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(Noonan/BE)

November 18, 1985

4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. ~~I can say of our meetings that there was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side; no advantage or concession gained or given; no major decision...planned or taken; no spectacular progress achieved or pretended."~~ You may find those words vaguely familiar. ~~They're the words John Kennedy used to describe his meetings with Krushchev in Vienna. So not too much has changed.~~

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker. I hope he was quite a listener too.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We ~~must~~ ^{must} ~~have a responsibility to~~ be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; ^{''} (and) ^{''} respect ^{''} (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. ^{we have shown under pressure that} America can say ^{we will} today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ^{neither} ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity ^{yield} to advance freedom and peace is lost. ^{our} ^{principles} ^{nor} ^{sacrifice} ^{our} ^{interests}

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings ~~might~~ give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. ~~This is an area of such great importance that~~ *On this subject* it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it ~~too~~ uncomfortable or inconvenient, ~~to face.~~

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in the Third World -- ~~and~~ *about* failures to live up to human rights obligations -- ~~and~~ *about* the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought ~~those~~ *e* questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for ~~real~~ *real*, equitable, ~~and~~ *and* verifiable ~~and deep~~ reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our ~~research on the~~ Strategic Defense Initiative. *research program into* I told Mr. Gorbachev that S.D.I. is a ~~defensive systems~~ *defensive systems* ~~that would threaten no one and~~ *might* ~~weapon~~ that offers the hope of eventually freeing both our countries from the ~~death-grip of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.~~ *threat of nuclear* ~~I offered the possibility of eventual cooperation~~ *And I noted that the Soviets' own long standing programs* ~~in this field suggest they too see the possibilities~~ *in strategic defense.*

~~If a breakthrough proves possible, I argued that with the Soviets on S.D.I. if such a breakthrough does, indeed, we should cooperate in moving toward a safer world, prove possible.~~

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a ~~three-level~~ peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where ~~democratic~~ ^{that speak for the people} insurgencies are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed governments. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights, ~~a sensitive issue for the Soviets.~~ I explained that we Americans not only believe that freedom is essential to a meaningful life -- we believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors; and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people ^{tend to} prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not a matter of "interference in internal matters" any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way! ^{That's why I urged Mr. Gorbachov to enter into a quiet but serious dialogue on the subject.}

^{Finally,} We discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Such contacts really

can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more ~~in~~ ^{from} 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. That was a very American thing to say.

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans ~~have a right to~~ ^{should} know the people of Russia -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union ~~have a right to~~ ^{need} know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms ~~control~~ ^{reductions}, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying ^{on strategic nuclear issues as well as} OTHER ARMS ISSUES

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev is content to allow these dangerous wars to fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of

conquest. Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can ~~enlist our~~ ^{the heroic efforts of those who fight} support ~~for the true cause of~~ freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. ^{But} We have also agreed to ~~continue~~ ^{--and, if possible, to intensify--} our meetings with the Soviets on these regional issues.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, there is progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety ~~(ARE MAKING PROGRESS)~~ ^(HAVE PRODUCED AGREEMENTS) that will serve the interests of both our countries. ^(CONSULATES HERE)

And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (AS APPROPRIATE).

We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued ^{face to face} involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may ~~well~~ ⁵ help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates ^{so far} East and West... (is) as wide and deep as the

difference between individual liberty and ~~repression~~ ^{regimentation} Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We ~~can~~ ^{must,} however, do all in our power to be ~~persuasive~~ ^e for peace. And I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave ~~the other~~ ^{Mr. Gorbachev} side a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing

as wide and deep as the gulf that lies between the concept of man made in the image of his God and the concept of man as a mere instrument of the State."

truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID CHEW

FROM: WILLIAM MARTIN *WPM*
SUBJECT: Speech to Congress

The attached mark up reflects the NSC staff's preliminary comments on yesterday's draft of the President's speech to Congress on Thursday.

Bud McFarlane has not yet had a chance to go over the draft in detail.

We are turning copies over to the speechwriters.

Attached:
Speech Draft

cc: Ben Elliott
Peggy Noonan

(Noonan/BE)
November 18, 1985
4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

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wonderful homecoming. This great chamber has always greeted us
with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your
warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and
to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with
General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we
discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree
on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and
where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good
to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. I can say of our meetings that there
was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or
ultimatums by either side; no advantage or concession gained or
given; no major decision...planned or taken; no spectacular
progress achieved or pretended." You may find those words
vaguely familiar. They're the words John Kennedy used to
describe his meetings with ^hK^hruschev in Vienna. So not too much
has changed.

