.G. or West Berlin. If a traveler is in Berlin and purchases a voucher showing a pre-paid reservation in G.D.R. hotels, a visa can be obtained the same day. Day visas limited to East Berlin can be obtained by westerners (except West Berliners) within an hour at specified Berlin sector crossing points.

G.D.R. single-entry tourist or business visas cost about \$8 (15 marks), multiple entry about \$22 (40 marks). A day visa for East Berlin costs about \$2.80 (5 marks). In addition, the G.D.R. official travel agency, which processes visa applications in the U.S., charges those over 16 years old a handling fee of \$22 (or, for express handling, \$30) per person. The G.D.R. requires those between the ages of 15 and 60 to purchase about \$13.50 in G.D.R. currency per day. Those under 14 are exempt from such currency conversion requirements, and those over 60 must purchase about \$8. This money cannot be reconverted into hard currency or taken out of the G.D.R.

U.S. visitors are prohibited from traveling in areas adjacent to G.D.R. military installations, and permission must be obtained for travel within 5 kilometers of the G.D.R. border, except when entering or leaving the country. It is common G.D.R. practice to demand excessive bail from foreign travelers arrested in the G.D.R. and impose more severe prison sentences on them than those imposed on G.D.R. citizens. G.D.R. police also much more rigorously enforce speed limits on foreign travelers than on their own citizens and require that traffic fines be paid on the spot in hard currency.

The U.S. Embassy in Berlin issued 1,672 tourist visas and 714 other types

of nonimmigrant visas to G.D.R. citizens during this reporting period. U.S. tourist visas are issued within one working day, except for cases which require waivers of ineligibility. The latter take an average of 10 days to 2 weeks and include the majority of applicants because of affiliations with communist organizations. Those wishing to travel to the U.S. for business reasons who are not ineligible generally receive visas in 5 working days. A U.S. tourist visa costs \$8 for a single entry, \$16 for two entries.

Czechoslovakia. In theory, Czechoslovak citizens are allowed to travel to the West once every 3 years. In practice, a few Czechoslovaks are able to travel to the West every year, while others are granted exit documentation only once in a lifetime or never. In addition to applying for passports and exit permission, which are required even for travel to countries in the East, persons desiring to visit "nonsocialist" countries must submit an application for a hard currency allocation in January of the year in which they wish to travel. The maximum allocation is currently \$550. To obtain hard currency, Czechoslovaks must pay 25 Czechoslovak crowns for each dollar, a rate which is close to the free market price but almost three times the current "official" rate given to U.S. tourists in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovaks applying to travel also need permission from their employer and a police certificate. The U.S. Embassy in Prague issued 4,010 tourist visas during this period. Total nonimmigrant visa issuance was 5,253 (no increase over the same period last year).

Tourism to Czechoslovakia in general is encouraged, although former Czechoslovak citizens frequently experience difficulties in obtaining entry visas. During this period, several U.S. citizens of Czechoslovak ancestry were refused visas to visit relatives in Czechoslovakia. A visa was issued in at least one such case after U.S. intervention. Tourists are not generally restricted in their travel around the country, although certain localities—for example, around military establishments—are declared off limits. If a tourist loses his travel and identity documentation, he usually has to wait 3–5 days before he receives exit permission. Efforts by the U.S. Embassy to assist in such cases have met with very limited success. Currency exchange regulations are strictly enforced, and the embassy frequently receives telephone calls during peak travel months from American tourists who failed to exchange enough

money (currently approximately \$16 a day) or allowed their visas to lapse and found that Czechoslovak hotels were not allowed to house them.

The Czechoslovak borders are closely patrolled by guards armed with automatic weapons and instructed to shoot individuals attempting to leave the country illegally. There are no available estimates on the number of persons killed or wounded while trying to escape, although Austrian and West German residents living in the border area report that they regularly hear gunshots on the Czechoslovak side of the border. There are no available statistics on the number of persons serving prison sentences for attempting to leave Czechoslovakia without official permission, but this was one of the few "crimes" that was specifically omitted from the May 1985 amnesty. A private Czechoslovak human rights group, "The Committee for the Defense of the Unjustly Persecuted" (VONS), estimates that there are about 1,000 prisoners currently imprisoned on such charges.

Bulgaria. The U.S. Embassy in Sofia issued 426 tourist visas to Bulgarian nationals during the period, an increase of approximately 40% over the corresponding period in 1986. Other Western embassies in Sofia also report significant increases in 1987 in the number of Bulgarians allowed to travel abroad. As in the past, however, in nearly all cases of Bulgarians receiving passports and exit visas to visit the West, one or more members of their immediate families must remain in Bulgaria. While it is not clear how much time is required for a Bulgarian to obtain a passport and exit visa (in those cases in which such documentation is obtained), Bulgarian law calls for decisions to be made on passport applications within 45 days of the date of application. A Bulgarian passport authorizing travel to one country for up to 1 year costs 80 leva (\$40); a passport authorizing travel to more than one country or for more than 1 year costs 120 leva (\$60). U.S. tourist visas cost Bulgarians \$14 (28 leva).

Information is not available on how many Bulgarian visas were issued or denied to Americans wishing to visit Bulgaria during the period or the average duration of the visa application process. Reports from Americans who visited Bulgaria indicated that waits of up to a month for visas were frequent, and accounts of friends or relatives who were refused Bulgarian visas or whose visa processing time made travel impossible were common. Bulgarian tourist visas cost Americans \$14, but many

American visitors probably paid less, passing through Bulgaria on lower-cost transit visas.

A frequent problem for Americans visiting Bulgaria continued to be the Bulgarian requirement—often not made clear to visa applicants—that a special “visitation” (rather than “tourist”) visa is necessary to stay with a relative or friend instead of in a hotel room paid for in hard currency. All hotel and air travel expenses within Bulgaria must be paid for by foreigners in hard currency. The loss of a “statistical card” (issued upon entry into Bulgaria without explanation of its significance) or its improper stamping by hotels for confirmation of payment in hard currency can result in fines of up to 200 leva. In theory, tourist travel within Bulgaria is unrestricted, but in some areas of the country (notably those areas with a large ethnic Turkish population), it is, in fact, subject to governmental regulation without prior notification. People traveling on overland transit visas are not allowed to leave the main road, presumably in order to discourage local contact with Turkish citizens transiting Bulgaria.

Religious Contacts

In signing the Madrid Concluding Document, the 35 CSCE states agreed to implement further provisions of the Final Act so that religious faiths and their representatives can “develop contacts and meetings among themselves and exchange information.” As noted elsewhere in this report, however, religious contacts and information exchange are actively suppressed in the Soviet Union and in some East European countries.

Soviet Union. Soviet authorities regularly grant entry visas to officially invited religious representatives of various faiths, except when such representatives are members of unregistered (and, therefore, illegal) churches in the U.S.S.R. The government often invites such representatives to the country during major international conferences. It is more difficult for members of small churches (Baptist, Pentecostalist, etc.) and members of other churches who do not have official invitations to pay visits on fellow believers, particularly in areas outside of Moscow and Leningrad.

Romania. Officially recognized leaders of Romanian churches are generally allowed to travel to the West to meet with their coreligionists or attend

conferences. A few foreign religious activists have been denied entry at the borders. Most, however, are allowed to enter Romania without difficulty to meet with church leaders, attend church services, and, in most cases, preach in these churches. The ability of religious visitors to Romania to “exchange information” is severely hampered by strict Romanian border controls. It is extremely difficult to bring religious materials into Romania, and many visitors report that Bibles—even single copies for personal use—and other religious materials continue to be seized by border authorities. Romanian censorship of international mail also applies to correspondence between church groups in Romania and the West.

Poland. The U.S. Embassy in Warsaw frequently issues visas to members of the clergy, as most Polish clergymen seem to have no difficulty in obtaining passports for travel abroad. In fact, some are able to do so with considerably shorter notice than other travelers. Many representatives of U.S. religious denominations travel to Poland regularly without difficulty.

