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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

453341
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CDD25
HE006-01

October 30, 1986

TR

Dear Miss Mirante:

I am writing in response to your July 22 letter to Kenneth Barun regarding United States support for the Government of Burma's opium eradication program.

The U.S. considers Burma's aerial spraying program to be one of the most successful narcotics control initiatives underway anywhere in the world. Our experience has shown that destroying drugs at the source hits the weakest link in the drug chain and produces the most immediate results. We believe that in time Burma's efforts will cut opium production sharply in that major producing country.

Although the hilltribes have traditionally cultivated relatively small amounts of opium for its medicinal and psychoactive properties, their introduction of the crop into the international money economy is of relatively recent origin. Nevertheless, whether for personal use or trafficking, their illegal cultivation of opium is as reprehensible as the criminal activities of every other person deriving a livelihood from the illicit drug trade. Opium-producing hilltribes in Southeast Asia are engaged in an enterprise which harms the people of that region and Americans alike.

You suggest that a negotiated settlement between Burma and the narcotics trafficking groups could end the Golden Triangle drug trade. Even if the legitimate government of Burma were to negotiate with the criminal drug traffickers who are seeking its overthrow or national dismemberment, there is no basis to assume that the realization of the drug traffickers' purported "political" objectives would cause them to abandon their very lucrative criminal activities.

Your statement that the 2,4-d herbicide is "highly toxic to animals and humans" is incorrect. This is clear even from the Of Mice and Molecules extract enclosed with your letter. The U.S. and Burma conducted comprehensive environmental impact studies to assure that 2,4-d does not produce deleterious side effects. Through more than 40 years of use, it has proven to be both safe and effective.

~~ENCLOSURES FILED IN OUTSIDE ATTACHMENTS #13499~~


Six months have passed since the end of Burma's 1985-86 aerial spraying operation. There is no credible evidence to support allegations that Burma misused the airplanes or equipment for military purposes, that any crop other than opium was

AUG 04, 86 Carleton Turner Ltr to the Hon.
ANN B. Wroblewski attached

internationally sprayed, or that the spraying has had any adverse effect on humans, livestock, or food crops. If you have any concrete evidence which you believe substantiates the claim that Burma is conducting "a campaign of chemical terror", we would welcome the opportunity to examine it.

Although there is a considerable gap between your views and those of the U.S. government, I was struck by the following statement in your "Burma Frontier Insurgency" paper (page 28): "The narcotics trade was so profitable that many groups that turned to it to finance their political goals ended up discarding their political ideals and becoming efficient criminal profit-making organizations." That, it seems to me, is the essence of the problem.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Carlton E. Turner", with a long horizontal flourish extending to the right.

Carlton E. Turner, Ph.D.
Director, Drug Abuse Policy and
Deputy Assistant to the President

Miss Edith T. Mirante
14 Dartmouth Road
Cranford, NJ 07016

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

8/18/86

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. OFFICE OF DRUG ABUSE POLICY THE WHITE HOUSE		
2.		
3.		
4. 22 AUG 1986		
5.		

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

DR. TURNER HAD REQUESTED A DRAFT RESPONSE TO EDITH MIRANTE'S LETTER CRITICIZING THE OPIUM ERADICATION PROGRAM IN BURMA. A DRAFT IS ATTACHED, TOGETHER WITH MISS MIRANTE'S LETTER AND THE OTHER MATERIALS SHE ENCLOSED.

EVI. MISS MIRANTE ALSO WROTE TO SEVERAL PERSONS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT, AND HAD A CONVERSATION WITH THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE THAI/BURMA AFFAIRS OFFICE.

UNCLASSIFIED

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) William J. Duffy INM/P Department of State	Room No.—Bldg.
	7811NS
	Phone No.
	647-8726

5041-102

* U.S. GPO: 1985-0-461-274-20011

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
 Prescribed by GSA
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 4, 1986

Dear Ann:

It seems there is someone opposing the bilateral eradication program in Burma. I have been asked to respond by the powers to be. Could you have Rayburn or someone draft me a strong, hard-hitting response for my signature?

Thanks very much.

Sincerely,

CT

Carlton E. Turner

Honorable Ann B. Wrobleski
Assistant Secretary
International Narcotics Matters
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20520

Enclosures

*ABW
per*

*Duffy
Should do -*

Ann

Project Maje
14 Dartmouth Rd.
Cranford, N.J. 07016

July 22, 1986

Mr. Kenneth Barun
Mrs. Reagan's Project on Drug Abuse
Room 213, The East Wing,
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Barun,

I am the director of an independent, non-profit project concerned with the political situation in Burma, particularly the insurgency there and related issues such as human rights and the narcotics trade. Of particular concern is the current herbicide aerial spraying program in Northern Burma, as we have been getting information that the herbicide spraying is having serious effects on the welfare of minority ethnic groups (hill tribes) in that area.

I would like to draw your attention to the following factors that I believe indicate that this program may be inappropriate for use in Burma:

- .Military usage of the herbicide against villages/suspected of support for insurgent groups. Burma has in the past used narcotics suppression aid for military purposes.
- .Government animosity towards ethnic minority groups, and possible lack of concern about effects on herbicides on them.
- .The hill tribes are completely dependent on growing opium as a cash crop. Opium has been grown by these tribes for 100 years, and the breakdown of the economy in the Shan State under Ne Win has caused them to be completely reliant on the opium crop. There is no significant attempt to provide alternative crops to the opium destroyed.

- .In Northern Burma, opium poppies are grown in small fields surrounded by food crops; aerial spraying of the herbicide will drift over food crops, cotton crops, and water supplies. The herbicide used, 2,4-D, is toxic to food crops grown by hill tribes, and to cotton, and will enter the water supply. The ~~hills~~^{fields} are uphill of village houses, and livestock, and often very close to them. The spraying takes place during the winter and catches people (mainly women and children) working in the fields or resting in field huts.
- .The effects, or feared/perceived effects, of the 2,4-D spraying cause displacement migration of the hill tribes. The spraying program is causing hill tribe villagers in Kengtung to seek the protection of insurgent armies (both non-communist and communist factions).
- .The program was originally designed for use in Mexico, where poppy growing is a recent, organized crime originated phenomenon, and poppy fields tend to be large and isolated.

I believe that the above considerations, as well as available data on the toxicity of 2,4-D to humans, animals, food crops, water, soil, etc.; indicate strongly that this program should be reviewed as to its suitability for use in Burma.


The solution to the drug trade in the Golden Triangle must, in the long run, be a political solution. Only a negotiated settlement between Burma and the insurgent groups will bring about peace. Only in peace can alternatives to opium growing be developed and instituted. For the time being, interdiction efforts, of chemicals and heroin, in Thailand, seem to be the best way to squeeze the drug traders. Working towards a solution with the insurgents in control of major opium traffic points might be another possibility.

The 2,4-D spraying program seems to be a most unsatisfactory approach to drug suppression. There is, of course, a "war on drugs"-- and there must be-- but dropping chemicals on primitive hill tribes who will flee to communist rebels seems to be the wrong way to go about it. As far as the hill tribes are concerned, the crop dusters (Made in U.S.A.) might as well be a B-52 bombing raid.

I am enclosing some material on the insurgency and narcotics which might be of interest to you. You will note that the letter of protest "Chemical Warfare in Burma: U.S. Involvement" includes a letter which Sai Lek of the Shan State Progress Party addressed to the First Lady during her recent Southeast Asia trip, in hopes of alerting her to the dangers of a drug suppression program gone wrong.

I would be most interested in your comments on this issue. If you would like to discuss this further, or if Project Maje can provide other information you might require, please contact me.

Sincerely,



Edith T. Mirante
201-276-8494

Name	Date
Donna Knight	1/6/87
" "	1-8-87

Handwritten signature: [Illegible]

PARAQUAT

1983,
Eric Skjei &
M.D. Whorton

Paraquat achieved a small degree of notoriety a few years ago because it was being sprayed on marijuana crops in Mexico in an effort to cut off one source of marijuana entering the United States. The strategy failed because once they are cut and dried, sprayed plants are indistinguishable from unsprayed ones—Mexican growers simply went ahead and harvested their sprayed crops as usual and shipped them out rather than lose a sale. When this fact became known in the United States, it created a justifiable but somewhat misinformed panic in dope-smoking circles.

When ignited and inhaled, paraquat byproducts can cause a mild, transient burn in the lining of the throat. However, as numerous accidental and suicidal ingestions of paraquat have demonstrated, this herbicide is much more hazardous when swallowed. Ingestion of a relatively small amount of paraquat is followed by a deceptive period of some three to four weeks in which no symptoms are experienced. But within about one month the first signs of irreversible and fatal pulmonary fibrosis, a type of scarring of the lung tissue that obstructs breathing, begin to appear. Although most of what we know about paraquat's toxicity has been learned from cases in which more than 70 cc have been ingested, as little as 15 cc (about one tablespoon) is a lethal dose.

Paraquat is widely used in the United States as a preemergent (before the crop comes up) spray to control weeds. It cannot be used once the crop has appeared because it is nonselective and will kill desirable as well as undesirable plants.

On July 12, 1981, the Federal Drug Enforcement Administration announced that it was working closely with state governments in California, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina in planning a possible paraquat spraying program to suppress domestic marijuana production. Some states, concerned about paraquat's acute toxicity, have placed special restrictions on its use, but as of this writing the EPA has not.

2,4-D AND 2,4,5-T

Both 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T are members of a chemical family known as "chlorophenoxy" herbicides. Chlorophenoxyes are systemic herbicides, which means that if they are sprayed on any part of a plant, or even the ground around it, they will quickly spread throughout it

(a process known as "translocation") and kill it. Chlorophenoxies cause a host of interrelated, somewhat mysterious effects on plants, often likened to a type of plant cancer. Photosynthesis slows, some parts of the plant swell or elongate, others, like leaves, stop growing entirely. Roots quit taking in water and soil nutrients; the tissues that distribute water and nutrients throughout the plant become blocked and die.

First marketed in 1944, 2,4-D is one of the oldest herbicides around, and one of the most widely used. Experts estimate that 75 percent of all weed control of any kind involves just three basic compounds, one of which is 2,4-D. It is used in some fifteen hundred different products, including many specifically formulated for home use. It is highly biodegradable, lasting at most from a few weeks on sprayed vegetables to a few months in water. In the human body it is not well absorbed through the skin but passes readily through the walls of the intestine, and is eliminated within days.

The acute oral LD₅₀ of 2,4-D in rats is about 275 mg/kg, which makes it a moderately toxic substance. Studies of its effects on poisoned animals have found evidence that it damages the liver and kidneys, and under some conditions can cause disorders of the central nervous system, including paralysis. It is a teratogen in rats, mice, hamsters, and pigs at fairly high dosage levels. It does not appear to be mutagenic, though on this issue there is ambiguity in the data. There is clearer evidence that 2,4-D is an animal carcinogen, but again the data are not entirely consistent on this point, either.

