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(Noonan/BE)
November 20, 1985
11:30 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. Thanks, partner.

Thank you for this warm welcome. Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole, I want you to know your statements of support were and are greatly appreciated.

As you know, I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent a total of 14½ hours in ^{various} meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. Approximately ~~8~~ ^{4½} of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, one on one.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so there will be at least 3,000 opinions on what happened. Maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I thought I'd file a report, too.

To begin with, it was essential that we meet. I had called for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or

(We only counted hours when PR was included -KT)

national purpose -- but we understand each other better. I gained a better perspective; I hope he did, too.

In short, it was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact, that Mr. Gorbachev this morning accepted our invitation to come and visit the United States this spring.

I found Mr. Gorbachev ~~to be able, aggressive, and assertive~~ ^{to be a tireless and aggressive defender of} ~~the General Secretary~~ ^{the Soviet} He was quite a talker, and, I believe, a good listener. Our policy and the subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For Communist system. 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have ^{ideology} complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom. ^{It's not hard to see how he rose to the top of the system.}

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that their ideology and purpose will not change and that this implies perpetual competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

When I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. And so, in a very real sense, preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years ago when -- with the help of Congress -- our defense modernization plan began. America is once again strong -- and

our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it uncomfortable or inconvenient.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about Soviet expansionism by force in many regions -- about ^{Soviet} ~~failures~~ to live up to human rights obligations -- and about the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought these questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. ^A ~~I explained our Strategic Defense Initiative. I told Mr. Gorbachev that S.D.I. is a research program into defensive~~

~~systems that would threaten no one and that might eventually free both our countries and other nations from the threat of nuclear destruction. And I noted that the Soviets' own long-standing programs in this field suggest they, too, see the possibilities in strategic defense. If a breakthrough proves possible, I argued that we should cooperate in moving toward a safer world.~~

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed regimes. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights, and I explained that we Americans *feel that* ~~believe that~~ human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors -- and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people tend to prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not an issue that "interferes" with our efforts for peace any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale.

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans should know the people of ~~the Soviet Union~~ -- ~~Russia~~ -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, as you know, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

~~(B) On arms reductions, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying -- on strategic nuclear issues as well as (OTHER ARMS ISSUES).~~

As for Soviet interference in many regions of the world -- I am afraid that there is no change in their view. They still contend, for example, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of conquest. Let me be frank: We cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. But we

have also agreed to continue -- and, if possible, to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets on this and to work toward a political solution of it.

~~On the issue of people-to-people contacts, there is progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)~~

~~In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety have produced agreements that will serve the interests of both our countries. (CONSULATES HERE.)~~

~~And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (AS APPROPRIATE).~~

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued face-to-face involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West... (is) as wide and deep... as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the state." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We must, however, do all in our power to be persuasive for peace. I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians ~~held to each other~~ ^{huddled together} on the edge of an unknown continent. And now, ~~we are~~ ^{here we are, gathered together} moderns huddled on the edge of an unknown

~~At Santa~~

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future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

A

Q I ~~also~~ described to Mr. Gorbachev our Strategic Defense Initiative, our research effort ^{that envisions} designed to ~~determine the~~ feasibility of defensive systems which could ultimately ~~to~~ protect all nations against the danger of nuclear war. ~~We did not agree.~~ This ~~part of the~~ discussion produced a very direct exchange of views. *(You will not be surprised to hear that we did not agree.)*

Mr. Gorbachev ^{initiated} ~~expressed~~ concern that we might ~~want to~~ use a strategic defense system ~~(as a way)~~ to put offensive weapons into space. ^{and} ~~He also asked whether we~~ ^{are} ~~were~~ doing research on defense as a way to establish nuclear superiority.

^{emphasized} ^{made it clear}
I ~~made it very clear~~ to Mr. Gorbachev, therefore, that SDI has ^{that} ~~nothing~~ to do with offensive weapons. ~~It is an~~ ^{Instead, we are} ~~investigating~~ ~~only~~ non-nuclear defensive systems that would be a threat ~~only to an~~ ~~attacking~~ ~~only offensive missiles, not to people.~~ ~~attacking nuclear weapons.~~ ^{successfully} If such research is ~~successful~~, it will ^{our} ~~could~~ bring ^{much} ~~much~~ closer to the safer and more stable world ~~which that~~

^{Man kind could at long last repeal his obvious}
we ~~all~~ seek. We would be able to deter aggression by being able ~~doctrine of mutual assured destruction and defend itself against~~ to defend against attack, instead of relying on the threat of ~~attack and escape the fear of mutual terror -- this is my~~ retaliation with offensive nuclear weapons. ~~(This would indeed be a dream.)~~
a safer and morally preferable way to keep the peace.