Probably have to drop — remembered
as a bad summit

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker. I hope he was quite a listener too.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. ~~With all that divides us, we~~ cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We have a responsibility to be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; (and) respect (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. America can say today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

We have shown under pressure that we don't yield our principles or sacrifice our interests.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings ~~might~~ give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. ^{On this ~~subject~~ subject} ~~This is an area of such great importance that~~ it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it ~~too~~ uncomfortable ~~an inconvenient to face~~.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in the Third World -- ^{about} ~~and~~ ^{about} failures to live up to human rights obligations -- and ^{the} obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples. ^{deep}

I brought those ^e ~~concerns~~ ^{concerns} to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for ~~real~~ equitable, ~~and~~ verifiable ^{and deep} reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our ~~research on the~~ Strategic Defense Initiative, ^{and} ~~I~~ told Mr. Gorbachev that ~~it~~ ^{it} ~~is~~ ^{research program into} a defensive systems ^{might} ~~weapon~~ that ~~offer the hope of~~ eventually freeing both our countries from the ^{threat of nuclear} ~~death grip of the doctrine of mutually assured destruction.~~ ~~It offered the possibility of eventual cooperation~~

^{that would threaten no one and that} I observed that the Soviets' own ^{long-standing,} vigorous programs in this field suggests ^{I believe in strategic defense.}

~~with the Soviets on S.D.I. if such a breakthrough~~
proved possible, ~~such a breakthrough~~

we believe political settlements to these conflicts can be reached, and I explained the constructive role America is prepared to play.

I argued that we should cooperate in moving toward a safer world.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a ~~three-sided~~ peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where ~~democratic~~ *that speak for the people* insurgencies are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed governments. *also* I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. ~~believe~~ *cannot* Mr. Gorbachev ~~no longer~~ doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights ~~a sensitive issue for the~~ ~~Soviets~~. I explained that we Americans not only believe that freedom is essential to a meaningful life -- we believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors; and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not a matter of "interference in internal matters" any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

Finally,
We discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on ~~my~~ *my* proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Such contacts really

That's why I urged Mr. Gorbachev to enter into a quiet but serious dialogue on the subject. I said our interest is not in rhetorical claims and

expressed a very American view when he

can enhance understanding. Franklin Roosevelt once said he learned more ^{from} 5 minutes with a man than from any number of briefing books and letters. ~~That was a very American thing to say.~~

I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people ^{need to} estranged. Americans ~~have a right to~~ know the people ^{the Soviet Union} of ~~the Soviet Union~~ -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union ^{need} ~~have a right~~ to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms ^{reductions} ~~control~~, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying ^{on strategic nuclear issues as well as} ~~on strategic nuclear issues~~ ^[ADD REFERENCE TO OTHER ARMS ISSUES]

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev is content to ^{let} ~~allow~~ these dangerous wars ~~to~~ fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of

difference between individual liberty and repression." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

I am, as you are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We ~~can~~^{must}, however, do all ~~in our power~~^{we can} to be ~~persuasive~~^{with proposals} ~~for~~ peace. ^{that} ^{strength} ^{the} ~~And~~ I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we ~~must~~ avoid illusions ~~on our side~~, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good.

We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave ~~the other side~~^{Mr. Gorbachev} a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing

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We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will affect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave the other side a lot to think about.

Where do we go from here? Well, our desire for improved relations is strong. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing

truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

(Noonan/BE)
November 18, 1985
4:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Thank you ladies and gentlemen.

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, Members of the Congress,
distinguished guests, my fellow Americans:

It's good to be home. Nancy and I thank you for this wonderful homecoming. This great chamber has always greeted us with kindness but after the bracing winds of Lake Geneva your warmth is especially appreciated.

I have just come from Geneva; I am here to report to you and to the American people on the summit and on my discussions with General Secretary Gorbachev. I want to speak of what we discussed -- what we agreed on -- what we were not able to agree on -- whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey -- and where we go from here.

To begin with, I am glad we made the journey. It was good to talk with Mr. Gorbachev. I can say of our meetings that there was "...no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side; no advantage or concession gained or given; no major decision...planned or taken; no spectacular progress achieved or pretended." You may find those words vaguely familiar. They're the words John Kennedy used to describe his meetings with Krushchev in Vienna. So not too much has changed.