Pesticide applicators acutely exposed to 2,4-D have reported symptoms of headache, loss of appetite, dizziness, weakness, gastritis, vomiting, chest pain, and blackouts. Chronic exposure seems to be linked to appetite loss, loss of taste and smell, headaches, fatigue, and nonspecific abdominal pain. In a very few cases signs of degeneration of peripheral nerves have been reported, and in one case an autopsy of a fatality caused by 2,4-D poisoning disclosed extensive damage to the outer sheathing of the nerves in all parts of the brain. Experts believe the lethal dose of 2,4-D in humans is between 80 and 800 mg/kg body weight, making it significantly less acutely toxic than parathion, but quite a bit more toxic than malathion. The EPA is currently developing better information on 2,4-D's toxicity and reviewing its registration to see if additional restrictions on its use are advisable.

2,4,5-T, a close chemical cousin to 2,4-D, appears to be quite a bit more hazardous. What we know about it to date indicates that it is not carcinogenic or mutagenic, and is only teratogenic in labora-

CHEMICAL WARFARE IN BURMA
U.S. INVOLVEMENT

The United States Government is presently supplying the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma with toxic chemicals to use against the Burmese Government's political opponents and minority ethnic groups.

The herbicide 2,4-D is being supplied to Burma by the U.S. for use in opium crop eradication, but in actuality it is being used by the Burmese to wage a campaign of chemical terror in the Shan State. Several minority ethnic groups (Shan, Wa, Lisu, Lahu, Kachin, etc.) live in the opium growing area of Burma's Shan State. Various political organizations (both communist and anti-communist) representing the minority ethnic groups have been in open rebellion against the Government of Burma since the present Burmese regime took power in 1962 and negated the Constitutional right of autonomy for the Shan State.

Powerful rebel groups control vast areas of the Shan State and have resorted to the opium trade in order to finance their war. Shan rebel leaders have repeatedly expressed their willingness to work with U.S. agencies to find a way out of the opium trade, but the U.S. has been obligated to deal exclusively with the Burmese Government. U.S. efforts to suppress narcotics through the Government of Burma have met with minimal success. The Shan State opium crop amounts to some 600 metric tons, annually.

EDITH T. MIRANTE
PROJECT DIRECTOR

PROJECT MAJE
TO ENCOURAGE AMERICAN AWARENESS OF
THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN BURMA

14 DARTMOUTH RD.
CRANFORD N.J. 07016

201-276-8494

Since 1981, an increasing number of Burmese military officers have been brought to the U.S. for training in "crop eradication missions", i.e. crop dusting with herbicides. The herbicide which the U.S. has been providing to the Burmese Government since 1984 is 2,4-D. 2,4-D is an extremely hazardous chemical, highly toxic to animals and humans. Many forms of 2,4-D are contaminated with dioxins. 2,4-D was a component of Agent Orange herbicide used in Vietnam.

According to many observers in Northern Burma, the Burmese Government's use of 2,4-D is by no means confined to poppy fields. Many of the major poppy growing areas are protected by insurgent forces, which have machine guns and other artillery easily capable of shooting down crop dusting planes. In less protected areas of the Shan State, the Burmese Government's use of 2,4-D has had disastrous effects, however. Aerial spraying causes the herbicide to disperse. Poppies are grown in small plots mixed in with the upland rice and maize that are the hill tribes' food supply. According to a Shan observer:

"The northern and the eastern parts of the Shan State have been terribly affected by this 2,4-D: 1. Spoiling arable land into soil unfit for cultivation and animal-keeping
2. Spoiling the water sources and drainage system 3. Causing people to get sick and nauseated 4. Animals were affected and suffered premature deaths. Reports keep coming in."

Burma's aerial spraying of 2,4-D on areas where opium is grown by illiterate hill tribes with no other source of cash may be intended to terrorize the tribes into obedience to the Burmese Government, but it might well have the opposite effect of turning them to the rebel groups for protection.

The following items are attached:

1. "'Burma Using Dangerous Herbicide'" The Nation (Bangkok), April 14, 1986, Sinfah Tunsarawuth.
2. Letter from Sai Lek of Shan State Progress Party, to Mrs. Nancy Reagan (during her recent visit to Thailand), protesting the use of 2,4-D in the Shan State.
3. Account supplied by Tailand Revolutionary Council of effects of 2,4-D spraying of Kengtung Province of the Shan State in February, 1986.

Shan State Progress Party and Tailand Revolutionary Council are both Shan organizations opposed to the Burmese Government.

For more information on the abuse of herbicides for chemical warfare in the Shan State, and information on other aspects of the insurgency and narcotics trade in Burma, please contact Project Maje. Burma Frontier Insurgency, a full-length situation report, is available from Project Maje.

Edith T. Mirante
June 20, 1986

PROJECT MAJE
14 Dartmouth Rd.
Cranford, N.J. 07016
(201) 276-8494

THE HERBICIDE being used to destroy poppy trees in Burma is a chemical that is dangerous to human and environment and is not recommended by the United Nations, informed sources said.

Spraying of the chemical, known as "2,4-D," from airplane, a practice by the Burmese Government, is an application particularly warned against, the sources said.

The sources said the Burmese Government started using the herbicide by aerial spraying to eliminate poppy trees since the 1984-1985 growing season.

The using of the 2,4-D to kill poppy trees was a bilateral aid programme the United States provided to Rangoon, according to the sources. However, they said it was the Burmese decision to make use of the chemical.

The herbicide was introduced in Thailand, which has opium-producing areas in the North. But due to its toxicity to human and environment, the Thai Government rejected its application here, according to the sources.

The 2,4-D was a compound used in the production of the controversial Agent Orange the principal defoliant used by US troops during the Vietnam war. The effect of the agent on health of American servicemen engaging in the war has

been much publicized.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) of the US Government, which has to certify chemicals applying with environment, in 1980 requested more extensive tests on the 2,4-D for causing deformed fetus, cancer and reproductive impairment in laboratory animals.

In "A Handbook of Pesticides Regulated in the United States" published by the National Wildlife Federation, it was reported the EPA is presently awaiting the results of these tests.

The handbook said the EPA has had to require further tests because the 2,4-D was frequently used together with 2,4,5-T which was suspended for most uses in 1979, and there was deficiencies in the chronic and subchronic toxicity data supporting the registration of 2,4-D.

The Agent Orange was a mixture of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T.

"In spite of the agency's conclusion that 2,4,5-T use posed an unwarranted teratogenic and fetotoxic risk, EPA could not determine that 2,4,5-T alone was responsible for all the observed effects. Thus, 2,4-D was placed under investigation," the document said.

The EPA is also concerned with the presence of dioxins in 2,4-D formulations. Dioxins are a class of "extremely toxic chemicals" that are present as contaminants in nearly all formulations of 2,4,5-T.

"There is independent evidence that many formulations of 2,4-D are also contaminated with dioxins," the EPA said in its report.

The agency warned users of 2,4-D to avoid spray drift the chemical or contamination of water supply with it.

However, the way the Burmese Government sprayed the herbicide from airplane allowed contamination in water resources and areas where dairy animals are grazed, sources said.

The sources said Rangoon had to use the herbicide to destroy poppy trees since manual eradication by Burmese troops were obstructed by rebel minorities.

Many Burmese troops were killed by insurgents when they entered poppy growing areas of maimed by land mines planted by the insurgents. However, the Burmese Government did not give up the poppy eradication by troops.

Sources said Rangoon started to launch a big campaign to eliminate opium since 1978. It was estimated that 12,500-25,000 rai (5,000-10,000 acres) of poppy cultivation areas were destroyed each year.

Although the Burmese Government has tried to diminish cultivation areas, Opium output from the Burmese part of the Golden Triangle has increased in recent years, sources said.

The US Government estimated 534 and 424 metric tons of opium came out of Burma in 1984 and 1985 respectively. However, observers put the figure as 600-650 tons a year.


One observer said the use of 2,4-D might not help decrease opium production in Burma instead would antagonize hilltribe people who were afflicted by the chemical and push them into association with rebel groups which are fighting against the Burmese Government.

Eradication of poppy fields!

Burma using dangerous herbicide

Through the U.S.Ambassador to Thailand

Mrs Nancy Feagan
c/o The President,
Washington D.C.
USA



Madam:

A recent report from our people from Shan States says that US-supplied helicopters carrying deadly chemicals of the Burma Army indiscriminately sprayed poisonous gas over a large area of the Shan States purportedly to destroy opium-producing plants.

The concept of defoliating the poppy plants at the source is an excellent idea but the trouble is, it also killed all life-sustaining rice crops as well as whatever livestock the hill tribesmen possess. The most sickening thing about this episode is that it also killed human beings that eke out a living in the wilderness.

Reports have filtered out of the area that poverty-stricken Wa and Lahu tribesmen and their innocent babies are dying by the thousands from the side effects of the barbaric attacks.

Worse, primitive hill people there do not have access to proper medical treatment to redress their grievances. We are afraid that they will only become victims and play into the hands of the ruthless Opium Warlord Khun Sa a.k.a. Chang See-fu who has only to say: "See, I told you so," propaganda.

The Shan State Progress Party regards the drastic measure taken against hill tribesmen as being inhuman, cruel, irresponsible and extremely reckless.

We also believe that it is not only against human decency but against basic norms of the UN Charter and incompatible with the status of a civilized state.

We can only wonder what has become of the much-publicized Human Rights. Are the tribesmen not human beings even if they do not conform to the standards of our modern life ?

May we ask, if we are to understand that this is not Genocide, then what is ?

It has been our official policy to support without reservation the campaign to destroy and eradicate not only drug-producing poppy plants but also the suppression of self-seeking drug pushers who masquerade as freedom fighters to liberate Shan State from the Burmese National Socialist militaristic regime.

The cruelly repressive Rangoon government (now) does not even pretend to control the Shan State whose freedom fighters, black propaganda aside, have given them fierce resistance.

Giving aid to Rangoon therefore seems to us to be barking up the wrong tree.

Or is providing the chemicals and the means to deliver them to the "poor mountain souls," a result of some over-eager official who want to impress dignitaries about to visit the region that something is being done to the most recalcitrant problem of the decade ?

We, the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) wish to ask; on humanitarian grounds, the U.S. government to refrain from spraying poisonous gas and chemicals on the impoverished hill-tribesmen.



(Sai Lek)

Secretary-General,
Shan State Progress Party,
Liberated Area, Shan State

Data on the effects of "2, 4-D" so far gathered
 in Keng Tung Province, Eastern Shan State
 * Sprayed in February, 1966 *

Tambon	Date of spraying	number of villages	number of acres destroyed	number of people intoxicated	number of animals intoxicated
1. Muang Krok	Feb 7-8	20	1080	74 (incl. 1 dead)	2 buffaloes, 3 pigs
2. Muang Long	Feb 3-8	6	236	1	1 horse, 14 pigs
3. Muang Hai	Feb 3-7	6	139	not obtainable	yet
4. Muang Lu	Feb 7-9	7	207	"	"
5. Nam Pa	not obtainable	7	210	"	"
6. Na Kuei	Feb 13-14	1	20	"	"
7. Mian Hem	Feb 10-11	12	360	"	"
8. Tong Ta	Feb 7-11	22	315	"	"
9. Nam Khak	"	30	200	"	"
10. Muang In	"	20	190	"	"
11. Muang Saen	"	20	200	"	"
Total		151	3165	75 (incl. 1 dead)	2 buffaloes, 1 horse 17 pigs (dead)

Note 1. The one who died was Na Saw (25), a villager of Ma Nue village, Tambon Muang KOK, Muang Sani district.

2. The Burmese do not use the terms (Province, district, Tambon etc.) for their administrative divisions. It has been used here however for convenience, assuming that most observers are used to the Thai terms.