So I ~~therefore~~ welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev personally what I have been saying throughout my administration. ~~We are a nation that defends, rather than attacks, that~~ ^{that} defensive power, and our alliances are ~~not offensive.~~ ^{NUCLEAR} defensive. We don't seek superiority over the Soviet Union. ~~We must be realistic.~~ ^{And we have to be realistic,} After all, I am a realist. I know that even if we wanted superiority, we couldn't achieve it, since the Soviet Union would keep building up ^{its} offensive systems. ~~In fact,~~ ^{that's just what} the Soviet Union has been doing ^{its buildup is} for years, and ~~this is~~ a source of great concern to the West.

I also made it clear that we do not seek a first strike advantage. ~~To the contrary: It is~~ ^{is} one of my fundamental arms control objectives to get rid of first strike weapons. This is why we have proposed a 50% percent reduction in comparable offensive nuclear systems, and especially those which could ~~carry out~~ ^{carry out} threaten a first strike. And this is why we want to ~~discuss with~~ ^{of us} the Soviet Union how all could have a safer future, ~~in the end if~~ ^{with the Soviet Union} we began right now to explore together the possibility of a cooperative move toward reliance on defense instead of offense..

And I went further in ~~my efforts~~ ^{expressing} to reassure Mr. Gorbachev about our ~~personal~~ ^{peaceful} intentions. I described ~~to him~~ our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a program of open laboratories in the strategic defense research. ~~What we are offering is~~ to brief Soviet experts on our research program and to let them see first hand ~~and they could see first hand~~ that SDI does not involve offensive weapons.

And I told Mr. Gorbachev that since ~~we~~ ^{we} know very well that the Soviet Union has been conducting ~~very~~ extensive research in strategic defense for years, we would ~~welcome the reciprocal~~ ^{think it's} ~~time~~ ^{as well.} opportunity to learn more about their efforts. Their strategic defense programs, in fact, even go beyond research. ~~If we are~~ ^{they} ~~to take the necessary first steps to break down our mutual~~ ^{Discussion 1 +} ~~distrust, on this issue, it is vital that~~ ^{at this} the Soviet Union ~~acknowledge this fact and join us in establishing a cooperative process.~~ ^{should} ~~their program and join us in cooperation.~~

Finally, I ~~offered~~ ^{reassured} to Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research bears fruit, prior to any decision of deployment of defensive systems, the U.S. would negotiate with the Soviet Union, ~~over~~ ^{side} how both of us could ~~move~~ ^{move} ~~together~~ gradually and safely ~~toward relying for our security~~ ^{move} ~~more and more on~~ defensive systems which would threaten no one.

(B)

We have concluded a new cultural ~~an~~ agreement that is designed to bring the best of America's artists and academics to the Soviet Union. ~~Just one part of this exchange~~ The exhibits alone that will be included in this exchange are ~~one of the most~~ ways Exhibits -- is probably the single most effective means for the average Soviet citizen to learn about the ~~Amer~~ American way of life. This agreement will also expand the opportunities for Americans to ~~experience~~ ^{experience} the ~~Russian~~ ^{Soviet} people's rich cultural heritage.

We have also decided to go forward with a number of people-to-people initiatives that will provide greater contact ~~between~~ ^{between} not only the political leaders of our two countries but ~~the~~ our respective students, teachers ~~sportsmen and other citizens~~ ^{and others as well}. This will both help break down stereotypes and, ~~in all candor~~ ^{frankly}, ~~offer~~ ^{provide} an alternative to official propaganda.

We have agreed to establish a new Soviet Consulate in New York and a new US Consulate in Kiev. This will bring an official American presence to the Ukraine for the first time in decades.

We have also, together with the government of Japan, concluded a ~~Biting Oak~~ Pacific Air Safety Agreement with the Soviet Union. This is designed to set up cooperative measures to improve civil air safety in that region, ~~and see to it that what happened two years ago can never happen again.~~ ^{what happened before must be allowed to}

as a way of dealing ~~more~~ ^{also} with the energy needs of the world of the future, we have ~~agreed~~ ^{also} with the Soviet ~~Union~~ to join an international effort to explore the feasibility of building a prototype fusion reactor.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

All of these steps are part of a long term process of building more stable and secure relations with the Soviet Union. No one ever said this would be easy -- but we've come a ^{long} way the past five years thanks to a renewed American confidence, renewed American ^{well being} economic strength and renewed American self confidence and renewed military strength.