Hungary. Hungary has a good record in this field. There are substantial contacts, and travel is considerable in both directions. The U.S. Embassy in Budapest is not aware of particular difficulties for any denomination, though some foreigners who have actively distributed religious materials in Hungary on previous trips have been denied entry.

German Democratic Republic. Clergy and lay members of Western churches have been permitted to attend church synods and conferences at a national ecumenical level, and some G.D.R. religious leaders have been allowed to attend similar meetings in the West. The authorities prohibit official relations between East and West German congregations, and they often do not permit personal visits by West German clergy when they suspect church business will be discussed.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak record on facilitating travel by religious officials to and from Czechoslovakia remains spotty. When an exchange is proposed between an officially recognized institution in Czechoslovakia and its counterpart outside, visas are often granted. In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, however, the government has followed an extremely restrictive policy. Pope John Paul II has not been permitted to visit Czechoslovakia, despite an invitation by Cardinal

Tomasek and petitions signed by thousands of Czech and Slovak Catholics. Similarly, Catholic priests and other religious leaders who manifest too much independence are frequently denied permission to travel outside Czechoslovakia. Unofficial or unsanctioned travel by religious groups, the importation of religious literature, and similar activities have been severely punished in the past.

Bulgaria. There are no known cases of American religious figures being denied visas to visit Bulgaria to pursue religious contacts during the period. U.S. immigrant visas were issued during the period to a Bulgarian Orthodox priest taking up an assignment in the U.S. and his family members. A pending case, awaiting complete documentation to meet U.S. visa requirements, involves a Bulgarian who has already been issued Bulgarian travel documents and who will receive religious training in the U.S.-

Information

The Final Act signatories agreed to facilitate wider and freer dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage cooperation in the field of information and exchange of information with other countries, and to improve the working conditions of journalists. The Madrid Concluding Document contains a number of provisions which strengthen the commitments in the Final Act. Included among these are provisions that commit the participating states to: encourage the sale and distribution of printed matter from other states; decide journalists' visa applications without undue delay; grant permanent correspondents and their families multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year; provide more extensive travel opportunities for journalists; increase possibilities for foreign journalists to establish contacts with sources; and allow journalists to carry with them reference materials and personal notes.

Dissemination of Information

Soviet Union. There has been a noticeable increase in the availability of outside information in the Soviet media, including reprinting U.S. commentators and U.S.-Soviet telebridges, which feature debates between Americans and Soviets. In this reporting period, the magazine *Ogonyok* ran a one-page interview with U.S. Ambassador Matlock, and *Pravda* carried an opinion

piece by Senator Robert Dole. In addition, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged press conferences for Secretary Shultz, House Speaker Jim Wright, and Senator Patrick Moynihan. All three were followed by TV interviews broadcast on Soviet TV. The increased informational exchange has been selective, however, and the broad spectrum of outside information remains inaccessible to the average Soviet citizen. For example, Soviet TV turned down USIA's request to broadcast President Reagan's August 26 speech.

American newspapers and magazines are not available at Soviet newsstands, with the exception of very rare copies of American communist newspapers. The *International Herald Tribune* and the *London Times* have been seen on sale for hard currency in Moscow's luxury hotels, which cater to Western tourists. Official and some other resident Americans in the U.S.S.R. can receive Western newspapers and magazines through the Soviet mail. Otherwise, American noncommunist periodical publications are circulated only among a select Soviet elite and are treated as confidential material.

Publications from other Western countries are treated similarly. The Soviet state organization that makes newspaper and magazine subscriptions available to the public lists for the U.S. only technical, scientific, and communist periodicals, at costs considerably higher than for domestic and East European journals.

Although *America Illustrated* magazine remains very popular in the U.S.S.R., it is available in extremely limited quantities for newsstand sales, in addition to a limited number of subscriptions available through the Soviet distributor. Many copies of each issue are returned to the embassy as "unsold." A few American films are shown to Soviet audiences. On average, five to seven are advertised weekly in the repertoire of films available to the general Soviet public in Moscow. Over half are for children.

In March 1987, the Soviets ceased jamming Voice of America (VOA) broadcasting in languages native to the Soviet Union. Radio Liberty (RL) broadcasts, however, remain jammed. Jamming may not be 100% effective, but reception is undependable and poor.

Romania. The Romanian Government seeks total control over dissemination of information in Romania. All media are rigidly controlled and

used primarily as vehicles for government and party propaganda. Foreign and even local news items are carefully selected. As a result, domestic media reports are widely ignored or treated with extreme skepticism. An active and imaginative "rumor mill" fills in much of the news gap. Foreign radio broadcasts, including VOA and Radio Free Europe (RFE), are not jammed and are a major source of both foreign and domestic news. Romanian libraries carefully control access to information, especially to historical source materials.

In this reporting period, there were no Western periodicals or publications sold to the general public in Romania, although a variety of technical journals and other Western publications are available in limited quantities to selected government and party officials, academicians, and scientific researchers. The National Press Agency (Agerpres) no longer receives the major Western news services. As a result of this loss of service, the Romanian press is now relying heavily on material from socialist news agencies such as TASS and New China, as well as reprinting articles from Western publications.

There are no American or other Western books or periodicals sold at Romanian newsstands, even in those hotels used primarily by foreigners. Although efforts to limit Romanian citizens' access were apparent during the reporting period, some continued to gain access to Western publications through foreign embassy information centers and libraries. American books, usually out-of-date scientific or technical works, are sometimes available in secondhand bookstores.

A few Romanians have subscriptions to Western periodicals, usually individually purchased during foreign travel. The Romanian Government does not grant permits for its citizens to use foreign exchange for Western periodical subscriptions.

The severe energy and hard currency shortages faced by Romania have cut down both the purchases of foreign productions and the total air time of Romanian national television. Romanian television has continued to limit its air time to approximately 20 hours per week. These restrictions have led to the increasing popularity of Bulgarian television among viewers in the southern half of Romania, Yugoslavian television in the southwestern part of Romania, Hungarian television in western Romania, and Soviet television in north and northeastern parts of the country. Despite these problems, however, Romanian television broadcasts an older American film almost every Saturday

or Sunday night and occasionally both nights. Films shown in recent months include "Kramer vs. Kramer," "Jezebel," "My Fair Lady," "Lady be Good," and "All About Eve." One or two American films were regularly among the offerings of commercial theaters, including relatively current releases such as "Star Wars," "Airport," and "Places in the Heart." Old westerns also show up fairly regularly at movie theaters throughout the country.

Poland. Although not as open as during the Solidarity period of 1980-81, the Polish media still remain the least constrained in the Warsaw Pact. While following the government line on international issues, the press continues to be a forum for lively debate on domestic issues. The broad range of views found in the Polish press reflects an equally wide diversity of philosophical positions maintained by individual publications. Independent Catholic weekly *Tygodnik Powszechny*, Warsaw daily *Zycie Warszawy*, hard-line party weekly *Rzeczzywistosc*, "liberal" party weekly *Polityka*, and newly legalized, secular *Res Publica* all present contending views on economic reform, ideology and cadre policy, the extent of dialogue with various spheres of society, cultural issues, the role of the church, and the role of the intellectual in society. The press also freely discusses social and family problems, acute housing conditions, drug and alcohol abuse, poor delivery of medical services, problems in education and alienated youth, inadequacies in public health services, environmental issues, and many other subjects highlighting current concerns in Poland.

Within the sphere of international issues, and specifically those involving East-West relations, the Polish media contain a handful of well-known journalists who frequently treat individual subjects, such as arms negotiations, by focusing on the facts and eschewing overtly propagandistic lines. Well-known officials and journalists participate in press and media discussions of public issues. Many journalists who during martial law were dismissed after "verification" of political orthodoxy or who resigned in protest are now active again in a variety of smaller circulation but widely read publications.

