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SCIENTISTS UNCOVER SERIOUS ERRORS IN CONTROVERSIAL STUDY ON SDI

(Updating Executive Memorandum No. 158, "Why the Physicists' SDI Study Is Flawed," April 24, 1987.)

It has been a month since some members of the American Physical Society released their report casting doubt on the technical feasibility of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Since then, the evidence continues to grow that the scientific and technical quality of the APS report is seriously flawed. A number of prominent U.S. scientists, in fact, are beginning to ask why the authors rushed the report into print before they checked it thoroughly for errors.

Dr. Frederick Seitz, President Emeritus of Rockefeller University and a former President of both the American Physical Society and the National Academy of Sciences, observes: "I know of no precedent, in my 55-year association with the American Physical Society, for the issuance of so seriously flawed a document as this, under the aegis of that Council."

Errors by Factors Up to 100. Two other leading U.S. scientists with intimate scientific and technical knowledge of the SDI's directed energy programs also have raised serious objections to the APS study. Dr. Lowell Wood of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Dr. Gregory Canavan of the Los Alamos National Laboratory charge that "The APS report contains a number of major technical errors by factors ranging up to 100, [and that these] errors are always in the direction of making the task of defending the United States against Soviet missile attacks seem much harder than it really is...."

No Technical Evidence. Seitz's observations about the APS report are perhaps the most damaging because they cast doubt on the objectivity of the authors. In addition to charging that the APS study contains "numerous errors, inconsistencies, and unrealistic assumptions," Seitz took issue with an APS Council statement, issued subsequent to the release of the report, that condemned all prospects for near-term deployment of strategic defenses, in spite of the fact that the study did not deal at all with the most promising of all near-term defense technologies, kinetic energy weapons. Since the APS Council provided no technical evidence for this attack on the chances of near-term deployment, Seitz concludes that the APS Council's statement "abandons all pretense of being based on scientific factors, [and that] these actions by the Council of APS represent a political as well as a scientific declaration."

There is evidence as well that the APS study contains a number of serious scientific and technical errors. Wood and Canavan outlined a number of these in a statement before hearings conducted by the House Republican Research Committee on May 19. They were particularly perplexed that a number of conclusions in the report's Executive Summary were directly contradicted by the findings in the body of the report. Finally, they were concerned that the report did not receive the kind of peer review from fellow scientists that would normally be expected in a scientific study such as this.

Specific errors identified by Seitz, Wood, and Canavan include:

◆◆ Overestimating the amount of improvement needed in the performance levels of the chemical laser. The APS Executive Summary says that SDI research is at least a factor of 100 away from adequate performance levels in chemical lasers. Wood and Canavan say SDI-tested lasers are roughly a factor of only 10 away from meeting power level requirements for weapons performance against Soviet threats for the end of the century.

◆◆ Overestimating the amount of power needed for adequate performance of the excimer laser which someday could knock down missiles shortly after they are launched. The report says that one billion watts are needed. But according to Wood and Canavan, formulas in the report itself confirm that just six million watts are sufficient for an effective excimer laser defense against Soviet attacks.

◆◆ Overestimating the usefulness of a fast-burn booster (a hypothetical intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) that burns out faster and at lower altitudes than normal booster rockets) against directed energy defenses. The APS report states that a Soviet fast-burn booster can neutralize the effectiveness of a U.S. neutral particle beam defensive weapon. Wood and Canavan point out, however, that the technical analysis in the report itself clearly shows that this conclusion is incorrect. They say that, although a fast-burn booster can burn out at an altitude of 60 miles, which is ten miles lower than a space-based neutral particle beam can reach, a missile cannot release its warheads until it reaches 90 miles. Thus the missile with all its warheads on board can be attacked by the neutral particle beam even after the booster rocket has burned out.

◆◆ Overestimating the effectiveness of another theoretical Soviet countermeasure against U.S. directed energy defenses--spinning the missiles to distribute the heat of the laser beam, thus weakening the laser's effect. Wood and Canavan state that "the ICBM has to rotate at least once a second to spread the laser energy. The spin exerts centrifugal force on the walls of the missile which have to be strengthened at the cost of reduced payload and a complete missile redesign--for a very small gain."

Damning Indictment. The evidence mobilized by Seitz, Wood, and Canavan adds up to a damning indictment of the scientific and technical quality of the APS report. The numerous factual errors in the report are compounded by the subsequent statements by APS Council members on SDI matters that are not even addressed in the study. This raises serious questions about the manner in which this study was conducted. It seems that the study was rushed into print before it received adequate scientific review. Moreover, some of its authors have gone far beyond the realm of physics in making pronouncements and judgments on when they think SDI deployment can begin. With this evidence mounting, the credibility of the APS itself is at risk. The APS should recognize its mistake in issuing a seriously flawed report by withdrawing the report and undertaking a new study that will follow accepted procedures of scientific analysis and evaluation.

Kim R. Holmes, Ph.D.
Deputy Director
of Defense Studies

5-1-87 The Naysayers' Report

Progress on the Strategic Defense Initiative is such that deployment could start in five to seven years, as a nearby article explains. But that news hasn't captured much attention. Instead the American Physical Society, the nation's largest association of physicists, last week issued a report that seemed to cast doubt about the success of SDI and warned of long deployment delays.

In fact, the APS study had nothing to do with near-term prospects. Its purpose was to study the long-term prospects of the most futuristic concepts; it didn't take up near-term possibilities, in particular kinetic-kill devices that destroy missiles and warheads by the force of midair collision. This was clearly stated in a letter by an APS peer-review committee.

"The study group has not been charged with examining [kinetic-energy weapons] components or systems; the shift in emphasis of [the government's SDI program] occurred while the study was in progress," the peer review noted. "No evaluation was made of how well the research and development program is being carried out, given its objectives," adding that the cost-effectiveness of an SDI system wasn't estimated.

Finally, the review committee concluded: "The report does not, and could not, address the global question of whether, on what scale or at what pace, the United States should proceed with programs intended to create strategic defenses." This is, of course, precisely the use to which the report is widely being put.

The study group was appointed in late 1984, as the Pentagon SDI office was being organized, long before its shift in emphasis to near-term possibilities. The group looked only at directed-energy weapons, such as lasers

and particle beams, that could shoot down missiles and warheads. The panel found that "substantial progress" has been made but "significant gaps" in scientific and engineering understanding remain. This means that 10 or more years of "intensive research" are required before "an informed decision" can be made about the effectiveness and survivability of directed-energy weapons.

These physicists are more-or-less right, of course, but none of this is news to anyone following SDI, let alone to the office conducting the research. In reading the 424-page report (available for \$200), we couldn't help but wonder what purpose is served by having 17 physicists with other full-time jobs trying to second-guess the Pentagon's multibillion dollar, 2,000-person-strong SDI effort. The review group said giving advice on whether to build strategic defenses wasn't the purpose of the report. So what was it?

This is a question that earnest scientists ought to be asking themselves. Are such reports undertaken out of curiosity about lasers and particle beams? Or are they perhaps undertaken to appease vocal political activists within the physics profession? The result, in any event, is a report that can be used as a policy prescription by those scientists who choose to use it that way, and disavowed as a policy prescription by those who do not. Not, we would say, a very high-minded exercise.

What remains even after the APS study are the achievements of SDI research to date. The U.S. is within reach of a defense against Soviet ballistic missiles. The layers of that shield will take time and effort to deploy, but the goal is worth pursuing and getting closer, not further away.

Summer in Boston Program
Institute of Politics

PUBLIC DISINFORMATION FORUM

The Summer in Boston Program at the Institute of Politics offers Harvard Summer School students the opportunity to attend events and discuss some of the most important issues of the day. All events are free and take place at the Kennedy School of Government, 79 JFK Street. Evening programs are open to the public.

