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Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev (Dolan)
(Hayes) 10/13/1986 File #1 (5)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 1 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
2. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 2 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
3. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 3 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
4. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 4 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
5. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 5 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
6. draft	2:30 p.m. p. 10 (1p, partial)	10/11/86	P5
7. draft	same as item #6.	10/11/86	P5
8. list	Themes (non-arms control) (4pp) <i>(2-p typed final + 2-p handwritten draft)</i>	n.d.	P5 CG 12/22/00
COLLECTION: SPEECHWRITING, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF: Speech Drafts			ggc
FILE FOLDER: File 1: Add. to the Nation on Pre-Summit meeting with Gorbachev, 10/23/86 [5 of 6] <i>Box 328</i>			4/20/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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(DOLAN)

October 10, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

GOOD EVENING.

As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland.

It's good to be home. And tonight I would like to take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings.

Now because faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are founding principles of our republic, I've have -- right from the start regarded you, the american people, as a full participant in the discussions between Mr. Gorbachev and myself. I know it was a suprise to the General Secretary to learn at this late date there was a third party in the room, but believe me, without your support, these talks could not be held, and without your continued participation, the goals of world peace and freedom can never ultimately be attained.

Which is way I am reporting to you tonight, as I did when I returned from last year's Summit Conference in Geneva. Let me begin by pointing out, however, that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike Geneva in one way; they were not a full blown summit conference; they were preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit conference.

(DOLAN)

October 10, 1986

2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

NO CAPS

GOOD EVENING

As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland.

It's good to be home. And tonight I ~~would like to~~ *want to* take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings.

Now because faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are founding principles of our republic, *I want*
~~I have~~ *you know that* ~~very of my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev~~ *I have*
people, as a full participant in the ~~discussions between Mr. Gorbachev and myself.~~ *or may* I know it was a surprise ~~to~~ the General Secretary to learn ~~at this late date~~ there was a third party in the room, but, believe me, without your support, these talks could not be held, and without your continued participation, the ~~goals~~ *ultimate* of world peace and freedom, can never ~~ultimately~~ be attained. *of*

These discussions, the talks,
Which is way I am reporting to you tonight, as I did when I returned from last year's Summit Conference in Geneva. Let me begin by pointing out, however, that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike Geneva in one way; they were not a full blown summit conference; they were preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit conference.

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ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

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As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland.

It's good to be home. And, tonight, I would like to take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings.

Now because faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are founding principles of our republic,

I've ~~always~~ ^{known} believed ~~it~~ ^{that} right from ~~the start~~ ^{the start} ~~discussions with~~ ^{discussions with}

~~Mr. Gorbachev that there has been an extremely important~~ ^{as}

~~participant in our meetings. I know it may surprise the General~~ ^{as}

~~Secretary to learn that there was a third party in the room but I~~ ^{as}

~~regard that~~ ^{as} have always regarded you, the American people, ~~as the unseen but~~ ^{as a full}

~~participant in our discussions. I know it was~~ ^{as} critically important factor in all our discussions. Without your

~~support, these talks could not be held, and without your~~ ^{as}

~~continued participation, the goals of world peace and freedom can~~ ^{as}

~~never ultimately be attained.~~ ^{as}

Without your support, these talks could never have been

held, and without your guidance, their goals of world peace and

freedom, can never be attained.

Which is way I am reporting to you tonight, ^{as} ~~as~~ I did when I

returned from last year's Summit Conference in Geneva, ^{as} ~~let me~~ ^{let me} let me

the discussion between Mr. Gorbachev and myself.

surprise the American people to see that I was a third party in the room, but let me believe me!

~~begin by pointing out that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland were not a full blown summit conference; they were intended to be preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit conference.~~

~~The decision to hold another summit conference was made at that meeting last year when~~ *you see when Mr. Gorbachev and I met*
~~discussions Mr. Gorbachev I were walking together I told him I~~ *last year in Geneva*
~~would like him to visit the United States; so I invited him, and he said: "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union and he invited me; and I said "I accept." And so one agenda item -- the scheduling of future~~ *he quickly settled one question the experts thought would be a difficult one, was that simply.*
~~this, locations, but we was decided, settled~~
~~summits -- that the experts thought would be a difficult one, was~~
~~that simply.~~
~~delt with as simply as taht. The next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union.~~

So face to face discussions help. I just wish all the items on the summit agenda were as easily handled. The differences between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies are deep and abiding. Which is simply to repeat a formula I have repeated many times: that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because the mistrust each other. And during our discussions together I have been candid with Mr. Gorbachev about our view of the source of that mistrust: the Soviet regime's record of attempting to impose its rule and ideology on the world. And that is why -- as important as arms control is -- a true agenda for peace means justice, freedom and recognition of human rights, must deal with ever deeper issues. And that is why we have insisted from the very start that the issues that go to the heart of our differences with the Soviet

he quickly settled one question the experts thought would be a difficult one, was that simply.

to meet again in future summitt conferences and we agreed that the

At Geneva Mr. Gorbachev and I decided on the sites for future summitt conferences --
the first would be in the United States and the seond would be in the Soviet Union.

~~But we put off the deicson about an exact date until later.~~

~~This was one of the critical points dicisions that had to be made~~
~~I iceland~~

The critical matter of the exact date of the ~~fooling summit conference~~ was not havoer
decided upon ~~decide later.~~

~~This was one of the principal issues under discussion in~~
I am pleased to tell you that this matter has now been agreed to; Mr. ~~Had.~~

Grobacheve will be visiting us herein the United staes ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~. I look foward²
to welcoimg him (Insert)

But the
critical matter
of the
exact
date
of the
summits
was left
unresolved.

(DOLAN)

October 10, 1986

2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good Evening.

As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland.

I trust
It's good to be home. And tonight I thought I would take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings.

Plan I've always believed from the very start of our
~~You see, since the start of my race to face discussions a year ago with Mr. Gorbachev, I've always believed there's been another~~

face to face discussions
~~equal participant in all of our meetings. I know it may surprise~~

our people
~~Mr. Gorbachev to know there was a third party in the room but --~~

I know
because the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the

the
governed are the founding principles of our republic -- I have

factor
always regarded you, the American people, as equal and critically

in the
~~important participants in the summit process.~~

without
Without your support, these talks could never have been

ultimately
held, and without your guidance, their goals of world peace and freedom, can never be attained.

low first
Which is way I am reporting to you tonight, as I did when I returned from last year's Summit Conference in Geneva. Let me

never
begin by pointing out that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland were not a full blown summit conference; they were

in the Geneva in one way: they
~~intended to be~~ preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit conference.