Despite occasional crackdowns on individual underground publishing operations, the underground press continues to thrive, churning out a multitude of products varying from shop-floor leaflets to relatively high-quality editions of books not published

officially. The underground also produces videotapes on a variety of subjects. Satellite television has come to Poland: according to an August 1987 statement of the government spokesman, 1,500 authorizations have been issued for satellite dishes. In March 1987, Polish TV began 10 hours a day of live retransmissions of Soviet television broadcasts received by satellite from the U.S.S.R.

The more orthodox party and government officials attempt to retain tight control over what they consider the most influential print and electronic media. Their goal is for journalistic products to be characterized by single-minded adherence to the prevailing government line. Poland is a country, however, where the editors-in-chief of individual publications can and do wield significant influence. Formal press censorship is practiced, but the government claims, and most independent writers agree, that censorship interventions have become less frequent. Many articles are self-censored before they reach official eyes. Controversial articles which do appear are often the result of prolonged bargaining between the editor and censors. In fact, the worth of an editor-in-chief is measured by his ability to run interference for his staff and pull the right strings to get what is considered important in print. Because of this quasi-decentralized feature of the Polish media, government officials often have to be satisfied with an absence of criticism or a replay of other Eastern-bloc media commentary as opposed to enthusiastic backing. Within the imposed and perceived parameters of official press policy, the Polish audience is exposed both to ideas and to means of handling controversial issues which would receive little or no public exposure in most other East European countries. The weekly press conferences of the government spokesman, Jerzy Urban, with foreign journalists, which provide detailed information on domestic and foreign policy issues, are given extensive coverage in the official Polish media. The government daily, *Rzeczpospolita* carries, virtually verbatim, the transcript of each of these conferences, including pointed questions from Western reporters, which are frequently at least as informative for Polish readers as the spokesman's responses. The official press frequently publishes the results of public opinion polls, which reflect widely shared views unpopular with the government, and quite often, articles appearing in the underground press spark lively debates in the official press as well.

No American periodicals or books are presently sold at newsstands, although some U.S. news weeklies are found in public reading rooms. Books published in the U.S. can also occasionally be found in Polish *antikwariat* (used book) stores. Public and university library purchases of new books and periodicals from the U.S. are severely limited by lack of hard currency. We have received no reports of removal of books from library shelves. Thus, American books and periodicals already in library collections—principally university libraries—remain available to users. (Since 1983, USIA has funded a program to assist university libraries in receiving American professional periodicals). The USIA-produced *Ameryka* and *Problems of Communism* continue to be banned. *Ameryka* continues to be a subject of much discussion between the U.S. Government and Polish authorities. It is expected distribution of *Ameryka* will be resumed following the visit of Vice President Bush.

Control of hard currency expenditure outside of Poland makes it almost impossible for an individual to subscribe to an American periodical. The Polish mails usually deliver the many periodicals sent through subscriptions paid for from abroad. Public sale of books and periodicals from the U.S.S.R. and other communist countries is widespread, and prices are comparable to those for Polish publications. The Government of Poland facilitates private subscriptions to periodicals from communist countries by permitting subscribers to order them through the Polish central subscriptions office. At a given time, around 15 American films are playing in Warsaw's 40 cinemas. Polish television often shows old American films. Although the lack of hard currency has made new acquisitions extremely rare, Polish television continues to rebroadcast a series of Muppets programs. Television series from Australia, England, France, Brazil, and the U.S. are highly popular and a frequent feature of prime-time TV. News programs have adopted new formats, particularly on the second channel of Polish television, and Polish TV now subscribes to CNN satellite broadcasts and features excerpts from this network on a daily basis. In an unprecedented move, Polish TV agreed to broadcast an uncensored 5-minute speech by Vice President Bush during his recent visit and did so, despite obvious unhappiness with the very outspoken nature of some of his remarks.

Approximately 5% of VOA Polish service shortwave broadcasts were jammed during this period. No VOA Polish mediumwave broadcasts have been jammed, and reception of this band continues to be good. Eighty percent of Polish RFE broadcasts were jammed. VOA English service has not been jammed.

Hungary. The availability of information remained good during the past 6 months. USIA officials continued to consult with Hungarian TV on television reproduction and other facilitative assistance. However there appears to have been tightening of ideological control from the party, which reminded journalists that they must also serve the purposes of ideological information.

The TV "receive-only" satellite dish that USIA arranged to have donated to Hungarian TV now receives WORLDNET, which comes to the U.S. Embassy daily on videocassette and has been shown to Hungarian audiences in the library. WORLDNET will soon feature a live interactive show on nutrition and health in cooperation with Hungarian TV. Since October 1, 1986, there have been successful interviews on prime time TV with Ambassadors Zimmermann (CSCE), Rowny (Reykjavik Summit), and Assistant Secretary Paul Freedenburg (Department of Commerce).

In addition to ubiquitous Eastern-bloc publications, Western publications have been available for local currency at international hotels for some time, though usually at a price prohibitive for the ordinary Hungarian. Those publications with "embarrassing" political articles do not appear. Hungarians can also subscribe to some Western periodicals in Hungarian currency.

Hungarian media usually support Soviet foreign policy, though often seemingly without enthusiasm, as by quoting TASS or *Pravda* on a topic. All Hungarian media pay close attention to East-West issues and are keen to highlight positive developments. Hungarian commentary has been harsh concerning American policies in Europe or on arms control. Hungarians seem to be able to watch Western TV and listen to Western radio without government intervention, and there is no jamming of RFE or VOA.

The U.S. Embassy library in Budapest receives over 100 U.S. newspapers and magazines, which are read mostly by young people and some retirees. The library serves about 1,000 people a month, including third-country nationals. The library's outreach service

brings the table of contents of American magazines and journals to the major universities and intellectuals. A showing of ABC "News of the Week" fills the library with spectators every Wednesday.

U.S. officials are regularly invited to visit Hungarian universities, colleges, and, more recently, secondary schools. Their nonpolitical talks are welcomed by faculty and administrators eager to learn and hear American English. Indeed, many of the formal barriers to these visits have been dropped over the past 3 years, as has much of the red tape restricting distribution of American literature and videotapes by embassy officials. These materials merely supplement the hundreds of publications of American authors and showings of recent American movies throughout the country. Relations with educational and most government officials are cordial. Embassy officials continue to be concerned, however, that students and professors are intermittently warned not to enter the American Embassy. Although some Hungarians view this as a vestige of 1950s thinking, it seems to occur often enough to warrant mention.

German Democratic Republic. To the maximum extent feasible, the G.D.R. attempts to control the information available within its territory. All media have as their prime responsibility the inculcation of values and beliefs favorable to the government and to the economic and social system it has established. A subsidiary goal is to present countries with different political, social, and economic structures, including the U.S., as unsuccessful in meeting the basic needs of their citizenry. G.D.R. coverage of U.S. foreign and domestic affairs continues to be, on the whole, critical, often quoting negative comments from the U.S. press out of context or presenting distorted pictures of life in the U.S. Occasionally, positive comments about the U.S. are made, but these are exceptions to the rule.

Print media are effectively controlled. In general, only publications listed in the G.D.R.'s postal publication register may be imported. Materials not so listed are regularly confiscated at border and sector crossings. The U.S. Embassy in Berlin has been able to distribute to official and unofficial contacts a variety of printed materials, including the USIA-produced magazines *Dialogue*, *English Teaching Forum*, and *Problems of Communism*. These publications usually reach their recipients, whether mailed or delivered by hand.

G.D.R. broadcasting stations are state-owned and -directed. However, about 80% of G.D.R. households receive television from the F.R.G., and practically every household receives Western radio stations. The state does not try to discourage receiving foreign broadcasts but does try to counter criticism in foreign newscasts with stories in its own programming.

U.S. magazines and newspapers, other than those published by the U.S. Communist Party, are not available to the general public. Libraries and official institutes do receive U.S. magazines, scholarly journals, and daily papers. Circulation of all these publications, even within those university sections or institutions permitted to subscribe to them, is restricted. Small numbers of the *International Herald Tribune* and other Western papers are also sold upon request for hard currency to foreigners in a few hotels catering to Western visitors.