~~I believe it can be said.~~

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As you know, I have just come from Geneva and talks with General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent a total of 14-1/2 hours in various meetings with the General Secretary and the members of his official party. Approximately 4-1/2 of those hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, one on one.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so there will be at least 3,000 opinions on what happened. Maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I thought I'd file a report, too.

To begin with, it was essential that we meet. I had called for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or

national purpose -- but we understand each other better. I gained a better perspective; I hope he did, too.

In short, it was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact, that Mr. Gorbachev this morning accepted our invitation to come and visit the United States this spring.

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be a tireless and aggressive defender of Soviet policy and the communist ideology. It's not hard to see how he rose to the top of that system. The General Secretary was quite a talker, and, I believe, a good listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that their ideology and purpose will not change and that this implies perpetual competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

When I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. And so, in a very real sense, preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years

ago when -- with the help of Congress -- our defense modernization plan began. America is once again strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it uncomfortable or inconvenient.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about Soviet expansionism by force in many regions -- about Soviet human rights obligations -- and about the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought these questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to reduce them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would

make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer.

I described our Strategic Defense Initiative -- our research effort that envisions defensive systems which could ultimately protect all nations against the danger of nuclear war. This discussion produced a very direct exchange of views.

Mr. Gorbachev insisted that we might use a strategic defense system to put offensive weapons into space and establish nuclear superiority.

I made it clear that S.D.I. has nothing to do with offensive weapons; that, instead, we are investigating non-nuclear defensive systems that would only threaten offensive missiles, not people. If our research succeeds, it will bring much closer the safer, more stable world we seek. Mankind could at long last repeal this odious doctrine of mutual assured destruction, defend itself against attack, and escape the prison of mutual terror -- this is my dream.

So I welcomed the chance to tell Mr. Gorbachev that we are a Nation that defends, rather than attacks, that our alliances are defensive, not offensive. We don't seek nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union. And to be realistic, even if we wanted superiority, we couldn't achieve it, since the Soviet Union would keep building up its offensive systems. That's just what the Soviet Union has been doing for years, and their build-up is a source of great concern to the West.

I also made it clear that we do not seek a first strike advantage. One of my fundamental arms control objectives is to

get rid of first strike weapons. This is why we have proposed a 50-percent reduction in comparable offensive nuclear systems, and especially those which could carry out a first strike. And this is why we want to begin right now to explore with the Soviet Union the possibility of a cooperative move toward reliance on defense instead of offense.

I went further in expressing our peaceful intentions. I described our proposal in the Geneva negotiations for a program of open laboratories in strategic defense research. We are offering to brief Soviet experts on our research program and let them see first hand that S.D.I. does not involve offensive weapons.

And since we know that the Soviet Union has been conducting extensive research in strategic defense for years, we think it's time to learn more about their efforts as well. Their strategic defense programs, in fact, even go beyond research. If they seek to join us in lessening distrust, then Soviets should acknowledge their program and join us in cooperation.

Finally, I reassured Mr. Gorbachev on another point. I promised that if our research bears fruit, prior to any decision of deployment of defensive systems, the U.S. would negotiate with the Soviet Union -- how both sides could move gradually, safely, and together, toward defensive systems which would threaten no one.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia,

where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed regimes. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights. I explained that we Americans feel that history teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors -- and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people tend to prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not an issue that "interferes" with our efforts for peace any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

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And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, as you know, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

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We have also, together with the government of Japan, concluded a Pacific Air Safety Agreement with the Soviet Union. This is designed to set up cooperative measures to improve civil air safety in that region. What happened before must never be allowed to happen again.

As a way of dealing with the energy needs of the world of the future, we have also agreed with the Soviets to join an international effort to explore the feasibility of building a prototype fusion reactor.

All of these steps are part of a long-term process of building more stable relations with the Soviet Union. No one ever said it would be easy. But we've come a long way the past 5 years thanks to our renewed military strength, renewed confidence, and renewed economic well-being.