Star Wars: SDI and the Feasibility of Directed Energy Weapons, Wednesday, July 8, 7:30 p.m., Forum. Prof. Nicolaas Bloembergen of Harvard, a Nobel Laureate and Co-Chairman of the American Physical Society study on directed energy weapons, will be joined by Lt. Col. Pete Worden, Senior Policy Analyst in the Office of Science and Technology, at the Executive Office of the President. The discussion will be moderated by Prof. Richard Haass of the Kennedy School of Government. A discussion of the technical feasibility of "Star Wars" and its consequence on U.S. policy. *See attached W.S.J. Commentary*

Look for new W.S.J. Commentary
The Wreck of the American Economy and the Rise of Japan, Tuesday, July 14, 4:00 p.m., place TBA. Prof. Robert Reich of the Kennedy School, a prolific writer and progressive thinker, will lead a more informal discussion of the challenges facing the United States in international trade.

Smoking and Public Policy, Wednesday, July 15, 7:30 p.m., Room 140. A discussion of the new Cambridge City Ordinance banning smoking in public places and in most offices, as well as the difficulties in enforcing such a law. Cambridge City Councilman David Sullivan is one of four members of a panel which will include Nancy Rigotti of the Institute for the Study of Smoking Behavior and Policy, Lewis M. Rambo of the international consulting firm, Arthur D. Little, and moderator Wayne Sharpe of the Cambridge Chamber of Commerce.

The Difficulties of Running for Office, Wednesday, July 29, 7:30 p.m., Room 140. A discussion of the challenges encountered by candidates for local elected positions. The panel will include Richard Thornburgh, former governor of Pennsylvania, Julie Belaga, former Connecticut state legislator, Stuart Halsan, Washington State Senator, and moderator Jim King, Senior Vice President of Northeastern University.

→ The Future of Covert Operations after the Iran/Contra Affair, Wednesday, August 5, 7:30 p.m., Room 140. Former National Security Council staff members Gregory Trevorton and Peter Zimmerman will lead a discussion of about what will become of covert U.S. international policy.

The 1988 Presidential Election, Wednesday, August 12, 7:30 p.m., place TBA. A panel of political journalists including Marvin Kalb, former host of NBC's "Meet the Press," will discuss the candidates for President of the United States.

It's Now or Never

If we don't stop them in Central America, we may never get another opportunity

At the center of the cloud of confusion, turmoil, and mystery surrounding U.S. policy toward Central America lies Nicaragua. For most of this decade, the American people have witnessed fierce battles waged inside and out of Congress over the question of further funding for the Contras who are waging a war against the Sandinista regime in Managua. More recently, we have been entertained by the Iran-Contra hearings. Yet, as amazing as some of the revelations made in those hearings may be, both the hearings and the battle over Contra funding serve merely as side-shows to distract attention from the very real and horrifying truth that U.S. policy is and has been geared toward an ongoing and calculated betrayal of not only Nicaragua, but all of Central America.

There may yet be time to prevent Central America from falling into the Soviet orbit, and perhaps even to liberate Nicaragua. But it will require a cold, hard assessment of the very real threat to our security posed by Communist Nicaragua, as well as exposure of the treachery of those sitting in lofty places who have deliberately worked to create a replay of Cuba and Vietnam in Central America. A good place to begin is with a sober assessment of the true nature of the Sandinista revolution and the undeniable menace it has created in our own back yard.

The Menace at Our Doorstep

It was, of course, on July 19, 1979 that the forces of the Sandinista National Liberation Front marched triumphantly into Managua, thereby completing their successful takeover of the Nicaraguan government. "Victorious Sandinista rebels," reported *U.S. News & World Report* a few months later, "now cementing their grip on Nicaragua, are the best-prepared revolutionaries ever to come to power in Latin America." The report added: "The ragtag guerrillas of Fidel Castro who took over Cuba two decades ago were

rank amateurs by comparison."

With amazing swiftness, the new Sandinista regime began the process of enslaving the people of Nicaragua. The Sandinistas seized control of the military, the media, the educational systems, and the church; a secret police force was created; private property was confiscated and industries were nationalized; kangaroo courts were established to mete out jail sentences to opponents; in the cities, people were terrorized into submission by government-organized mobs that dictator Daniel Ortega termed *las turba divinas* (the divine mobs); people in rural areas were herded like cattle onto state-run collective farms; a war of genocide was launched against the Miskito Indians; and the reign of terror was even extended to the household level with the creation of a sophisticated neighborhood spy network. By the middle of 1985, CIA Director William Casey was disclosing that the Sandinista government "in 5½ years has accomplished 33" of the 46 universally recognized "indicators of the consolidation of power by a Marxist-Leninist regime."

Communist Nicaragua, in proclaiming a "revolution without borders," quickly proved itself to be a menace to all of Central America and to the United States. In 1985, President Ronald Reagan declared: "We know that the support Nicaragua gets from Cuba, Bulgaria, East Germany, North Korea, Libya, the PLO, and Iran is a threat to our security because the dictators of Cuba and Nicaragua have not only pledged to spread Communism — they've been caught trying to do just that." Arquimedes Canadas, a former Salvadoran guerrilla commander, has testified that Marxist insurgents in El Salvador have been receiving as much as "99.9 percent of our arms" from Nicaragua.

Armed to the Teeth

Communist Nicaragua has also armed itself to the teeth. It has approximately



Sandinistas celebrate their rise to power in 1979.

200,000 troops in arms, counting its army, militia, and reserves, which is far more than the combined military manpower of neighboring Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. The nation possesses the only tank force in Central America, a force that includes Soviet-made T-54 and T-55 tanks, as well as the more advanced T-62 tanks. In addition, the Sandinista army has Soviet-made Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships, which are among the most advanced in the world and used by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Its army is equipped with Soviet AK-47 assault rifles, and it is believed that the country may possess Soviet MiG-21 fighter jets.

The threat posed by Nicaragua is augmented by the fact that its military apparatus is actually controlled by the Soviet Union and Cuba. In mid-1983, Nester Sanchez, a Pentagon expert on Latin America, revealed that "Cubans serve in key positions at every level of the Nicaraguan armed forces." As early as 1981, Nicaraguan refugees were claiming that there were "hundreds" of Soviet military experts inside their country. By April 1985, President Reagan was announcing that "just this week we confirmed the presence of Russian military

personnel in the battle zones of Northern Nicaragua" where fighting with Contra forces occurred.

A Scripps-Howard News Service dispatch dated February 9, 1986 disclosed that the Soviet Union plans to turn Nicaragua into a military base in utter violation of the Monroe Doctrine: "The Soviets intend to build a dry dock at the Nicaraguan port of San Juan del Sur that will enable their warships to operate from both Pacific and Atlantic harbors 'in close proximity to the Panama Canal,' according to CIA Director William Casey." According to Mr. Reagan: "Using Nicaragua as a base, the Soviets and the Cubans can become the dominant power in the crucial corridor between North and South America. Established there, they will be in a position to threaten the Panama Canal, interdict our vital Caribbean sea lanes and ultimately move against Mexico."

War Delared on the United States

The Sandinistas who rule Nicaragua have made no attempt to hide the fact that they are at war with the United States. One line in their anthem declares: "Let us fight against the Yankee, the enemy of humankind." Humberto Belli, a former editor of *La Prensa*, has offered this explanation: "This line, which existed prior to the triumph of the revolution, is . . . born . . . from a philosophy which holds that the United States is the source of all evil in the world. For the Marxists, the United States plays a role similar to that which Satan plays for Christians."