I found Mr. Gorbachev to be able, aggressive, assertive, and assured. He was quite a talker. I hope he was quite a listener too.

Our subject matter was shaped by the facts of this century. For 40 years the actions of the leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom.

These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West or the world. You know these facts; there is no need to recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R. or the intentions of its leaders. But it is equally obvious that our differences must remain peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let confusion complicate things further. We have a responsibility to be clear with each other, and direct. We must pay each other the tribute of candor.

Five years ago, when I took the oath of office for the first time, we began dealing with the Soviets in a way that was, we believed, more realistic than in the recent past. One aspect of the new realism was to continue the tradition observed by Thomas Jefferson: to "...confide in our strength without boasting of it; (and) respect (the strength of) others without fearing it."

I believe that, with your support, the policies this Nation has developed and followed the past 5 years have given us new strength to thwart aggression and subversion. America can say today: We are strong -- and our strength has given us the ability to speak with confidence and see that no true opportunity to advance freedom and peace is lost.

That is the history behind the Geneva summit, that is the context of the drama. And may I add that we were especially eager that our meetings might give a push to important talks already under way on nuclear weapons. This is an area of such great importance that it would be foolish not to go the extra mile -- or in this case the extra 4,000 miles.

We discussed the great issues of our time. I made clear before the first meeting that no question would be swept aside, no issue buried, just because one side found it too uncomfortable or inconvenient to face.

In recent years, the American people have questioned not only Soviet nuclear policies but their compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in the Third World -- and failures to live up to human rights obligations -- and the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought those questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev.

We discussed nuclear arms and how to control them. I explained our proposals for real, equitable, and verifiable reductions. I outlined my conviction that our proposals would make not just for a world that feels safer but that really is safer. I explained our research on the Strategic Defense Initiative. I told Mr. Gorbachev that S.D.I. is a defensive weapon that offers the hope of eventually freeing both our countries from the death-grip of the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. I offered the possibility of eventual cooperation

with the Soviets on S.D.I. if such a breakthrough does, indeed, prove possible.

We discussed threats to the peace in several regions of the world. I explained my proposals for a three-level peace process to stop the wars in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola, and Cambodia, where democratic insurgencies are pitted against communist-controlled or communist-backed governments. I tried to be very clear about where our sympathies lie; I believe I succeeded. I believe Mr. Gorbachev no longer doubts, if he ever did, our commitment to freedom.

We discussed human rights -- a sensitive issue for the Soviets. I explained that we Americans not only believe that freedom is essential to a meaningful life -- we believe that human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace.

History teaches no clearer lesson than this: those countries which respect the rights of their own people tend, inevitably, to respect the rights of their neighbors; and those countries which abuse the human rights of their people prey on their neighbors and upset the peace of the world. Human rights is not an abstract moral issue -- it is a peace issue. And human rights is not a matter of "interference in internal matters" any more than a bridge support "interferes" with a bridge -- it's a part of the bridge, not just something that's standing in the way!

We discussed the barriers to communication between our societies, and I elaborated on our proposals for real people-to-people contacts on a wide scale. Such contacts really

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I told Mr. Gorbachev there is no justification for keeping our people estranged. Americans have a right to know the people of Russia -- their hopes and fears and the facts of their lives. And citizens of the Soviet Union have a right to know of America's deep desire for peace and our unwavering attachment to freedom.

And so, you see, our talks were wide ranging. Let me at this point tell you what we agreed upon and what we didn't.

We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters, however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you there's always room for movement, action, and progress when people are talking.

On arms control, the Soviets still have not met us half way. This is disappointing. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying.

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev is content to allow these dangerous wars to fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that it is the historic duty of the Soviet Union to encourage wars of, quote, national liberation. He did not agree that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is not a matter of liberation but of

conquest. Let me be frank: we cannot hope for an immediate or dramatic end to the Soviet occupation. But we can enlist our support for the true cause of freedom in Afghanistan -- and this we shall do. We have also agreed to continue our meetings with the Soviets on these regional issues.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, there is progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (FILL IN THE FACTS). We look forward to implementing agreements on (AS APPROPRIATE.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety (ARE MAKING PROGRESS)/(HAVE PRODUCED AGREEMENTS) that will serve the interests of both our countries.