It must be noted here that the Burmese use the terms: district (equivalent of Chang wat), township (equivalent of Amphur or district), ward (tambon).

3. Since 1974, the Burmese don't have districts (Changwats) anymore.

State Dept. to Buy Spray Aircraft For Overseas Drug Eradication

By Paul Proctor

Washington—U. S. State Dept. plans to procure additional high-speed, extensively modified and armored fixed-wing agricultural spray aircraft, which have proved to be very effective in overseas drug eradication programs, especially in high-risk areas.

A request for proposals was issued in April for approximately 15 additional fixed-wing turboprop spray aircraft to be procured over several years; if funded, the contract value could exceed \$11 million. The aircraft will supplement a fleet of 150 aircraft, mostly helicopters, which have been provided to cooperating countries working with the State Dept.

Nine modified and armored Ayres Turbo Thrush spray aircraft were procured by the State Dept. from 1983 through 1985. That \$5.5-million contract was awarded on a sole-source basis due to the urgency of the drug eradication mission and availability of a fast, two-seat version of the Turbo Thrush. The aircraft are used mainly in Mexico, Colombia and Burma.

In 1985, fixed-wing aircraft in service with the State Dept. sprayed 26,000 acres in one high-risk country where they encountered experienced light infantry equipped with quad 50-caliber antiaircraft guns, although they received no hits.

The modified Turbo Thrushes have been so successful in inhibiting narcotics traffic, governments of other countries where significant amounts of narcotic crops are harvested, including Belize and Panama, are expected to join in interna-

tional drug eradication efforts. The accuracy and speed of the aircraft offers an attractive alternative to countries that have lost troops and strained relations with local governments during manual defoliation efforts. Manual defoliation also is tremendously expensive and requires a large and coordinated logistic effort.

Aircraft Specifications

According to the RFP, the spray aircraft must carry two crew—a pilot and pilot-observer, a VLF/Omega navigation unit in addition to other avionics, a self-sealing auxiliary fuel tank, and it must have the capability to apply up to 400-gal. spray loads in high altitudes and in hot, humid weather conditions. Aircraft level speed capability is required to exceed 150 mph. To minimize exposure to ground fire during spraying operations. Armored seats and engine panels that protect the aircraft's fuel control and compressor areas, as well as other systems, also are specified. The armor plate must be capable of withstanding hits from 7.62-mm. ball ammunition at 100 meters.

To maximize spray effectiveness at high aircraft speeds and to minimize drift damage to nearby legitimate crops, the State Dept. has conducted a spray boom flyoff resulting in selection of a specially developed unit made by Waldrum Specialties, Inc. The boom was found effective at aircraft speeds up to 220 mph. and altitudes to 200 ft. above ground level. Agricultural spraying usually is conducted at speeds less than 130 mph. and altitudes of 12 ft.

A chief responsibility of the pilot-observ-

er is to assist the pilot in navigation and in spotting fields where narcotics crops, such as poppies, are grown. The crops often are found on plots ranging in size from a half to a full acre. During spraying operations, however, the pilot-observer will primarily watch for ground-based antiaircraft fire.

The rear-seat position also is equipped with a full set of flight controls so the pilot-observer can return the aircraft to base if the primary pilot is disabled by gunfire. During high-risk missions, crewmembers will wear flak and survival vests and ballistic helmets.

Though aircraft with herbicide payload capabilities up to 500 gal. may be acquired, missions that involve spraying multiple, small narcotics fields probably will carry payloads limited to 400 gal. to reduce pilot fatigue.

Both contact and systemic herbicides such as Paraquat and 2-4-D are used. Cockpit air filtration equipment, standard in certain commercial spray plane applications to block dangerous herbicide fumes, is not necessary because toxic herbicides are not used and multiple passes over the same field are not flown due to the increased chance of encountering antiaircraft fire.

At least two of the U. S. agricultural aircraft manufacturers, Ayres of Albany, Ga., and Air Tractor of Olney, Tex., plan to respond to the request for proposals. Since the RFP was issued by the State Dept. in September, Air Tractor has developed and flown a modified version of its new AT-500 class turboprop spray aircraft, called the AT-503, largely in re-



Air Tractor AT-503 dual-place agricultural aircraft specifically designed for drug eradication role is shown above with 1,100-shp. Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-45R turboprop. The difficulty of narcotics

crop spraying is evident in photo at right of a defoliated Mexican marijuana patch measuring four-tenths of an acre. Surrounding tree canopy was not affected due to precision of the herbicide application.



Two Ayres Turbo Thrushes are shown. Despite chunky aerodynamic form caused by two-place configuration, fixed landing gear and spray boom, the 1,200-shp. Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-65R turboprop gives the aircraft working speeds greater than 150 mph.

sponse to the RFP. The aircraft already has received its Federal Aviation Administration Type Inspection authorization, and full FAA certification is expected this summer.

The AT-503 is equipped with a 1,100-shp. Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-45R turboprop engine, a more powerful engine than on other Air Tractor spray aircraft. The engine is capable of driving the aircraft at level flight speeds of 215-mph. calibrated air speed, Leland Snow, company president, said.

Ayres plans to offer the State Dept. the same highly modified version of its \$395,500 base-cost Turbo Thrush that it sold the department in the past, including

seats for two crew, armor-plating and self-sealing long-range fuel tanks. It is powered by a 1,200-shp. Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-65R turboprop engine.


In addition to giving the aircraft the speed to minimize its exposure to antiaircraft fire, high engine power is necessary for adequate spray aircraft performance at the high altitudes and hot, humid conditions where narcotics crops are grown. Average air density altitude during State Dept. overseas drug eradication efforts is 6,000 ft. above sea level, which is an optimal growing altitude for opium poppies. Five-bladed propellers with low-tip speeds are used to reduce aircraft noise. The Turbo Thrushes regularly catch narcotics

farm personnel working in their fields, a situation the noisier State Dept. helicopters rarely encounter.

The majority of the State Dept.'s overseas herbicide applications are currently performed by helicopter, using approximately 36 single-engine Bell 206 Jet-Rangers and LongRangers. The move to higher-speed fixed-wing spray aircraft is helping cut State Dept. costs. The operating expense of a fixed-wing spray aircraft averages one-fourth that of a helicopter for approximately the same initial acquisition outlay. Fixed-wing spray aircraft also are more than six times as productive as small helicopters in the drug eradication role and are reliable enough to require no backup aircraft. The Turbo Thrushes operating with the State Dept. have never missed a scheduled mission due to a maintenance problem.

Depending on the arrangement with the host country, defoliation missions are flown either by U. S., host country or a mix of U. S. and host country crews. Aircraft operation is similar. The State Dept. gives the fixed-wing spray aircraft to some countries, loans the aircraft to other countries and acts as a visiting eradication team for a third group.

The traveling eradication team concept is especially cost-effective as a small group of Turbo Thrush spray aircraft require an average of less than two weeks to spray most countries' narcotics crops. They can then wash out and refill their chemical hoppers with fuel and ferry to another location a significant distance away. With a hopper fuel load, the PT6A-65R-powered Turbo Thrush is capable of flying a San Francisco, Calif., to Honolulu, Hawaii, leg. □



DRUG WARS: A SHAN EXPOSÉ OF KMT TRAFFICKERS

(T.R.C.) APRIL 29, 1986

(~~NOT CONFIDENTIAL~~)

To
Concerned Authorities.

DETERMINED TO BE
ADMINISTRATIVE MARKING
E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect. 3.3(c)
BY NARA *dh* DATE 2/19/10

Special Information on the CPB + ex-KMT + Wa (WNA) activities.

On 9th. February 1986, a Thai newspaper said that two Thai soldiers were killed by SUA troops in Chaingrai district and on the 14th. April 1986 said that the bomb blast at Ban Nong Cok, Chiangdao Township which killed over fourteen and injured more than 60 people, was caused by SUA - now renamed SSA after merger with the TRC.

To clear SUA's name and have all authorities concerned know the truth of these false informations in the newspaper :-----

(a) The death of the two Thai soldiers had its beginning when in late January 1986, an opium caravan of ex-KMT (93rd. Army) together with WNA, CPB and pro-CPB-SSA headed for Thailand from the Shan State. Upon nearing the Thai border, this convoy of drug-traffickers were intercepted and attacked by the new SSA troops in early February 1986, causing them to split into several groups. On the 7th. February, one of these CPB combined groups crossed into Thailand near Saen Huang Koh, Tambon Mae Kham, Amphur Mae Chan, Changwat Chaingrai. At that time, the two Thai soldiers happened to be around the same area and fell into the hands of this intruding group. Fearing that Thai authorities would know about their connections with the CPB and drug smuggling, this Wa and ex-KMT splinter group killed to silence the two Thai soldiers mentioned above.

(b) Concerning the bomb-blast at Ban Nong Uk, Chiangdao Township on the 14th. April '86, hidden reasons and motives connects it to the Thai Government order for the complete disarming and issuing National Registration Cards to ex-KMTs living on Thai soil. ex-KMT General Li, due to ill health and old age feared that he would face grave trouble with the Thai authorities if they knew his ex-KMT (93rd. Army)'s connection with CPB in narcotics trafficking which is against Thailand's policy, tried to retire from being the Commander of the ex-KMT (93rd. Army). Knowing of this, the WNA + CPB and pro-CPB(SSA) also feared that General Li's retirement would deprive them of his influential support and a base-camp along the Thai border. So they planned and created a terrorist-like bomb blast incident during the new year fair at Ban Nong Uk which is one of General Li's ex-KMT refugee village, in order to make General Li angry and further support them against the new SSA with misunderstanding.

Why did this incident occur at Ban Nong Uk, a place heavily guarded by ex-KMTs and Thai soldiers and not at other loosely guarded ex-KMT or WNA encampment like Ban Mae Chan Luang near Mae Chan where it would be much easier to do so ?

The new-SSA says it has evidences to prove that the ex-KMT, Ai-Shao-Sur's WNA troops went to Pang Sang (CPB stronghold in Eastern Shan State). Together with the CPB troops brought opium and heroin base to Thailand.

(1) In the month of January 1986, CPB troops headed by YANG PHOI and pro-CPB(SSA) 805th. Battalion headed by SHWE HLA, altogether 390 strong came down from Pang Sang heading for the Thai border. New-SSA troops attacked them on 1st. February '86 near PHOM PA KHEM. On the 3rd. Feb. '86 they crossed in Thailand at DOI ANG KHANG, Fang township.

(2) On 13th. February '86, new-SSA troops attacked an opium convoy of CPB's 086th. Battalion headed by CHAO TSENG WEI @ CHAO CHEN numbering more than (100) at HUEY YAO, Muang Yong area. On 21st. Feb. '86, they entered Ban Muser Kuie near Doi Sam Sow in Thailand. On 23rd. Feb. '86, they were transported from Ban San Ton Lu in Mae Ai township in two trucks (One Dyna and one white 4-wheel Toyota) through Muang Fang to Tam Ngob. On 25th. Feb '86, Thai village militias captured (16) of CPB's 086th. Batln. remnants at Ban Lao Ta and turned over to the Mae Ai Thai police who released them in the same evening with their weapons consisting of three M22s, two M21s, one M16 and one RPG.