As part of their campaign to destroy the United States, the Sandinistas are undoubtedly training terrorist squads to infiltrate and attack the United States. In 1984, Antonio Farach, a former Nicaraguan diplomat, revealed that officials at the highest levels in the Sandinista regime are involved in a drug trafficking war against the United States. He disclosed that higher-ranking officials in the regime explained the rationale for the campaign in this manner: "The drugs did not remain in Nicaragua. The drugs were destined for the United States. Our youth would not be harmed but rather the youth of the United States, the youth of our enemies." As Moammar Qaddafi of Libya has publicly gloated: "Nicaragua is a wonderful thing. They fight America on its own ground."

Communist Nicaragua clearly stands as a glaring violation of the Monroe Doctrine, as a threat to the peace of Central America, and as a menace to the security of the United States. Mr. Reagan grimly made this assessment of the situation in his address to a joint session of Congress in 1983: "The national security of all the Americas is at stake in Central America. If we cannot defend ourselves there, we cannot expect to prevail elsewhere. Our credibility would collapse, our alliances would crumble and the safety of our homeland would be put in jeopardy."

This is the grim situation the United States now faces. Yet, recognizing the grave threat posed by Communist Nicaragua and properly responding to it are two entirely different matters. Indeed, it has been the U.S. response to this menace at our doorstep that has proven to be the most alarming aspect of the crisis in Central America.

Pro-Sandinista Sentiment

The initial response of the government of the United States to the Communist conquest of Nicaragua in 1979 was one of undisguised jubilation, for the Administration of President Jimmy Carter had worked overtly and covertly to help overthrow the democratically-elected government of Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza. The nauseating story of how the Carter Administration collaborated with the Kremlin to ensure the success of the Sandinista revolution has been fully documented in the book, *Nicaragua Betrayed*, written by Anastasio Somoza in collaboration with Jack Cox.*

Even after the Communist regime had been installed in Managua, the Carter Administration openly worked to sustain it and ensure its permanency, a fact that was reported by a Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service dispatch on August 2, 1979:

The main thrust of current administration policy is to seek friendly relations with the Sandinista-dominated government in Nicaragua.

In fact, United Press International reported that according to a member of the ruling revolutionary

junta, the United States had gone so far as to agree in principle to supply arms to the new government, although supplying food and other essentials is of higher priority.

With the full approval and concurrence of the U.S. government, money from a variety of sources poured into Nicaragua to aid the Sandinista regime. A gift of \$500,000 was immediately forthcoming from the Organization of American States. The Inter-American Development Bank quickly granted the Sandinista government \$107 million in grants, and pledged to extend another \$120 million over a four-year period. By the end of 1979, the government of Daniel Ortega had been given a total of \$89 million in gifts and offered \$490 million in international loans.

The Carter Administration itself lobbied Congress for and received funding for \$75 million in aid to Nicaragua, of which the Sandinistas managed to get their hands on \$60 million before the gift could be withdrawn. It is not known if the Sandinistas secretly received arms from the U.S. government to kill Contras; yet, according to a September 15, 1979 dispatch of the Los Angeles Times-Washington Post News Service, the Carter Administration openly extended a \$23,600 military training grant to "send 20 Sandinista soldiers for several weeks to U.S. bases in Panama, and two Sandinista commanders on a tour of military bases in the United States."

Agents of Influence

After outraged American voters ousted Jimmy Carter from office, pro-Sandinista sentiments continued to be openly displayed by many in high places, both in and out of the Federal Government. In 1984, for instance, 10 Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives actually wrote a "Dear Commandante" letter to Daniel Ortega that included praise for the Communist government of Nicaragua. When Nicaragua filed suit against the United States in the World Court in 1985, it was discovered that the chief legal strategists for the Sandinistas were not Nicaraguans — they were Americans, the most prominent being a Harvard professor and "civil liberties" crusader named Abram Chayes. It was especially noteworthy that Chayes, a member of the Council on

**Nicaragua Betrayed* (hardbound, 431 pages) is available for \$15.00, plus \$1.50 for postage and handling, from General Birch Services Corp., 395 Belmont, Massachusetts 02178.

Foreign Relations, had once served as a legal adviser in the Kennedy Administration's State Department to help "resolve" the 1962 Cuban missile crisis to the complete satisfaction of Moscow and Havana.

Earlier this year, Frank Varelli, a former FBI informant, revealed that a confidential FBI book on suspected terrorists had been prepared that identified a number of prominent individuals in the United States who are actively promoting the Communist cause in Central America. Representative Patricia Schroeder of Colorado, for instance, had been identified as an "agent of influence" who is "actively raising money for the Sandinistas" and "openly working on behalf of the Sandinista government." Varelli revealed that the confidential FBI report had also identified Robert E. White, a former Ambassador to El Salvador, as a secret Communist agent.

Three Objectives

The undisguised supporters of the Sandinistas in the United States are dedicated to accomplishing three objectives. The first is to wage a concerted campaign to portray the Contras as terrorists. Typical of such efforts is a report co-authored by David Siegel, Associate Director of Emergency Services at San Francisco General Hospital, and Richard Garfield, an epidemiologist at Columbia University in New York. The report, published by the Central American Health Rights Network under the title, *Health and the War Against Nicaragua 1981-1984*, made the following bold claim: "The U.S.-backed contras operate largely by terrorizing the population. Doctors, nurses, teachers and especially community volunteers have often been kidnapped, tortured, raped or killed by the contras." Although this publication reportedly "disturbed" many Congressmen, it was based, as are so many others like it, on the testimony of "witnesses" provided by the Sandinista government. The report, incidentally, contained warm praise for the supposedly wonderful health-care services established by the Communist government of Nicaragua.

The second objective of the openly pro-Sandinista sympathizers in the United States is to "Vietnamize" the Sandinista-Contra war by urging Congress to place a "no-win" restriction upon the Contras. This objective has been realized in the



The Contras: Are they being betrayed by U.S. government policies?

form of a series of Boland Amendments — named after Representative Edward Boland of Massachusetts — that have been enacted by Congress to attach "strings" to the aid for the Contras. The first Boland Amendment, adopted in 1982, specifically forbade the use of Contra funding "for the purpose of overthrowing the government of Nicaragua."

Finally, in their quest to "solve" the crisis in Central America, the ultimate objective of the openly pro-Sandinista sympathizers in the United States has been identified by Representative Stephen Solarz of New York (one of the 10 signers of the 1984 "Dear Commandante" letter): "They want to deal with it through the process of negotiation. . . ." The working model to serve as the basis for a negotiated "peace" accord in Central America has been identified by former Senator Gary Hart as "the Contadora Group proposal," a plan devised by the governments of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico — the very Latin American regimes which, together with the Costa Rican government, helped the Sandinistas come to power in Nicaragua in 1979. According to *U.S. News & World Report*, the Contadora plan "amounts to a form of partition" in Central America that "would accept Cuban and Soviet influence in Sandinista Nicaragua in return for Communists' promise to keep hands off elsewhere." Yet, according to a Houston Chronicle News Service article

dated May 24, 1986: "A recently published Pentagon report concludes that Nicaragua would not honor a Contadora agreement even if it signed it."

The ultimate objective sought by the undisguised pro-Sandinista elements in the United States, in other words, is to betray the Contras, recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet-Cuban base in Nicaragua, withdraw all U.S. influence from the region, and allow the rest of Central America and Mexico to fall into the Soviet orbit, thereby allowing the menace now existing in Nicaragua to spread all the way from the Panama Canal to the Rio Grande. Recognizing that this sentiment openly abounds in Congress, anxious Americans have turned hopefully toward the executive branch of the government, only to discover that it, too, is actually committed to this plot to surrender all of Central America.