It's good to be home. And tonight ~~I would take~~
~~a few~~ ^{I like to} I thought I would take a few moments to explain to you what took place in
these meetings. Now because ~~the~~ faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the
consent of the governed are founding principles of our republic, I've
always believed --right ~~from the start of the war~~ ^{my first talks} ~~the discussion~~ ^{with} between Mr. Grbachev and
~~myself~~ --that there's been another equally important participant in our meetings.
I know it may surprise ^X the general secretary to learn that th there was a third party
in the room but I have always ^{regarded} you, the American people, as the ^{but critically important} unseen factor
in ^{all} our discussions. ^V Without your support, th these talks could not be held,
and without your continued participation, the goals of world peace and freedom
can never ultimately be attained.

(DOLAN)

October 10, 1986

2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland.

It's good to be home. And tonight I thought I would take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings. *You see,*

Since the start of my face to face discussions a year ago with

Mr. Gorbachev, *I've always believed there's been another special* ~~there has been another equal participant in all~~ *special*

all of you ~~the meetings between the two of us.~~ *together.* I know it may surprise *us*

~~Mr. Gorbachev to know there was a third party in the room but~~ *partially*

because the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the

government *A* ~~are the founding principles of our republic~~ *and critically* I have *impaired*

always regarded you, the American people, *as not the equal participants in* ~~as critical to the~~

the summit process. *S*

Without your support, these talks could never have been

held, and without your *participatory and* ~~continued guidance and participation,~~ the *is*

goals *no of* ~~America seeks to achieve~~ *the goals to* world peace and world freedom, can

never not be attained ~~never be achieved.~~

Which is way I am reporting to you tonight. *as I did when I returned from last* ~~Let me begin by~~ *year*

pointing out that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland

were not a full blown summit conference; they were intended to be

preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit

conference. *last* ~~Mr. Gorbachev and I decided on some time ago.~~

you in Geneva.

summit when it happens

The decision to hold a summit conference was made at meeting last year.

You see, when Mr. Gorbachev and I met at the summit conference in Geneva, one question that was regarded as difficult and best left to later in our discussions, was that of scheduling initial discussions Mr. Gorbachev and future summit discussions. But after one of our meetings -- when Mr. Gorbachev and I were walking along together, I told him how much I would like him to visit the United States, I invited him, and he said, "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union and he invited me; and I said "I accept." And so, it was as simple as scheduling of future summit -- that the experts said was too

that -- the next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union.

So, I simply said that. The next summit would be in the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union.

So face to face discussions help but I wish all the items on the summit agenda were as easily handled. The differences between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies are deep and abiding. Which is simply to repeat a formula I have repeated many times: that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because the mistrust each other. And during our discussions together I have been candid with Mr. Gorbachev about our view of the source of that mistrust: the Soviet regime's record of attempting to impose its rule and ideology on the world. And that is why -- as important as arms control is -- a true agenda for peace, means a true peace, peace with justice, freedom and recognition of human rights, must deal with ever deeper issues. And that is why we have insisted from the very start that the issues that go to the heart of our differences with the Soviet Union such as human rights violations and Soviet military intervention -- either directly

thought would be difficult

the United States and the one after that in the Soviet Union.

Page 3

or by proxy -- must be addressed in our negotiation especially
our summit conference.

(DOLAN)

October 11, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to explain what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me remind you that from the ~~very~~ start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. This faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went ¹¹⁰ ~~an~~ extra mile to Iceland.

These most recent meetings with the Soviet leaders were intended as preparatory meetings, a planning session for a full fledged summit conference to be held when Mr. Gorbachev visits the United States. And tonight I am pleased to report to you that as Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed yesterday in Reykjavik the Soviet leader will be visiting America in the month of

next year ~~for a full summit conference. It is my hope, we will~~ ^{that we can} ~~build on what we have already achieved. We began in Geneva~~

~~and we have begun together in Geneva and Iceland.~~

It is my hope that both sides can continue at that time the work we have begun together in Geneva and Iceland.

I just wish the other items on our agenda in Iceland could have been as easily resolved. Don't mistake me; the Iceland talks were useful and quite productive -- more so than I believe either party originally anticipated. But, they were also sobering -- they brought home again the truth of the statement that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other. The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding and, as I have candidly told Mr. Gorbachev himself, our view of the source of that mistrust remains the same: the Soviet Union's record of attempting to impose its ideology and rule on the world.

But because there are no diplomatic quick-fixes to such profound differences, we adopted in Iceland the prudent, realistic and above all deliberate approach with the Soviets that we have pursued from the earliest days of our administration.

~~You may remember that early in our first term instead of rushing into negotiations, we made it clear that we had no illusions~~
^{hwa}
about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we assisted freedom fighters who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola Cambodia and elsewhere.

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working towards them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

And it is all of this that makes this current summit process so very different from that of previous decades. ~~We have been deliberate; we have been realistic. We have been candid with the Soviets; we have been candid about the Soviets.~~

~~But there has been another difference: to my mind, the crucial difference. You see, my fellow Americans, America is no longer under siege -- no longer are the Soviets surprising America at every turn; no longer are they making us react hastily to their threats or respond weakly to their adventures or stand humiliated by every nickel-and-dime dictator under their influence.~~

~~America is no longer under siege, To the contrary,~~ today America's economic and military power is resurgent, the Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized, and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market.

Yes, the atmosphere surrounding the current summit process is different, different because ~~the world is different; different because of the hard work and the sacrifice of the American people over the past five and one half years.~~ *the world is different; different because of the hard work and the sacrifice of the American people over the past five and one half years.* Your energy has restored and expanded our economy, your self-sacrifice has restored our military strength; and your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis ~~(like Lebanon and Grenada)~~ *(like Lebanon and Grenada)* have given pause to our adversaries,

heartened our friends and inspired the world. Freedom is on the march today; ~~and it is on the march because -- in its critical hour -- the American people stood guard while it gathered its forces and regained its strength.~~ *because because -- at its critical hour -- the American people stood guard while it gathered its forces and regained its strength.*

~~hour, at the point of maximum danger -- it regained its strength~~
~~and gathered its forces while you, the American people, stood~~
~~steadfast in its defense.~~

That is why I can report to you tonight that the fruit of
 your work was evident in Iceland. Indeed, if there is one
 impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is
 that we are seeing now those first tentative signs of harvest, a
 harvest of peace and freedom planted by the strength and resolve
 of the American people and their allies, a harvest that can be
 ours if, as a people, we persevere in the spirit that has brought
 us so far.

One sign of this in Iceland was the discussion of the key
 issue of arms control. I think you know that when I came to
 office I committed America to a new realism about arms
 negotiations. Arms agreements would no longer be allowed to
 justify the arms race, to intensify it, or to guarantee Soviet
 superiority. That is why in the early 1980s the United States
 sought to restore the strategic balance, but even as we took these
 steps, I put forth a series of new proposals calling not just for
 arms control but for arms reduction. We called for a 50%
 reduction in strategic offensive missiles and for the total
 elimination of the intermediate range nuclear forces that are so
 threatening to our allies in Europe and Asia. And in related
 fields such as nuclear testing and chemical and biological
 weapons we proposed equally important reductions.

