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Dear Mr. White:

Thank you for your recent letter to Lt. Gen. Powell concerning Greenland.

Lt. Gen. Powell has asked me to assure you that this Administration appreciates the importance of Greenland to the defense of North America. We will continue to work with U.S. allies in protecting our mutual security interests in this important geographical area.

Sincerely,

Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary

Mr. Brent White
265 Meridian Avenue, Suite 6
San Jose, California 95126
MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: WILLIAM A. COCKELL

SUBJECT: Letter to Mr. White

The attached correspondence from Mr. Brent White of San Jose, CA, catalogues an odyssey through the DOD bureaucracy in his attempt to raise alarm bells about a Soviet occupation of Greenland.

We know of no reason for such alarm, and recommend that the letter to Powell be answered by the Executive Secretary.

Recommendation

That you sign the letter to Mr. White at Tab I.

Approve Disapprove

Cobb and Ermarth concur.

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Brent White
Tab II Incoming letter

Prepared by
Michael Donley
November 14, 1987

Lt. Gen. Colin Powell
National Security Advisor
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Powell:

I became convinced last year that the Russians may soon try to establish bases on southern Greenland, perhaps ostensibly for use as distant early warning radar sites, to offset our advantage in this area, but which bases would eventually evolve into offensive air, naval and missile bases.

These bases would be of enormous value to the Russians. Greenland is vast, empty and undefended; its parent country, Denmark, has about as much military significance as Austria, and I would not find it surprising if the Russians doubted that the U.S. and NATO had the resolve to risk a nuclear war over a few, purely defensive radar sites (like our own) on the remote wastes of a distant province of Denmark.

Accordingly, I wrote to Secretary Weinberger and others about my apprehensions, but received no satisfactory reply.

I am enclosing copies of my correspondence with them, and it is my hope, Sir, that you would review them, and if you think the situation warrants it, take preventative measures.

Thank you very much.

Cordially,

Brent White

Brent White
Mr. John J. Maresca  
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense  
Washington, D.C. 20301-2600

Dear Mr. Maresca:

Thank you very much for your response to my letter again expressing my concerns about a possible Russian seizure of bases on southern Greenland.

I don't think that the Russians consider NATO's paper assurances of protection to Denmark's remote province to be overly formidable. Remember that South Viet Nam once enjoyed similar protection under a protocol of the SEATO alliance.

An article in the June 22, 1987 Wall Street Journal reports that retired NATO commander, General Bernard Rogers, said: "I personally think the day is coming that the Soviet Union is going to test us some place--northern Norway, eastern Turkey, Hamburg or Berlin--and just see what the reaction will be. I'm not sure you could reach a consensus that NATO as a body would react to that test."

My money is on Greenland. Greenland bases would be of immense strategic value to the Russians. The seizure of Greenland bases would be much less likely to provoke a vigorous NATO response than would a Russian foray upon the home territories of major NATO partners. (Would the Germans be willing to die for Hamburg or the Turks for Istanbul? Would they die for Greenland?) Yet if the Russians were allowed to keep the Greenland bases, the effect upon
NATO would be about as destructive as a successful Russian move in Europe.

I continue to be concerned.

Cordially,

Brent White

Brent White

BW:jfy

cc  Mr. Caspar Weinberger
    Mr. Fred Ikle
    Mr. Louis G. Michael
    Admiral William J. Crowe
    General Larry D. Welch
    Admiral Carlisle Trost
    General John A. Wickham, Jr.
16 JUN 1987

In reply refer to
I-87/12166

Mr. Brent White
President
Atlas International Aircraft Corporation
3696 Marks Avenue
San Jose, California 95118

Dear Mr. White:

Thank you for your recent letters to Secretary Weinberger and Under Secretary Ikle expressing again your concern about possible Soviet ambitions against Greenland.

I would like to emphasize that Greenland is an integral part of the national territory of Denmark, a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and U.S. forces regularly conduct military activities at Thule Air Base there. I would like to convey to you our assurances that the United States and, we believe, Denmark and other NATO members will continue to give full consideration to the security and protection of this vital area.

Sincerely,

John J. Maresca
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
European & NATO Policy
October 27, 1986

Lt. Col. Thomas A. Mahr
U.S.A.F.
Pentagon, Room 4A120
Washington, D.C. 20330

Dear Colonel Mahr:

Thank you for your 10/17/86 response to my 10/2/86 letters to General Welch and Secretary Aldridge regarding the possible establishment of Russian bases on Greenland.