Carter's Pledge

It was the executive branch of our government, of course, that originally betrayed Nicaragua in 1979 and helped bring the Sandinistas to power in that country. At the time of the original betrayal, it was apparent that genuinely anti-Communist Nicaraguans intended to form a Contra movement to oust the newly installed Communist regime. Less than two weeks before the fall of his government, President Anastasio Somoza had said: "We may take to the brush for

guerrilla warfare. Every lieutenant in the Guard could be a guerrilla leader." As soon as the Communists seized power, President Somoza's son, working with former National Guard Major Pablo Emilio Salazar, began the process of raising a guerrilla Contra army to operate from bases within Honduras. The objective of the Contras, as expressed by Enrique Bermudez, a Contra military commander and former Colonel in the National Guard, was "to overthrow the Communists" in Nicaragua.

The newly established Sandinista government in Managua was concerned with the threat posed by the Contras and demanded and secured from the government of the United States an executive pledge to protect the Communists from the Contras. This pledge, made by the Carter Administration, was reported by the United Press International on July 31, 1979:

American Ambassador Lawrence A. Pezzullo has reassured the leaders of the Sandinista-backed Nicaraguan government the United States would not support any attempt to destabilize their rule.

Pezzullo issued a strong statement Monday telling the five-member revolutionary junta and the Sandinista army command that the U.S. would oppose any effort to overthrow the regime.

Taking Control of the Contras

In compliance with this executive pledge, the CIA was ordered to move in covertly and take control of the Contra movement and guide the Contras into a "no-win" war against the Sandinista government. *Newsweek* magazine, in 1982, revealed that it was the Carter Administration, not the Reagan Administration, that initiated the CIA covert operations.

When the Reagan Administration came to power, it expanded the effort until it became the largest covert CIA operation since the Vietnam War. From the very start, the Reagan Administration decided to honor the executive pledge made to protect the Sandinistas from the Contras. Not once has President Ronald Reagan, despite all his strong rhetoric, ever specifically called for the ouster of the Sandinista government.

In 1984, State Department spokesman

John Hughes said: "The suggestion that the policy of the United States is to overthrow the Sandinista regime is not correct. There has been no change in our basic policy objectives." On August 18, 1985, the *New York Times* disclosed: "Robert C. McFarlane, President Reagan's national security adviser, said in response to a query that it was 'absolutely not' the policy of the United States to overthrow the Sandinistas." In June 1985, Ronald Reagan himself, in a letter to Representative David McCurdy, stated: "We do not seek the military overthrow of the Sandinista government or to put in its place a government based on supporters of the old Somoza regime." According to Secretary of State George Shultz: "Our goals in Central America are like those we had in Vietnam."

Despite the fact that the Reagan Administration supports funding for the Contras, the Administration's underlying strategy is to lose the war, and in due course surrender all of Central America to Soviet influence. Thus, the Administration continues to officially recognize the Sandinista regime as a legitimate government, continues to promote aid to and trade with Communist nations known to be supporting the Sandinista war effort against the Contras, and has done as little as possible to harm the economy of Communist Nicaragua.

Sanctions or Support?

As late as March 24, 1985, the *Houston Chronicle* observed in an editorial: "The contras have succeeded in damaging Nicaragua's economy. Yet the United States remains Nicaragua's largest trading partner, buying most of its coffee, cotton and banana exports." Embarrassed by the exposure of this fact, the Reagan Administration announced on May 1, 1985 the imposition of trade sanctions against Nicaragua. The sanctions, however, were quite mild and stood in sharp contrast to the severe economic sanctions that were imposed on South Africa. According to an Associated Press report, the sanctions were deliberately designed "to give time to Nicaragua to find other markets for its products . . . and to find suppliers for items like machinery which it imports from the United States." The sanctions did not bar Americans from traveling to Nicaragua, nor did they prohibit U.S. banks from making new loans to that Communist country.

In 1984, Senator Daniel Moynihan of New York demanded and received a letter from President Reagan to Senate Majority leader Howard Baker of Tennessee that explained the Administration's basic policy objectives for Nicaragua. "We now have for the first time an explicit Presidential statement about his objectives," Senator Moynihan declared. "I don't think there's any precedent for such a letter." In his letter, President Reagan explained that his policy objective "does not seek to destabilize or overthrow the government of Nicaragua," but "only, among other things, to bring the Sandinistas into meaningful negotiations . . . on peace in the region."

A Sentinel Miami [News] Bureau article dated May 26, 1985 has identified the working model for a negotiated "peace" settlement supported by the Reagan Administration: "The Reagan Administration, while pushing Congress to approve financial aid for rebels fighting the Nicaraguan government, officially supports the Contadora process." This was confirmed by Secretary of State George Shultz, who asserted that "there is a recognition all around that the center of negotiations must be the Contadora process." The ultimate "solution" to the crisis in Central America sought by the Reagan Administration, in short, is identical to that advocated by the undisguised pro-Sandinista elements in the United States.

Betraying the Contras

There remained only one hitch in the plot to recognize the legitimacy of the Soviet-Cuban conquest of Nicaragua and to surrender all of Central America — how to get the Contras to agree to the sellout. The solution was to put forth the fallacious theory that the original Sandinista revolution of 1979 was supposedly "betrayed" by the Communists, and that the Contras are merely fighting to restore the "integrity" of the revolution. Ronald Reagan himself has put forth this theory, claiming that it is therefore the noble duty of his Administration to help "those who fought a revolution to escape a dictatorship to have a democracy and then had it taken away from them by some of their fellow revolutionaries."

In accordance with this fictional theory, the CIA has deliberately placed the most undesirable supposed "defectors" from the Sandinista regime in positions



CIA-installed Contra political leaders have included
(from left to right): Adolfo Calero, Edgar Chamorro, and Eden Pastora

of political leadership over the Contra movement, knowing full well that these agents will be more than willing to sell out the true interests of the Contras at any political Contadora-type "peace" conference. A look at some of the leading *contra* political leaders the CIA has selected proves enlightening.

Adolfo Calero. One of the key conspirators of the Sandinista revolution that toppled the elected government of President Anastasio Somoza, Adolfo Calero served briefly in the new Sandinista government and helped his fellow conspirators enslave his homeland. Then, one day, he claimed he suddenly noticed that Nicaragua was a Communist country and announced his "defection." The CIA, deeply impressed with his clairvoyance and keen insight, placed him in the position of chief political leader of the largest Contra force, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), a position he has held since 1982. Calero's chief accomplishment has been to purge many genuine anti-Communists within the FDN (so-called "Somocists") from leadership positions. In an article he wrote for the April 11, 1985 issue of the *Houston Chronicle*, Calero explained his political views. Regarding the U.S. "intervention in our country that led to the removal in 1979 of the previous government," he stated that "I... welcomed that action." He repeated the standard lie that "the

Sandinista regime... has betrayed our revolution," and claimed that the Contra movement is a "struggle to return Nicaragua to the values that guided us in removing the Somoza dictatorship."

Edgar Chamorro. He is a member of a family of Marxist newspaper publishers that actively worked to bring the Sandinista regime to power. When the family patriarch, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, was assassinated in 1978, the family immediately blamed President Somoza, although they now confess that he was probably sacrificed by the Sandinistas as a "martyr." Violeta Chamorro, Edgar's mother, served briefly on the ruling Sandinista junta and exclaimed: "This is no Marxist revolution, and there are no sinister people in the shadows waiting to take us over." Edgar's brother, Carlos, is the editor of the official Sandinista newspaper, *Barricada*; his Uncle Xavier runs another pro-Sandinista newspaper called *Nuevo Diario*; while Edgar himself, together with his mother and Uncle Jaime, ran the "opposition" newspaper, *La Prensa*. (There is no real opposition media in Communist Nicaragua.)