And finally, we launched a research program and
 revolutionary new technologies that could destroy ballistic
 missiles in flight -- looking to a day when the huge arsenals of

found not in the simple fact of these negotiations but

in the movement toward world peace

what they mean for the liberty and dignity mankind

these missiles would be obsolete, and defense strategies would rely on protection of our peoples rather than on perpetuating their vulnerability. And we offered to the Soviet Union an agreement by which they could join with us in cooperative transition to this new strategic environment of mutual security.

All this was on the table in Iceland. And, I am pleased to report to you that in several of these areas, the Soviets made serious responses. (INSERT)

I cannot predict the nature or dates of future agreements. What I can say is that for the first time in a long time, Soviet-American negotiations in these areas are moving, and moving in the right direction: not just arms control but arms reduction.

For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet-American relations; that, as I said, the real cause of the arms competition was political tensions growing out of our deeper differences. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking about more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- to expand the negotiating agenda, to go to the real source of ~~political tension~~ ^{the differences} between the Soviets and ourselves.

One such issue is human rights. As ~~John~~ ^{President} Kennedy once said, "Is not peace, in the final analysis, a matter of human rights . . .?" Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a heroic champion human rights in the Soviet Union, Yuri Orlov, described to me the persecution he suffered for leading an effort to get the Soviet government to live up to the human rights agreements it signed at

Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like those of far too many other individuals of all walks of life in the Soviet Union -- including those who wish to emigrate.

And that is why I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also make it plain that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union -- like Mr. Orlov -- cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, ^{human rights and} than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to ^{judging} Soviet intentions, ~~we are all from Missouri~~, we are all from Missouri; you have got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. I told Mr. Gorbachev that ^{there} ~~no~~ ^{at the summit cannot} ~~summit~~ good feeling ~~can~~ make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the people of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need. And (INSERT -- Afghanistan)

So once again, I think these were useful discussions.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, human rights and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral or people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people ~~that~~ ^{programs} that could lead to exchanges between not just a few ~~selected~~ elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We set a date for a full-fledged summit; we reestablished our four point agenda; we discovered some new grounds of agreement; we probed again some areas of disagreement.

Now my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev here in the United States will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings. Indeed, we must bear in mind that because of the nature of the Soviet regime itself, many obstacles will be put in our path as we go along. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid ^{and} ~~we must~~ make it clear, as we did in the recent Daniloff case, that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions.

I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for world peace and freedom. I know such optimism in a

century that has seen so much war and suffering brought on by totalitarian rule seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet realization that totalitarian or militarist societies enjoy only initial advantages over free nations, advantages that, as British author Paul Johnson points out, are far outweighed by the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent. ~~The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of all history, Mr. Johnson writes. "Grant it a breathing space and it will quickly develop a strategy of survival and form the instruments of victory."~~

~~And because of you, the American people, have given the cause of freedom that breathing space, and throughout the world those enormous reserves of free societies are making their presence and power felt.~~ *have now throughout the world.*

I saw evidence of this when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation there -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval ports than to our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at its best: committed to defend not only our own freedom but also the freedom of our allies and all the world; committed to maintaining the strength and resolve that makes possible productive negotiations with adversaries.

But I must tell you that as I looked out on their faces I also thought of their families back home and ~~the~~ thousands of

Flying back last night from Iceland you can well imagine I was grateful again for the gift of a land like this. But I must tell you I also thought about other faces I have seen in my journeys -- the faces of the people ^{seen in my journeys to} ~~of Iceland and of so many~~ other nations around the world -- faces filled with hope, hope that the leaders of the world might someday work together and bring to every people and every land the blessings of peace and freedom.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted in our time with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of peace and freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me in the past, and again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue ~~on~~ our journey toward peace *and*

help and your prayers as we continue on our journey toward peace and
the ~~the~~ of freedom a world ~~to~~ ~~is~~ where human
rights are respected and freedom is cherished.

(DOLAN)
October 10, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. It's good to be home. And tonight I want to take a few moments to explain to you what took place in these meetings.

Now ^{And it's} ~~because~~ faith in the intuitive wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are founding principles of our republic. ^I I want you to know that from the very start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have regarded you, the American people, as a full participant in our discussions. I know it may be a surprise ^{at this point} to the General Secretary to learn there was a third party in the room, but, believe me, without your support, these talks could not be held, and without your continued participation, the ultimate goals of these discussions ~~of~~ world peace and freedom can never be attained.

→ ^{this} ~~which is~~ way I am reporting to you tonight, as I did when I returned from last year's Summit Conference in Geneva. ^H Let me begin by pointing out, ~~however~~, that the talks I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike Geneva in one way; they were not a full blown summit conference; they were preparatory meetings, a planning session, for a future summit conference.

(and I)
You see, when Mr. Gorbachev met in Geneva we quickly settled one question the experts thought would be troublesome. ~~when we~~ *I told him*

while we were out walking together I ~~told him~~ *just* I would like him to visit the United States; so I invited him, and he said: "I accept."

And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union and he invited me; and I said "I accept." And so the

face to face
for this can help -- the ~~question of future summits and their locations was settled as~~ *which was thought would be difficult*

simply as that.

But one critical matter was left unanswered: the exact date of the future conferences. *But this was one of the principal* ~~It was principally this important~~

question we took up ~~issue we met in Iceland, to take up.~~

And ~~so~~ I am pleased to report to you tonight that, as agreed in Geneva a year ago, the next summit will take place herein the United States and that -- as we agreed in ~~Iceland~~ *in Iceland --* a day or two ago Mr. Gorbachev will be visiting us ~~some time~~ in the month of _____. ~~(Insert) on this decision~~

I just wish the other items on our agenda could have been as easily resolved. Let me make it clear that these most recent discussions with Mr. Gorbachev have brought home to me again the truth of the statement, "nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other." The differences between the United States and the Soviet Union remains deep and abiding and ^{as} I have never hesitated to point out to Mr. Gorbachev ~~what we believe is~~ *in our view* the source of those differences and mistrusts ~~of~~ *is, record* the record of the Soviet Union of attempting to impose its ideology and rule on the world.

It ^B Because of the depth of these differences ~~that~~ this administration has from its earliest day taken a prudent, realistic and above all deliberate approach toward negotiations with the Soviets. Instead of rushing into negotiations, the administration took the time to make clear ^{we had no} illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. It's why we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. It's why we reaffirmed our commitment to the twin goals of world peace and freedom; it's why we said again that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. We stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and institutions around the world; and we assisted freedom fighters in places like Afghanistan and Nicaragua, Angola and other places who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in their ^{own nations} ~~countries~~.