You responded that Greenland is protected by NATO, which has a "35-year record of preventing the Soviets from moving into Europe and the North Atlantic region," from a Russian invasion, by reason of Denmark's membership in NATO.

May I remind you, Sir, that South Vietnam once enjoyed similar protection under a protocol of the SEATO alliance? Nonetheless, we abandoned South Vietnam, in large part to secure the release of a relatively small number of captured Americans; because the American public no longer supported the war, with its graphic casualties; and because the loss of distant South Vietnam did not directly and immediately threaten us.

Would it be unreasonable of the Russians to suppose that the American people might shrink from an American/Russian confrontation, with its attendant possibility for escalation into a nuclear holocaust, over purely defensive Russian radar sites on the remote wastes of a distant province of Denmark?

If I was running the Soviet Union, establishing bases on Greenland would be my next move. With very little to lose and a great deal to gain from such a gamble, a "long shot," a gambit with even an 80% chance of failure would be justified. Nay, demanded!
Ten or twenty thousand men could be drawn from Soviet prisons, put in uniform, given obsolete weapons and radar equipment and transported to Greenland in ships that were ready for the scrapyard.

Upon debarking, they could set up primitive DEW radar sites, ostensibly to offset the advantage that DEW sites give the U.S.

A "solemn avowal" would then be made that these radar sites would always be purely defensive and the U.N. invited to station observers there permanently to verify their continuing defensive nature, and the U.S. warned that any hostile moves against them would result in reciprocal strikes against the U.S. DEW sites.

If the U.S. reacted with uncharacteristic resolve and all the men and equipment were lost, not much more than a little "face" would be lost, from their point of view, and if their gambit succeeded and they were allowed to remain there, these bases could eventually become of immense strategic value, perhaps tipping the "balance of power" in their favor.

If they pass up this opportunity, they are not half as astute as I think they are!

I remember the long, drawn-out process of granting statehood to Alaska and Hawaii, areas with more logical claims for statehood than alien Greenland, and as there is no public awareness of any need to give Greenland statehood, I wasn't really expecting my suggestion to be acted upon the next day. But at the very least, couldn't the Danish patrols be augmented by U.S. personnel (if the Danes agreed), regular U.S. air and naval patrols be initiated along Greenland's south and east coasts, and a treaty specifically covering Greenland be signed (and well publicized) with Denmark?

You concluded your letter with the hope that it "allayed (my) concerns and answered (my) questions." I'm sorry to say that it did not. But, again, thank you very much for your response.

Cordially,

Brent White

BW:clv

cc: General Larry D. Welch
     Secretary Edward Aldridge
Mr. Brent White  
3696 Marks Avenue  
San Jose, CA 95118

Dear Mr. White:

Thank you for your letters of October 2, 1986 to General Welch and Secretary Aldridge requesting their views on giving U.S. statehood to Greenland to preclude a Soviet invasion.

A better source for an answer to your statehood question might be the State Department, since it is charged with the responsibility of making US Foreign Policy. DoD's role, as you know, is to assist in implementing the policy after it's been formulated.

With regards to your concern about defending Greenland, I'm sure you're aware that although Greenland is not a formal member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, its mother country, Denmark, is. As a result, Greenland is tied by a strong web of treaties to a number of European and American countries, each pledged to protect the other. This network helps protect the Greenlanders from Soviet expansion.

I understand your concerns about this expansion, especially in light of the Soviets' track record. But NATO's 35-year record of preventing the Soviets from moving into Europe and the North Atlantic region is just as strong. The U.S. support of NATO — financially, militarily, politically — has been one of the keys to the treaty's success.

I hope this letter allays your concerns and answers your questions.

Sincerely,

THOMAS A. MAHR, Lt Col, USAF  
Chief, Civil Affairs Branch  
Community Relations Division  
Office of Public Affairs

cc: State Department PAC/PC
October 2, 1986

Mr. Caspar Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Weinberger:

I believe the Soviet Union's next major "expansionist" move could be the establishment of air, naval and missile bases on Greenland's southeastern, south and southwestern coasts. This would be a mighty audacious move for them to make, but I believe they could get away with it, and I will attempt to explain how. If they succeeded in this, our defenses would be very seriously eroded, and even if they failed in their gambit, the cost of their withdrawal could be painful and debilitating concessions from us.

Suppose that in the near future the Russians landed perhaps 6-12 contingents of perhaps 1,000-2,000 armed troops each on 6-12 sites on Greenland's southern coast, with the announced intention of setting up a network of early warning radar facilities, similar to our own "DEW" line radar facilities, to give them early warning of a "first strike" U.S. bomber raid on the Soviet Union. Effective opposition from either Greenland's 50,000 inhabitants or from Denmark can be immediately ruled out, leaving the job of expelling them to the U.S., if it is to be done at all.

