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*Carol*

# **ABN** CORRESPONDENCE

*Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!*

BULLETIN OF THE ANTIBOLSHEVIK BLOC OF NATIONS



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*Cover: Mother Of God With Jesus  
Painting by Daria Hulak-Kulchytsky*

## **ABN** CORRESPONDENCE

*Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!*

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# TO EVERYONE WHO IS CAPABLE OF HEARING THE CRY OF HUMAN SUFFERING

*Appeal by Yuriy Badzio*

*Yuriy Badzio, a Ukrainian national rights activist and political prisoner, currently serving a term of exile outside Ukraine, recently wrote an appeal "To Everyone Who Is Capable Of Hearing The Cry Of Human Suffering."*

*The appeal, dated August 31, reached the West via samvydav (underground publication) channels. In his appeal, Mr. Badzio recounts the psychological terror being used by Soviet authorities who refused him permission to visit his ailing 82-year old mother in the village of Kopynivtsi, Transcarpathian oblast of Ukraine. Mr. Badzio's mother, whom he has not seen for eight years, suffered a stroke on August 10 which left her paralyzed on one side and causes her to lose consciousness. "The authorities of the country have refused to hear my cries for help, have refused to respond to the deathbed pleas of a mother and have subjected an 82-year old woman to physical and psychological torture that poses a direct threat to her life. My wife, my children, and I also feel as if we were in a torture chamber," Mr. Badzio wrote in his appeal.*

*Mr. Badzio also discusses the tragic plight of Ukraine, noting that "the reaction of the world to our situation has been and remains outrageously indifferent and self-seeking." He goes on to cite the real reason he was deprived of his freedom: "my public statement in defence of the rights and interests of the Ukrainian people."*

*Mr. Badzio, 61, a philologist and journalist, was arrested in April 1979 and was subsequently sentenced to seven years' imprisonment and five years' internal exile for writing his documentary work about the subjugation of Ukraine entitled **The Right To Live**.*

I had not intended to use the occasion of my coming to Ukraine to visit my mother for making public statements of any kind. My world outlook, political conduct and emotional reactions to circumstances are far from extremist, and I am not prone to immoderate responses to situations. I already knew and now have new confirmation of the sad truth that, in terms of the historical needs and prospects of the Ukrainian people, today's world is blind and deaf to our fate.

However, the manner in which I have been treated recently is so exceptional and, in my opinion, so significant in moral, political and legal terms that I feel compelled to speak out.

I was given permission to take leave from exile and spend one month in the village of Kopynivtsi in the Zakarpatska Oblast visiting my 82-year old mother, who has not seen me for more than eight years. The travel document that I was issued in Khandyga (the village in the Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, where Mr. Badzio is serving his term of exile) specified my itinerary only as far as Kyiv (Kiev), but it noted that the purpose of my trip was "to see my sick mother." When I insisted that the Khandyga authorities specify my itinerary to my final destination, that is to the village of Kopynivtsi, the militia inspector explained to me that the Kyiv authorities knew all the details and that they would issue me the necessary document designating the remainder of my itinerary.

Upon my arrival in Kyiv, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR gave me permission to spend only seven days with my mother. But a day later, citing

an order from Moscow, the ministry revoked even this permission, claiming that the Khandyga militia had informed them that I myself had chosen Kyiv and had refused to visit my mother. This is patently untrue as proven by my written requests to the chief of the Khandyga militia for permission to visit my mother in the village of Kopynivtsi and to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR for permission to travel to my mother's home through Kyiv.

The falsehood of this claim is further attested by my announcement of my visit to Kopynivtsi in letters to family and friends, as well as by my conduct in Kyiv. The situation is simple and unambiguous, justifiable on both legal and moral grounds, and there are no procedural obstacles in the law to prevent the resolution of this issue. This matter does not pertain to me alone; it also affects my wife, and, above all, my mother — an old woman and a mother being deprived of what is almost certainly her last chance to see her son and bid him good-bye forever.

I have been requesting permission to visit my mother since the day I arrived in Kyiv. In addition to the request I submitted to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, I sent similar requests to the highest government authorities in the land: a statement and a telegram to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Aleksander Vlasov; a telegram to the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzhkov; a telegram to the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Andrei Gromyko; two telegrams to the general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev; a telegram and a statement to the procurator general of the USSR, Aleksander Rekunkov. I also telephoned the reception office of the Central Committee of the CPSU, where they spoke to me in a rude and vulgar manner. My brothers and sisters, who had gathered at my mother's home, also appealed to the authorities, in particular to the chairman of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov, asking that I not be detained in Kyiv.

There has been no response from anyone. Meanwhile, the moral aspects of the case, which were already exceptional, have become even more grave: my mother, who had been waiting for my arrival in a state of considerable stress and anxiety, suffered a stroke on August 10 which has left her paralyzed on one side. She has been bedridden for three weeks and frequently loses consciousness and the ability to speak. Whenever she does regain consciousness, the first thing she asks is when I will arrive.

For more than 20 days, the authorities of this country — the highest representatives of the government at that — have refused to hear my cries for help, have refused to respond to the deathbed pleas of a mother, and have subjected an 82-year old woman to physical and psychological torture that poses a direct threat to her life. My wife, my children, and I also feel as if we were in a torture chamber.

I have spent a considerable portion of my life amidst a thick fog of official lies, demagoguery, oppression and abuse. But even I was taken completely by surprise and astonished by the diabolical spectacle that has been staged for me on this occasion. Even if there were no high-sounding declarations by the government about the revolutionary restructuring and democratization of Soviet society, I would regard the conduct of people responsible for creating and maintaining this terrible repressive situation as a cynical violation of the most elementary universal norms of humanity and morality.



*Yuriy Badzio with his wife Svitlana Kyrychenko, shortly before his arrest in 1979.*

I find it difficult to imagine why and for what purpose the authorities have decided to exact such a high price — this so-called “prophylactic” (preventive) torture that is so familiar to political prisoners who refuse to yield. But I am not the only one being tortured; it is my mother, above all, who is being tortured. Is this being done in revenge for my attitude to the government’s initiative with respect to political prisoners in January and February of this year, for my attitude to the government’s attempts to remove the problem from the agenda for a time at least by means of a devious maneuver designed to capitalize on its results? The situation is especially serious, because it falls within a political context that bears directly on the very essence of the government’s proclamations about reforms.

Of course, what we have here is not the stupid, arbitrary act of some petty functionary. I am now convinced that everything was planned in advance, and that there is a definite operational or political design behind what has happened. But I also know that no government considerations, be they broad or narrow, can exculpate those responsible for these repressions: their conduct is barbaric and its inhumanity and immorality are tantamount to sacrilege and robbing the wounded and the dead.

I interpret what the government has done as serious proof of its true ideological and moral nature, of the real intentions of the initiators of restructuring, and of the possibility and prospects of a revolution from above.

Such a flagrant disregard for the law and for moral principles, especially in the light of the widely advertised policy of reform, is possible only when public opinion does not exist, or when the authorities know that there will be no reaction from world public opinion. It would appear that they were certain about the latter circumstance.

And we Ukrainians have learned once again that the politicians and the political public in the West, and in particular the Western media, treat us as no more than material to be used for propaganda purposes. They "forget" that we are a nation, a separate and self-contained subject of history, with our own legitimate historical needs and interests. Ukraine of the 1960s-1980s has proved itself in a fitting and honorable manner; it has suffered perhaps the harshest repressions and the largest human losses. The reaction of the world to our situation has been and remains outrageously indifferent and self-seeking. National-political (great-power) and ethnic egoism reigns in the attitude towards us where one might expect simple human sympathy to have produced active solidarity with our plight. Disregard of the Ukrainian problem and Ukrainophobia cannot but have their historical consequences, even in the sphere of private human relations.

All of this requires a separate and detailed discussion. I will confine myself here to a single point, a simple syllogism: the lasting and sound betterment of international life on the principles of stable, peaceful coexistence and cooperation cannot occur without a complete and genuinely revolutionary democratization of the Soviet Union, and the democratization of the Soviet Union is impossible without democracy for Ukraine, without a democratic resolution of the Ukrainian question, that is, in practical terms, without the attainment by the Ukrainian people of national independence, of real and complete control over its historical existence.

Vasyl Stus (a prominent Ukrainian poet and human rights activist, who died of medical neglect in a Soviet labor camp in 1985 at the age of 47) once told the story of a beggar who asked for alms thus: "Give! Give!! Give!!!" (in other words, he demanded rather than pleaded). Intending to continue the fight for my release, I want to assume the role of such a beggar.

Ukraine is a member of the United Nations, one of the founding members of this international organization. The real national-political and cultural situation of the Ukrainian SSR as a formally separate state entity of the USSR is the subject of my treatise, *The Right to Live*, for which I was deprived of my freedom. (The full text of the treatise was confiscated from Mr. Badzio at the time of his arrest and only his theses, in the form of "An Open Letter to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU", are available in the West. An English translation of this letter was published by the Journal of Ukrainian Studies, (University of Toronto), 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984) and 9, No. 2 (Winter 1984). I place upon you, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, the moral responsibility for taking up my defense in person and through UNESCO and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.

I know that some time after I was imprisoned, certain members of the U.S. Congress spoke out in my defense. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to them and ask that the U.S. Congress continue to keep my fate within the sphere of its official attention. As a matter of fact, during those August days when I was knocking hopelessly on the doors of the highest government offices, including those of the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, crying for help, the deputies to the Supreme Soviet were hosting an American delegation led by Sen. Daniel Patrick Moynihan. I therefore address the appeal in this letter to you in particular, Sen. Moynihan.

At the heart of the social and political ideology of my treatise, *The Right To Live*, lies the concept of democratic socialism. I appeal to the leadership of the Socialist International to speak out for my release.

The ideas of democracy, freedom and cooperation are the keynote of all my public statements. The participation of the Vienna Conference on the Helsinki Accords cannot ignore the criminal treatment to which I have been subjected. I appeal, in particular, to the delegations of the United States, Canada, Great Britain, France and West Germany, in the belief that the representatives of these countries have not fallen prey to the euphoria brought on by the liberal changes in Soviet policy and have retained the ability to comprehend the reality soberly.

The absence of criminality in the texts and actions cited in the charges brought against me is obvious even in accordance with the logic of Soviet law (in principle, of course). I therefore appeal to all international jurists' organizations to demand that the Soviet authorities submit my case to an objective review with the participation of Western lawyers.

The real reason why I was deprived of my freedom is my public statement in defense of the rights and interests of the Ukrainian people. I appeal to the lawyers of Leonard Peltier to become my defenders as well before the government of the Soviet Union, which is actively concerned with the fate of Leonard Peltier. I wish to inform you and Leonard Peltier that as a political prisoner, on December 10, 1984, I submitted to the Soviet authorities a declaration on the occasion of International Human Rights Day, in which I also appealed to the government of the United States to turn its attention to the fate of Leonard Peltier and ensure an objective and just examination of the case. As punishment for my statement, I was held for 12 days in a special punishment cell, where conditions were such that they constituted daily torture.

A writer is a symbol of the moral conscience of humanity. The first such writer to come to mind is you, Gabriel Garcia Marquez. I therefore appeal to you for assistance. Perhaps it was your recent meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev that has prompted me to turn to you.

My mother is a woman of deep religious conviction and intense and pure Christian feeling. During the third week of August, when our Soviet Peace Committee welcomed Mother Theresa in Kyiv, the torture of my sick 82-year old mother reached its apogee. I appeal to you, Mother Theresa, to your heart, which feels pain at the absence of love and goodness in the world. Before you, I pass harsh moral judgment on those people who did not find a drop of compassion for my old half-paralyzed mother. Your response to their cruelty, Mother Theresa, would diminish some of the evil in human life.

I take this opportunity to thank all people of good will abroad who have spoken and continue to speak out in defense of all Soviet prisoners of conscience, including myself.

I ask the representatives of organized groups and individual members of the Ukrainian community abroad to ensure that this appeal, as well as other evidence of my fate, reaches the people I have named here.

**Yuriy Badzio**  
**Kyiv, August 31, 1987**

## FORMER UKRAINIAN AND GEORGIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS TESTIFY IN US CONGRESS

Ukrainian Catholic activist Yosyp Terelya and prisoner of conscience Danylo Shumuk, both recent arrivals from the Soviet Union, provided a very grim interpretation of "glasnost" and its effects for Ukrainians before a hearing of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Also appearing with Terelya and Shumuk were Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, both members of the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group.

In his testimony, Terelya stated that since December 1986, repression against Church activists as well as Ukrainian nationalists has increased in the Soviet Union. Terelya cited that beginning December 1986 and ending in June 1987, "at least 150 churches have been burned or bulldozed" on orders of the KGB. Even with the popularization of "glasnost" in the West, Terelya stated that prison camps "are still home for many faithful" including Vasyl Kobryn, head of the Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church.

Comparing Khrushchev to Gorbachev, Terelya stated that when Khrushchev came to power, he granted amnesty and political rehabilitation to Soviet political prisoners. Terelya noted that the Gorbachev regime has not yet taken such a step.

Following Terelya's remarks, Shumuk, a long-time prisoner of conscience, testified movingly that "the terror of Russification of my people has reached a culmination point." Shumuk pointed out that in Kyiv, there are only 34 Ukrainian-language schools compared with 152 Russian-language schools, while in the cities of Donetsk, Voroshilovohrad, Mykolayiv and Chernihiv there exist no Ukrainian-language schools. Shumuk also pointed out that in historically significant Ukrainian centers such as Zaporizhia and Kharkiv there are one and two Ukrainian-language schools respectively, compared with 95 and 156 Russian-language schools.

In his remarks, Shumuk said he considers "glasnost" a "deception of public opinion in the USSR and to a greater extent here in the West." He asked, "can one seriously accept this 'glasnost' and these 'reforms' when the organization of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine still remains a secret and uncondemned by the government of the USSR?"

Shumuk also cited the banned Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches as well as those persons confined for writing about the famine and Ukrainian secession from the USSR as examples of "glasnost's" limits.

Eduard and Tengiz Gudava, in a joint statement, said that "glasnost" and democratization were essential goals of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union long before the arrival of the Gorbachev regime. They stated that "the present exclusion of the human rights movement from the process of glasnost" makes it a mockery.

The Gudava brothers stated that Gorbachev's human rights policy is "based on the exploitation of propaganda from the release or emigration of each dissident or refusenik separately" along with "extensive marketing of sensationally democratic announcements and hints." The Gudavas believe that Gorbachev is playing on the desires of the West to discover a "human face in the image of the Soviet beast,"

concluding that the regime is "creating an image visible to everybody" based on the "extent of his or her impressionability."

Responding to questions about the Soviet proposal to host a human rights conference in Moscow, most of the panelists had similar responses. Shumuk put forth six conditions which the Soviets would have to meet in order for a Human Rights Conference to take place in Moscow: the release and rehabilitation of those persecuted for their political and religious beliefs; justice to those who led repressions against innocent people; an end to jamming of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; the introduction of native language use in all Soviet republic schools and institutions; the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Afghanistan; and the legalization of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine.

Terelya added that the Soviets should guarantee national rights based on self-determination as well as the free emigration of those who wish to leave the Soviet Union. Amplifying the comments of Terelya and Shumuk, Gudava stated that the West should take advantage of "perestroika," using the opportunity to better conditions for national liberation struggles and assist efforts to coordinate various national movements.

Each person testifying underscored the need and importance in understanding the national component of the human rights struggle in the Soviet Union, especially among those movements outside of the Russian FSSR. All four panelists made specific mention of the national rights issue in the Soviet Union, attesting to the fact that much of the human and religious rights activities are expressions of desires for national self-determination.

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*Hon. Steny H. Hoyer*

## **OPENING REMARKS HELSINKI MONITORING HEARING**

Washington, D.C., October 22, 1987

Last week, I had the honor of representing the United States, together with the senior Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan, on the ABC capital-to-capital broadcast, the live spacebridge program linking members of the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Soviet. It was shown, uncensored, throughout the Soviet Union.

Our topic was one the people of the USSR are not accustomed to hearing the truth about — human rights. Over one hundred million Soviet citizens watched and listened to a remarkably frank discussion on human rights in the Soviet Union.

Never before has such a broadcast aired in the USSR. We were able to ask Soviet officials, before millions of their own people, why they restrict religion, movement, and political and national expression, why they have policies which we in the West cannot and may never understand.

And the general idea they tried to convey was that the situation is changing — that there are, indeed, shortcomings in their practices they are trying to correct.

Of course, the world waits to see whether their actions will accord with their words and promises. We await real progress in Soviet Helsinki compliance. We

wait to see how these changes will affect Soviet society. And we wait to see the impact on the citizens of the USSR with the least amount of influence in Moscow — the half of the Soviet population that is non-Russian.

Few individuals are in a more unique position to offer insights into these questions than our witnesses today — two Ukrainian and two Georgian human rights activists recently released from Soviet prisons. They come from two formerly independent nations — now Soviet republics — Ukraine and Georgia. They represent two proud peoples, each with their own ancient and unique historical, cultural and religious traditions. Georgia and Ukraine, throughout much of their history and especially in this century, have suffered greatly. Yet these nations still aspire to a future where fundamental human freedoms are respected.

The Helsinki Commission is pleased to welcome to these hearings these four men who, despite relentless persecution, maintained their dignity and their commitment to the struggle for human rights. Their persistence, despite the KGB's most tenacious efforts, is a testament to their courage and devotion to ideals embodied in the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Yosyp Terelya is the best-known leader of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the largest banned religious denomination in the Soviet Union. Mr. Danylo Shumuk, until his release last January, was the longest-serving prisoner of conscience known in the USSR. Eduard and Tengiz Gudava were members of the second Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group. They also founded an unofficial musical ensemble made up of Jewish and Catholic refuseniks.

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act commits all signatory states to respect human rights, including religious and national minority rights. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses on observance of these principles in Ukraine and in Georgia, — and indeed, in the entire Soviet Union.

\*\*\*

## THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS NEVER CEASED ITS WORK

*The following is the statement by Yosyp Terelya, former prisoner of conscience and Ukrainian Catholic activist, released during his testimony before the U.S. CSCE Commission in Washington, D.C., on October 22.*

Throughout the whole period of the subjugation of Ukraine to the Muscovite occupier, our Ukrainian Catholic Church was always the object of attacks and destruction by the "Great State" circles of the Empire. It makes no difference whether we are speaking of the tsarist times or the days of the Red governors of Moscow.

The government of the "one and indivisible" Russia, along with its faithful servants in the Russian Orthodox Church made tremendous efforts to destroy the Ukrainian Catholic Church and along with it our people and our nation... Whether they succeed at this, only time will tell. But, notwithstanding, at this time our Church continues to live and our people hope that someday we will have our day in the sun.

After the death of Stalin many persecuted priests and monks, who remained alive, returned from the concentration camps. Many petitions were written to the

government asking for relief from terror and repression. In the 1960s petitions were authored appealing to sympathetic Christian circles asking them to show their Christian solidarity with our struggle to attain our God given freedoms.

Even though much of our hierarchy and clergy were physically destroyed the Church never ceased its work. Rather the Church reorganized itself in the underground. But the KGB began a new wave of repression against the priests, monastics and active faithful. The KGB organized a slew of operations to once more physically destroy our clergy.

In 1953 the Basilian monk Peter Oros was murdered. In 1957 the abbot of an underground monastery in Boronyav, Yosyp Zavadiuk, was killed. In 1957 in Karaganda, while in exile, the layman of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Ivan Markiv was murdered. In 1963 in Dzheskazgani the Basilian priest-monk Oleksa Zarytskyj was tortured to death by the KGB.

Even more were sentenced to new prison and camp terms, for example: Basilian monk Anton Potochniak — 7 years' camp; Studite monk Hryhoriy Budzinskyj — 10 years' camp; priest Ihnat Soltys and Redemptorist priest Mykhaylo Vynnytskyj both 7 years' each. There were many more who fell to Khrushchev's wave of terror.

When the third Muscovite occupation began in 1944, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had 6,390 priests and monastics, whereas today in Ukraine and throughout the USSR, there are just over 1,000 priests and 1,200 monastics in the underground, plus a very active group of faithful. The Church in Ukraine and the USSR is directed by over 10 bishops, among whom there are some who are already known in the West; the bishop of Lviv, who is in fact the assistant of Patriarch Myroslav



*Yosyp Terelya (left) testifying before the Helsinki Commission on October 22, 1987. Rev. Myroslaw Tataryn of the St. Sophia Religious Association, translated.*

Cardinal Lubachivskyj, is His Excellency Bishop Sterniuk, the Bishop of Kolomyja and Ivano-Frankivsk is Bishop Dmyterko, the Bishop of Uzhorod is Ivan Semedi, and there is also Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk.

The Soviet authorities continually use terror against our Church: constant fines, new arrests and sentences for the faithful and priests. Even this year in 1987, when Gorbachev proclaims for the whole world reconstruction and glasnost, the camps are still home for many faithful among them: the head of the Helsinki Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church, Vasyl Kobryn; in a woman's camp in Siberia is Polanya Batio; in the Kazan special psychiatric prison is Hanna Mykhaylenko and in another camp is the now blind Prof. Pavlo Kampov. These are only a few of the best known names. In addition to the past year and a half many churches have been desecrated, closed or even totally destroyed.

But as Christians we are grateful to Our Lord for having given us both suffering and hope — we remember that “the first shall be last...” We remember with both joy and sorrow the innocent slaughter of the hierarchy of our Church. We rejoice because they now abide in the Kingdom, we are sorrowed because they are no longer among us. At the very outset of the arrests, Bishop Khomyshyn was tortured to death in the Kyiv Lukyanivskiyi prison. Bishop J. Kotsylovskyj of Peremyshl was martyred on November 17, 1947. Bishop Lokota was murdered in a camp in Vorkuta on November 12, 1950. October 1 is the date of the death of Bishop Ivan Budka in Dzhezkazgani. Bishops Letyshevskyj and Ivan Verhun died in exile. The Bishop of Uzhorod Fedor Romzha was murdered by the KGB on November 1, 1947. Bishop Hoydych of Pryashiv died in a Czech camp in 1960. Bishops Ivan Balan and Oleksander Rusu were murdered in the Rumanian prison of Sigetskyj in 1950.

However, accepting Gorbachev's propaganda campaign of 'glasnost' at face value, we the Ukrainian Catholic Church have presented Moscow with a fact — we desire legalization. The authorities must now resolve the problem of the Ukrainian Church or they must begin a new wave of arrests and sentences upon those who signed the declaration. Should they choose the latter it would demask 'reconstruction' before the world. This Church which the Soviets contend does not exist, does in fact exist and flourish. In Ukraine alone there are 5 million Ukrainian Catholics and another 1.9 million in other areas of the USSR.

Without doubt, should the Soviets not resolve the question of the Ukrainian Church and the question of free emigration from the USSR for all people without exception — then we feel that in no way should there be a positive conclusion to the Conference in Vienna on Cooperation and Security. It is now time that the government of Moscow show in deeds, not just words that they are ready to put into practice the agreements which they have signed in the past.

The Church also asks that as a further sign of the Soviets' sincerity in seeking a new openness they close the special regime camp Kuchino No. 36-1 and release unconditionally all prisoners held there and in other prisons and camps in the USSR. We are very concerned with the fates of Lev Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Vasyl Ovsienko, Vasyl Kobryn, Hanna Mykhaylenko, Petro Ruban, Mykola Horbal, Pavlo Kampov, Ivan Smetana, Stefan Belskyj, Mykola Mamus and many, many other prisoners of conscience who languish in Soviet prisons and camps.

Only when the above problems are faced and resolved in a positive manner can we say that we have created a situation in the world where true peace can be advanced. In other words, we must recognize that peace in the world is more than just an absence of war. The Ukrainian Catholic Church realizes that peace is built on measures which assure order and justice for all social groups throughout the world. And such order cannot be built on force or dictatorship since this would just be a mirage of true peace. Just social order must rather be built on mutual respect of our neighbors — individuals must respect each other's rights.

Solidarity and tolerance are the true measures of human relations. We clearly saw this in the fate of our suffering Church, in the fate of our people. We await an expression of solidarity from the Congress and the Government of the United States and from all in the West. Solidarity as has been expressed for 40 years, for example, by the Dutch priest Werenfried van Straaten and his organization Church in Need. We are grateful to all Christians and non-Christians who have assisted and continue to help our persecuted Church.

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### **“GUARANTEE PEACE ON EARTH”**

*Yosyp Terelya read the following statement  
upon his arrival to Canada in October, 1987.*

I am overjoyed to be able to say, without worrying about the KGB: “be vigilant, strengthen Christian solidarity.”

At the same time I would like to express my sincere gratitude and the gratitude of my wife and our children to the government of this free Canada — we are free, we are among you. The Prime Minister of Canada, the Most Honorable Brian Mulroney, the Minister of External Affairs, the Honorable Joe Clark and the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Mr. Bouchard who did everything they could to ensure that I would not be brought to trial again and that I could be among you today.

I would also like to acknowledge the efforts on my behalf made by the members of Parliament, Joe Reid and Andrew Witer, thank you sincerely. With joy and sincerity, I would also like to thank the government of Queen Beatrice of the Netherlands and the Christian communities of that country for their many efforts on my behalf and ultimately for granting me my initial visa for travel to the West.

I am the son of my people, the son of the Apostolic Universal Church of Christ and I can now see you and speak with you in the name of our humiliated and wronged Ukrainian Catholic community in the USSR. In 1982, on September 9, my friends and I founded a new Helsinki Group: The Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine. The aim of this group was to bring to light the abuse of the rights of believers of all confessions on the territory of Ukraine. We knew what was ahead of us.

After three months I was arrested and sent to camp VL-315/30. In time, the Ukrainian Catholic priest, Fr. Anton Potochniak, was brought there. Fr. Potochniak died in the camp on May 29, 1984. Fr. Potochniak was also a member of the Initiative Group and one of the authors of our Madrid Memorandum.



*Yosyp Terelya at a press conference in The Hague on September 24, 1987.*

Reflect upon the reality: we were persecuted by the communists of Moscow and by the official Soviet Russian Orthodox Church only because we were faithful to Christ and the Holy See (Rome) — they do not even allow us the very necessities of life. No one will ever know the number of martyrs for Christ's faith who lay down their lives in the prisons and camps of the USSR! But we must remember that in the Soviet Gulag more Christians may have died, than for the entire period from Christ to 1917. Even today, thousands of Christians remain in the camps of the USSR. The government continually resists the closing of the horrible special-regime camp in Kuchino where such important activists as Lukyanenko, Kandyba, Horbal and others are imprisoned.

Gorbachev's government does not have the courage to condemn the unjust and illegal acts of Stalin and to once and for all solve the question of the Ukrainian Church by recognizing the legal existence of the Ukrainian national churches: the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church.

But I also have another concern: two nuclear accidents in Ukraine. I speak here of the accidents in Chornobyl and Rivno. I appeal to those present, aid us in the evangelization of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia — this will guarantee peace on earth and will bring us all closer to God's Kingdom.

## **THERE CAN BE NO PEACE WITHOUT MUTUAL TRUST**

*Testimony before U.S. CSCE Commission in Washington D.C.*

I have travelled a long road of incarceration in prisons, concentration camps and exile. It took me 42 years to find my way to you, to your capital, to these hearings. My first words to you are words of thanks for your constant moral support which you have for many years given political prisoners of the Soviet Union.

From time to time over the radio programs of the Voice of America and Radio Liberty and various roundabout ways we received the news that at the Helsinki Conferences in Madrid, Ottawa and Vienna, members of the U.S. delegations spoke about the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union, about religious persecution, about the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches, which are outlawed in the USSR. They spoke about Russification of the non-Russian peoples. And they mentioned us by name — political prisoners condemned to long years of miserable existence or even death. We knew that you mentioned many of us, including myself. All of this gave us strength to persevere in the most difficult moments — knowing that someone in distant Washington, or members of Amnesty International know and remember us and are working towards our release.

And how painful it is for me to speak before you today, to be in the capital of the most powerful country in the world, to be free and to know that my friends from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group — Vasyl Stus, Yuriy Lytvyn, Oleksa Tykhyj — will never be able to come to the West because they died in Soviet imprisonment. It is painful because still other members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group remain in the terrible death camp No. 36-1: Levko Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Ival Sokulskyj and Mykola Horbal. It is painful to find myself at liberty in the Free World, while to this day the right to leave is denied to Mykola and Raisa Rudenko, Yuriy Shukhevych, Yuriy Badzio, and to many others who still remain imprisoned, exiled, in psychiatric prisons and those who are constantly persecuted under conditions of so-called "freedom".

These constant repressions are evidence that neither the Soviet government nor its new leadership believe their own citizens, do not believe the millions of people they rule.

And I ask: how can the West believe the current government of the USSR? How can the Administration of the USA trust Gorbachev? How can you, honorable Senators and Congressmen be certain that during your trips to the Soviet Union and in the course of your conversations with Soviet diplomats they are telling you the truth?

I am convinced that without mutual trust there can be no peace. I am convinced that truth, justice, honesty and humaneness must form the basis for mutual trust between the people and between states. Does this kind of trust exist? No, it doesn't, and it won't exist as long as one nation oppresses another.

The Soviet Union consists of various republics, each with its own language, culture and spirituality. But the existence of separate "independent" republics is only theoretically recognized. In reality, the USSR is a Russian communist empire with an authoritarian regime of a government, which does not tolerate the slightest signs of a desire for independence, freedom, and democracy. For expressions of free thought, for strivings toward independence, the Russian communist empire starved over 7 million people in Ukraine in 1933. Later, approximately the same number of people perished in prisons and labor camps, some having been sentenced for possessing a handful of grain gleaned from the fields to save their children from death by starvation.

I did not live through the horrors of the Ukrainian Famine of 1933 because I was born in Volynia, which after World War I, became a part of Poland. In 1932 I became a member of an underground communist organization, thinking and believing that only the communists were fighting for social and national justice. Filled with these ideas I organized members of the Young Communist League and energetically engaged in underground communist activity. In 1935 I was sentenced by the Poles to 8 years of imprisonment and following an amnesty I was released in 1939. In the fall of 1939 the Red Army "liberated" Western Ukraine from Polish occupation and soon it was united with Eastern Ukraine. However, we didn't enjoy this "liberation" for long, because shortly afterwards the repressive machine began its horrible work in Western Ukraine.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked Communist Russia, its ally for the preceding several months. The war found me at work in a construction battalion on the Western border. I was taken prisoner during the siege of Kyiv. I escaped the POW camp in Khorol in the Poltava region. Only then, making my way through the regions of Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia did I learn of the horrors of the Famine of 1933, the arrests, trials and summary executions of 1937. From that point I came to hate communism, to hate Russian imperialism as much as I hated German fascism.

In 1943 I joined the organized struggle against German Nazism and Russian communism in the role of political instructor in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In the USSR I was sentenced the first time for my participation in the UPA, the second time for my refusal to participate in the repressive organs, and the third time for writing my memoirs (*Life Sentence*). In all three cases I was sentenced for political reasons, because I could not make peace with the regime of Russian communism. My weapon in this struggle was the word and only the word. All totaled, I spent 37 years in Polish, German and Russian prisons and camps, and 5 years in exile.

Not everyone is talking a lot about "glasnost" because people tend towards wishful thinking. I consider this "glasnost" a deception of public opinion in the USSR and to a greater extent, here in the West. Can one seriously accept this "glasnost" and these "reforms" when the organization of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine still remains a secret and uncondemned by the government of the USSR? When today those who were sentenced and died in confinement for writing and speaking about the famine remain unrehabilitated? When today the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches are denied a legal existence regardless of the fact that their right to exist is recognized in the Soviet Constitution, in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords? When they have not rehabilitated those who, in accord-



*Former political prisoner Danylo Shumuk (left) and translator Yuriy Dobczansky from the Library of Congress at the CSCE hearing in Washington.*

ance with the Constitution of the USSR called for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union or those who spoke out against the Russification of Ukraine?

In 1972 during my trial, the director of the Pioneer camp where I worked was called as a witness. The judge asked him: "What can you tell us about Shumuk?" He answered: "Shumuk's attitude towards his work was faultless, but he always and everywhere spoke only in Ukrainian and expressed indignation about the fact that all the posters in our camp were in Russian. In 1970, we wanted to write above all the entranceways to the camp: 'Dobro pozhalovat' (Welcome) in Russian, and Shumuk wanted to write this in Ukrainian, and then I realized that he is a nationalist."

And they sentenced me as a nationalist. I bring up this point just to illustrate that not only almost 20 years ago, but today on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the terror of Russification of my people has reached a culmination point. In the capital of Ukraine, in Kyiv, there are only 34 Ukrainian-language schools and 152 Russian-language schools and in such traditionally Ukrainian cities as Donetsk, Voroshilovohrad, Mykolayiv and Chernihiv, there are none. In the historical Ukrainian city of Zaporizhia there is only one, and 95 Russian schools. In the former capital of Ukraine, Kharkiv, there are only 2 Ukrainian schools, and 156 Russian schools. (More detailed information about these conditions in Ukrainian education is provided in the Kyiv newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 9, 1987. I request that a copy of the article be submitted for the record.)

I heartily welcome the fact that up to July 1987 the USSR finally allowed 2,378 Jews to emigrate, that several of my prison companions — Russian prisoners —

have left for the West. And I ask whether it is "glasnost" if until now they have allowed only two Ukrainians to leave, as fortune would have it, myself and Yosyp Terelya?

My friends from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Shukhevych and many others are still trying to leave. This is a problem not only for us Ukrainians. The problem of Ukraine becomes a problem for the entire Western world, for the 35 nations that signed the Helsinki Accords. To this day the principles of Helsinki have not reached my people. Ukraine is still not included in the Helsinki process—a problem we addressed in our memorandums. There is still not even one Western consulate in Kyiv, not to mention the absence of an accredited journalist. And I ask: is this normal for a nation of 50 million, for the largest European nation in the 20th century?

I am deeply convinced that it is in the interest of the USA and Canada, where I have now made my home, and in the interest of all Western nations to support in practice my nation's aspirations to independence using peaceful means, diplomacy and negotiations. It is in the interest of peace on earth and normal relations among nations that Ukraine be an independent state in the UN and among all nations—an equal among equals. The independence of Ukraine, the Baltic nations, and all of the republics of the USSR would be a great step towards achieving a stable and longlasting peace in the entire world.

Then the danger of Russian communist infiltration of Nicaragua, the countries of South America, Africa and Asia would be diminished. Taking advantage of the current situation in the USSR, I am convinced that much could be achieved in this area. I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that you and the US Congress will take my thoughts into consideration.

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*Tengiz and Eduard Gudava*

## **GEORGIAN NATIONALISM REMAINS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE PEOPLE**

*The following is the statement of Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, Georgian national and human rights activists, before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1987.*

Recently, the national problem in the USSR has become more acute. There are indications that the authorities want to compensate for limited progress in individual rights by instituting retrogressive national policies, which result in the increasing of the population (for example, the events in Kazakhstan and Latvia). The situation in Georgia is also becoming more dramatic. In view of this, the political importance of the human rights movement increases substantially.

Three major aspects can be identified with the human rights movement in Georgia:

1. The struggle for national interests;
2. Religious activity;

### 3. The defense of fundamental human rights.

Understanding the fundamental unity of these three aspects is growing among Georgian human rights activists, even though Georgian nationalism remains the most important issue for the people. This is to be expected because Georgia, like the Baltic States and Western Ukraine, were forcibly annexed into the USSR.

National consciousness, which is extremely strong among the intelligentsia and the students, covers a wide ideological spectrum, from the defense of local national interests to supporting the idea of national liberation.

For Georgian human rights activists, the idea of national liberation is directly associated with the following fundamental legal principles: the right of a nation to self-determination, the right of individuals to free expression of their views, the right of patriotic associations and the right to use democratic procedures in resolving the issue of Georgia's separation from the Soviet Union. The majority of Georgian political prisoners were imprisoned for supporting the last principle, even though that right is stated in the Soviet constitution. Thus, in Georgia, the struggle for national independence is a struggle for democratization and vice versa. In this, Georgian nationalists differ from, say the Basques or the Irish, who are in possession of all the democratic means for fulfillment of their programs.

These days, when the Soviet Union publicizes worldwide the "democratization" of its regime, we hear nothing about changes in the attitude of Moscow towards the right of the Georgian people for a democratic procedure to resolve the most fundamental question: that of the sovereignty or non-sovereignty of Georgia.

My brother, Eduard, and I are members of a movement, whose aim is the humanitarian fight against totalitarianism and tyranny, and which supports the ideals of liberty, democracy and human rights. We joined the movement as youths because we were critical of the Soviet system and were searching for the truth.

While we were medical students during the 1970s, we openly expressed our disagreement with many realities of Soviet life: the non-existence of freedom of speech or democracy and the issue of self-determination for the Georgian people, etc. For all this, we were subject to authoritarian force. Our parents were dismissed from their jobs for supporting our activity.

In 1978, we were convicted of speculation on trumped-up charges. I (Tengiz) was sentenced to four years in a labor camp; Eduard to three years. After our conviction, in 1982 we handed in an application to Amnesty International where we accused the Soviet government of tyranny and asked for legal help. At that time, we wrote an autobiographical book which was distributed as *samizdat* (underground literature).

In March 1982, we found our way into the British Embassy in Moscow where we told about ourselves and, under the threat of annihilation by the KGB, we asked representatives of the embassy to be witnesses to our fate. At the end of 1982, we were politically motivated to renounce our Soviet citizenship.

In 1983, we converted to Catholicism and began to take an active part in the life of the Catholic parish in Tbilisi. We organized a choir, obtained and distributed Bibles and church literature, issued religious *samizdat*, and arranged Catholic youth circles.

In searching for new forms of activity, at the end of 1984, we organized a "Phantom Orchestra." It consisted of refuseniks and dissidents, both Christians

and Jews. The purpose of the orchestra was to draw the world's attention to the breach of human rights in the Soviet Union. Orchestra members were subjected to various repressions such as searches, cross-examinations, and assault and battery. Even foreigners were subject to repression. In May 1985, four Boston musicians were deported from the Soviet Union after joining in concert with the "Phantom Orchestra."

In the spring of 1985, we joined the Georgian Helsinki group and renewed its activity. While we carried on our human rights activity, the KGB persecuted us constantly and we were subject to cross-examinations, threats, spying, searches and arrest. Our apartments were searched and bugged, our correspondence was inspected and blocked. We were deprived of any possibility of working in our specialty and, as a result, we lived in poverty.

In May 1985, we and our mother were accused of "slander against the Soviet state and social system" and later we were arrested and condemned. I (Tengiz) was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to seven years in a labor camp and three years in exile. Eduard was convicted of "hooliganism" on a trumped-up charge and sentenced to four years in a labor camp (he had hung out the following placard: "KGB, stop persecuting").

It is remarkable that I was accused of not only having taken part in the Georgian Helsinki group, the organization of the "Phantom Orchestra," religious and *samizdat* activity, but I was also guilty of a speech made by American Senators and Congressmen about the breach of human rights in Georgia. For the first months of the investigation, the KGB threatened to incriminate me on the grounds of "high treason" according to the paragraph "rendering assistance to a foreign state in conducting hostile propaganda with respect to the Soviet Union." During our imprisonment we did not stop fighting for our rights. We went on long hunger strikes. As a result of this, we were subject to additional floggings.

At the end of April 1987, we were discharged from prison in the course of Gorbachev's campaign for discharging political prisoners. But the powerful pressure of the KGB preceded our discharge from prison. The purpose of the pressure was to incline us to public "repentance" as a precondition for our discharge, although the authorities' actions ended in failure. We were discharged on the condition that we would emigrate from the Soviet Union.

On September 8, 1987, we arrived in Boston, Massachusetts.

## **Georgia and its national problems**

Georgia is situated between the Black and Caspian Seas and it borders Turkey and Iran. The population is approximately five million people, 70% of whom are Georgian.

The Georgian people are an ancient family which was organized as a state from time immemorial. In the fourth century, Georgia adopted Christianity and for centuries it was an advanced outpost of the Christian faith. In the 18th century Georgia fell under full Russian influence and it was turned into a province of the Russian Empire.

After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Georgia became independent. In 1921 it was occupied by the Red Army and became part of the Soviet Union. After that,

national liberation actions of the people did take place, but they were brutally suppressed. Now, Georgia is one of 15 Soviet republics.

All branches of industry are developed in Georgia. The most important is agriculture. Georgia is the main supplier of tea, citrus fruits and wine. The nature of Georgia is varied and favorable to tourism.

Georgian culture is rich and original. Shota Rustaveli, a poet and an intellectual, was born and worked creatively in Georgia in the 18th century. At present, Georgian theatre and cinematography are known all over the world.

However, the human rights community feels that the creative forces of the Georgian people are gripped by the vice of the communist regime. Many people in Georgia think that because of the general inefficiency of socialist economy, their natural national resources are being used inefficiently, and that, if Georgia were an independent state, it would flourish economically. The society is being eaten away by social sores: corruption and machination which are connected with the party and form a united "mafia".