And yet at the same time we were establishing and working towards these goals, ~~of American foreign policy~~, we also pursued another of our major objectives:

: our comittment to a work with the Svoiets to prevent war, lessen tniions and keep the peace. So we took a step by step approach towards Svoiet Amreican relations, ~~lessing~~ gradually expanding ~~th~~ and then intesnifying ~~those~~ ^{the} areas ^{of} mutual and mulitnation ^d dicussssion. Eventually, this steady approach paid off, it led to last year's summit conferenc^e in Genvea and the decision to ~~schedule~~ ^{F. held} two ~~other~~ ^{other} summitt conferences.

Now I point all this out in ~~order~~ for you so that you can see ~~because I think the~~ ^{I believe} background to these discssssion highlights what is different from about this distinguiehs this summitt proc3ss from those of earlier decaces. We have been candid with the Svoiets and about the Svoeets; we have been without illusions or false expectatons. We have been ~~slow~~ and deliberate. we have been ~~candid about the soviets~~ ^{could} and with the Svoiets and about the Svoiets. But there is still on other pricnpal difference. about the atmosphere of these² ngeotiations with the Svoiet Union. You see, Amreica is no longer under siege. far from it. But there is another difference. ~~Adn that is the hsitorial tides.~~ ^{And finally} You see, Aremica ~~nd freedom~~ are no longer undr siege. ~~We xxx the cuase of freedom is not longer b To the contrary, the cause of freedom is one ht march.~~

But my fellow Americans, while

This then is where we believe hsitory is going' but my fellow Aremicans unlike the Marxists we do not blive there is naything inevitable about history -- we believe it is in large measure the free refelction of the decisons d the will of meand the deicosn free mean and women.

My fellow Aremicans, when it said there was a difrerence the difrerence is you. A few years aggo, Tought e last five and a half years, you have made it possible to for Amreica to rever her miliatry and eocnomic strength; you havemade it possible

And so I pleased to report to you tonight, that as agreed in Geneva ^{USA,} 0 year
we agreed in ~~Geneva~~ the next summit will take place herein the United States
and the date ~~...~~ ^{first - 67} and ^{a date to be agreed,} as we agreed in Iceland (Mr. Gorbachev will be
visiting ~~us~~ ^{US} sometime in the month of ~~...~~ We were both gratified
by this decision and I pointed out ~~(Insert on decisions on date.)~~ ^(Insert on this decision)

~~ge~~ I just wish the other items on our agenda could have ~~easily been resolved.~~ ^{been as} ~~Don't~~
been as easily resolved. Let me make it clear that these most recent discussion with Mr. Gorbachev
have brought home to me again the truth of the statement, "nations do not mistrust
each other because they are armed; they are armed because they
mistrust each other. ~~xxx~~ The differences between the United States and the
and the Soviet Union ^{remain} are deep and abiding and I have never hesitated to point²
out to Mr. Gorbachev what ^{believe} is the source of those differences: the ^{differences and mistrust} ~~determination~~ ^{second}
of the Soviet Union to ~~impose its ideology of attempting to~~ ^{impose its ideology}
and rule on the world.

Yet at

It's because of the depth of these differences that this administration has from its
earliest day taken a prudent, realistic and above all ^{deliberate} ~~realistic~~ approach toward negotiations with
the Soviets. Instead of rushing into negotiations, the administration took the time
to make clear our illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate ~~xxx~~ intentions. It's why we
were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and
democracy. It's why we reaffirmed our commitment to the twin goals of
world peace and freedom; it's why we said again that the principal objective of American
foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. We stressed our
commitment to the growth of democratic government and institutions around the world;
and we assisted freedom fighters in places like Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola
and other places who were resisting ^{the} ~~the~~ imposition of totalitarian rule in their countries.
And yet at the same time we were establishing ~~these goals~~ ^{and} of working towards the
and working towards these goals of American foreign policy, we also pursued another of our major
objectives:

You see when Mr. Gorbachev met in Geneva we ^{quickly} settled one question the experts thought would be troublesome. ^{when} We were out walking ^{together} and I told him I would like him to visit the United States, so I invited him, and he said: "I accept." And then he told me how much he would like me to see the Soviet Union and he invited me; and I said "I accept." And ^{so} ~~the~~ the question of future summits and their locations was settled ^{as} ~~that~~ simply ^{as} that.

So face to face discussions help. I just wish all the items on the summit agenda were as easily handled. The differences between the Soviet Union and the United States and its allies are deep and abiding. Which is simply to repeat a formula I have repeated many times: that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because the mistrust each other. And during our discussions together I have been candid with Mr. Gorbachev about our view of the source of that mistrust: the Soviet regime's record of attempting to impose its rule and ideology on the world. And that is why -- as important as arms control is -- a true agenda for peace means justice, freedom and recognition of human rights, must deal with ever deeper issues. And that is why we have insisted from the very start that the issues that go to the heart of our differences with the Soviet Union such as human rights violations and Soviet military intervention -- either directly or by proxy -- must be addressed in our negotiation especially our summit conference.

But ^{one} the critical matter was ^{not} left unresolved: the exact date of the future conference. ~~that when these conferences would take place was left unresolved.~~ ^{that it was principally} important issue ^{that we} ~~that we~~ ^{had to take up} ~~that we~~ ^{had to take up}

By NARA COB Date 12/22/60

~~Secret~~

Cobb
Comments by
5:00 p.m.

(DOLAN)

October 11, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Arms control
substance is
bound to take up
a few new
pages.
This will have
to be trimmed
way back.

Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to ^{report} ~~explain~~ what took place in these discussions.

~~(But)~~ First, let me say it's good to be home, and remind you that from the ~~very~~ start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. ^{stat} I know it may surprise the General Secretary to learn that all ^{stat} this time there was a third party in the room, but ^{stat} believe me, without your support, ~~and participation~~ none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. ^{stat} I am reporting to you tonight because ^{stat} this faith in the ~~(intuitive)~~ wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went that extra mile to Iceland.

Could
trim

insert
from
pp.
2-3

^{Now, these meetings with the Soviet leaders,}
~~Let me begin by pointing out one important way in which the discussions I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike the earlier ones in Geneva: they were not a full-blown summit conference; they were~~ ^{intended as} preparatory meetings, a planning session

Don't
overdo
this.
Meetings
were
pretty
significant
+ this
distinction will
look increasing
silly

^{full-fledged} for a future summit conference, ^{to be held when Mr. Gorbachev visits the} ~~Iceland~~ ^{United States.} ~~was a base camp before the summit.~~

(You see, when Mr. Gorbachev and I met for the first time last year in Geneva we quickly settled one question the experts thought would be troublesome. While we were out walking together I told him that I would like him to see the United States and invited him to visit, and he said: "I accept." And then he told me he would like me to see the Soviet Union and invited me. And I said: "I accept." And so, the supposedly thorny question of future summits and their locations was settled as simply as that; I think you can see why face-to-face discussions between leaders of nations are frequently helpful.