U.S. books and periodicals, other than those of the U.S. Communist Party, are generally not available at bookstores and newsstands. Circulation of U.S. materials in libraries is restricted. Only a very few researchers and scholars receive subscriptions to U.S. publications. Although that is due in part to the difficulty of obtaining hard currency, it also reflects official reluctance to grant the postal license necessary to receive such materials through the mail. About 30 U.S. titles, most of which are already in the public domain, are translated and printed by government-owned publishing companies each year, but the printings are small and the books often hard to obtain. The embassy distributes some and has conducted exhibits both in the embassy library and in the book fair in Leipzig. G.D.R. law forbids the distribution of books "whose content violates the preservation of peace or in some other way is counter to the interest of the socialist state and its citizens." There is no encouragement of any kind for wider usage of U.S. books and periodicals. On specific occasions, selected G.D.R. visitors are permitted to visit the embassy library for invitational events. These same people would not, however, be routinely permitted to use the library.

There is no reliable information on exactly how many foreign or U.S. films were shown in G.D.R. theaters in 1986. However, some of the most popular films on the G.D.R. circuit are American — Woody Allen's "Purple Rose of

Cairo" and "Out of Africa," for example. G.D.R. television does purchase some U.S. feature films for broadcast. Some of these films are chosen because they represent a negative view of U.S. society; others simply for their entertainment value.

VOA, RFE, and RIAS [Radio in the American Sector] broadcasts are not jammed in the G.D.R. G.D.R. journals, however, have printed articles accusing these services of being agents of the CIA and presenting anti-G.D.R. propaganda.

Czechoslovakia. The poor performance of the Czechoslovak Government in dissemination of printed, filmed, and broadcast information continued during the reporting period. Although information originating from socialist countries is prominently published and broadcast, information from the U.S. and Western Europe is hard to obtain and restricted by the government.

No American publications are sold openly in Czechoslovakia, except for a few copies of the U.S. Communist Party newspaper *Daily Worker*, which are seen on newsstands irregularly. Only rarely and haphazardly are a few nonpolitical Western publications sold in Czechoslovakia. During the reporting period, the Government of Czechoslovakia did not interfere overtly with the operation of the U.S. Embassy's library in Prague, which makes nearly 4,000 American books and approximately 115 current U.S. periodicals in the English language accessible to the public daily. However, access to the library is clearly discouraged by the presence of armed Czechoslovak police officers outside the embassy and the widespread fear among Czechoslovak citizens that they will have difficulties should they visit the library. The embassy's press and culture section distributes 164 subscriptions to American periodicals (105 titles) to Czechoslovak citizens and institutions under its periodical presentation program, but the embassy continues to receive complaints that subscriptions are often interrupted.

The Czechoslovak Government undertakes to disseminate and translate written works from socialist countries. American literature, on the other hand, while widely available in translation, often seems chosen with an eye to its negative view of American society rather than for its literary merit. A number of quality American bestsellers are, nevertheless, translated, and translations of American fiction appear quite regularly in the magazine *World Literature*. Customs duties have not

been lowered to promote the dissemination of and access to books, films, and other forms of cultural expression from the U.S.

Some American books and periodicals are available on a restricted basis in technical and university libraries. English departments in the major Czechoslovak universities maintain collections of American literature, but these contain many gaps, particularly in recent American fiction and criticism.

Moreover, the departmental libraries are generally open only to faculty members and students majoring in English. A 1983 government directive that changed the terms of payment for periodical subscriptions from "non-socialist countries" from Czechoslovak crowns to U.S. dollars or other convertible currency is still in force. Since hard currency payment by individuals and institutions is a real burden, the long-term result of the directive probably is a substantial reduction in the number and variety of foreign publications purchased from the West. While the Czechoslovak State Library spends some \$10,000 annually on American books, they are mainly of a technical nature and are available only to selected institutions and individuals.

American films make up a sizable percentage of films shown commercially and are better represented than films from other Western countries. Among the American films screened in Prague during the reporting period were "The Verdict," "Places in the Heart," "The River," and "Flashdance." Most U.S. films are at least several years old and contain nothing that could be considered offensive to socialism or to the Czechoslovak Government. American films rarely appear on Czechoslovak television.

RFE broadcasts are jammed heavily in Prague and other cities, but it is often possible to receive RFE transmissions in the countryside or, by changing frequencies, to receive them in the large cities. The VOA is not jammed.

Bulgaria. The Bulgarian media remain tightly controlled by the Communist Party. Almost all journalists are members of the party or of the Fatherland Front Mass Organization. While there has been some increase in press criticism of mid-level government and economic officials in the past year, such "openness" is allowed only when it is judged to serve party interests. Some relaxation of the restrictions on the sale of Western newspapers was evident during the period, with limited numbers of noncommunist West German, French, Italian, Swiss, British,

and American newspapers occasionally available for purchase in Sofia. Carefully selected articles from the Western press also are sometimes translated for publication in Bulgarian periodicals. Individual Bulgarian citizens are actively discouraged from subscribing to Western periodicals. However, certain Bulgarian institutions like the Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Committee for Culture have institutional subscriptions to Western newspapers and news magazines for their senior officials. Bulgarian publishers regularly translate and publish in limited quantities the works of major contemporary American, as well as other Western, authors.

Bulgarian television frequently shows Western programs, and Western films, particularly American films, are shown regularly in Bulgarian cinemas. Two recent films were "Beverly Hills Cop" and "Legal Eagles." The National Film Archive continues to screen an American film every Monday and Friday, as well as other films; it is open to the public. "A Night at the Opera," "Catch 22," "Sister Carrie," and "The Red Badge of Courage" were among the American films recently aired on television. Western plays, usually those critical of Western values, are performed in Bulgarian theaters, and Western popular and other music is regularly heard on Bulgarian radio. The government has not jammed VOA's Bulgarian service for 3 years but continues its heavy jamming of RFE. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs circulated a note to all diplomatic missions early in 1987 indicating that all materials intended for distribution in Bulgaria should first be submitted to the Ministry's Press Department, it has not taken steps to enforce that requirement.

Working Conditions for Journalists

Soviet Union. During this reporting period, harassment of foreign journalists continued. In an attempt to intimidate reporters working in the Soviet Union, Moscow-based American correspondents continued to be attacked in the Soviet media for allegedly tendentious reporting. As recently as September 1987, an NBC camera crew was harassed and roughed up while covering a demonstration in downtown Moscow.

Newsday and National Public Radio correspondents received accreditation in this reporting period. The Soviet authorities are still withholding

approval, however, for the opening of a bureau of the *Washington Times*. While the application has not been officially denied, it is buried in the Soviet bureaucratic process.

Soviet authorities issued visas to two VOA correspondents and two USIA TV personnel to cover the opening of the "Information USA" exhibit. One of the VOA correspondents had been denied visas twice previously.

During the reporting period, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow issued 10 visas to Soviet journalists for permanent accreditation or shorter professional visits.

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continued to distribute in each other's country their official monthly publications, *America Illustrated* and *Soviet Life*. Out of 60,000 copies of *America Illustrated* delivered to the Soviets for newsstand and subscription sale, 8,000-9,000 copies of each issue are returned to the embassy, ostensibly as unsold.

Romania. Romania openly seeks to manipulate and control journalists. A lecture from Romania's National Press Agency on the need for more objective reporting is standard procedure for all incoming journalists. Despite vigorous complaints by the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest when visas were not forthcoming, a number of journalists had difficulty obtaining visas in the reporting period. Western journalists can obtain government-arranged interviews and sometimes manage to make unofficial contacts with Romanian citizens but still depend heavily on diplomatic and Western business contacts as sources of information.

There are no permanently accredited American journalists resident in Romania. Approximately 20 single-entry visas per year are granted to visiting American journalists, including the three nonresident American journalists accredited to Bucharest.