When Edgar "defected" from the Sandinista cause, the CIA made him the Public Relations director for the FDN, a position he held until he was kicked out by the Contras for trying to harm their cause. It was Edgar Chamorro who "leaked" (and probably helped write) the controversial CIA Warfare Manual that

was to prove so embarrassing for the Contras. Following his expulsion by the Contras, he turned up a little later as a witness on behalf of the Sandinista government before the World Court, where he told chilling tales about alleged atrocities committed by the Contras.

Alfonso Robelo. Although he came from a wealthy family, Alfonso Robelo was a key conspirator in the Communist takeover of Nicaragua in 1979. As the Director of the Jesuit-run Central American University, he contributed greatly to move elements in the Catholic Church to support the Communist subversives by advocating the Theology of Liberation. Less than two weeks after the Sandinistas came to power in Managua they sent Robelo to Havana to represent them officially at ceremonies commemorating the 26th anniversary of the launching of the Cuban revolution. During the festivities, he told Fidel Castro: "Cuba and Nicaragua will always be, as they always have been, brother nations. Cuba and Nicaragua united will win." As a member of the ruling Junta of National Reconstruction, Alfonso Robelo had been instrumental in bringing Cubans into Nicaragua in large numbers. His stated opinion was: "We must recognize the generosity of a brother country like Cuba." Then, several years later, Robelo announced that he was shocked to learn that the Cubans had taken over Nicaragua, adding that he had decided to "de-

fect." The CIA immediately saw in this man great leadership abilities and made him a Contra political leader. Alfonso Robelo has given this explanation of his views of the Contra movement: "We are not counter-revolutionaries. We are rescuers of a betrayed revolution."

Arturo Cruz. An international banker affiliated with the Inter-American Development Bank, Arturo Cruz was a key conspirator in the 1979 Communist revolution in Nicaragua. Afterwards, he served the new Sandinista regime as a member of the ruling junta and later as its Ambassador to the United States. While he was serving in the latter capacity, an Associated Press report dated October 22, 1981 stated: "Arturo J. Cruz . . . denied that Nicaragua had been used as a staging area by Cuba." Several years later, he suddenly noticed that Nicaragua was a Communist country and "defected" to the "democratic" opposition. His criticism of the Sandinista regime, however, has always been a form of guarded praise. He was reportedly encouraged by the phony 1984 elections staged by Daniel Ortega and claims that Ortega is a moderate. Cruz is convinced that "Ortega will make an effort to reach national conciliation," and, according to a *Christian Science Monitor* article dated March 3, 1984, he "believes it is possible that the Sandinistas might 'democratize' Nicaragua somewhat." The CIA was impressed by Cruz's utterances and, since 1985, he has been openly promoted as one of the chief Contra political leaders.

Eden Pastora. This man, who is known to have fathered at least 22 children by four different women, once served as "Commander Zero" in the Sandinista revolutionary army. Eden Pastora's idol has always been Fidel Castro, about whom he has said: "For what he did to help us in the insurrection, I will always love him." Following the Sandinista takeover, Pastora served the new regime as vice minister of defense, vice minister of interior, founder and first leader of the Sandinista militia, and commander of the counter-insurgency Ezekiel Brigade that specialized in hunting down and slaughtering suspected Contras. After more than a year of leading forces to kill Contras, Pastora announced his "defection," although he still insisted: "We are Sandinistas. We support revolutionary changes. We support the gains already made by the Nicaraguan govern-

ment." Eden Pastora wrote an article for the June 10, 1983 issue of the *Houston Chronicle*, proclaiming, "I remain steadfast in my loyalty to the true revolution," and stating that he was trying "to do everything within my power to prevent the revolution from being aborted." He expressed dismay over the fact that many of the Contras were genuine anti-Communists and stated that "my revolutionary conscience calls for me to provide an alternative." Pastora wrote that he was "ready to find a political solution" and would like to guide the Contras to "support the effort by the four Latin American countries known as the Contadora Group." It has long been known that the CIA regards Eden Pastora as the greatest Contra political leader of them all, and an attempt was actually made to place him in the top leadership position. The first attempt, however, failed because the Contras regarded Pastora as the personification of everything against which they were fighting. But Pastora may yet be brought back by the CIA at a crucial time to "represent" the Contras at peace talks and betray everything for which they have fought and bled.

Averting the Planned Disaster

If it were not for the deadly seriousness of the crisis we now face, the entire charade behind the plot to surrender Central America might appear to be nothing more than a tragic comedy. Yet the situation the United States faces today is genuinely grave. Americans who are anxious to avert the planned disaster must realize that the menace at our doorstep cannot be removed simply by backing President Reagan in his bids for further funding of the Contras. Concerned Americans must demand that their President assume proper leadership in this crisis and adopt a completely new policy toward Central America that would include, as a minimum, the following steps to ensure our national security and the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine:

- The severance of diplomatic relations with Communist Nicaragua with the assertion that its government has been installed in a manner unworthy of recognition by the United States.
- The imposition of economic sanctions against Communist Nicaragua that are as severe in nature as those the United States has imposed on South Africa.

- The cessation of all trade with and aid to Communist nations known to be supporting the Sandinista regime's war effort against the Contras.
- The cessation of funding to all international lending organizations that bankroll the Communist government of Nicaragua.
- The expulsion from leadership positions in the Contra movement of all those whose records are tainted by previous affiliation with the Sandinista government.
- The extension of formal diplomatic recognition to a genuine Nicaraguan "government-in-exile" to be comprised of genuine anti-Communist leaders chosen by the Contras.
- The open and unequivocal proclamation that the U.S. objective is to assist the Contras in their effort to eliminate the illegal Sandinista regime in Managua.
- The termination of the unsavory practice of CIA-controlled covert aid to the Contras, accompanied by the open granting of military aid to the official "government-in-exile" of the Nicaraguan Contras.

It is questionable whether U.S. troops should be sent to Nicaragua to enforce the Monroe Doctrine. If the steps listed above are taken, however, it may be possible to avoid the use of our own troops. It is no secret that the Sandinista army, large and formidable as it is, suffers from a high desertion rate; and *U.S. News & World Report* has recently noted that "Nicaragua's economy rapidly is nearing collapse." The pressure tactics outlined above may be sufficient to topple the Communist regime in Managua without further steps being necessary. Yet one thing is certain: *Under no circumstances should U.S. troops ever be committed to Central America unless and until all of the measures listed above have been implemented!* To commit American troops without implementing the other measures would merely doom our own soldiers to die in a hopeless, "no-win" war.

Yet, more important than anything else, the American people must never again allow their leaders to betray our true allies and subvert the genuine interests of the United States in Central America, or anywhere else in the world. ■

— WARREN L. MCFERRAN

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

TO:

LK MZ

☐ YOU WERE CALLED BY- ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY-

Nancy Gilbertson

OF (Organization)

N.H w/ various SDI

☐ PLEASE PHONE ☐ FTS ☐ AUTOVON

(603) 673-8078

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Newspapers Pentagon

Spoken to top leaders

morning Wientberger

resent Carlucci

Depressed
funeral

Packing leaving cntry

RECEIVED BY

Renounce CFR

DATE

TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

☆ GPO : 1982 O - 361-529 (210)

MEMORANDUM
OF CALL

Previous editions usable

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MESSAGE

Council of Foreign
relations

why surrendering?
Progressive

RECEIVED BY

DATE

TIME

63-110 NSN 7540-00-634-4018

STANDARD FORM 63 (Rev. 8-81)
Prescribed by GSA

Verily, Verity's Not a Cabinet Maker

Surely, C. William Verity Jr. is not the man for Secretary of Commerce. This is a former chief executive of the Armco Corporation.