~~But in Geneva, we did leave one critical matter unresolved: the exact date of those future conferences. So in Iceland, this was our top agenda item.]~~ I am pleased to report to you tonight that ~~we made progress, that -- as agreed in Geneva a year ago -- the next summit will take place here in the United States and -- as Mr. Gorbachev and I agreed yesterday in Reykjavik, the Soviet leader will be visiting America in the month of _____ next year. I told Mr. Gorbachev this was a good time to visit us here because (e.g. Mr. Thomas will be on vacation, and the mess will have a full supply of chocolate chip cookies.)~~

Not the
top
agenda
item

I just wish the other items on our agenda could have been as easily resolved. Don't mistake me; the Iceland talks were useful and quite productive -- more so than I believe either party originally anticipated. ^{And} ~~So~~ ^{our old ally} Let me at this point express to the people of Iceland the profound gratitude of the United States;

insert
A

To
P.I

Top 1
~~government~~; without all ~~the magnificent arrangements they put together~~ they did on such short notice ~~to make~~
 these discussions could not have been as successful as they were.

~~Let me also add that we saw another welcome development in Iceland: serious evidence of Soviet willingness to negotiate on matters that up until now had been stalemated. In a few moments, I want to report to you on some of the areas where we saw movement.~~

NP But, ~~first~~, *they were also* it is my duty as President to point out that for all the progress made in Iceland, these talks were sobering -- they brought home again the truth of the statement that nations do not mistrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they mistrust each other. *stet* ~~My fellow Americans, we must remember that~~ the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union are deep and abiding and, as I have *stet* candidly told Mr. Gorbachev himself, our view of the source of that mistrust remains the same: the Soviet Union's record of attempting to impose its ideology and rule on the world. *Trim*

Because there are no diplomatic quick-fixes to such profound differences, we adopted in Iceland the prudent, realistic and above all deliberate approach with the Soviets that we have pursued from the earliest days of our administration. *stet* ~~You may remember that early in our first term instead of rushing into negotiations, we made it clear that~~ *stet* ~~We~~ had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions; we were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We said that the principal objective of American foreign policy is not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the *Trim*

growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world; that is why we ^{declared our sympathy and support for} ~~assisted~~ freedom fighters who were resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, ^{Cambodia, and elsewhere.} ~~and other nations.~~

Be vague about what we're doing

And yet at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working towards them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking ~~means~~ to lessen tensions with the Soviets, ~~ways~~ to prevent war and keep the peace. ~~[As I say,~~ we adopted a deliberate, step-by-step approach towards Soviet-American relations, gradually expanding and then intensifying the areas of ~~mutual~~ ^{bilateral} and ~~multinational~~ ^{multilateral} negotiation. Eventually, this steady approach paid off; it led to ^{her} ~~last year's~~ ^{progress in} ~~overcoming many specific problems in the negotiations between us,~~ ^{summit conference in Geneva and the decision to schedule two} other summit conferences in the future; and it led to the recent step in Iceland for planning and preparation.

Trim

sketch

Pay off should be substance, not meetings. And later we spell out what pay off is.

~~[So we have been deliberate; we have been realistic. We have been candid with the Soviets; we have been candid about the Soviets. We have been without illusions; we have been without false expectations.]~~ ^{There is an important difference between this} ~~And All of this makes this current summit process so very different from that of previous decades.~~

Rep

sketch cut several of this

And there has been another difference. To my mind the crucial difference. You see, my fellow Americans, no longer are the Soviets surprising America at every turn; no longer are they making us react hastily to their threats or respond weakly to their adventures or stand humiliated by every nickel-and-dime dictator under their influence.

sketch +

Oh, come on!

America is no longer under siege. To the contrary, today America's economic and military power is resurgent, the Western

democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized, and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market.

[Yes, the ^{contact of} ~~atmosphere surrounding~~ the current summit process is different, it is different because the world is different; different because of the hard work and the sacrifice of the American people over the past five and one half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economy, your ^{faith} ~~self sacrifice~~ has ^{restored} ~~sustained~~ our military ^{strength;} ~~build up~~; and your ^{renewed patriotism} ~~courage and sense~~ of national unity in times of crisis like Lebanon and Grenada has ^{given pause to} ~~warned~~ our adversaries, heartened our friends and inspired the world. ~~Freedom is on the march today; and it is on the march because -- in its critical hour, at the point of maximum danger it regained its strength and gathered its forces because you, the American people, stood steadfast in its defense.~~]

~~That is why I can report to you tonight that the fruit of your work was evident in Iceland. Indeed, if there is one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that we are seeing now those first tentative signs of harvest, a harvest of peace and freedom planted by the strength and resolve of the American people and their allies, a harvest that can be ours if, as a people, we persevere in the spirit that has brought us so far.~~

One ^{sigh} ~~startling evidence~~ of this in Iceland was the ~~entirely new nature of our discussions~~ ^{of} the key issue of arms control. ~~You know that when I came into office I committed America to a~~ In past years, arms control negotiations had become a kind of ~~new realism about arms negotiations.~~ international sting operation -- the Soviets would agree to stabilize some categories of weapons and then use loopholes to

Could cut

Trim

Page 5
before you
get to be
main
subject!
(Perhaps
trim some
of the
preceding)

Not
"entirely
new"

discussions with Mr. Gorbachev here in the United States will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings. Indeed, we must bear in mind that because of the nature of the Soviet regime itself, many obstacles will be put in our path. When that happens, we must be prepared, not surprised. We must not permit such developments to disorient our policy or derail our initiatives. We must be deliberate and candid. We must make it clear, as we did in the recent Daniloff case, that the Soviet Union will be held responsible for its actions.

I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for world peace and freedom. I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering brought on by totalitarian rule seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet realization that totalitarian or militarist societies enjoy only initial advantages over free nations, advantages that, as British author Paul Johnson points out, are far outweighed by the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent. The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of all history. Mr. Johnson writes. "Grant it a breathing space and it will quickly develop a strategy of survival and form the instruments of victory. In the long run," he writes "it holds all the moral and intellectual cards and these are decisive in combination."

And because you, the American people, have given the cause of freedom that breathing space it so desperately needed, freedom does now hold the winning cards. And throughout the world, those

greatly expand weapons not directly covered by our agreements. In the era of the 60s and 70s, for example, while the US reduced its deployment of nuclear warheads by 7,800 and lowered its megatonnage or explosive power by 75%, the the Soviets added more than 8,000 nuclear warheads to its arsenal of strategic missiles alone -- and half of these were added after the SALT II arms control treaty was signed in 1979. And, while the United States developed no new missiles, the Soviets developed several generations of strategic weapons of all kinds -- indeed, in just a few years they had pointed a thousand new warheads on medium range missiles at the cities of Europe. As one American Secretary of Defense put it: "We built and they built. We stopped and they kept building." Here then was the worst perversion of all: arms control agreements that justified the arms race, intensified it, and guaranteed Soviet superiority.