During the visit of Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev, two American journalists were denied entry into Romania because of past unfavorable articles. One of the two had a visa and was still denied entry, while the other was denied a visa. Also during the reporting period, a Romanian journalist visiting Vienna called on several Western press offices to warn them that their correspondents would not be granted visas if they wrote critical articles about Romania.

As in previous reporting periods, some journalists have been granted visas immediately, while others have

encountered long and seemingly arbitrary delays. Journalists who have never visited Romania usually have little difficulty obtaining visas; those who have written articles critical of Romania are likely to face difficulties getting second visas. Other journalists have continued to be able to obtain airport visas without delay.

The Romanian Government provides opportunities for journalists to travel under controlled conditions, usually only to government-approved destinations and with official escorts. Foreign journalists, however, may (and frequently do) travel unescorted by rental car or public transportation.

Romanian authorities vigorously discourage all but officially approved contact by their citizens with Western journalists. By law, citizens must report contacts and the substance of any conversation with any foreigner. The enforcement of this law has continued during the reporting period. Stringers hired by American and Western news agencies must have government approval.

During this period, there were no problems getting government authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians, equipment, and professional reference materials into the country. There is meticulous recording of serial numbers, however. In the case of typewriters, a sample of the typeface must be submitted as well.

No American journalists have been expelled from Romania during the reporting period, though a number have been denied reentry visas, evidently due to government displeasure over their previous reporting.

Five Romanian journalists traveled to the U.S. during the past 12 months. One went under UN auspices, three were participants in USIA exchange programs, and one traveled on a regular journalist's visa.

American and other national press centers may be established for special events, such as high-level visits. There is a Romanian Foreign Press Club, although events there are very rare.

Poland. Although interviews with government officials must be arranged through the government press enterprise, Interpress, and the Foreign Ministry Press Department, resident and visiting American journalists rarely report difficulty in obtaining access to important sources and continue to rank Poland high on the list of East European countries in terms of general access. The Government of Poland

spokesman holds weekly press conferences for foreign correspondents which are well attended and often include newsworthy announcements and considerable give-and-take. Foreign journalists may travel freely without prior permission, although many have been stopped by provincial authorities for document checks and inspection of the contents of their motor vehicles.

Technical equipment is imported without restriction, but technical assistance is not; American television networks are allowed one permanently accredited correspondent as well as an accredited producer. Additional permanent technical personnel, such as film crews, must be hired locally. Although resident correspondents are not required to hire personnel through a central government office, as is the case in some East European countries, Polish national employees must be approved and registered with the Foreign Ministry.

The Polish authorities have accredited successors to such U.S. media representatives as the *New York Times* and AP correspondents during this reporting period. More than 40 visas have been granted to U.S. journalists not permanently accredited. The Voice of America Vienna correspondent and the head of VOA's Polish service both applied for visas to cover Vice President Bush's visit to Warsaw in September 1987. Both received their visas immediately. Visas were also readily given to cover the Pope's third visit to Poland. Delays have not been a problem. There are now 16 U.S. journalists and two television producers permanently accredited in Poland. They and their families have multiple-entry visas which must be renewed every year. There are no travel restrictions in Poland for resident or visiting foreign journalists. No American journalists have been expelled from Poland during the reporting period.

No visas for permanent accreditation were issued to Polish journalists during the reporting period. Approximately eight visas were issued to journalists for short visits to the U.S. No U.S. visas were refused to Polish applicants, nor were there any delayed decisions by the U.S. Embassy in Warsaw.

One press center, Interpress in Warsaw, is open to both national and foreign correspondents.

Hungary. American journalists visit Hungary routinely and usually have no difficulty in getting visas. Hungary has sometimes denied visas to foreign journalists whose activities are viewed as hostile by the government.

The official press center, Pressinform, provides efficient assistance to journalists. Foreign journalists also have access to the press center of the Hungarian Journalists Association. During the reporting period, the government organized an international press conference by the prime minister—the first in several decades.

After notification and registration with Hungarian authorities, radio and television journalists can bring their own equipment into the country. They can also bring in, without difficulty, reference material for professional use. Generally, few restrictions are imposed on foreign journalists who seek personal contacts and communication with either official or nonofficial sources, and there are no areas closed to travel in Hungary. No U.S. correspondents were expelled from Hungary during the reporting period.

The U.S. Embassy in Budapest issued 32 visas to Hungarian journalists for temporary or permanent stays in the U.S. No such visas were refused or delayed for more than 10 days.

German Democratic Republic.

Foreign journalists are generally treated correctly and courteously by G.D.R. officials. The G.D.R. appears to be responding quickly to short-notice requests by U.S. television crews to film inside the country, granting permission for equipment to be imported and for third-country nationals working for U.S. companies to be given visas quickly. Foreign journalists' ability to report on events in the G.D.R. is limited by laws which restrict travel without prior permission and their ability to make appointments directly with G.D.R. officials and individuals. Visiting journalists are required to follow a program organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are often accompanied on their interviews by a G.D.R. "interpreter," and are issued visas only for the period of time covered by the organized program. As a departure from the norm, West German television was permitted to do several live broadcasts from the G.D.R. during Erich Honecker's visit to the F.R.G., including some involving interviews with ordinary citizens.

During the reporting period, a UPI correspondent became the third representative of an American news organization accredited to the G.D.R. The others are a representative of the communist *Daily Worker* and an AP correspondent (an Austrian citizen). According to G.D.R. sources, approximately 260 U.S. journalists were granted

G.D.R. visas in 1986, working on about 140-160 different projects. About 35 U.S. television teams filmed in the G.D.R. in the same period. According to information supplied by G.D.R. officials, 15-20 requests for visas by American journalists were denied in 1986, generally because these involved specific requests for interviews with Honcker or other high-ranking G.D.R. officials. The non-American journalist employed by AP, the *Daily Worker* correspondent, and the UPI correspondent have multiple-entry visas valid for 1 year, as do their family members.

For visiting journalists, all travel outside of Berlin must be approved by the Foreign Ministry. In practice, the authorities usually are tolerant of travel without prior approval, but they have the legal basis to stop it if they wish. Western journalists are also required to have Foreign Ministry approval for interviews or any significant contact with ordinary citizens. By law, many G.D.R. citizens may not maintain contact with foreign journalists. Access to information and people remains carefully controlled by the state.

Authorization for radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment into the G.D.R. has generally been granted. G.D.R. authorities insist that foreign journalists, like other foreigners, are subject to restrictions on the printed material they can bring into the G.D.R. In fact, however, journalists generally have had no trouble in bringing in needed material.

No American journalists were expelled during the 6 months covered by this report.

During the reporting period, the embassy issued one visa to an ADN correspondent. The U.S. now issues multiple-entry visas to G.D.R. journalists, valid for up to 1 year.

An international press center with facilities open to foreign journalists is located in East Berlin. A press center is open in Leipzig during the Leipzig fairs.

Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovak Government's generally poor handling of Western journalists has continued. Multiple-entry visas are not granted, even to accredited journalists. Foreign press centers in Prague and Bratislava provide little useful information. Access to government officials and "newsworthy" data are sharply restricted.

The Press Department of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs is generally reluctant to release information regarding the number of visas granted to American newsmen for

either short-term or long-term accreditation. The U.S. Embassy in Prague estimates that during the reporting period, a total of about three dozen visas were granted to American journalists. Approximately 90 visas were issued in the January-June 1987 period.

According to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Department, nine American journalists have 1-year renewable accreditation for work in Czechoslovakia. The American news organizations represented include the AP, UPI, *Newsweek*, the *Washington Post*, the *Detroit Free Press*, the *New York Times*, and *U.S. News & World Report*. A total of 63 journalists from Western countries and Japan have similar accreditation, according to MFA Press Department sources. One American journalist from the VOA Czechoslovakia Service was refused a visa during the reporting period. No American journalists were expelled during the reporting period. CBS and ABC TV correspondents still await permanent nonresident accreditation. Their applications date from February 1984 and August 1986, respectively. In general, the Czechoslovak Government has been reluctant to grant permanent accreditation to American television representatives.