The spiritual values of the Georgian people, such as their language, history, culture, and religion, are being persecuted and this arouses the anxiety of the intelligentsia. Only owing to the demonstrations of the intellectuals and students in 1978, did the Georgian language at last receive a constitutional status and became established and approved as the state language. However, this status is broken everywhere. The Georgian language is being excluded from scientific, administrative and management activity.

The teaching of Georgian history is curtailed. Many monuments of antiquity are being destroyed. To weaken the unity of the Georgian people, the further fragmentation of the Georgian national minority is encouraged. In addition, there is evidence of discrimination against Georgians residing in adjoining republics.

The issue of Meshs, or Georgian Moslems, is left unresolved. Meshs are Georgian Moslems who were deported by Stalin and deprived of any possibility of returning to the homeland.

The authorities prevent the opening of new parishes which are greatly needed. The mass actions of the believers toward this end are brutally suppressed. The official church hierarchy is under the control of the state, and is infiltrated with KGB agents. With a view to undermining church authority, amoral and criminal elements are installed in the priestly environment. The clergy and lay people who are against this, are subject to persecution.

The authorities subjugate the people for expressing patriotic and national-religious views. People are put on trial as state criminals or ordinary criminal cases are fabricated against them. At this time, we are aware of three names of Georgian patriots who have been suffering in prison for many years: Guram Gogbaidze, Valentina Pailodze and Boris Kukobava.

Currently the issue of building a Trans-Caucasus Mountain Pass Railway is extremely controversial. There is wide public opposition to this project and against the Soviet government because of the inherent danger to ecology, demography and historical monuments in the construction zone. Petitions have been submitted to the government which are signed by thousands of representatives of the intelligentsia, students and workers. Recently, the authorities started a campaign against the signatories: they are summoned by the KGB, the Central Committee of the Commu-

nist Party, where they are threatened and told to withdraw their signatures. Searches are conducted with confiscation of the lists of signatories. There is danger that unrest among the students will become widespread.

It should be noted that Gorbachev's *perestroika* has resolved none of the national problems of the Georgian people. Moreover, there is an opposite tendency. For example, after the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yegor Ligachev, visited Georgia in June 1987, the Georgian language divisions in all departments of Tbilisi State University were drastically reduced and a campaign to intimidate student activities was begun.

All of the national problems of Georgia are the consequence of the above issue, the prevalence of nationalistic ideas creates a specific character for the entire human rights movement. Together with a relatively underdeveloped open organization of human rights structures, there is a widespread of small, temporarily national, patriotic and religious groups, which exist in an atmosphere of very active student masses with the productive support of the scientific intelligentsia, especially in the humanities.

Human rights events tend to concentrate around several renowned activists and these events include the distribution of proclamations and petitions, often during demonstrations.

The Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group had two short periods of activity, both of which resulted in severe repercussions against the participants. First, the group announced its creation in January 1977, with six members. In four months it was attacked by the authorities and four members were arrested and its activity stopped. In the spring of 1985, the group appeared with new members, also numbering six. At that time, my brother and I became involved. Once again, after three months, the KGB destroyed the group: three members were imprisoned and two emigrated to the West.

In our activities, we emphasized the necessity to observe universal human rights norms. The group published several documents about the conditions of Georgian political prisoners, about unlawful deeds by the authorities, as well as appeals to the West regarding the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and a demand for freedom for Andrei Sakharov, etc.

Presently, the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group consists of two members: Ziyad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava. They are helped by many supporters whose names should not yet become public because of the danger of repercussions.

### **Gorbachev's "perestroika" and ourselves**

Our assessment of Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* coincides with the opinions of many human rights activists we know in the USSR. Briefly, our conclusions are as follows:

Changes are occurring in the USSR and their importance should neither be under nor overestimated.

Of course, some of these changes are positive; a number of political prisoners have been released, some families have been permitted to emigrate, previously banned writers and their books have been "pardoned". Still, this campaign has its other side which not everyone wants or can see.

First, let us examine the motivations for all their changes. It is extremely naive to assume that present Soviet leaders are liberals striving for good. It is enough to mention that we were already arrested and sentenced during Gorbachev's rule, and we experienced the entire depth of Shevardnadze's "humanism" during his tenure as head of the Georgian Communist Party.

Changes occurring in the USSR are necessitated by pressure from three directions:

1. Socio-economic: there is fear of another Poland, where the decline in the standard of living, together with the flourishing of corruption and protectionism, resulted in an explosion of indignation not only among individual dissidents, but involving the entire working class.

2. Military-economic: here there is fear of SDI as a project capable of making technological superiority of the West real and irrefutable.

3. Ideological: there is fear of continuous increasing political and moral isolation of the Soviet regime which is deservedly considered to be an "evil empire".

Accordingly, the Soviet Union was forced to undertake these changes in order to stop dangerous tendencies and to preserve and strengthen its totalitarian and misanthropic nature. Secondly, positive changes in the Soviet system have been long awaited by human rights activists, both in the USSR and abroad.

*Glasnost* and democratization were and are essential goals of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and they were formulated long before Gorbachev. Many activists have sacrificed their lives in the struggle for these ideas. The present exclusion of the human rights movement from the process of *glasnost* makes it a mockery of real *glasnost*. At the same time, the attitude of Soviet authorities toward human rights activists and the human rights movement have not changed.

Freed political prisoners were not rehabilitated, but rather "pardoned" under various fabricated excuses. The process of their release was not covered in the Soviet press, except for a couple of very short and absolutely deceitful paragraphs in the newspapers.

The jamming of some Western radio stations is continuing, as well as the ban of the publication of the best masterpieces of free literature.

Fundamental human rights — of speech, of obtaining information, of freedom of religion and association, of emigration and return, of due process of defense, etc. — are not guaranteed now any more than they were under Gorbachev's predecessors.

Changes in legislation (both already introduced and expected) — are designed to legitimize the deficient Soviet interpretation of human rights which is drastically different from what is universally accepted. Real modification of the Soviet legal system should have begun with a modification of the foundation — the totalitarian and anti-human rights Soviet constitution. The hounding of human rights activists continues in the USSR finding, however, new forms.

Gorbachev's entire policy in the human rights area is based on a primitive use of the Western media: the exploitation of propaganda from the release or emigration of each dissident or a *refusenik* separately and the extensive "marketing" of sensationally democratic announcements and hints. Gorbachev is playing on the desire of the West to discover a human face in the image of the Soviet beast. He is

creating a mirage in the desert, visible to everybody to the extent of his or her impressionability.

Thirdly, human rights activists see as a major danger of the process now occurring in the USSR, the camouflaging of the real Soviet attitude towards human rights.

This real attitude has not changed. Together with a smoke screen of Soviet propaganda and the attempt by Soviet ideologues to substitute the universal interpretation of human rights with their own, they pose a danger of not only the reinstatement of past suppression of individual rights in the USSR, but also of its expansion worldwide.

Where are the guarantees that this practice of suppression is not going to be reintroduced? Who will be accountable for the death and suffering of hundreds of people whose only "crime" was defending their own legitimate rights, dignity and freedom?

Still intact is the whole apparatus of the KGB and those articles in the criminal code which leave the possibility for further terror against dissidents. "Repentance" in this system goes no further than artistic allegories.

It is our belief that only an open and democratic trial of the instigators and executioners of repression against human rights would be a real indicator of *glasnost* and democratization in the USSR. Only such a trial could act as a watershed between the 70 years' bloody history of the Soviet regime and Gorbachev's rule.

Our slogan for today is: KGB, stand and be accountable! Totalitarianism, stand and be accountable! We strongly believe that the Soviet communist system brings a continuously increasing threat to the world at large. At the foundation of this system there is a denial of the spiritual nature of man, of freedom of choice.

The history of this system is a history of monstrous crimes against human rights, against humanity and the rule of law, in conjunction with the devilish ability to conceal its atrocities and escape responsibility.

The global danger of the present policy of *glasnost* in the USSR comes from the preservation and strengthening of the criminal nature of the Soviet system. The stabilization of the system at a new level will give it even more power.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that there is a lack of understanding of this situation in the West. At the same time, we are certain that understanding the Soviet system is necessary both to save Western democracy and preserve peace on this earth.

We hope to contribute as much as we can towards this great cause. We could propose a great many projects in this direction. We are counting on the understanding and help of the American authorities for the implementation of these projects.



Compliments of the season and sincere wishes for a

**MERRY CHRISTMAS**

and a

**HAPPY, PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR**

*to all our friends and readers of ABN Correspondence*

ABN Central Committee



## PUBLICATION OF UNOFFICIAL UKRAINIAN JOURNAL ANNOUNCED

The well-known Ukrainian human rights activist Vyacheslav Chornovil has written an open letter to Soviet Party leader Gorbachev, announcing the intention to openly publish an unofficial journal. The letter criticizes the fact that the national question has thus far remained untouched by the policy of *perestroika*, suggesting that nationality issues be discussed at a special plenum of the Central Committee.

Vyacheslav Chornovil, one of the veterans of the Ukrainian dissident movement and a former political prisoner, has announced the intention of a group of Ukrainian journalists and writers to renew the publication of a *samvydav* (underground publication) journal suppressed in the early 1970s. The announcement comes in a thirty-page open letter to CPSU general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev dated August 5, 1987 that has recently reached the West through *samvydav* channels.

Chornovil, arguing that former political prisoners like himself have been prevented from contributing to the official press, maintains that they, in effect, have been forced to seek out other means of communicating with readers:

I am informing you that a few Ukrainian journalists and writers who have been barred from their professions and the press, including myself, are legally resuming the publication of the socio-political and literary journal *Ukrainskyj Visnyk* (*Ukrainian Herald*), which came out in the difficult conditions of the years 1970-72, and which fully meets today's requirements of *glasnost*. (A declaration to the appropriate departments is being sent separately, along with a statement of the publication's program and a request to allow the minimum possibility for the journal to be published, at least the personal inviolability of its associates.

According to Chornovil, Ukrainian writers, journalists, and artists who have been excluded from membership in the official creative unions may also form their own unofficial groups.

As is clear from the text of the letter, the idea of publishing an unofficial journal is a reaction to the unsatisfactory results of Gorbachev's campaign for *glasnost* and *perestroika* insofar as the national question is concerned. Chornovil argues that "today the national question, the most important question for a multinational country that has proclaimed itself a union of sovereign socialist states, finds itself in the most obscure blind alley of restructuring":

Theory (including your speeches at congresses and plenums) is totally devoid of any analysis of the real state of affairs, and the same general phrases about "flourishing and drawing together" that are known still from Stalinist times are repeated, with the same warnings about the inadmissibility of preserving national survivals (although, in practice, one such "survival" that is being banished now for almost sixty years turns out to be, above all, the national languages of the non-Russian members of this "equal" union.)


Referring to a speech made by Yegor Ligachev in Tbilisi last June, Chornovil argues that if it also reflects Gorbachev's thinking then it must be concluded that thus far no alternative has been found to the Stalinist nationalities policy pursued in the Soviet Union to the present day. This is borne out, he says, by the regime's reaction to the disturbances in Alma-Ata, which were seen only as manifestations of local nationalism. The practical consequence was a reduction of the number of Kazakhs in the republic's institutions of higher education and an influx of Russians, russified Ukrainians, and others.

In practice, maintains Chornovil, restructuring with regard to the national question has been limited to permitting cultural figures, for the most part writers, to talk about "the depressing situation" of the national languages and the cultural heritage of their nations. Even so, says Chornovil, this discussion has been conducted on a superficial level, without delving into the reasons for the existing situation and avoiding any references to the erosion of the statehood of those nations comprising the Soviet Union. At the same time, in the name of equality, "chauvinists" have been given an opportunity to voice their views. As a case in point, Chornovil notes the article by Oleg Trubachev, a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, published in *Pravda* on March 28, 1987, which he says resulted in many protests.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, Chornovil feels that the situation is hopeless as long as the present republican Party leadership remains in power:

Here in Ukraine, many people think that in order for restructuring to finally reach the republic, the entire Shcherbitsky "team" — poisoned by bureaucracy, corruption, and chauvinism — should have been removed from leading positions at the center and on the local level a long time ago (chauvinism, as Lenin noted, is often associated with "russified non-Russians").

Chornovil also has some concrete suggestions for Gorbachev, should the Soviet Party leader consider returning to "the Leninist norms of national life in the Union." First of all, a special plenum of the Central Committee should be convened that would tackle the problem with the same courage and candor that Gorbachev displayed when outlining the country's economic situation at the June Plenum of the Central Committee. The proposed plenum should tell the entire truth about the real situation of the non-Russian nations in the USSR, about the fictitious character of their statehood, and how current policies are totally out of line with Lenin's legacy. It should restore to its rightful place Lenin's thesis that the main danger as far as national relations is concerned has been and remains "great power chauvinism" rather than "local nationalism." Other topics that need to be addressed include a discussion of Moscow's central role in planning and implementing Soviet nationalities policy. This is in reaction to the argument that has been put forth by some Ukrainian writers recently to the effect that the real villain here is the local Ukrainian Party leadership that has hoped to win favor at the center by being holier than the pope. Chornovil also proposes that such a plenum finally discard the notion that the Soviet Union's nations will eventually be "merged," and that it provide a legal guarantee for the non-Russian languages by specifying them as state languages in the republican constitutions. And, in order that the Central Committee properly prepares itself for such an undertaking, Chornovil suggests that its



*Vyacheslav Chornovil, Ukrainian Helsinki Group member, sentenced in June 1980 to 6 years' labor camp. Photo from 1970.*

members acquaint themselves with some of the Ukrainian dissident writings on the subject, particularly Ivan Dzyuba's classic essay *Internationalism or Russification?*

The *glasnost* aspect of Gorbachev's policies with regard to filling in the so-called blank pages of history is also subjected to severe criticism insofar as Ukraine is concerned. Chornovil provides a long list of individuals and specific issues — beginning with the first decades of the twentieth century and ending with the suppression of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group at the end of the 1970s — that thus far have either been totally ignored or treated only superficially. The modern history of Ukraine, he points out, has been written largely in terms of the history of its Bolshevik Party. According to Chornovil, Ukrainian historians would do better if they took some pointers from their colleagues in neighboring Poland.

In closing, Chornovil expresses the hope that he will have the opportunity to discuss these issues in more depth with Aleksandr Yakovlev, whom he describes as being an adherent of Gorbachev's policies, and explains that the choice of an open letter was dictated by the expectation that it would come to the attention not only of the addressee, but would also reach a wider circle of the Party leadership and the public as a whole.

Chornovil's letter to Gorbachev displays the same uncompromising stand on fundamental issues that previously landed him in the Gulag on four separate occasions. If his criticism of Ukrainian writers and other intellectuals who have recently been pressing for changes in the Kyiv press, particularly with regard to the language question, seems unfair in view of the past experiences of those who have expressed divergent views, the basic thrust of his argument can hardly be challenged. To date, the Party has yet to address the national question in any serious shape or form.

## UNOFFICIAL JOURNAL *AUSEKLIS* APPEARS IN LATVIA

The first copies of *Auseklis*, an unofficial journal on political, social, and literary topics, started to circulate in Latvia in mid-October, 1987. A copy of the typed journal has subsequently reached the West. *Auseklis* is the first uncensored publication of its kind to appear in postwar Latvia. A review of the journal shows that it remains true to its stated purpose: it disseminates ideas and documents that the official media, even during this period of officially endorsed "openness," will not print.

Taking advantage of Gorbachev's policy of "openness," three Latvians have decided that the time is ripe for the publication of a nonprofit journal that would disseminate ideas and information conspicuously absent from the official media. They have, no doubt, been buoyed by the appearance of *Glasnost* in Moscow on August 20 and perhaps also by the Ukrainian human rights activist Vyacheslav Chornovil's intention to resume openly the publication of *Ukrainskyj Visnyk*, a *samvydav* journal on socio-political and literary themes that was suppressed by the Soviet authorities in the early 1970s.

### Preparations and Plans

On October 6, Ivars Zuvovskis, Lidija Doronina-Lasmane, and Ausma Kresla submitted a request to the Latvian SSR Council of Ministers to publish and disseminate free of charge 20 to 30 copies of a journal called *Auseklis*; attached to the request was a manuscript of the journal's first issue. Zuvovskis and Doronina-Lasmane are former political prisoners and are well known in dissident circles, but almost nothing more than her address in Riga is known about Kresla. After receiving no reply from the authorities for about two weeks, they decided to start distributing the unofficial journal. The first issues appeared in mid-October in Riga. About 40 copies of *Auseklis*, probably the first uncensored journal of its kind to be produced in Latvia in the postwar years, are now in circulation. There are plans to publish the journal bimonthly and to issue a supplement for younger readers.

### Appearance and Purpose

The title page features a drawing reminiscent of the female figure that holds three stars on top of the Statue of Liberty in Riga; this figure is enclosed by an eight-pronged star, which for centuries has been a Latvian symbol for the morning star or *Auseklis*. Centered under the drawing is the journal's name in capital letters. *Auseklis* was also the pen name of Mikus Krogzemis, a poet popular during Latvia's national renaissance in the 19th century. Thus, the drawing and the name seem to suggest the dawn of freedom. The journal's motto and name are given on the title page; it is stated that the issue is the first of 1987 and that it is an independent journal on social, political, literary, and religious topics.

The first 4 of the journal's 122 typed, unillustrated pages are devoted to explaining why it was founded. The unsigned introduction, presumably by the editor Zuvovskis and his assistants, Doronina-Lasmane and Kresla, states that since the republican press has been slow to implement the revolutionary changes

advocated by the present CPSU leadership, the need exists for an uncensored publication to transmit information and ideas not found in the party and government-controlled media, hence, the appearance of *Auseklis*. The authors add:

We are Latvian patriots and shall fervently uphold our national interests, but at the same time we shall respect the national sentiments of other nations and view Latvians simply as a nation equal among other nations. We take pride in our nation's traditional hospitality, and we shall urge our compatriots to receive with the utmost cordiality those who come to us as friends and those who wish to get to know Latvia and the Latvians; but those who despise, scorn, and humiliate us should not count on amity. Believing in equal standing and equal rights, we shall strive for mutual understanding with members of the other nationalities living in Latvia. We shall demand that the wrongs inflicted upon our nation during Stalin's tyrannical rule be recognized. We are deeply convinced that even the sharpest disagreements and the most complicated problems can be resolved through constructive discussions and the willingness of both sides to compromise. Aware of the perilous situation of our nation in the world arena, we believe in our tenacity to survive as a nation and in a brighter future for Latvia. This faith in a brighter future will serve as the foundation for our activity. The journal's motto comes from Ranis' eloquent poetry:

"That new era, tremulous in the rustling wind,  
Will not arrive, unless we bring it in."

In conclusion, the introduction urges readers to support actively the policies of the new era ushered in by the CPSU.

### **Organization of Contents**

As promised on the title page and in the table of contents at the end, the journal covers a broad spectrum of topics, organized into the following sections: news and information (48 pages), prisoners of conscience (19 pages), literature (13 pages), religion (17 pages), and history (20 pages). The same categories will be used in the next issue of the journal which will deal primarily with the demonstrations of August 23.

### **News and Information**

As its name indicates, the first section contains topical reports, recent documents, and polemical articles on current issues. It is the journal's longest section and contains the following: a description of the demonstration in Riga on June 14, 1987; six statements by the Latvian human rights group Helsinki '86 about the demonstrations of June 14 and August 23, which the group organized; a letter from Zukovskis to the Latvian Communist Party newspaper *Cina* on a vitriolic article by Jazeps Zelonka, published on June 17, about the demonstration of June 14 and its initiators; a cogent article by M. Leimanis urging that Latvian be made the official language of the republic; another article by Zukovskis calling on the Soviet authorities to discuss crimes against humanity committed not only under Hitler but also under Stalin; critical remarks about *glasnost* and freedom of the press by A. Strelyanny, a member of the Board of Editors of *Novyj Mir*, made in a speech to Komsomol activists at the Moscow State University; information about the plight and the aims of the Crimean Tatars; and a biographical sketch of the journalist Pavils Ducmanis, who collaborated with both the Nazi and Soviet

regimes in Latvia. Interspersed between these articles are statistical data comparing conditions in independent Latvia with those under the Soviet Union. These facts do not merely fill space but also counterbalance Soviet propaganda about Latvia in the 1920s and 1930s.

### Prisoners of Conscience

The second section focuses on the political prisoner Gunars Astra, an advocate of democratic changes and national rights in Latvia. Astra was charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and was sentenced on December 15, 1983 to 7 years in a special regime camp (the harshest type in the Soviet Gulag) and 5 years in exile. The sentence was so severe partly because he was considered a recidivist. He had been arrested and accused of industrial espionage in 1961; although the charges were completely unfounded, he was tried for treason and participating in organized anti-Soviet activity and was sentenced to 15 years. While in detention, Astra protested many times against the mistreatment of prisoners of conscience.

The journal includes a biographical sketch of Astra; an open letter dated June 6, 1987 to CPSU General Secretary Gorbachev from 19 Latvian and Estonian former political prisoners calling for Astra's release; letters from the signers of the open letter, asking the editors of *Dzimtenes Balss* and *Literatura un Maksla* to publish the appeal for Astra's freedom; an open letter to leading Latvian writers from the Riga-based Committee To Free Gunars Astra, which points out that in 1983 the authorities considered Astra's main offenses to be his possession of "forbidden" books, such as George Orwell's *1984* and Aleksander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago*, and Astra's English translation of a memorandum by 45 Baltic activists calling for the revocation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact; and Astra's stirring final statement at his trial before the Latvian SSR Supreme Court on December 15, 1983.

### Literature

Consisting of only 13 pages, this is the journal's shortest section. It compares the paeans to Stalin by the pro-regime writers Andris Vejans and Arvids Grigulis and anonymous poets with two poems by Andrejs Eglitis, an exiled Latvian poet living in Sweden. The second part of the section consists of the Reverend Juris Rubenis' incisive analysis of Chingiz Aitmatov's novel *Plakha*. Rubenis considers from a philosophical and nonsectarian viewpoint the different attitudes toward religion and faith expressed in the novel, which was published in *Novyj Mir* in 1986.

### Religion

This section features four documents issued by Renaissance and Renewal, a group of Latvian Lutheran activists; a careful assessment by Peteris Cekuls of the current conflict within the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Latvia over the consistory's inability to defend the Church and its clergy from the regime's attacks; an appeal from five Latvian clergymen to the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet to commute the death sentence of the Kazakh student Kairat Ryskulbekov, who participated in the riots in Alma Ata in 1986; and a trenchant sermon on the role of the Church in contemporary society by Dean Modris Plate that was removed by censors from the 1983 calendar of the Lutheran Church in Latvia.

## History

All of the articles in the journal's final section focus on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its effect on Latvia. The section summarizes the treaty and gives the full text of the appended secret protocol dealing with the Baltic States, an historical background of the Soviet-German treaty of 1939, and a brief review of the relations between Moscow and Berlin during World War II. This is followed by the text of a memorandum written in 1979 by 45 Baltic activists and endorsed by 4 Soviet human rights advocates, calling for the revocation of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and rectification of the wrongs committed as a consequence of it, and review by the UN General Assembly of the situation in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which have not been allowed to exercise their right of self-determination.

The concluding article, which illustrates Latvia's plight under Hitler and Stalin, is an interview with the German official who ordered the partial razing of a monument in Jelgava honoring those who had fought against the Germans and Russians after Latvia proclaimed its independence in 1918. A postscript states that the demolition work started by the German occupation forces was completed by Soviet soldiers and that a dragon-shaped "monstrosity" now stands on the site.

## CANADIAN M.P. DEFENDS YURIY SHUKHEVYCH

On Tuesday, October 20, 1987, Canadian M.P., Andrew Witer, brought to the attention of the House of Commons the plight of the Ukrainian political prisoner Yuriy Shukhevych. Mr. Witer pointed out that Yuriy Shukhevych has spent 33 years in Soviet labour camps, prisons and internal exile for the so-called crime of being the son of the commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Roman Shukhevych.

Mr. Witer also mentioned Yuriy Shukhevych's poor health and called on the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Government of Canada to use their influence to effect the immediate release of Yuriy Shukhevych and to send a clear reminder to the Soviet Government of its obligations as a signatory of the Helsinki Accords.

A significant factor was that Mr. Witer's statement was delivered in the presence of a visiting delegation of four members of the Supreme Soviet.

Later that day during a meeting of the Soviet delegation with a joint House of Commons and Senate External Affairs Committee, Mr. Witer questioned the Soviet delegation about the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the millennium of Christianity in Ukraine and emigration from the Soviet Union. Other members of parliament also questioned the Soviet delegation. David Kilgour asked about the Ukrainian famine, the murder of Polish officers at Katyn and Afghanistan. Bill Attwell asked about refuseniks and Jewish immigration, while others concentrated primarily on disarmament and the environment.

In response to a question on the formation of a Soviet Canadian parliamentary association, Mr. Witer stated that the Canadian people rejected such a proposal earlier this year. He stated that Canada has many citizens of Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian and Byelorussian origin whose firm position is that until the Soviet Union gets out of Afghanistan, until it respects human rights and complies with freedom of speech, political thought and worship, and discontinues deliberate Russification of the captive nations, Canadian parliamentarians do not have a common ground for debate with the Soviets. The response of the Soviet delegation was as expected.

## ON THE 45TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UPA

Three letters — UPA (Ukrayinska Povstanska Armiya — Ukrainian Insurgent Army) but what depth of meaning and what images do those letters evoke before our eyes. The wondrous Ukrainian Carpathian Mountains, the forests of Volyn. Young soldiers and commanders cleaning their weapons, learning the craft of warfare.

1941. June in Ukraine. Armed German columns approaching Ukrainian lands. The figures have merged with the tanks and foreboding hangs in the air. The German military might approaching and the Russian regiments retreating, leaving behind them prisons filled with Ukrainian leaders and the flower of Ukrainian youth. People searched among the corpses, identified relatives, buried them. However, there was no time to mourn them for long, because we began to build “new temples and fortresses” on the ruins.

The bells rang out. The joyous refrain of “Rise Ukraine” echoed from the radio station in Lviv. On June 30, 1941 the National Assembly in Lviv (initiated by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists under the leadership of Stepan Bandera) declared the restoration of the Ukrainian National Republic. Yaroslav Stetsko became head of the newly created Ukrainian National Government. The joyous news was carried across Ukraine all the way to Kyiv. Blue and yellow Ukrainian national flags fluttered in cities and towns, people knelt and kissed the warm, ancestral Ukrainian earth soaked in blood and tears. Princes of the Church, Metropolitan Andrey Sheptyckyj and Metropolitan Polikarp of Lutsk blessed the Ukrainian nation and its government. Churches, schools, libraries were opened, the people were rising.

However, Nazi Germany, armed to the teeth with the most modern armaments, did not respect the restoration of Ukrainian statehood. But Ukraine did not capitulate before Nazi Germany, the Nazi Germany which annexed Austria, which conquered France, the Benelux countries, Czecho-Slovakia and before whom, Poland capitulated after a three-week struggle.

World War II began and Ukraine was ideologically prepared for battle for its sovereignty and statehood, and aware of its goal. In Western Ukraine under Poland, the Ukrainian Military Organization created by Col. Yevhen Konovalets was active, which subsequently was reorganized into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The Organization brought with it awareness into Ukrainian cities and villages, strengthened their morale and raised faith in our strength and ability, raised courageous leaders who were not afraid to state before Polish courts that they were ready to die for the Ukrainian state.

In Central and Eastern Ukraine, after the loss of independence which was declared in Kyiv with the IV Universal in 1918, Ukrainians did not lay down their arms, but continued the armed struggle with the communist Russian invaders for many years. The trials of the members of the Organization for the Liberation of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Youth Organization as well as the artificial famine of 1932-33 organized by Moscow shook the conscience of the Ukrainian nation. The people would not surrender. The enemy was unable to break or destroy

the Ukrainian nation, which continually brings forth new strength to build a new life on the ruins of the old.

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists gave the Ukrainian people faith in their own strength, faith and trust in their government and faith in the victory of just truth — the right of our nation to be master on our own land. The proclamation of the restoration of the Ukrainian State took place not only in Lviv with the Act of June 30, 1941, this proclamation was repeated across all the cities and towns of Ukraine. The people rose not only to freedom, but to grasp the opportunity to announce to the world that only the Ukrainian nation could be master on Ukrainian soil.

The war between Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia provided such an opportunity, because this war was being waged over Ukraine, not over its independence, but over its riches and resources, its land and its people. Ukrainian nationalists were not surprised by this, they were prepared because they had not forgotten the order of the great hetman Ivan Mazepa: "You will have rights only through the sword!" That is why members of underground nationalist groups, risking their lives, pursued the retreating Bolshevik forces, to confiscate their weapons, which very soon became necessary in building up our own military.

Lesya Ukrainka, a Ukrainian poetess, lived with hope for the "morning star", which would pierce the darkness of night and show our nation the path to freedom. She believed and lived with a vision for a better future. When World War I ended, her prophetic words came true. The morning star in Ukraine took flame, dimmed, and burned once again. And despite our rights and freedoms being trampled and destroyed, not even defeat in the war for the liberation of Ukraine, nor the terror enforced by Moscow's oppressors could stop the Ukrainian nation from its striving for freedom and statehood. That is why when the Nazi sword of destruction hung over the world, the morning star once again burned in Ukraine. When the enemy was terrorizing the Ukrainian people with oppression and famine, plundering our lands and shedding our blood, we did not humbly stand by, we prepared for battle and the threat of Ukrainian national revolution hung over the enemy.

In April, 1942, the Second Conference of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists adopted the following resolution: "We will base our policy on the creation and strengthening of our own revolutionary, political and military forces and on an independent, all-Ukrainian policy of revolutionary struggle."

On October 14, 1942, the first armed divisions of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army were formed in Polissia. October 14 is the feast of the Ukrainian Army, the feast of St. Mary, the Protectress. It is also the date of the formation of the modern Ukrainian armed forces — the Ukrainian Insurgent Army. The UPA quickly spread from Polissia and Volyn to the Kamyanetska, Vynnytska, Zhytomyrska and Kyivska oblast. News of the UPA was spread across all of Ukraine. The Third Conference of the OUN in February, 1943, having examined its external political resolutions, confirmed that the UPA had taken upon itself the defense of the Ukrainian population. In July, 1943, 12 Ukrainian oblasts had joined the armed struggle against the occupants. OUN became the backbone in the structure of the UPA, it provided the revolutionary struggle with ideological-political clarity and direction.

Three components, — the re-established Sovereign Independent Ukrainian State, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent

Army, together created a powerful force which challenged the two totalitarian occupants —Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia to war. The nation was filled with the spirit of heroism.

Foreign historians write that in the course of only one year, divisions of the UPA engaged in 531 defensive battles, 82 offensive battles, 112 acts of sabotage and 47 propagandive raids. The minister of defense of communist Poland, General Swierczewski and the Bolshevik General Vatutin were assassinated by UPA detachments.

What gave the UPA the strength and the courage to fight against the greatest military force of Europe of that time — Nazi Germany, and later with the shifting fronts, against both totalitarian powers, Nazi Germany and Communist Russia? The strength and courage stemmed from the fact that the nation was ready and aware of its purpose. Young men and women freely and readily joined the ranks of the UPA and the people supported them as they best could, providing food and clothing. The partisans obtained their weapons by taking them from the enemy.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army became an all-national army. Not one country in the world helped the UPA. Its own nation helped and that is why the UPA was able to sustain itself for so long. The UPA defended the Ukrainian nation and the ideal of the Ukrainian State for over ten years. Moscow needed the help of Communist Poland and Czecho-Slovakia to defeat the UPA.

When the leader and several members of the Ukrainian National Government were arrested, the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council was created in 1944 on the initiative of the OUN-UPA, whose secretariat was headed by a member of the Ukrainian National Government, General Roman Shukhevych-Taras Chuprynka. The UPA was not only an armed force, these were politically aware people. It was the UPA divisions who protected the first Conference of the Subjugated Nations in 1943 in the forests of Zhytomyr. It was the UPA divisions who carried the motto of ABN "Freedom for Nations! Freedom for Individuals!" to Byelorussia, the Baltic countries and the Caucasus. They carried the idea of a common liberation front to Poland, Rumania, Czechia, Slovakia in 1945 and 1946. Armed divisions of the subjugated nations were formed along-side the UPA. It was members of the OUN and UPA, imprisoned in Siberia, who organized strikes, mobilized not only Ukrainians but people from all the subjugated nations, strengthening a common front against Moscow's tanks. And today, those who return from concentration camps, add to the fame of those OUN-UPA members, who stood firm and unbroken in their ideals even in the face of death. When members of the OUN and UPA found themselves in other subjugated countries, they used their experience to organize underground resistance movements there against our common enemy — Moscow. Artem Yuskevych organized such a movement in Estonia, for which he and his Estonian friends were arrested and sentenced to imprisonment in Siberia, where he died.

On the 40th anniversary of the UPA, Patriarch Yosyp Slipyj wrote the following in his epistolary letter: "The UPA was born out of the sacrificing love for our homeland, which became a live boundary, clear symbol and a flaming sign for the future and the coming generations. Even though the enemy forced many UPA fighters into prisons and death camps, along with our Church hierarchy, priests and the faithful of both Ukrainian Churches, even though the enemy tried to defame

our fighters and martyrs, ruining and grazing their graves with tanks, they could not destroy the UPA. It lives on, like a living legend because the UPA placed itself under the protection of the Blessed Virgin.”

Forty years ago, on the orders of its leadership, several divisions of the UPA embarked on missions. They were led by fearless, brave commanders: Hromenko, Burlaka, Krylach, Lastivka and others. They were ordered to go West. Through enemy lines and hermetically sealed borders, they reached the Free World, the American zones in Austria and Germany. Many of these brave men died on the way fighting with the enemy, but the majority reached their destination. At last, the Western press carried reports that the UPA is fighting in Ukraine and its divisions had reached the West. Those who came told of the terror which was reigning in the nations subjugated by Moscow, an ally of the West. In 1949 an appeal from the leadership of the UPA in Ukraine to the Ukrainian emigration was issued. It stated: “Fighters and commanders of the UPA! You fulfilled your orders bravely. The nation rejoices that you have reached the free zones to voice a protest before the whole world, to protest the subjugation of the Ukrainian nation by the Russian Bolshevik occupant, and to tell the truth about the liberation struggle in Ukraine. Although you are far from your homeland, your struggle is not over. The enemy which is subjugating your native land is active there as well and you must fight against him.”

The raids which convinced the doubting Thomases that the UPA exists and is fighting, also showed that we could not count on help from the West after Yalta and Potsdam. This convinced us even more that we had to rely on ourselves, both in Ukraine and outside of it. In the aforementioned appeal, it was also stated: “Represent your country and its liberation struggle with dignity — each Ukrainian outside of his struggling homeland, is a representative of his nation. Each Ukrainian person must carry the ideals of Ukraine, must unceasingly speak the truth about the USSR to all nations and must mobilize them to fight against Russian Bolshevik imperialism, must organize all nations subjugated or threatened by Moscow into a single, united front.”

The struggle of the Ukrainian nation continues. And today, when we commemorate the UPA, let us remember the words of the Prime Minister of the Ukrainian National Government, Yaroslav Stetsko, in his greeting to soldiers and commanders of the UPA in 1982: “Focus your attention on the young generation, counteract pacifism and scorn for armed struggle, because no enslaved nation liberated itself without an armed struggle. Remember that nations who had too many heroes never ceased to be, it is nations without heroes and martyrs that disappear.”

Commemorating the 45th anniversary of the UPA, let us remind the world that we cannot expect anything good from Moscow while it enslaves other nations, while its communist totalitarian system continues to exist.

We don't know where the graves of the brave soldiers of the UPA are, we don't know where Gen. Taras Chuprynka is buried, but we do know that the Ukrainian nation has not laid down its arms. New generations were raised on their heroism and they are preparing for the decisive battle. That is why Moscow fears the UPA even now, arresting and sentencing its former members to death. Ukraine is rising up to freedom. The death of heroes and martyrs for both God and Ukraine was not in vain.

## NATIONALISM IN LATVIA

In July, 1986, a group of Latvians, most under the age of 45, formed a new Helsinki monitoring group in the city of Liepaja, demanding that Mikhail Gorbachev allow Latvia to implement its constitutional right to secede from the Soviet Union. The group also sent letters to the United Nations and Pope John Paul II, asking that action be taken to halt the Russification of their once independent nation.

In September, 1986, hundreds of Latvians, many of them young, braved a tight ring of KGB security agents to approach Americans participating in the Chautauqua Conference in Jurmala, Latvia. Some shouted, "We are slaves of the Russians." Others pleaded for help from the West saying, "We are waiting for freedom and you are our only hope."

On December 27, 1986, over 300 Latvian youths returning from a rock concert, marched down the main street of Riga, the nation's capital, shouting, "Down with Soviet Russia! Freedom in a free Latvia." Tourists who witnessed the event reported that several Soviet militia cars were overturned. A similar demonstration occurred a week later.

Nationalism in Latvia, like that in neighbouring Estonia and Lithuania, is not new. Ever since the Soviet Russians invaded and occupied the three Baltic countries in 1940, anti-Russian sentiment has understandably been strong. What is significant here, and seems reflected in other non-Russian Soviet-ruled republics such as Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Georgia, is that the common denominator in all these anti-Russian manifestations is youth. In all the above mentioned incidents, the key figures are Latvians born after Soviet rule was established.

One would think that after 46 years of rule in the Baltic States (and even longer in the other republics), a steady propaganda diet promoting "socialist internationalism" and the desirability of the "complete unity of nations" within the Soviet Union would have diminished the nationalist ardor of the Soviet-educated generations. Not so. To the contrary, it appears that in the non-Russian republics, youthful rebelliousness is expressing itself in decidedly nationalistic terms.

A Latvian-made documentary, "Is it easy to be young?" presently playing before packed houses in Moscow, shows Latvian "punks" and "heavy metal" kids decked out in chains, spiked bracelets and garish make-up, expressing open disenchantment with the Soviet Union. The opening of the film even documents a riot that occurred near Riga following a rock concert when over 100 youths demolished two rail cars.

The documentary does not reveal, however, that during the demolition of the rail cars, the Latvian youths were singing, "We will batter the red swan," a clearly anti-Russian verse from a song they had just heard at the concert. The severity of the Soviet punishment for one of the youths involved in the melee — three years in a strict regime prison — indicates that the authorities knew quite well that this wasn't just a case of adolescent hormones running amok.

Ironically, the fact that non-Russians are in fact "mastering the Russian language" could be the Kremlin's undoing. According to tourists returning from Latvia, the resurgence of nationalism among younger Latvians is accompanied by a

## 64 CONGRESSMEN ASK MOSCOW TO END IMPRISONMENT, PERSECUTION OF CATHOLIC PRIEST

Sixty four members of the U.S. House of Representatives have written to the Soviet official who oversees religious affairs in Lithuania to ask that a "wrongfully imprisoned" Roman Catholic priest now in a labor camp, be released and allowed to practice his vocation without interference.

In a letter to Religious Affairs Commissioner Petras Anilionis, dated October 1, the Congressmen express their concern that Father Jonas Kastytis Matulionis may not be allowed to go free in November, though that is when his three-year sentence in a general regime labor camp officially ends. They note that Matulionis, whose conviction on charges of "disturbing public order" was covered under the terms of a 1985 Soviet amnesty, was released on June 19, 1985, but rearrested 7 days later and returned to labor camp. The Congressmen term the circumstances surrounding Matulionis' second arrest "mysterious."

The letter also raises the issue of Matulionis' poor health, stating that at one point his weight in the labor camp had gone as low as 40 kilograms (90 pounds).

In addition, the Congressmen ask that Matulionis not be persecuted after he is released from the labor camp. They say the motive behind Matulionis' arrest in November 1984 was to punish him for graduating from an underground seminary after he had been denied admission to the only state-controlled seminary in Lithuania. The specific charge for which he was convicted under Article 199-3 of the Lithuanian SSR Criminal Code was leading a religious procession from a church to a cemetery.

The congressmen remind Anilionis of remarks made by his superior, Konstantin Kharchev, the top official in the USSR for religious matters, while the latter was visiting the United States in late August. They quote him as admitting that in the past the Soviet government made mistakes in its policy toward religious believers, which it was not attempting to reverse. According to the signers of the letter, the punishment of Fr. Matulionis for graduating from a seminary not sanctioned by the Soviet government was just such a mistake.

Father Matulionis is one of a dozen priests who have graduated from the underground seminary in Lithuania. Though the Soviet government refuses to recognize the legitimacy of these theological courses and harasses its graduates, the semi-

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growing curiosity about other Soviet minorities, i.e. fellow victims of Soviet Russian discrimination and repression. The deeply nationalistic Latvian rock song "Native Language" for example, was translated from a Moldavian poem.

Despite their ethnic and linguistic differences, the non-Russian minorities of the Soviet Union are discovering that they have something in common: a deep-seated resentment against the ethnic Russian majority. By learning the Russian language, however, they (the non-Russians) can communicate with each other more readily. In the long run, the Soviet ideologists in the Kremlin may achieve their "unity of nations", but it may not be what they had in mind.

