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Folder Title: Address to the Nation on Pre-Summit
Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev (Dolan)
(Hayes) 10/13/1986 File #1 (1)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. notes	re: speech (1p)	n.d.	P5
2. draft	1:30 a.m. p. 1 (1p, partial)	10/13/86	P5 CS 1/22/00

COLLECTION:	SPEECHWRITING, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF: Speech Drafts
	ggc

FILE FOLDER:	File 1: Add.to the Nation on Pre-Summit meeting with Gorbachev, 10/13/86 [1 of 6] Box 828 OA-12886
	4/21/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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CLOSE HOLD

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: ASAPSUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ICELAND MEETING

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: The attached will be forwarded to the President at 1:00 p.m. today. Please provide any comments directly to Tony Dolan as soon as possible, with an info copy to my office. Thanks.

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
11:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

So, let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Gorbachev and I made considerable headway on a number of arms reduction issues.

We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for

both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

But there remained toward the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. This we would not and could not do.

That was the deadlock at Hofdi House late Sunday afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a 10-year delay in American deployment of S.D.I., and a 10-year program for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth. We took that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-negotiable demand that the United States end at once all development of a strategic defense for the free world -- that we confine our program strictly to laboratory research. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all the agreements of the previous 12 hours of negotiation were null and void.

That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would

have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as President is the security of these United States and the safety of the American people. So, a one-day headline or a glowing cover story was never an issue. The only issue in my mind was my duty to my country and those I had sworn to protect. So again and again we kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting.

And again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- even if developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

In refusing our offer and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war. Nevertheless, we remain dedicated to continuing the peace process. We have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached

and not to tear down the nearly-complete structure we erected in Iceland because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

We made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the strategic defense initiative.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. I cannot

predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only repeat that, for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues under discussion on the table in Iceland, issues that are even more fundamental. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I can report to you that I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the summit cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This

area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in

Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might, your support has restored our military strength, and your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

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"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions.

And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

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(Dolan)
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~~[And that was easy to do, because I think you know I have a basic trust in the intelligence of the American people and I have always believed that if given the facts, they will always make the right decision. I mention this because I know there are some already demanding to know why I would not give up our Strategic Defense Initiative and charging the United States caused a breakdown in our talks in Iceland. I noticed the press, even before I left Iceland, was reporting we were to blame for not reaching an agreement.]~~

So, Let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Gorbachev and I made considerable headway on a number of arms reduction issues, ~~clearing away obstacles and going further than we ever have before. And, you know, as the hours went by we found ourselves agreeing on more and more elements -- and lower and lower levels of weapons.~~

~~You may recall, for instance, that a year ago in Geneva we agreed on the goal of 50 percent cuts in our strategic nuclear forces. Well, this weekend in Reykjavik we went further -- agreeing at last on more precise numbers for these cuts and on the precise period -- 5 years -- in which they would be made. Some people had been suggesting that the road to agreement was to try for smaller cuts over a longer period. But we held to our proposal of deep cuts as soon as possible -- and we made it stick. Under our plan, heavy missiles, the most dangerous weapons in the Soviet arsenal, would be cut in half. I was especially glad to see that Mr. Gorbachev agreed with me on this.~~

~~You may also recall that last year in Geneva he and I instructed our negotiators to seek an interim agreement on cutting intermediate nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. This has been one of the most controversial and divisive East-West issues in the life of my Administration; yet at Reykjavik we cut through the rhetoric of the past and were able to agree on drastic cuts in these forces, outlawing them altogether in Europe and allowing only 100 warheads on such~~

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Let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. ~~In several critical areas, we made progress.~~ We moved toward agreement on drastically reduced numbers of intermediate range nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. We approached agreement on sharply reduced strategic arsenals for both our countries. We made progress in the area of nuclear testing.

But there remained towards the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States. *This we would not do and could not do.*

~~This was a variation on an old Soviet position and it was unacceptable.~~ So to break the deadlock Sunday afternoon, we made to General Secretary Gorbachev the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history -- complete elimination by both sides of all ballistic missiles over a period of 10 years. And if the General Secretary would agree with us to rid the world of these most destructive of weapons, I said we would offer a 10 year delay in any deployment of S.D.I. If the Soviet Union would agree with the United States, I said, to eliminate all offensive missiles, the United States would not deploy the defensive system Mr. Gorbachev says he fears.

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That was the deadlock at Hovdi House late Sunday Afternoon. Then, the American delegation recessed and caucused, and returned to the table with the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in American history.