Verity was nominated by President Reagan last Aug. 10 to fill the Cabinet vacancy created by the death of Malcolm Baldrige, former Secretary of Commerce.

Speaking of Baldrige, the President said, "He had a vision, not only for dealing with immediate issues, but for the future of the world economy as well." Yes, Malcolm Baldrige did have a vision, but it was of a world government and not one of America's greatness and prosperity.

It is true that Verity is quite capable of filling the boots of Malcolm Baldrige, but these are not the cowboy boots of an independent America.

Verity was one of 25 top American executives of her giant corporations who, under the sponsorship of Don Kendall of Pepsi and vodka fame, who went together in 1973, with the blessing of President Richard Nixon, to organize U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council. At that time Verity was head of the ARMCO Company.

As chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council, Verity advocated economic ties with the Soviet Union and was critical of those who argued that U.S. economic investments in the Soviet Union and her allied countries should be conditioned on social behavior.

Union Leader 10/15/84



Mel Thomson's Perspective

Verity has proposed that the U.S. extend its most-favored nation status to the Soviet Union; that the Soviets be admitted to the International Monetary Fund in the World Bank and that they be granted membership in GATT (General Agreement on Tariff and Trade).

During the 1970's as president of ARMCO Steel, Verity sought to build steel mills in the Soviet Union.

He said that if he was appointed to the position of Secretary of Commerce, he would do all in his power to extend the trade of the U.S. to the Soviet Union. Verity was critical of President Jimmy Carter for imposing the grain embargo and other economic strictures on the Soviet Union in the wake of the Afghan invasion.

It is interesting to note that it was Verity who took the lead role in attacking our own Larry Brady for his efforts at the Commerce Department in seeking to limit transfers of American technology to the Soviet Union.

It is anticipated that Verity's policies and beliefs will have a very adverse impact on those American industries who

are threatened by unfair slave labor competition from the Soviet Union.

Finally, William Verity's presence in a Cabinet would be another voice for a soft-on-communism policy at a time when potentially dangerous arms control treaties are being considered.

Thus, to put C. William Verity Jr. in the Presidential Cabinet or in any other position of policy responsibility in the U.S. government, would be to put the wolf in charge of the chickens.

As Nackey Loeb, publisher of this newspaper, said so eloquently in a front page editorial on Aug. 21: "Tragically, Verity does not fit in with much of our current trade policy, as immoral as that is. But neither that policy, nor Verity himself, fits in with a nation that believes in freedom."

Verity has been confirmed by the U.S. Senate, primarily, we think, because he favors trading with the enemy, which seems to be the policy of the Reagan Administration.

And, anyone who wants to trade with the Evil Empire is a friend of those who want to advance the Soviet Union to the detriment of America.

I am worried that this appt. will result in exporting our HIGH TECHNOLOGY (SDI components) to the USSR -

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 13, 1987

Nancy A. Gilbertson
8 Springhill Road
Mont Vernon, New Hampshire 03057

Dear Nancy:

Thank you for contacting me regarding the Reagan Administration's proposed reinterpretation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. I appreciate your taking the time to share your thoughts with me on this matter.

For the past year and a half, the United States has been embroiled in a contentious and arcane internal dispute over the correct interpretation of those portions of the 1972 ABM treaty which pertain to the development and testing of futuristic or so-called "exotic" ABM systems. This controversy was precipitated in October, 1985, when the Reagan Administration announced with no advance notice or congressional consultations that the interpretation of the Treaty which successive U.S. administrations had upheld since 1972 was incorrect.

The debate on the reinterpretation issue has necessarily been legalistic. Treaties are, after all, the law of the land, and the President is charged with executing the law. Moreover, the Senate has a crucial constitutional role in treaty-making and thus has a direct interest in ensuring that treaties are accurately presented and faithfully upheld. If the President can unilaterally change treaty obligations which were clearly understood and accepted by the Senate at the time it consented to ratification, it dramatically alters the Senate's constitutional role as a co-equal partner in this area.

For these reasons, it is imperative that the Administration's case for the reinterpretation be subjected to a rigorous legal analysis. Some have accused those who do not accept the Administration's case for the reinterpretation of allowing "legalisms" to stand in the way of necessary progress in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Others have accused the Administration -- in one columnist's phrase -- of "lookin' fer loopholes" in the Treaty through what might be called "sharp practices".

I believe that it is important to put aside accusations as to motive and judge the facts as they stand. If the reinterpretation is legally correct, then our Nation has every

Nancy A. Gilbertson
October 13, 1987
Page 2

right to proceed accordingly. But if it is not legally correct, then manipulating the law of the land is not acceptable.

I do not believe that the reinterpretation debate should be cast in terms of whether one is for or against the ABM Treaty. The Treaty was accepted in 1972 by the Nixon Administration and the United States Senate on the assumption first, that the Soviet Union would strictly observe its terms, and second, that significant reductions in strategic offensive arms would be accomplished within five years.

Neither expectation has been fulfilled. The Soviets have not restrained the relentless expansion of their strategic offensive forces. Their massive investment in strategic defenses (primarily air defenses) -- while not a violation of the ABM Treaty -- does contradict the spirit of the agreement; that is, that both sides recognized and accepted that there can be no shield against retaliation. Violations such as the Krasnoyarsk radar further undermine the integrity of the agreement.

In light of these considerations, the Soviet Union must recognize that the U.S. commitment to the ABM Treaty cannot be deemed unalterable or open-ended -- whether or not the traditional interpretation of the Treaty is upheld. If arms control or unilateral strategic modernization efforts (such as moving to mobile ICBMs) fail to restore stability to the strategic balance in the future, the United States may well have to deploy strategic defenses designed to protect its retaliatory forces and command and control communications. Unless the ABM Treaty could be amended by mutual agreement to permit such deployments, this action would necessarily require the United States to exercise its right under the supreme national interest clause of the Treaty to withdraw on six months notice.

Certainly a U.S. decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty would be enormously controversial at home and abroad. I am not counseling this course at this time. Nonetheless, the American public and our allies need to understand that if we cannot solve current strategic vulnerabilities through arms control or our own strategic programs, we may have no recourse but to consider deploying some form of strategic defense.

Second, those who support the reinterpretation in the name of accelerating the SDI may be laboring under a fundamental misimpression. There is a strong case that the specific SDI early deployment now favored by Secretary Weinberger cannot be developed or tested under either interpretation.


Nancy A. Gilbertson
October 13, 1987
Page 3

Finally, those who would cast this issue as a question of whether one is for or against Soviet violations of arms control agreements miss the point: there are other, more honorable, responses available to the United States. These include, first, insisting that the Soviets correct the violations; second, proportional U.S. responses; and third and last; abrogation of the agreement.

For 200 years, the United States has stood for the rule of law as embodied in our Constitution. The reinterpretation issue must be approached not with an eye toward near-term gains, but rather with a decent respect for the long-term interests of the rule of law and the continued integrity of this Constitution -- that magnificent document whose 200th birthday we celebrate this year.

I appreciate the opportunity to share these views with you and hope they put my more detailed analysis of the ABM Treaty interpretation issue into a broader context.