*Baltic News, September, 1987*

narians are ordained by members of the official Catholic hierarchy and, in the eyes of the Church, enjoy all the rights and powers of their counterparts who graduate from the state-sanctioned seminary.

The Congressional letter on behalf of Rev. Matulionis was circulated on Capitol Hill under the auspices of the Lithuanian Catholic Religious Liberty Group, which is co-chaired by Representatives Edward Feighan (D-Ohio) and John Miller (R-Wash.). Miller and Feighan have sponsored three other letters to Soviet officials on behalf of jailed or exiled Roman Catholics from Lithuania.

*Lithuanian Information Center*

## **25 SENATORS URGE MOSCOW OFFICIAL TO FREE BISHOP FROM 26-YEAR EXILE**

Twenty-five U.S. Senators have called upon a leading official in Moscow who oversees religious affairs for the USSR to end the internal exile of Lithuanian Bishop Julijonas Steponavicius as the prelate marks his 76th birthday.

In an October 22 letter to Konstantin Kharchev, Chairman of the Council for Religious Affairs, the Senators expressed their concern over the banishment of Bishop Steponavicius in January 1961 to the small north Lithuanian town of Zagare from Vilnius, the Lithuanian capital, where he was serving as apostolic administrator. Noting that the bishop has never been formally charged with any crime, much less tried or convicted, the Senators call his quarter-century of exile "incredible."

In their letter to Mr. Kharchev, the U.S. lawmakers cited a Western news report that the Soviet government was considering legal reforms that would abolish the practice of internal exile. Though welcoming this prospect, they urged that the case of Bishop Steponavicius be resolved immediately, given his advanced age (he was born October 18, 1921) and his prolonged period of exile. The Senators requested that the bishop be allowed to return to Vilnius and take up his duties there as apostolic administrator.

Steponavicius was consecrated as a bishop by Pope Pius XII in 1955. In 1958, Pius XII appointed him apostolic administrator of the diocese of Vilnius and Panevezys. An apostolic administrator, as distinguished from a resident bishop, is appointed when the Pope wishes, in abnormal circumstances, to retain more direct administrative ties with a diocese.

Bishop Steponavicius was exiled by the Soviet government in 1961 for refusing to accept state control over the Catholic Church in Lithuania. He clashed with Soviet authorities who wanted to direct the selection of new priests and of faculty for the Lithuanian seminary, and who ordered him to prohibit priests from engaging in religious activities with youngsters.

The bishop is widely rumored to be the secret cardinal ("in pectore") appointed by Pope John Paul II in 1979. It is believed that the Pope bestowed the cardinal's hat on Steponavicius covertly to prevent harsher reprisals against him by Soviet authorities.

The letter to K. Kharchev was spearheaded by Senators David F. Durenberger (R-MN) and Donald W. Riegle, Jr. (D-MI), co-chairmen of the recently formed Lithuanian Catholic Religious Liberty Group in the Senate. The letter was also signed by the following Senators: Alfonse D'Amato (R-NY), Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (D-De), Jeff Bingaman (D-NM), Rudy Boschwitz (R-MN), Quentin N. Burdick (D-

## FORMER POLITICAL PRISONERS FORM NEW HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP IN UKRAINE



*Founding members of the Initiative Group for the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of Conscience: (from left) Vasyl Barladianu, Ivan Hel, Mykhailo Horyn, Zorian Popadiuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil.*

Five former political prisoners have formed an Initiative Group for the Release of Ukrainian Prisoners of Conscience in Ukraine.

In a statement dated October 3, the founding members — Vasyl Barladianu, Ivan Hel, Mykhailo Horyn, Zorian Popadiuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil — assert that the existence of prisoners of conscience in the USSR contradicts international agreements signed by the Soviet Union, the essence of the Soviet Constitution, as well as “those democratic changes that have been initiated in the country.”

The new group is the first such organization set up in Ukraine since the liquidation of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (The text of the statement is printed below.)

The establishment of a new human rights monitoring group in Ukraine comes at a time of increased political activity within the community of Soviet dissidents and former political prisoners.

Within the past several months a number of unofficial journals have also sought legal status from Soviet authorities. Among them is the *Ukrainskyj Visnyk* (Ukrainian Herald).

Like other groups who have recently sought redress of their grievances, particularly representatives of the non-Russian nations, the human rights activists have argued that their activities are fully consistent with the Communist Party’s avowed policies of *glasnost* and democratization.

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▶ ND), John H. Chafee (R-RI), Kent Conrad (D-ND), John C. Danforth (R-MO), Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), Pete V. Domenici (R-NM), John F. Kerry (D-MA), Frank R. Lautenberg (D-NJ), Patrick J. Leahy (D-VT), Carl Levin (D-MI), Spark M. Matsunaga (D-HI), Howard M. Metzenbaum (D-OH), Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY), Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK), Don Nickles (R-OK), Claiborne Pell (D-RI), Larry Pressler (R-SD), Paul Simon (D-IL) and Timothy Wirth (D-CO).

An estimated 80% of Lithuania’s inhabitants are believed to be practicing Roman Catholics. They comprise 2.5 million of the Soviet Union’s 4 million western rite Catholics.

*Lithuanian Information Center*

All five founding members of the Ukrainian group have previously served long terms in concentration camps. Two of the group's members, Messrs. Horyn and Popadiuk, were released earlier this year prior to the expiration of their terms.

## **Existence of Prisoners of Conscience Contradicts Human Rights Agreements Signed by USSR**

*Appeal of the Initiative Group for the Release of  
Ukrainian Prisoners of Conscience*

We, the undersigned, believe that the existence of prisoners of conscience in the USSR contradicts the international agreements of human rights signed by the government of the USSR, the nature of the constitution of the USSR, its laws and democratic transformations in the country which have begun in the government.

Further, the movement for the political democratization of life has come into conflict with the reality of the political situation in our country. The release of a portion of the prisoners of conscience by means of a pardon cannot hide the reason for their imprisonment and is a method of shifting the guilt from the authorities' shoulders during the Brezhnev-Andropov period onto the shoulders of their opponents, who throughout the last 10 years have struggled against the infringement of national and religious rights of individuals (in the USSR).

We, therefore call upon the government of the USSR to:

- a) remove from the Soviet Ukrainian criminal code and other national republics the constitutionally, discriminatory articles which were used to imprison those struggling for democratization.
- b) fully rehabilitate prisoners of conscience together with the compensation for the wrongs done to them.
- c) return to Ukraine the bodies of those prisoners of conscience who have died in the camps.

We turn to the world community to support our efforts. We will regularly inform them about the state of political life in our country and call upon all people to inform us about prisoners of conscience. We are ready to cooperate with organizations and groups, who work for similar aims in Ukraine, other Soviet republics and outside the USSR.

Oct. 3, 1987

*Signed:*

**Mykhailo Horyn (head of the group),  
Vasyl Barladianu,  
Ivan Hel,  
Zorian Popadiuk,  
Vyacheslav Chornovil,**

### **NOTE!**

The Ukrainian National Information Service (UNIS) reported on December 8, 1987 that Ivan Hel, Mykhailo Horyn and Vyacheslav Chornovil were arrested while on their way to Moscow for a conference on *glasnost*. After being detained for four hours, all three were released.

# CHRONICLE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN UKRAINE

## Special issue

On November 12, 1984, in Lviv, the chairman of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, Vasyl Kobryn, was arrested. During the search of his home, the tenth issue of *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine* was confiscated along with various church literature, a Catholic catechism, a missal, a Bible, several crosses and rosaries, as well as paper and materials for the next issues of the *Chronicle*.

Vasyl Kobryn is presently in Lviv prison.

\*\*\*

At about the same time, Father Hryhoriy Budzinskyj, the secretary of the Initiative Group, who was on his way to visit Yosyp Terelya in Transcarpathia, was abducted. On the way, Father Budzinskyj disappeared along with his driver — the Soviet KGB did not repeat the mistake of their Polish colleagues...

\*\*\*

On November 14, a search, which lasted 7 hours, was carried out in the home of Yosyp Terelya, member of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine and head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics. The search was carried out in connection with the arrest of Vasyl Kobryn.

It was carried out by the investigator of the public prosecutor's office, Mitsada, Ivan Ivanovych, local militiaman Lt. Bazhyv, and a "third person who did not identify himself". Four representatives of the village council were also present during the search. The report of the search

stated that it had been carried out in connection with the case of Vasyl Kobryn in order to find "Uniate clerical anti-Soviet literature" as well as "other documents and literature"...

When the prosecutor and the KGB man entered Terelya's home, he protested against the illegal nature of the search. Terelya needed to search the militia and KGB man in order to make sure that the guardians of communism were not carrying any narcotics or other rubbish. The Soviet law enforcers reacted vigorously, but eventually turned out their pockets after which they began their "work".

The owner of the home himself placed on the table all the "seditious materials" in his possession. These included: a catechism, a Bible, liturgical materials, a missal, a Psalter, a collection of poems by Iryna Ratushynska, various notes, his own poetry, and also various underground church literature, which included the book *My Saviour*.

After completing the search, the officials presented Terelya with the protocol, which he refused to sign because it was written in Russian. From the above-mentioned literature only one poem by Terelya was confiscated, as well as a typewriter and tape-recorder along with a cassette with an Easter broadcast and poems by Tychyna, Rylskyj and other classical figures of Ukrainian literature, including Shevchenko. The KGB man told the investigator not to take Ratushynska's poems or any of the other everyday things that are usually discovered during searches.

Terelya was summoned to appear at the district centre for questioning on November 15. However, on the night of No-

vember 14-15, he managed to flee from his guarded home and warn his friends.

\*\*\*

On November 14, a search was carried out in the home of Stefania Sichko, a member of the Initiative Group, who lives in the town of Dolyna, Panas Myrnyj Street, No. 14. During the search nothing was found. Stefania Sichko was warned not to leave.

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Between November 9 and 14, 310 Ukrainian Catholics were given a final warning by the authorities to accept Soviet passports by November 17, which these faithful members of the Church had disowned earlier. Not one Catholic carried out the order of the authorities, and so Soviet prisons and concentration camps are being filled with new victims of communist tyranny.

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**Appeal by the head of  
the Central Committee of Ukrainian  
Catholics, Yosyp Terelya,  
to Catholics in Europe  
and North and South America**

Glory be to Jesus Christ!  
Peace on you, Brothers and Sisters!

In Ukraine a new pogrom of Ukrainian Catholics has begun, (a pogrom) of all members of the Initiative Group. This year, Father Antin Potochnyak, a member of the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine, died in a Soviet concentration camp. He was serving a term of imprisonment in concentration camp VL-315/30, where he was killed on May 29 of this year, aged 72. Now there is a new pogrom of all members of the Group and also of the rank and file of the faithful of the Church.

What are the Ukrainian Catholics guilty of? We are guilty of one thing — we want to pray openly and bring up our children, but we are not permitted to do so...

We ask of the authorities only one thing — legalisation — but they incarcerate us in prisons and camps.

Brothers and Sisters! Friends! The time has come for a new trial for our people and our Church — pray for us, guilty ones, let your prayers help us to stand firm. These may be my last words of love to our Lord God Jesus Christ, to you, and to my friends and relatives...

Glory be to Jesus!

Glory forever!

Y. Terelya

Lviv, November 15, 1984

\*\*\*

Aleksander Oros, a Ukrainian Catholic and professor of Uzhhorod State University, is serving his sentence in difficult conditions in concentration camp YeCh-325/62, which is situated in the town of Cherkassy. According to available information, A. Oros has been forbidden to correspond with his friends and relatives, and also to make use of the camp shop.

\*\*\*

Ukrainian Catholic Pavlo Kampov, who is almost blind and is serving a sentence in difficult conditions in concentration camp OR-216/3-1 in the RSFSR, Kirov region, Rudychnyj settlement, is dying.

\*\*\*

In the village of Dovhe, Transcarpathian region, the authorities have warned Catholics Maria Trykur, her husband Mykhailo, and also Polanya Batyo, to accept Soviet passports. If they refuse, these faithful will be arrested and punished. This year, the above mentioned people re-

turned home from Soviet concentration camps, where they were serving a sentence for their faith and for Ukraine.

\*\*\*

According to available information, 2 more political prisoners have died in the Kuchino concentration camp VS-389/36-1, shortly after the tragic death of O. Tykhyj, V. Marchenko and Yu. Lytvyn. Who will be the next victims?

18.11.1984  
Y. Terelya

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### RESISTANCE OR SUBMISSIVENESS

Or

thoughts which I sometimes have...

Seven days ago, I made a decision which will affect both my own personal life and that of our movement for the legalisation of the Ukrainian Catholic Church.

Between November 12 and 14, the Initiative Group to Defend the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine was crushed. The secretary, Father Hryhoriy Budzinskyj, has "disappeared", along with his driver, and no one knows where; I have gone underground; and other members of the Group are under house arrest "until things are cleared up".

Three hundred and ten refuseniks, who have disowned Soviet passports and other documents, have been arrested "under the pretext" of the crushing of the Group...

Our movement had a loyal character vis-à-vis the authorities, but after my arrest opinions became divided.

On January 12 of this year, I was re-elected for another term as head of the Central Committee of Ukrainian Catholics and at the same time took on responsibility for the publication of *The Ukrainian Catholic Herald*. Remaining a member of

the Initiative Group, I also worked on *The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Ukraine*.

From here — from the underground — the world and everything we do appear different. Here, we have no room for thoughts of submissiveness. As a Christian and Catholic, I understand that all the work and endeavours to denigrate and hate God, that is to oppose Him, are doomed to failure.

The initial days of confusion have made us more confident that the former conditions are drifting over. The distress was necessary in order to lead the Church out of its state of uncertainty and confusion. Now everything is clear. They want to physically destroy us — to do what Stalin was unable to achieve. In time, wickedness violated, or rather rose up against, the eternal law. Through sin, which is the offspring of wickedness, Russia became what it is today — the land of practical atheism. Collective egoism and pseudochauvinistic slogans, nourished by sin and having gone through a national catastrophe, gave an appearance which is not unique since the beginning of the world.

Some people have a wrong opinion as regards the question of the Church, and in particular the Ukrainian Catholic Church. The very idea of "Church" is dangerous to the land of practical atheism and militant God-killing, and gives rise to much fear. For a "Church" is a "bond" and any "bond" (that is union) is hateful to the Satanists. But the "Ring of Nibelung" idea creates much anxiety and has already led Russia into a catastrophe in the past. Apparently, history does not teach anything.

Analogies easily come to mind: the Russo-Japanese war and its consequences, and now the Soviet Russian-Afghan war and its consequences which are difficult to foresee.

## 70 YEARS OF TYRANNY

The 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution is no cause for celebration. The revolution brought with it bloody terror and enslavement of once free nations. The pompous self-glorifying parades that were held in Moscow cannot hide the truth, and that is that the Bolshevik Revolution ushered in an era of totalitarian, imperialist Russian rule.

ABN representations in the United States, Great Britain and Denmark held demonstrations, distributed leaflets and submitted memorandums to their respective governments concerning 70 years of Soviet Russian communist rule.

In the United States, a conference was organized by the American Freedom Coalition in New York. Chaired by Richard Frazer, the conference included the following speakers: Mr. Habib Mayar — Afghan Community in America; Mrs. Slava Stetsko — ABN; Mr. Roy Innis — Congress of Racial Equality; Mr. P. Barry Farber, well-known radio commentator, and Mrs. Linda Shapiro, whose husband, a television camera operator was killed by the communists in Afghanistan.

On November 7, 1987, a demonstration was held outside the Soviet Mission to the United Nations in New York. The participants carried placards, distributed leaflets and information about the spread of Soviet Russian imperialism.

Ukrainians in Denmark held a 48-hour hunger strike on November 6 and 7. They also prepared a memorandum on the anniversary of the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, which they submitted to the government of Denmark and the governments of free western nations.

The ABN Delegation in Great Britain issued a statement to the press and to the British Government, pointing out that the 70 years of Bolshevik rule have been years of tyranny, terror, mass murder, mass starvation and enslavement. The text of the statement is printed below.

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▶ After the murder of Father Popieluszko and the disappearance of Father Budzinskyj (his body and that of the driver were not found) Ukrainian Catholics realised for certain that it is war! But why war? Why the persecution? The answer is that practical atheism is in a state of crisis.

Some radical Catholics can be heard voicing the opinion that a more realistic (form of) opposition to the regime than the perpetual appeals for recognition and legalisation should be adopted. Certain people, who are more categorical in their opinions, think that the time has come to use force and get involved in the war in Afghanistan, making use of China, in order to conduct partisan warfare not only for the liberation of Afghanistan, but also on

the territories of neighbouring republics. Other voices urge that people accept Israeli citizenship and join the Israeli army in order to cut off Moscow's reach in the Middle East. Others still, including me, believe that the regime will after all agree to the recognition and legalisation of our Church.

One should not forget that in Russia of the Soviets Stalinism is simply impossible, it cannot return. Indeed, it is not needed by Moscow's rulers; to speak well of Stalin does not yet mean to wish for his return. Even the current pogrom of the Ukrainian Catholic Church is a cul-de-sac and (reveals) the impotence of the authorities, which is a consequence of their rejection of Christ.

## STATEMENT

issued by the ABN, UK Delegation  
on the 70th Anniversary of the October Revolution

No other 70 years in the history of mankind have been so full of tyranny, terror, mass murder, mass starvation, mass enslavement, suppression of freedom, oppression and extermination of whole nations, international armed aggression, torture of disagreeing individuals and whole groups — whether on religious or other ideological grounds — of fraud, distortion, mendacity and forgery committed by the government and the ruling clique, than the last 70 years under communism. And this great “achievement” is now being celebrated!

No cosmetic public relations operations, such as the freeing of a few dozen dissidents, no three-hour speeches about the naughtiness of Stalinism (which is to be “investigated” by a special government commission), no hollow promises of no more dictating to the satellites, will abolish the Soviet Gulag. That prison of millions, that jail of directly enslaved and satellite nations is held together solely by brute force. *Glasnost* and *perestrojka* will hardly scratch the surface of the evil of that empire. Are they not being used as decoys to lure the Western powers into disadvantageous arms agreements? Deeds, not words should be demanded. When is the Soviet Union going to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan, East Germany, Poland and the rest of the Central European nations?

The threat of nuclear aggression, the endangering of world peace, the blackmailing of Western European nations in an attempt to neutralize and Finlandize them will be removed only when the Evil Empire is dismantled, nations and individuals set free, communist dictatorship abolished.

The governments of the free world should exert their influence and pressure in that direction instead of giving technological and other material aid to the Soviet Union. And the media in the free world should inform the public truthfully about the evils in the East and they should also put emphatic pressure on Moscow in the interests of human rights and freedom instead of trying to find excuses for the culprits and the culpable system every time when, despite the disinformation and propaganda spread abroad by the powerful communists and their front organization apparatus, the world learns about some communist crimes.

*Members of the ABN representation in Denmark during the hunger strike.*



## BOOK REVIEWS

### THE MILLENNIUM OF UKRAINIAN CHRISTIANITY

A monumental work in English entitled "The Millennium of Ukrainian Christianity" is being prepared by the Ukrainian Institute for Education in Munich. It will appear at the end of 1987 on the eve of the epochal event of Ukraine's official acceptance of Christianity in 988 during the reign of Grand Prince Volodymyr the Great.

The editor-in-chief is Prof. N. Chirovsky, and members of the editorial board are: Dr. A. Bedriy, Prof. Y. Borovsky, Prof. Dr. V. Omelchenko, L. Poltava, Prof. Dr. B. Romanenchuk, Dr. B. Stebelsky, Prof. Dr. W. Stojko. Numerous Ukrainian authors, renowned academicians and activists in Ukrainian Church life have contributed individual chapters to the work.

The book will contain approximately 650 pages with over 60 illustrations. It will reflect the great impact of Christianity on Ukrainian spiritual and cultural life throughout centuries.

The book will be divided into four parts, which will reflect four Christian aspects of the Ukrainian national community: 1. the historical aspect; 2. the organizational aspect; 3. the religious aspect; 4. the cultural aspect.

The contents of the book are: the preface; expression of thanks; contents.

In lieu of an introduction: What has Christianity given to Ukraine during the first millennium, *H. Udod*.

#### PART I: A Historical Perspective

**Chapter 1:** The Development of Christianity in Ukraine in the Historical Perspective, *Nicholas F. Chirovsky*.

**Chapter 2:** St. Olha's Christianity and its Sources, *Richard Mason*.

**Chapter 3:** Was it Really Russia That Was Christianised in 988? *Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, Patriarch and Cardinal*.

**Chapter 4:** The Christianisation of the North-Eastern Borderlands of the Kyivan Empire, *Bohdan Korchmaryk*.

**Chapter 5:** The Subjugation of the Kyivan Metropolitan to the Authority of Moscow's Patriarch, *Ivan Vlasovsky*.

**Chapter 6:** The Ukrainian Church Under Soviet Russian Domination, *Volodymyr Mykula*.

**Chapter 7:** The Ukrainian Catholic Church in Catacombs.

#### PART II: Religious Perspective

**Chapter 8:** Kyiv — the City of Divine Wisdom, *Dmytro Dontsov*.

**Chapter 9:** Sermons: 1. The Death and the Resurrection of the Ukrainian Nation; 2. The Foundations of the Ukrainian Autocephaly; 3. Let Us Pray for Those Who Died for Their Country; 4. The Native Language — A Way to God, *Vasyl Lypkiwsky, Metropolitan*.

**Chapter 10:** The Essential Features of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, *Ivan Ohienko, Metropolitan Ilarion*.

**Chapter 11:** The One Thousand Year Old Ukrainian Church Rite, *Rev. Volodymyr Kovalyk*.

**Chapter 12:** The Russian Orthodox Church as an Instrument of Moscow's Imperialism, *Myroslav Ivan Lubachivsky, Patriarch and Cardinal*.

**Chapter 13:** The Meaning of Christianity for the Ukrainian People in Modern Time, *Rev. Roman Mirchuk*.

**Chapter 14:** The Characteristics of the Ukrainian Protestant Movement, *Alexander Dombrovsky*.

**Chapter 15:** The Ukrainian Churches in the Second Millennium, *Rev. Andriy Chirovsky*.

**PART III: Organizational Perspective**

**Chapter 16:** The Church Organization in Ukraine in the Kyivan-Galician Times, *Very Rev. Ivan Choma*.

**Chapter 17:** The Monasteries and their Organization in the Ukrainian Church, *Rev. Metelii Voynar*.

**Chapter 18:** The Ukrainian Church During the Tartar Invasion, *Rev. Yuriy Fedoriv*.

**Chapter 19:** The Church and the Monastic Schools and Education in the Early Era of the Ukrainian Statehood, *Vasyl O. Luciiv*.

**Chapter 20:** The Question of a Ukrainian Patriarchate, *V. Lentsyk*.

**Chapter 21:** The Question of a Ukrainian Patriarchate — Another Aspect, *Yaroslav Stetsko*.

**PART IV: Cultural Perspective**

**Chapter 22:** Christianity's Contribution to the Ukrainian World Perception, *Mykhailo Kushnir*.

**Chapter 23:** Christianity and the Ukrainian National Character — A Brief Psychological Perspective, *Ivan Z. Holovinsky*.

**Chapter 24:** The Impact of Christianity Upon Ukrainian Culture, *Bohdan Stebelsky*.

**Chapter 25:** The Theological World Perception Elements in the Ukrainian Icon, *Mykhailo Kushnir*.

**Chapter 26:** Ukrainian Church Music, *Myron Fedoriv*.

**Chapter 27:** Liturgical Elements in the Past of the Ukrainian Theatre, *Hryhor N. Luzhnytsky*.

**Chapter 28:** Ukrainian Church Painting in the Kyivan-Galician Times, *Ivan Keyvan*.

**Chapter 29:** Church Architecture in Ukraine-Rus' From the Early Times to the Era of the Rococo, *Vasyl and Yuriy Luciiv*.

**Chapter 30:** Old Ukrainian Prints, *O. Sokolyshyn*.

**APPENDIXES**

I. Spiritual Testament of His Beatitude Patriarch Yosyf.

II. "A Year Since the Patriarch Passed Away", *Very Rev. Werenfried Van Straaten*.

III. Statement by the Lviv Krylos.

IV. For the Ukrainian Catholic Patriarchate, *Yaroslav Stetsko*.

Orders can be sent to:

ABN Bureau,  
Zeppelinstr. 67,  
8000 München 80,  
West Germany.

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**MOSCOW'S USE OF THE  
1988 ANNIVERSARY FOR  
DISINFORMATION PURPOSES**

The fall issue of *Disinformation: Soviet Active Measures and Disinformation Forecast* in 1986 (1130 17th Street, NW, Suite 620, Washington, D.C. 20036 USA, Subscription price: \$20.00 per year) reports on the Soviet Russian plans for using the thousandth anniversary of the adoption of Christianity in Kyivan Rus'.

Moscow, and rightly so, fears Ukrainian nationalism, and will try to find as much support in the West as possible for the celebrations. On the other hand, Pope John Paul II has strongly supported Ukrainian Catholic rights.

The first point in the USSR strategy will be to try to convince the West that there is freedom of worship. The Patriarchate in Moscow has therefore been given permission to organize celebrations to divert attention from the anti-religious policies of the regime. To fool the West, lavish books on iconography and church architecture will probably be published. The Patriarchate will probably invite representa-

tives of major Christian denominations in the West.

However, at the same time anti-religious campaigns will intensify within Soviet Russia and the KGB might well step up harassment of Christians. Dissenting Christians will certainly be kept away from the celebrations.

The struggle between Ukrainian Catholics and the KGB is likely to be harder. The leaders will probably be arrested and the Kremlin will claim that the Ukrainian Catholic Church "voluntarily" opted for abolition.

Ukrainians in the West will be targets of special active measures. Active Ukrainians in politics and church affairs will be, as usually, depicted as "obscurantist reactionaries".

Moscow is not, according to "Disinformation", used to celebrating religious anniversaries so it will be an unusual twist in tactics along with the old lines being repeated.

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#### ENGLISH REPORTS ON MAZEPA 1687-1709

*By Theodore Mackiw, Ukrainian Historical Association, Inc., New York, 1983, 177 pages.*

Scholarship concerning the Ukrainian leader Ivan Mazepa (1639-1709) appears to be entering upon a new and welcome phase of development. Whatever the specific factors may be, one happy result of the process has been the steady appearance in recent years of excellent, provocative reinterpretations of Mazepa's personality. Theodore Mackiw's *English Reports on Mazepa, 1687-1709* exemplifies many of the virtues of this new trend.

In his introductory chapters the author acquaints the reader with the personality of Mazepa, Hetman (Com-

mander-in-Chief) of the autonomous Ukrainian Military Republic, also known as the Hetmanstate. This state was at first under a Polish protectorate (1649-1654) and, from 1654, under a Russian one. The Hetmanstate itself lasted until 1764, when Catherine II forced the last Hetman, Cyril Rosumovsky (1750-1764), to abdicate and ultimately incorporated Ukraine into the Russian Empire.

The author not only describes the general situation in Eastern Europe, Ukraine in particular, but also presents a brief biography of Mazepa which helps to explain his motives in joining Charles XII of Sweden. He writes: "Mazepa was, in principle, neither a Russophile nor a Russophobe, although he knew the tragic development of Ukrainian-Russian relations. In fact, he considered coexistence with Russia possible on the basis of the agreement of Pereyaslav in 1654. This was the political reality which he inherited from his predecessor and it was his understanding that the condition *sine qua non* of any Ukrainian policy was the benevolent or at least neutral position of the Russian government towards Ukraine" (p. 1). In fact, Russia had given Mazepa reason to hope he would be able to consolidate Ukrainian lands within the framework of the Hetmanstate. When the Great Northern War began in 1700, the relations between Tsar and Mazepa were cordial. On Peter's recommendation, the Austrian Emperor Joseph I granted Mazepa the title of Prince of the "Holy Roman Empire" (September 1, 1707).

However, Mackiw argues, when Mazepa learned from the Tsar himself that he intended to abolish the autonomy of the Hetmanstate and to absorb the Cossacks into the Russian Army,

and especially when the Tsar refused the Hetman's request for military aid against a possible Swedish invasion of Ukraine, Mazepa had no alternative but to negotiate for Swedish alliance.

Although England was not directly involved in the Great Northern War, Whitehall carefully watched this development, as can be seen in the contemporary English press, memoirs, and in the reports of English diplomats and eyewitnesses.

According to Mackiw, the contemporary English press, using Russian sources through German and Dutch channels and without having information from Swedish sources, reported in an unbiased fashion about Mazepa and his alliance with the Swedish King, merely giving facts without comments. It would have been helpful if the author had provided an analysis of the reports concerning Eastern Europe, particularly concerning the Hetman, in the contemporary English press but he did not. It should be mentioned that one of the oldest contemporary American newspapers, *The Boston News-Letter* of January 29, 1705, contained a report about "the Cossacks commanded by the famous Mazepa" (p. 66).

One of the controversial questions is whether or not Mazepa invited Charles XII to enter Ukraine and then failed to give the help he had promised. The Hetman is blamed for that by some historians to this day. For example, the German historian Hans von Rimscha blames Mazepa in his *Geschichte Russlands* (Darmstadt, 1979), that the Hetman "influenced Charles XII to switch from the Smolensk-Moscow route into Ukraine" (p. 289). Yet, as Mackiw correctly explains, the Swedish King was forced by lack of food and accommodation to move southwards. This was confirmed

by Captain Jeffreyes, who also mentioned in his report of October 7, 1708 from the Swedish headquarters at Starodub that Charles XII sent a special messenger to Mazepa's residence in Baturyn requesting to spend the winter in Ukraine.

The English diplomats cannot be accused of bias in their reports concerning Mazepa as some Russian historians claim. For example, Lord Whitworth in his report of November 28, 1708 wrote about Mazepa's joining forces with the Swedish King. The Russian translation of that document reads "treason", yet, in an earlier report, Whitworth had expressed his doubt whether Mazepa, a man nearly seventy years of age, very rich, childless, enjoying the confidence and affection of the Tsar, and exercising the authority of a monarch, would have joined the Swedish King for selfish or other personal reasons.

Mackiw not only analyzes the reports of the British diplomats but also publishes for the first time the dispatches of Dr. John Robinson and Sir Philip Meadow. Although the reports of Lord Whitworth and Captain Jeffreyes have been published before, Mackiw includes some interesting facsimiles.

Mackiw's work is supported by extensive documentation, up-dated publications, well chosen maps, engravings, and copies of original documents. It is informative and stimulating, not only for the uninitiated but also for scholars who regularly research this period of history.

The Ukrainian Historical Association should be encouraged to provide for the English speaking public more books which prove that the best defense of history is a demonstration of its bearing on truth.

*Wolodymyr T. Zyla*  
*Texas Tech University*

## UKRAINIAN SILHOUETTES

By Michael Heifetz. Cover by Nadia Stender, author's biography, photographs of prisoners in question, author's dedication to his Ukrainian Friend, E.M. Published by "Prologue" and "Suchasnist" no. 163, "Suchasnist", 1984, p. 23

Born in Leningrad of Jewish nationality, Michael Heifetz, an intellectual and literary specialist, himself a political prisoner who knew the political prisoners described, has done more with his book *Ukrainian Silhouettes* in acquainting the reader with the fate of prisoners of conscience Vasyl Stus, Vyacheslav Chornovil, Mykola Rudenko and other idealists — human rights fighters and member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in Soviet Russian prisons and concentration camps, than any other Ukrainian literary specialist until now.

Indeed, numerous articles have appeared by publicists and literary specialists in our press about the late Vasyl Stus, however, the material which has appeared until now with regard to the size and content of presented articles and moreover with regard to their deeper grasp of the essential nature of the staunch Ukrainian poet, cannot be compared to Michael Heifetz's over 70 page-long psychological research on the uncompromising Ukrainian national fighter both in literature and in the political arena — Vasyl Stus, who was tortured in the punitive concentration zone. For his clear, projective portrayal of this one man — Vasyl Stus — unyielding till the end, a man of strong character, an iron will and irreproachable national behaviour, the author of *Ukrainian Silhouettes* deserves the reader's thanks. In fact, Vasyl Stus fully deserves M. Heifetz's character portrayal of him on account of his moral values, high poetical cadence and the artistic literary qualities of his creativity, since "there is no greater poet in current Ukrainian literature."

The author first heard the attribute given to this great Ukrainian poet as "the best in present-day Ukraine" in the Moldavian "Dubrovlag" from the Ukrainian political prisoner, the young student of the Lviv University, "the tall, handsome, gray-eyed man", Zorian Popadiuk about whom Heifetz also writes with great sympathy and fondness in his original collection of silhouettes about Ukrainian political prisoners of the Soviet terror system of brutal force on people and nations.

M. Heifetz also depicts prominent and less prominent figures in the Ukrainian resistance after becoming personally acquainted with them during imprisonment together: — the "zek" (from the Russian word "zakliutchonnyj") "general" Vyacheslav Chornovil, thus called for his qualities of leadership; the pensive poet-philosopher Mykola Rudenko; the "subtle and sensitive to any kind of injustice" Vasyl Ovsienko; the humane but staunch Dmytro Kvetsko; and many other less known Ukrainian national rights fighters, such as Petro Saranchuk, Volodymyr Kaznowskyj, Mykola Konchakivskyj, Roman Semeniuk, Constantyn Skrypnyk, Mykola Hamula, Mykhailo Zhurakivskyj, Mykola Hutsul, Fedir Dron. M. Heifetz also renders the less known heroes their due. He finds a place for all of them in his documental book of Soviet Russian maltreatment of people, accurately characterizes known and less known silent heroes.

Heifetz also writes about foreigners, friends of Ukraine, as for instance, the brave Armenian prisoner, the secretary of the United National Party of Armenia — Paruyra Ayrikyan, a close friend of Ukrainian political prisoners.

On the whole, the author distinguishes himself with his freedom-loving spirit and erudition, and is well acquainted with the Ukrainian liberation struggle.

*Roman Kuchar*

*IN MEMORIAM*



*Dr. Basil Mailat*

It is with great sorrow and pain that we inform our readers and all friends of ABN that the great Rumanian patriot Dr. Basil Mailat passed away at the age of 80 on November 11, 1987 in Munich, West Germany.

Dr. Mailat dedicated his whole life to the service of his Rumanian nation. In his early years, as Mayor of Bucharest, Dr. Mailat was responsible for the public welfare of the citizens of Rumania's capital. Later on, in exile, he continued to fight for the freedom and independence of his native Rumania, in the capacity of a long-term member of the Central Committee of ABN and as its secretary-general — a post which he held for many years until his death. His dedication to the cause of freedom of all nations subjugated by Russian communism and imperialism never ceased and his death is a painful loss to us all.

Dr. Mailat's funeral took place on November 16 and was attended by Rumanians, and friends from ABN. Tributes and messages of sympathy were expressed by the Prelate Dr. Octavian Barlea, rector of the Rumanian Catholic Mission in Germany, in which he emphasized Dr. Mailat's great service to the Rumanian people. Dr. Radu Budisteanu, his compatriot, recalled his fifty-year long acquaintance with the deceased, who, in spite of being a victim of constant persecution in his homeland, never for a moment ceased his struggle for the freedom of his people. A tribute from ABN President, Mrs. Slava Stetsko was read by Nino Alschibaja, who gratefully acknowledged Dr. Mailat's great work in ABN and his incessant struggle not only for the independence of Rumania, but for all the nations enslaved by Moscow. His love for his nation and his dedication to its freedom and the freedom for all subjugated nations will remain an inspiration for all and will always be remembered.

May His Memory Be Eternal.

*The Central Committee of ABN*



Monument to the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) on the 45th anniversary of its formation, unveiled October 1987 in Oakville, Ontario.



# CURRENT NEWS SPECIAL EDITION



21 APRIL 1988 No. 1717

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# FROM THE EDITOR

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## Original Sources

**Kommunist** (Communist): the official journal of the Central Committee of the CPSU published 18 times a year since 1924. A theoretical and political journal, its title was Bol'shevik until 1952.

**Komsomol'skaya pravda** (Young Communist League Truth): a newspaper published by the YCL Central Committee six times a week since 1925 on youth and political issues as well as on sports and recreation.

**Krasnaya zvezda** (Red Star): the official newspaper of the Ministry of Defense published six times a week since January 1924 on military interests focusing on training exercises and military and political indoctrination. It reviews foreign affairs and criticizes foreign military developments.

**Kryl'ya Rodiny** (Wings of the Motherland): an aviation journal for the masses published monthly by the All-Union Society for Volunteer Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF) since 1950 on flying, parachuting, and maintenance and ideological training.

**Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya** (World Economics and International Relations): a journal published monthly by the Institute of World Economics and International Relations since July 1957 on economic, political, military, technical, and ideological issues.

**Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony** (Air Defense Herald): the official Soviet Air Defense (PVO) forces journal published monthly by the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) Publishing House since 1931 on military, technical, and ideological subjects.

**Voyennyy vestnik** (Military Herald): a journal of the Ministry of Defense published monthly since 1921 on the services, foreign armies, the theory and practice of military operations, and ideology. It also contains book reviews.

**Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye** (Foreign Military Review): a journal published monthly by the Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) Publishing House on western military developments and drawn exclusively from foreign military press sources.

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# FROM THE EDITOR

Much has been written in the western press about "openness" (*glasnost'*) and "restructuring" (*perestroyka*) as these terms have been made famous by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign to reform his country's economic and political system. However, little has been written outside of the USSR about the exciting changes being proposed or already being implemented in Soviet doctrine, operational art, and tactics. Concepts like "reasonable sufficiency" and "defensive battle," along with some dramatic arms control proposals, have been widely discussed by Soviet military and civilian authors. How are reasonable sufficiency and defensive battle affecting the military and what relationship do they have to Gorbachev's efforts to revive the sluggish Soviet economy?

According to many economists, for the USSR to achieve the ambitious economic goals set by Gorbachev, a number of improvements must be implemented, including a massive investment in high technology, construction of new physical plants, substantial reductions of military expenditures, and a redirection of those resources back into the civilian sector. The Soviet military has so far been willing to go along with Gorbachev's economic reforms, viewing them as the only way to keep pace technologically with the West. But the tone of the following articles suggests that a great debate is raging in the Soviet Union over what constitutes a "reasonably sufficient defense" for the USSR and how the new Warsaw Pact defensive battle doctrine should be implemented.

The term "reasonable sufficiency" was used by Gorbachev as early as 1985 but became well known only after it appeared in a 26 February 1987 *Pravda* article. Some civilian authors have used the theme of reasonable sufficiency to call for deep unilateral cuts in Soviet military force levels and have suggested that Warsaw Pact and NATO forces be structured in such a way to make it impossible for either side to launch an offensive (See "Reasonable Sufficiency," *Soviet Press Selected Translations*, 24 February 1988). On the other side of the debate, many military leaders remain sceptical.

In an article published in the December 1987 issue of *Problemy mira i sotsializma* [Problems of Peace and Socialism], the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal S. Akhromeyev, stated, "With each passing year, U.S. and NATO Armed Forces become increasingly offensive and aggressive. Our doctrine proceeds on the basis that the strength of the armed forces and the quantity and quality of the arms they are equipped with must be strictly commensurate with the level of the military threat and be determined by the actual requirements for the reliable defense and security of our countries. We seek to have exactly the forces required to achieve this goal, nothing more. This is the meaning of the principle of defense sufficiency." Other prominent military officers have joined in this debate. In his book *On Guard For Peace and Socialism*, USSR Minister of Defense, General of the Army D. Yazov was even more specific regarding the military attitude toward reasonable sufficiency and defensive battle: "Soviet military doctrine regards defense as the main type of military operations for repelling aggression. It must be reliable and strong; determined and vigorous; and designed to halt an enemy's attack, weaken him, prevent losses of territory, and rout the invading hostile forces... It is impossible to rout an aggressor with defense alone...After an attack has been repelled, ground and naval forces must be able to conduct a decisive offensive. The switch to an offensive will be in the form of a counteroffensive that will have to be conducted in a tense and difficult situation of confrontation with a well-armed enemy." Regarding reasonable sufficiency in the nuclear sphere, Yazov stated, "The essence of sufficiency for our strategic nuclear forces is determined by the need to prevent an unpunished nuclear attack in any situation, even the most unfavorable."

The following five articles were selected because they discuss in detail the issues of reasonable sufficiency, defensive battle, and nuclear war-fighting and provide the reader with a better understanding of the important changes taking place in Soviet military thought.

Capt Michael K. Chartrand, USAF

# MILITARY THOUGHT

## ВЫЗОВЫ БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ - СТАРЫЕ И НОВЫЕ

В. Журкин, С. Караганов,  
А. Кортунов

There is no need to prove that the tempo, dynamics, and nature of our progress toward restructuring [perestroyka] will depend a lot on our international situation. It is just as obvious that the formation of favorable external conditions will depend on a firm, aggressive, innovative, and persistent Soviet foreign policy during restructuring.