(3) On the 24th. Feb. '86, a clash between troops of new-SSA and CPB's 086th. Batln. plus WNA about 200 strong headed by AI PALUR and CHANG CHUNG MING who came through Hua Mae Kham, Doi Khek and Doi Ong Long occurred near the border. And again near the border village of Saen Muang Koh. Three new-SSA men were wounded and six CPB killed after which they proceeded to Ban Muser Kuie and Mae Chan Luang in Thailand.

(4) On the 27th. April '86, more than (100) troops from CPB's 86th. Battln. crossed Ban Ho Pang and Ho Yawd between Mong Sat and Mong Ton in the Shan State carrying opium and heading for Tam Ngob and Doi Ang Khang in Thailand.

(5) About (300) men from the CPB and pro-CPB(SSA) headed by KAI FAH carrying opium, crossed the Nam Kyang to Kengtung motor-road near Kho Lam in Loilem District on the 27th. April '86. Troops from WNA and ex-KMT at Doi Ang Khang in Thailand led by TIEN TSE WEN and WEI HSIU MIN numbering over (100) went up to join them near Mong Kang on the bank of the Salween river, deep into the Shan State north-west of Mong Ton. These troops, undoubtedly will be heading in the same direction as before.... that is Doi Ang Khang in Thailand.

More than (200) men from ex-KMT (93rd. Army) and Maha Sang's WNA are now living at Ban Mae Aw Mai, Changwat Maehong-Son in Thailand. Mixture of ex-KMTs and CPB troops of Wa is under the command of TIEN TZU YUNG and TIEN KUANG MING are also drug traffickers. Their financial supporters are the three brothers named WEI HSIANG LUNG, WEI HSIANG KANG and WEI HSIANG YING who are popularly known as the Wei brothers. Their usual hide-out and dwelling place is a canning factory at Ban Yang, Muang Fang township. The manager of that canning factory is a nephew of the Wei brothers, married to a Ban Yang village girl whose step-father is named KYAN KUO CHI. Kyan Kuo Chi owns a lychee orchard in Ban Yang and was a former KMT officer under General Li's command. The Wei brothers have a new house near Kyan Chi's house. The one who helps the Wei brothers keep their opium and heroin drugs is named HO CHING TSAO whose house is also in Ban Yang. CHANG TZU TUNG, who transports arms, ammo and chemicals from Ban Yang to Doi Ang Khang lives at Doi Ang Khang and was once General Li's wireless operator who now owns a small guest house at Doi Ang Khang. AH HUNG and TIEN YUN LIENG alias AH LIENG who lives on the road that leads from Suan Dok to Chiangmai University are responsible for transporting their heroin from Ban Yang to Chiangmai. A tea dealer named CHANG HSIANG CHING whose tea factory is at Doi Saket helps in handling their money; a profitable job which enabled him to build a house worth about two million Bahts at Hong Hoi. In Chiangmai, Saya Pao or Chai Pao from the Wa group and CHU HSIANG PING (chinese) help the Wei brothers make contacts and arrangement with Thais and Army Rangers to conspire with them in transporting heroin. The Wei brothers' business accountant is LI KUANG TSO who lives in Chiangmai frequently visiting Bangkok and Ban Yang. The people involved together with men from WNA + CPB + pro-CPB(SSA) and ex-KMTs now number more than (500) and are active in Thailand and along the Thai-Burma border.

Mixture of ex-KMTs and Wa from Loi (Doi) Hin in the northern Shan State near Shan State - China border, headed by AI SHAO SUR have their centre at San Ton Lu, Thaton, Muser Kuie and Mae Chan Luang in Chiangrai province. After General Li's ex-KMTs went to Pang Sang to become allies with the CPB's 86th. Battalion, over (400) CPBs mostly of Wa origins have come down to Thailand. At present, around Doi Ang Khang and Ban Muser Kuie in Thailand, there are more than (200) of Ai Shao Sur's men, over (150) pro-CPB(SSA) and (300) strong ex-KMTs..... altogether making up to over (1200) men. Ai Shao Sur and his wife LI YI Chin mostly live at Doi Mak Ang Khang in a new village by the chinese name of Kwon Wou Shin Chui.

CHI TSAO WEI, a former KMT works for Ai Shao Sur in Chiangmai. His house address is No. 121/17 Maha-nakhorn and those who live with him are mostly Was from the CPB.

This special information is being drawn out without prejudice against any individual or organization but with only the aim for concerned authorities to know the real truth.

by :-
A Special Correspondent,
in Chiangrai.

Date. 29th. April 1986.

LETTER FROM AN AMERICAN IN CHIANGMAI:
SHAN OPIUM PRODUCTION AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

JUNE 13, 1986

Living in the "Golden Triangle" (those portions of Burma, Laos and Thailand in which the opium poppy is grown) means that one is constantly aware of the drug problem. Almost daily the newspapers report a foreign traveler apprehended at Don Muang (Bangkok) Airport with drugs. Often acquaintances are found to be involved in one aspect of the drug traffic or another - from user to mule to dealer. In particular, the corruption which the trade engenders is startlingly apparent in a country whose people enjoy only a modest standard of living. The illegal wealth displayed by government officials, primarily the police, can only be explained by their being on the "take" and in many cases, using their official status to assist the drug dealers. Military and police vehicles are commonly used to transport drugs within the country. Forestry Department helicopters are reported to be the latest addition to the mobility of the drug traffickers. When the monthly salary of a police private is less than \$100.00 and other wage scales commensurate, it is easily seen that the corruptive influence of drug trafficking can render the entire civil and military service not only inefficient, but rotten and ready to fall to a governmental system different from that enjoyed at present.

Recently (1985-1986 poppy season) the Thai military engaged in an opium crop destruction program which finally put teeth in the many crop replacement programs that have been introduced in northern Thailand. These crop replacement programs have been successful, at least to the eyes of the layman. The Hmong, Lisu, and other hill-tribes which were formerly heavily engaged in growing opium poppy are now doing quite well raising vegetables,

coffee, tea and various fruits. They can market their crops because of a program to build access roads into the more remote areas. The opium crops destroyed were, for the most part, grown by "double-dippers"; tribesmen who were growing alternate crops and, because the government had not previously enforced the law, also growing opium poppy. It has been said that the poppy destruction was done on a "selective" basis. The fields were not destroyed because they were not profitable. This means that Thailand is still in the fight against opiates? Unfortunately, it must be that Thailand is moving from a "producer" to the status of a "consumer" of opiates. The ground is being gained. Why so? Poppy cultivation has been prohibited in Thailand for a number of years. Field Marshal Sarit outlawed it during the 1950s and since that time the trend in local production (acreage) of opium has been down. Fields of poppy that became adjacent to newly constructed roads had to be moved because of their being too obvious. In many cases these were the best fields and new ground was harder to cultivate and less productive. The demand caused by the increase in foreign tourists to the country placed pressure on the local supply. The embarrassment of seeing so many pictures of opium poppy and opium users printed in various foreign publications helped cause the Thai Government to enforce their own laws prohibiting cultivation.

It was the introduction of heroin, coincident with the Vietnam War, that caused an increase in the number of narcotic users in this country. Before heroin, the use of opium was generally confined to the older people, previously "legal" addicts and hill tribesmen. Smoking opium is a time-consuming occupation, addictive only after long exposure and it is not in consonance with the fast-paced modern society. Heroin, however, is very much the "fast-food" required by the modern user and extremely addictive after a very short exposure. Those who do not use the needle very much, they prefer to mix the heroin with tobacco and smoke it. The smoker of heroin can attain, in a few minutes, the same state of euphoria that takes an opium smoker several pipes. With the advent of heroin, Thailand's drug problem took on the same dimensions experienced in Western societies. Chinese chemists, imported from Hong Kong, made the heroin largely from imported opium and the dealers were not averse to selling it locally when the opportunity presented itself. The predominantly Chinese "connection" has no loyalty to move the product out of Thailand, their loyalty is to the profit motive. So, although Thailand produces less opium, it consumes more opiates in the form of "hard" drugs.

Contributing to the increase in drug use in Thailand was the introduction of a communist government in Laos and a socialist government in Burma. Neither of these governments make available the most basic necessities of life to their inhabitants. We are talking about cloth, needles, medicine, shoes, salt, sugar; if it is needed to complement a bare subsistence, it is not available. There are black markets operating in both countries with goods obtained from Thailand. In order to purchase

from these black markets, the Kachins, Shans, Wa, Lahu, Hmong and other hill-tribes of both Burma and Laos continue to raise the only cash crop they have had for the past hundred or so years - opium - which rapidly finds its way into the border region of Thailand. Why opium and not, say, rice or melons? There are a number of reasons:

(1) Opium can be grown as an additional crop, during a period when the land would otherwise be fallow (normally the "cold" season in SE Asia).

(2) Seeds from one crop can be saved and used for planting in subsequent years.

(3) It can be gathered and packaged entirely by the hill-tribe family, it requires no extra processing.

(4) It is, in comparison to its' value, small in size and weight and easy to transport. It travels well, usually in blocks of 1.6 kilogrammes (one vis), wrapped in locally produced mulberry paper.

(5) It can be kept for a long period of time - years - it can be buried, or otherwise hidden, and dug up with no appreciable loss of potency.

(6) It does not have to be taken to a market, invariably, the purchasers go to the source.

(7) Most importantly, it is used by the hill-tribes as a medicine (in many cases the only medicine they have). It stops diarrhea in children; it will stop pain from injuries or tooth-ache; it will keep a woman with stomach cancer from pain until she dies. Older people use it in the drug sense, dreaming away their days after a lifetime of hard work.

Is there a "natural" alternate cash crop? Unfortunately there is not. Tea, coffee and English walnuts are some of the viable alternate crops available to the tribesmen on the plateau of the Shan States but even these crops suffer in comparison with opium due to their bulk in transport. They are, however, being cultivated and moved into Thailand for sale. It must be realized that there is no market for vegetables and fruit in the Shan States and there is no road net-work by which to move these products to Rangoon or other cities. (Vegetables and fruit grown in the north of Thailand are distributed to Bangkok and points further south; some are even exported.) In the mountainous areas of Burma and Laos all transport is done by mule or horse, rarely can even two-wheeled carts be used.

Who are the hill-tribes? Almost invariably they have, at some time, been residents of China who for political reasons or from population pressure have been forced into the mountains of southern China, Burma, Laos, Vietnam and northern Thailand. In the case of the Shans of Burma, they are closely related to the

Thai of Thailand. The Shans are called: "Thai Yai" (Big Thai) and the Thais of Thailand: "Thai Noi" (Small Thai). The preponderance of the illegal opium available in SE Asia is grown in the Shan States of Burma. We are talking in the range of 400 tons of opium per year. The Shans have been in revolt against the Government of the Union of Burma since about 1958. This is true of most of the ethnic minorities in Burma, the: Wa, Kachin, Chin, Mon, Karen and Karenni have also been in rebellion against the Ne Win Government.