Sincerely,



Sam Nunn

SN/jfr

①
CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP

DATE: 10/20/87

- ☐ DISCUSS WITH ME
- ☐ FOR YOUR APPROVAL
- ☐ PLEASE NOTE & FILE
- ☐ PLEASE NOTE & RETURN
- ☐ FOR YOUR INFO.
- ☐ FOR YOUR COMMENTS
- ☐ PLEASE HANDLE

Re: Reinterpretation
Issue: we can't defend
America by using their
rules to control our
response.
In effect, Kosta Tsipis et al
FROM: TSIPIS
HAVE OVER RIDDEN THE

RECONFORM - NO MORE SIXX
Constitutional Mandate for the provision
of a common defense - NG

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TO:
THUS, A New 1987
ABM Treaty puts the ball
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who can't abide by
Treaties and we are no
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FROM:
OF OUR "PROVOCATIVENESS"

RECONFORM - NO MORE SIXX
1987 Treaty should address Telemetry + Electromagnetic
Interference.

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TO: Thus, A New 1987
ABM Treaty puts the ball
in the court of those
who CAN'T abide by
Treaties and we are no
longer on the defense
FROM: OF OUR "PROVOCATIVENESS"

REDFORM - NOTE STX -
1987 TREATY SHOWS ADDRESS Telemetry + Electromagnetic
Interference.

Mr. President,

November 9, 1987

How you react to glasnost, will probably determine the future of freedom for the entire world.

Not only are we in a struggle against the threat of nuclear blackmail or accidental missile launch but the larger battle ground is between good and evil.

The Norwegian Peace prize is Satans lure, while that which is Gods finds its reward in the spiritual realm. Man cannot serve two masters.

"Now we are going to develop a permanently manned space station and new opportunities for free enterprise because, in the next decade, Americans and our friends around the world will be living and working together in space."

Hold fast to dreams for if dreams

Die, life is a broken winged bird that cannot fly

President Ronald Reagan

Let us then consider what is in the best interest of future generations; let us

take our space program which will ensure a balance in nuclear security by initiating a new, honest 1987 ABM Treaty to replace mutually Assured Destruction.

Nancy GILBERTSON



Mr. ⁱji ✓

Deploy ~~A~~ 1987

ABM Honest

TREATY —

Now or Never

PLEASE!

Nancy Gilbertson

Unanswered Questions about the
INF Agreement

by

Gilbert S. Stubbs

September 18, 1987

On the surface it would appear that Secretary of State George Shultz has substantially advanced the cause of arms control by nearly completing an INF (Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces) agreement that would eliminate medium and short-range missiles from U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. However, before we can conclude that this is indeed a landmark in arms control, Secretary Shultz must supply answers to the following questions:

(1) How can you justify removing the only U.S. land-based missiles in Europe that can reach the Soviet Union, while not in any way decreasing the overwhelming Soviet conventional forces and long-range missiles that threaten our NATO allies?

(2) How can you justify backing down from the kind of unrestricted on-demand inspection that U.S. negotiators previously maintained was required to verify the elimination of mobile missiles?

(3) Exactly what means will you employ to insure that all existing Soviet medium and short-range missiles are destroyed?

(4) How will you insure that the Soviets will not manufacture additional missiles of the type "eliminated," using factories not previously used for this purpose, and covertly stockpiling such missiles and their launchers for future deployment?

(5) How will you insure that the Soviets will not covertly produce and deploy additional long-range mobile missiles to take the place of the "eliminated" missiles of shorter ranges?

(6) How will you insure that the Soviets will not produce and deploy easily-concealed, land-launched cruise missiles to replace the ballistic missiles eliminated?

(7) Exactly what methods of on-site inspection do you intend to employ in Cuba and Nicaragua to insure that the Soviets have not concealed medium and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles in these countries for future deployments against the United States?

(8) And finally, how can you justify accepting limitations on the on-site inspection of medium and short-range missiles that you most certainly will not be able to accept in agreements on long-range mobile missiles where the stakes are infinitely higher?

INF and START: For Good or for Ill?

by

Gilbert S. Stubbs

November 17, 1987

Many of us who have supported President Reagan on increased defense expenditures and SDI are deeply concerned about his rush into ill-conceived, hastily-negotiated disarmament agreements. Purporting to advance the cause of disarmament and to reduce tensions, the INF and START treaties will do nothing of the kind.

By removing the only U.S. missiles on NATO soil capable of reaching Soviet territory, the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) Treaty not only will make NATO more vulnerable to intimidation and invasion by vastly superior Soviet conventional forces, but will make it extremely unlikely that the imbalance in these conventional forces will ever be redressed by negotiations. Moreover, by creating the myth that limited on-site inspection can detect the concealment of missiles which can be dismantled into stages less than 30 ft in length, the INF Treaty will lead the U.S. down a path of disastrous verification concession in START.

In START (strategic arms reduction talks), where the stakes to the U.S. are infinitely higher, Secretary of State George Shultz has already conceded an undisputed superiority in destructive power to the Soviets. He has done this (1) by defining "equality" in terms of numbers of warheads, ignoring the fact that much larger Soviet warheads give them far more destructive power and hard-target kill capability and (2) by allowing the Soviets to retain a sufficient number of first-strike ICBMs to destroy essentially our entire ICBM deterrent along with other key targets. (In his press conference of Sept. 18, 1987, Secretary Shultz stated that START negotiations have "moved along" in measuring equality in terms of warheads and in allowing the Soviets to keep 154 of their gigantic SS-18 missiles, having over six times the total throw-weight of the planned U.S. Peacekeeper missile force.)

Secretary Shultz has further bowed to the Soviets in START by agreeing that limited defenses against a Soviet ICBM attack (which even opponents of SDI admit are feasible) will not be deployed for at least seven years (and therefore indefinitely). While thus guaranteeing to the Soviets the future vulnerability of our land-based forces, Mr. Shultz has agreed to reduce our currently most survivable sea-based (submarine) deterrent by a factor of two.

We who have applauded President Reagan's unfinished agenda for restoring our national and NATO defenses are sickened at the prospect that much of what has been gained in the past seven years will be negotiated away in the next few months.

START and INF Negotiations:
Where are they leading us?

by

Gilbert S. Stubbs

INF: Not a Good Treaty

The INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) Treaty has generated serious misgivings among our NATO allies and among both liberal and conservative members of the House and Senate. Even most of the Republican Presidential contenders, with the notable exception of V.P. George Bush, have expressed serious reservations about this Treaty that would remove the only U.S. nuclear missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union, while leaving intact vastly superior Soviet conventional and strategic nuclear forces.

The sloppy way in which the INF Treaty has been negotiated was indicated in the Reagan-Shultz press conference of October 30, 1987. Here, President Reagan announced the planned signing of the Treaty at the summit meeting on December 7, 1987, while admitting that key, all-important provisions on verification had yet to be negotiated! At this conference Secretary Shultz and President Reagan made a joke of the fact that the completion of verifications negotiations was being subject to a deadline:

Shultz: "It's not done, but if it doesn't get done, Mr. Shevardnadze and I are going to get kicked in the rear end very hard by our leaders."

Reagan: "Ha, ha, yes."

One of the arguments now being employed to justify the fast pace of INF negotiations is that we must get this Treaty out of the way in order to get to the far more important START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty. Actually, as presently being negotiated, the START Treaty is far worse than the INF Treaty, and it will pose an even more direct threat to U.S. security. Therefore, if the INF Treaty is an obstacle to completion of the START Treaty, then we should hold up rather than approve the INF Treaty.

START: Potentially a Worse Treaty

The 50 percent cut in strategic arms contemplated in START is a good idea. But the manner in which this cut is to be made is hopelessly flawed. The cut is not to be made to equal levels of potential destructive power, as would be indicated by the total weight of strategic warheads deliverable by each side. Rather, the START negotiations are being based on reducing to equal numbers of warheads. This would give an overwhelming advantage to the Soviets whose larger warheads provide them with a much greater destructive power in both their ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) forces than the corresponding U.S. forces.