The first achievements here are taking shape ever more clearly. The Washington summit meeting, the signing of a historic treaty on the elimination of two entire classes of nuclear weapons, the shifts on an agreement for a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons while observing the ABM Treaty, the agreement to work toward reducing conventional weapons and armed forces and search for mutually acceptable solutions to a wide range of problems connected with ensuring peace—all of this has made a serious contribution to halting the arms race and consolidating strategic stability. The results of the meetings and talks in the American capital provide graphic evidence of the opportunities opening up both in developing Soviet-American relations and for a cardinal expansion of dialogue and cooperation between all countries of the East and West.

There is no doubt that the Washington talks provide new impetus for the discussions in the world about ensuring the security

of nations and peoples in the missile and space age. The Soviet Union's standpoint on these problems has been clearly formulated: Security cannot be ensured by military means, either now or in the future, and political solution is becoming the most rational way toward it: security is indivisible and can only be equal for everyone, or it will not exist at all; genuine equal security in our age is guaranteed by an ever lower level of the strategic balance, including progress toward eliminating nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction.

This is the way the question is put in principle, so to speak, from the point of view of the long-term tasks facing the international community. But what specifically will be the requirements for ensuring the national security of the Soviet people now? What specifically determines the practical actions taken to fulfill the directives of the 27th CPSU Congress to ensure that our people have the opportunity to work in lasting peace and freedom?

In his time, V. I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the set of international circumstances that led to the Soviet state's security were very fluid and dynamic. It is sufficient to recall the Leninist analysis of the changing threats to our country in the early 1920s during the transition from war to peace. The need to adequately analyze the source and intensity of

## CHALLENGES TO SECURITY - OLD AND NEW

V. Zhurkin, S. Karaganov,  
A. Kortunov

threats to the Soviet state's security at each stage of its history and each turn of international development arises because assessing them incorrectly can lead to foreign policy errors—to undermined security on the one hand and to a senseless waste of resources and political capital on the other.

However paradoxical it may seem at first glance, it is precisely in our time that adequately assessing current dangers, their correlation, and their urgency is becoming especially relevant. During most of the Soviet Union's history, the threats to its existence have been clearly defined, their sources have been fairly obvious, and the forms and methods of counteracting them have not engendered any particular differences of opinion. To all intents and purposes, it has been a matter of surviving in a hostile capitalist environment, preventing the formation of a united anti-Soviet front of western countries, and ensuring the necessary material potential to rebuff any aggression on the part of imperialism.

The situation has changed substantially in our time. Whether socialism is "to be or not to be," in the form that it took 5 to 7 decades ago has been decided finally and irrevocably (bearing in mind, of course, that the threat of extermination in a nuclear war has appeared and increased for all mankind, and thus also for its socialist part). For this reason, one

## Soviet Press Selected Translations

may speak of substantially greater freedom to maneuver in domestic and foreign policy, which makes it possible to adopt a comprehensive and well-considered approach to national security, considering short- and long-term trends, military and non-military challenges, and outside threats and possible dangers in domestic development.

On the other hand, in recent decades there has been a sharp expansion in the range of objective challenges which our society (as indeed any other society) has had to face. Never before has the competition between the two socioeconomic systems permeated so many spheres, and never before has interaction between socialism and capitalism at the international level been so intense. In recent decades, mankind has come up against a fundamentally new set of problems—global problems. Looming on the horizon is a set of unprecedented tasks connected with establishing the scientific and technological civilization of the 21st century.

Human thought, as is well known, lags behind rapidly changing political realities. This explains the natural tendency to concentrate most attention on traditional, previously encountered threats and to underestimate new ones that have become or are becoming a reality. In any assessment of the realities of the political-military situation in the world, this gives rise to an urgent need to avoid making an absolute out of past experience and fully consider the changes occurring in the world.

Take this example: the main and traditional threat in the mass consciousness of Soviet people is the threat of 22 June 1941 repeating itself in one form or another, in other words, an invasion from the West, whether as a nuclear attack or as massed aggression involving conventional armed forces. The nuclear age undoubtedly lends its own specific

nature to this problem. The threat of nuclear attack is the most dangerous military threat to our country. This threat undoubtedly has analogies with 1941. Thus, the deployment in Western Europe of U.S. Pershing-2 missiles, with a 10-minute flight time to reach the Soviet capital, might have meant that the nuclear threat was literally on Moscow's doorstep, as in the fall of the first year of the war. From the point of view of today's political-military reality, however, such a nuclear attack would ultimately mean inevitable catastrophe for the aggressor, too.

In that case, the question arises of whether it is possible for aggression on the 1941 pattern to be repeated, of course with modern forces and weapons. Let us start with what seems to be the main point. There is no conflict in East-West relations today that could give rise to the temptation to resort to war as a solution. Using common sense, it is hard to imagine any reason for western armies to invade the territory of the socialist states. Modern capitalism has a considerable number of problems, and acute ones at that. However, these problems—the problems of capitalism at the end of the 20th century—are, in principle, impossible to solve by military aggression against socialism. This is one of the main reasons why there are no influential political forces in the United States or Western Europe that would set themselves to such a task.

There are, of course, circles that operate actively in the West and dream of social revenge—crushing the Soviet Union as the main obstacle to the implementation of their schemes to restore the western, imperialist version of social homogeneity to the world political map. These circles do not conceal their hatred of socialism or their aspiration to consign it to the "scrap-heap of history" and to begin a "crusade" against the USSR. As was demonstrated by

the behavior of American ultra-right-wingers during the visit of the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee to Washington, this hatred may have purely ideological motives, and may not be determined by direct economic interests. However, as long as they are in their right minds, even the most unrestrained hawks ultimately cannot help seeing that attempts to abolish or throw back socialism by military means would be suicidal for their own societies.

Europe is an especially indicative example. On a European continent saturated with nuclear power stations, chemical plants, and enormous fuel dumps, even a non-nuclear war would result in the de facto death of all civilization on the continent. Moreover, this applies most of all to Western Europe, where the population density and the degree of urbanization are greater than in Eastern Europe, while its territory is smaller. The very nature of highly industrialized society acts as a factor to deter war here. In addition, it is impossible to imagine how a war in Europe could be kept at a non-nuclear level. A radioactive wasteland would be the only probable outcome of a nuclear war, however limited it might have been designed to be.

Apart from that, one can say with conviction that the overwhelming majority of the populations of both the United States and Western Europe do not want to fight, particularly in an aggressive war. At one time, the unilateral decision to place American intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe substantially complicated the political situation in some countries in this region. Anti-Soviet and anticommunist attitudes undoubtedly exist in the West and are intensively fanned by reactionary forces. However, in comparison with, say, the 1930s, the population's level of culture has risen and the masses' resistance to extremist impulses has grown stronger.

It is impossible to ignore the fact that Soviet foreign and domestic policy in recent years has objectively contributed to unmasking the myth of a "Soviet threat" and to dispelling a hostile image. M. S. Gorbachev's visit to the United States and the international public reaction to this visit demonstrated once again that the process of forming a new image of the USSR in the world has already begun, and, if it develops successfully, may lead to significant and even irreversible shifts in western public awareness.

Aggressive groups of NATO country ruling classes are attempting to achieve their internal political goals by inventing an artificial image of the external threat and presenting in a false light the foreign policy strategy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, their military setup, and specific acts in the world arena. They also make wide use of one of the paradoxes of the security problem for their own ends, a paradox typical of our time. In the past, the provision of appropriate secrecy and concealment in foreign and military policy was regarded as an important area of strengthening national security. This secrecy was multiplied by the absence of the technical means that have now appeared to observe the other side and deprived a potential adversary of confidence in the accuracy of his information, forcing him to display a certain amount of caution and restraint. It also, however, gave opponents an aspiration to prepare for operations on a worst case basis, thus contributing to the arms race. The counterproductive nature of such secrecy is today becoming increasingly obvious. This secrecy makes it easier for anti-Soviet propaganda to operate, allows our opponents to present various steps taken by the USSR in a distorted light, and is used to fan the military psychosis.

Only openness [glasnost'] makes it possible to give people in

other countries access to the tasks of our policy, convince them of the USSR's peace-loving intentions and plans, and isolate reactionary and militarist groupings. That is why measures to expand the openness of our foreign policy and military activity are immensely important for strengthening the Soviet Union's security. They weaken rather than intensify the threats.

What was said above does not at all mean that bourgeois democracy is capable of cowing the aggressiveness of militarism to such an extent that it can serve as a barrier to any military aggression. The U.S. attacks on Grenada and Libya, its intervention in Lebanon, its undeclared wars against Nicaragua and Afghanistan, its military maneuvers in the Persian Gulf, and the cases where Western European NATO member countries have used military forces (and this in the present decade alone), provide convincing evidence that, in our time, the main danger of war has its roots in imperialism.

But, all the same, if one looks at large-scale aggression or a major war between two systems, whether on a regional or, worse still, a global scale, bourgeois democracy does serve as a certain barrier to the unleashing of such a war. This has been graphically demonstrated by the history of American intervention in Indochina, whose lesson has not been forgotten on the other side of the Atlantic. In spite of all its militarist ardor, the Pentagon cannot now avoid recognizing the existence of restrictions imposed on its operations by democratic institutions and by the unwillingness of people to sacrifice their lives and prosperity in aggressive wars.

In any case, the existence of an approximate balance between the combat capabilities of both sides on the European continent means that NATO armed forces cannot count on successful aggres-

sion. Large-scale offensive operations require substantial superiority in the main types of weapons. Meanwhile, the covert mobilization of anyone's armed forces has been made extremely difficult in view of today's national means of verification and the system of confidence-building measures.

Does this mean that, for all intents and purposes, the threat of war in Europe no longer exists? It seems impossible to give a categorical answer to this question. The immense military potentials that have accumulated here, over-saturated with nuclear weapons, could under certain circumstances lead to a rapid escalation of an accidental crisis. If the massive deployment of the latest conventional weapons with especially high kill power and a clearly expressed offensive nature were to take place on the continent, as some members of NATO headquarters are planning (and this is the "compensation" for eliminating intermediate and shorter range missiles that the most militarist forces in NATO are demanding), strategic military stability on the continent would be undermined. As a result, distrust, tension, and the threat of war would increase, and there would be a greater probability that events could start to get out of control.

Thus, the threat of war in Europe, which has not yet been finally removed from the agenda of world politics, today at the end of the 20th century is much different from the one people faced between the wars or immediately after World War II.


This great difference in the threat presupposes a greatly different reaction to it. In the past, the level of sufficiency of the USSR's military power in the European theater was determined by the requirement to repel any aggression and crush any possible coalition of hostile nations. Now the task is fundamentally different: to hold back, to prevent a war

per se. This task, for its part, requires a reinterpretation of many traditional postulates of military strategy and operational art, beginning with a reassessment of requirements in the numbers of certain types of weapons (for example, tanks), the nature of maneuvers, and so on.

The guaranteed prevention of war in Europe requires a consistent decrease in military confrontation there and, ultimately, the halt of the increasing military threat of military-bloc confrontation and the creation of a different, stable, and humane system of security on the continent that would rule out hostility and an arms race. The Soviet-American accord reached on the elimination of intermediate- and shorter-range missiles in Europe could be a turning point in the political-military situation on our continent. This accord not only means the elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons, but is a solid step toward a strictly defensive character to the military doctrines and armed forces of the two opposing groups in Europe, and for the first time creates real conditions for a decrease in conventional military confrontation in Europe and for radical steps toward improving stability in Europe.

Today and in the long term, the possibility of a premeditated nuclear attack—of a global nuclear aggression—is as improbable as the conscious unleashing of a large-scale war in Europe. Our people's enormous efforts to strengthen the defense capability of the Soviet land have borne fruit. Now, anyone who would think about a nuclear attack knows that he should not count on impunity, no matter what he uses to initiate a conflict. Moreover, the use of even a small percentage of the strategic nuclear forces in the world would be enough to destroy every living thing on Earth.

Strategic nuclear parity, understood as depriving both sides



of the hope of an unpunished attack, has a large margin of stability. Even the most fanatical hawks in the U.S. administration, who still in the early 1980s demanded the restoration of American superiority and who pushed Washington's rulers toward an enormous increase in military appropriations, are compelled to agree with this. Now these people have noticeably calmed down, and retired Defense Secretary C. Weinberger, who at the beginning of the decade had called for the United States to acquire the same safety margin it had in the 1950s, now recognizes that this is unfeasible. Many very authoritative American experts are more often, and not without reason, acknowledging that Washington has not achieved any changes in its favor during the latest round of the nuclear arms race that it launched.

In these conditions, from the viewpoint of general security, it is becoming increasingly obvious that a radical, 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive arms in the near future is not only desirable, but a real possibility.

The point is, as indicated by the Soviet Union, that parity is ceasing to be a factor in holding back a war. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the increase in their flexibility and precision are leading to the the divergence of

the concept of balance and parity—even when calculated by qualitative and not quantitative indicators—from the concept of strategic stability—on which the assessments of the probability of war are judged—which more or less coincided in the past. The possibility of an accidental, unsanctioned outbreak of a nuclear war and a rapid, uncontrolled escalation of a crisis is increasing. Thus, an outwardly paradoxical situation is taking shape: the threat of premeditated nuclear aggression is decreasing, but the threat of war may be increasing.

Perhaps for the first time in our country's history, we can say with confidence that no aggressor in his right mind can encroach on us. The accumulation of power is grounds for believing that this correlation of forces and this situation will exist for a long time.

Having lost the head-on struggle for military superiority in the military area of their choice, international imperialism, primarily American, has, for a number of years now, gradually shifted the focus of its efforts to other areas—economic (including military economic), humanitarian (attempts to undermine the prestige of socialism's ethical makeup), and others. Even in the most explosive area—the military—one can also see a reorientation of efforts to it.

At the current stage of international relations, the West, primarily the United States, still essentially rejects a decisive demilitarization of competition between the two systems. But there has been an attempt to shift the focus of military rivalry to the economic sphere. In accordance with the plans of western political strategists, the task of economically exhausting the USSR in a continuing arms race is being brought more and more clearly to the fore. The political essence of this approach boils down to achieving success in the struggle between social systems without warfare and without violating the formal framework of peaceful coexistence.

History has ordained that the balance of forces developed between socialism and capitalism in the last decade has basically manifested itself as "military equalization," primarily in nuclear parity and not progress in science and technology. Socialism has not yet been able to achieve higher labor productivity as compared with highly developed capitalist countries (The general level of labor productivity in USSR industry, according to data of the USSR Committee for Statistics, is about half that of the United States, and more than five times less in agriculture). It should be noted that the Soviet Union's international political role and influence have always been considerably greater than its role in the world economy or in science and technology.

Of course, the relationship between a nation's economic power and its foreign policy weight and influence is a complex system of direct and indirect ties. One can cite the example of Japan—the world's third leading economic power and the undisputed leader in the most important areas of progress in science and technology—has relatively less weight in politics than a number of other nations. The military-political dependence on the United States

lessens this weight even more, often completely depriving Japan of its own identity in the approach to the major political problems of today. Nonetheless, this disproportion is leveling out, though very slowly.

The known discrepancy between our country's enormous foreign policy role and relative economic, scientific, and technological power has recently become increasingly alarming, because it began to increase during the years of stagnation [U.S. Editors' note: This is a term used to describe the Brezhnev years]. The accumulation of negative trends in the USSR's economic development in the 1970s and the early 1980s began to affect more noticeably and dangerously the dynamics of the correlation of forces between the two systems. The enemies of socialism, concerned about their failure in the head-on sectors of military rivalry with the Soviet Union, one may assume, saw a historic opportunity for themselves here. Thus appeared the idea to push the Soviet Union to the wayside of economic, scientific, and technological progress and win the rivalry between the two systems.

The process of reorienting imperialism's strategy toward the USSR and other socialist countries is proceeding unevenly; it is developing differently in various areas. But despite the ambivalence and even contradictoriness of the advances being made, the contours of an evolving new strategy by the West toward the USSR and the entire socialist community are becoming increasingly distinct.

Above all, one sees the economic exhaustion of socialism—a way of imposing excessive military expenditures on it in the arms race—as the main direction of this imperialist strategy. Although the idea of economic exhaustion has always been present in the military plans of imperialism, it is coming to the

fore just now and is proclaimed openly and unambiguously as a [high] priority area. The U.S. Department of Defense has formulated the so-called competitive strategy, which boils down to imposing an intensive arms race on the Soviet Union in a maximum number of areas. By using the United States' leading position in the scientific and technological sphere, the plan is to constantly and purposefully devalue Soviet military assets ("to make the Soviet investments in defense already implemented obsolete"), to force the USSR to spend fresh resources, and then again devalue them. The point is to "develop military programs, to which an effective Soviet response would be much more expensive than the programs themselves."

At the basis of plans to push the USSR toward military efforts in areas that suit the United States and increase its expenditures on defense is an entire system of political propaganda measures, deliberate misinformation, and bluff. From the very beginning, such plans were one of the most important areas that, in particular, counted on provoking the Soviet Union to create its own SDI program and spend many billions on the militarization of outer space. The USSR's resolve to counter the American "Star Wars" program by other, more effective, and much less expensive retaliatory measures thwarted these plans but did not bring to their senses the creators of the strategy of exhaustion, who continue the quest in other areas.

The United States considers the conventional arms race, which, as is known, accounts for the bulk of a nation's military expenditures (80-85 percent in the United States) as particularly promising. Of course, Washington's strategists and politicians are aware of the capabilities that the Soviet Union has in this sphere. Today the boogymen of "Soviet superiority" in conventional weap-

## Soviet Press Selected Translations

ons and armed forces is the main component of the myth of a "Soviet military threat," which all enemies of nuclear arms reduction use in their propaganda theories. Nonetheless, the persistent calls to increase U.S. and NATO conventional weapons, on the whole, are clearly aimed at eliciting a massive response from the Soviet Union. This is because proliferation of nuclear weapons is gradually losing its significance, considering the stockpiles of weapons that have already been accumulated. Regarding conventional weapons, truly infinite possibilities are opening up here for the supporters of economic exhaustion (or so they believe).

The other important element of the strategy of exhaustion consists of attempts to inflame regional conflicts in various parts of the world to intensify the involvement of the USSR and other socialist countries in these conflicts. In the process, a number of goals are simultaneously being pursued: the economic weakening of the Soviet Union, forcing it to dissipate its resources in many directions; the political isolation of the USSR, setting it off against other "power centers"; and the creation of a hullabaloo over the USSR's "geopolitical offensive" and the growth of the "Soviet military threat." For it is namely in regional sectors where the imperialist nations seek to "share responsibilities" among themselves that the predominance of nations that confront the Soviet Union in economic, scientific, and technological capabilities; human resources; food supply; and a number of other areas is particularly pronounced. The fact that the Soviet Union gives assistance to the governments of a national democratic and socialist orientation in most conflicts in developing countries (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique) in their struggle against antigovernment bands and mercenaries places a much greater political responsibility and eco-

nomical and military burden on the USSR than on the United States.

Finally, in the strategy of exhaustion, the traditional reliance of reactionary imperialist circles on the international isolation of the Soviet Union appears in a new light. The main emphasis in it is on economic levers and on the desire to push the Soviet Union onto an autarchic track of economic development. The most overt appearance of this strategy is in attempts, which have intensified in recent years, to tighten the restrictions on exports of science-intensive equipment and technology to the USSR and to consolidate the prevailing structure of Soviet foreign trade, which is based on the export of raw material and energy resources and on the import of industrial products and significant amounts of foodstuffs. This is a question of persistent efforts to force our country to the periphery of the world economic system.

The neutralization of the challenges that international imperialism presents the Soviet Union and other socialist countries today primarily depends on a consistent implementation of the restructuring of the economic system and public life and on the acceleration of socialism's socioeconomic development. This makes the transformations currently under way in our country even more significant and imparts an international dimension to them.

If it is a question of foreign policy proper, an integrated and comprehensive approach here is particularly important. The thorough correlation of foreign policy; domestic tasks; short-, medium-, and long-term foreign policy goals; and the resources necessary to achieve them is becoming more important than ever before. In other words, there is an urgent requirement to further develop an integrated national strategy for the USSR that would be based on a coherent

system of assessments of domestic and international factors, would include a comprehensive assessment of threats and developing opportunities, and would map out the important tasks in various areas of foreign policy, as well as the basic stages of progress toward them.

The presentation at the 27th CPSU Congress of the long-term program to create an all-encompassing system of international security was an important step along this path. This program has undoubtedly made Soviet foreign policy much more comprehensive. It is particularly important, because it defines the military, political, economic, and humanitarian areas of security and says, moreover, that the non-military aspects in international security should not be considered something secondary or subordinate to military aspects. They are recognized as being quite independent and no less important than military aspects.

The report "October and Restructuring: The Revolution Continues" sets forth a task of fundamental theoretical and political significance—the thorough study of the prospects for progress toward a stable peace. This progress can only be a long and, evidently, complex process. Even if the danger of a nuclear cataclysm or any other war were eliminated, contradictions, rivalry, and confrontation would remain. At the same time, the process of eroding the military threat and gradually shifting from today's state of confrontation to one of international peace based on a system of all-embracing security would create new conditions for removing elements of confrontation from international life and for cultivating expanding spheres of cooperation.

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# MILITARY THOUGHT

## РАЗВИТИЕ ВОЕННОГО ДЕЛА И СОКРАЩЕНИЕ ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ И ОБЫЧНЫХ ВООРУЖЕНИЙ

А. Кокошин

The new political thinking in international relations includes an understanding that an abrupt and profound politicalization of traditionally military questions—the development of military equipment and the organizational development of armed forces, strategy, operational art, and even certain aspects of tactics—has occurred before our very eyes. These questions are the subject of talks between the highest national leaders and diplomats, and of debates in public and political circles.

An analysis of the problems and prospects of arms limitation and disarmament is impossible without revealing and thoroughly considering the patterns of development of military affairs, primarily long-term. At the same time, disarmament problems, having become practically the most important item of international relations, are increasingly affecting discussions about the future armed forces of states and coalitions and about military thought. This mutual influence requires profound and intensive scientific elaboration, efforts by scientists and specialists of the most diverse vocations, and an active shaping of a new scien-



tific discipline such as political-military research.

I

Social, economic, and political factors play a decisive role in the development of the means and methods of armed conflict. But the natural internal evolution of military affairs, including military equipment, is of no small importance. New thinking requires fully considering the changing dynamics of various weapon systems and the formation of the man-made

## THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY AFFAIRS AND REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL ARMS

A. Kokoshin

world of military technology, which is developing according to still largely unknown special laws. Knowledge of these laws is a necessity. Without this, there can be no success in diplomacy and foreign policy.

The rate of development of weapon systems and—according to a number of indicators—new methods of armed conflict, at times, significantly outstrips the rate of progress at talks on limiting armed forces and arms. The main reason for this is the lack of political will in our partners at these talks and the opposition of right-wing militaristic forces in the United States and other capitalist countries. But one must also bear in mind the poorly considered logic of weapon systems development and the evolution of strategic and operational thought, as well as the lack of proper correlation between this logic and political and diplomatic logic.

One of the key problems in this process is analyzing the dialectics of the development of offensive and defensive weapons and methods, both in the nuclear and non-nuclear spheres. A precise analysis of current offensive and defensive capabilities is necessary,

as are long-term forecasts. Such comprehensive assessments and forecasts should be based on an understanding of profound historical patterns.

F. Engels paid close attention to the competition between the means of attack and defense. It should be noted that the analysis of the developmental dialectics of the means of offense and defense was one of the main sources of Engels' outstanding political-military predictions about the character and results of World War I.

The confrontation between offensive and defensive weapons has continued for millennia. It seems that one can select two historical periods to reveal the basic patterns of this process. One of them began with the appearance of nuclear weapons in 1945. The other is longer and goes back 200 to 220 years; it is associated mainly with the development of capitalism and the establishment of machine production.

Phases have repeatedly changed throughout these 200 to 220 years, within whose framework either offense prevailed over defense or defense prevailed over offense, convincingly demonstrating a manifestation of the law of dialectics—of negation of a negation. To an ever increasing extent, these changes occurred through the development of military technology, which also entailed transformations in the methods of military operations. As Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov notes, this did not occur immediately after the appearance of new weapons, but only when they were used in such numbers that a qualitatively new situation was unavoidable. While there is a limited use of new weapons and combat equipment, they are most often adapted solely to existing methods of warfare or, at most, introduce certain partial modifications to them. For instance, machine guns were used in the 1899–1902 Boer War. However,

their insignificant numbers and low quality did not lead, at that time, to a fundamental upheaval in military operations, but only made certain changes in the combat formations of troops.

The role of machine guns was more noticeable in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War. Thereafter, the rapid development of automatic weapons and their widespread incorporation in forces had an incomparably large effect, which was especially graphic in World War I.

Changes in the correlation of offensive and defensive capabilities, for their part, considerably influenced the policies of states and the assessments of national and political figures and military commanders on the nature and scale of military force. Actually, the scale of political goals that it was intended to accomplish by military assets largely depended on the assessment of offensive and defensive capabilities in a specific political-military situation. History shows that subjective assessments were often largely and even totally at variance with reality, which naturally affected the implementation of proper political precepts. For instance, on the eve of World War I, practically all sides relied on large-scale offensive operations, and in most cases with most definite goals. According to the apt statement by the outstanding Russian and Soviet military theorist, A. A. Svechin, "before 1914 the entire military world fell into an offensive hysteria." In reality though, defense prevailed in this war.

## II

In our day, when analyzing the capabilities of the means of attack and defense, World Wars I and II, as the largest and most indicative clashes between the most powerful actors in international relations, are most often compared with the high level of development of industrialized

forces. These wars were waged using all available weapons and methods of warfare with the utmost exertion of both sides' forces.

In World War I, the massed use of automatic weapons, artillery, and engineering systems, and of the forms and methods of combat operations prevailing at the time led to defense turning out to be stronger than offense. Time and again, major strategic offensives petered out both in the western and eastern theaters of war in Europe. The actions of troops were mainly statically defensive.

Between the two world wars, a number of countries actively searched for ways to overcome the situation that had arisen during World War I. At a certain point, a seemingly unstable balance between offensive and defensive capabilities appeared and remained for some time, in the late 1920s and early 1930s.

In subsequent years, both Soviet and foreign military sciences opened up opportunities to overcome the predominance of defense over offense. Military thought in Germany was working very intensively.

From the outset, the massed use of breakthrough and exploitation weapons in World War II (tanks, self-propelled artillery, aviation, submarines, and aircraft carriers) made fighting on land, in the air, and at sea aggressive and offensive. A tactical breakthrough immediately developed into an operational breakthrough. Large mobile units, primarily tank groups and armies, played a decisive role in this process.

If one takes a look at history, it turns out that the Franco-Prussian War was mainly a demonstration of the superiority of offense over defense, but the Crimean War, of the defense over the offense (and was the first static

war in world history). If one moves even deeper into history, one discovers that the Napoleonic wars were chiefly a triumph of offensive and aggressive strategy. They were waged with definite goals aimed at routing the enemy's armed forces and at major territorial seizures. If one compares, for instance, the Seven Years' War with them, one can see that there was no clear superiority of offense over defense; in a number of instances, defense generally prevailed over offense, and the definitive goals set in the period of the Napoleonic wars were lacking.

Science, particularly historical science, requires that exceptions to general patterns be revealed and considered. This is very important, because an exception in one phase of a certain process turns out to be a rule, a dominant characteristic, in the next phase. Practically all of the previously mentioned major wars in Europe had their very important exceptions. Napoleon, who had carried out a series of successful campaigns in Europe with the clear dominance of offense over defense, lost the war against Russia, whose military leaders, M. B. Barclay de Tolly and M. I. Kutuzov, used strategic defense as the main method of warfare against the invasion by the powerful Napoleonic army.

World War I had examples of successful strategic offensive operations: the offensive on the southwestern Russian front in July-August 1916 (the Brusilov Breakthrough) and a series of offensives by the allies on the Western Front in 1918, such as the Battle of the Marne and the Amiens and Saint-Mihiel operations.

World War II, for its part, showed that a defense prepared in advance, assuming the tactical intentions of an enemy preparing for an attack are ascertained, is quite successful and leads to a rout of the attacker's most powerful

force grouping. This was the lesson of the Battle of Kursk, one of the major battles of World War II.

In view of the general defensive nature of Soviet military doctrine, the necessity and capabilities of strategic defense were clearly underestimated on the eve of Hitler's 1941 aggression. The possibility of defensive action was only permitted on an operational and tactical scale.

Considering offense as the main form of combat, Soviet military theory predicted that the initial period of a future war would be characterized by a large number of meeting engagements, while the belligerents' attempt to gain the initiative from the first hours of a war, would force them to accomplish the mission by offensive actions which would develop into meeting engagements.

At the beginning of the war, strategic defense was organized, as a rule, during the enemy's aggressive offensive actions with an incomplete strategic deployment and with a lack of defensive lines prepared in advance. In the summer of 1942, the unsuccessful outcome of defensive operations in the Voronezh sector and in the Donbass resulted in a breakthrough of defenses on the southern side of the strategic front. This was used by the enemy to develop the offensive on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Thus, for the second time in the war, strategic defense became the main form of military actions by armed forces. All these substantial errors led to serious defeats of the Red Army, enormous human casualties, and a considerable loss of territory.

One cannot fail to note that our postwar literature on the art of war in the Great Patriotic War, right up to recent times, has mainly examined the experience of strategic offensive operations from the second half of 1943 through 1945. Often, authors have not even mentioned that these opera-


tions were possible only after the initiative was seized at the cost of enormous casualties—including through fundamental errors in the elaboration of military doctrine and strategy—from a very dangerous enemy. There is no doubt that, if proper attention had been devoted to questions of strategic defense before the war, we would have paid a considerably smaller price for victory.

The origins of these miscalculations in the shaping of the Red Army's prewar doctrine go back to the late 1920s, when an entire trend of military and political-military thought associated primarily with the name of Professor A. A. Svechin was virtually crushed and vilified. His works were not free of shortcomings. However, based on a comprehensive analysis of the correlations between the means of attack and defense, the defensive and the offensive, profound historical trends, the history of warfare, including World War I and its results, he made extremely important forecasts about how a second world war could begin, the nature of the threat to the USSR's western borders, and so on.

The Allies also did not use the possibilities of strategic defense on the Western Front in May, 1940. The armed forces of Britain, France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, as Professor D. Proektor convincingly showed in his fundamental study, suffered a crushing defeat, largely because of a tragic error permitted during the deployment of the Allied armies.

One gets the impression that the Allied command on the Western Front in May, 1940 did precisely what Von Schlieffen, Germany's chief of the general staff, dreamed of in his time and about which he wrote in his well-known work, "Cannae."

In examining the cyclic alternation of the prevalence of offense or defense in major wars on



the European Continent, including World War II, one cannot fail to note the presence of one stable long-term trend that seemingly permeates all these phases; namely, there was a constant increase in the kill capability of the weapons used and a growth in the intensity of combat operations and in the depth of operations and territorial area encompassed by military events. Resources used for warfare, their mobilization, and the military strain on the economy of each state during a war also increased.

### III

How has the situation since World War II developed? This has been a period of radical and unprecedented changes in the technological side of the issue due to the creation of nuclear weapons. A gigantic leap has occurred in the kill capability of weaponry. In its strategic and political significance, the appearance of nuclear weapons surpassed even the appearance of firearms. Nuclear weapons, even when both sides had only a few weapons, immediately increased the advantages of offense even more when compared with the capabilities of defense. With the growth of the number of delivery vehicles and warheads, the question of the possibility of defending against nuclear weapons became increasingly problematic, despite

the occasional expectations of the creation of an ABM defense.

The assessment of the role of nuclear weapons has undergone a substantial evolution in the postwar period. N. V. Ogarkov, in particular, correctly notes that, in the 1950s and 60s when there were still few of them, they were viewed only as a system capable of sharply increasing the firepower of troops. Various attempts were made to adapt nuclear weapons to the forms and methods of military actions that already existed by that time primarily to accomplish strategic tasks. Subsequently, in the 1970s and 80s, the accelerated growth in the numbers of nuclear weapons of various yields and the development of different long-range and precision-guided vehicles for their delivery to a target, as well as their wide incorporation in military forces, led to a radical review of the role of these weapons and to an abrupt change in the views of their role and importance in warfare, of the methods of conducting a battle or an operation, and "even of the possibility of fighting a war using only nuclear weapons."

Many assessments by western specialists and military theorists have undergone a significant evolution. For instance, former U.S. Secretary of Defense R. McNamara, stresses that, under

modern conditions, nuclear weapons can no longer be considered a means of waging war.

The appearance of these weapons, despite the revolution they have produced in military affairs, has not led to an abandonment of the development of general-purpose forces and conventional weapons. Moreover, many specialists stress the necessity, in peacetime, of deployed and correspondingly concentrated large general-purpose forces equipped with conventional weapons, even, perhaps, in a larger number than required before the appearance of nuclear weapons. This was justified by the following: If weapons of mass destruction are used, breakdowns in the lines of communication and in systems of mobilizing reservists are inevitable. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult to make up the losses caused by a nuclear attack. Hence the conclusion that it is necessary to have, on a permanent basis, very large general-purpose forces in peacetime. As a result, at present in Europe alone, two large-scale forces in the form of NATO and the Warsaw Pact confront each other. This premise has nourished a high level of military confrontation and an arms race in non-nuclear areas as well.

Discussing the correlation of offensive and defensive weapons as applied to the nuclear period, one can briefly note the following: Let us recall, for instance, the debates in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the different variants of a U.S. ABM defense. At first, the question of creating a dense ABM defense for the country's territory was discussed, then a "thin," dispersed ABM defense for the country's territory, and then just an ABM point defense and a system capable of protecting a portion of U.S. centers only from a reduced-strength strike by accidental and unauthorized launches. When the second cycle of research and development on the ABM program

ended in the United States and the question arose of a spasmodic increase in appropriations for this system in connection with the upcoming deployment of one variant or another, very substantial reassessments were carried out. After fierce debates, a decision was made to completely reject the creation of an ABM system. The result of these debates and corresponding military technology and strategic military assessments was the signing in 1972 of the Soviet-U.S. ABM Treaty of unlimited duration.

As is known, at the turn of the 1970s and 80s, the idea of creating an ABM defense for the country's territory using new technology, including weapons based on new physical principles and with space-based echelons, was given new impetus in the United States and has currently become one of the main research and development programs of the Department of Defense (and of the military sector of the Department of Energy). A number of areas have already been revealed that define the potential role of this comprehensive program (the "Strategic Defense Initiative"—SDI) in the future level of the strategic military balance.

First, we will focus attention on the program's political significance. It is aimed at undermining the ABM Treaty, which by the mid-1980s became one of the main political-military factors of strategic stability. From the strategic military and military technology viewpoint, the ABM system that the U.S. plans to create as a result of research and development via the SDI program could fulfill at least three functions: first, ABM defense against a reduced-strength retaliatory strike by the other side; second, the creation of a certain capability to inflict "space-to-ground" strikes; and third, the development of a wide range of computer systems that would ensure a higher kill capability and

flexibility and efficiency in using strategic offensive arms and conventional weapons and general-purpose forces.

In examining the development of offensive and defensive means in the sphere of conventional weapons and general-purpose forces since World War II, one can note another feature. Both during the war and in the postwar period, defensive weapons—antitank artillery, antitank mines, various missile and SAM systems, ATGMs, ASW ships, etc.—were created at an intensified pace. The new capabilities of these weapons were repeatedly demonstrated in regional wars in the 1970s and 80s. N. V. Ogarkov concludes that, at a certain stage, their skillful use balanced offensive and defensive weapons. Now, diverse weapons, including aerial weapons for combating tanks, aircraft, and, to a certain extent, ships, are rapidly developing. In the process, the development and production of these weapons has reached a level that urgently requires considering the operation of the laws of dialectics and carefully studying new trends and possible consequences of their development.

Beginning in the 1970s, many Soviet and western specialists began to devote increasing attention to these circumstances. Most often, for instance, one recalls the 1973 Arab-Israeli war in the Middle East, during which the belligerents lost no less than 50 percent of their tanks and aircraft in a matter of a few days. In the October 1973 War, tank warfare was the essence of the fighting between both sides' forces. It revealed the exceptional importance of special antitank weapons, primarily ATGMs, which were used by both ground forces and helicopter gunships. "The main trend in the development and refinement of antitank defenses of the opposing side's forces was the improvement of its stability and activeness." According to the assessments of many experts, the sharply

increased capabilities of infantry and the continuous development of mobile antitank guided missiles has led to the fact that the combination of tanks and fighter-bombers, which has prevailed on most battlefields since 1940, is losing the function of being a decisive tactical factor. Now it is necessary to add helicopters armed with ATGMs, as well as weapons against the enemy's antitank guided missiles, to the tanks and fighter-bombers. As former West German parliamentary State Secretary of Defense A. von Bülow notes, modern technology makes it possible to arm an ordinary infantryman on the battlefield with relatively inexpensive weapons that can shoot down, within a matter of seconds, a very expensive aircraft or destroy a heavily armored vehicle that cost a few million [dollars].

It seems that N. V. Ogarkov's conclusion regarding the new correlation between the capabilities of offensive and defensive weapons should be considered in all its fullness in the elaboration of practical approaches to limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons. This situation cannot remain for long, if the arms race continues, and if political-military relations between countries do not change. The shift to a new stage, even a qualitative leap forward, in the development of conventional armed forces and weapons is currently imminent. Weapons are appearing that are comparable in their effectiveness with weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the sharply increased operating range of conventional weapons will make it immediately possible to envelop, along with border regions, a large area of the territories of countries and their coalitions, which was lacking in past wars. The qualitative leap forward in the development of conventional weapons also entails a change in the preparation and conduct of operations. For its part, this presupposes the possibility of conducting

operations using conventional weapons in qualitatively new and considerably more destructive ways than before.

The use of automated troop and weapons command and control systems, the creation of global reconnaissance systems and reconnaissance/strike systems, the complete mechanization and high degree of mobility of troops, and the use of military robotics bring about a transfer of an increasing number of the functions previously performed by people to automatic devices. The speed of actions and the rapid change in the tactical and operational situation, the simultaneous envelopment of large territories of a number of European countries, the deliberate disruption of communications channels, and the conduct of fighting at any time of day and night and under any weather conditions do not permit, as General of the Army V. M. Shabanov notes, political and high military leaders to authorize the decisions being made, including the use of tactical nuclear weapons because of a lack of time and information.

The shift to combat using weapons of mass destruction may be sudden and unpredictable, and this engenders a desire to maintain one's own nuclear weapons in a state of heightened combat readiness, which, in turn, substantially increases the danger of an outbreak of a nuclear war and its escalation. The massed use of conventional weapons does not rule out a deliberate or accidental attack on the enemy's nuclear and chemical weapons, including depots, missile launchers, vehicles for storing and transporting nuclear warheads and shells, loaders, and other similar targets. Its consequences could be similar to the use of the corresponding weapons of mass destruction and could upset the balance in tactical nuclear arms and provoke unpredictable retaliatory action. Strikes by conventional weapons are also capable of destroying the numer-

ous European nonmilitary nuclear electric power stations and power plants. The result would be virtually equivalent to an attack using nuclear weapons, and the consequences would be considerably more tangible than in the Chernobyl accident.

All this has a most negative effect on the possibility of ensuring the stability of the strategic military balance without broad measures to limit and reduce armed forces and conventional arms.

Under the present conditions, the problem of the element of surprise in combat to achieve success in offensive and defensive operations is becoming increasingly acute. The most important precondition and decisive factor in achieving surprise is felt to be the timely secret creation of groupings of men and equipment and maintaining them in constant combat readiness. On the whole, ensuring the element of surprise is considered a principle of the art of war that is as compulsory as the creation of superiority in men, equipment, and weapons on selected axes of main thrusts.

It is important to bear in mind that the requirements for achieving the element of surprise largely contradict conditions for ensuring strategic stability. At the same time, due to an entire package of factors, this task has become even more complicated and considerably more expensive. Compared with numbers in the Great Patriotic War, the degree of troops' saturation with various weapons and military equipment has increased. Accordingly, the volume of camouflage work necessary to prepare for an operation, and during it, has grown. Also, it is necessary to consider that reconnaissance subunits have been equipped with new technical systems that have substantially expanded their capabilities while complicating the conditions for operational camouflage.

Limiting and reducing armed forces and conventional weapons must take shape while anticipating and considering the real dynamics of developing new weapons, primarily precision-guided, long-range munitions. In many respects, the appearance of these weapons can completely change the traditional tenets of the art of war, but not, by any means, in the direction required by new ideas of ensuring international security based on the need that it be mutual, like strategic stability. Long-range precision-guided munitions, if they are adopted in forces on a mass basis, will bring additional instability. (Many serious military specialists have recently focused attention on the possibility of using a wide range of measures and weapons that would neutralize, or at least substantially reduce, the effectiveness of long-range precision-guided munitions. In particular, electronic combat equipment has a prominent place among them). Their appearance would promote the development of new warfare systems and methods and make the arms race even more expensive.