As for Soviet interference in many regions of the world -- I am afraid that there is no change in their view. They still contend, for example, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of conquest. Let me be frank: We cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. But we have also agreed to continue -- and, if possible, to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets on this and to work toward a political solution of it.

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And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West... (is) as wide and deep... as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the state." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

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Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with

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These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that their ideology and purpose will not change and that this implies perpetual competition. Our task is to assure that this competition remains peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

When I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. And so, in a very real sense, preparations for the summit started not months ago but 5 years ago when -- with the help of Congress -- our defense modernization plan began. America is once again strong -- and

our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it uncomfortable or inconvenient.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about Soviet expansionism by force in many regions -- about ^{Soviet} ~~failures~~ to live up to human rights obligations -- and about the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

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systems that would threaten no one and that might eventually free both our countries and other nations from the threat of nuclear destruction. And I noted that the Soviets' own long-standing programs in this field suggest they, too, see the possibilities in strategic defense. If a breakthrough proves possible, I argued that we should cooperate in moving toward a safer world.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed regimes. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights, and I explained that we Americans believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors -- and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people tend to prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not an issue that "interferes" with our efforts for peace any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale.

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans should know the people of Russia -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

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We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, as you know, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms reductions, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying -- on strategic nuclear issues as well as (OTHER ARMS ISSUES).

As for Soviet interference in many regions of the world -- I am afraid that there is no change in their view. They still contend, for example, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of conquest. Let me be frank: We cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. But we

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In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety have produced agreements that will serve the interests of both our countries. (CONSULATES HERE.)

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We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued face-to-face involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West... (is) as wide and deep... as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the state." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

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Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

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Page 8

future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

(Noonan/BE)
November 20, 1985
11:30 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's great to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this
wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a
personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador
of good will for all of us. Thanks, partner.

Thank you for this warm welcome. Mr. Speaker, Senator Dole,
I want you to know your statements of support were and are
greatly appreciated.

As you know, I have just come from Geneva and talks with
General Secretary Gorbachev. In the past few days, we spent a
total of _____ hours in meetings with the General Secretary and
the members of his official party. Approximately _____ of those
hours were talks between Mr. Gorbachev and myself, one on one.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and
opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like.
There were over 3,000 reporters in Geneva, so there will be at
least 3,000 opinions on what happened. Maybe it's the old
broadcaster in me but I thought I'd file a report, too.

To begin with, it was essential that we meet. I had called
for a fresh start -- and we made that start. I can't claim we
had a meeting of the minds on such fundamentals as ideology or

national purpose -- but we understand each other better. I gained a better perspective; I hope he did, too.

In short, it was a constructive meeting. So constructive, in fact, that Mr. Gorbachev this morning accepted our invitation to come and visit the United States this spring.

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Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

Incorporated
- Bud's comments
- NSC
- Fred Ikle's

(Noonan/BE)
November 19, 1985
11:30 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this
wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a
personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador
of good will for all of us. ~~So~~ ⁹⁹ thanks, partner.

~~This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but
after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially
appreciated.~~

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and
to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with
General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we
discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree
on -- ^{why} ~~whether~~ it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and
where we go from here.

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~~claim we had a meeting of the minds -- but I think we understand~~ ^{start}
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^{So constructive, in fact, that}
~~In short, it was a satisfying summit.~~ ^{constructive meeting.} ~~And we mean to meet~~
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I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker, and I ^{believe} ~~hope he was~~ quite a good listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that ~~our~~ ^{their ideology} and ~~difference~~ ^{purpose} ~~must remain peaceful.~~ ^{will not change} With all ~~that~~ ^{and} divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

~~_____~~
Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength, without boasting of it; ... (and) respect ... (the strength of) others, without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. We have shown under pressure that we will neither yield our principles nor sacrifice our interests. America can say today: We are

strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

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standing in the way! That's why I urged Mr. Gorbachev to enter into a quiet but serious dialogue on the subject.

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Such contacts really can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more from 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. That was a very American thing to say.

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(264)

As for Soviet ^{interference} activities in the ^{many regions of} ~~Third~~ World -- I am afraid that there is no change in their view. ^{They still contend,} Mr. Gorbachev is content to allow these dangerous wars to fester and continue. ^{for example,} He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, ~~quote, national liberation.~~ ^{seem to see} He did not agree that the Soviet ~~forces occupy~~ ^{are the oppressors of a brave people} invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of conquest. ^{Let us resolve freedom} Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. But we have also agreed to continue -- and, if possible, to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets ^{this and to work toward a political solution of it.} on ~~these regional issues~~ ^{of}.