Secretary of State George Shultz, in his press conference of September 18, 1987, indicated the kind of fuzzy thinking that is going into U.S. START negotiations:

"From our standpoint, we're glad to see the position that has been agreed; the cutting in half of the heavy Soviet missiles to 154 is translated into warheads at 1540. I think that's an important matter as we seek to have the main unit of account be warheads' instead of launchers. So that's something that [has] moved along."

Secretary Shultz did not tell the public that according to U.S. intelligence estimates, the heavy Soviet SS-18 missiles to which he referred may have 14 rather than 10 warheads per missile, as he assumed. He also failed to point out that the enormous throwweight of this missile would allow it to carry 20 MX-size warheads, giving the Soviets 3080 counterforce, first-strike warheads after START "reductions," compared to the 500 warheads being allowed by Congress for the U.S. MX (or Peacekeeper) force.

Not only has Secretary Shultz conceded to the Soviets their first-strike capability against U.S. ICBMs and other key military

targets -- achievable with a reduced SS-18 force alone -- but he has already agreed in START negotiations to forestall any efforts to deploy defenses against a Soviet first-strike for at least seven years. Even strident opponents of strategic defense have admitted that it is feasible to deploy limited defenses that would nullify the Soviet first-strike threat within the time interval in which Shultz would proscribe such defenses.

In allowing the Soviets to retain their first-strike ICBM capability against defenseless U.S. facilities, the START Treaty would stake U.S. security almost entirely on the survivability of U.S. ballistic missile submarines. Eight years ago Dr. William Perry, Director of Defense Research and Engineering under President Carter testified to a Senate committee that in the 1990s these submarines could become as vulnerable as fixed-base ICBMs. In an October 27, 1987 hearing of the House Arms Control Subcommittee aired on C-SPAN, Representative Solarz expressed concern that the Soviets want us to eliminate all but 7 to 10 of these submarines under START and that our negotiators have so far agreed to reduce their number from 36 down to 17. During the hearing, Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, former national security director to President Ford, was asked by Rep. Solarz whether reducing our submarine deterrent to 17 submarines "is compatible with stability." He replied, "I'd rather not do it, frankly."

Going Beyond START and INF

Further aggravating the problems created by Secretary Shultz's INF and START concessions are the efforts of the Democratic majorities in Congress to dismantle our defenses by all kinds of unverifiable test bans, including a comprehensive nuclear test ban, an anti-satellite weapon test ban and a ban on important tests of strategic defenses. Five of the six Democratic Presidential contenders have also called for a missile test ban that would eliminate the small mobile ICBM. This is the only U.S. strategic ground-based missile that would have a reasonable chance of surviving, if START prevents the U.S. deployment of strategic defenses.

A Call for Action

All of these efforts to rush into agreements that are lopsided and unverifiable, or to initiate test bans that amount to unilateral disarmament, are based on the assumption that this is what the American public desires. It is up to us to disabuse our elected and appointed officials of this notion.



THE FIX IS IN

by
Lt. General Daniel O. Graham
Director, High Frontier

In a six-minute, dramatic message to Congress describing the sudden Japanese attack on U.S. naval and air forces at Pearl Harbor, Franklin Delano Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 "a date which will live in infamy." If negotiations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. go as planned, future historians may well describe December 7, 1987, as the second sinking of U.S. defensive forces.

The President is now committed to a Summit on December 7 and Soviet leader Gorbachev seems confident of achieving in Washington that which eluded him in Reykjavik and Moscow, namely, the killing off of SDI. According to Soviet Defense Ministry spokesman Boris Pyadychev just prior to the Summit announcement, "The General Secretary will come to the U.S. when work is finalized on SRM and IRM, and also when some agreements in principle are worked out relating to key provisions in the area of strategic offensive arms and in the area of measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty." More recently, Soviet arms negotiator, Victor Karpov, told the press that the superpowers "have reached an understanding" on halving strategic arsenals and "barring deployment of space weapons for a time."

In other words, the INF Treaty is merely window dressing for the main event -- an agreement to reduce strategic arsenals by 50 percent in exchange for the death of SDI.

The INF deal is a *fait accompli*, and with the Reagan Administration committed in advance to signing a treaty on December 7, we can be certain that Gorbachev's minions will give no ground on the "details" yet to be worked out -- crucial "details" like the horrendous problem of verification, and the fact that key elements of the yet-undrafted treaty are only "implicitly," not explicitly, agreed to by the Soviets.

One such issue: exactly what missiles are involved? The impression given the public is that all nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with ranges of 500 to 5500 km. will be eliminated over a period of five or more years. But the original Soviet proposal was to exclude the short-range weapons from East Germany and Czechoslovakia only, leaving 500-1000 km. missiles elsewhere in Eastern Europe, fully capable of striking any important NATO target.

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We're told the Soviets have "implicitly" agreed that these weapons would be "totally" eliminated but does that mean they will be excluded from Poland and Hungary as well?

And what about such weapons in the hands of Soviet armies just across the border in the U.S.S.R. itself? If they are not eliminated, these powerful and mobile weapons can be repositioned in Eastern Europe within a matter of a few days, even a few hours. Small wonder our European Allies greet the vagaries of the INF Treaty with skepticism, and small wonder that Congressmen from both sides of the aisle have warned that the Administration may be creating a treaty which cannot be ratified.

Certainly by setting, in advance, a celebration date of December 7, Soviet negotiators will now prove intransigent in settling these critical issues and the more concessions our side makes to insure a positive result on December 7, the less the public will be informed of the bad news.

We have already seen Mr. Shultz diligently trying to obscure the fact that "agreements in principle" include leaving us utterly vulnerable to nuclear attack for another 15 years. And we have seen vital issues in the INF relegated to the status of "details" in public pronouncements. We can expect more of the same with regard to SDI.

Quite obviously, Paul Nitze, our chief strategist on arms control deals has been assiduously pressing for U.S. acceptance of Soviet demands. Nitze uses "non-withdrawal from the ABM Treaty" as a semantic veil to obscure the fact that the Soviets' insistence that we forego SDI testing and deployment for another seven to ten years would leave the United States unnecessarily defenseless for at least fifteen years, for it will take six to eight years after a decision to create the defense.

Such back-door dealing is nothing new to Nitze who has, in the past, felt it wise to keep the public in the dark about deals with the Soviets. We all remember Nitze's "walk in the woods" proposal, an unauthorized effort to forge a compromise with the Soviets in the early 1980s. And during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Nitze also advised that the public not be informed that part of the deal with Soviet Premier Khrushchev to get the missiles out of Cuba was the removal of U.S. intermediate-range missiles from the soil of our allies in Europe. His advise did not prevail then, but the signs of obfuscation on current arms control deals suggests that such advice is being taken today.

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Mr. Shultz has accepted Mr. Nitze's view, and agreed "in principle" that the U.S. will accept "non-withdrawal." The "detail" to be worked out is whether to cripple SDI for seven years or longer.

Certainly, this view is supported by the strong forces in the Administration, in Congress, at State, and even within DoD, who would readily forego all possibilities of defenses in return for an arms deal with the Soviets -- forces which will now be strengthened by the departure of Secretary of Defense Cap Weinberger.

Even the President who seems, on the one hand, to insist that no agreements will be reached limiting SDI, appears to be ready to negotiate on the matter of deployment. One can only assume that he has still not been told that he can order deployment of SDI today and that even SDI's severest critics admit the technology is in hand.

For good or ill, it seems certain that there will be a treaty to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces, but the real question is just what else has been promised to be eliminated in Moscow in 1988.

On that desperate day in 1941, Franklin Roosevelt could still express confidence that we would "gain the inevitable triumph -- so help us God."

If the fix is in, we, today, can be less certain of such an outcome.

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