There are no travel restrictions for accredited journalists, except in security areas. The MFA Press Department organizes several journalist tours every year.

The government permits radio and television journalists to bring their own technicians and equipment but encourages use of local technical personnel and equipment. Journalists are permitted to carry professional reference material with them, but it is often scrutinized by border guards and customs officials on entering and leaving the country.

One U.S. visa was granted to a Czechoslovak correspondent during the reporting period. At present, there are three accredited Czechoslovak journalists in the U.S.

Bulgaria. Working conditions improved modestly for foreign journalists, who are sometimes hindered in carrying out their work. Visiting journalists report that they have been able to obtain appointments with more high-level officials in both the party and the government than before. Journalists are still encouraged to accept the services of escort-interpreters, who accompany them everywhere. They are actively discouraged from seeking appointments on their own. Theoretically, all areas of

Bulgaria are open to journalists. However, Western journalists are strongly discouraged from visiting ethnic Turkish areas, except through tours organized by the official Sofia Press Agency.

While there are no resident American journalists, seven correspondents for American news organizations are accredited to Bulgaria. During this period, no American journalist was refused a visa to enter Bulgaria. Some journalists have experienced delays of up to 2 months in obtaining visas, however. TV and film crews are permitted to bring their equipment into the country, as are radio journalists. The Sofia Press Agency, which is responsible for visiting journalists, charges a fee to nonaccredited journalists for making appointments with officials and others in Bulgaria. The average cost of this service is \$200 for 3 days of work, and more if the journalist stays longer. The Foreign Ministry runs a press center for foreign journalists in a Sofia hotel and arranged press conferences on the average of once a month during the reporting period.

COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE FIELDS OF CULTURE AND EDUCATION

This section of Basket III commits the signatories to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges, improve access to cultural achievements, expand contacts between educational institutions, increase international scientific cooperation, and encourage the study of foreign languages.

General Considerations

Exchanges are an integral aspect of relations among the CSCE states. The examples listed in this section are only a partial accounting of the exchanges and the state of cooperation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and East European countries. The highlights are indicative, however, of the scope of exchanges and cooperative ventures—both publicly supported and sponsored and strictly private in nature—initiated or in progress during the reporting period.

The following table shows the number of lecturers and researchers exchanged during the reporting period under the Fulbright and International Research and Exchange Board (IREX) programs with the Soviet Union and East European countries.

Soviet Union. Exchanges in the field of culture continued to develop apace following the signing of the bilateral exchanges agreement in November 1985 in Geneva. Despite a considerable number of success stories, there have also been problems in implementing the provisions of the agreement, particularly in the field of the performing arts. The President's initiative to promote people-to-people exchanges had raised hopes for increasing contacts between private groups and individuals in the two countries, but thus far, participating Soviet organizations have not been able to sustain a greatly expanded number of such exchanges. Soviet bureaucratic inertia continues to present formidable obstacles to pushing forward new projects, particularly at the Ministry of Culture.

Planning for cultural exchange projects continued to be hampered by bureaucratic delays in various Soviet organizations and, perhaps above all, by a lack of financial resources on both sides of the Atlantic. Although the Soviet State Concert Organization (*Goskontsert*) had somewhat increased its fee offers to potential American performing artists recently, in August there were signs that *Goskontsert's* foreign currency reserves had been reduced, and the Soviet side appeared reluctant to commit itself to programming for the second half of 1988. A number of American performers, whose reputations were perhaps less well established but who were, as a result, "more affordable" for the Soviet side, were turned down by the Ministry of Culture on the grounds of insufficient artistic quality. Meanwhile, a steady stream of Soviet performers has continued to pour into the U.S. during this period, including the Bolshoi Ballet.

Several new approaches are currently under discussion to bridge the gap between the modest financial resources of the Soviet side and the high costs of bringing American performers and groups to the U.S.S.R., including a possible "no fee" exchange of the Chicago Symphony and a Soviet orchestra. In a similar arrangement, the Opera Company of Boston and the city of Boston signed a protocol with the Soviets in August to exchange festivals of Soviet and American music in 1988 and 1989. It remains to be seen whether these efforts to reduce the money stakes in performing arts exchanges will help redress the imbalance between the number of Soviet performers and groups going to the U.S. and those American artists and ensembles able to come to the Soviet Union.

Fulbright and IREX Programs

Fulbright	From U.S.	To U.S.
Bulgaria	6	7
Czechoslovakia	7	5
G.D.R.	4	3
Hungary	7	12
Poland	17	18
Romania	7	2
Soviet Union	5	10

IREX	From U.S.	To U.S.
Bulgaria	10	4
Czechoslovakia	4	6
G.D.R.	10	10
Hungary	5	10
Poland	4	9
Romania	2	2
Soviet Union	77	82

One highlight of the period was the late July/early August tour of singer Billy Joel, who attracted over 100,000 people to his six concerts in Moscow and Leningrad. Also, the Pat Metheny Group introduced Soviet audiences to the *avant garde* of American jazz during its June tour of three Soviet cities. The Boston-based Empire Brass Quintet toured six Soviet cities in September, performing works by European and American composers to capacity audiences. The group led an open master class at the Leningrad Conservatory and participated in public discussions on music at the well-known Gnessins Institute in Moscow.

Programs for Russian language study between American colleges and universities and Soviet academic institutions such as Moscow's Pushkin Institute and Leningrad State University remain active, and demand for such programs has led several U.S. organizers to seek significant expansions. Numerous proposals for new programs at both the university and high school level have been put forward and remain under consideration by Soviet educational ministries. Currently, American students travel to Leningrad State University for language study under the auspices of the Council of International Educational Exchange (CIEE). The American Council of Teachers of Russian (ACTR), Ohio State University, and Middlebury College provide opportunities for American college students to undertake advanced language study

in Moscow at the Pushkin Institute. Of these, ACTR has gained Education Ministry approval for a significant expansion in both its regular and summer programs. In addition, a number of private U.S. commercial organizations have language study programs in Leningrad for American college students. Approximately 360 Russian-language students from the U.S. will take part in these programs during the coming year, a considerable increase over participation in previous years. Further increases are likely in 1988-89, since the University of California is ready to sign an agreement with Leningrad State University to exchange students and professors.

The number of participants in official exchange programs, including those administered by IREX and the Council for International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), in most cases reached minimum numbers outlined in the cultural agreement. Some improvements in Soviet performance were noted, as the Ministry of Higher Education brought its procedures for nominating, placing, and informing scholars of archival access and other pertinent data in line with specific timetables outlined in the new agreement. Archival access granted to scholars also was more extensive than that given to exchanges in the last academic year, and there was a significant reduction in problems relating to both archival and manuscript misassignment in the 1987-88 IREX group, due to the high demand for placement in Moscow.

Soviet sponsors continued to have difficulty identifying eligible, available grantees for travel to the U.S. The number of last-minute withdrawals or postponements was much smaller than in recent years, and more Soviet scholars traveled than has recently been the case. A growing number of Soviet English-language teachers traveled to the U.S. in both government-supported and private exchanges.

The Fulbright lecturer program appeared to be operating on an improved, expanded basis, as the Ministry of Higher Education brought its procedures into compliance with those outlined in the new cultural agreement. Dependent housing, for example, was no longer a problem, and the ministry appeared to be more adept at handling administrative details relating to nomination and placement of candidates. U.S. lecturers still, however, lacked information on the faculty consultants assigned to help them and on specific courses they would be required to teach. No visa denials were noted for

American exchangeees, although one Soviet lecturer officially placed was subsequently informed of U.S. visa ineligibility; the ministry chose to take no reciprocal action. Thirteen Soviet lecturers arrived to begin programs in the U.S., which was a substantial improvement over previous years when last-minute postponements and withdrawals by the Soviet Union were the rule rather than the exception. In spite of substantial improvements, the number of both Soviet and American participants in the Fulbright program fell somewhat below the minimum provided for in the new cultural agreement.