That is why in the early 1980s the United States sought to restore strategic balance with the Soviets by deploying weapons systems like the MX missile and the B-I bomber as well as install new medium range Cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe.

But even as we took these steps, I resolved that never again would arms control agreements be used to justify an arms buildup. That is why I put forth a series of new proposals calling not just for arms control but for arms reduction. We called for a 50% reduction in strategic missiles and similar reductions in the medium range weapons that are so threatening to our allies in Europe. And in related fields such as nuclear testing and chemical and biological weapons we proposed equally sweeping reductions.

And finally, we began to develop new technologies that could destroy strategic missiles in mid flight -- thereby looking to a day when the huge arsenals of these missiles would be obsolete. And we offered to the Soviet Union an agreement by which they could share in our technology and deployment of our Strategic Defense System.

All this was on the table in Iceland. And, I am pleased to report to you that in several of these areas, the Soviets made serious responses. (INSERT)

But because each of these areas involves complex technology, I cannot predict the nature or dates of future agreements. What I can say is that for the first time, Soviet American negotiations in these areas are headed in the right direction: not just arms control but arms reduction.

In addition to this, there has been another beneficial and dramatic change in this summit process. For some time before our talks began, I had been saying that arms control negotiations alone could not bear the full weight of Soviet American relations; that problems in arms negotiations should not be permitted to thwart or imperil the entire Soviet-American relationship. I also noted that negotiations in other areas could sometimes assist in speeding up the arms reduction process. In short, doing more about arms control meant talking more than arms control. So I proposed "umbrella talks" with the Soviets -- negotiations with a broad based agenda. That is why we sought to expand the negotiating agenda -- to go to the source of political tension between the Soviets and ourselves: violations of human rights by the Soviets and military intervention -- either

directly by the Soviets or by their proxy states -- in the affairs of other nations.

It is just such an agenda that Secretary Shultz brought back with him from Moscow before last year's Geneva summit. For the first time, we had on the table those issues that went to the heart of our political tensions with the Soviet Union -- human rights and regional conflicts.

For Iceland, human rights was the first and the major item on our agenda. Only last week, here in the Oval Office, a noted Russian human rights leader, Yuri Orlov, described to me his suffering under the Soviet system; he was persecuted for leading an effort to get the Soviet government to live up to the human rights agreements it signed at Helsinki in 1975. Mr. Orlov's suffering is like those of far too many other scientists, intellectuals and artists in the Soviet Union.

And that is why I made it plain to Mr. Gorbachev that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also make it plain that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. If the best and brightest inside the Soviet Union cannot trust the Soviet Government, how then can the rest of the world? So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that

follow. When it comes to judging Soviet intentions, we are all from Missouri: you have got to show us.

Another area we took up in Iceland, a second issue at the heart of the differences between the Soviet and American sides, is that of regional conflicts. As I said to Mr. Gorbachev it would simply be unthinkable for world leaders to meet in splendid isolation even as the people of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa and Southeast Asia undergo the terrible sufferings resulting from Soviet invasion or military intervention. Again, our three part proposals for limiting regional conflicts were a critical agenda item. And (INSERT -- Afghanistan)

So once again, I think you can see there was some movement.

Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, recognition of human rights and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral or people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people exchanges that could lead to exchanges between not just a few selected elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think then you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We set a date for a full-fledged summit; we reestablished our four point agenda; we discovered some new grounds of agreement; we probed again some areas of disagreement.

Now my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or our future

"enormous reserves" of free societies are making their presence and power felt.

I saw evidence of this when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation there -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval ports than our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for the sacrifices and devotion to country.

But I must tell you that as I looked out on their faces I also thought of their families back home and the thousands of other faces I have seen in my journeys through America. On the trips from the airport when our motorcade travels down the highways, many Americans interrupt their day to greet us, to say hello; school children waving flags in front of their schools, laborers in blue overalls from garages and warehouses; office workers standing in their shirt sleeves; housewives with toddlers in their front yards. Always I remember those faces and I like to say how good it is for us to get out of Washington, to move across America, to see again towns and neighborhoods, baseball diamonds and football fields. And I say, too, I am thankful -- thankful for the gift of the real America, the gift of coming home again.

Flying back last night from Iceland you can well imagine how grateful again I was for that gift of coming home, to a land like this. But I must tell you I also thought about other faces I have seen in my journeys -- the faces of the people of Iceland, and of so many other nations around the world -- faces filled with hope, hope that the leaders of the world might someday work

Page 12

together and bring to every people and every land the blessings of peace and freedom.

"Wherever the banner of liberty is unfurled, there shall be America's heart, her prayers and her benedictions," John Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we are honored by history, entrusted in our time with the oldest dream of humankind -- the dream of peace and freedom.

It is in pursuit of that dream I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week; it is in pursuit of that dream I have invited Mr. Gorbachev to visit us here for further discussions. And it is in pursuit of that dream that I thank you now for all the support you have given me in the past, and again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue on this journey toward peace.

Thank you and God bless you.

~~Secret~~

T. Jones
Comments by
5:40 p.m.

DETERMINED TO BE
AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.1(a)
By NARA *RR* Date 4/13/94

(DOLAN)

October 11, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. [As most of you know,] I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to ^{share} ~~explain~~ what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me say it's good to be home, and ^{to} ~~remind~~ you that from the very start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. I know it may surprise the General Secretary to learn that all this time there was a third party in the room, but, believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. [I am reporting to you tonight because this faith in the [intuitive] wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went [that extra mile] to Iceland.]

that I already said went to share what our press is in

Let me begin by pointing out one important way in which the discussions I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike the earlier ones in Geneva: they were not a full-blown summit conference; they were preparatory meetings, a planning session

for a future summit conference. Iceland was a base camp before the summit.

[You see, when Mr. Gorbachev and I met for the first time last year in Geneva we quickly settled one question the experts thought would be troublesome. While we were out walking together I told him that I would like him to see the United States and invited him to visit, and he said: "I accept." And then he told me he would like me to see the Soviet Union and invited me. And I said: "I accept." And so, the supposedly thorny question of future summits and their locations was settled as simply as that.]

[I think you can see why face-to-face discussions between leaders of nations are frequently helpful.]

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Finally, there was a fourth item besides arms reduction, recognition of human rights and the resolution of regional conflicts. This area was that of bilateral or people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed the signing of several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people exchanges that could lead to exchanges between not just a few selected elites but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

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I can tell you that I am ultimately hopeful about the prospects for world peace and freedom. I know such optimism in a century that has seen so much war and suffering brought on by totalitarian rule seems unwarranted to some. Yet this confidence is based on more than an easy optimism; it springs from a quiet realization that totalitarian or militarist societies enjoy only initial advantages over free nations, advantages that, as British author Paul Johnson points out, are far outweighed by the "enormous reserves" of democratic societies, societies where national unity springs from popular consent. The resiliency of a free society is one of the comforting lessons of all history, Mr. Johnson writes. "Grant it a breathing space and it will quickly develop a strategy of survival and form the instruments of victory. In the long run," he writes "it holds all the moral and intellectual cards and these are decisive in combination."