We offered the Soviets a ten-year delay in American deployment of SDI, and a ten ~~year~~ year program of the complete elimination of all Ballistic missiles---Soviet and American---from the face of the earth. WE told that proposal downstairs to Mr. Gorbachev, and Mr. Gorbachev rejected it.

Instead, he made a non-^{neg}otiable demand that the United States end at once all development of our stratic defense for the American ^{free world} ~~xxx~~ people. Unless we signed such a commitment, he said, all ~~xxx~~ our ⁱⁿ ~~previous~~ ^{of the previous Treaty Agreements} agreements were null and void.

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I had sworn to protect. So again and again those I kept offering and the Soviets kept accepting. And

Mr. Gorbachev said he could accept this offer only on one condition: that we halt all our work on strategic defense for the United States -- except laboratory research. ~~That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.~~

Insert B

So again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage, while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- *even if* once developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

In refusing our offer, and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war resulting from attack by ballistic nuclear missiles.

Nevertheless, we remain dedicated to continuing the peace process. We have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached

My fellow Americans, my most solemn duty as president of these United States and the safety of the American people is the security of these United States. So, a one-day headline or a low-key over story was not the issue. The only issue was my duty to my country and

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and not to tear down ~~(throw away)~~ ~~that which we have~~ built
(~~accomplished in so many areas~~) because of our differences over
the single issue of S.D.I.

So you can see that for all the progress we made, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union remain deep and abiding, that, obviously, there are no diplomatic quick-fixes to such profound differences. These talks brought home again the truth of the statement that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.

But I do believe we made progress in Iceland and will continue to make progress if we continue to pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy: we made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And finally, we began work on ~~strategic~~ ~~rebuilding~~ ~~our~~ ~~military~~ ~~structure~~, ~~reconstructing~~ ~~our~~ ~~strategic~~ ~~defense~~ ~~initiative~~.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working towards them, we pursued another of our

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what have the Soviets to negotiate seriously?
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major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this, in Iceland was the progress on the ~~issue of arms control~~ ^{Control. To the} I cannot predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only repeat that, for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues under discussion on the table in Iceland, issues that are even more fundamental. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecutions he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human

rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I can report to you that I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the ~~good feeling at~~ summits cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in

these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

[We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement.] And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.

within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets towards even more breakthroughs.

I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet appreciation for what British author, Paul Johnson calls the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent.

The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of history. And because of you, the American people, those enormous reserves are now making their presence and power felt throughout the world.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with

the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey towards a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

1. The speech could be improved by giving some of the history of these negotiations - pointing out that the Soviets walked out of talks after the Pershing missiles were installed in Europe and only came back to the table because of fear of S.D.I.

2. The speech does not give any cogent answer to the question: "if SDI is defensive, and if you and Gorbachev agreed to eliminate all nuclear missiles over 10 years, why do you need SDI?"

3. The speech does not address the Soviets' fears that SDI could become an offensive system, and that space testing would enable the US to threaten them with SDI after they have given up their missiles. Nor does it address our concern that the Soviets may not abide by the agreement and we have nothing -- without SDI -- to give them an incentive to comply.

4. The section on other issues -- human rights, etc. -- is too long. The American people want to hear about the role of SDI in the arms talks -- and how close we were to agreement -- the rest is boring.

5. The speech should be much more upbeat, emphasizing the likelihood of future negotiations with this as a basis. In all negotiations, one party frequently leaves the table, but if there is a real interest in dealing, they'll begin again.

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
1:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aim of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

[And that was easy to do, because I think you know I have a basic trust in the intelligence of the American people and I have always believed that, if given the facts, they will always make the right decision. I mention this because I know there are some already demanding to know why I would not give up our Strategic Defense Initiative and charging the United States caused a breakdown in our talks in Iceland. I noticed the press, even before I left Iceland, was reporting we were to blame for not reaching an agreement.]

Let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Gorbachev and I made considerable headway on a number of arms reduction issues, clearing away obstacles and going further than we ever have before. And, you know, as the hours went by we found ourselves agreeing on more and more elements -- and lower and lower levels of weapons.