An exchange of high school students (eight per side) between Phillips Academy (Andover) and the Physics-Mathematics High School in Novosibirsk began in March 1987, and plans were in place to begin a second high school exchange (between Choate-Rosemary Hall and Leningrad Physics and Mathematics High School) in 1988. Undergraduate exchanges increased in 1987 with the establishment of an undergraduate exchange (10 per side) between the Institute of International Education and Moscow State University. In addition, the American Collegiate Consortium for East-West Exchange is close to concluding an agreement to exchange undergraduates in 1988. The State University of New York Undergraduate Exchange Program also remained active in this period.

One potentially far-reaching development noted in the reporting period was institutional reorganization in some Soviet entities that conduct exchanges with the U.S. For example, the U.S.S.R. Committee of Youth Organizations created a new U.S. section to handle its increasing exchange activities, and the youth tourist organization Sputnik appears to have made budgetary and other readjustments to accommodate increased exchanges with the U.S. It will have the effect of building exchanges into the Soviet system and thus allow for greater contact with Americans.

Romania. As in 1986-87, the Romanian Government accepted only six Fulbright professors for the 1987-88 academic year. In past years, they had accepted as many as 10. The number of American researchers in Romania remained about the same, but the Romanian side has not used its quota of Fulbright research grants for study in the U.S. By the end of the reporting period, only one Romanian Fulbright

lecturer had traveled to the U.S. for the 1987-88 academic year, although additional nominations were promised. The bilateral program of cultural exchanges was extended for an additional 2 years by diplomatic note in July 1987.

Visits, exhibits, film showings, book fairs, magazine exchanges, and performing arts exchanges all come under the Cultural Exchange Agreement or the agreement that originally established the American and Romanian libraries in the two countries. Film showings are a regular feature of the program of the American Library in Bucharest, and various exhibitions have been held at the library in the past 6 months. However, invitees to film showings cannot attend unless they receive explicit approval from authorities. Since implementation of the law limiting contacts with foreigners, some Romanians report they have been told they should not come to the American Library.

Major U.S. film and art exhibits have been well received. Over 80,000 visited the "Filmmaking in America" exhibit in Timisoara during the first 16 days of its run in September. Small circulating exhibits have drawn good audiences in several provincial capitals. American speakers on all topics continue to attract interested audiences, both at Romanian institutions and at the American Center. Programs have included specialists in arms control, East-West economic relations, and U.S. foreign policy, as well as film, art, and literature.

Most other Western countries continue to report shrinkage of cultural exchange programs, with some longstanding activities eliminated. Financial restrictions typically are cited by Romanian authorities as the reason. Romanian priorities appear to discourage academic exchange in non-technical areas.

Romanian compliance with the Helsinki Final Act's provisions on translation, publication, and dissemination of written works from other states is spotty. A limited number of American books are published each year, usually literary works, while other American stories and novels appear in translation in literature journals. Romanian publishers cite lack of hard currency to purchase rights as a major obstacle in publishing American books.

As noted above, only a limited number of American books and films are available in Romania. Foreign exchange shortages and rigid ideological

controls have made it unlikely that this situation will change drastically, although Romanian television has requested and received U.S. tapes on cultural and scientific subjects.

Historically, Romania's culture has been enriched by an impressive variety of minorities and their traditions. The same variety exists today: Romania has a sizable ethnic Hungarian population; a significant ethnic German population [now dwindling through emigration]; the traditions of a Jewish culture; and remnants of Bulgarian, Turkish, and even Tatar groups as well as a large Gypsy population. From a postwar high point, when a special autonomous area was created for the Hungarian minority, special government efforts aimed at maintaining the cultural integrity of minorities have shrunk to the point where many claim the government's policy is now one of cultural assimilation. Government statements tend to discount ethnic differences on the grounds that "there are only Romanians" in Romania today.

Opportunities to study technical and general subjects at the university level in Hungarian or German have declined drastically. Reportedly, as of 1986, university entrance examinations were no longer given in Hungarian. Ethnic German students have not been able to take university entrance exams in their mother tongue for some years. Once a center of Hungarian culture and studies, the former Babes-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca has been officially renamed the "University of Cluj." Hungarian-speaking professors at the formerly Hungarian Medica Academy at Tirgu Mures are being replaced by Romanian-speaking professors. When history is treated in books or on television, the past contributions of the minority groups are given little or no mention. Signs denoting ethnic origin of folk art and other displays have been removed from many museums. As noted in the previous report, the country's largest Hungarian-language periodical, *Muvelodes*, was converted to Romanian. Archives and libraries of the German and Hungarian minorities were removed to Bucharest, becoming less easily available to the scholars of these communities. However, historical artifacts and archives from all over the country, including those from ethnic Romanian areas, have also been transferred to Bucharest.

The Romanian Ministry of Education maintains correct relations with U.S. authorities. As in 1986, approval was granted for 6 of the 10 American

Fulbright lectures proposed for the 1987-88 academic year. Recent American researchers have been well received by Romanian institutions, which have been helpful in obtaining necessary research material.

The number of Romanian professors who have taken up Fulbright professorships in the U.S. has gradually declined from 10 in 1982-83 to 5 in 1985-86. This year, like 1986-87, only one Romanian professor has been named, although the ministry continues to promise more nominations. This drastic decline stands in stark contrast to the situation 10 years ago, when the Romanians were sending, in addition to Fulbright professors, as many as 35 research scholars to the U.S. The principal reason given for this decline is that the teaching load and rules governing extended absences do not allow sufficient time for most professors to undertake lengthy teaching and research projects abroad.

There are no open-access libraries (other than small neighborhood libraries) in Romania, except those associated with diplomatic missions. Foreigners other than official grantees usually are not allowed to use library or archival facilities.

Poland. There are no official bilateral exchanges between the U.S. and Poland. The Government of Poland continues to send orchestras, art exhibits, and other such attractions to the U.S., but these activities are commercial undertakings and are not the result of official cooperation between the respective governments. Various American musicians and artists continue to visit Poland under private arrangements. A lack of hard currency, rather than any concerted attempt to exclude Americans, tends to keep the number of visiting artists at a modest level.

Both government-to-government (e.g., Fulbright) and private academic exchanges continue. While the government officially continues to limit the USIA's International Visitors Program (IVP) by forbidding private Poles to accept official invitations from the U.S. Government, enforcement of this policy has become increasingly sporadic. During the reporting period, several IVP grantees traveled to the U.S. more or less openly.

Polish publishers continue to publish translations of American and other Western authors, although much of what is currently appearing in print results from contracts signed several years ago. In the future, fewer American titles may appear unless some

means can be found to assist in the hard currency purchase of publication rights. The shortage of Western books, magazines, films, and other sources of information was largely due to censorship and lack of hard currency.

In the cultural field, government policy toward Poland's minorities can be described as benign neglect. Although there has been a great deal of public attention to the importance of Poland's Jewish cultural heritage, official attempts to preserve it have been largely of an archival nature. The long-planned institute for the history and culture of Jews in Poland at Jagiellonian University began operations and hosted its first conference. Other small national minorities, (e.g., Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Tatars) maintain their cultural identity mainly through their own efforts.

IREX scholars have experienced no known problems regarding access to open archival material.

Hungary. The number of exchanges between the U.S. and Hungary has increased dramatically since June 1987. In particular, the Soros Foundation funded 162 young Hungarians to spend 6 weeks in the U.S. studying English and American history and culture. The program was very successful, and plans are underway to repeat the exchange next year. The Fulbright program continues to expand, with 14 scholars and graduate students traveling each way under the terms of the cultural agreement between the U.S. and Hungary. The Fulbright program also sponsors many additional scholars traveling each way and this year inaugurated a secondary school teacher exchange by sending an English teacher to spend a year at the bilingual gymnasium in Szeged. Starting in January, three Hungarian Fulbrighters will go to the U.S. for professional training in the areas of environmental studies, translation, and architecture. In addition, there are over 20 private exchanges between American schools and universities throughout Hungary, and the number multiplies every year. Finally, the Salgo chair in American studies is in its fourth year at the Eotvos Lorand University in Budapest and has sponsored several conferences on aspects of American literature and culture at various universities.