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I saw evidence of this when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our Naval installation there -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval ports than our own coastline. As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for the sacrifices and devotion to country.

But I must tell you that as I looked out on their faces I also thought of their families back home and the thousands of other faces I have seen in my journeys through America. On the trips from the airport when our motorcade travels down the highways, many Americans interrupt their day to greet us, to say hello; school children waving flags in front of their schools, laborers in blue overalls from garages and warehouses; office workers standing in their shirt sleeves; housewives with toddlers in their front yards. Always I remember those faces and I like to say how good it is for us to get out of Washington, to move across America, to see again towns and neighborhoods, baseball diamonds and football fields. And I say, too, I am thankful -- thankful for the gift of the real America, the gift of coming home again.

Flying back last night from Iceland you can well imagine how grateful again I was for that gift of coming home, to a land like this. But I must tell you I also thought about other faces I have seen in my journeys -- the faces of the people of Iceland, and of so many other nations around the world -- faces filled with hope, hope that the leaders of the world might someday work

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together and bring to every people and every land the blessings of peace and freedom *that we enjoy.*

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Thank you and God bless you.

Thomas
copy

~~Secret~~

Thomas
Comments by
5:40 p.m.

DETERMINED TO BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING E.O. 12356, Sec. 1.1(a)	
By NARA <u>RL</u>	Date <u>4/13/94</u>

(DOLAN)

October 11, 1986
2:30 p.m. (Iceland)

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: ADDRESS TO THE NATION
ICELAND MEETING
MONDAY, OCTOBER 13, 1986

Good evening. [As most of you know,] I have just returned from meetings with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev, in Iceland. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to ^{share} ~~explain~~ what took place in these discussions.

But first, let me say it's good to be home, and ^{tell} ~~remind~~ you that from the very start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. I know it may surprise the General Secretary to learn that all this time there was a third party in the room, but, believe me, without your support and participation, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. [I am reporting to you tonight because this faith in the [intuitive] wisdom of the people and the consent of the governed are the founding principles of our Republic. And it is for these principles, I went [that extra mile] to Iceland.]

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Let me begin by pointing out one important way in which the discussions I've just returned from in Iceland were unlike the earlier ones in Geneva: they were not a full-blown summit conference; they were preparatory meetings, a planning session

Page 2

for a future summit conference. Iceland was a base camp before the summit.

[You see, when Mr. Gorbachev and I met for the first time last year in Geneva we quickly settled one question the experts thought would be troublesome. While we were out walking together I told him that I would like him to see the United States and invited him to visit, and he said: "I accept." And then he told me he would like me to see the Soviet Union and invited me. And I said: "I accept." And so, the supposedly thorny question of future summits and their locations was settled as simply as that.]

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
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Thank you and God bless you.

W. Starn



THEMES (NON-ARMS CONTROL)

General

- Building upon Geneva, where broad conceptual agreement reached on need for long-term improvement in relations. This time, we filled in considerable detail in several areas of the agenda, looking toward concrete results at next full summit in U.S.

Human Rights

- President still believes that movement more likely to occur if specific issues are discussed quietly with the Soviets.
- Categories of issues discussed included emigration, divided spouses, divided families, dual nationals.
- President made clear candidly to Mr. Gorbachev the importance of this subject to be U.S.-Soviet relationship and to the possibilities of progress across the board.
- Both sides agreed to continue discussing these subjects.

Regional Conflicts

- Both sides recognize the impact that regional conflicts can have on the broader relationship.
- A full and vigorous exchange of views took place. There was little common ground on the main issues: Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, South Africa.
- The U.S. side stressed the President's approach as outlined in his 1985 UNGA speech: negotiations between the warring parties; supporting efforts by the U.S. and USSR; and, economic help for the war-torn countries after peace comes.
- The U.S. made clear that until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends who fight for freedom and independence will have the support they need.
- The two sides agreed that even though their exchanges did not bear fruit, they should maintain their dialogue on these crucial issues.

Bilateral Contacts

- The two leaders recognized the importance of expanding bilateral contacts and cooperation, and instructed their delegations to explore new possibilities in a number of areas.

~~SECRET~~

-- Among these areas are nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear energy safety, the peaceful use of outer space, combatting international terrorism, and international cooperation on thermonuclear fusion.

THEMES (NON-ARMS CONTROL)

Human Rights

- President still believes that movement more likely to occur if specific issues are discussed quietly with the Soviets.
- Categories of issues discussed included emigration, divided spouses, divided families, dual nationals
- President made clear candidly to Mr. Gorbachev the importance of this subject to the US-Soviet relationship and to the possibilities of progress across the board.
- Both sides agreed to continue discussing these subjects.

Regional Conflicts

- Both sides recognize the ^{impact} ~~importance~~ that regional conflicts can have on the broader relationship.
- A full and vigorous exchange of views took place. There was little common ground on the main issues: Afghanistan, Central America, Angola, Southern Africa, ~~the Middle East~~
- The US side stressed the President's approach as

outlined in his 1985 UNGA speech: negotiations between the warring parties; supporting efforts by the US and USSR; and economic help for the war-torn countries after peace comes.

- The US made clear ~~that until Soviet~~ ~~to continuing~~ policies change, we will make sure that our friends who fight for freedom and independence will have the support they need.
- The two sides agreed that even though their exchanges did not bear fruit, they should ~~continue~~ maintain their dialogue on these crucial issues.

Bilateral Contacts

- The two leaders ~~acknowledged~~ recognized the importance of expanding bilateral contacts and cooperation, ~~in a number of areas~~, and instructed their delegations to explore new possibilities in a number of areas.
- Among these areas are nuclear non-proliferation, establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers, nuclear energy safety, the peaceful use of outer space, combatting international terrorism, and international cooperation on thermonuclear fusion.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

10/6/86

MEMORANDUM

TO: JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR. *FR*

SUBJECT: APPROVED PRESIDENTIAL ACTIVITY

MEETING: Presidential Address to the Nation

DATE: October 13, 1986

TIME: 8:00 pm

DURATION: Approximately 20 minutes

LOCATION: Oval Office

BACKUP LOCATION:

REMARKS REQUIRED: Yes

MEDIA COVERAGE: Coordinate with Press Office

FIRST LADY
PARTICIPATION: No

NOTE: PROJECT OFFICER, SEE ATTACHED CHECKLIST

W. Ball
P. Buchanan
D. Chew
J. Courtemanche
M. Coyne
E. Crispen
M. Daniels
T. Dawson
D. Dellinger
A. Dolan
J. Erkenbeck
L. Faulkner
C. Fuller

W. Henkel
J. Hooley
A. Kingon
J. Kuhn
C. McCain
J. Miller
R. Riley
R. Shaddick
B. Shaddix
L. Speakes
G. Walters
WHCA Audio/Visual
WHCA Operations

R. McDaniel

Nancy
more speech
back up

H.