You may recall, for instance, that a year ago in Geneva we agreed on the goal of 50 percent cuts in our strategic nuclear forces. Well, this weekend in Reykjavik we went further -- agreeing at last on more precise numbers for these cuts and on the precise period -- 5 years -- in which they would be made. Some people had been suggesting that the road to agreement was to try for smaller cuts over a longer period. But we held to our proposal of deep cuts as soon as possible -- and we made it stick. Under our plan, heavy missiles, the most dangerous weapons in the Soviet arsenal, would be cut in half. I was especially glad to see that Mr. Gorbachev agreed with me on this.

You may also recall that last year in Geneva he and I instructed our negotiators to seek an interim agreement on cutting intermediate nuclear missiles in both Europe and Asia. This has been one of the most controversial and divisive East-West issues in the life of my Administration; yet at Reykjavik we cut through the rhetoric of the past and were able to agree on drastic cuts in these forces, outlawing them altogether in Europe and allowing only 100 warheads on such

missiles worldwide. As a result, Soviet SS-20 missiles would be reduced from approximately 400 to only 33.

Finally, you probably know that Mr. Gorbachev has made nuclear testing one of his most frequent -- and I have sometimes thought, propagandistic -- themes. Yet at Reykjavik we were on the verge of an agreement to begin a completely new set of negotiations on nuclear tests.

We didn't have every detail settled, but all these were real achievements.

But there remained towards the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States.

This was a variation on an old Soviet position, and it was unacceptable. So, to break the deadlock Sunday afternoon, we made to General Secretary Gorbachev the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history -- complete elimination by both sides of all ballistic missiles over a period of 10 years. And if the General Secretary would agree with us to rid the world of these most destructive of weapons, I said we would offer a 10-year delay in any deployment of S.D.I. If the Soviet Union would agree with the United States, I said, to eliminate all offensive missiles, the United States would not deploy the defensive system Mr. Gorbachev says he fears.

Mr. Gorbachev said he could accept this offer only on one condition: that we halt all our work on strategic defense for the United States -- except laboratory research. That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

So again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage, while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- once developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

In refusing our offer, and making his non-negotiable demand on the United States, Mr. Gorbachev refused an historic opportunity to rid the world of the threat of nuclear war resulting from attack by ballistic nuclear missiles. Nevertheless, we remain dedicated to continuing the peace process. We have come too far to turn back now. So tonight I call on the Soviet Union to build on the agreements we reached

and not to tear down (throw away) that which we have built (accomplished in so many areas) because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

So you can see that, for all the progress we made, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union remain deep and abiding,^e that, obviously, there are no diplomatic quick-fixes to such profound differences. These talks brought home again the truth of the statement that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.

But I do believe we made progress in Iceland and will continue to make progress if we continue to pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy: we made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working towards them, we pursued another of our

major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. I cannot predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only repeat that, for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but ✓ toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues under discussion on the table in Iceland, issues that are even more fundamental. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the ✓ persecutions he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human

rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I can report to you that I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the good feeling at summits cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in

these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might, your support has restored our military strength, and your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. And today, freedom is on the march because, at its critical hour, the American people stood guard as it gathered its forces and regained its strength.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it

within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets towards even more breakthroughs.

I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet appreciation for what British author, Paul Johnson calls the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent. ✓

The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of history. And because of you, the American people, those enormous reserves are now making their presence and power felt throughout the world.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with

the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; ^{and} it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey towards a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:00 a.m. TODAY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ICELAND MEETING

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	DOLAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide your comments directly to Tony Dolan by 11:00 this morning, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
1:30 a.m.

What are we for?

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aim of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

[And that was easy to do, because I think you know I have a basic trust in the intelligence of the American people and I have always believed that if given the facts, they will always make the right decision. I mention this because I know there are some already demanding to know why I would not give up our Strategic Defense Initiative and charging the United States caused a breakdown in our talks in Iceland. I noticed the press, even before I left Iceland, was reporting we were to blame for not reaching an agreement.]

This is unclear: what have these general ideas to do with what happened in Iceland?

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We didn't have every detail settled, but all these were real achievements.

But there remained towards the end of our talks one area of disagreement. While both sides seek reduction in the number of nuclear missiles and warheads threatening the world, the Soviets insisted that we sign an agreement that would deny to me -- and to future Presidents for 10 years -- the right to develop, test, and deploy a defense against nuclear missiles for the people of the United States.

This was a variation on an old Soviet position, and it was unacceptable. So, to break the deadlock Sunday afternoon, we made to General Secretary Gorbachev the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history -- complete elimination by both sides of all ballistic missiles over a period of 10 years. And if the General Secretary would agree with us to rid the world of these most destructive of weapons, I said we would offer a 10-year delay in any deployment of S.D.I. If the Soviet Union would agree with the United States, I said, to eliminate all offensive missiles, the United States would not deploy the defensive system Mr. Gorbachev says he fears.