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We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may well help move us forward over the years.

The fact is, every new day begins with possibilities; each new day is empty of history; it's up to us to fill it with the things that move us toward progress and peace. Hope, therefore, is a realistic attitude -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates East and West... (is) as wide and deep as the

difference between individual liberty and repression." Today, three decades later, that is still true.

And yet I truly believe that this meeting was worthwhile for both sides. A new realism spawned the summit; the summit itself was good; and now our byword must be: Steady as we go.

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Ben's A's
for staffing

(Noonan) K82
November 18, 1985
2:00 p.m. (Geneva)

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: JOINT SESSION OF THE CONGRESS
REPORT ON GENEVA
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And so I believe ~~this summit was worth the effort. I believe it was productive. I believe it made progress -- because talking is good, not bad, and Being clear about our beliefs and our intentions is good, not bad. And attempting to know each other and deal with each other not as separate nations but as men~~

~~representing separate peoples is good and not bad or helpful and not harmful.~~

Where do we go from here? Well, every American President who met in summit with the Soviets -- and that is eight of our last eight -- has, for the past 30 years, seen summitry as another step in the long walk to a place called peace.

Well, Our desire for improved relations is strong, -- and so we mean to continue on the journey. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

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Our desire for improved relations is strong -- and so we mean to continue on the journey. We're ready and eager for step-by-step progress. We know that peace is not just the absence of war. Peace is sustained harmony among nations. Such harmony is difficult to achieve in discordant times, but it's the thing truly worth pursuing. We don't want a phony peace or a frail peace; we did not go in pursuit of some kind of make-believe detente or era of new accords. We can't be satisfied with cosmetic improvements that won't stand the test of time. We want real peace, and we want it to last.

As I flew back this evening, I had many thoughts. In just a few days families across America will gather to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is 350 years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent.

And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

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(Noonan)
November 15, 1985
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I wish to speak of what exactly we discussed, what we agreed on, what we didn't agree on, whether it was worthwhile to make such a journey, and where we go from here.

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leaders of the Soviet Union have complicated our hopes for peace and for the growth of freedom. These past 40 years have not been an easy time for the West, or the world. You know the facts of this as well as I do, and I will not here recite the historical record. Suffice it to say that we in the United States cannot afford illusions about the nature of the U.S.S.R., or about our differences. But we must also make sure that those differences remain peaceful. With all that divides us, we cannot afford to let misunderstanding or confusions darken our relations. We have a responsibility to be clear and direct with each other.

I believe that the policies the United States has followed the past 5 years have contributed to a certain rethinking on the part of Soviet leaders, and a relative restraint. We have tried to create a basis for dealing with the Soviet Union more productively than in the past.

We have kept in mind the injunction of Thomas Jefferson -- "We confide in our strength, without boasting of it; we respect (the strength of) others, without fearing it." America can say today: We are strong -- and our renewed strength gives us the ability to talk with confidence and see to it that no true opportunity for progress is lost.

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You know as I do that in recent years the American people have questioned both Soviet nuclear policies and Soviet compliance with past agreements. We have had questions about expansionism by force in the Third World -- and failures to live up to human rights obligations -- and the obstacles to free and open communication between our peoples.

I brought those questions to the summit and I put them before Mr. Gorbachev. I brought, too, our proposals for dealing with these questions and, perhaps, resolving them to the benefit of mankind.

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We discussed human rights. I explained that the American people not only hold a deep belief that human freedom is God's true intent for man and cannot be interfered with by the state; that the state in fact preserves human rights but does not grant them.

But, in a practical sense, the American people know human rights are inseparable from the issue of peace. The American people understand that those countries which guarantee and protect human rights for their people can be trusted to respect the peace and integrity of their neighbors -- and those states which must answer to their people are less likely to make war for any but wholly legitimate reasons. And so more human rights in the world means more peace for the world. And our speaking of human rights was not a matter of interference any more than a bridge support interferes with a bridge -- it's part of the bridge, not something that's standing in the way.

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We remain far apart on many issues, as had to be expected. We reached agreement on certain matters however, and, most significant, we agreed to meet again. This is good: as a former union leader I can tell you, there's always room for movement, if not action, when two parties are at the table.

On arms control, the Soviets have still to meet us half way. It is a disappointment that they have not come half way yet. But the pace of our arms negotiations has picked up and we've made some small progress. What's more, we've agreed to keep trying for more progress.