(Judge/ARD)
October 13, 1986
8:00 p.m.

Received SS

PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS: DROPBY ICELAND BRIEFING FOR EXECUTIVE 8:46
BRANCH OFFICERS
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986

Welcome to the White House complex. I wanted all of you to come over this afternoon to hear first hand about our meetings in Iceland. But before I turn to my report let me first say that I couldn't have gone to Reykjavik without the hard work and dedication above and beyond the call of duty of ~~you~~ ^{the} men and women ^{Low} ~~I~~ see before me. You labored night and day to get us ready for that meeting. And I know we sort of sprung it on you at the last minute. I'm grateful to all of you for the fine work you did.

Let me say thanks as well to the members of the small team I took with me to the meeting. They worked around the clock. A few of them got no sleep at all while we were there. I've long had great respect for every one of them, and that respect grew even stronger in those four days. They were an outstanding team, and all Americans can be proud of them and the work they did.

And you can be proud of the fruit your work is bearing for the Reykjavik meeting has set the stage for a major advance in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. At Reykjavik, the Soviet Union went farther than ever before in accepting our goal of deep reductions in the level of nuclear weapons. Some are now saying that since in the end we didn't sign agreements, the talks were a failure. Well, they couldn't be more wrong.

The Soviets have approached all their past talks with us in just the same way. Before they've made agreements at the bargaining table, they've tried to win even more through public

peace offensives aimed at dividing American and European opinion. They've trumpeted sweeping proposals to the media that didn't stand a chance in private talks. They've used these to try to put us on the defensive with our publics.

In the past, only after the Soviets were convinced that the West was united on every point have they got down to serious bargaining. The significance of the meeting at Reykjavik is not that we didn't sign agreements in the end. The significance is that we got as close as we did before the Soviets again began to play to the galleries.

On issue after issue, particularly in the area of arms reduction, we saw that General Secretary Gorbachev was ready to make serious concessions. For me concessions on arms reduction were especially gratifying. Just 5-½ years ago, when we came into office, I said that our objective must not be regulating the growth in nuclear weapons, which is what arms control, as it was known, had been all about. No, I said that our goal must be reducing the number of nuclear weapons, that we had to work to make the world safer, not just to control the pace at which it became more dangerous.

At first there were those in Congress and the media who said that I wasn't serious about reducing arms. They said that all I wanted to do was make demands that were so extreme that the Soviets would never agree to them. Well, now the Soviets, too, are talking about real arms reduction. In Reykjavik Secretary General Gorbachev and I came close to cutting nuclear arsenals in half and to reducing the number of intermediate nuclear weapons

held by each side to 100, with none in Europe. This represented historic progress over past talks between our countries, and let me say that it wouldn't have been possible without the support we've had from the American people over the last 5-½ years.

Because the American people have stood behind us as we worked over the years to rebuild our nation's defenses, we went to the Iceland meeting in a position of strength. And the Soviets knew that we had the support not only a strong America but a united NATO alliance that was going ahead with deployment of Pershing II and cruise missiles. They knew that their propaganda campaign to get Europe to stop from putting INF missiles in place had failed. So, yes, it was this strength and unity that brought the Soviets to the bargaining table. And particularly important, of course, was America's support for the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Now, as you know, I offered Secretary General Gorbachev an important concession on SDI. I offered put off deployment for a decade and I coupled that with a ten year plan for eliminating all ballistic missiles from the face of the earth. This may have been the most sweeping and important arms reduction proposal in the history of the world. But that wasn't good enough for Mr. Gorbachev. He wanted more. He wanted us to stop all but laboratory research on SDI, to do no field testing and to agree never to deploy a strategic defense at all, that is, he wanted us to kill strategic defense entirely, which has been a Soviet goal from the start. Of course, the Soviet Union has long been engaged in an extensive strategic defense program of its own.

And unlike ours, the Soviet program goes well beyond research, even to deployment. So in contrast to the proposals we came so close to agreeing on at Reykjavik, this proposal would have given the Soviets an immediate one-sided advantage and a dangerous one. I could not and would not agree to that.

And just as important, America and the West need SDI for long-run insurance. We know the Soviet record of playing fast and loose with past agreements. We know how they burst out of the nuclear testing moratorium in the early 60s. We know how they've violated the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the SALT II agreement. We know how they've even violated the Helsinki Final Acts, basic human rights agreements that they signed with great fanfare eleven years ago and have never made the faintest effort to abide by. Only last week I was reminded of this when I met with Yuri Orlov, who was imprisoned in the Soviet Union for setting up a citizen's organization for monitoring human rights, an organization specifically sanctioned by the Helsinki agreements.

America can't afford to take a chance on waking-up in 10 years and finding that the Soviets have an advanced defense system and are ready to put in place more or more modern missiles and we have no defense of our own and our deterrence is obsolete because of the Soviet defense system. If arms reduction is to help bring lasting peace, we must be able to maintain the vital strategic balance which has for so long kept the peace. Nothing could more threaten world peace than arms reduction agreements with loopholes that would leave the West naked to a massive and

sudden Soviet build-up in offensive and defensive weapons. My guess is that Mr. Gorbachev understands this, but wants to see how much farther he can push us in public before he once again gets down to brass tacks in private.

So here's how I see the meeting in Iceland adding up. We made historic advances in the arms reduction process. We took discussions into areas that have never before been put on the table. The Soviets finally began serious talk on real reductions in nuclear arms. The next step will be in Geneva, where our negotiators will work to build on this progress.

The biggest disappointment in Iceland was that Mr. Gorbachev decided to make progress in virtually all areas hostage to his one-sided and dangerous demand that we kill our strategic defense program. Forgive me for saying it, but in doing this he was going back on an agreement he made with me in Geneva. There he promised, at the very least, not to hold up INF negotiations for an agreement on SDI. Well, I hope that the Soviets will once again drop SDI as a precondition for progress, so we can indeed eliminate the threat posed to our friends in Europe and Asia by Soviet intermediate missiles. And I promise you that we will seek right away at Geneva to build on the potential progress in this and other areas made at Reykjavik.

You know, one of my past jobs was as a negotiator of labor agreements. I got used to one side or another walking out of contract talks. It didn't mean that relations had collapsed or that we had reached an insurmountable impasse. It just meant that a little grand-standing was going on. It's important for us

right now to look beyond the Soviet grandstanding, to see the real progress that we made at Reykjavik and to unite so that we'll be strong for the next stage in negotiations. If we do that, I believe that we have it within our grasp to achieve with the Soviets some truly historic breakthroughs.