Would we have the resolve and support from most of the American public to kill Russian soldiers and thereby risk nuclear annihilation? We did in Cuba 25 years ago, but that was to remove offensive missiles from a site 90 miles from the U.S., at a time when we were much stronger than the Russians. This would be an entirely different ball game, and we wouldn't be playing on our home field.
But suppose that we did muster up the resolve, assembled the necessary forces to remove the Russians, told them in no uncertain terms that if they did not evacuate all their troops immediately, we would remove them, regardless of the cost, and fully intend to do so.

Suppose, then, that the Russians adamantly refused to leave, stating that they were on land that was illegally colonized and therefore Denmark had no right to grant or deny the use of sites on Greenland to anyone, including the U.S. and Russia; that the Russian radar bases were purely defensive in nature and would never be anything else; that the United States was seeking to maintain an unfair advantage over the Soviet Union by maintaining early warning radar facilities on Greenland while seeking to deny them the same right to defend themselves against a U.S. bomber attack; and that should the U.S. be so foolish as to carry out their threat, the Soviet Union would immediately reply in kind, tit for tat, by destroying our DEW line radar sites with one SLBM fired at each one. Wouldn't a lot of people in the U.S. lose their enthusiasm for this confrontation at this point? Many Americans, it seems to me, never take the long range, "strategic" view of these things, preferring instead to write off one little country after another -- Vietnam, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, et al. -- as not in themselves being worth an expenditure of American lives and money, and certainly not worth risking a nuclear war over, and "defensive" Russian radar sites on remote Greenland might well be regarded the same way.

If allowed to keep these radar sites, they would evolve in time into air, naval and missile bases. First, small airfields would be built to accommodate small cargo aircraft, and then eventually lengthened to accommodate larger cargo aircraft and perhaps some defensive interceptors such as the MiG23. In time, you would see bombers, IRBM's, antisubmarine aircraft, submarine and surface ships at these bases.

I don't believe that the value to Russia of bomber, naval and missile bases on Greenland could be overestimated!

Russian bomber bases on Greenland's southern coast would cut in half the distance their long-range bombers must now fly to the U.S., and would enable even their 500 medium-range bombers to reach all U.S. targets.

Operating from southern or southwestern Greenland, their medium-range Backfire bomber could reach any city in the U.S., including Los Angeles, Houston and Miami, and hit shipping all the way to the equator, in an arc that would include all the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean Sea, and extend to about Liberia, West Africa, and return to base without refueling.
Even the Russians' shorter-range Badger and Blinder bombers have a sufficient combat radius to reach Washington, D.C., and if carrying ALCM's, could "stand off" over the Atlantic and hit targets inland from Minneapolis to Houston. And from Winnipeg, Canada, they could dispatch ALCM's to targets as distant as Los Angeles. They could also hit shipping in the North Atlantic in an arc that would extend from New York to the Azores to Spain's western tip to the English Channel to the Shetland Islands in the Norwegian Sea.

From the southeast coast of Greenland, short-range SU24 Fencers could reach past Iceland and with external fuel tanks, clear to Scotland, and hit any shipping in between.

A large increase in the number of their bombers able to hit targets in the U.S. could make necessary an extensive and expensive augmentation of our air defense system at the expense of other programs such as the MX, B-1 and Trident, etc., just as our potent bomber force compels the Russians to maintain a large and costly air defense system, leaving less money for offensive systems.

The emplacement of intermediate range ballistic missiles on Greenland's southern and southwestern coasts could be a bigger problem than air and naval bases there. IRBM's fired at the U.S. from Greenland would have just half as far to travel as ICBM's fired from Russia, cutting in half our warning and response time and greatly complicating our defense against them. An IRBM fired from southern Greenland would reach New York City just a minute or two later than would have the Cuban-based missiles which so exercised President Kennedy and occasioned the blockade.

Can this scenario I have drawn be prevented? I believe so, but it would require more than just a defense treaty with Greenland and/or Denmark and stern warnings. I believe we should consider the immediate incorporation of Greenland into the United States as the 51st state, or at least as a "territory" (with the approval of Denmark and the Greenlanders, of course), and the dispatch as soon as possible of U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force patrols to "show the flag" along Greenland's vulnerable coasts.