One of the urgent tasks facing political-military science today is the development of conditions for ensuring strategic military stability in a non-nuclear world (and the stages of progress toward it) and the quest for the limits of reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, which would be determined both on a mutual and unilateral basis.

In a number of areas, strategic stability in the conventional level radically differs from what should take place at the nuclear level. The basis of stability in the latter case is the threat of inevitable retribution, primarily by ensuring unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike. On the conventional level, it is impossible to materially and practically implement a similar threat. Even if this goal were set, it would look absurd, insofar as nuclear deter-

rence would be replaced simply by non-nuclear deterrence, but with the same or similar catastrophic consequences.

The main thing at this level, in the context of ensuring strategic stability, is the creation of a set of conditions in which the capabilities of one side's defenses (strategically, operationally, and tactically) would exceed the offensive capabilities of the other side, and vice versa.

In ensuring a stable strategic military balance and determining the limits of the reasonable sufficiency of military capabilities, one must bear in mind that the search for these variants of military concepts and structures of armed forces, which would be clearly defensive, has a long tradition in Europe. Heinrich von Bülow, a prominent military affairs theorist of the 18th century, wrote: "The art of war is precious to me as an aegis of security and freedom, and my duty is to study it, because I am convinced that I have ideas on how to make offense futile by improving the art of defense." Von Bülow's predecessor, Henry Lloyd, promoted the idea of natural borders in Europe that would give defense a decisive advantage over offense.

For instance, his fundamental work, "Strategy," published in 1911 by prominent Russian theorist General N. P. Mikhnevich, pointed out the advantages of defense (in both tactics and strategy): "**Defense also has strategic advantages:** The defender is close to his resources. As he withdraws, his forces become more and more concentrated and the resources increase, while the opposite is true for the attacker... A defender in his own country suffers less hardship than an attacker, and the mood of an army defending its own home is much more serious." For all these reasons, Clausewitz considered "**defense as the strongest form of waging war.**"

Commenting on this proposition of Clausewitz, A. A. Svechin wrote: "Tactically, defenders can better use the terrain, make wider use of fortification works, and more fully exploit their fire. In strategy, defense has the opportunity to use the lines and depth of a theater, which forces the attacker to expend forces for the consolidation of terrain and spend time passing through it, while any gain of time is a new plus for the defense."

Discussing the fact that defense is the stronger form of warfare, it seems that Clausewitz made an exceptionally important remark from the viewpoint of developing mutual approaches to strengthening strategic stability and creating conditions for preventing a war at the conventional level: "Absolute defense is in total contradiction to the concept of warfare..." It follows from this view that, with the shift by the two sides to purely defensive force groupings, concepts, and strategic and operational forms, the possibility of waging any large-scale war disappears. Here it is once again necessary to stress that this applies only to general-purpose forces and conventional weapons but does not extend to the strategic nuclear sphere.

#### IV

An important step toward the creation of a qualitatively new political-military situation in Europe was taken by the Warsaw Pact states, which adopted the document, "On the Military Doctrine of the Warsaw Pact Member States," at the 29 May 1987 Berlin Conference of the Political Consultative Committee.

The proposals in the documents of the Budapest (June 1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries and in the statement on the Warsaw Pact military doctrine, envision the creation of a fundamentally new political-military

situation in Europe, including mutual relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Their orientation is that reducing military confrontation on the continent would prevent the possibility of a sudden attack and offensive operations. In other words, the main goal of these joint or parallel actions by the sides is to strengthen strategic stability with lower and less burdensome levels of military confrontation.

Without exaggerating, this formula could be called a conceptual breakthrough in this area. The reaction in various political circles of Western Europe and among a number of persons in the United States was considerable and positive. It largely corresponds to the various concepts of so-called "alternative defense" ("nonoffensive defense," "nonprovocative defense," and so on) that have been actively developed in recent years in West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, and Great Britain.

An impartial examination and comparison of both sides' military doctrines and concepts and a development of a single view on how they will evolve further would be a substantial contribution to building confidence in Europe and increasing the stability of the strategic military balance.

Discussing the May 1987 announcement of the Warsaw Pact Doctrine, General of the Army D. T. Yazov, USSR Minister of Defense, stressed that it incorporates new views on the organizational development of the military and on the problems of preventing a war. The prevention of war—both nuclear and conventional—has become the main task of the armed forces. This question of strategy, and of military doctrine as a whole, has not been previously studied to this extent. Within the framework of the general defensive orientation of military doctrines, the question of a total correspondence between its political and military

## Soviet Press Selected Translations

technological components arises. In this connection, Soviet military leaders stress that the provisions of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine are a mandatory part of the the art of war and organizational development of the Soviet Armed Forces and the other allied armies. As Col Gen M. A. Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, stresses, the Soviet Army's main mode of operation in repelling aggression will be not offensive, but defensive operations and combat. It seems that the latter, very important tenet of the technological military part of the USSR's and Warsaw Pact's military doctrine, could serve, to a certain extent, as a reply to the question, frequently raised in the West, of Soviet "operational maneuver groups [OMGs]."

At the same time, one must note that the Warsaw Pact countries have every reason to have a negative attitude toward the NATO concept of Follow-on Forces Attack [FOFA], which essentially repeats the openly offensive U.S. AirLand Battle concept. The current U.S. naval strategy, which is associated with the names of Admiral Watkins and former U.S. Secretary of the Navy Lehman, is obviously aggressive and dangerous (ultimately for both sides).

Such U.S. and NATO strategic and operational concepts are completely incompatible with statements about the defensive nature of the NATO doctrine. It is noteworthy that this is recognized by the main political figures and military professionals in the West, who criticize such concepts in view of their inability to ensure mutual security and strategic stability.

A frank discussion of both sides' military doctrines and concepts and a common approach to their further development is a very complex and largely unprecedented task. But the threat facing Europe and the whole of civiliza-

tion if war breaks out is also unprecedented.

It will probably be necessary to assess the combined combat capabilities of the sides, both defensive and offensive, to solve the problem of preventing a sudden attack. In a number of areas, this will require more complex layouts and studies than a traditional numerical comparison of the opposing forces—comparing the number of divisions, tanks, aircraft, artillery pieces, missile launchers, and so on. One must bear in mind that there are currently considerable differences in the assessments of composition of men, equipment, and weapons of the sides (Warsaw Pact and NATO) in official western and Soviet publications, which, in addition, reflect different methods of calculation. Questions associated with the elaboration of "third generation" confidence-building measures (if one takes what was adopted at the Stockholm conference in 1986 as the second generation) will require more in-depth professional preparation. Among other things, a special analysis of the role of current combat training exercises (especially combined arms exercises) seems necessary.

Despite the problems with prospects for joint measures to strengthen strategic stability and reduce military confrontation, precisely this approach is most promising. It is substantially different from the one that has been used for many years at the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and arms in central Europe.

At present, the conditions for verifying accords substantially surpass those of 30 to 40 years ago. This fact alone proves that ensuring stability in a non-nuclear world and increasing the stability of the strategic military balance at various levels of nuclear arsenal reductions is possible. Strategic

stability with reduced military confrontation could be achieved by each side's creation of expressly defensive forces and structures armed with the weapons that could not be used for a sudden attack or for offensive operations. Destabilizing types of conventional weapons must be limited and prohibited.

The entire structure of both sides' resources as well as surveillance and command, control, and communications systems must be such that, if an armed conflict breaks out, it would not promote conflict escalation and would allow the supreme political leadership and military command to get adequate information about the development of the conflict at any moment and to control the conflict so it could be terminated at the earliest possible stage.

One of the main principles of creating an essentially new system of strategic military balance at the conventional level boils down to the following: The Warsaw Pact's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed NATO's offensive capabilities, while NATO's defensive capabilities must substantially exceed the Warsaw Pact's offensive capabilities, at reduced levels of military confrontation between the two alliances. This is precisely what the proposals of the Budapest (1986) and Berlin (May 1987) conferences of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states lead to. Success in this task would largely contribute to the creation of the necessary mutual security conditions for the switch to a nuclear-free world.

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# MILITARY THOUGHT

## ОСНОВЫ СОВРЕМЕННОГО ОБОРОНИТЕЛЬНОГО БОЯ

Полковник Г. Ионин

As everyone knows, Soviet military doctrine is entirely defensive. Therefore, we will not begin hostilities, if we are not attacked. If the imperialists unleash a war, then we will be forced to repel the aggressor's invasion from its very outset and only then go over to the offensive. This is the reason for the great attention paid to the defensive in the theory of the art of war and in the practice of troop combat training.

In this article, I want to touch on only the basis of defensive battle: to examine its essence and place in combined arms combat; the conditions for troops going on the defensive and the demands produced by it; the battle formation; the construction of defensive areas; and the fire plan.

The defensive appeared with the offensive. Its development came about primarily as a result of improvements in armaments and combat equipment. Their influence on the nature and methods of defensive actions appeared not only directly but through changing enemy offensive capabilities. In particular, the use of new combat assets by defending forces increases their defensive capabilities, imparting new characteristics to defense, making it firmer and more aggressive. But an advancing enemy also uses new types of armaments and combat equipment. This increases his firepower and the force of his strike, mainly by using weapons of mass destruction, as well as precision-guided munitions [PGMs], which are part of weapons complexes or systems using guided or correcting and homing ammunition capable of destroying a target on the first shot. Correspondingly, this places higher demands on a defensive.

## THE BASIS OF MODERN DEFENSIVE BATTLE

Col G. Ionin

The essence and place of the defensive in combined arms combat. Today, combined arms combat is in a position not only to repel an offensive of superior enemy forces, but inflict important losses on them and also set up favorable conditions for going over to the offensive and breaking up the enemy's offensive.

On the defensive, troops will most often be fighting significantly superior forces. For example, in the battle for Moscow in the autumn of 1941 on the Tula-Kashira axis, the enemy had an eight-fold advantage in tanks and a three-fold advantage in artillery. And now the army commands of the large capitalist nations intend to create a four- to six-fold superiority on the main axes to achieve success in an offensive. It stands to reason that, when there is an unfavorable correlation of forces and weapons, it is impossible to count on routing the opposing grouping. Even repelling an offensive in a similar situation is a very, very complex matter. But if the strong features of a defensive consisting of the following are correctly implemented, they are completely practical.

First, the defenders could use the protective features of the terrain and engineering equipment more effectively than the attacker. Even the simplest of trenches lowers the vulnerability of troops to nuclear weapons (and consequently losses as well) approximately three-fold and to conventional weapons fired from covered firing positions, seven-fold or more.

Second, on the defensive, both nuclear and conventional weapons have great capabilities. For example, the kill zone for troops in

the open is more than 3 times greater than for sheltered areas.

During the war years, three artillery battalions expending 30 to 40 percent of their basic ammunition load were sufficient to suppress a battalion attacking in dismounted formation (forcing it to take cover and inflicting 20 to 30 percent losses on it). To suppress the same subunit on the defensive (forcing it to stop firing and also inflicting 25 to 30 percent losses on it) now requires not less than nine artillery battalions and an expenditure of their entire basic ammunition load.

Third, in combat with enemy tanks and mechanized infantry, the defender could use minefields, and, at the same time, the opportunities of the enemy to do this have been limited, even considering remote minelaying.

Fourth, the defender could choose the place of the battle with advantageous areas and lines, implement camouflage more reliably than the attacker, hide true and show false intentions, prepare maneuver beforehand, etc.

Consequently, the essence of a defensive consists of repelling an offensive by superior enemy forces by hitting him with aviation strikes and the fire of all weapons in combination with broad maneuver and counterattacks while simultaneously holding on to important areas of the terrain, and also creating favorable conditions for going over to the offensive.

It follows from what has been said that achieving a complete rout of the opposing enemy grouping by defensive actions is impossible. They can only set up favorable

circumstances for destroying the enemy grouping and with it—the offensive. Therefore, it is justified to consider the defensive as a type of combined arms combat, subordinate to the interests of the offensive. One usually falls back on it when being forced to (where an offensive is impossible), or intentionally (where an offensive is not expedient).

**Conditions for going on the defensive and the requirements for it.** Conditions for going on the defensive are usually understood to be the actual tactical situation in which the preparations for it will be implemented, including going over to the defensive itself. Moreover, from the situations laid down, the status and character of enemy actions have a decisive influence on the conditions. Depending on this and on the mission received, a defensive can be prepared and the troops can go over to the defense in a timely manner (including both in peacetime for covering border areas and when repelling a possible enemy attack), during battle (conducting military actions), or in close contact with the enemy or away from him.

Preparing for a defensive in peacetime entails taking steps directed at repelling an enemy invasion, including making decisions; giving missions to subunits; and organizing the fire destruction of the enemy, the types of support, and so forth. From the outset of hostilities, the situation could change sharply and correspondingly require a clarification of earlier conducted measures and sometimes calls for making a new decision. That is to say, the situation, as a rule, will not be easy.

During the past war, the enemy tried to foil our defensive preparations. With this aim, they hit troops going over to the defensive, and when creating a center of fighting in our rear area, they tried to seize lines that ensured a favorable situation to develop an offensive. In modern conditions, the opposition will be still more aggressive.

It is significantly harder to go over to the defensive in close con-

tact with the enemy. During an offensive in the Great Patriotic War, our forces had to do this to repel counterattacks by superior Nazi forces, reinforce the areas taken, support the flanks of advancing troops, as well as when there was an unsuccessful outcome of a meeting engagement. Units and subunits going on the defensive, as a rule, were subject to the aggressive actions of the attacking side. Today, this could be strikes with weapons of mass destruction and conventional PGMs, continuous attacks, remote minelaying, and the same kind of aggressive actions by naval forces in coastal sectors. When going on the defensive, troops will be forced to simultaneously eliminate the consequences of enemy nuclear and chemical strikes, repel enemy attacks and clear the terrain of mines. It may be necessary to improve the position occupied through combat, as well as fight sabotage and reconnaissance groups in one's own rear area.

During combat, troops not in contact with the enemy went over to the defensive wherever we, for a number of reasons, had not envisioned an offensive (on secondary and poorly accessible axes), and also on the sea coast and islands to repel a possible enemy naval assault. In similar circumstances, favorable conditions appear for carefully studying the terrain in the depths and on approaches to the forward edge; choosing the most favorable defensive lines and areas of defense; arranging the battle formation; and organizing fire, maneuver, and the wide use of engineering equipment not only in the depths but on the forward edge of the defenses.

However, one should understand that, today, the attacker has effective, long-range weapons, above all, reconnaissance/strike systems, reconnaissance/fire systems, and remote minelaying assets, which can also make going over to the defensive complicated when not in contact with the enemy. This requires everyone to know the conditions for troops going over to the defensive, know the order of the commander's work

to organize it, and expend the minimum amount of time on it and conduct it secretly.

In circumstances where troops would not have gone on the defensive, they always had to satisfy the requirements of a defensive, namely: to be firm, aggressive, and capable of repelling enemy strikes using all types of weapons and to withstand the strikes of nuclear and chemical weapons, aviation and artillery, massed attacks by tanks and other armored combat vehicles. They must combat the enemy aggressively, while not allowing an airborne or airmobile group assault, and if the enemy manages to penetrate—destroy him. Only then will defense achieve the goals set for it.

**The battle formation.** For defense, units and subunits are assigned sectors and areas or strong points, in which they deploy in the battle formation.

Depending on the mission received and the actual situation, the battle formation could be made up of either one or two echelons. According to the experience of the past war, the two-echelon formation turned out to be the most acceptable. One should emphasize that, when on the defensive in less important sectors and when there are significant losses, the battalion's battle formation must be made up of one echelon.

The commander of a motorized rifle battalion, Maj Yu. Veselovskiy, had a creative approach to this problem at an exercise. For the first time, repelling an attack by a superior "enemy" was required, and the officer decided to set up the battle formation into two echelons. This made it possible to gradually intensify fire, maneuver men and equipment, and take part in the counterattack conducted by the regiment's second echelon.

In another instance, the battalion was defending itself on a secondary axis of the "enemy" offensive in poorly accessible terrain and after suffering losses. Now, the battalion commander set

up the battle formation in one echelon. But to prevent the depth of the defense from being reduced and to have the ability to organize flank and cross fire, he moved one company forward. The officer skillfully used the camouflaging features of the terrain and periodically changed positions while maneuvering with elements of the battle formation located in the depths of the defense. He succeeded in confusing the enemy.

**Setting up the defensive area.** Battalions occupy defenses within the bounds of one position. It is based on company strong points prepared for overall defense and joined in the battalion area. Moreover, company strong points are set up in this way so that they intercept, not only by their own fire but by their location on the terrain, the most probable axis for the enemy advance. When such points block the attacker's path, it is more difficult for him to develop the battle.

Experienced commanders try to put every defensive position and, consequently, every defensive forward edge behind water barriers, swamps, ravines, and other obstacles. Stubborn resistance by the defender on such lines lowers the pace of the enemy advance and permits an extended period to effectively destroy him by fire.

Increased defender troop mobility makes it possible to create firing lines assigned to tank subunits and also motorized rifle subunits in IFVs located in the second echelons. They can be prepared both in the battalion defensive area and beyond the limits of the probable axes of massed enemy tank and IFV or APC attacks. Antitank and anti-IFV ditches, as well as the path for moving forward to them, are prepared on firing lines. Wherever the enemy can penetrate the defense, the deployment lines of second echelon subunits (or reserves) for the counterattack take shape. When there is time, they can be prepared in the engineering sense.

The firmness of a defensive is significantly increased when alternate positions are prepared in and

between battalion areas. They are constructed at an angle to the front to hinder the enlargement of an enemy breakthrough on the flanks and permit fire pockets to be set up to destroy the enemy by fire and counterattacks. In a defensive, it is hard to overestimate the role of ambushes—by tanks, ATGM subunits, and other antitank weapons. Their positions could be prepared throughout the entire depth of the defenses, mostly in gaps between strong points. Subunits with a small complement detailed for an ambush could quickly change positions and suddenly inflict significant losses on enemy tanks and IFVs or APCs that have broken through.

**The fire plan.** The strength of a defensive is in its fire. But it is possible to fully use fire assets only when they are used purposefully and coordinated by target, place, and time, that is, when they have been organized into a fire plan. In combined arms units and subunits, a single fire plan is created for all types of weapons: artillery (from concealed fire positions), antitank weapons, and small arms.

The fire plan is the aggregate of the fire of all types of fire assets positioned according to the decision of the commander. The plan ensures that fire is organized to have a maximum effect on the enemy. It includes concentration sectors and defensive artillery fire lines prepared at the approaches to the defenses, ahead of the forward edge, on the flanks, and in the depth of the defenses; antitank fire zones and solid, multilayered fire from all types of weapons in front of the forward edge, in the gaps, on the flanks, and in the depth of the defenses; and prepared fire adjustment to concentrate it quickly on any threatened axis or sector.

An important role is given to **antitank fire** because tanks and other armored combat vehicles form the basis of offensive enemy groupings, and the results of antitank fire determine to a large extent the achievement of the goals of the defensive.

Antitank fire is the organized fire of tanks, IFVs, ATGMs, and

guns, mostly antitank and grenade launchers that lay direct fire. The outer limit of antitank fire can be at a depth of several kilometers and supported by fire from ATGMs, IFVs, tanks, and other assets. Tanks, IFVs or APCs, ATGMs, and guns are secretly positioned in the strong points and areas of the defenses. They are dispersed, considering the requirements of protecting against nuclear and conventional weapons, to make it possible to conduct fire at maximum range; hit the enemy flanks with high-density, crossing, surprise, short-range concentrated fire; have a mutual fire support plan; and set up fire pockets.

The fire plan must be coordinated with planned nuclear strikes and combined with a system of engineering obstacles.

These are the most important concepts for the basis of modern defensive battle that must be followed by combined arms commanders and staffs when preparing the defense and command and control of subordinate subunits.

*From the [Soviet] editor: With Col G. Ionin's article, the editors begin the publication of materials on the problems of defensive combat. In this connection, the editors are asking unit and subunit commanders, staff officers, military academy and school instructors, chiefs of combat arms and services, and all readers of the journal to express their opinion, first of all, on such issues as organizing defensive battle at the battalion, company, and platoon level.*

*The problem of setting up the battle formation and organizing fire plans, engineering preparation of positions, strong points and areas, and all-around support merit attention and need working out in detail. We will be talking separately about military stratagem and deceptive actions and the ability to achieve surprise in defensive battle.*

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(Source: Voyenny vestnik, № 3, 1988, pp. 18-21)

# MILITARY THOUGHT

## МЫСЛЯТ О НЕМЫСЛИМОМ

Чего не сможет сдержать  
«Доктрина ядерного  
сдерживания»

Генерал-майор запаса Л. Корзун

Since the days of ancient Rome, the lovers of military adventurism have hidden behind the sophism: "If you want peace, prepare for war." By measure of the development of the means of armed conflict, the unjustifiability of this formula has become more evident. Its falseness and danger were revealed by Karl Marx. He wrote: "Of all dogmas of the bigotted politics of our time, not one has caused so much misfortune as the one that says 'If you want peace, prepare for war.' This great truth is distinguished mainly in that it contains a great lie, which is the battle cry that called all of Europe to arms..."


Two world wars unleashed by imperialism during less than half a century, confirmed that Marx was correct. The insane arms race by the largest imperialist governments, which preceded these wars, not only failed to prevent suffering and destruction, but on the contrary, accelerated it and increased the numbers of human victims to unprecedented levels.

But even more dangerous circumstances, threatening the very existence of mankind, grew out of the appearance of nuclear weapons. Their genocidal potential was demonstrated by the entirely unjustified (from either a moral or purely military point of view) atomic bombing of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 by the

## THINKING THE UNTHINKABLE

What the "Doctrine of  
Nuclear Containment"  
cannot contain

Maj Gen (Res) L. Korzun



American militarists. Even though W. Churchill labelled the atomic bomb "the second coming of Christ," in actuality nuclear weapons have become a herald of the possible ruin of world civilization, if mankind doesn't conform to the realities of the nuclear age and change its political thinking.

While the atomic bomb was the sole domain of American imperialism, it was viewed by them as the main tool for establishing world domination. In reality, this goal continues to be fundamental to American policy today. True, even the American president is now forced to admit, from time to time, that nuclear weapons are evil. However, supporters of nuclear weapons immediately attempt to show that

this evil is unavoidable, as though it is vital to the deterrence of an even greater evil—war.

As M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in a speech to the international forum on "A Nuclear Free World and the Survival of Mankind," it is exactly this thesis that lies at the root of the doctrine of nuclear containment. In his speech, he totally destroyed this highly hypocritical and totally unfounded doctrine in which, regrettably, many people still believe.

What then is the essence of this doctrine that has become the basic strategic goal of the U.S. and other NATO countries as well? It proclaims that the most important prerequisite for security has to be the guarantee of effective "contain-

ment" of a potential aggressor through fear, foremost by means of American nuclear might to prevent some form of activity or other, among which are attack on the U.S.A. and its allies. Proceeding from this false premise about the "Soviet military threat," the creators of this doctrine and their followers contend that the main target of "containment" is the Soviet Union, and every step toward widening the arms race and achieving military superiority is blamed as a consequence of its actions. The doctrine of nuclear containment is used to justify U.S. efforts to upset the strategic balance through a sharp buildup of strategic offensive weapons and even Washington's plans for the militarization of space.

All of this is leading to some long-range consequences. In the well-aimed words of one American politician, the actions of the present administration are driven by a "self-sufficiency of strength." The president himself, and his closest associates, continually affirm the U.S.'s dependence on strength. According to R. Reagan's arguments, "strength is the strongest argument we have to convince our enemies." It's been calculated that, since the atomic incineration of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. has produced 60,000 nuclear warheads of 71 types for 116 weapon systems. By the end of 1986, the American nuclear arsenal included 26,000 warheads of 30 different types.

The Pentagon devoted appropriate energies to the selection of the corresponding targets. In a U.S.-published book by W. Arkin and R. Fieldhouse entitled "Nuclear Battlefields," it is shown that the Single Integrated Operations Plan SIOP-6, on 1 October 1983, identified 40,000 targets in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries for nuclear strikes, including not only military targets, but industrial, administrative, and others.

That is the U.S. view of "nuclear containment." But even this isn't enough for the Washing-

ton administration. It has demonstratively violated SALT-2, exceeding its limits on the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons. It's well known that just one Trident nuclear submarine has a destructive capability equal to several times that of the Second World War, which cost mankind 50 million lives.

Do we need any more convincing proof that today's nuclear arsenals have become so senselessly huge, that not only are they unable to reliably assure the safety of their owners, but to the contrary, substantially undermine it. It's totally evident that, under such conditions, a realistic containment is out of the question.

The world is aware of several dozen incidents where the use of nuclear weapons by U.S. militarists was moved into the practical plane. This is a very dangerous policy—a policy of nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. Imperialism is currently complementing its traditional "gunboat diplomacy" with "nuclear blackmail diplomacy." History bears witness to the fact that this policy often led, and continues to lead, to serious conflicts. I ask, where's the guarantee that nuclear threats won't eventually lead to catastrophe?

We need to take note of this circumstance. At the Moscow forum, M.S. Gorbachev pointed out that: "The greater the number of nuclear weapons, the less chance of their good behavior." That this is so can even be judged by the American press. Using only data publicized there, one can see what a huge number of accidents and different defects arise with nuclear weapons and their platforms as a result of design miscalculations, and equipment breakdowns due to mistakes by maintenance personnel, etc. They are truly playing with fire, indeed a fire in which our entire planet and all life on it could burn to a cinder. And there are no guarantees, nor can there be any against technical malfunctions.

If the U.S. president occasionally speaks of the unthinkableness

of nuclear war, then his stubborn reluctance to halt the nuclear arms race, his refusal to call an end to nuclear testing, his determination to acquire new and "exotic" weapons, his drive to develop the "Star Wars" program and the militarization of space have given birth to serious doubts about the sincerity of such pronouncements. H. Kahn, a prominent American political analyst, whose advice benefits many powerful people in the U.S., admonished, "We must be prepared to really wage nuclear war and to win it." I call this "thinking of the unthinkable." Apparently, many activists in the present administration in Washington are thinking of the "unthinkable." [Former] Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger himself announced, "If we don't take war seriously, not intending victory, then there's no need to start it."

U.S. nuclear weapons are currently spreading over the planet like a cancerous growth. Incidentally, medics aren't the only ones who know that the best chance of saving the patient is the timely removal of the tumor. That's why the Soviet leader's announcement that "The Soviet Union shall not retreat from its goal...to achieve a sharp reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, and their subsequent elimination," caused such wide response.

The Soviet Union's purely defensive military doctrine is in contrast to the outdated nuclear containment policy. Its chief purpose is not to tolerate war, but to prevent it. The accomplishment of this is provided by political resources, the support of the defenses of the Motherland at a necessary level, the military might of Soviet Armed Forces, and the preservation of strategic military parity. Again and again the Soviet Union expresses its desire to relinquish its status as a nuclear power, and reduce all other arms to a minimum of reasonable sufficiency in observing the principle of equal security.

(Source: *Krasnaya zvezda*, 20 Mar 87, p. 3)

# MILITARY THOUGHT

## ДЛИТЕЛЬНАЯ ЯДЕРНАЯ ВОЙНА

## PROTRACTED NUCLEAR WAR

Генерал-лейтенант Г. Конев  
Генерал-майор В. Покровский

Lt Gen G. Konev  
Maj Gen V. Pokrovskiy

For more than 40 years after the building of nuclear weapons in the U.S., the basis of all existing U.S. military strategies—"massive retaliation" (in the 1950s), "flexible response" (in the 1960s) and realistic deterrence (in the 1970s)—that determine the objectives, forms, and methods for using the barbaric means of obliterating people has always remained unchanged in principle—unconcealed nuclear blackmail and threats to use nuclear weapons in any set of circumstances. This principle has been officially elevated by Washington to an instrument of policy, is designated to achieve aggressive, hegemonistic objectives, and has found its embodiment in the modern doctrine of "neoglobalism," reflecting the efforts to achieve world domination of the most reactionary militarist circles whose supporters are counting on the use of force as the best means of accomplishing external political tasks.

In the very same aggressive spirit of "neoglobalism," the main objectives of U.S. military policy in the 1980s were formulated and based on "direct confrontation" with the Soviet Union on a global and regional scale. The aggressive essence of this policy is directed at achieving "complete and unchallenged U.S. military superiority." It was analyzed in depth at the 27th CPSU Congress and also completely proven in the published works of Soviet military specialists.

Again in the recent past (the end of the 1970s to the beginning of the 1980s), one clearly saw persistent efforts by U.S. military leaders to inject the idea of

"limited" nuclear war into the minds of people, presenting it as a more "humane" form of military actions compared with the massed use of nuclear weapons. What was the true reason for the Pentagon's "human kindness" regarding the fate of the people of the world? First, according to recently published testimony by a number of U.S. military specialists, "limited" nuclear war supporters envision that such wars would be waged in any of the world's "hot spots," excluding U.S. territory and areas adjacent to it. Second, in the view of Pentagon strategists, towards the end of the 1970s a rough parity between the USSR and the U.S. occurred in strategic nuclear weapon platforms with which, by the number of nuclear warheads located on them, the U.S. had the advantage. Judging by the statements of western specialists, the use of strategic offensive forces in limited or massive use would not give any sort of superiority to the United States in achieving its political objectives, because the opposing sides could inflict unacceptable losses on each other and the subsequent existence of the countries would be placed in doubt.

At the same time, strategists tried to use the alleged superiority of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal in "limited" nuclear strikes that, in their opinion, in the end must also play a role at a certain stage of "measured" exchanges of nuclear strikes to lead to the exhaustion of the Soviet Union's potential and deprive it of the capability to inflict "unacceptable losses" on the U.S. When looking at the U.S. idea of "limited" nuclear wars, foreign

observers emphasized that the plan consists of widening the role of nuclear weapons as a deterrent and making this means of warfare a practical instrument that allows the U.S. to painlessly achieve certain political and strategic objectives in its confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The conclusions of the U.S. military and political leadership concerning the use of strategic weapons in limited armed conflicts brought about important changes in the planning for using nuclear weapons. The Pentagon was given the mission of quickly developing a large number of plans for possible crises and conflicts. The essence of such planning came down to a detailed analysis of all hypothetical situations affecting U.S. interests in which nuclear weapons could be used and to the selection of the forms and methods of conducting nuclear strikes that corresponded to the actual conditions. According to U.S. press data, the existing "Single Integrated Operations Plan" (SIOP), developed by U.S. headquarters with the objective of conducting massed nuclear strikes, had by the end of the 1970s many (more than 200) scenarios for selectively limited and regional use of nuclear forces, which are regularly played out in the largest U.S. Armed Forces military exercises.

Simultaneously with the development of limited use of strategic offensive forces, the Pentagon conducted a search for new ways to achieve military superiority while there was still a qualitative and quantitative parity of the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals, which, in the

view of U.S. specialists, would be achieved by the beginning of the 1980s.

When the Reagan administration came to power, they very insistently pushed through the idea of protracted nuclear war and the decisive role of preparing the strategic forces and the country for such a war, in which the U.S. could achieve victory (When reviewing questions concerning the duration of such a nuclear war, a number of U.S. publications emphasize that it would mainly depend on the recuperative capabilities of both the armed forces and the country as a whole and on the effectiveness of organizational and other measures, as well as on any number of frequently unforeseen factors. Based on this, and judging by numerous publications, U.S. military specialists feel that the duration of a protracted nuclear war could be from 2 to 6 months and somewhat longer). In 1982, [then] Secretary of Defense Wienberger, while expounding the position of the country's military and political leadership on military problems, officially indicated that it was necessary to build nuclear forces "possessing solid survivability even in the most complex conditions of protracted nuclear war." The requirements of "solid survivability" led to a reexamination of principles for the structure and use of strategic offensive forces in combat, and was reflected in the concept of "active countermeasures," which was interpreted as protracted nuclear war. The concept, according to the words of the U.S. Secretary of the Navy, "had been developed to improve the chances for the U.S. to achieve superiority." Although the author of these illusory efforts also did not say over whom it was necessary to "achieve superiority," foreign specialists regarded this as another attempt to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union. How then is the Pentagon planning to implement its plans?

In the view of the Pentagon's leadership, to wage a protracted war nuclear forces must have, above all, high survivability, flexibility of use, and the capability to be in a combat-ready state for a

prolonged period of time. Moreover, they emphasize that the effectiveness of nuclear weapons in combat in a protracted war would largely be determined by the reliability and survivability of supporting systems—command, control, and communications [C<sup>3</sup>]; warning; intelligence; monitoring the results of nuclear strikes; the logistics base; and others.

The concept of "protracted nuclear war" made it necessary to fundamentally change the main planning principles at all stages of combat by U.S. strategic offensive forces, because earlier, carefully developed plans were only for making nuclear first strikes; follow-up actions had, in fact, not been worked out. In keeping with the new views, special significance is attached to setting up the necessary reserve of forces that would have to be used in accordance with timely developed plans for waging protracted nuclear war. And finally, in the views of U.S. specialists, one must have a clear idea of the duration of such a war to develop well-founded and purposeful plans to wage it. What then does the military and political leadership of the U.S. intend to undertake and how will it implement this concept in practice?

The orientation of U.S. strategic forces towards waging protracted nuclear war, as reported in the foreign press, was similarly expressed five years ago in an official presidential statement about "a new strategic program" that provided for "modernizing and sharply increasing the combat capabilities of all components of the strategic offensive forces triad (land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and strategic bombers); significantly increasing the effectiveness of existing command and control [C<sup>2</sup>] systems to ensure reliable direction of strategic forces in protracted nuclear war; modernizing strategic defensive systems; and strengthening civil defense."

In Wienberger's view, taking into account such requirements as high flexibility and survivability for strategic nuclear forces when

waging protracted nuclear war predetermines the improvement of existing weapons and the building of advanced strike weapons by considering the strong and weak sides of every strategic offensive force component. For example, the high survivability of SSBNs can ensure the creation of a reliable strategic reserve of strike assets for waging protracted nuclear war, and with the increase in accuracy of missiles fired from submarines, they could be the main means to destroy any protected target. Effective use of ICBMs, which are highly accurate and possess a high combat flexibility, could be achieved, and their sufficient survivability could be ensured. Flexibility in combat in a given war will be characterized by strategic bombers capable of also making strikes on planned targets and detecting and hitting highly protected stationary and mobile targets from the immediate vantage point of the person in the situation.

Based on the requirements of the "strategic program," the U.S. is now putting the MX ICBM (10 warheads each) on combat alert, as well as bringing into service the Ohio class SSBN that, beginning in 1989, will be armed with new Trident-2 missiles. It is felt that the latter will not differ from an ICBM in firing range and effectiveness for destroying highly protected targets. B-52 bombers continue to be equipped with cruise missiles and the new B-1B strategic bombers are coming into the inventory. The Pentagon also intends to put the Midgetman ICBM and the ATB bomber into the strategic offensive forces.

In connection with the creation of new offensive strike weapons, the U.S. military and political leadership is paying close attention to increasing the survivability of all components of the strategic triad. American specialists feel that the survivability of strategic bombers in protracted nuclear war depends on the existence of a network of air bases and logistic assets. One of the ways to solve this problem is the possible use of a greater number of U.S. civilian airfields having

runways suitable for B-52 and B-1B bombers (such airfields, in the view of U.S. specialists, number more than 450). Moreover, it is considered necessary to create the corresponding fuel, ammunition, spare parts, air crews, and technical personnel reserves.

It is felt that, to ensure the combat readiness of bombers when they are concentrated at the airfields mentioned above, special mobile repair and servicing centers must be deployed and equipped with everything necessary. The centers, which are located on large-cargo vehicles, must disperse in a timely manner and, when necessary, move out to the airfields that survived destruction to organize the reception and servicing of aircraft there. To more confidently support their activities, a logistics unit or sub-unit could have earlier been placed there and dispersed in protective shelters.

Similar methods of ensuring survivability, according to U.S. military experts, will be used for SSBNs. They could include the building of specially protected shore structures to restore the combat capabilities of ships and the use of floating bases to reload SSBNs with missiles at sea.

The U.S. press mentioned that, at present, the USAF's Strategic Air Command [SAC] has developed plans to restore the combat capabilities of strike assets at every missile and air base. For bombers, for example, they are providing post-strike landing fields, a special plan for technical servicing and the loading of ammunition, and the assignment of replacement crews. For ICBM units, measures have been worked out for ensuring the restoration of combat readiness of personnel of mobile groups, for the timely stockpiling of spare parts and equipment, for repairs, and for the use of surviving launcher silos.

As Pentagon specialists emphasize, the most important area for preparing U.S. strategic forces for protracted nuclear war is improving C<sup>3</sup>, which must be flexible and reliable when nuclear

weapons are used on any scale. With this objective, they are working on placing airborne command posts on E-4B aircraft and on increasing the protection of airborne command posts from the effects of nuclear blasts. In the middle of the 1980s, a new level of U.S. Armed Forces C<sup>2</sup> systems—mobile ground command posts for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, operational SAC groups, and numbered air forces, as well as ICBM launch command posts—was added to the three existing ones (main, backup, and reserve aided by the airborne command post). These C<sup>2</sup> elements could be deployed during increased tensions in areas far away from those targeted for destruction. They are also improving communications systems in the long, super long, and millimeter wavebands. For example, at this stage, the GWEN [ground wave emergency network] long-wave system will be deployed; it is based on a net of transceiver stations using surface waves from 150 to 175 kHz, which are not subject to the effects of ionization and electromagnetic radiation from nuclear blasts. According to the U.S. press, this system has a single purpose—to get orders from the U.S. military and political leadership to strategic forces during a protracted nuclear war. It indicated also that special modular command centers are being developed to hold the country's highest leadership for a protracted period under extraordinary conditions.

It is important to increase the survivability of the IMEWS satellite early warning system by setting up a mobile receiver and processing the data from it and by modernizing radar warning system stations to increase the accuracy of determining the scale of nuclear missile strikes. The Pentagon, according to the U.S. press, is paying a great deal of attention to setting up a joint operational system, made up of special transmitters located on satellites, to determine the location of nuclear explosions (it is proposed to deploy up to 20 satellites). This system must be capable of detecting and determining the coordinates of nuclear blasts on any point on Earth with

an accuracy of up to 100 m and pass this information to the corresponding receiving centers. According to the testimony of a representative of the U.S. Department of Defense, such a system would ensure "observing the damage in real time and make it possible, when waging protracted nuclear war, to retarget nuclear assets, and thus allow the destruction of surviving military targets and the cancellation of earlier planned strikes on targets whose need to be destroyed has passed."

In recent years, tests carried out on the orders of the Pentagon paid a great deal of attention to planning the actions of strategic offensive forces in a protracted nuclear war. Moreover, with the appearance of the "protracted nuclear war" concept, many publications emphasize that the SIOP, as it existed in its earlier version, "was obsolete, since it was based chiefly on the idea of a single massive strike in a short-lived war." For example, in a U.S. National Defense University study "Protracted Nuclear War," published in 1984, American military specialists suggested developing "an integrated operational plan to destroy targets" in a protracted nuclear war—WIOP (Warfighting Integrated Operational Plan).

Such a plan, in the opinion of U.S. experts, must be the basis for the implementation of the tenets of protracted nuclear war and for a large number of the scenarios throughout the entire war. The greatest attention, in their opinion, must be paid to developing new combat principles for nuclear forces, dispersing nuclear missile forces, planning nuclear missile strikes, and creating and using a strategic forces reserve to maintain constant superiority, even when there are repeated massed nuclear weapons exchanges. In such a reserve, apart from missiles located on submarines, they intend to include a portion of ICBMs, dispersed strategic bombers, and sea-based cruise missiles, which could be redeployed in any region and retargeted at any time during protracted nuclear war.

When examining the specifics of developing a plan for protracted nuclear war, American military specialists indicate that it is necessary to distribute as well as possible strike assets assigned to the first and follow-up strikes and to create a strategic reserve component that could be combat-ready for a prolonged period. Moreover, they feel that the new plan, like the SIOP, must also include not only strategic offensive forces but also all types of operational-tactical [intermediate-range] and tactical nuclear assets, whose use may play an important role in achieving the main political objectives during protracted nuclear war.

While preparing for protracted nuclear war, the U.S. military and political leadership has attached paramount significance to armed forces command and control during war and with this aim, in extraordinary conditions in the U.S., a special procedure has been provided for transferring the power of national command authorities to the proper successors, each of whom must know his own duties and order of succession and fulfill the functions of armed forces command and control. When transferring national authority, presidential successors are the vice president, the speaker of the House of Representatives, the president pro tem of the Senate, the secretary of state and other secretaries, etc. (16 people in all). The succession of the military authority represented by the secretary of defense is done by his deputies, the secretaries of the army, air force, and navy and their assistants.

In a study by the National Institute for U.S. Military and Political Problems published in May 1983, it was asserted that all procedural questions on organizing and transferring authority were the responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which has at its disposal a centralized data collection system that constantly monitors the whereabouts of the president and his successors and works out plans to evacuate and disperse them on airborne command posts

and protected C<sup>2</sup> elements when a war is waged. Quarterly, FEMA conducts exercises to test these plans and reviews the work of the data collection system that monitors the whereabouts of the president, secretary of defense, and their successors.