As for Soviet activities in the Third World -- I am afraid Mr. Gorbachev appears far too content to allow these brutal and dangerous wars to fester and continue. He insists, as his predecessors have, that the Soviet Union sees it as an historic necessity to assist in wars of quote national liberation. He did not agree, for instance, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an expression not of liberation but of conquest, not of peace but armed violence, not of stability but expansionism. Let me be frank: we cannot hope for dramatic change in this area. But, again, we have agreed to continue our meetings on these regional issues.

On the issue of people-to-people contacts, we have some progress to report. Mr. Gorbachev and I were able to come to agreement on (blank blank blank). We look forward to implementing agreements on (as appropriate.)

In addition, our discussions on civil aviation and air safety (are making progress) (have produced agreements) that will serve the interests of both our countries.

And finally, as you know, Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed to meet again next year in (as appropriate). We know the limits as well as the promise of summit meetings. And we believe the continued involvement of the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union may well help move us forward over the years. After all, each new day and each new year begins new and fresh and bursts with possibilities; this is true. And so hope is a realistic attitude in this world -- and despair an uninteresting little vice.

And so: was our journey worthwhile?

Thirty years ago, when he too had just returned from a summit in Geneva, President Eisenhower said, "...the wide gulf that separates East and West...(is) as wide and deep as the difference between individual liberty and repression." Today, three decades later, that is still true. And yet I truly believe that this meeting was a good start for both sides. I am, as you are, and as the people of the world are, impatient for results. But in spite of our goodwill and our good hopes we cannot always control events. We can however do all in our power to be persuasive for peace. And I have made it clear to Mr. Gorbachev that there will be no Soviet gains from delay.

Just as we must avoid illusions on our side, so we must dispel them on the Soviet side. Meetings like ours help to dispel Soviet illusions about the resolve of the West. And that too is good, for I sometimes think we children of the nuclear age have as much to fear from miscalculations as from the coolest of calculations.

We face a new Soviet leadership. Its members face many big decisions at home and abroad. We cannot know whether this Soviet government will continue to resist their people's desire and their nation's need for change. We cannot know -- but because the choices they make will effect us, I thought it absolutely essential to tell the Soviet government personally where the United States stands. I think we gave the other side a lot to think about.

And so I believe this summit was worth the effort. I believe it was productive. I believe it made progress -- because talking is good, not bad. Being clear about our beliefs and our intentions is good, not bad. And attempting to know each other and deal with each other not as separate nations but as men representing separate peoples is good and not bad or helpful and not harmful.

Where do we go from here? Well, every American President who met in summit with the Soviets -- and that is eight of our last eight -- has, for the past 30 years, seen summitry as another step in the long walk to a place called peace.

Our desire for improved relations is strong; we won't just sit back and take no for an answer. We're ready and eager for step by step progress toward peace.

We also know that peace is not just the absence of war; peace is a process that goes on each day. And we want real peace and real freedom. We don't want a phony peace, an insubstantial peace, a frail peace that won't take the pressure over time, be it some kind of make believe detente or accord or eras of..... We just can't be satisfied with the cosmetic improvements sometimes offered by the other side. We can't be satisfied because they don't promise real peace but a peace that will not stand the test of time.

Both our commitment to peace, real peace -- and our commitment to freedom -- and our commitment to a new realism -- will function as our compass as we proceed.

As I flew back this evening I had many thoughts. In just a few days the families of America will gather together to celebrate Thanksgiving. It is ____ years since the first Thanksgiving, when Pilgrims and Indians held to each other on the edge of an unknown continent. And now we are moderns huddled on the edge of a future -- but, like our forefathers, really not so much afraid, and full of hope, and trusting in God, as ever.

Thank you for allowing me to talk to you this evening. And God bless you all.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

11/8/85

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT MCFARLANE (Coordinate with James Hooley
FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR* and M. B. Oglesby, Jr.)
SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Report to Joint Session of Congress on Geneva
Trip

DATE: November 21, 1985

TIME: Approximately 9:00 pm

DURATION: Approximately 30 minutes

LOCATION: U. S. Capitol

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: Yes

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

cc:	K. Barun	A. Kingon
	P. Buchanan	J. Kuhn
	D. Chew	C. McCain
	E. Crispen	B. Oglesby
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	T. Dawson	J. Rosebush
	B. Elliott	R. Scouten
	J. Erkenbeck	R. Shaddick
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