The Russians would surely like to have Alaska, but they make no move to take it, even though it's closer to them than to us, and would be extremely difficult for us to defend, because an invasion of Alaska would be an invasion of a bona fide American state. Greenland, on the other hand, is the remote and defenseless province of a tiny country far removed from it and incapable of defending it.

It's vitally necessary, I think, that we get our name on the mailbox there, and soon!
Would the Danes and Greenlanders agree to an incorporation of Greenland into the United States? I believe so, if they could be convinced of a probable Russian interest in, and occupation of Greenland, and shown their vulnerability and complete lack of recourse apart from union with the U.S.

Do they now have any sense of Greenland's vulnerability and possible attractiveness to the Russians? Apparently so! As you can read in the enclosed copy of a recent article from Jane's Defence Weekly, Denmark maintains a small contingent of troops on Greenland's northeast coast to "patrol the uninhabited wastes of northeast Greenland," and "show the flag." Why patrol only the northeast sector? Why not the southwest as well? And why patrol any part of it at all if it could have no possible use to anyone?

May I please have your opinion on this subject, Sir?

Cordially,

Brent White, President
Atlas International
Aircraft Corporation

BW:clv

cc:  Mr. Fred Ikle
     Mr. Richard N. Perle
     Mr. John Lehman
     Mr. Edward Aldridge
     Mr. John O. Marsh, Jr.
     Admiral William J. Crowe
     General Larry D. Welch
     Admiral Carlisle Trost
     General John A. Wickham, Jr.
     General Robert D. Russ
     General Robert T. Herres
     General John T. Chain
     Senator Barry Goldwater
ONE OF THE world's smallest and loneliest military units is the Danish sledge patrol that year-in and year-out patrols the uninhabited wastes of north-east Greenland.

The Sirius patrol dates back to the Second World War when Denmark was occupied. Greenland remained free, supported by the USA, but even before the Americans joined the war, the Danish governor raised a miniature 'army' of 15 men to root out the German meteorological stations in the north-east. This they successfully did with the loss of only one man.

After the war the unit was disbanded, but in 1950 a decision was made to create a permanent sledge patrol to maintain Danish sovereignty in Greenland.

At first it was called Resolute, but in 1953 this name was changed to Sirius and 10 years later it got its own badge — a sledge-dog's head in a crowned star surrounded by a dog collar.

Headquarters of the Sirius patrol is at Daneborg, a desolate outpost consisting of a few wooden huts on the north-east coast.

The area patrolled by the unit is the 16,500 km coastline, where sealers and fur-hunters used to roam, but which has been uninhabited since all polar animals living in the area were declared protected species.

The patrol normally covers 19,000 km each year, in summer by boat and helicopters, in the winter by dog sledge.

Administratively, the Sirius sledge patrol comes under the Royal Danish Navy, but the men come from all three branches of the forces.

The number of men in the unit is classified, but they are very few, and spend two years in Greenland. Half are relieved every year so that the unit is composed half of 'veterans' with one year's service and half newcomers.

Psychological tests

The commanding officer is a captain and all patrol members are at least national service sergeants.

All have to be single, and all have to go through rigorous medical and dental check-ups and psychological tests.

The patrols are still undertaken by dog sledge. Aircraft and tracked vehicles have been tried, but did not come up to expectations.

The sledges are the most efficient and economical means of transport. They do not suffer from lack of fuel and spare parts, and in an extreme case you can always eat a dog or feed it to its own kind.

The patrol members build their own sledges and sew their own dog harnesses according to age-old Greenland tradition. This is done so they are familiar with the construction and are able to make all repairs themselves.

The Sirius dogs are considered a special breed. They are heavier than dogs in other parts of Greenland and are able to pull a far greater load. The average cargo of a Sirius sledge is 400 kg or 35 kg per dog.

Uniforms are not worn at the base at Daneborg. Patrol members are allowed to carry out some duties in blue jeans and Iceland fisherman's sweaters, but for patrol duty the most modern polar equipment is used.

The main object of the patrol, apart from maintaining Danish sovereignty, is showing...
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cc: VP, Baker, Other

COMMENTS: Should be seen by: ____________________________ (Date/Time)
TO: POWELL
FROM: WHITE, BRENT

SUBJECT: LTR TO POWELL RE RUSSIANS ESTABLISH BASES ON SOUTHERN GREENLAND

ACTION: ANY ACTION NECESSARY

FOR ACTION
ERMARTH
COCKELL

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

STAINER
RODMAN
PERINA

COMMENTS

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

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C 12/2 Stevens Sigd

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K. TRICE, CLT

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