The U.S. press has widely publicized the special exercise "Ivy League-82," conducted in March 1982, during which U.S. military and political leadership, for the first time, actually worked on preparing for controlling the country and the armed forces during protracted nuclear war. The main goal of this demonstration of force, which the U.S. government did not even hide, consisted of a "realistic appraisal of the capabilities of the United States to survive a nuclear missile war." According to the exercise scenario, the leadership of the country and the armed forces was transferred, in turn, to presidential successors (that were quickly dispersed) according with the procedures outlined in the U.S. Constitution. The order of priority of transferring power was implemented under uninterrupted contact with the successors.

The annual U.S. large-scale exercise "Global Shield" regularly works on problems of employing ICBMs and strategic bombers in protracted war conditions. According to a statement by former SAC commander [General] R. Ellis, together with "monitoring the conduct of operational plans using strategic aircraft and ICBM forces in different situations, special attention is paid to actions by these forces when there is an exchange of nuclear strikes and to supporting their combat capabilities over a prolonged period of time." In exercises of this type, they examine the ability of strategic forces to reestablish their combat capabilities and prepare for follow-up massed strikes, regroup forces and assets, organize command and control, and put reserve communications assets into operation.

Overall, if one thoroughly analyzes the essence and intentions of contemporary U.S. policy and the actual development of

plans for their strategic forces, the aggressive efforts of U.S. imperialism can be clearly seen. In strategic military parity between the U.S. and the USSR, Washington is trying to give its nuclear potential the characteristics that would ensure their capability, in the words of the U.S. President, "to gain the upper hand in protracted nuclear war." Moreover, if before the U.S. leadership was covering up its doctrines and concepts for "waging nuclear wars" with high-blown defensive phraseology about the necessity of "containing" the Soviet Union, then the Reagan Administration has now cast off this false scrupulousness and openly declared that it is developing similar plans for war against the Soviet Union. For example, Wienberger openly proclaimed in one official document that "the requirements of the new concept of protracted nuclear war are based on the belief that victory is possible."

It is completely obvious that such imperial ambitions of the U.S. leadership do not stand up under criticism. If one looks at the history of previous wars, it is easy to see that the scale, duration, and results of wars, even with the use of conventional weapons, did not coincide with what was predicted. This fitting and convincing answer to the U.S. creators of new nuclear concepts was given by M.S. Gorbachev: "those who resort to the argument about 'limited,' 'short-lived,' or 'prolonged' nuclear wars are clearly still prisoner to the outlived stereotypes of our century, when war was a great calamity but did not threaten, as now, humanity with extinction. The nuclear age inevitably requires new political thinking." But as the actions of the present U.S. government show, it is precisely such thinking that the U.S. military and political leadership does not possess.

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(Source: Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye, № 10, 1987, pp. 9-14)

# SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. MILITARY

Photographs accompanying this article appeared in original text.

## 170 В ЛОДКЕ, НЕ СЧИТАЯ РАКЕТ

О тех, кто служит на  
ПЛАРБ типа «Огайо»

Е. Серов


America likes the biggest and the best. The highest skyscrapers, the longest highways, and the biggest hotels are located in a country with the highest crime rate, and the greatest number of jobless and homeless, in a country where the biggest money is spent on weapons—mostly nuclear.

Nuclear submarines, mainly those equipped with intercontinental ballistic missiles, are the object of special attention in U.S. ruling circles. On SSBNs, as such submarines are called, are located 50 percent of all strategic nuclear warheads. The largest of the SSBNs are the Ohio class, each of which is equipped with 24 Trident-1 missiles. The Ohio class SSBN is the pride of the U.S. Navy. It's a great honor to serve on them; at least that's how the Pentagon tries to portray it.

The submarine's crew consists of 16 officers and 155 sailors and petty officers. All of them, writes the journal *Proceedings*, are picked from the best trained sailors. It is well known that, in the

U.S., the armed forces are manned with hirelings. Therefore, "picking personnel" is like enticing them into the service. The Pentagon leadership is also trying to make maximum use of Americans' love for the biggest and the best.

Service on an SSBN is only for "real" men; who would not want to be these very same "real" men? They've added to the usual



enticements: the possibility of education, travel, and 30 days of paid leave. In addition, there are more "specifics." For those who love to eat—the largest submarine dining facility; for those who love

## 170 ON THE BOAT, NOT COUNTING THE MISSILES

About those who serve on  
an Ohio class SSBN

Е. Серов

to sleep, the most spacious bunks; for those who love to amuse themselves, a record and videotape library, and there's even the largest underwater gymnasium with a full assortment of every kind of sports equipment. The very biggest and the best of everything is used to entice the best trained for nuclear submarines. Even women are now permitted to serve on submarines (true, for the time being only on non-nuclear ones).

Accustomed to regarding the service as a source of income, the submariners rarely list patriotism and duty to their country as reasons for serving on an SSBN. Mostly, to be part of the world of the biggest and the best.


### How They Are Trained

And here they are on board: as a rule, officers conduct training while still ashore. For sailors and petty officers who have completed submarine school, the main training starts on the boat.

All training on board is conducted under the direction of those more senior in rank and by more experienced sailors. The training course for the new men is from 10 to 12 months in duration (about 12 hours of classes a day). It includes studying all the main centers and assemblies on the sub and later being tested by senior onboard specialists. Every crew member must be ready to act like a professional, no matter where he is, should the alert signal be received. In the opinion of [U.S. Navy] command authorities, the survivability of the boat rests mainly on the "morale of the crew."

Psychological isolation must not affect the submarine's crew. This is all the more true in a practical absence of communications with land: no newspapers, radio, or television. Sometimes local radio programs and ones from home are received, but only when the submarine is at periscope depth. On the one hand, this creates psychological tension in the crew, and on the other, it creates a golden opportunity for brainwashing the command. On the radio, for one and all, there is the march "Stars and Stripes"; for one and all there are books about the perfidious enemy; there are videotapes in which the GIs are never depressed and never lose, also for one and all, and more of the same.

There is no ideological conditioning specialist on the sub, but all the same they are able to resourcefully "brainwash" the American sailors. Especially zealous "advocates of defense interests" suggest even changing the habits of the crew "from civilian to military"; to eliminate from the



sailors' vocabulary expressions like "after work" and a "day off," etc., that allegedly create an impression psychologically among the personnel, that they are civilians in military service.

Crew members get purely superficial indulgences during the voyage: they can change into any uniform combination and boots that are all the same style. Outward signs of individualism are suppressed by carrying out the strictest discipline. A U.S. Navy Captain, [John Paul] Jones, asserted that, "although the ship acts in defense of the rights of people and the Republic, its command is based on the principle of absolute despotism." This was said at the end of the 18th century but it expresses reality today as well. The officers on the boat are responsible for "command despotism."

### Who Presses the Button

The main figures on the submarine are the nuclear propulsion engineer and the nuclear weapons systems control officer. The majority of officers who in their time occupied the former of these duty posts are now subma-

rine commanders. This situation, in the opinion of the [former] U.S. Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Trost, is correct, because those who command nuclear submarines must have good theoretical and practical skills in working with nuclear propulsion. All submarine officers, except the nuclear weapons systems officer, undergo such training.

But this is precisely who will be on the button the moment the order to launch is received. Who then is he?

The nuclear weapons systems control officer on the submarine is responsible for the most important thing—the Trident missiles. Training for the specialists is conducted in submarine school and lasts 12 weeks. They admit only Annapolis graduates into this school.

In all, such specialists on U.S. Navy submarines number nearly 100. Many of them are dissatisfied with their situation: a lack of training in the "nuclear propulsion" program will stop them from moving up in the service. But this is careerist thinking and they could scarcely upset the officer who carries out presidential orders to launch the missiles. They don't undergo another 5-week course for nuclear weapons systems officers in addition to their professional training for nothing. Such training guarantees that orders will be carried out 100 percent.

The most powerful weapons must be in the hands of the most reliable people, who are not capable of reflecting on making a nuclear strike on any target. The U.S. loves the biggest and the best.

(Source: *Krasnaya zvezda*, 24 Sep 87, p. 3)

# SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. MILITARY

## ДВОЕ У «КРАСНОЙ КНОПКИ»

Капитан М. Жеглов

"Charlie" and "Juliet"—this, of course, is not Shakespeare. "Charlie Zero," "Juliet," and "Golf" are the designators of several command post bunkers at the U.S. Air Force base in Grand Forks, North Dakota, where the USAF Strategic Air Command's (SAC) Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBMs] are based. Each such bunker ties together about 10 Minuteman mis-

siles. Their launch positions surround the bunker, and, to increase missile survivability, the distance between them is not less than 5 kilometers. It is also known that the missiles at Grand Forks occupy a territory the size of New Jersey. And if only this base were the only one...

### WORK

The person in the picture is 1st Lt (there is such a rank in the U.S. military) Anthony on combat alert. Together with another officer, he is lowered into the underground bunker, "clothed" in steel and concrete, to a depth of nearly 20 meters. The alert crew passes through to a command compartment—a room crammed with computer panels, communications equipment, and other devices. In the compartment there are both a tiny bathroom and a separate space for walking, a little bit less than one and one-half meters



across. Food is prepared above and lowered to the missileers in the command compartment below. Missile launch officers look after twinkling indicator lights, receive messages, look at TV, listen to the radio, and read. And all the time they wait for the command to press the "red button..."

Eighteen hundred officers, part of SAC's ICBM crews, regularly do the same things at their posts. In all, more than 52,000 out of 109,000 people in the command have access to nuclear weapons.

Alert duty for the intermediate-range Pershing-2 is carried out by crews from the 56th Field Artillery Command with headquarters in the West German city of Schwebesch-Gmüde, and cruise and Lance missile launchers. Crews are also on constant alert on ICBM-equipped U.S. Navy submarines.

## TWO ON THE "RED BUTTON"

Capt M. Zheglov

### HOW THEY ARE SELECTED

Each of these servicemen goes through a careful screening. The main criteria of this screening are political reliability, professional training, and psychological toughness. Later on and till the end of their service, they are under the so-called personal reliability program. According to the views of

U.S. command authorities, which form the basis of this program, reliable servicemen are those whose "conduct; execution of service obligations; and physical, psychological, and emotional state show that they can act consistently and predictably"—one must understand that what is meant is automatically, without any "unnecessary" thoughts or doubts.

The monitoring of this "reliability" is multifaceted and continuous. Servicemen can be relieved of their service duties temporarily or permanently if they are not in a condition to work at full capacity, depending on their own declaration, evidence from co-workers, family situation, or simply on the decision of the commander. A reason for such a decision, writes the journal *Air Force Magazine*, could also be even the "slightest sign of any sort of problem," beginning with insufficient approval of the government's policies and

ending with troubles in one's personal life.

During selection, preference is given to those who expressed a desire to serve in nuclear missile units. But in SAC, for example, those appointed to officer positions are chosen exclusively from volunteers. The term of service for an ICBM crew officer is 4 years. On the average, nearly 30 percent of officers sign a contract for a second term. Moreover, material incentives play a big role: servicemen connected with nuclear weapons receive several times more than those equal to them in rank but who have different military specialties.

The result of such manning practices is that the majority of nuclear missile unit personnel are servicemen in senior categories that have a high level of special and technical training. The officer personnel of these units, in the view of the Belgian newspaper Drapeau Rouge, are the cream of the officer corps of the U.S. Armed Forces.

#### **HOW THEY ARE TRAINED AND FOR WHAT**

Nuclear missile unit personnel undergo initial specialized training in corresponding army and air force schools. Later on, the missileers' professionalism will be maintained and sharpened by participating in training alerts, special studies, and—for operational-tactical and medium-range missile subunits—combined arms exercises. For example, to work on firing the missiles, Pershing-2

crews regularly redeploy from their permanent stations in West Germany to the U.S., where launches are made from Cape Canaveral.

Ensuring the political and psychological readiness of servicemen to use nuclear weapons is hardly unimportant to U.S. military and political leaders. Nuclear weapons are seen in their eyes as a panacea for every occurrence in life. In a number of arguments to prove this absurd assertion, even the tragic examples of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are used. Military propagandists claim that, if it were not for the U.S. atomic bombing, the leaders of Japan at that time would not have capitulated and would have carried on the war to the complete destruction of Japan and its people.

One is being exposed to a prejudiced and biased commentary now as well. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General D. Galvin, recently stated that, looking at the conclusion of an INF [intermediate nuclear forces] accord between the U.S. and the USSR within the framework of the "double zero option," the threat of armed conflict in Europe will grow. It is hardly surprising that this statement, reinforced by the authority of the commanding general, was widely circulated among nuclear missile servicemen.

The main goal—to ensure an unconditional readiness to use nuclear weapons, is implemented, for example, by overall training and development. U.S. Department of Defense directives for the

years 1984–1989 state, "the possibility of using nuclear weapons remains a key element in the strategy of global deterrence."

#### **WHAT THEY BELIEVE IN**

"Freedom, equality, humanism" is the motto of one of the artillery regiments in one of the Pershing-2 battalions of the 56th Field Artillery Command. It is precisely these values that they intend 1st Lt Anthony and his coworkers to "defend" while using the weapons entrusted to them. For them, the U.S. is the bastion of such values. To the list of staunch convictions one can add the alleged U.S. intention to use nuclear weapons only for defensive purposes, a skillfully instilled hatred for the USSR and socialism as being diametrically opposed to "the free world," the belief in the "Soviet military threat," and the belief that "the USSR is threatening to achieve world domination."

They also believe in their "special mission." However, many hope they don't have to do it for real. It's not without reason that, in one of the units, they call the communications system over which the order to use the missiles is supposed to come "the cemetery radio." However, U.S. servicemen view the increase in nuclear armaments and the implementation of every new military program proposed by the U.S. military-industrial complex as a way of keeping this radio from working.

(Source: Krasnaya zvezda, 15 Oct 87, p. 3)

# MILITARY TECHNOLOGY

## «КРЫЛАТЫЕ НЕВИДИМКИ»

Почему США внедряют  
технику «стелс» в  
боевой авиации

V. Надеждин

The term "Stealth" has been mentioned more and more frequently in recent years by the press, radio, and television in reports on the aircraft arms race unleashed by the United States. Our journal has already told about the aircraft being developed with this technology, and yet many readers are still asking: What is "Stealth" technology? Why are they introducing it into military aviation so urgently?

According to the foreign aviation press, five programs to develop aircraft using Stealth technology are now under way in the United States. These are programs for Lockheed's F-19, which is already in mass production; Northrop's ATB advanced strategic bomber; the ATF tactical fighter for the U.S. Air Force; the ATA tactical aircraft for the U.S. Navy, and the ACM cruise missile, being developed by General Dynamics.

The F-19 and ATB are among the priority programs. The sizes of the appropriations attest to this. According to official information, 34 billion dollars is to be spent to develop and produce 132 ATB bombers. Official information on how much the F-19 aircraft will cost the taxpayers has not been reported. According to the estimates of foreign specialists, 7.3 billion dollars will be spent to produce 100 to 120 aircraft of this type. Justifying to the U.S. Congress the need for vast appro-

## "INVISIBLE WINGS"

Why the U.S. is introducing  
Stealth technology into  
military aviation

V. Nadezhdin

priations to "complete the equipping" of aviation with aircraft built with Stealth technology, R. Cooper, director of the Department of Defense's Advanced Research Projects Agency, stated that it "is the most revolutionary improvement in the field of military aviation since the jet engine and the swept-back wing."

Just what is Stealth technology?

All the work connected with applying this design and technology has been classified secret in the United States. However, many materials appearing in the foreign specialized press in recent years make it possible to put together a fairly complete picture of the concept. The journal *Interavia Aerospace Review* writes that Stealth technology ([Soviet Editors' note:] "Stealth" means secrecy) is a system of measures and technical solutions aimed at significantly reducing the level of the following six basic features that reveal the position of an aircraft: radar returns, heat radiation, the presence of smoke in exhaust gases, the vapor trail; visual observation, and engine noise.

Reducing the radar cross section of an aircraft is one of the most important elements in Stealth, since radar is the principal sensor for the air defense system. Reducing the radar cross section is achieved in two ways: by eliminating elements in the aircraft structure that reflect a radar

emission and by using radar-absorbing materials.

It is well known that the angular joints of surfaces, large vertical planes, sharply protruding structural elements, and the various antennas and metal first stages of jet engine compressors are good radar reflectors. For this reason, a layout and configuration that takes these requirements into account is selected for aircraft being built with Stealth technology: the wing should be smoothly coupled with a fuselage having a very thin profile; the tail fin and other stabilizing surfaces should be either removed completely or significantly reduced in size and canted inward; the engines are installed deep in the fuselage at the end of long curved air intake channels, which are encased in radar-absorbing materials to suppress the radar echo from the first stage of the compressor; and the armament is positioned inside the fuselage.

Specialists believe that the "flying wing" configuration with a lifting body meets these requirements most completely. However, it should be noted that reducing the stabilizing surfaces and making use of unconventional aerodynamic shapes led to a significant decrease in the aircraft's margin of stability. And this entails the need to use a control system, requiring a powerful onboard computer, to provide active stabilization in flight.

Carbon-based compounds, which are part of most modern composites, are considered to be among the most effective radar-absorbing materials. At the same time, it is pointed out that an iron filler, in the form of particles or needles that absorb the electromagnetic energy of a radar emission, may be introduced as part of the composition materials used in building the Stealth aircraft. Coatings of ferrite materials, which also absorb the energy of an emission well, are probably being used in addition to the composition materials. They were developed in Japan, and the U.S. Department of Defense obtained samples of them in the early 1980s.

Reducing the engines' heat radiation is considered the second most important element in Stealth technology. This is related to the fact that thermal-imaging systems are the only means, aside from radar, for detecting aircraft beyond visual range. Moreover, the guidance systems for missiles aimed at airborne targets operate in the heat spectrum of electromagnetic waves.

Specialists single out three basic sources of an aircraft's heat radiation: the engine, the jet blast, and structural elements heated by airstream friction. Obviously, aircraft built with Stealth technology must have an exhaust system that restricts radiation from hot engine components to the smallest possible angle. A flat jet nozzle, which they believe will limit heat radiation when the engine is operating with the afterburner off, may be used for this. Devices that either mix the flows around the main and internal contours of the engine or form a screening flow of cold outside air around the jet blast are possible to make the effect of the jet blast into the nozzle structure less conspicuous.

Thermal radiation from the structural elements heated by the airstream is less intense, but it also may become dangerous in view of improvements in thermal-imaging detection systems. To reduce the level of thermal radiation, a closed-cycle cooling and life-support system, that is, one that

discharges the radiation of heat into the surrounding space, is possible (for example, by the fuel's absorption of excess heat) as well as the use of heat-absorbing coatings for structural elements that are heated aerodynamically.

In the opinion of specialists, suppressing emissions from the aircraft's own onboard electronic systems is a complex task for the designers. Ways of resolving this problem are mentioned in articles that have been published: installing electronic equipment in a single screened compartment, reducing the number of antennas (since each one reemits part of the energy it receives), and installing them under emission-absorbing domes with radio-transparent windows that may be opened and closed. The development of passive onboard target search and tracking systems, thermal-imaging sensors, and sensors in the millimeter-waveband is also being planned. Also planned are improvements in data processing devices, which will make it possible to employ onboard radar using less power and emitting a signal for a brief period of time.

The use of sound-absorbing materials and structures in the outer casing of engine compartments is possible in order to reduce acoustic detectability of Stealth aircraft. The likelihood of a vapor trail being formed may be reduced by using chemical fuel additives that change the size of the water droplets formed in the exhaust jet. They mention active camouflage systems as a promising means of reducing optical detectability, that is, systems of lighting devices that will adjust the intensity of light on the aircraft's surfaces to the background intensity.


It is believed that aggressive work on developing combat aircraft that are harder to detect was begun in the mid-1970s by Lockheed within the framework of the XST (Experimental Stealth Tactical) aircraft program. The magazine Flight International wrote that the XST is a single-seat subsonic monoplane with two engines, each of which develops 5,400 kilograms of thrust. Four

such aircraft were built by 1981; two of them crashed. After testing the XST under real air defense system conditions, conducted at the secret U.S. Air Force proving grounds in Tonopah, the firm obtained a contract to develop the tactical F-19 aircraft and to build the first group of 20 of this type. There have been no official figures on the cost of one F-19, but specialists estimate it at 40 to 70 million dollars. Although the U.S. Department of Defense still does not officially acknowledge the existence of the F-19, many journals claim that mass production of them is already under way and that up to 30-40 aircraft are being turned out annually.

In this connection, it is worth recalling the report in a February issue of The New York Times that, according to its information, the U.S. administration was planning to use the F-19 to carry out a strike against the residence of Libyan leader M. Khadhafi in Tripoli. This was opposed by W. Crowe, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who stated that Stealth technology is too valuable to risk in such an operation.

The U.S. Strategic Air Command became interested in Stealth technology after mass production of Rockwell's B-1A bomber was cancelled in 1977. By early 1979, the feasibility of developing a Stealth bomber was substantiated, and in 1981 the Northrop firm acquired a contract to develop the ATB strategic bomber. Boeing and Vought became its partners in the program. Northrop is the primary contractor for the ATB program, Boeing is responsible for developing onboard electronic equipment, and Vought is charged with developing improved materials for use in the aircraft's construction. Improved F-101 engines made by General Electric are planned to be used for the power plant.

A full-scale mock-up of the bomber was built at the start of the program, and flight testing of a small-scale demonstration aircraft was begun in 1982. It was suggested in the bulletin Aerospace Daily that the first flight of the experimental ATB would take



- 1-Crew cabin; 2-Attack radar;
- 3-Electronic warfare antennas;
- 4-Retractable packs for FLIR and laser radar systems;
- 5-Nose-wheel bay;
- 6-Shielded avionics bay;
- 7-Completely flush ventral inlets;
- 8-Serpentine, RAM-treated duct with internal streamwise baffles;
- 9-Common Strategic Rotary Launcher with eight cruise missiles;
- 10-Main landing gear;
- 11-Auxiliary air inlets;
- 12-Engines;
- 13-Auxiliary inlets for IR suppression;
- 14-Absorbent baffles for IR and radar suppression;
- 15-Two-dimensional vectoring/reversing nozzles;
- 16-Flaperons, possibly with flexible covering;
- 17-Roll/lift-dump spoilers;
- 18-Split wing-tip surfaces function as elevators, rudders, and air brakes;
- 19-Wing fuel tanks;
- 20-Fuselage fuel tank;
- 21-Possible conformal carriage of Advanced Cruise Missiles;
- 22-External RAM

[U.S. Editors' note: This diagram appears to be copied directly from *Stealth Aircraft: Secrets of Future Airpower* by Bill Sweetman]

place in late 1987 or early 1988, that 18 of the bomber series would be put into service by 1992, and that their number would be increased to 132 by 1996.

In the opinion of many foreign aviation specialists, the ATB bomber will have a "flying wing" configuration. They note that selecting Northrop as the primary contractor may be related to the fact that it built and tested two "flying wing" aircraft in the 1940s. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the bomber's hypothetical exterior appearance and layout. According to estimates in the foreign press, it will have a maximum takeoff weight of 181 tons and a combat load of 18.1 tons; it will have a wingspan of 45-53 meters and an area of 370 square meters. The vertical tail surface will either be absent altogether or consist of two small fins canted inward. As reported in the journal *Air International*, forms of advanced technology such as a control system with fiber-optic signal transmission lines, ultra high speed inte-

grated circuits, expert systems, a satellite communications and navigation system, bistatic radar, and so forth are being planned for the aircraft.

The armament will include a Stealth cruise missile being developed by General Dynamics. They are studying the possibility of using an onboard laser weapon and conventional bombs with advanced explosives that yield 10 times more energy than nitroglycerine. The primary mission of the ATB is believed to be combating mobile intercontinental ballistic missile launchers. It is assumed that its low detectability will make it possible for the aircraft to fly at high altitude in the air defense radar coverage zone, which will facilitate target search and detection. In the specialists' opinion, any other bomber would be quickly detected and shot down under such conditions.

The use of Stealth technology creates many problems for defense systems. The principal advantage

of an aircraft with low detectability is that it can detect the enemy's radar before it is detected itself, and this will enable it to either employ more effective countermeasures or execute maneuvers in time to avoid the air defense zone. At the same time, some specialists are rather skeptical about statements concerning the Stealth aircraft's "invisibility." Thus, a staff member of the English firm Plessey, A. Vase, states in an article published in the journal *International Defence Review*, that progress in radar development makes it possible to assume that radar will continue to be the principal means of aircraft detection in the future, and he cites a number of well-grounded arguments to support his view. The views of some other specialists in airborne target detection are expressed in the same vein.

(Copyrighted, *Kril'ya rodiny*, 1987)

(Source: *Kril'ya rodiny*, № 9, 1987, pp. 30-31)

# FLIGHT TRAINING

## ПЕРЕХВАТ В РЕЖИМЕ РАДИОМОЛЧАНИЯ

Полковник А. Андрюшков

Maj Dobronravov was bent over the plan position indicator in the ground-controlled intercept [GCI] van. The light beam of the sweep ran in a circle, lighting up the range line and the azimuth. From time to time, bright flashes burst out onto the dull screen, and at times, they merged, forming irregular shapes of lighted spots.

Major Dobronravov displayed a determined interest in them, but the officer had already shown a flair for this: the blip of the "enemy" that he had already waited for a long time must be about to appear. He, a GCI controller, didn't have the right to make a mistake in his own calculations. Lt A. Deryabin was there observing his actions. Just a year ago, he graduated from the Stavropol' Higher Military Academy for Pilots and Navigators named for Marshal of Avn V. A. Sudets, but he had already managed to prove himself in his work. The pilots recognized the lieutenant's voice over the airwaves from the first words and, having recognized it, believed that Deryabin would not let them down and would precisely bring them out to the estimated point of attack.

But today, both Maj Dobronravov and his young comrade-in-arms had another, more complex and important mission. He would lead the interceptor pilot to the "enemy" not with his voice, but would ensure the pilot was guided in radio silence using the automated control system. Preliminary data had already been programmed into the computer. But this was only half of the matter, as they say, of calmly constructing the route. What is important now is to evaluate the situation in the

air with maximum objectivity at maximum target detection range.

"The 'enemy' would not miss a chance to break through to the protected target under the cover of jamming," thought Dobronravov, looking at the blips on the plan position indicator.

"Comrade Major," resounded the calm voice of Lt A. Deryabin, "There's a target! Azimuth... Range..."

A brighter spot pulsed in the thickest jamming at the very edge of the plan position indicator. It moved rapidly in a definite direction. Maj Dobronravov thoughtfully praised him, "Well done, Lieutenant!," and pressed the button on the microphone: "315 take off!"

Military Pilot First Class Capt A. Kruglov immediately reported his readiness to the command post.

The fighter interceptor moved down the taxiway; the instruments in the cabin had already begun their silent conversation with the pilot, precisely feeding him the needed information about upcoming maneuvers in the air. At the command post, the GCI controller turned on the automated control system, having programmed "enemy" characteristics into it. Long before the flight, commander Capt Kruglov carried out a simulated missile launch, and Maj C. Dobronravov and Lt Deryabin began the "battle" with the "enemy."

"Attention!" resounded the signal in the pilot's headset. A number of figures lit up on the

## INTERCEPT IN RADIO SILENCE

Col A. Andryushkov

illuminated display. And just then a three-cornered pointer crept up the instrument scale, marking the desired flight parameters. The course selector needle took up the required position.

Some time will go by before meeting the "enemy," but Capt A. Kruglov already knows a lot about him. And because the combat equipment is working reliably and everything is going like it was earlier played out in training sessions when pilots "flew through" a good dozen variations of the upcoming battle with the GCI controllers, he was even more confident.

The rectangular landing field was left behind in the roar of the afterburners. The fighter was speeding aloft. And then there was silence...

But in radio silence, the pilot did not feel alone by himself in the aircraft cabin. He understood the language of the instruments that were talking about the position of the combat aircraft in the air, and the workings of its most important systems and assemblies. The fluorescent aiming screen was clear. From time to time, traces of jamming flared up [on the screen]. The pilot knew the "enemy" was still a long way off. But the GCI controller was waging an invisible battle with him. And there was nothing conventional or simplified about it. He was using one of the tactics of interceptors—radio silence.

Kruglov heard the signal in his headsets and simultaneously noticed the course selector moving. He was paying close attention. The main thing was to maintain the course parameters for closing

with the target that had been programmed into the computer. Today, success in aerial combat would greatly depend on the accuracy of Capt Kruglov and his ability to react flawlessly to the instrument readings. It is strictly forbidden to ask again for a command that has been given, for the "enemy" aircraft may be equipped with a radio intercept [COMINT] system.

But the instruments seemed frozen. The GCI controller was also silent. The mental strain at such a moment is great. Here's where one needs to show calmness and will and not fall apart. This does not come easy to the pilot, but somewhere in the depths of his consciousness there is the fleeting thought: "Everything's going normally! Everything-like we learned it."

Like we learned it... There's a lot hidden behind those words: precise knowledge of the theory of instrument guidance, dozens of check flights, and long hours before that in ground training sessions. Experience is accumulated in tense drills and success is born. You can't hide that, at first, some fliers and command post officers were distrustful of the capabilities of the navigation system. In this connection, heated arguments flared up between them. In one such dispute, someone even tried to "strengthen" his argument by a parable about an old helmet headset: reportedly, in it he showed where and how much better a new one was, but it still had to be broken in. It was a joke, of course, but the problem behind it was psychological. Political workers and physicians both had to solve it.

Besides good mental toughness, it became necessary for aviators mastering the automated control system and using it in their intercepts to have a firm grasp of the theory and experience of using a computer in flight. "And that is why creating a frame of mind to understand and accept new training methods, if you please, is the heart of the problem," said the chief of air, fire, and tactical training, Military Sniper-Pilot

Major E. Chernyy to his comrades-in-arms. Capt Kruglov got to the heart of the problem through theory, flying, argument, and scepticism. He knew that, tomorrow, he would have to teach his subordinates—lieutenants who graduated from academies.

A fair amount of time has passed since this combat applications method was still a novelty. Senior pilots remember one technical flying conference. Automated control system specialists and adjustment technicians arrived in the unit. At first, they talked about the importance of the system and how it could be used, and everything went quietly and orderly at the conference. But then an exchange of views began. And the specialists from higher headquarters had to be given a towel more than once—because somebody had gotten hot from the pilots' questions. But such a form of training was very useful. Then they jotted down their observations and suggestions in their notebooks.

Everyone studied the automated control system adjustments.

In a word, pilots, GCI controllers, and the technical engineering personnel were mastering a method that was for them, at that time, new in principle, and, as was the custom in such an important matter—from simple to complex. Capt Kruglov remembers how everyone persistently trained to work in simple and complex weather conditions, day and night. Using the automated control system revealed something new on each flight. While getting acquainted with the many capabilities of the new equipment entrusted to them, it was as if the people themselves were transformed: in selfless labor and in actual matters, military camaraderie and mutual aid were clearly displayed. The experience of the best [pilots] in competitions to effectively use combat equipment and weapons immediately belonged to everyone. In the squadron where Capt A. Kruglov served, this helped them to master the skills of instrument navigation and complete a flight in the

automated control system mode successfully. The subunit achieved a rating of excellent. And this has already been substantiated by the passage of several years. The aviators are working with special enthusiasm on the threshold of the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution.

Well, this flight has great significance not only for officer A. Kruglov but for the entire squadron. Unexpectedly, the distance-to-target indicator burst onto the illuminated display. The onboard armaments were combat ready. A signal came through: the target is maneuvering. The instruments now are giving the order for attack. This GCI controller, Maj Dobronravov, implemented his own plan via the computer.

The target blip was on the aiming screen in front of officer A. Kruglov. The intercept now, as the pilots say, was a matter for the equipment. Kruglov pressed the firing button. Over the airwaves, like a shot, the word flew swiftly and coldly:

"Launch!"

At such times, interceptor pilots forget that their enemy is only theoretical.

On exiting from the attack, Capt Kruglov noticed the dim silhouette of the aircraft far ahead of him. Its crew hardly knew that it had been attacked at precisely that moment. It was "shot down" while still a long way off. It was an exercise target. However, had this been a real enemy, such "knowledge" wouldn't have made any real difference. For, as Hero of the Soviet Union, Col N. Glotov, who has trained many generations of interceptor pilots in air combat tactics, says about the intercept area, "This is the place where the enemy aircraft is smashed to smithereens."

(Copyrighted, Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony, 1987)

(Source: Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony, № 10, 1987, pp. 29-31)

# MILITARY TRAINING

The following is an official response to a two-part article revealing training and maintenance problems in the Moscow Air Defense District. [See *Soviet Press Selected Translations* 30 December 1987, p. 209 and 24 February 1988, p. 25.]

## «ЗОНА ОТВЕТСТВЕННОСТИ»

## “THE ZONE OF RESPONSIBILITY”

The article “Zone of Responsibility,” published in *Krasnaya zvezda* on 1 and 4 August of this year [1987], was examined by the main headquarters, the political directorate, and the directorates and services of the Air Defense Forces. The problems raised in the letter were discussed by the party organizations of the arms and services, by the main armaments directorate, and by the overhaul and repair directorate.

The criticism was recognized to be justified. Raising the issues of logistics supply, the repair of armaments, and the obligations of people responsible for quality maintenance of armaments was a timely and proper thing to do.

Fulfilling the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Ministry of Defense, the Air Defense Forces’ military council is implementing organizational measures to improve the administrative structure and restructure the work style and methods of the central administration.

Col Gen L. Leonov, deputy commander-in-chief and chief of the main armaments directorate, and Col N. Goncharov, the directorate’s party committee secretary, turned their attention to the necessity of increasing the responsibility of personnel for special technical troop support.

Maj Gen of Avn V. Sibirtsev, chief engineer of the Air Defense Forces and deputy commander-in-chief for services, was harshly criticized for serious problems in efforts to ensure quality servicing of equipment in the forces.

Maj Gen V. Voskoboynikov, chief of the overhaul and repair directorate, was ordered to implement exhaustive measures to upgrade the quality and ensure the timeliness of repairs on equipment and armament.

The efforts of leaders to upgrade the quality of equipment and the maintenance and operation of armaments will be analyzed during the final inspection of the 1987 training year. The working, moral, and political qualities of the officers of the armaments services of units and formations are being studied. Additional measures are being developed locally to ensure that engineers, technicians, and all personnel are personally responsible for maintaining equipment and armaments ready for immediate combat use.

**Lt Gen V. Silakov,  
Member of the Military Council, Chief,  
Political Directorate of the Air  
Defense Forces**

Col V. Toporov also replied to the article “Zone of Responsibility.”

He reports that steps have been taken to reduce the time needed to restore air defense resources and to upgrade the quality of their overhaul. Control over providing spare parts, tools, and accessories to air defense troops has been intensified. Troop unit chief engineer Lt Col A. Filippov and deputy commander Lt Col V. Kulakov were disciplined for irregularities in their work.

A response to the article signed by Col A. Atroshchenko, deputy chief of the political directorate of the Moscow Air Defense District, states that acting chief of the armaments directorate Col A. Glukhov and chiefs of the motor vehicle and engineering services Lt Cols M. Bulgakov and Yu. Gushchin were reprimanded for weakening their control over the activities of subordinate services and sluggishly restructuring their personal work. Department chief Col V. Bolshakov was compelled to report the errors of his ways to the political division of the headquarters and the district’s directorates. Communists V. Kolokolov, V. Yemelyanov, A. Bobryshev, and O. Pavlov were harshly criticized at a party meeting of the armaments directorate for sluggishness in providing the units with spare parts, tools, and accessories.

(Source: *Krasnaya zvezda*, 26 Sep 87, p. 2)

# NAVAL AFFAIRS

*The following article is continued from the previous issue. It is the third segment of a four-part series and examines U.S. and NATO war strategies.*

## БОЕВЫЕ ДЕЙСТВИЯ НА МОРЕ И ВОПРОСЫ РАННЕГО ПРЕДУПРЕЖДЕНИЯ

Вице-адмирал И. Хурс

## COMBAT AT SEA AND THE PROBLEMS OF EARLY WARNING

Vice Adm I. Khurs

In parts one [and two] of this article, we examined the views of U.S. Navy and NATO command authorities on the conduct of naval combat, the main missions of the naval forces of capitalist countries, and the change in the role and significance of the service arms of modern navies. Below, according to foreign press materials, we bring to light the issues involved in navies accomplishing the missions before them and the problems of early warning.

**Naval actions against the shore.** One of the most important missions of navies remains, in U.S. terminology, "establishing a beachhead." The suppression of shore installations, the destruction of ships in ports and bases, and the seizure of the enemy's coastline by means of an amphibious assault will play a large role in such actions. In future naval operations against the shore, as compared with past experience, the role of submarines and surface ships using over-the-horizon cruise missiles, which can attack shore installations as part of the forces of the first echelon, will increase significantly.

Western specialists feel that, in the future, amphibious assault operations will also retain their special mission, seizing important enemy coastal regions, gulf waters, islands, naval bases, and ports.

When organizing naval amphibious forces, the capitalist countries pay special attention to increasing the rate of troop

landings from water crossing equipment and from the air and to increasing the combat survivability of assault ships and vessels.

Modern naval thought in the West pays a great deal of attention to blockading actions that are the basis for initial operations to stop the enemy fleet from deploying into the ocean. The most acceptable method of blockade, as was mentioned in the foreign press, is considered to be blockading ports, bases, and gulf waters ("control of the straits"). It is suggested that the enemy will, as a rule, have air superiority on his own coast, and, therefore, the main forces and assets that establish the blockade will be mainly submarines and mines.

The blockading of gulfs and straits will be carried out by naval, aviation, and ground forces with support from one's own and allied territories; this, in the view of NATO specialists, will ensure an echeloned formation and high combat survivability of blockading forces and increase the time to operate against targets. The aggressive use of antiship missile systems, as well as the development of air defense systems, will become an important feature of blockading under new conditions.

In the military plans of NATO and even of other allies in the capitalist world, an important, if not the leading, position is the protection of sea and ocean lines of communications [SLOCs] that

support their vitally important requirements. In peacetime, each day there are 3,000 cargo vessels just in the Atlantic transporting raw materials and finished products necessary for the normal development of the NATO countries' economies. In wartime, transportation requirements will grow because of the delivery of military cargoes. In the view of NATO experts, it will be necessary to deliver upwards of 2 million tons of combat equipment, 6 million tons of supplies and ammunition, and 15 million tons of POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] materiel to Europe by sea to conduct combat during the first three months. Nearly 800 vessels will take part in just these shipments. The great expanses of SLOCs from the coast of the U.S., Central America, Canada, and the Persian Gulf to ports in Europe, Japan, and South Korea is cause, judging by foreign press reports, for serious worry among western military strategists. The issue is also further complicated by the absence, in their opinion, of a sufficient quantity of men and equipment to protect SLOCs. In addition, during wartime, the West is forced to detail forces to protect offshore areas of oil and gas extraction; these areas have been widely developed in recent times, and their proportional weight in the energy balance of NATO countries continues to grow. In this connection, protecting SLOCs has a long-standing history that retains its importance and is an object for study among foreign military specialists.

In recent years, two methods of protecting SLOCs have been developed during NATO exercises; they have been designated "protected zones of sea communications" and "mobile zones of superiority." The first presupposes conducting specially organized combat operations by permanent naval groupings and other services of the armed forces that have been concentrated in specific operational areas. The goal of these operations is to destroy or displace the enemy in these areas. This method is mainly used in the initial and terminal sectors of SLOCs and in convoy form-up or dispersal areas.

Protection for crossings between terminal points in SLOCs for large and especially valuable convoys is organized by means of the "mobile zones of superiority," using direct escort of transports, as was done in World War II, and effectively screening and "clearing" the convoys' way of enemy forces. The given method presupposes achieving complete mastery of the seas and air superiority along the route the convoy follows.

In sea TVDs, depending on the situation, the very same methods are used to protect convoys, enlisting the services of the coastal defense forces, as well as shore and ground assets. In connection with this, measures have been looked at that would strengthen convoy defenses by means of equipment transported on special mobile systems, including helicopters and anti-aircraft assets.

The views of foreign military specialists on the role of navies and their service arms, as well as their use in operations, underwent a test in recent postwar regional conflicts and wars. In the same plane, interest was mainly centered around the 1982 Anglo-Argentinian Conflict, in which the British achieved their objectives in the operations mainly with the help of the fleet. There have been many contradictory reports about this conflict in the foreign press. They were mainly published while the conflict was going on or right after it ended, when there had

been insufficient time for more in-depth analysis of the events that took place. In a short period of time, the British succeeded in forming a task force made up of more than 120 ships and auxiliary vessels. The nucleus of the task force was two aircraft carriers. One of the most important places was held by two assault landing ships and six submarines, five of them nuclear. The actions of the main task force were supported by more than 30 surface ships of the destroyer and frigate classes.