In order to grant independence to Burma after WWII the British first formed a government with a constitution which called for a plebiscite at the end of ten years. At that time, the States forming the Union of Burma were to decide whether or not they wanted to continue to be a part of the Union of Burma or secede and become a separate state(s). When the Ne Win government refused to allow the plebiscite, the States rebelled. With the exception of the Communist Party of Burma all of the various rebel groups are pro-western in their political outlook. To support their war against the Burmese, many of the rebel groups have used the profits from opium sales to purchase arms and equipment. The Karens do not because they are able, due to ease of transportation, to sell teak and other raw materials to the Thais. Some of the groups may obtain a certain amount of "venture capital" but they all tax the products sold on the black-market when they are carried through their areas of influence. The opium has been, for the most part, sold to various groups of Chinese. Both the Haw Chinese who have lived in the mountainous areas as long as the hill-tribes and the remnants of the KMT armies which came out of China in 1949 together with their Taiwanese and Hong Kong adjuncts, are the main purchasers and processors. Employing chemists from Hong Kong, they turn the opium into morphine and heroin and put it on the market. Quite often the Chinese operate in the areas controlled by the rebel groups; setting up their heroin distilleries and possibly obtaining guards from the rebels, but for the most part, there is a definite break in the distribution chain when the Chinese buyer takes over the opium to convert it into heroin. There may not be an Italian Mafia but there is definitely a Chinese one!

Approximately 1970-1971, Lester Wolfe, who was I believe, Head of the House Committee on SE Asian Affairs, considered the feasibility of purchasing the entire opium crop from the Shan Insurgents. It was decided not to do so because it would "just lead to the planting of more opium". Later the DEA types moved in like gangbusters and we began to see again the conspicuous display of wealth and property last noted when the CIA and Air America operatives were in Vientiane, Laos. The United States has placed DEA operatives in Thailand to assist the Thai Government. In addition embassy officials coordinate the entire anti-drug effort to include crop-replacement programs, promotion of public awareness to the drug problem, etc. The DEA is marginally effective and its operations by their very nature are a corruptive influence. I think that the figure is about 10% of the drugs being smuggled into America are apprehended by all of the law-

enforcement agencies. It is, however, an offensive weapon against drugs. This has tremendous political appeal. To be doing something, whether it works or not, is politically more effective than a activity. The problem is, as I see it, that the 90% of the drugs smuggled into the US were done so by corrupting a vast amount of people during all the steps required in the production of heroin. The chemicals needed to process the opium into morphine/heroin, are proscribed, possession is limited to legitimate use. This means that corruption starts by obtaining the chemicals, moving the chemicals from the dock area of Bangkok almost 1,000 kilometers north to the border region where they are used. It is almost as difficult for the traffickers to get the chemicals in as it is to get the drugs out! That they are successful in doing so indicates the degree of corruption practiced here. A law-enforcement agent who wouldn't fix a parking ticket for twenty dollars, will turn his head for five thousand and we are definitely talking "big bucks". Once a man has been corrupted he can be had again and again and usually for less and less - it is addictive.

What would be the cost of the Shan State opium crop? At recent border prices, the four hundred tons of opium would cost in the neighborhood of one hundred million dollars. Your staff should be able to find the equivalent US street value of forty metric tons of heroin. According to a recent news item, a heroin find in Holland placed the Dutch price at about \$100,000.00 per kilo - that means the 40 tons would be worth roughly 4 billion dollars. Golden Triangle heroin is almost 99% pure whereas street "smack" is generally cut with powdered milk, quinine, sugar etc. to where it is 99% impure. Many foreign users OD here because of the purity of local heroin.

What would be done with the opium purchased? Sell it to medical supply houses or to the Australians who are raising poppy in a big way in Tasmania. If nothing else crops up, burn the stuff.

Could a purchase be made? The same person who offered it to Lester Wolfe is now the head of the TRA (Tai Revolutionary Army) and contact can be made with him. Khun Sa, aka Chiang Chi Fu, is the "Opium King" of the Golden Triangle. Notice that he is not called the "Heroin King" because he doesn't run the refineries, and claims that he has never done so. The TRA is presently mounting an operation to close off the entire cross border opium trade into Thailand to increase its' profits and leverage.

What would the TRA do with the proceeds of a sale? Buy the guns and other military necessities to continue waging a war of rebellion against the Burmese. They will do this regardless of who buys the crop. They are, however, committed to educating their people and finding alternative crops for them.

Would a pre-emptive purchase be cost-effective? If there is a desire to dry up the supply of heroin from this part of the

world, then it would be effective. When 4 billion dollars worth of narcotics can be removed from the market for an expenditure of only 100 million, it is cost effective! The bulk of the heroin produced in the Golden Triangle probably goes to/through Europe and Australia so our allies should be happy to participate in such a program.

Is the purchase of the opium morally justifiable? Since the planters of the poppy are following a traditional method of obtaining cash; since the sellers of the opium are engaged in a just war of rebellion against a socialist government illegally imposed upon them; and, since the purpose of the purchase is to remove the heroin from the hands of criminals, I believe it is morally justified. Certainly, the morality of having agents from the US, Australia, Holland, Germany and France assigned to Thailand and attempting various forms of entrapment on drug users from their respective countries, is questionable. Further, I feel that the purchase of cocoa-paste in South American should be explored to see if a similar condition exists.

How effective would a pre-emptive purchase be in stopping the SE Asia heroin trade? I feel that initially about 75% of the Shan State opium crop could be purchased. As the TRA grows stronger through both political maneuvering and weapons purchased from the profits of pre-emptive sales, the amount of opium purchased should reach the 90% figure. For all intents and purposes SE Asian heroin would be eliminated.

What happens if there is an increase in opium production as was previously feared? First, a slight increase should be expected because these people have been starving for money and what it can purchase for a long time. Secondly, after two or three years, there would be no other purchasers still in being; this would give the pre-emptive purchasers a monopoly status to manipulate both the quantity and the price. Finally, after three or five years, if there was not an agreed upon reduction in the amount of opium being produced in the Shan States, a refusal to purchase would destroy the opium based economy and make any effort to sell to illegal buyers an easy target for law enforcement officials. Naturally there should be assistance offered the TRA and other groups to establish either alternate crops or some other means of livelihood.

The loudest objections to a pre-emptive purchase of Golden Triangle opium will come from those with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo: DEA and the Department of State. Both of these agencies have "seen the light at the end of the tunnel" more times than General Westmoreland. Putting it simply, if there was no heroin being manufactured because of a pre-emptive purchase of opium, there would be no need for DEA, now would there?

Supporting the Government of Burma in a campaign to spray with herbicide the fields of the minorities in the Shan States is immoral and that is what we are now doing. These fields on which

the opium poppy is grown are the same fields used for rice, maize and other subsistence crops. They are not like the lava beds of northern California which are unsprayed for fear of contaminating the marijuana with paraquat! Shades of Agent Orange!!

The answer to the drug problem in the US is surely not in a failed program of legalization; experience with the English program has shown that legalization is an unworkable solution. Enforcement alone does not work, the US record of 10% interception has proven that. Education and control of the user group in a free society is impossible; it is time to try another means, a market means of establishing a monopoly and then controlling, not the price but the product by destroying the product.

THE SHAN STATE THEIR CASE:
SHAN HISTORY AND NARCOTICS POLICY

(T.R.C. SPEECH, FEBRUARY 20, 1986)

" TAI-LAND REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S (T.R.C.)"
EXPLANATORY SPEECH DELIVERED TO THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
on 20th. February, 1986.

Honoured guests and officials !

On behalf of the Shan State and her people, we sincerely wish to express our pride and gratitude to have your presence here in our humble camp. It is due to our common purpose :-

" the control and eradication of narcotic drugs in the so-called Golden Triangle" that we have all come to gather here to-day.

First of all, before coming to our main point, I would like to provide you with a brief review of our (Shan State) historical background which is most essential for the understanding of this occasion. I am sure you have already heard some of the facts beforehand, but as an active participant for a justifiable cause, my rendering of these facts would be in a more connected context, beneficial to all.

To eradicate opium and bring a successful end to the drug question in the so-called BURMA, we must first find and analyse the causes. Any non-partisan observer would invariably have found that the opium issue has clung to and grown upon the tree of political instability and economic insecurity in the so-called Union of Socialist Republic, Burma. Without these eco-politic instability, a parasitic phenomenon, the drug problem has nothing to live on but to wither and die. The Shan State people's desired solution is to bring an end to the political issue of Shan State's Freedom, while on the other hand, the opium problem can be easily and effectively controlled and eliminated with much less demands on the American tax-payers' money annually.

So, let us examine the causes which have led to the political instability in the so-called "Socialist Republic of Burma", which in turn have nurtured the growth of drug problems. To cure ^{an} illness, one must know it's cause before applying the right remedy. Who are these Shan State people whose opium are said to be posing a great threat no less than that of a nuclear war ? Why do the Shan State people grow opium and Do they really like to grow opium ?----- Alas, the answering voices of the Shan State people to the people of the world is being made unknown by the Burmese Way to Socialism.

The Shans (Tai), like other non-Burmese races in the so-called Burma are generally categorised as "minorities". But this term is being challenged by a few irrefutable facts. From the State of Assam in India to the Kachin State of Burma and to the Yunnan Province of China, the number of Shans who call themselves "TAI" --- i.e. the Free --- amount to not less than (50) million. Adding the Laos and the Thais, the Shans or "Tai" living in Asia would be no less than -100- million. (The word "SHAN" itself is a Burmese corruption of the term -"SIAM"- which was Thailand's old official name). Therefore, the term "minority" is better fitted to the Burmese themselves whose number does not exceed -20- million. These Shan people, contrary to general notions do not consider themselves as Burmese. By flesh and blood, language and culture, they are definitely of a different stock altogether.

The Shans migrated from their birth-place, the Al-tai Mountains of Mongolia, millenniums ago. The Shans founded many a prosperous kingdom in the land now called "China" long before these were eventually absorbed by the Chinese with their sheer numbers. ("The Tai Race" - William Clifton Dodd).

The Shans (Tai) have been here in the Shan State for more than two thousand years ago. Muang Nai, a southern city, was built in B.C. 519; Hsen-wi, in the north in B.C. 441; and Hsi-paw, also in the north in B.C. 423 in a period when Burma was a term yet to be mentioned in any historical records, proving the originality and historical ownership of the Shan State people over Shan State in the so called "to-day's Burma".

There is also a misunderstood term which should be made right:- " The Golden Triangle" (well known BUT well misinterpreted). This area does not comprise of the tri-border regions between Burma (Shan State), Laos and Thailand as is generally understood, but the whole of the Shan State itself which is triangular in shape with it's base in the west and the apex in the east, full of undeveloped and untapped agricultural mineral resources. Mr. Adrian Cowell, a British Film Producer who made two well-known documentary films on the Shan State, "The Unknown War" in 1967 and the "Opium Warlords" in 1973. The camera-man was Mr. Chris Menges whose recent film "The Killing Fields" won him an Oscar in 1984. This fact is a reminder of the prevailing sheer ignorance of the opium-heroin issue.

In fact, nothing much is known about the so-called Burma since no one is allowed by Rangoon to travel freely or permitted to carry out independent studies of conditions and situations within Burma. Yet, Foreign donor-countries' stand is amazing :- which is, everything must be according to what Rangoon says, because Rangoon says so. In their "desperation", they have completely forgotten about their own saying :- "Everyone is innocent until proved guilty". The Shan State people's side of the coin is being completely ignored and the people night and day are being persecuted by the Burmese, aided and abetted by the champions of the Human Rights. Despite the UN's Human Rights Declaration, we are barred from being "entitled to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal in the determination of any criminal charges" against the Shan State people.