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We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and

their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave Mr. Gorbachev a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

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of support
were and
are
greatly
appreciated

As you
know I have
just come
from Geneva
and talks
with General
Secretary
Gorbachev.
(Go to
1)

~~We built for 5 years
met with him
engaged the other
believe in the
context of~~

① In the past few days we spent a total of — hours in meetings with ^{the General Secretary} ~~Mr. Gorbachev~~ and the members of his official party. Approximately — of those hours were talks between ~~the~~ Mr. Gorbachev ~~and me~~ and myself, one on one.

There will be, I know, a great deal of commentary and opinion as to what the meetings produced and what they were like. There were over 3,000 ^{reporters} ~~journalists~~ in Geneva, so there will be at least 3,000 ^{opinions} ~~reports~~ on what happened. ← Maybe it's the old broadcaster in me but I thought I'd file a report ~~myself~~ too.
~~I did send a check~~

~~I find the nature of success is that~~
I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive ^{and} assertive, and ~~assured~~. He was quite a talker, and, I ^{believe} ~~hope~~ he was quite a good listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that ~~our~~ ^{their ideology} ~~differences~~ ^{and} must remain peaceful. With all ~~that~~ ^{purpose} divides us, we ^{will not change} cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We ^{and} must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor. ^{that this implies perpetual competition. Our task is to assure that this competition}

~~Five years ago~~, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. ^{And so, in a} ~~One aspect of very real sense, preparations for the summit~~ ~~the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength, without boasting of it; ... (and) respect ... (the strength of) others, without fearing it."~~ ^{started not months ago but five years ago when -- with the help of Congress -- our defense modernization plan began. America is once again}

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. We have shown under pressure that we will neither yield our principles nor sacrifice our interests. America can say today: We are

strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context in which it occurred. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. On this subject it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side ~~found it uncomfortable~~ or inconvenient.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in ~~the Third World~~ ^{many regions --} ~~about failures to live up to~~ ^{Soviet} human rights obligations -- and about the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought these questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to ~~control~~ ^{reduce} them. I explained our proposals for equitable, verifiable, and deep reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our Strategic Defense Initiative. I told Mr. Gorbachev that S.D.I. is a research program into defensive

systems that would threaten no one and that might eventually free both our countries ^{and other nations} from the threat of nuclear destruction. And I noted that the Soviets' own long-standing programs in this field suggest they, too, see the possibilities in strategic defense. If a breakthrough proves possible, I argued that we should cooperate in moving toward a safer world.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where insurgencies that speak for the people are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed ^{regimes} governments. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights, ^{and} I explained that we Americans ~~not only believe that freedom is essential to a meaningful life --~~ we believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: Those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors, ⁶ and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people tend to prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not ^{an issue that "interferes" with our efforts for peace} a matter of "interference in internal matters" ³ any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's

standing in the way! ~~That's why I urged Mr. Gorbachev to enter into a quiet but serious dialogue on the subject.~~

Finally, we discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. ~~Such contacts really can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more from 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. That was a very American thing to say.~~

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans should know the people of Russia -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union need to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, ^{as you know} ~~most~~ ~~significant,~~ we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms reductions, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying -- on strategic nuclear issues as well as (OTHER ARMS ISSUES).

As for Soviet ^{interference} activities in ^{many regions of} the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev ^{showed no sign of a willingness to halt these regional wars,} is content to allow these dangerous wars to fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not ^{seem to see} agree that the Soviet ^{forces occupying} invasion of Afghanistan ^{are the oppressors of a brave people} is not a matter of liberation but of conquest, ^{who deserve freedom.} Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can support the heroic efforts of those who fight for freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. But we have also agreed to continue -- and, if possible, to intensify -- our meetings with the Soviets ^{this and to work toward a political solution of it.} on ~~these regional issues~~ ^{of}.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, ~~there is progress~~ to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety have produced agreements that will serve the interests of both our countries. (CONSULATES HERE.)

And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (AS APPROPRIATE).