In the past year, 27 Hungarians traveled to the U.S. as IVP grantees, seven of whom were chosen by the U.S. Embassy in Budapest. One of these

grantees was appointed to the nine-member Secretariat of the Hungarian Party's Central Committee shortly after his return from the U.S.

The Hungarian "Gold and Silver" exhibit has enjoyed a successful tour in the U.S., visiting New York, Chicago, Santa Barbara, and Houston. A new U.S. exhibit, "Design in America," will begin a 4-month tour in January 1988.

The Hungarian Ministry of Culture welcomes all of these initiatives, and lack of funds appears to be the only impediment to further expansion of the cultural ties between the U.S. and Hungary.

German Democratic Republic.

The state controls cultural offerings and cultural policy. Official policy encourages cultural expression that supports and strengthens the ideology of the Communist Party. The G.D.R. does, however, bring in foreign performers and has arranged for an unusually large number of American performers and groups to visit in 1987, as part of its program to celebrate Berlin's 750th anniversary. In addition, through access to West German television, East Germans citizens are able to enjoy a wider variety of cultural offerings than those offered by the G.D.R. media. The only Western cultural center in East Berlin, the French Cultural Center, enjoys good crowds. Visitors to the U.S. Embassy library continue to be strictly controlled by police. Nevertheless, the number of young East Germans visiting the library has increased dramatically over the past 2 years. There is no official U.S.-G.D.R. cultural exchange program.

In 1984, the U.S. Embassy in Berlin proposed a major film exhibit to the G.D.R. Approval has been given, and after long negotiations, there are plans for the exhibit to be shown in 1988. Final agreement on conditions for the exhibition space has not yet been reached, but discussions are underway.

The Sorbs, numbering about 45,000, constitute the only substantial ethnic minority in the G.D.R. There is no apparent cultural or governmental discrimination against this group. Schools in areas with a Sorb population have specially designed curricula that emphasize aspects of the Sorb culture, and instruction is offered in the Sorb language. Sorbs are well integrated into the general population.

The beginning of the Fulbright program this academic year marks an important milestone in exchanges between the U.S. and the G.D.R. In addition, an active IREX program

continues, as well as several small direct university-to-university exchanges. The National Academy of Sciences runs a small exchange program with the G.D.R. Academy, and the G.D.R.-U.S. Friendship Society offers a small number of scholarships to U.S. students.

Czechoslovakia. Overall bilateral relations in the field of culture and education have sustained a fairly high level of activity during the reporting period. On April 15, 1986, Czechoslovakia and the U.S. signed their first Bilateral Exchanges Agreement and Program Document. The agreement has expanded exchanges in the fields of social science and the humanities and, to a limited extent, in science and technology. Despite some strain in implementation, there has been a heightened level of exchanges in cultural and educational areas.

In the area of exhibits, a major USIA exhibit, "American Theater Today," ran for 21 days in June in Brno and was visited by over 40,000 people. A USIA-supported American entry at the Prague Quadrennial 1987 (International Exhibition of Scenography and Theater Architecture) in June won top honors. In September a U.S. Embassy-sponsored exhibit, "The American Home," was seen by some 40,000 visitors at the Brno Engineering Fair.

American performances continue to appear in Czechoslovakia on a commercial basis, most notably during the annual Prague Spring Music Festival. In April, the state impresario organizations, *Pragokonzert* and *Slovkonzert*, sponsored concerts in four cities for the USIA-organized tour of the Nashville Masters. There was standing room only at all performances. In May, the Prague Spring Festival featured American conductors James Levine, Erich Leinsdorf, and Andrew Litton; singers Roberta Alexander, Ellen Titus, and June Anderson; organist Daniel Chorzempa; and the Guarneri Quartet.

Czechoslovak authorities continue to show interest in visits by Czechoslovak specialists to the U.S. Under the International Visitors Program, 13 Czechoslovaks traveled to the U.S. during the reporting period. One grantee is taking part in the International Writing Program at the University of Iowa; a second attended a special program on print journalism; and a third had a special program concerning higher education in the U.S. tailored to her needs. Others participated in programs which focused on foreign policy, conservation of natural resources, and English teaching. Sixteen Czechoslovak specialists participated in a special English teaching program at the University of Texas, Austin, in August.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Czech and Slovak Ministries of Education showed less reluctance during the reporting period to accept U.S. Embassy programming of specialists in American literature and other fields at Czechoslovak institutions. Nonetheless, many embassy letters regarding the possibility of programming these speakers still go unanswered. Six experts were programmed during the reporting period. One lecture was held at the American library. Authorities did not interfere with attendance by Czechoslovak citizens, beyond the surveillance at the gate.

The 1986 Bilateral Exchanges Agreement expanded the Fulbright program from two Americans in Czechoslovakia and three Czechoslovaks in the U.S. to 12 scholars in each country. During the reporting period, a nearly full complement of 10 U.S. scholars assumed positions with Czechoslovak institutions as lecturers or research scholars, while 11 are projected for similar positions in 1987-88. Nine Czechoslovak scholars were affiliated with educational institutions in the U.S. during the 1987-88 academic year, and 11 are projected for the 1987-88 academic year. American short-term English teaching academic specialists participated in 2-week Czechoslovak English teaching seminars as part of a

program under the agreement that increases participation in these specialized seminars.

Progress has been made in university-to-university affiliations with the preliminary agreement of Charles University and the University of Nebraska to have direct relations and with discussions ongoing between Comenius University and the University of Pittsburgh. There were no known complaints from American exchangees regarding access to archives or libraries. However, exchangees did report that access to "special collections," not normally available to most Czechoslovak library patrons, involves a difficult and cumbersome process. The card catalogues for these special collections are not publicly available.

Bulgaria. Over the past year, the U.S.-Bulgarian cultural relationship has expanded modestly, but the Bulgarian Government continues to construe the bilateral cultural agreement narrowly in order to limit U.S. Embassy access to Bulgarian media and cultural institutions. After 15 months of negotiations, the government finally approved the placement of a major USIA exhibit, "Design in America," which will be shown in Sofia and Varna. The government also agreed to a U.S. proposal increasing the number of Fulbright lecturers from two to three and accepted three U.S. Fulbright researchers and two U.S. graduate students for placement this academic year. Visiting scholars not known to Bulgarian counterparts usually have difficulty in obtaining access to archives. Scholars with Bulgarian contacts do not experience the same difficulties. ■

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UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Preamble

Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,

Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people,

Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,

Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,

Now, Therefore,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

proclaims

THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.

Article 1

All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

Article 2

Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, lan-

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948.

The rights embodied in the Declaration have been set forth in two covenants—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights—which were adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966.

guage, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.

Article 3

Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.

Article 4

No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.

Article 5

No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.

Article 6

Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.

Article 7

All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.

Article 8

Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law.

Article 9

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.

Article 10

Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.

Article 11

1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.

2. No one shall be held guilty of any penal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the penal offence was committed.

Article 12

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Article 13

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.

Article 14

1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.

2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 15

1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to change his nationality.

Article 16

1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution.

2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.

3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State.

Article 17

1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others.

2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.

Article 18

Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

Article 19

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.

Article 20

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.

Article 21

1. Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his country.

3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 22

Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.

Article 23

1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

2. Everyone, without any dis-

crimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.

3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social protection.

4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

Article 24

Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.

Article 25

1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.

Article 26

1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.

2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship

among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.

Article 27

1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits.

2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.

Article 28

Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.

Article 29

1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.

2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Article 30

Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein.

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