68% of the population of the Shan State are ethnic Tais. The rest is made up of Paos, Palaungs, Was, Kachins, Lahus, Lisaw (Lisu) etc.

As records show, the Burmese who are the late comers and the Shans have alternately governed the "Burma Proper" of the olden days. In order to save time, I shall jump over to the 19th. Century. BY 1882, the Shans had successfully freed themselves from Burmese Supremacy. Then in 1885, after "Burma Proper" was completely colonized by the British, they turned their eyes towards the East. They were afraid that the Shan State, strategically positioned, would be taken over by the French who were also expanding their colonies from the East, having annexed Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and part of Thailand. This prompted the British to draw what they called "Plans for establishing British influence in the Shan States during the open season of 1887". This resulted in the Shan leaders accepting the Union Jack and the status of a Protectorate in 1887. This historical point is important, because it shows that the Shan State as a separate entity, did not become a colony together with the "Burma Proper".

Eversince then, more and more foreign travellers had the opportunity to observe the Shan people. They invariably agreed that the Shans "are the most peace-loving people"; "the people who trust everybody and envy nobody"; "that they are very religious with little desire for worldly riches though their land is rich in minerals". True to their observations, the British had to use only a handful of armed men to be able to exert their authority in the Shan State. Therefore, it is self-evident that the reasons for the Shan State people's armed up-rising which exploded in 1958 was not triggered off by warlike intentions or greed which are foreign to the Shan State people's nature, but because of the intolerable and inhumanistic conditions created by the Burmese who appointed themselves masters of the country after the British departure.

With the British decision to depart from her colonies and Protectorates after WW-II. and the Allied Declaration to grant Independence to their subjects who fought for the Allied cause, the Shan State people legally became entitled to have a free and independent country status. But due to being a land-locked country, the Shans were concerned about whether to go it alone or join others for common security and prosperity.

Meanwhile, the Burmese were also well aware that alone, they would have a difficult time fighting for survival. They wanted the Shan State and the Karrennis (later renamed Kayah) as parts of Burma, knowing the strategical position and the invaluable natural resources to be tapped. Wily political courtship by the Burmese leaders led to the convening of the Multi-Nationalities Conference at Pang-long Town, in the Southern Shan State during the month of February, 1947. On the 6th. Feb. '47. it was unanimously agreed that Independence would be speedily achieved if a form of togetherness and single-mindedness was shown. The Shan State people leaders' condition of the utmost importance for the future of the Shan State was "the Burmese acceptance of the Shan State's right to secede, if and whenever the Shan State people chooses". General Aung Sann, then the Burmese leader who was assassinated in the same year, agreed to the Shans' demand. The result was the "PANG=LONG" Agreement which was signed on the 12th. February, 1947 and included in Chapter X of ^{of the} First Constitution of the newly formed Union of Burma, it was provided for the Shan State and Kayah (another independent land) the right to secede after a 10 years trial period within the Union. It was really a deal for the Burmese; had they

been less magnanimous, they would not have won the trust of the Frontier people (as they were called in those days). The internaleco~~o~~political events which took place in the Union of Burma within the agreed trial period of 10 years clearly shows the gradual upheaval and disintegration within the Union of Burma.

Soon after the declaration of Independence of the Union of Burma on January the 4th. 1948, the Karen rebellion broke out. The Burmese Government, in its infant stage, was helpless and Rangoon itself was in danger of falling into the hands of the Karens, who were angry and eager for a taste of revenge against the Burmese. As their victory drew nearer, the Karens approached the Shans to join hands. They told the Shans that the Burmese were never to be trusted because they could not and would not keep their promises whatsoever. But the Shans turned down their offer because to a Shan " A promise is a promise; a promise is what makes up a man. The Burmese must be given a chance to show their sincerity.

Following the Shans' refusal, the Karen Uprising was defeated and they steadily had to withdraw to the mountains and jungles to continue their fight up to this very day. The Burmese failed to reciprocate the Shans' goodwill towards them in their conflict with the Karens, while trying to consolidate their hold over the Shan State, thereby leading towards armed confrontations.

Even before Independence, the Burmese began to introduce a variety of political parties with their conflicting ideologies into the Shan State with the aim to destroy the Shan State people's cohesiveness. Almost all at once, the Shan State people found themselves face to face with their wives who refused to share the same bed; their children who refused to share the same roofs and their own villagers who refused to attend the same market and monasteries, all because of their different party affiliations. Inevitably bloodshed followed.

Again, with Burmese instigations, the PaO minority in the Shan State took to rebellion in 1949, ostensibly against Feudalism but later deteriorated into a racial conflict. Historically, the PaOs had their own land and kingdom in lower Burma. Their last King, Manuha was defeated and taken prisoner by the Burmese King Anawgatha around the 11th. century. Due to Burmese atrocities, many PaOs fled their homeland in the Thaton - Sittaung region and fled to sanctuary in the Shan State which was kindly provided by the Shans. We have lived together for over nine hundred years in peace and mutual goodwill. It was very treacherous of the Burmese to kindle the rebellion which was later seen by both sides as non-benefitting but only a self-destructing act to set the stage for further Burmese encroachments.

At that same period, the Communist victory in Mainland China drove the defeated KMT troops into the neighbouring countries, including the Shan State. On the pretext of a foreign military threat towards the Shan State of the Union of Burma, the Burmese sent their military forces throughout the whole of the Shan State and established military-command bases in strategic towns. The Shan State Government became merely a meaningless governing body, powerless to do anything against the rape of Shan State by the Burmese until the present day.

Since then, numerous acts of human rights violations in contrary to legal rights provided by the Constitution were inflicted by the Burmese upon the Shan State people, whom they look-down upon as inferior human-beings to be treated like brainless animals.

Thus, in 1957 with the 1958 Ten Years Trial Period deadline approaching, the Shan State people began to make open reviews on the pros and cons, the losses and the gains during the ten years of co-existence as the Union of Burma. A National Conference was held in Muang Yai, a northern town, to discuss the big question, all in accordance with the legal provisions. U Nu, the then Prime Minister, flew to Lashio, the northern Shan State capital, to dissuade the Shan State leaders.

He called a public meeting where he threatened to go " Lincoln's way" should the Shan State people decided to secede from the Union. Many ways were used by the Burmese Government to disrupt and make the National Conference a failure, nevertheless a unanimous decision to forward the question to the Shan State Supreme Legislature or the Shan State Council in Taung-gyi, which was due to hold session on 20th. September of the same year.

On September 19th. 1957, PM U Nu arrived in Taung-gyi and invited the Shan State leaders to a dinner party on the same evening. It was there that he virtually ordered the Shan State leaders not to bring forward the question of secession on the following days. Any discussant should be regarded as the nation's No. 1 enemy. To make sure, U Nu ordered the Burma Army troops to occupy the environs of the Shan State Council, forbidding the Shan State MPs from entering or leaving, not to say about holding a session. Many Shan State MPs and leaders were arrested, some killed or disappeared without any trace and many fled to escape detention.

The Burmese had done all these in violation of the Shan State people's constitutional rights. So what alternate choice had the Shan State people to get back their constitutional rights. Some Shan State leaders and people despising violence thought of peaceful means :- i.e. to go halfway and not to demand complete secession which was their full right but to ask for an equal status. The result was the Constitutional Amendment Movement which was supported throughout the Union of Burma then. The chief demands were :-

1. Burma proper itself to become a constituent state.
2. Equal powers to both Houses (the Upper house being comparable to the US Senate.)
3. Equal representation in the Upper House.

PM U Nu made pretenses to support the Amendment Movement and invited the leaders of all the nationalities to Rangoon with the aim for an easy swoop on their dull-witted opponents, as subsequent events proved. Just before the momentous day on which the historic meeting was to be convened, power was quietly handed over to General Ne Win (C in C) who at once took over the reins with alacrity. On March-2nd. 1962, Gen. Ne Win staged a coup d'etat, arrested the Shan State leaders and other political leaders and abolished the National Constitution.

Some leaders disappeared altogether and were never seen alive or ever heard of again, while many spent years behind bars without trial. The only way out for the Shan State people left was the one they were trying to avoid at all cost, leading to the vigorous armed resistance movement in the Shan State starting from 1958.

It was no less just than the 13 American States which overthrew the British power; no less just than the guerrillas fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan and those against the Vietnamese in Cambodia. All of them have the common root of injustice which is the main cause of political instability in Burma today. The narrow-mindedness of the Burmese, their supra-nationalism; their ultra-reliance of the military power to forcefully change everything and everybody towards their Burmese Way to Socialism; their unrealistic socio-economic policies through mismanagement and incompetence..... coupled with the Communist Party of Burma's (CPB) Agrarian Reform in the Shan State during the 50s and their subsequent subversive policies, all added to exacerbate the situation and create the chaos in Burma. Undeniably today, blackmarketeering is the life-saving bloodline of Burma's economy. This will always be the case until the Rangoon Government heeds and gives the legal democratic rights of the people in the Union.

Here, I would like to introduce you with an outline of the Shan State Resistance Movement which had culminated in the recent National Unification and the establishment of the Tai-land Revolutionary Council (T.R.C.) which is the sole War-time Provisional Government of the people of the Shan State. This outline is also aimed to give interested observers a better understanding of the past and present situation.

The Shan State Resistance Movement was first launched on the 21st. of May 1958, headed by Sao Noi (a Shan Yunnanese). His was the only organization in the whole of Shan State known by the name "Hoom Sirk Han" (NSH = Young Brave Warriors) to which all the Shan armed groups rallied. But due to the Shan State people's lack of political maturity, the Burmese attempts to drive a wedge in the movement succeeded. The NSH disintegrated into numerous armed bands after Sao Noi and the Students' faction failed to reconcile. Our present leader, PM Korn Jerng (then only 33 yrs.) tried desperately to mediate both sides for a compromise, but it was in vain. The consequence was costly and far-reaching upon the Shan State Resistance Movement, stretching it to more than a quarter of a century.

Then, in 1967, came the anti-Chinese Riots in Rangoon which resulted in China severing diplomatic relations with the Ne Win Regime and openly recognising the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) with full military and logistical aids. With these backings, the CPB settled down to influence the Shan State Resistance Movement. In unison with the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) it also tried to engineer the Shan State Resistance Movement back into the Burmese path of control. Knowing the Shans needed arms, it offered to give arms at the expense of their basic principles :-

The acceptance of "local autonomy" in lieu of their previous "Independence" and the acceptance of the Shan State as a "part of Burma". As a result, the Shan State Resistance Movement split into two main factions :::: the pro- CPB and the anti-CPB.

Initially, the latter was militarily weaker and the Shan State might have fallen to the CPB backed faction during these years were it not for a break-up between the CPB and its allies in 1977 which was really a Godsnt Blessing for the Shan State people as a whole. Later, together with the demise of the Gang of Four in China, who were the main backers of the CPB and the failure of the CPB's shortsighted policies, they steadily lost all of their influence in the Shan State, making the people look up towards their own people for leadership.

This put the Burmese into a jam. Unless they could invent a new strategem, a new twist, the BSPP - CPB secret co-operation to corner the Shans was doomed to failure. But with the rising tide of the world'd anti-feelings towards drug abuse, the Burmese had no trouble in finding another trick. In fact, it became the best trick they had ever employed so far.