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued face-to-face involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the

things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates so far East and West... (is) as wide and deep ~~as the difference between individual liberty and regimentation -- as wide and deep~~ as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the state." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting ~~was worthwhile for~~ both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of ~~our goodwill and our good hopes~~ we cannot always control events. We must, however, do all in our power to be persuasive for peace. I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

~~We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and~~

~~their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave Mr. Gorbachev a lot to think about.~~

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

Tomorrow

Good chemistry
not vituperative
never acrimonious

Dr. Hany
Garbo seemed
more forthcoming
than his
predecessors

- Joint session
Brussels
- Joint signing
in which Hany
will be a written
statement.

(Noonan/BE)
November 19, 1985
11:30 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. And before I go on I want to say a personal thank you to Nancy. She was an outstanding ambassador of good will for all of us. So -- thanks, partner.

This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good to talk with Mr. Gorbachev -- good to sit down with him, exchange views and flesh out the things behind our thoughts. I can't claim we had a meeting of the minds -- but I think we understand each other better. I believe I gained some insight; I hope he did, too.

In short, it was a satisfying summit. And we mean to meet some more.

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker, and I hope he was quite a listener. Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know the facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We must be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength, without boasting of it; ...(and) respect ...(the strength of) others, without fearing it."

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And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

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their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave Mr. Gorbachev a lot to think about.

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Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUMDATE: 11/19/85 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 10:00 A.M. TOMORROW 11/20.SUBJECT: ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
(11/19/85 - 11:30 p.m. draft)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	☐	☐	OGLESBY	☐	☐
REGAN	☒	☐			
MILLER	☐	☐	RYAN	☐	☐
BUCHANAN	☒	☐	SPEAKES	☐	☐
CHAVEZ	☐	☐	SPRINKEL	☐	☐
CHEW	☐	☒	SS VAHN	☐	☐
DANIELS	☐	☐	THOMAS	☒	☐
FIELDING	☐	☐	TUTTLE	☐	☐
HENKEL	☒	☐	ELLIOTT	☐	☒
HICKS	☐	☐	NOONAN	☐	☒
KINGON	☐	☐		☐	☐
LACY	☐	☐		☐	☐
McFARLANE	☒	☐		☐	☐

REMARKS:

Attached is the latest draft of the President's speech to the Joint Session of Congress. Comments on this draft are due by 10:00 a.m. and should be directed to Ben Elliott in the Intercontinental Hotel, Room 1208, drop 304-6. Because of the unprecedented logistical arrangements necessary to produce this speech, all comments on any future draft must be given

RESPONSE: to Ben Elliott by 8:00 p.m. Wednesday evening.

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

(Noonan/BE)
November 18, 1985
4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS.
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. *And before I go on I want to say a personal*
Thank you to Nancy. She was
This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and where we go from here. *an outstanding ambassador of good will*
Still, for all of us. So -- thanks, Pat.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. *I can say of our meetings that there was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side, no advantage or concession gained or given; no major decision... planned or taken; no spectacular progress achieved or pretended."* *I think we understand each other better than we did. I believe I gained some insight; I hope he did too. vaguely familiar. They're the words John Kennedy used to describe his meetings with Khrushchev in Vienna. So not too much has changed.*

Probably have to drop -- remembered as a bad summit

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker, ^{and} I hope he was quite a listener, ~~too~~.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. ~~With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We have a responsibility to be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.~~

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; (and) respect (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. America can say today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

We have shown under pressure that we don't yield our principles or sacrifice our interests.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context ^{in which it occurred.} of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings ~~might~~ give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. ^{On this subject} ~~this is an area of such great importance that~~ it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles. X

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it ~~too~~ uncomfortable ~~to discuss it~~.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but ~~their compliance with past~~ agreements. We have had questions about ~~expansionism~~ by force in the Third World -- ^{about} ~~and~~ failures to live up to ~~human rights~~ obligations -- ^{about} ~~and~~ the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples. ^{deep}

I brought those ^e ~~concerns~~ ^{concerns} to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for ~~real~~ equitable, ~~and~~ verifiable ^{and deep} reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our ~~research on the~~ Strategic Defense Initiative, ^{and} ~~told~~ Mr. Gorbachev that ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~is~~ ^{research program} ~~a~~ ^{into} defensive systems ~~that~~ ^{might} ~~offer the hope of~~ eventually freeing both our countries from the ^{threat of nuclear} ~~death grip of the doctrine of mutually assured~~ destruction.

^{that would threaten no one and that} ~~I observed that the Soviets' own~~ ^{long-standing,} ~~vigorous programs in this field suggest~~ ^{See the proposal} ~~How too believe in strategic defense.~~