A particular feature of the operation was that the assault landing began without eliminating the main threat, the Argentinian Air Force and Navy, beforehand. Therefore, at the same time the landing operation was being carried out, battles were being waged for mastery at sea and in the air. The British, counting on a passive reaction from the Argentinian Navy, limited their activities to taking the island airfield at Port Stanley so that it could not be used by aircraft operating from mainland Argentina.

The British kept their carriers practically out of reach of enemy aircraft.

According to foreign press materials, early warning of Argentinian aircraft attacking the British task force was given mainly by guided missile destroyer and guided missile frigate radar pickets, which directed the vertical takeoff and landing Sea Harrier aircraft to their targets.

The subsequent repelling of Argentinian aircraft that had broken through was done by the onboard fire assets of surface ships. Fire positions consisting of three to four ships were set up specifically for the air defense of landing craft. A similar mission was conducted for aircraft carriers by escort ships.

Because of the lack of aggressiveness of the Argentinian Navy towards British surface ships, aircraft were the main opposition. In the view of western military specialists, combat between them

was concluded in favor of the British, although the Argentinian Air Force made 445 combat sorties.

During the operation, the British established a tight blockade of the Argentinian coastline, which was enforced mainly by submarines. Also, reconnaissance and sabotage groups disembarking from helicopters and submarines were widely employed to search for possible assault landing sites.

When analyzing the stages of the conflict, foreign military specialists feel that surface ships demonstrated sufficiently high survivability under complex air threat conditions and accomplished their missions. Together with this, they indicate that the British suffered heavy ship losses mostly because the ship grouping had unreliable air defenses. The great distance of the combat region from Great Britain (nearly 15,000 km) did not permit the use of the Nimrod airborne warning and control system for early detection of air targets, and there were no radar patrol planes or helicopters in the carriers' inventory. It is said that there were also deficiencies in the Sea Wolf shipborne surface-to-air missile system, which had proven itself favorably during the operation, since it had a high degree of responsiveness. The structural protection of the British ships turned out to be weak, something that had already begun to be considered when designing them. In particular, as the foreign press reports, for the first time in postwar practice, the new U.S. Arleigh Burke class guided missile destroyer will be built almost entirely from steel, and aluminum alloys will be used on a very limited scale. The most important spaces are the magazines, launcher tubes and control posts that are armor protected and "sunk" into the hull of the ship.

[To be continued]

(Copyrighted, *Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye*, 1987)

(Source: *Zarubezhnoye voyennoye obozreniye* № 7, 1987, pp. 49-54)

# MILITARY AFFAIRS

## РАЗРЕШИТЕ СТАТЬ В СТРОЙ!

говорят девушки, мечта-  
ющие быть офицерами

## LET US JOIN THE RANKS!

say young women, dreaming  
of becoming officers

Until recently, the future officers association at the DOSAAF Club in Kuybyshev included 10 young women. However, the number of girls gradually dropped. The young women began to doubt that they could become military personnel, and they stopped attending the classes. And 17-year-old schoolgirl Margarita Rezun became the only girl among 300 guys. In a recent controlled test in initial military training, Rita displayed excellent knowledge. Presently, she is a platoon leader for lessons in her initial military training class and is studying successfully at a future servicemen's university and never misses a lesson at the future officers association.

But perhaps Rita, like the other girls, dreams in vain of wearing the officer's shoulderboards?

O. Moskovskiy, B. Belyakov (special TASS correspondents)

Commentary by Gen of the Army, D. T. Yazov, [then] Deputy USSR Minister of Defense for Personnel:

Women up to the age of 30 years may be accepted into active military service as officers on a voluntary basis under the following conditions: they have completed higher education and received training in the military department or have completed higher education in a civilian specialty related to a military one.

Women may serve in officer positions, for example, at computer centers, in radar flight support units, in legal or medical establishments, in the communications troops, in editing and publishing offices, and other positions. Women officers have performed well in office work, in military psychology and sociology, and in many other fields.

There is a specific procedure for granting extra leave time and other benefits to women serving on active military duty in accordance

with current laws on the protection of mothers and children.

And what about the dream of some young women of studying at military academies and serving in command positions? This is of interest to Yelena Shaytanova from Novokuybyshevsk, who dreams of becoming a military pilot, and Natalya Baykova of Saransk, who has applied for admission to a command academy. We understand the desires of these young women perfectly well, but our laws do not provide for their training at military academies. Military service in command positions involves great stress. Besides, there is no need for the centralized training of female military personnel at military educational institutions in peacetime.

Young women may submit all specific questions pertaining to their acceptance for active military duty to the military commissariat at their place of residence.

(Source: Komsomolskaya pravda, 1 Apr 87, p. 2)

# MILITARY AFFAIRS

## THEY ARE STILL AROUND

V. Gromova

I am an attentive reader of yours. I have been reading your paper with interest for a long time. Recently, a lot has been written about things which had been forgotten; I read certain articles and my heart bleeds. I remember my own life and my husband's life. Our generation lived through the difficult 1930s, then the war years, then also the difficult postwar years. Now the deaths of Kirov, Tukachevskiy, Yakir, and other innocent victims are written about openly. This is understandable: The fate of great people is in public view. But if even great people did not survive, what can be said about ordinary people?

My husband, A. I. Bogomolov, was just such an ordinary person. He was arrested after the end of the Finnish War, sentenced to be shot, then given 10 years, plus 5 years disfranchisement. He spent 4 years in a camp in the North in horrible conditions. Then came a new arrest, another accusation, 15 months under "Section 30" and an underground cell. In both cases he did not sign the accusation. He served his time there in the North, 12 years in all. His health was ruined forever, and his lungs were damaged by the cold. After his time in the camp, he lived in Syktyvkar.

I met my husband after 42 years' separation; the last time I had seen him had been in 1940, when I brought my newborn son to visit him at a Leningrad transit prison. We met... My impression was one of horror, but we decided not to split up. His wife had died, my husband had died, and our children had grown up. So for 5 years I have been doctor, sister, nursemaid, and friend. My husband's health is completely ruined; he worked until he was 74 years old. We live in my room in a communal apartment, next door there is a mentally ill person. There are brawls, shouting matches, and the woman next door gets into fist fights. We have been refused a separate apartment—we have more than 6 [square] meters per person.

But this is what I want to tell you. In 1955, my husband was rehabilitated for his second conviction, while we received rehabilitation for the first conviction only in 1985, when I myself started to pursue the matter, and the Leningrad Military District tribunal reconsidered his 1940 case and also quashed the verdict "for lack of evidence of a crime." My husband was given 270 rubles only after this rehabilitation; this was 2 months' salary for the post he held before the Finnish War. For all

## ОНИ ЕЩЕ ЕСТЬ

В. Громова

Я ваш внимательный читатель. Читаю газету давно и с интересом. В последнее время много стали писать о забытом, читаю некоторые статьи, а сердце обливается кровью. Вспоминаю свою жизнь и жизнь своего мужа. Наше поколение прожило тяжелые тридцатые, потом военные, потом тоже тяжелые послевоенные годы. Теперь открыто пишут о смерти Кирова, о Тухачевском, о Якире, о других безвинно погибших. Это понятно: судьба великих людей у всех на виду. Но если не уцелели даже великие, что же говорить о рядовых людях?

Таким рядовым человеком был мой муж, Богомолов А. И. Он был арестован после окончания финской войны, приговаривали к расстрелу, дали десять лет плюс пять лет поражения в правах. Четыре года провел в лагере на Севере, в страшных условиях. Потом — новый арест, новое обвинение, 15 месяцев «тридцатки», подземной камеры. В обоих случаях обвинение он не подписал. Отсидел свой срок там же, на Севере, в общей сложности двенадцать лет. Подорвал навсегда здоровье, отморозил легкие. После лагеря жил в Сыктывкаре.

Встретилась я со своим мужем через 42 года после разлуки, последний раз видела его в 1940 году, когда с новорожденным сыном приходила на свидание в ленинградскую пересыльную тюрьму. И вот встретились... Впечатление ужасное, но решили не расставаться. У него умерла жена, у меня умер муж, дети взрослые. И вот пять лет я и врач, и сестра, и нянька, и друг. Здоровье у мужа совершенно расстроенное, он работал до 74 лет. Живем в моей комнате в коммунальной квартире, рядом — психически больной человек. Скандалы, крики, соседка пускает в ход кулаки. В получении отдельной квартиры нам отказали — у нас на человека больше шести метров.

Но вот что я хочу сказать вам. В 1955 году муж был реабилитирован по повторной судимости, реабилитацию же по первой судимости мы получили только в 1985 году, когда я сама хлопотать, и военный трибунал Ленинградского военного округа пересмотрел его дело 1940 года и тоже «за отсутствием состава преступления» отменил приговор. Только после этой реабилитации мужу выдали 270 рублей — двухмесячный оклад по должности, которую он занимал до

## Soviet Press Selected Translations

the 12 years in northern camps, for the interrogations, for the exhausting work in mines and felling timber—for all this, a total of 270 rubles! Every time I inquired, I was told that this is the law and referred to the 1955 statute.

My husband's rights as a participant in the war were restored only after the last rehabilitation. He is now a category-one invalid and cannot see. I read him the articles, and he cries. He receives a pension of 113 rubles—this includes 15 rubles that he is given as a category-one invalid "for nursing." I have written and shall continue to write every time this happens, because I feel it is unjust. So long as he lives and I have the strength, I shall write about how people like my husband were given no benefits to compensate, however little, for everything they have suffered. They have not wronged their country, but their lives have been wrecked, their families' lives have been wrecked, they were deprived of society's respect, and they were not even given the right to fight, to become honored invalids or war veterans and receive holiday greetings!

I am not asking you to help me get an apartment. We are elderly people and, even if you help us get a separate apartment, it will be too late for us. My husband is 82 years old. Recently he suffered a stroke. But I beg you to help all those who also suffered though they were innocent and unable to defend themselves since "the verdict was not subject to appeal."

Today, they broadcast on the radio Tvardovskiy's poem "Right of Remembrance." I trembled, and tears flowed from my husband's blind eyes. He was always a hard worker, a Young Communist League member, he worked on the Kuznetskstroy, in Balkhash, and he always had calloused hands. Now he cannot do anything, of course, but he senses the new time and believes that it is really revolutionary. Today a lot is changing, and it would be unjust if people who have suffered so terribly disappear from view when so much attention is being paid to war and labor veterans. Why not review the 1955 statute? Why don't the people who have suffered humiliation and trauma enjoy any benefits—either material or moral? Is it their fault that they were unable to earn these benefits?

I beseech you to help me and to help those who can still be helped. Even now, you sometimes hear people say of such-and-such a person that he was an enemy of the people and it is not for nothing that he was behind bars. It is not a question of money—the point is that society should be aware of its duty to these people.

Valentina Z. Gromova

Leningrad

(Source: *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 23 Dec 87, p. 11)

финской войны. За все двенадцать лет северных лагерей, за допросы, изнурительный труд в шахте, на лесоповале — за все про все 270 рублей! На все запросы мне отвечают, что таков закон, ссылаются на положение 1955 года.

Только после последней реабилитации, в 1985 году, муж восстановлен в правах участника войны. Сейчас он инвалид I группы, не видит, статьи я ему читаю, а он плачет. Получает пенсию 113 рублей — это вместе с теми 15 рублями, которые полагаются ему как инвалиду I группы «по уходу». Но я писала и буду продолжать писать во все инстанции, потому что считаю все несправедливым. Пока он жив, пока у меня есть силы, я буду писать о том, что людям, подобным моему мужу, не дали никаких льгот, чтоб хоть немного скрасить им все пережитое. Они ни в чем не провинились перед нашей страной, им искалечили жизнь, искалечили жизнь их семьям, лишили уважения общества, им даже не дали права воевать, чтобы стать почетными инвалидами или ветеранами войны и получать праздничные поздравления!

Я не прошу вас помочь мне получить квартиру. Мы люди пожилые, и даже если вы поможете нам получить отдельную квартиру, мы уже не успеем в ней пожить. Мужу 82 года, недавно он перенес инсульт. Но я прошу вас помочь всем тем, кто тоже пострадал безвинно, кто не имел возможности защищаться, так как «приговор обжалованию не подлежал».

Сегодня по радио передавали поэму Твардовского «По праву памяти». Меня колотит нервная дрожь, из слепых глаз мужа текут слезы. Он всегда был человеком труда, комсомольцем, работал на Кузнецкстрое, на Балхаше, руки у него всегда были в мозолях. Теперь он уже ничего не может, конечно, но он чувствует новое время и верит, что оно действительно революционное. Сегодня многое меняется, и будет несправедливо, если так страшно пострадавшие люди выпадут из поля зрения, когда столько внимания уделяется ветеранам войны и труда. Почему не пересматривается положение 1955 года? Почему у людей, перенесших унижение, потрясение, нет никаких льгот — ни материальных, ни моральных? Разве они виноваты в том, что не смогли их заработать?

Прошу вас, помогите мне, помогите тем, кому еще можно помочь. Ведь и сейчас еще можно услышать, как о ком-то говорят, что он был врагом народа, что сидел он неспроста. Дело ведь не в деньгах — дело в том, чтобы общество почувствовало свой долг перед этими людьми.

Валентина З. Громова

Ленинград

(*Литературная газета*, 23 Декабря 87 г., стр. 11)

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**SPECIAL FOURTH  
CLASS BOOK RATE**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 17, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN ✓  
PAUL STEVENS  
TOM GRISCOM

FROM: Rhett Dawson M

SUBJECT: Presidential Remarks for Moscow Summit Trip

Attached is a schedule for preparation, circulation, and Presidential review of remarks associated with the President's upcoming trip to Helsinki, Moscow, and London. Please make this schedule available to the appropriate people on your staff. Our aim in preparing this package is to ensure that all those who are involved have a clear picture of our time frame for reviewing the President's remarks.

For each set of remarks, the attached schedule contains the date of the event, the date a draft is expected for staffing, and the date a draft is due to the President for his approval. Please review it and let me know if you have any problems, so we can prepare accordingly.

cc: Nancy Roberts

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

REMARKS FOR MOSCOW SUMMIT TRIP

	<u>Event</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Staff</u>	<u>To RR</u>	<u>Cards/Tele</u>
1.	Radio Talk - 5/28	5/23	5/18	5/19	None
2.	South Lawn Departure	5/25	5/18	5/23	5/24
3.	East-West Relations/ Helsinki	5/27	5/9	5/23	5/26
4.	Kremlin Arrival	5/29	5/18	5/23	5/28
5.	Meeting w/Monks	5/30	5/16	5/23	5/29
6.	Meeting w/Dissidents	5/30	5/16	5/23	5/29
7.	Dinner Toast - Kremlin	5/30	5/19	5/23	5/29
8.	Luncheon w/Writers	5/31	5/18	5/23	5/30
9.	Moscow State Univ.	5/31	5/9	5/23	5/30
10.	Dinner Toast - Spaso House	5/31	5/18	5/23	5/30
11.	Signing Ceremony	Prepare on road if necessary			
12.	News Conference	6/1	Write on road		5/31
13.	Moscow - Embassy Personnel	6/2	5/18	5/23	6/1
14.	Kremlin Departure	6/2	5/18	5/23	6/1
15.	London - Foreign Affairs	6/3	5/16	5/23	6/2
16.	Andrews Arrival	6/3	Write on road		6/2
17.	Radio Talk	6/4	5/31	6/1	None
18.	World Gas Conference	6/6	5/31	6/1	6/5
19.	Regional Press Briefing	6/8	6/3	6/6	6/7

Agnes - FYI

May 12, 1988

josh:

here are some random thoughts for Moscow :

leave a concrete vision for the future

--there is a discrepancy between conservative values and cultural values and liberal economic policies

--youth are force of the future and force for change

--stress that change does not tear away from values, family

--as JFK said "change is only constant in the modern world"

--spiritual discussions do not happen in a church building/ present our values and how they are tied in the the basic fibre of this country

--spiritual/intellectual change must occur along with opening up other elements of society.

T.G.

AN  
APPEAL FOR  
TECHNICAL FREEDOM  
AND OPEN UNIONS  
IN THE PRESSION OF  
THE PAPER INDUSTRY

**AN  
APPEAL FOR  
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM  
IN THE SOVIET UNION  
ON THE OCCASION OF THE  
MILLENNIUM OF  
CHRISTIANITY IN  
KIEVAN RUS'**

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## **Обращение по Поводу Празднования Тысячелетия Крещения Киевской Руси**

### **Свобода Религии Народам Советского Союза**

Генеральному секретарю ЦК КПСС  
Михаилу Сергеевичу Горбачёву.

**I. ГОД 1988 ЯВЛЯЕТСЯ ГОДОМ ПРАЗДНОВАНИЯ** тысячелетия прихода христианства на Киевскую Русь. Хотя эта годовщина имеет особое значение для христиан во всём мире, но это также повод для людей доброй воли ознакомиться с огромным и разнообразным духовным наследием всех народов, всех религиозных общин, населяющих Советский Союз: православных, католиков, протестантов, евреев, мусульман и буддистов.

Религиозная свобода была признана в качестве неотъемлемого права человека в таких основных международных документах, как Устав Организации Объединённых Наций, Всеобщая Декларация прав человека, Международный Пакт о гражданских и политических правах, Международный Пакт об экономических, социальных и культурных правах, Конвенция о борьбе с дискриминацией в области образования, Заключительный акт Хельсинского совещания по безопасности и сотрудничеству в Европе, Декларация ООН о ликвидации всех форм нетерпимости и дискриминации на основе религии или убеждений. Под всеми этими документами стоит подпись Советского Союза, который торжественно присягал хранить верность принципам, изложенным в этих документах. Мировая общественность считает, что соблюдение таких неотъемлемых прав человека, как свобода религиозных убеждений является краеугольным камнем в деле укрепления мира между народами.

К сожалению, теперешняя государственная политика СССР направлена на оказание давления на верующих всех исповеданий и ограничивает в большой степени деятельность религиозных объединений. Вместе с верующими в Советском Союзе мы хотим надеяться, что эта удивительная дата—празднование тысячелетия Крещения Киевской Руси—может стать поворотным

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**An Appeal for Religious Freedom in the Soviet Union  
On the Occasion of the Millennium of Christianity  
In Kievan Rus'**

To Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev  
General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**I. 1988 MARKS THE MILLENNIUM OF CHRISTIANITY** in Kievan Rus'. While this anniversary has special meaning for the Christian community throughout the world, it also provides an occasion for all men and women of goodwill to celebrate the great and varied spiritual heritages carried by the peoples of the Soviet Union—Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist.

Religious freedom has been acknowledged as a fundamental human right in such landmark steps towards the growth of international law as the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Helsinki Final Act, and the U.N. Declaration Against All Forms of Religious Intolerance—agreements to which the Soviet Union has solemnly pledged its adherence. The international community recognizes that respect for such fundamental human rights as religious freedom is an essential building block of peace, within and among nations.

Unhappily, present state policy in the U.S.S.R. puts pressure on religious believers of all faiths, and circumscribes the activities of religious communities. We join with believers in the Soviet Union who hope that this remarkable anniversary, the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus', can become the occasion for fundamental change in Soviet state policy and practice toward religious communities.

We the undersigned, Americans of many different creeds and political persuasions, joined by a common concern for human rights and peace, appeal to you, General Secretary Gorbachev, to honor your nation's commitments to international agreements on the fundamental human right of religious freedom.

We are heartened by the progress our two countries have made in the area of arms reduction, and by your call for a new era of openness in the Soviet Union.

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моментом в политике и практике советского государства по отношению к религиозным объединениям.

Мы, нижеподписавшиеся американские граждане самых различных религиозных убеждений и политических взглядов, с тревогой следим за положением с соблюдением прав человека, а также за перспективами укрепления мира. Мы обращаемся к Вам, Генеральный Секретарь Горбачев, и призываем Вас выполнить обязательства СССР в области соблюдения свободы религии, налагаемые на него международными документами, под которыми стоит подпись советских представителей.

Нас обнадеживает тот прогресс, который был достигнут нашими странами в области сокращения вооружений и Вашим собственным призывом к открытости и гласности в Советском Союзе.

Нас обнадеживает, что определенное число лиц, несправедливо репрессированных, были освобождены и что некоторые другие получили разрешение эмигрировать из страны.

Но мы призываем провести более глубокие, перманентные реформы в соответствии с Вашими заявлениями о гласности, перестройке и демократизации. Мы призываем Вас положить конец непрекращающейся дискриминации и преследованиям верующих в СССР.

Мы верим в то, что значительный прогресс в соблюдении прав человека и особенно свободы религии будет иметь благотворное влияние на характер взаимоотношений между двумя странами и таким образом будет способствовать делу сохранения мира на земле.

**II. МЫ ЗАЯВЛЯЕМ О СВОЕЙ СОЛИДАРНОСТИ С** верующими всех религий в Советском Союзе и призываем Вас принять немедленные меры для введения конкретных конституционных и юридических изменений, которые бы обеспечили полную свободу религии в СССР:

- Мы призываем изменить формулировку статьи 52 Советской Конституции таким образом, чтобы она гарантировала не только право на совершение
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We note the resolution of a number of individual emigration and prisoner cases.

But we urge deeper, more permanent change, commensurate with your commitment to *glasnost*, *perestroika*, and democratization. Thus we urge you to redress the continuing pattern of discrimination and harassment against religious believers in your country.

We believe that significant progress in the matter of human rights, and especially on the fundamental right of religious freedom, will contribute to a new pattern of relationships between our countries, and thereby enhance the prospects of peace.

**II. WE JOIN IN SOLIDARITY WITH BELIEVERS OF** all faiths in the Soviet Union, urging you to undertake immediately the actions necessary to effect these specific constitutional and legal steps toward full religious freedom in the U.S.S.R.:

We urge that Article 52 of the Soviet Constitution be amended so that citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed the right, not only to "religious worship," but also to "form religious associations and disseminate religious beliefs" on terms of full constitutional equality with atheistic organizations and atheistic propaganda. We urge you to restore to all religious associations the full status of "juridical person" under Soviet law.

We urge that the Decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. of April 8, 1929 (and its equivalents in other Soviet republics, as amended by a decree of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium of June 23, 1975), and the equivalent laws "On Religious Associations" adopted subsequently in other Union republics, be repealed.

In particular, we urge you:

- to return to individual religious groups the houses of worship, religious artifacts and religious books which have been expropriated by the authorities;
  - to restore the right to construct and own new houses of worship;
  - to allow religious instruction of children, young people and adults outside the public school system;
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религиозных обрядов, но и право создавать религиозные ассоциации и право распространения религиозных убеждений на основе полного равенства с атеистическими организациями, занимающимися распространением атеистической пропаганды. Мы призываем Вас вернуть религиозным ассоциациям статус юридического лица в советском законодательстве.

- Мы призываем Вас отменить декрет Всероссийского центрального исполнительного Комитета и Совета народных комиссаров РСФСР от 8 апреля 1929 года (и его эквиваленты в союзных республиках, введённых декретом Президиума Верховного Совета РСФСР от 23 июня 1975 года), а также сходные законы о религиозных объединениях, введённых позже в союзных республиках.

В частности мы призываем Вас:

- Вернуть верующим церкви и молитвенные дома, а также церковную утварь и религиозные книги, экспроприированные властями;
  - Дать право верующим строить новые церкви или восстанавливать старые;
  - Разрешить религиозное обучение детей, молодёжи и взрослых во внешкольное время;
  - Отменить запрет на благотворительную деятельность религиозных объединений;
  - Покончить с требованиями предварительной регистрации государственными органами религиозных ассоциаций и священнослужителей;
- Мы призываем отменить статьи 142 и 227 Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР и их эквиваленты в других республиках, а также декрет Президиума Верховного совета РСФСР «О применении статьи 142 уголовного кодекса РСФСР» и декрета «Об административной ответственности за нарушение законодательства о религиозных культах» и их эквивалентов в союзных республиках, как законов, противоречащих основному конституционному закону об отделении церкви от государства.
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- to lift the ban against charitable activities by religious groups;
  - and to end the requirements of preliminary state “registration” of religious associations and the clergy.

- We urge that Articles 142 and 227 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code (and their equivalents in other republican criminal codes), as well as the March 18, 1966 Decrees of the R.S.F.S.R. Supreme Soviet Presidium “On the Application of Article 142 of the R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code” and “On the Administrative Liability for the Violation of the Legislation on Religious Cults” (and the equivalent decrees adopted by the Supreme Soviet Presidia of the other Union republics), be repealed as contrary to the constitutional separation of church and state.
- We urge you to publish and submit for public reconsideration, with the participation of religious believers, all hitherto secret or only partially-published decrees and instructions setting the structure, powers, and procedures of the Council for Religious Affairs [C.R.A.] attached to the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers, its republican and oblast branches and commissioners. We urge that you assure representation on the C.R.A., at all government levels, of representatives of religious believers, and that the activities of the Council for Religious Affairs be guaranteed full legality and publicity (*glasnost*).
- We urge you to legalize the Greek Catholic (Uniate or Ukrainian Catholic) Church and other religious groups (such as, for example, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church) that were banned by the Stalin government, and to restore to these religious groups the churches, houses of prayer, religious artifacts, monastic and seminary buildings, and other confiscated property necessary for their religious activities.

**III. THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF RELIGIOUS freedom, as codified in the U.N. Declaration Against All Forms of Religious Intolerance, has many concrete expressions in daily life. Therefore we urge the following:**

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- Мы призываем Вас опубликовать и вынести на всенародное обсуждение с участием верующих все остающиеся до сих пор секретными инструкции и неполностью опубликованные декреты и инструкции, определяющие структуру, полномочия и протокол работы Совета по религиозным делам (СРД) при Совете министров СССР и его республиканских и областных отделов и уполномоченных.
  - Мы призываем Вас обеспечить представительство членов религиозных ассоциаций в этих учреждениях на всех уровнях, а также полную гласность и обязательное соблюдение законов при исполнении сотрудниками этих учреждений служебных обязанностей.
  - Мы призываем Вас легализовать существование Униатской Украинской католической Церкви и других религиозных групп, как, например, Украинская Автокефальная церковь. Обе эти церкви были при Сталине поставлены государством вне закона. Мы призываем Вас вернуть этим церквям храмы, молитвенные дома, церковную утварь, монастырские и семинарские помещения и другое конфискованное имущество, необходимое для их религиозной деятельности.

**III. НЕОТЪЕМЛЕМОЕ ПРАВО НА РЕЛИГИОЗНУЮ** свободу, как это зафиксировано в Декларации ООН о ликвидации всех форм нетерпимости на основе религии или убеждений, должно находить конкретное выражение в повседневной жизни народа. Поэтому мы призываем к принятию следующих мер:

- Всем узникам совести и осужденным по религиозным мотивам должна быть объявлена амнистия.
  - Верующим должно быть предоставлено право свободно исповедовать свою веру без вмешательства, преследований и запугивания со стороны властей. Требование принудительной регистрации властями верующих, священнослужителей даже до начала их религиозной деятельности должно быть отменено. Также должно быть отменено право властей на
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- A general amnesty should be declared for all religious prisoners of conscience.
  - Religious believers should be able to practice their faith without interference, harassment, or persecution. The requirements for compulsory state "registration" of religious congregations and the clergy, prior to their starting their activities, should be abolished, along with the prerogative of state authorities to veto any members of congregations' executive and auditing committees. Membership on these committees (including chairmanship) should be open to the clergy.
  - Religious communities should enjoy the freedom to preach, to publish, and to disseminate their teachings through the mass media. Independent religious publishing institutions should not be hindered in their work.
  - Parents should be able to transmit their faith to their children without being harassed or discriminated against on this account. Religious organizations should be able to conduct institutions of religious education without state interference. Clergy should be allowed, with parental permission, to provide religious instruction to children. School children and students at secondary or university levels should not be pressured to join organizations espousing atheism; punished for declining to do so; or otherwise be denied equality of educational opportunity and advancement on account of their religious beliefs and practices.
  - The state should not interfere in the appointment of seminary faculties, and should relinquish its control over the appointment of candidates to seminaries.
  - Religious believers, including children, should be able to absent themselves from work or from school on religious holidays.
  - Believers who wish to emigrate from the Soviet Union on religious grounds should be allowed to do so.
  - Believers, clergy, and religious groups in the Soviet Union who wish to maintain contacts with fellow-believers and religious institutions throughout the world should be free to do so.
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запрещение к участию в церковных и приходских советах тех или иных лиц, выбранных верующими для этой цели. Членство в этих советах, включая пост председателя, должно быть открыто духовенству.

- Религиозные объединения должны иметь право проповедовать, публиковать и распространять свое религиозное учение при помощи средств массовой информации. Независимые религиозные издательства должны иметь возможность свободно осуществлять свои функции.
  - Родителям должно быть предоставлено право свободно обучать своих детей основам их религии без страха преследований или дискриминации. Религиозным организациям должно быть предоставлено право создавать школы для обучения основам религии и этот процесс не должен нарушаться вмешательством государственных органов. Духовенство должно иметь право с разрешения родителей осуществлять обучение детей основам религии. Государственные органы не должны оказывать давления на студентов и школьников с тем, чтобы заставить их вступать в организации, проповедующие атеизм. Учащиеся должны быть свободны от страха преследования или дискриминации в случае отказа вступать в такие организации. Они не должны подвергаться дискриминации в образовании или продвижении по службе по религиозным мотивам.
  - Государство не должно вмешиваться в распределение штатов в семинариях и в выбор кандидатов для поступления в семинарии и духовные школы.
  - Верующие, включая детей, должны иметь свободу отсутствовать на работе—и школьных занятиях—в дни религиозных праздников.
  - Верующие, которые хотят эмигрировать из СССР по религиозным мотивам, должны иметь эту возможность.
  - Верующим, священнослужителям и религиозным объединениям в СССР, которые хотят поддерживать контакты с верующими или религиозными
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- Religious communities should enjoy the full rights of social organizations in the Soviet Union. Religious communities should be able to solicit funds for charitable activities, to engage in works of charity, to own property, and to participate in organizations such as temperance societies.
  - Religious services should be permitted in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the aged. Religious believers should be able to wear religious symbols, and to have access to religious literature, while they are in hospitals, prisons, and homes for the aged.

#### **IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF THESE BASIC GUARANTEES**

of the fundamental right of religious freedom is an important measure of the status of human rights in the Soviet Union. We call on you, Mr. General Secretary, to demonstrate your commitment to peace by assuring all the peoples of the Soviet Union the right of religious freedom, which is an essential guarantor of peace. We appeal to you, on this occasion of the Millennium of Christianity in Kievan Rus', to join with us in working for an international community committed to defending the dignity of human beings as a fundamental requisite of peace.

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организациями в других странах, должна быть предоставлена эта возможность.

- Религиозные объединения должны пользоваться теми же правами, что и другие общественные организации в СССР. Им должно быть предоставлено право собирать пожертвования на благотворительные цели, заниматься благотворительной деятельностью, владеть имуществом и принимать участие в работе таких организаций, как общество трезвости.
- Необходимо разрешить совершение богослужений в больницах, тюрьмах, старческих домах. Верующим должно быть разрешено носить отличительные знаки их вероисповедания и иметь доступ к религиозной литературе в период пребывания в больнице, тюрьме или старческом доме.

#### **IV. УСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ ЭТИХ ОСНОВНЫХ ГАРАНТИЙ**

религиозной свободы будет важной меркой, по которой международная общественность будет судить о положении прав человека в Советском Союзе. Мы призываем вас, Господин Генеральный Секретарь, продемонстрировать свою приверженность делу мира и предоставить народам Советского Союза свободу вероисповедания, которая сама является надёжным гарантом мира на земле.

В связи с празднованием Тысячелетия Крещения Киевской Руси мы призываем Вас присоединиться к мировой общественности в деле защиты человеческого достоинства как необходимого условия воцарения мира на земле.

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## Signatories to the *Appeal for Religious Freedom in the Soviet Union\**

(List in formation)

- John F. Ahearne**  
*Vice President and Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future*
- Mark R. Amstutz**  
*Chairman, Department of Political Science, Wheaton College*
- Hadley Arkes**  
*Professor of Political Science, Amherst College*
- Ben Armstrong**  
*Executive Director, National Religious Broadcasters*
- Dawoud Assad**  
*President, Council of Masajaa*
- William Bentley Ball**  
*Attorney*
- Paul Baltakis, O.F.M.**  
*Roman Catholic Bishop for Lithuanians outside Lithuania*
- Fred Barnes**  
*Senior Editor, The New Republic*
- George W. Bashore**  
*Bishop, Boston Area, United Methodist Church*
- Fred Baumann**  
*Assistant Professor, Kenyon College*
- Arnold Beichman**  
*Research Fellow, Hoover Institution*
- Maurice M. Benitez**  
*Bishop, Diocese of Texas, Episcopal Church*
- Peter L. Berger**  
*University Professor, Boston University*
- Joseph Cardinal Bernardin**  
*Archbishop of Chicago*
- Walter Berns**  
*John M. Olin University Professor, Georgetown University*
- Tim Blanchard**  
*General Director, Conservative Baptist Association of America*
- Maurice Blond**  
*President, Interfaith Movement, Inc.*
- Albert Boiter**  
*Associate Editor, Religion in Communist Dominated Areas*
- Mary Ellen Bork**  
*Chairman of the Board, Thomas More Society of America*
- Robert H. Bork**  
*John M. Olin Scholar in Legal Studies, American Enterprise Institute*
- Rudy Boschwitz**  
*U.S. Senator, Minnesota*
- Barbara Boxer**  
*U.S. Representative, California*
- Joseph Boyle**  
*Professor of Philosophy, University of St. Michael's College*
- Jeffrey Boutwell**  
*Staff Director, International Security Studies, American Academy of Arts and Sciences*
- Bill Bradley**  
*U.S. Senator, New Jersey*
- Alan Brinkley**  
*Associate Professor of History, Harvard University*
- Kathleen M.A. Brooks**  
*Vice President and Executive Director, Children's Relief Fund*
- John H. Bunzel**  
*Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution*
- Kenyon C. Burke**  
*Associate General Secretary, Division of Church and Society, National Council of Churches*
- W. Glenn Campbell**  
*Director, Hoover Institution Senior Regent, University of California*
- Dick Cheney**  
*U.S. Representative, Wyoming*
- Pamela Braun Cohen**  
*National President, Union of Councils for Soviet Jews*
- Alberto Coll**  
*Professor, U.S. Naval War College*
- Charles W. Colson**  
*Chairman, Prison Fellowship*
- John W. Cooper**  
*Senior Research Fellow, Ethics and Public Policy Center*
- Thomas C. Cornell**  
*National Secretary, Catholic Peace Fellowship*
- Jim Courter**  
*U.S. Representative, New Jersey*
- Michael Cromartie**  
*Research Associate, Ethics and Public Policy Center*
- Dean C. Curry**  
*Associate Professor of Political Science, Messiah College*
- Richard T. Davies**  
*President, Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies*
- Richard Deats**  
*Director, U.S.-USSR Reconciliation, Fellowship of Reconciliation*
- Stan DeBoe, O.S.S.T.**  
*Director, Office of Persecuted Believers, Holy Trinity Fathers*
- Dennis DeConcini**  
*U.S. Senator, Arizona*
- Midge Decter**  
*Executive Director, Committee for the Free World*
- G.B. DeLashmet**  
*Executive Vice President, Abitibi-Price Sales Corporation*
- Christopher DeMuth**  
*President, American Enterprise Institute*
- J.S. Denton**  
*President, National Forum Foundation*
- Candace DeRussy**  
*Executive Officer, The American Foundation for Resistance International*
- Robert Destro**  
*Associate Professor of Law, Catholic University of America*
- Edd Doerr**  
*Executive Director, Americans For Religious Liberty*
- Felix Dubneac**  
*Archimandrite and Editor of Gandiresiarta*
- Paul A. Duffey**  
*Secretary, Council of Bishops, United Methodist Church*
- Robert P. Dugan, Jr.**  
*Director, Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals*
- Thomas H. Dunkerton**  
*President, Inter-Varsity Christian Fellowship*
- Bernard J. Dwyer**  
*U.S. Representative, New Jersey*
- Charles M. Fairbanks, Jr.**  
*Research Professor, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University*

**Roland Faley, T.O.R.**  
*Executive Director, Conference of Major Superiors of Men*

**Harris W. Fawell**  
*U.S. Representative, Illinois*

**Edward Feighan**  
*U.S. Representative, Ohio*

**Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.**  
*President, The Heritage Foundation*

**James Finn**  
*Editorial Director, Freedom House*

**Peter T. Flaherty**  
*Chairman, Citizens for Reagan*

**William J. Flynn**  
*Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Mutual of America*

**Ernest L. Fortin**  
*Professor of Theology, Boston College*

**Marvin Fox**  
*Philip W. Lown Professor of Jewish Philosophy, Brandeis University*

**William C. Frey**  
*Bishop, Diocese of Colorado, Episcopal Church*

**Milton Friedman**  
*Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution; Professor Emeritus, University of Chicago*

**Felice Gaer**  
*Executive Director, International League for Human Rights*

**Franklin I. Gamwell**  
*Dean and Professor, The Divinity School, University of Chicago*

**Suzanne Garment**  
*Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute*

**Marc Gellman**  
*Rabbi, Temple Beth Torah*

**Carl Gershman**  
*President, National Endowment for Democracy*

**Ann Gillen, S.H.C.J.**  
*Executive Director, National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry*

**Nathan Glazer**  
*Professor, Harvard University*

**Ernest Gordon**  
*President, Christian Rescue Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents*

**Robert Grant**  
*Chairman, Christian Voice*  
*President, American Freedom Coalition*

**Bill Green**  
*U.S. Representative, New York*

**Oscar Handlin**  
*Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Harvard University*

**Olexa R. Harbuziuk**  
*President, All-Ukrainian Evangelical Baptist Fellowship*

**Owen Harries**  
*Editor, The National Interest*

**C. Lowell Harriss**  
*Professor Emeritus of Economics, Columbia University*

**Thomas J. Harvey**  
*Executive Director, Catholic Charities U.S.A.*

**Alden M. Hathaway**  
*Bishop, Diocese of Pittsburgh, Episcopal Church*

**Stanley Hauerwas**  
*Professor of Theological Ethics, The Divinity School, Duke University*

**Carl F.H. Henry**  
*Evangelical Author and Theologian*

**Arthur Hertzberg**  
*Vice President, World Jewish Congress*

**Ira Michael Heyman**  
*Chancellor, University of California at Berkeley*

**Kent R. Hill**  
*Executive Director, Institute on Religion and Democracy*

**John P. Hittinger**  
*Associate Professor, College of St. Francis*

**Leroy C. Hodapp**  
*Bishop, Indiana Area, United Methodist Church*

**Paul Hollander**  
*Professor, University of Massachusetts at Amherst*

**David Hollenbach, S.J.**  
*Associate Professor of Moral Theology, Weston School of Theology*

**Sidney Hook**  
*Senior Research Fellow, Hoover Institution*

**John A. Howard**  
*Retired President, The Rockford Institute*

**Steny H. Hoyer**  
*U.S. Representative, Maryland*

**Blahoslav Hruby**  
*Executive Director, Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies*

**Earl G. Hunt, Jr.**  
*Bishop, Florida Area, United Methodist Church*

**George W. Hunt, S.J.**  
*President and Editor-in-Chief, America*

**Henry J. Hyde**  
*U.S. Representative, Illinois*

**Helen H. Jackson**  
*Chairman, Henry M. Jackson Foundation*

**John E. Jacob**  
*President and CEO, National Urban League*

**Kenneth M. Jensen**  
*Director of Research and Studies, U.S. Institute of Peace*

**James Turner Johnson**  
*Professor of Religion, Rutgers University*

**Nancy L. Johnson**  
*U.S. Representative, Connecticut*

**Albert E. Jolis**  
*Executive Director, American Institute for Resistance International*

**Barbara Jordan**  
*Lyndon B. Johnson Centennial Chair in National Policy, University of Texas*

**Francis I. Kane**  
*Chairman, Philosophy Department, Salisbury State College*

**Alfred Kazin**  
*Newman Professor of American Civilization, Cornell University*

**Stephen F. Keller**  
*Vice-Chairman, Seidler Amdec Securities, Inc.*

**Penn Kemble**  
*President, Prodemca*

**Charles R. Kesler**  
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International Christian Digest*

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Institute of International Studies*

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 Law School*

Dale Vree  
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
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*Executive Director,  
International Human Rights  
Law Group*

**James Zwerneman**  
*Treasurer, Christians in Commerce*

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The "Appeal for Religious Freedom" is a project of the James Madison Foundation, in cooperation with the Puebla Institute and the Trinitarians. Information on the Appeal may be obtained by writing Amy L. Sherman, Program Officer, James Madison Foundation, 1030 15th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, or by calling the Foundation at (202) 842-1514.

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## FORMER UKRAINIAN AND GEORGIAN POLITICAL PRISONERS TESTIFY IN US CONGRESS

Ukrainian Catholic activist Yosyp Terelya and prisoner of conscience Danyil Shumuk, both recent arrivals from the Soviet Union, provided a very grim interpretation of "glasnost" and its effects for Ukrainians before a hearing of the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Also appearing with Terelya and Shumuk were Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, both members of the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group.