They began to make efforts to turn this atmosphere against the Shan State people. (As PM Korn Jerng often says :- "It is the Burmese job to plaster their enemies, especially the Shans, a bad name. Their intention clearly is to drown the Shan State in a wave of worldwide anti-narcotic sentiments.") With expertise and cunning, they started to sell their made-up facts to the world which in essence is :- " The world suffers because of the Shan State's opium. This drug issue will only be settled when the Shans are wiped out." Maybe, the Burmese are applying the Adolf Hitler's way to eliminate the Jews as to the Shans.

The implication is simple :- Rangoon can never hope to win the Shan State people's support legally, so it uses the surest and easiest method of GUN-POWER. To achieve military victory, fund is needed. And to obtain funds from abroad, it needs a scapegoat, for which the Shan State people fits exactly their need. For it should be remembered that when the Ne Win Regime talk about " fighting opium", in effect it means to fight the National Liberation Movement and killing the forces supporting them, that is the citizens of the Shan State.

For the Shan State people, it is not that they grow opium in order to become rich at the expense of the wretched heroin addicts of the world. They grow opium because they need the money to buy the barest essentials of life; because opium has been one of their dependable cashcrop at all times while other agricultural products fluctuates according to the government economic policy. The opium problem in fact is rooted in the political and economic mismanagement by Rangoon which among others, created a stagnant and sinking economy and widespread poverty.

But disturbingly, credence have been given by some foreign government to the allegations made by Rangoon :- "Shans equals opium and drug-trafficking"! This implies that the eradication of opium and drug-trafficking will be brought about with the elimination of the Shan State people. It is exasperating because some sections of the free world are accepting as a fact what in reality is a politically motivated slander made by one warring party to discredit its enemies. This problem has been the creation of Rangoon. They are fully responsible for the growth of the problem. Yet, when the world became aware of it, they have tried to put all the blame on us, giving us no chance to defend ourselves. They have led the world to consider us the guilty party. We have been tried, convicted and sentenced to death in our absence. Is that the way of the free world who cherishes above all else "human rights" ?

But infatuation with anger alone cannot solve this problem but will only aggravate the trouble and eventually play us down into Burmese hands again.

The point was to immediately find a way out of this bad image, change the bad feelings of the world into good feelings and win their help to regain our human image. And if we could put forward more viable alternatives than that of the Burmese which obviously was not the right way to deal with things. It is a universal fact that it is not necessary to kill off the bees to obtain the sweet honey. To get the desired results with opium too, it is most essential to take the humanistic feelings into consideration which the Shan State people will have to present to the world.

The first step for the Shan State people was Unification. So, the nation-wide call for Unity was sounded off by PA Korn Jerng, the then Chairman of the Shan United Revolutionary Army (S.U.R.A.), a (33) years veteran of the struggle for Shan State's freedom, on June 16th. 1983. He invited all groups and individuals "who love their nation, people, culture and religion; all those who oppose the CPB and the BSPP; all those who advocate the principle of total Independence "to join him in founding a Revolutionary Council as the highest organ of the Shan State for the successful accomplishment of the Resistance war.

This call resulted in founding the Tai-land Revolutionary Council (TRC) on April 1st. 1984 with SURA and SSA combined. But SUA, although they had accepted all the four conditions for Unity was still in deliberation due to understandable reasons. They wished to know what the TRC's stand on the Shan State drug issue. TRC's response was clear-cut. On April 4th. 1984 the unanimous resolution was passed to support the free world in the drive for the eventual eradication of narcotics. The TRC expressed its goodwill and sincerity to the world by putting to the torch 70 kgs. of heroin-base and raw opium (captured from a CPB caravan along the Shan State - Thailand border) on July - 4th. 1984. The SUA agreed with the action taken by TRC but still wish to know the steps the Shan State people should take before complete eradication is achieved.

The result was the TRC's announcement of the two-phased plan for the Control and Eradication of Opium in the Shan State" on the 7th. November, 1984. which in brief demands :-

First Phase : CONTROL STAGE.

1. To make a careful survey of the total amount of drug output in the Shan State and of those that enter from external sources.
2. To make a thorough survey of the opium trade network operating in the Shan State.
3. To put all the traders in the Shan State under TRC's control.

Second Phase: ERADICATION STAGE.

1. To give these traders substitute trading means to replace their drug trading.
2. To give the real genuine poppy farmers compensationable income earning substitute crops or livelihoods.
3. To take action and forcefully annihilate all illegal cultivations, refinings and trades.

This plan signifies a different approach to the problem, that is, to settle the problem without having the Shan State people being slaughtered by the Burmese under a masked pretext. Convinced of the TRC's approach, the SUA finally signed an agreement to join the TRC as a co-founder on the 3rd. March, 1985. In accordance with the terms of the agreement (which was named the "Salween Agreement") a National Unity Conference was held on the 24th. March-1985 which elected the "Shan State United Patriotic Council" (SSUPC), being the Legislative Body of the Shan State during the Resistance war. Later on 21st. July, 1985 the TRC convened another historic meeting which formed an Interim Government of the Shan State.

General Korn Jerng became the head of the Shan State Government and General Khun Sa became the Chief of Staff of the combined SURA, SSA, SUA forces which was renamed the Shan State Army (SSA).

TRC's upholds the Four Sacred Ideals of (1) Country, (2) People, (3) Culture and (4) Religion as the concrete foundations.

TRC adheres to the "Five Guiding Principles" of :-

- (1) Anti-Communism (i.e. anti-CPB and anti-BSPP), (2) Total Independence, (3) Democracy, (4) Unity and (5) Peace.

TRC also advocates the "Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence of the 1955 Bandung Resolution" as its guidelines on foreign policy.

To conclude, TRC has taken significant steps during the last two years. But many things still awaits to be done, especially the solving of the drug question and the achievement of Independence and Peace for the Shan State people, both of which are inseperable.

We have drawn up what we cohsider a realistic "Programme for the Control and Eradication of Drugs in the Shan State". But in order to put it into practice, it is essential that we first the bordering areas between Thailand and the Shan State become under our control. Only by doing so can the Shan State people succeed in supervising the trans-border drug trade, which is the important initial step towards ultimate eradication.

Meanwhile we have been under heavy attack from the pro-CPB elements illegally residing in Thai territory.(i.e. the ex-KMT and the so called WNO (Wa National Organization). Both are ostensibly anti-communist and anti-narcotics but in reality endeavouing to resurrect the dying CPB which is desperate to secure a sanctuary along the Thai border through friendly elements for both economic and political reasons.

(a) to establish viable income through drug trade;

(b) to establish co-ordination and co-operation with CPB.

For the Shan State people, it would amount to committing genocide should they ever allow it to happen.

To avoid unnecessary bloodshed, TRC has tried it's utmost to draw the so called ex-KMTs and the WNO away from the CPB and join forces with TRC. However, TRC's friendly and brotherly persuasions were turned down by both groups because of their pride and prejudice. In response they attacked TRC's outlying camps starting from the month of March, 1985, to which our reactions have only been purely defensive in nature up to the present day. However, the so called ex-KMTs and the WNO misinterpreted our goodwill for a weakness. This was the reason why in mid-January, a 300 strong detachment made up from the four organizations (CPB, the pro-CPB Shan State Progressi e Party, WNO and the so-called ex-KMTs) made their journey towards the Thailand border, each carrying a back-pack of either raw opium or heroin base.

Prompt action was needed to counter this move and military units were set into motion to intercept these down-coming CPB troops, resulting in the capturing of some prisoners and a small amount of drugs and explosives. These captured prisoners and drugs are at your disposal to study and examine at will and we sincerely hope for all international and government agencies concerned to re-consider the best way to deal with our common enemy :- NARCOTICS. As for the so-called ex-KMTs and WNC, their exploitations of the Thai people and the Royal Government's goodwill should be examined for the security, peace and prosperity of both countries.

Lastly, we thank you all for your esteemed presence and kind assistance in attending this meeting and we sincerely hope that all have brought a better understanding of the Siam State situation.

Thank-you all.

Spokesman,
Thailand Revolutionary Council.

BURMA FRONTIER INSURGENCY

Edith T. Mirante
June, 1986

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CONTENTS

PREFACE.....1

MAP OF BURMA.....3

BACKGROUND ON BURMA.....4

THE INSURGENTS.....13

NARCOTICS AND THE INSURGENCY.....28

THE INSURGENCY AND FOREIGN RELATIONS.....34

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....39

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY.....41

APPENDIX: SELECTED NEWS ARTICLES.....43

PREFACE

"In Burma, what has occurred is the confining of the Burmese state to a narrow band of territory generally following the Irrawaddy Valley and some adjacent areas, while surrounding this, in hill areas, more than twelve hill peoples' national groups (Kachins, Karens, Chins, Shans et al), through low-level insurgencies, maintain de facto independence."

-- Srikant Dutt, "The Burmaization of North India", Frontier (Calcutta), February 2, 1980.

The aim of Project Maje is to encourage American awareness of the current political situation in Burma. The ongoing insurgency in Burma's frontier areas is arguably the most important aspect of that situation. Burma, a country many outsiders consider "peaceful" or "tranquil", has in actuality been torn by armed rebellion ever since its Independence from Britain in 1948.


This rebellion, waged by several insurgent groups ranged along Burma's borders with Thailand, Laos, China, India and Bangladesh, has far-reaching consequences. The insurgency (which includes a Communist force more than 13,000 strong) contributes to instability in a highly strategic region. The insurgency has conducted a thriving black market as an alternative to Burma's stagnant Socialist economy. Insurgent forces engage in production and transport of, and trade in, the illicit narcotic products of the world's largest opium poppy crop. Insurgent groups have established functioning rebel nations in opposition to Burma's totalitarian state.

For all of the above reasons, Americans should look behind Burma's "lacquer screen". Burma has discouraged outside contact, yet information on the insurgency is available to those who will seek it out.

This report is intended as a concise introduction to the present situation on Burma's frontiers, its background, and the groups and issues involved. Suggestions for further reading, and a selection of recent news articles about the insurgency are included. The text of the report is based on the author's contacts with insurgent leaders and personal experience on the Burma frontiers, as well as on a wide range of secondary sources.

The Burma frontiers are breeding grounds for both malaria and wild rumors, in nearly equal amounts. This report attempts to stick to established facts, although frontier politics are such a tangle of factions and alliances that yesterday's "bizarre rumor" often becomes today's "hard fact". The figures reported here for the troop strength of insurgent armies are informed guesses at best.

Should this report interest readers in obtaining more information about Burma and the insurgency, they are invited to contact Project Maje.



AREAS OF
INSURGENT
ACTIVITY:

- A) Karen
- B) Karen, Mon
- C) Karenni, KMT, Shan, other groups
- D) Shan, KMT, BCP, other groups
- E) BCP, Kachin
- F) Kachin, Naga
- G) Arakanese

BACKGROUND ON BURMA

The nation known as the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma is 678,000 square kilometers in area, and about 40 million in population. It is bordered by Thailand, Laos, China, India and Bangladesh. Four major rivers (Irrawaddy, Salween, Sittang and Tenasserim), running north to south, define the geography of Burma. The border areas are mountainous. A variety of minerals, jade and precious stones are found in the border areas. The central plains are important rice-producing land, and oil fields are found there as well.