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So again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage, while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

Why are the Soviets afraid of S.D.I.? Not a single Soviet citizen has anything to fear from an American S.D.I. That defensive system -- once developed and deployed -- would harm not people, but only ballistic missiles, after they had been fired. It threatens nothing and would harm no one.

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and not to tear down (throw away) that which we have built (accomplished in so many areas) because of our differences over the single issue of S.D.I.

So you can see that for all the progress we made, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union remain deep and abiding, that, obviously, there are no diplomatic quick-fixes to such profound differences. These talks brought home again the truth of the statement that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other.

But I do believe we made progress in Iceland and will continue to make progress if we continue to pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. Let me remind you that, from the earliest days of our Administration, this has been our policy: we made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working towards them, we pursued another of our

major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

This policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. I cannot predict the nature or dates of future agreements. I can only repeat that, for the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just toward arms control, but arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues under discussion on the table in Iceland, issues that are even more fundamental. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the agenda, to go to the real source of the conflict and competition between the Soviets and the West.

One such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights...?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion of human rights, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecutions he suffered for leading an effort simply to get the Soviet government to live up to the solemn commitment on human

rights it had signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like that of far too many other individuals in all walks of life inside the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

In Iceland, human rights was a critical part of our agenda. I can report to you that I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that the good feeling at summits cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in

these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights, and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our 4-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

Now, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We still believe that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. And we must bear in mind the nature of the Soviet regime itself will put many obstacles in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid and make it clear that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions. And we must persevere.

And on this point, I know you are also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it is different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past 5-1/2 years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might, your support has restored our military strength, and your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. And today, freedom is on the march because, at its critical hour, the American people stood guard as it gathered its forces and regained its strength.

So, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we are dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it

within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets towards even more breakthroughs.

I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet appreciation for what British author, Paul Johnson calls the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent.

The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of history. And because of you, the American people, those enormous reserves are now making their presence and power felt throughout the world.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation at Keflavik [KEF-la-VICK] -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a Nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted by destiny with

the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey towards a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

CLOSE HOLD

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 10/13/86 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11:00 a.m. TODAY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: ICELAND MEETING

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	MILLER - ADMIN.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
REGAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	POINDEXTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BARBOUR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BUCHANAN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CHEW	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	THOMAS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DANIELS	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HENKEL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	WALLISON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<u>DOLAN</u>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
KINGON	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MASENG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide your comments directly to Tony Dolan by 11:00 this morning, with an info copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

CLOSE HOLD

David L. Chew
Staff Secretary
Ext. 2702

CLOSE HOLD

(Dolan)
October 13, 1986
1:30 a.m.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me tell you that from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aim of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went the extra mile to Iceland.

[And that was easy to do, because I think you know I have a basic trust in the intelligence of the American people and I have always believed that if given the facts, they will always make the right decision. I mention this because I know there are some already demanding to know why I would not give up our Strategic Defense Initiative and charging the United States caused a breakdown in our talks in Iceland. I noticed the press, even before I left Iceland, was reporting we were to blame for not reaching an agreement.]

Let me assure you, the talks with General Secretary Gorbachev -- lasting more than 10 hours -- were hard and tough but extremely useful. During long discussions on both Saturday and Sunday, Mr. Gorbachev and I made considerable headway on a number of arms reduction issues, clearing away obstacles and going further than we ever have before. And, you know, as the hours went by we found ourselves agreeing on more and more elements -- and lower and lower levels of weapons.

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missiles worldwide. As a result, Soviet SS-20 missiles would be reduced from approximately 400 to only 33.

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Mr. Gorbachev said he could accept this offer only on one condition: that we halt all our work on strategic defense for the United States -- except laboratory research. That would have killed America's defensive program in its cradle. That would have forfeited our children's opportunity to live in a world free of the fear of nuclear attack. That would have sacrificed the future security interest of the American people, in exchange for a Soviet promise. And this we could not do.

So again and again, we hit the same obstacle. The Soviets told us their proposals were a single package. They said there would be no deals unless we also agreed to their terms on the Strategic Defense Initiative. They held other issues hostage, while trying to kill the possibility of research progress on strategic defense.

Why did Mr. Gorbachev reject our offer?

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