In his testimony, Terelya stated that since December 1986, repression against Church activists as well as Ukrainian nationalists has increased in the Soviet Union. Terelya cited that beginning December 1986 and ending in June 1987, "at least 150 churches have been burned or bulldozed" on orders of the KGB. Even with the popularization of "glasnost" in the West, Terelya stated that prison camps "are still home for many faithful" including Vasyl Kobryn, head of the Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church.

Comparing Khrushchev to Gorbachev, Terelya stated that when Khrushchev came to power, he granted amnesty and political rehabilitation to Soviet political prisoners. Terelya noted that the Gorbachev regime has not yet taken such a step.

Following Terelya's remarks, Shumuk, a long-time prisoner of conscience, testified movingly that "the terror of Russification of my people has reached a culmination point." Shumuk pointed out that in Kyiv, there are only 34 Ukrainian-language schools compared with 152 Russian-language schools, while in the cities of Donetsk, Voroshilovohrad, Mykolayiv and Chernihiv there exist no Ukrainian-language schools. Shumuk also pointed out that in historically significant Ukrainian centers such as Zaporizhia and Kharkiv there are one and two Ukrainian-language schools respectively, compared with 95 and 156 Russian-language schools.

In his remarks, Shumuk said he considers "glasnost" a "deception of public opinion in the USSR and to a greater extent here in the West." He asked, "can one seriously accept this 'glasnost' and these 'reforms' when the organization of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine still remains a secret and uncondemned by the government of the USSR?"

Shumuk also cited the banned Ukrainian Catholic and Ukrainian Orthodox Churches as well as those persons confined for writing about the famine and Ukrainian secession from the USSR as examples of "glasnost's" limits.

Eduard and Tengiz Gudava, in a joint statement, said that "glasnost" and democratization were essential goals of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union long before the arrival of the Gorbachev regime. They stated that "the present exclusion of the human rights movement from the process of glasnost" makes it a mockery.

The Gudava brothers stated that Gorbachev's human rights policy is "based on the exploitation of propaganda from the release or emigration of each dissident or refusenik separately" along with "extensive marketing of sensationally democratic announcements and hints." The Gudavas believe that Gorbachev is playing on the desires of the West to discover a "human face in the image of the Soviet beast,"

concluding that the regime is "creating an image visible to everybody" based on the "extent of his or her impressionability."

Responding to questions about the Soviet proposal to host a human rights conference in Moscow, most of the panelists had similar responses. Shumuk put forth six conditions which the Soviets would have to meet in order for a Human Rights Conference to take place in Moscow: the release and rehabilitation of those persecuted for their political and religious beliefs; justice to those who led repressions against innocent people; an end to jamming of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; the introduction of native language use in all Soviet republic schools and institutions; the withdrawal of all occupying forces from Afghanistan; and the legalization of the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches in Ukraine.

Terelya added that the Soviets should guarantee national rights based on self-determination as well as the free emigration of those who wish to leave the Soviet Union. Amplifying the comments of Terelya and Shumuk, Gudava stated that the West should take advantage of "perestroika," using the opportunity to better conditions for national liberation struggles and assist efforts to coordinate various national movements.

Each person testifying underscored the need and importance in understanding the national component of the human rights struggle in the Soviet Union, especially among those movements outside of the Russian FSSR. All four panelists made specific mention of the national rights issue in the Soviet Union, attesting to the fact that much of the human and religious rights activities are expressions of desires for national self-determination.

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*Hon. Steny H. Hoyer*

## OPENING REMARKS HELSINKI MONITORING HEARING

Washington, D.C., October 22, 1987

Last week, I had the honor of representing the United States, together with the senior Senator from New York, Mr. Moynihan, on the ABC capital-to-capital broadcast, the live spacebridge program linking members of the U.S. Congress and the Supreme Soviet. It was shown, uncensored, throughout the Soviet Union.

Our topic was one the people of the USSR are not accustomed to hearing the truth about — human rights. Over one hundred million Soviet citizens watched and listened to a remarkably frank discussion on human rights in the Soviet Union.

Never before has such a broadcast aired in the USSR. We were able to ask Soviet officials, before millions of their own people, why they restrict religion, movement, and political and national expression, why they have policies which we in the West cannot and may never understand.

And the general idea they tried to convey was that the situation is changing — that there are, indeed, shortcomings in their practices they are trying to correct.

Of course, the world waits to see whether their actions will accord with their words and promises. We await real progress in Soviet Helsinki compliance. We

wait to see how these changes will affect Soviet society. And we wait to see the impact on the citizens of the USSR with the least amount of influence in Moscow — the half of the Soviet population that is non-Russian.

Few individuals are in a more unique position to offer insights into these questions than our witnesses today — two Ukrainian and two Georgian human rights activists recently released from Soviet prisons. They come from two formerly independent nations — now Soviet republics — Ukraine and Georgia. They represent two proud peoples, each with their own ancient and unique historical, cultural and religious traditions. Georgia and Ukraine, throughout much of their history and especially in this century, have suffered greatly. Yet these nations still aspire to a future where fundamental human freedoms are respected.

The Helsinki Commission is pleased to welcome to these hearings these four men who, despite relentless persecution, maintained their dignity and their commitment to the struggle for human rights. Their persistence, despite the KGB's most tenacious efforts, is a testament to their courage and devotion to ideals embodied in the Helsinki Final Act.

Mr. Yosyp Terelya is the best-known leader of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, the largest banned religious denomination in the Soviet Union. Mr. Danylo Shumuk, until his release last January, was the longest-serving prisoner of conscience known in the USSR. Eduard and Tengiz Gudava were members of the second Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group. They also founded an unofficial musical ensemble made up of Jewish and Catholic refuseniks.

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act commits all signatory states to respect human rights, including religious and national minority rights. We look forward to hearing from our witnesses on observance of these principles in Ukraine and in Georgia, — and indeed, in the entire Soviet Union.

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## THE UKRAINIAN CATHOLIC CHURCH HAS NEVER CEASED ITS WORK

*The following is the statement by Yosyp Terelya, former prisoner of conscience and Ukrainian Catholic activist, released during his testimony before the U.S. CSCE Commission in Washington, D.C., on October 22.*

Throughout the whole period of the subjugation of Ukraine to the Muscovite occupier, our Ukrainian Catholic Church was always the object of attacks and destruction by the "Great State" circles of the Empire. It makes no difference whether we are speaking of the tsarist times or the days of the Red governors of Moscow.

The government of the "one and indivisible" Russia, along with its faithful servants in the Russian Orthodox Church made tremendous efforts to destroy the Ukrainian Catholic Church and along with it our people and our nation... Whether they succeed at this, only time will tell. But, notwithstanding, at this time our Church continues to live and our people hope that someday we will have our day in the sun.

After the death of Stalin many persecuted priests and monks, who remained alive, returned from the concentration camps. Many petitions were written to the

government asking for relief from terror and repression. In the 1960s petitions were authored appealing to sympathetic Christian circles asking them to show their Christian solidarity with our struggle to attain our God given freedoms.

Even though much of our hierarchy and clergy were physically destroyed the Church never ceased its work. Rather the Church reorganized itself in the underground. But the KGB began a new wave of repression against the priests, monastics and active faithful. The KGB organized a slew of operations to once more physically destroy our clergy.

In 1953 the Basilian monk Peter Oros was murdered. In 1957 the abbot of an underground monastery in Boronyav, Yosyp Zavadiuk, was killed. In 1957 in Karaganda, while in exile, the layman of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, Ivan Markiv was murdered. In 1963 in Dzheskazgani the Basilian priest-monk Oleksa Zarytskyj was tortured to death by the KGB.

Even more were sentenced to new prison and camp terms, for example: Basilian monk Anton Potochniak — 7 years' camp; Studite monk Hryhoriy Budzinskyj — 10 years' camp; priest Ihnat Soltys and Redemptorist priest Mykhaylo Vynnytskyj both 7 years' each. There were many more who fell to Khrushchev's wave of terror.

When the third Muscovite occupation began in 1944, the Ukrainian Catholic Church had 6,390 priests and monastics, whereas today in Ukraine and throughout the USSR, there are just over 1,000 priests and 1,200 monastics in the underground, plus a very active group of faithful. The Church in Ukraine and the USSR is directed by over 10 bishops, among whom there are some who are already known in the West; the bishop of Lviv, who is in fact the assistant of Patriarch Myroslav



*Yosyp Terelya (left) testifying before the Helsinki Commission on October 22, 1987. Rev. Myroslaw Tataryn of the St. Sophia Religious Association, translated.*

Cardinal Lubachivskyj, is His Excellency Bishop Sterniuk, the Bishop of Kolomyja and Ivano-Frankivsk is Bishop Dmyterko, the Bishop of Uzhorod is Ivan Semedi, and there is also Bishop Pavlo Vasylyk.

The Soviet authorities continually use terror against our Church: constant fines, new arrests and sentences for the faithful and priests. Even this year in 1987, when Gorbachev proclaims for the whole world reconstruction and glasnost, the camps are still home for many faithful among them: the head of the Helsinki Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church, Vasyl Kobryn; in a woman's camp in Siberia is Polanya Batio; in the Kazan special psychiatric prison is Hanna Mykhaylenko and in another camp is the now blind Prof. Pavlo Kampov. These are only a few of the best known names. In addition to the past year and a half many churches have been desecrated, closed or even totally destroyed.

But as Christians we are grateful to Our Lord for having given us both suffering and hope — we remember that “the first shall be last...” We remember with both joy and sorrow the innocent slaughter of the hierarchy of our Church. We rejoice because they now abide in the Kingdom, we are sorrowed because they are no longer among us. At the very outset of the arrests, Bishop Khomyshyn was tortured to death in the Kyiv Lukyanivskyi prison. Bishop J. Kotsylovskyj of Peremyshl was martyred on November 17, 1947. Bishop Lokota was murdered in a camp in Vorkuta on November 12, 1950. October 1 is the date of the death of Bishop Ivan Budka in Dzhezkazgani. Bishops Letyshevskyj and Ivan Verhun died in exile. The Bishop of Uzhorod Fedor Romzha was murdered by the KGB on November 1, 1947. Bishop Hoydych of Pryashiv died in a Czech camp in 1960. Bishops Ivan Balan and Oleksander Rusu were murdered in the Rumanian prison of Sigetskyj in 1950.

However, accepting Gorbachev's propaganda campaign of 'glasnost' at face value, we the Ukrainian Catholic Church have presented Moscow with a fact — we desire legalization. The authorities must now resolve the problem of the Ukrainian Church or they must begin a new wave of arrests and sentences upon those who signed the declaration. Should they choose the latter it would demask 'reconstruction' before the world. This Church which the Soviets contend does not exist, does in fact exist and flourish. In Ukraine alone there are 5 million Ukrainian Catholics and another 1.9 million in other areas of the USSR.

Without doubt, should the Soviets not resolve the question of the Ukrainian Church and the question of free emigration from the USSR for all people without exception — then we feel that in no way should there be a positive conclusion to the Conference in Vienna on Cooperation and Security. It is now time that the government of Moscow show in deeds, not just words that they are ready to put into practice the agreements which they have signed in the past.

The Church also asks that as a further sign of the Soviets' sincerity in seeking a new openness they close the special regime camp Kuchino No. 36-1 and release unconditionally all prisoners held there and in other prisons and camps in the USSR. We are very concerned with the fates of Lev Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Vasyl Ovsiyenko, Vasyl Kobryn, Hanna Mykhaylenko, Petro Ruban, Mykola Horbal, Pavlo Kampov, Ivan Smetana, Stefan Belskyj, Mykola Mamus and many, many other prisoners of conscience who languish in Soviet prisons and camps.

Only when the above problems are faced and resolved in a positive manner can we say that we have created a situation in the world where true peace can be advanced. In other words, we must recognize that peace in the world is more than just an absence of war. The Ukrainian Catholic Church realizes that peace is built on measures which assure order and justice for all social groups throughout the world. And such order cannot be built on force or dictatorship since this would just be a mirage of true peace. Just social order must rather be built on mutual respect of our neighbors — individuals must respect each other's rights.

Solidarity and tolerance are the true measures of human relations. We clearly saw this in the fate of our suffering Church, in the fate of our people. We await an expression of solidarity from the Congress and the Government of the United States and from all in the West. Solidarity as has been expressed for 40 years, for example, by the Dutch priest Werenfried van Straaten and his organization Church in Need. We are grateful to all Christians and non-Christians who have assisted and continue to help our persecuted Church.

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### “GUARANTEE PEACE ON EARTH”

*Yosyp Terelya read the following statement  
upon his arrival to Canada in October, 1987.*

I am overjoyed to be able to say, without worrying about the KGB: “be vigilant, strengthen Christian solidarity.”

At the same time I would like to express my sincere gratitude and the gratitude of my wife and our children to the government of this free Canada — we are free, we are among you. The Prime Minister of Canada, the Most Honorable Brian Mulroney, the Minister of External Affairs, the Honorable Joe Clark and the Minister of Employment and Immigration, Mr. Bouchard who did everything they could to ensure that I would not be brought to trial again and that I could be among you today.

I would also like to acknowledge the efforts on my behalf made by the members of Parliament, Joe Reid and Andrew Witer, thank you sincerely. With joy and sincerity, I would also like to thank the government of Queen Beatrice of the Netherlands and the Christian communities of that country for their many efforts on my behalf and ultimately for granting me my initial visa for travel to the West.

I am the son of my people, the son of the Apostolic Universal Church of Christ and I can now see you and speak with you in the name of our humiliated and wronged Ukrainian Catholic community in the USSR. In 1982, on September 9, my friends and I founded a new Helsinki Group: The Initiative Group in Defense of the Rights of Believers and the Church in Ukraine. The aim of this group was to bring to light the abuse of the rights of believers of all confessions on the territory of Ukraine. We knew what was ahead of us.

After three months I was arrested and sent to camp VL-315/30. In time, the Ukrainian Catholic priest, Fr. Anton Potochniak, was brought there. Fr. Potochniak died in the camp on May 29, 1984. Fr. Potochniak was also a member of the Initiative Group and one of the authors of our Madrid Memorandum.



*Yosyp Terelya at a press conference in The Hague on September 24, 1987.*

Reflect upon the reality: we were persecuted by the communists of Moscow and by the official Soviet Russian Orthodox Church only because we were faithful to Christ and the Holy See (Rome) — they do not even allow us the very necessities of life. No one will ever know the number of martyrs for Christ's faith who lay down their lives in the prisons and camps of the USSR! But we must remember that in the Soviet Gulag more Christians may have died, than for the entire period from Christ to 1917. Even today, thousands of Christians remain in the camps of the USSR. The government continually resists the closing of the horrible special-regime camp in Kuchino where such important activists as Lukyanenko, Kandyba, Horbal and others are imprisoned.

Gorbachev's government does not have the courage to condemn the unjust and illegal acts of Stalin and to once and for all solve the question of the Ukrainian Church by recognizing the legal existence of the Ukrainian national churches: the Ukrainian Catholic Church and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church.

But I also have another concern: two nuclear accidents in Ukraine. I speak here of the accidents in Chornobyl and Rivno. I appeal to those present, aid us in the evangelization of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Russia — this will guarantee peace on earth and will bring us all closer to God's Kingdom.

*Danylo Shumuk*

## THERE CAN BE NO PEACE WITHOUT MUTUAL TRUST

*Testimony before U.S. CSCE Commission in Washington D.C.*

I have travelled a long road of incarceration in prisons, concentration camps and exile. It took me 42 years to find my way to you, to your capital, to these hearings. My first words to you are words of thanks for your constant moral support which you have for many years given political prisoners of the Soviet Union.

From time to time over the radio programs of the Voice of America and Radio Liberty and various roundabout ways we received the news that at the Helsinki Conferences in Madrid, Ottawa and Vienna, members of the U.S. delegations spoke about the nationalities problem in the Soviet Union, about religious persecution, about the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches, which are outlawed in the USSR. They spoke about Russification of the non-Russian peoples. And they mentioned us by name — political prisoners condemned to long years of miserable existence or even death. We knew that you mentioned many of us, including myself. All of this gave us strength to persevere in the most difficult moments — knowing that someone in distant Washington, or members of Amnesty International know and remember us and are working towards our release.

And how painful it is for me to speak before you today, to be in the capital of the most powerful country in the world, to be free and to know that my friends from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group — Vasyl Stus, Yuriy Lytvyn, Oleksa Tykhyj — will never be able to come to the West because they died in Soviet imprisonment. It is painful because still other members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group remain in the terrible death camp No. 36-1: Levko Lukyanenko, Ivan Kandyba, Ival Sokulskyj and Mykola Horbal. It is painful to find myself at liberty in the Free World, while to this day the right to leave is denied to Mykola and Raisa Rudenko, Yuriy Shukhevych, Yuriy Badzio, and to many others who still remain imprisoned, exiled, in psychiatric prisons and those who are constantly persecuted under conditions of so-called "freedom".

These constant repressions are evidence that neither the Soviet government nor its new leadership believe their own citizens, do not believe the millions of people they rule.

And I ask: how can the West believe the current government of the USSR? How can the Administration of the USA trust Gorbachev? How can you, honorable Senators and Congressmen be certain that during your trips to the Soviet Union and in the course of your conversations with Soviet diplomats they are telling you the truth?

I am convinced that without mutual trust there can be no peace. I am convinced that truth, justice, honesty and humaneness must form the basis for mutual trust between the people and between states. Does this kind of trust exist? No, it doesn't, and it won't exist as long as one nation oppresses another.

The Soviet Union consists of various republics, each with its own language, culture and spirituality. But the existence of separate "independent" republics is only theoretically recognized. In reality, the USSR is a Russian communist empire with an authoritarian regime of a government, which does not tolerate the slightest signs of a desire for independence, freedom, and democracy. For expressions of free thought, for strivings toward independence, the Russian communist empire starved over 7 million people in Ukraine in 1933. Later, approximately the same number of people perished in prisons and labor camps, some having been sentenced for possessing a handful of grain gleaned from the fields to save their children from death by starvation.

I did not live through the horrors of the Ukrainian Famine of 1933 because I was born in Volynia, which after World War I, became a part of Poland. In 1932 I became a member of an underground communist organization, thinking and believing that only the communists were fighting for social and national justice. Filled with these ideas I organized members of the Young Communist League and energetically engaged in underground communist activity. In 1935 I was sentenced by the Poles to 8 years of imprisonment and following an amnesty I was released in 1939. In the fall of 1939 the Red Army "liberated" Western Ukraine from Polish occupation and soon it was united with Eastern Ukraine. However, we didn't enjoy this "liberation" for long, because shortly afterwards the repressive machine began its horrible work in Western Ukraine.

On June 22, 1941, Nazi Germany attacked Communist Russia, its ally for the preceding several months. The war found me at work in a construction battalion on the Western border. I was taken prisoner during the siege of Kyiv. I escaped the POW camp in Khorol in the Poltava region. Only then, making my way through the regions of Kyiv, Zhytomyr and Vinnytsia did I learn of the horrors of the Famine of 1933, the arrests, trials and summary executions of 1937. From that point I came to hate communism, to hate Russian imperialism as much as I hated German fascism.

In 1943 I joined the organized struggle against German Nazism and Russian communism in the role of political instructor in the ranks of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). In the USSR I was sentenced the first time for my participation in the UPA, the second time for my refusal to participate in the repressive organs, and the third time for writing my memoirs (*Life Sentence*). In all three cases I was sentenced for political reasons, because I could not make peace with the regime of Russian communism. My weapon in this struggle was the word and only the word. All totaled, I spent 37 years in Polish, German and Russian prisons and camps, and 5 years in exile.

Not everyone is talking a lot about "glasnost" because people tend towards wishful thinking. I consider this "glasnost" a deception of public opinion in the USSR and to a greater extent, here in the West. Can one seriously accept this "glasnost" and these "reforms" when the organization of the man-made famine of 1933 in Ukraine still remains a secret and uncondemned by the government of the USSR? When today those who were sentenced and died in confinement for writing and speaking about the famine remain unrehabilitated? When today the Ukrainian Orthodox and Catholic Churches are denied a legal existence regardless of the fact that their right to exist is recognized in the Soviet Constitution, in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Accords? When they have not rehabilitated those who, in accord-



Roma Hadzewicz

*Former political prisoner Danylo Shumuk (left) and translator Yuriy Dobczansky from the Library of Congress at the CSCE hearing in Washington.*

ance with the Constitution of the USSR called for the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union or those who spoke out against the Russification of Ukraine?

In 1972 during my trial, the director of the Pioneer camp where I worked was called as a witness. The judge asked him: "What can you tell us about Shumuk?" He answered: "Shumuk's attitude towards his work was faultless, but he always and everywhere spoke only in Ukrainian and expressed indignation about the fact that all the posters in our camp were in Russian. In 1970, we wanted to write above all the entranceways to the camp: 'Dobro pozhalovat' (Welcome) in Russian, and Shumuk wanted to write this in Ukrainian, and then I realized that he is a nationalist."

And they sentenced me as a nationalist. I bring up this point just to illustrate that not only almost 20 years ago, but today on the 70th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the terror of Russification of my people has reached a culmination point. In the capital of Ukraine, in Kyiv, there are only 34 Ukrainian-language schools and 152 Russian-language schools and in such traditionally Ukrainian cities as Donetsk, Voroshilovohrad, Mykolayiv and Chernihiv, there are none. In the historical Ukrainian city of Zaporizhia there is only one, and 95 Russian schools. In the former capital of Ukraine, Kharkiv, there are only 2 Ukrainian schools, and 156 Russian schools. (More detailed information about these conditions in Ukrainian education is provided in the Kyiv newspaper *Literaturna Ukraina*, July 9, 1987. I request that a copy of the article be submitted for the record.)

I heartily welcome the fact that up to July 1987 the USSR finally allowed 2,378 Jews to emigrate, that several of my prison companions — Russian prisoners —

have left for the West. And I ask whether it is "glasnost" if until now they have allowed only two Ukrainians to leave, as fortune would have it, myself and Yosyp Terelya?

My friends from the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Mykola Rudenko, Yuriy Shukhevych and many others are still trying to leave. This is a problem not only for us Ukrainians. The problem of Ukraine becomes a problem for the entire Western world, for the 35 nations that signed the Helsinki Accords. To this day the principles of Helsinki have not reached my people. Ukraine is still not included in the Helsinki process—a problem we addressed in our memorandums. There is still not even one Western consulate in Kyiv, not to mention the absence of an accredited journalist. And I ask: is this normal for a nation of 50 million, for the largest European nation in the 20th century?

I am deeply convinced that it is in the interest of the USA and Canada, where I have now made my home, and in the interest of all Western nations to support in practice my nation's aspirations to independence using peaceful means, diplomacy and negotiations. It is in the interest of peace on earth and normal relations among nations that Ukraine be an independent state in the UN and among all nations—an equal among equals. The independence of Ukraine, the Baltic nations, and all of the republics of the USSR would be a great step towards achieving a stable and longlasting peace in the entire world.

Then the danger of Russian communist infiltration of Nicaragua, the countries of South America, Africa and Asia would be diminished. Taking advantage of the current situation in the USSR, I am convinced that much could be achieved in this area. I am hopeful, Mr. Chairman, that you and the US Congress will take my thoughts into consideration.

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*Tengiz and Eduard Gudava*

## **GEORGIAN NATIONALISM REMAINS THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR THE PEOPLE**

*The following is the statement of Tengiz and Eduard Gudava, Georgian national and human rights activists, before the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Washington, D.C., October 22, 1987.*

Recently, the national problem in the USSR has become more acute. There are indications that the authorities want to compensate for limited progress in individual rights by instituting retrogressive national policies, which result in the increasing of the population (for example, the events in Kazakhstan and Latvia). The situation in Georgia is also becoming more dramatic. In view of this, the political importance of the human rights movement increases substantially.

Three major aspects can be identified with the human rights movement in Georgia:

1. The struggle for national interests;
2. Religious activity;

### 3. The defense of fundamental human rights.

Understanding the fundamental unity of these three aspects is growing among Georgian human rights activists, even though Georgian nationalism remains the most important issue for the people. This is to be expected because Georgia, like the Baltic States and Western Ukraine, were forcibly annexed into the USSR.

National consciousness, which is extremely strong among the intelligentsia and the students, covers a wide ideological spectrum, from the defense of local national interests to supporting the idea of national liberation.

For Georgian human rights activists, the idea of national liberation is directly associated with the following fundamental legal principles: the right of a nation to self-determination, the right of individuals to free expression of their views, the right of patriotic associations and the right to use democratic procedures in resolving the issue of Georgia's separation from the Soviet Union. The majority of Georgian political prisoners were imprisoned for supporting the last principle, even though that right is stated in the Soviet constitution. Thus, in Georgia, the struggle for national independence is a struggle for democratization and vice versa. In this, Georgian nationalists differ from, say the Basques or the Irish, who are in possession of all the democratic means for fulfillment of their programs.

These days, when the Soviet Union publicizes worldwide the "democratization" of its regime, we hear nothing about changes in the attitude of Moscow towards the right of the Georgian people for a democratic procedure to resolve the most fundamental question: that of the sovereignty or non-sovereignty of Georgia.

My brother, Eduard, and I are members of a movement, whose aim is the humanitarian fight against totalitarianism and tyranny, and which supports the ideals of liberty, democracy and human rights. We joined the movement as youths because we were critical of the Soviet system and were searching for the truth.

While we were medical students during the 1970s, we openly expressed our disagreement with many realities of Soviet life: the non-existence of freedom of speech or democracy and the issue of self-determination for the Georgian people, etc. For all this, we were subject to authoritarian force. Our parents were dismissed from their jobs for supporting our activity.

In 1978, we were convicted of speculation on trumped-up charges. I (Tengiz) was sentenced to four years in a labor camp; Eduard to three years. After our conviction, in 1982 we handed in an application to Amnesty International where we accused the Soviet government of tyranny and asked for legal help. At that time, we wrote an autobiographical book which was distributed as *samizdat* (underground literature).

In March 1982, we found our way into the British Embassy in Moscow where we told about ourselves and, under the threat of annihilation by the KGB, we asked representatives of the embassy to be witnesses to our fate. At the end of 1982, we were politically motivated to renounce our Soviet citizenship.

In 1983, we converted to Catholicism and began to take an active part in the life of the Catholic parish in Tbilisi. We organized a choir, obtained and distributed Bibles and church literature, issued religious *samizdat*, and arranged Catholic youth circles.

In searching for new forms of activity, at the end of 1984, we organized a "Phantom Orchestra." It consisted of refuseniks and dissidents, both Christians

and Jews. The purpose of the orchestra was to draw the world's attention to the breach of human rights in the Soviet Union. Orchestra members were subjected to various repressions such as searches, cross-examinations, and assault and battery. Even foreigners were subject to repression. In May 1985, four Boston musicians were deported from the Soviet Union after joining in concert with the "Phantom Orchestra."

In the spring of 1985, we joined the Georgian Helsinki group and renewed its activity. While we carried on our human rights activity, the KGB persecuted us constantly and we were subject to cross-examinations, threats, spying, searches and arrest. Our apartments were searched and bugged, our correspondence was inspected and blocked. We were deprived of any possibility of working in our specialty and, as a result, we lived in poverty.

In May 1985, we and our mother were accused of "slander against the Soviet state and social system" and later we were arrested and condemned. I (Tengiz) was convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" and sentenced to seven years in a labor camp and three years in exile. Eduard was convicted of "hooliganism" on a trumped-up charge and sentenced to four years in a labor camp (he had hung out the following placard: "KGB, stop persecuting").

It is remarkable that I was accused of not only having taken part in the Georgian Helsinki group, the organization of the "Phantom Orchestra," religious and *samizdat* activity, but I was also guilty of a speech made by American Senators and Congressmen about the breach of human rights in Georgia. For the first months of the investigation, the KGB threatened to incriminate me on the grounds of "high treason" according to the paragraph "rendering assistance to a foreign state in conducting hostile propaganda with respect to the Soviet Union." During our imprisonment we did not stop fighting for our rights. We went on long hunger strikes. As a result of this, we were subject to additional floggings.

At the end of April 1987, we were discharged from prison in the course of Gorbachev's campaign for discharging political prisoners. But the powerful pressure of the KGB preceded our discharge from prison. The purpose of the pressure was to incline us to public "repentance" as a precondition for our discharge, although the authorities' actions ended in failure. We were discharged on the condition that we would emigrate from the Soviet Union.

On September 8, 1987, we arrived in Boston, Massachusetts.

## Georgia and its national problems

Georgia is situated between the Black and Caspian Seas and it borders Turkey and Iran. The population is approximately five million people, 70% of whom are Georgian.

The Georgian people are an ancient family which was organized as a state from time immemorial. In the fourth century, Georgia adopted Christianity and for centuries it was an advanced outpost of the Christian faith. In the 18th century Georgia fell under full Russian influence and it was turned into a province of the Russian Empire.

After the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, Georgia became independent. In 1921 it was occupied by the Red Army and became part of the Soviet Union. After that,

national liberation actions of the people did take place, but they were brutally suppressed. Now, Georgia is one of 15 Soviet republics.

All branches of industry are developed in Georgia. The most important is agriculture. Georgia is the main supplier of tea, citrus fruits and wine. The nature of Georgia is varied and favorable to tourism.

Georgian culture is rich and original. Shota Rustaveli, a poet and an intellectual, was born and worked creatively in Georgia in the 18th century. At present, Georgian theatre and cinematography are known all over the world.

However, the human rights community feels that the creative forces of the Georgian people are gripped by the vice of the communist regime. Many people in Georgia think that because of the general inefficiency of socialist economy, their natural national resources are being used inefficiently, and that, if Georgia were an independent state, it would flourish economically. The society is being eaten away by social sores: corruption and machination which are connected with the party and form a united "mafia".

The spiritual values of the Georgian people, such as their language, history, culture, and religion, are being persecuted and this arouses the anxiety of the intelligentsia. Only owing to the demonstrations of the intellectuals and students in 1978, did the Georgian language at last receive a constitutional status and became established and approved as the state language. However, this status is broken everywhere. The Georgian language is being excluded from scientific, administrative and management activity.

The teaching of Georgian history is curtailed. Many monuments of antiquity are being destroyed. To weaken the unity of the Georgian people, the further fragmentation of the Georgian national minority is encouraged. In addition, there is evidence of discrimination against Georgians residing in adjoining republics.

The issue of Meshs, or Georgian Moslems, is left unresolved. Meshs are Georgian Moslems who were deported by Stalin and deprived of any possibility of returning to the homeland.

The authorities prevent the opening of new parishes which are greatly needed. The mass actions of the believers toward this end are brutally suppressed. The official church hierarchy is under the control of the state, and is infiltrated with KGB agents. With a view to undermining church authority, amoral and criminal elements are installed in the priestly environment. The clergy and lay people who are against this, are subject to persecution.

The authorities subjugate the people for expressing patriotic and national-religious views. People are put on trial as state criminals or ordinary criminal cases are fabricated against them. At this time, we are aware of three names of Georgian patriots who have been suffering in prison for many years: Guram Gogbaidze, Valentina Pailodze and Boris Kukobava.

Currently the issue of building a Trans-Caucasus Mountain Pass Railway is extremely controversial. There is wide public opposition to this project and against the Soviet government because of the inherent danger to ecology, demography and historical monuments in the construction zone. Petitions have been submitted to the government which are signed by thousands of representatives of the intelligentsia, students and workers. Recently, the authorities started a campaign against the signatories: they are summoned by the KGB, the Central Committee of the Commu-

nist Party, where they are threatened and told to withdraw their signatures. Searches are conducted with confiscation of the lists of signatories. There is danger that unrest among the students will become widespread.

It should be noted that Gorbachev's *perestroika* has resolved none of the national problems of the Georgian people. Moreover, there is an opposite tendency. For example, after the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Yegor Ligachev, visited Georgia in June 1987, the Georgian language divisions in all departments of Tbilisi State University were drastically reduced and a campaign to intimidate student activities was begun.

All of the national problems of Georgia are the consequence of the above issue, the prevalence of nationalistic ideas creates a specific character for the entire human rights movement. Together with a relatively underdeveloped open organization of human rights structures, there is a widespread of small, temporarily national, patriotic and religious groups, which exist in an atmosphere of very active student masses with the productive support of the scientific intelligentsia, especially in the humanities.

Human rights events tend to concentrate around several renowned activists and these events include the distribution of proclamations and petitions, often during demonstrations.

The Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group had two short periods of activity, both of which resulted in severe repercussions against the participants. First, the group announced its creation in January 1977, with six members. In four months it was attacked by the authorities and four members were arrested and its activity stopped. In the spring of 1985, the group appeared with new members, also numbering six. At that time, my brother and I became involved. Once again, after three months, the KGB destroyed the group: three members were imprisoned and two emigrated to the West.

In our activities, we emphasized the necessity to observe universal human rights norms. The group published several documents about the conditions of Georgian political prisoners, about unlawful deeds by the authorities, as well as appeals to the West regarding the 10th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and a demand for freedom for Andrei Sakharov, etc.

Presently, the Georgian Helsinki Monitoring Group consists of two members: Ziyad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava. They are helped by many supporters whose names should not yet become public because of the danger of repercussions.

### **Gorbachev's "perestroika" and ourselves**

Our assessment of Gorbachev's *perestroika* and *glasnost* coincides with the opinions of many human rights activists we know in the USSR. Briefly, our conclusions are as follows:

Changes are occurring in the USSR and their importance should neither be under nor overestimated.

Of course, some of these changes are positive; a number of political prisoners have been released, some families have been permitted to emigrate, previously banned writers and their books have been "pardoned". Still, this campaign has its other side which not everyone wants or can see.

First, let us examine the motivations for all their changes. It is extremely naive to assume that present Soviet leaders are liberals striving for good. It is enough to mention that we were already arrested and sentenced during Gorbachev's rule, and we experienced the entire depth of Shevardnadze's "humanism" during his tenure as head of the Georgian Communist Party.

Changes occurring in the USSR are necessitated by pressure from three directions:

1. Socio-economic: there is fear of another Poland, where the decline in the standard of living, together with the flourishing of corruption and protectionism, resulted in an explosion of indignation not only among individual dissidents, but involving the entire working class.

2. Military-economic: here there is fear of SDI as a project capable of making technological superiority of the West real and irrefutable.

3. Ideological: there is fear of continuous increasing political and moral isolation of the Soviet regime which is deservedly considered to be an "evil empire".

Accordingly, the Soviet Union was forced to undertake these changes in order to stop dangerous tendencies and to preserve and strengthen its totalitarian and misanthropic nature. Secondly, positive changes in the Soviet system have been long awaited by human rights activists, both in the USSR and abroad.

*Glasnost* and democratization were and are essential goals of the human rights movement in the Soviet Union and they were formulated long before Gorbachev. Many activists have sacrificed their lives in the struggle for these ideas. The present exclusion of the human rights movement from the process of *glasnost* makes it a mockery of real *glasnost*. At the same time, the attitude of Soviet authorities toward human rights activists and the human rights movement have not changed.

Freed political prisoners were not rehabilitated, but rather "pardoned" under various fabricated excuses. The process of their release was not covered in the Soviet press, except for a couple of very short and absolutely deceitful paragraphs in the newspapers.

The jamming of some Western radio stations is continuing, as well as the ban of the publication of the best masterpieces of free literature.

Fundamental human rights — of speech, of obtaining information, of freedom of religion and association, of emigration and return, of due process of defense, etc. — are not guaranteed now any more than they were under Gorbachev's predecessors.

Changes in legislation (both already introduced and expected) — are designed to legitimize the deficient Soviet interpretation of human rights which is drastically different from what is universally accepted. Real modification of the Soviet legal system should have begun with a modification of the foundation — the totalitarian and anti-human rights Soviet constitution. The hounding of human rights activists continues in the USSR finding, however, new forms.

Gorbachev's entire policy in the human rights area is based on a primitive use of the Western media: the exploitation of propaganda from the release or emigration of each dissident or a refusenik separately and the extensive "marketing" of sensationally democratic announcements and hints. Gorbachev is playing on the desire of the West to discover a human face in the image of the Soviet beast. He is

creating a mirage in the desert, visible to everybody to the extent of his or her impressionability.

Thirdly, human rights activists see as a major danger of the process now occurring in the USSR, the camouflaging of the real Soviet attitude towards human rights.

This real attitude has not changed. Together with a smoke screen of Soviet propaganda and the attempt by Soviet ideologues to substitute the universal interpretation of human rights with their own, they pose a danger of not only the reinstatement of past suppression of individual rights in the USSR, but also of its expansion worldwide.

Where are the guarantees that this practice of suppression is not going to be reintroduced? Who will be accountable for the death and suffering of hundreds of people whose only "crime" was defending their own legitimate rights, dignity and freedom?

Still intact is the whole apparatus of the KGB and those articles in the criminal code which leave the possibility for further terror against dissidents. "Repentance" in this system goes no further than artistic allegories.

It is our belief that only an open and democratic trial of the instigators and executioners of repression against human rights would be a real indicator of *glasnost* and democratization in the USSR. Only such a trial could act as a watershed between the 70 years' bloody history of the Soviet regime and Gorbachev's rule.

Our slogan for today is: KGB, stand and be accountable! Totalitarianism, stand and be accountable! We strongly believe that the Soviet communist system brings a continuously increasing threat to the world at large. At the foundation of this system there is a denial of the spiritual nature of man, of freedom of choice.

The history of this system is a history of monstrous crimes against human rights, against humanity and the rule of law, in conjunction with the devilish ability to conceal its atrocities and escape responsibility.

The global danger of the present policy of *glasnost* in the USSR comes from the preservation and strengthening of the criminal nature of the Soviet system. The stabilization of the system at a new level will give it even more power.

Unfortunately, we have to admit that there is a lack of understanding of this situation in the West. At the same time, we are certain that understanding the Soviet system is necessary both to save Western democracy and preserve peace on this earth.

We hope to contribute as much as we can towards this great cause. We could propose a great many projects in this direction. We are counting on the understanding and help of the American authorities for the implementation of these projects.



Compliments of the season and sincere wishes for a  
**MERRY CHRISTMAS**

and a

**HAPPY, PROSPEROUS NEW YEAR**

to all our friends and readers of *ABN Correspondence*

ABN Central Committee



April 28, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR STAFF

FROM:

CAROL *Carol*

SUBJECT:

James Madison Foundation Luncheon

I attended a lunch at the Madison Foundation with Dr. Bohdan Bociurkiw as the guest of honor. Dr. Bociurkiw is a professor of political science at Carleton University in Ottawa. A native of Ukraine, Dr. Bociurkiw is widely recognized as an eminent scholar of Soviet religious policy and practice.

Here are some interesting things that came up at the meeting:

- There is the growing feeling in Ukraine that the millenium has been "highjacked" by the state-controlled Russian Orthodox church.
- There is a growing trend of ecumenism among the repressed. Various faiths are speaking out for one another. This ecumenical attitude was spawned, in great part, in the labor camps.
- Lenin's wife drafted the first anti-religious statements to be incorporated in the Soviet constitution. The statements on religion in the constitution are sandwiched between the sections outlawing pornography and brothels. In her mind, religion is a moral evil on par with these.
- The Soviet constitution makes the practice of religion both a criminal and administrative offense.
- The laws dealing with the practice of faith are very vague: It is an administrative offence to "perform religious work." What does this mean? Answer: Almost anything. Under this prescription, priest are often fined for celebrating Mass in their homes.

- There are a few areas in which the state has loosened its repressive grip:
  - Allowing churches and religious groups to perform charitable works. Examples: volunteer and support hospitals, nursing homes, orphanages. (Read: allow the churches to use their own resources rather than burden the sagging Soviet economy).
  - Allowing restoration of certain religious properties. Example: Danilov monestery.
  - Allowing the printing of Bibles -- 100,000. It is a start, but falls tragically short of meeting the needs of 47 million believers. Dr. Bociurkiw said that sources he has within the Soviet Union say that the printing has been delayed because of a "paper shortage."
- Another loosening is the state allowing registration of religious groups. The authorities have said that if a group of 20 believers petition for registration, the state will allow for them to form a religious group. The Ukrainian Catholics, however, have been systematically denied this privileged. George Weigel of the Madison Foundation said that by denying the Ukrainians -- who meet all the official requirements -- the Soviets are going against their own stated principles.
- It has been said that the Soviet officials have offered the Ukrainian church an option: we will recognize you if you just accept the Russian Patriarch as your head. (Read: deny your faith).
- The standard punishment for practicing religion are changing. Rather than giving long prison and labor camp sentences, the authorities are opting more frequently for short sentences and frequent re-arrests; repeated fines; general harassment and discrimination. One thing that does is deny the West the opportunity of drawing up lists of jailed prisoners and following closely the cases. This type of punishment and repression is harder to track.

\* (I have attached the appeal for religious freedom in Soviet Union, which was presented to the President in Oval Office on Monday. It has been signed by over 240 prominent Americans, representing the broad range of religious and political opinion in this country).