The pattern of migration into Burma from the north led to the development of conflicting civilizations. The first civilization in Burma was that of the Mon, who entered from the east (Cambodia) in the 6th century B.C., and conducted trade with India. The Arakanese established an independent kingdom in the 4th century A.D. The Karen tribe migrated to south-central Burma from Yunnan during the 6th-7th centuries A.D. The Burmese entered Burma from the north during the 8th-9th centuries A.D. The Tai (also known as Shan) migrated/invaded from Yunnan to the northeast hills, during the 8th-9th centuries A.D. Numerous tribal groups settled in the mountainous regions.

From the 10th through 19th centuries, a series of wars took place, with the Mon, Burmese and Shan struggling for the upper hand in the region. A brief chronology:

- 10th c.: Mon vs. Burmese, Burmese victory
- 13th c. : Shans conquered Burmese, Mon regain power, Karens enslaved
- 14th-16th c.: Shan vs. Mon, Burmese regain power and defeat both Shan and Mon
- 18th c.: Mon regain power, Kachin tribes raid north, Burmese conquer Siam (Thailand), Mon defeated by Burmese
- 19th c.: Burmese capture Arakan and Assam, antagonizing British India. British capture Arakan, Assam and Tenasserim. Then British take over southern Burma as part of India. In 1885, British annex northern Burma as well.

British administration encouraged upsurge in rice production through "industrialized agriculture". Rice was exported to pay for imported goods. Indian moneylenders took over ownership of most farmland. These factors caused breakdown in traditional Burmese society, violence, resentment of British colonists. While the south-central area was governed by British officials, the frontier areas had indirect rule or protectorate status. British administration favored non-Burmese ethnic groups such as the Karen, particularly in the military and police force, and encouraged Indian immigration to Burma.

A Burmese anti-colonial movement, known as the "Thakins", rose out of anti-British sentiment. Members of this movement were encouraged and trained by the Japanese during the 1930's. In 1941, Japan invaded Burma from Thailand, with Thakin aid. Japan wanted possession of Burma's oil fields, and to cut the supply line to China that ran through Burma. Most Burmese supported the Japanese against the British. The non-Burmese frontier groups such as the Karen and Kachin tended to aid and support the British. British forces retreated from Burma to India. Allied forces, aided by guerilla units of Kachin and other non-Burmese groups, re-took Burma. Near the end of the war, the Thakins, led by Aung San, transferred their allegiance to the Allies.

After World War Two, the British wished to retain Burma as a colony, but Aung San pushed for immediate independence. Aung San engineered the Panglong Agreement, in which frontier groups (Shan, Kachin and Chin) agreed to support a Federation of Burma, with guarantee of autonomy. The Shan, Kachin and Chin states were assured of the right to withdraw from the Federation in ten years if they were dissatisfied with it. Aung San was assassinated by political rivals just before Burma became independent in 1948. Burma left the British Commonwealth, and U Nu was elected head of state. There was a parliamentary government, constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech, religion and assembly, and the Shan and Karenni (frontier peoples) were granted autonomy and 10-year right of withdrawal.

Immediately after Independence, the new government had problems with the Karen. The Karen had been against independence from Britain, and had no autonomous area like other frontier peoples. Many Karen were Christians (the Burmese were Buddhist), and anti-Christian massacres of Karen villagers sparked the Karen revolt against the Burmese government. At the same time, Communist groups left the government and began to fight it, in two factions. Arakanese Moslems, and Mon forces also went into revolt. Kachin rebels joined with the Karen, and took Mandalay (Burma's second largest city). The government in Rangoon almost surrendered to the Communists, but General Ne Win built up the Burmese army and Karen rebels refused to join with the Communist forces. During 1950-51, the Karen rebels were driven into the Tenasserim area (bordering Thailand) and the Communist and other rebels were forced into the northern mountains.

In 1950, the Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist) General Li Mi, fled the Chinese Communist takeover in Yunnan, to the Shan State of Burma. There, the KMT forces recruited soldiers, building a force of 12,000 troops, and engaged in the production and transport of opium on a large scale. They received some aid from Taiwan, Thailand and the United States. The Burmese, fearing Chinese retaliation, sought a United Nations solution to the KMT presence, and U Nu asked for an end to U.S. aid to Burma. A few thousand KMT troops were evacuated to Taiwan, but many remained in the Shan State and neighboring areas of Thailand.

During the mid-1950's, Burma's economy worsened drastically. Burma was heavily dependent on Japanese war reparations for foreign aid. Development plans were mismanaged, and failed. The economy was totally dependent on rice, and rice sales fell. Soviet economic aid attempts were unsuited to Burma, and failed. By 1958, the economy was in a shambles and insurgency (Communist and Karen) was on the rise again. Prime Minister U Nu temporarily gave governing power to General Ne Win. Ne Win set up a military government, with the Army in charge of banks, factories, shipping, etc. Kachin and Shan forces revolted against the government, and the Shan aristocracy was outlawed by Ne Win.

In 1960, elections were held, and U Nu won a large majority. He made good on an election promise to make Buddhism the state religion, which caused further Karen insurrection. The Shan and Karenni asked to leave the Federation, according to the 10-year clause. In 1962, Gen. Ne Win staged a coup d'etat, citing the need for national security. Political opposition was jailed without trial and many were executed. Shan leaders were jailed and many were executed. The Constitution was suspended. U Nu was jailed, then exiled. A resistance movement started by U Nu proved ineffective because of the Karen mistrust of him, and he was eventually granted amnesty and now lives as a Buddhist scholar in Rangoon.

Ne Win has been in power ever since the 1962 coup. He is now (1986) seventy-four years old. He instituted the "Burmese Way of Socialism", a mixture of Utopian Marxism and Buddhism, in order to "bring the masses to enlightenment". The main thrust of Ne Win's takeover was to bring the economy under total State (Army) control. Land and businesses were nationalized, particularly those belonging to Indians and Chinese. Banks were nationalized and large denomination banknotes were demonitized. Foreigners were deported, and only 24-hour visas were granted. All non-State newspapers were shut down, and all publication was censored. Education was State controlled, and indoctrination programs for farmers and workers were instituted. The Frontier States were placed under direct government administration. Burma was governed by a "Revolutionary Council" of military officers.

During the late 1960's, the economy continued to fail, and there were riots over lack of food. In 1971 the economy was liberalized to permit some free-market trading. In 1974, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma came into being with a new Constitution. Ne Win was President as well as head of the only political party (Burma Socialist Program Party). Ne Win declared that "Our Union is just one homogenous whole." As a Burmese citizen put it, "We have only one leader, and what he says, goes."

Despite constraints on free assembly, there was considerable civil unrest in Burma during the 70's. In 1974 there was an oil workers' strike, rioting at the funeral of U Thant (U.N. Secretary General and an associate of U Nu), and riots over lack of food. There were student riots in 1975 and the early 80's, and an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1976. A pattern of anti-Chinese feeling among Burmese (which reached its height in 1967 rioting against Chinese residents of Rangoon) continued.

Burma isolated itself in matters of foreign policy, and did not join ASEAN. Burma quit the Non-Aligned Movement (which U Nu helped found) over what Burma felt was undue Soviet influence, in 1979. Relations with the Super-Powers and with neighboring countries were unstrained, yet distant. Burma was uninvolved in the war in Indochina (Vietnam), but was by no means at peace during the 70's and early 80's, as its domestic insurgency (Communist forces and minority ethnic group forces fighting the Burmese government) raged on.

Since 1974, Burma has been more open to foreign loans and investment, especially from Japan and Europe. The need for foreign exchange forced the granting of seven-day tourist visas. The economy has improved and Burma has been exporting rice again, but Burma has one of the worst agricultural systems in Asia (lack of irrigation, lack of double crops and hybrid rice, poor planning). There is severe deforestation in the frontier areas and teak is depleted in government-controlled areas. Burma is presently one of the fifteen poorest countries in the world, despite abundant resources.

A "shadow economy" thrives in Burma, in which consumer goods (which are hardly manufactured in Burma) enter, and commodities (agricultural, forest and mineral products) flow out. This trade is largely controlled by the various insurgent groups, who occupy almost all of Burma's borders with neighboring countries. Rather than sell goods to the State, the Burmese and other ethnic groups smuggle them out for a high profit. Demand for consumer goods such as medicine, clothing and machine parts, insure a high profit on the smuggling trade coming into Burma. Rice, cattle, tin and teak leave Burma, and are taxed by insurgent groups.

Some of the insurgent groups also engage in transport and tax of opium grown in the northern frontier areas. The cross-border smuggling trade has enabled insurgent groups to arm themselves better than the Burmese Army. Burma accepts very little military aid. Arms are often obtained through Ne Win's personal contacts in Europe, using profits from the sale of jade and gems. The first joint venture with a foreign company was with a German firm, for the manufacture of obsolete G3 rifles for Burmese Army use. The Army is experienced but underequipped. The insurgents have access to black-market U.S. and Chinese weapons. Burma has about 170,000 troops, many of whom are draftees. There has been considerable abuse of civilians by Burmese troops in frontier areas. Minority group villagers have been confined to walled villages, used as slave labor, and used as shields and human mine-detectors. Thousands on both sides die each year in the ongoing insurgency. Burmese government figures for 1985 state that 1,870 insurgents were killed by its troops, and that 416 Burmese soldiers died.

From 1962 to 1978, Burma's universities were closed down for security reasons about a quarter of the time. Burmese still seek higher education. English (the medium of instruction during British Colonial days) was not taught in Burmese schools, until recently. English is now a required course in high school. Unemployment in Burma is high (6.7% in 1981), and there are many unemployed educated young people. The government campaigns against Western "decadence", but Western (or Thai) music and clothing styles are still popular among the young. There is a substantial drug problem, due to easy availability of opium and heroin. Drug addiction affects both urban youth and farmers in the mountainous areas. The government has banned family planning, and there is a 2.3% birth rate, adding 875,000 babies a year to the 40 million population. The government has made efforts to provide health care, but it is still inadequate.

There has been friction between Ne Win's government and the Buddhist monks in Burma. In 1965 the monks staged anti-government demonstrations and there were mass arrests. Since then the numbers of monks have dwindled, and there are government regulations, registration and identity cards for the monks. The government has attempted to suppress non-Buddhist religions such as Christianity (through government-aligned Buddhist organizations) and Islam (through deportation and arrest of Arakanese and Bengali Moslems) in Burma.

In 1981, Ne Win retired as President, but remained B.S.P.P. leader, and remained completely in control of the government. His "heir" is San Yu, who became President. San Yu is elderly and has severe health problems. The previous "heir", Tin Oo (Security Chief), became too powerful and was purged and jailed. There have been frequent purges of B.S.P.P. members.

There is a lack of documentation on human rights abuses in Burma. Torture is used in Burmese prisons. Political prisoners and insurgents have been tortured. It has been estimated that Burma has had some 8,000 political prisoners since 1962. No organized opposition to the government is allowed. The civil liberties of Burmese are circumscribed by "block wardens" and secret police (the Special Investigatory Department). In 1980, a general amnesty was granted, which freed many political prisoners and some insurgent leaders.

Non-indigenous citizens (defined as those whose families arrived in Burma after 1824) were denied rights pertaining to employment and residency under a 1980 citizenship law. This affected the Indian and Chinese populations remaining in Burma. There have been mass arrests, detention and forced registration of Arakanese Moslems. In 1978, 200,000 Arakanese fled to Bangladesh in the face of an Army attempt to register them, fearing detention as illegal aliens.