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PRIMARY GUIDELINES FOR FUNCTIONALLY IMPROVING, STRENGTHENING AND EQUIPPING THE SANDINISTA
PEOPLE'S ARMY (SPA) FOR THE PERIOD 1988-1990 AND PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR THE FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD 1991-1995

(DIRIANGEN I - DIRIANGEN II)

OCTOBER 1987

INDEX

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I: PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION
OF THE SPA

CHAPTER II: PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION
OF THE SPA OVER THE REMAINDER OF THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 1986-1990
(1988-1990)

CHAPTER III: PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES FOR THE SPA'S TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT
AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER FOR ARMS, SYSTEMS AND MATERIAL SUPPORT
FOR THE PERIOD 1988-1990

CHAPTER IV: PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION,
EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE SPA FOR THE FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD 1991-1995

CHAPTER V: SUPPLEMENT - THE SANDINISTA AIR FORCE/AIR DEFENSE (SAF/AD)

CHAPTER VI: SUPPLEMENT - THE SANDINISTA NAVY

CHAPTER VII: SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER FOR ARMS, SYSTEMS AND TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT
FOR THE PERIOD 1988-1990

CHAPTER VIII: PRELIMINARY ORDER FOR ARMS AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR THE FIVE-YEAR
PERIOD 1991-1995

CHAPTER IX: ATTACHMENTS - TABLES AND CHARTS

INTRODUCTION

1. In June of 1985, after compiling practical experience garnered since 1979 in the overall defense of the Sandinista People's Revolution (SPR) and from specific aspects of the structuring of the SPA amidst the conditions imposed by American aggression, the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense completed the first draft of the military doctrine of the SPR.

The key elements embodied in the military doctrine were expressed in the following considerations:

- a. the probable nature of enemy action, variations in his aggression and the occupation of [this] country.
- b. key doctrinal and strategic guidelines.
- c. primary methods for waging the People's National Patriotic War.

2. Concurrently, the definition and in-depth development of the key doctrinal elements enabled the establishment of the basic outlines which would guide the development of the SPA in the five-year period 1986-1990. These guidelines were combined into two key considerations:

- a.) primary guidelines for the structure and composition of the SPA over the period 1986-1990
- b.) primary guidelines for furnishing [the SPA] with arms and technical support in the five-year period 1986-1990.

3. The key doctrinal guidelines as well as the basic outlines for the five-year period 1986-1990 were moulded into a document entitled "Basic Planning of the Sandinista People's Army with Regard to Doctrine, Strategy, Structure and Equipment for its Strengthening and Consolidation and the Development of the National Defense over the Five-year Period 1986-1990", dated June 1985.

This document served as the basis for discussion for the tripartite conference (USSR-CUBA-NICARAGUA) which took place in June of 1985 in Havana, Cuba. Here, the "19th of

July" Plan was established as the basic framework for the development of the SPA and the basis for working out the provision of technico-material support and arms, for the five-year period 1986-1990.

4. Experience garnered from the defense of the SPR, from the time of the tripartite conference of June 1985 to the present-- a period characterized by a sustained escalation of American aggression via a mercenary war and the continuing threat of a large-scale military action on the part of the United States' own forces-- has enabled us to develop in depth certain elements of the military doctrine of the SPR and the improvement of the structure, composition and outfitting of the SPA for the period 1988-1990, to the end of insuring the total defeat of mercenary forces while simultaneously guaranteeing the strengthening and the multilateral preparation of this country in order to confront the direct invasion of American troops.

5. The Nicaraguan side, with the aim of submitting the proposed improvements in the structure, composition and outfitting of the SPA for the remainder of the five-year period 1986-1990 (viz., 1988-1990) for consideration by the Soviet and Cuban sides, requested the staging of another tripartite conference (USSR-CUBA-NICARAGUA) in November of 1987.

6. In order to guarantee the continued improvement and strengthening of the SPA through 1990 (viz., 1988-1990), it is vital to secure a supplemental order of arms, technical support, materiel and logistics not furnished in 1985, at which time the bases for support over the five-year period 1986-1990 were defined.

7. In this document, the SPA briefly sets forth the primary elements which constitute the basis for improving and strengthening its structure and composition through 1990 as well as the supplemental order assuring said strengthening over the period 1988-1990.

8. The November 1987 tripartite conference also intends to draft preliminary guidelines for improving the structure, composition, outfitting and technico-material support of the SPA for the five-year period 1991-1995. These considerations are taken up in Chapter IV of this document.

I - PRINCIPAL ELEMENTS OF THE PRESENT STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SPA

Taking the composition of the units established via the "19th of July" Plan and the various functional adjustments we have implemented over the period 1985-1987 as a frame of reference, the present composition of the SPA, in terms of its principal units, is as follows:

A. GROUND FORCES

1. Reserve combat units of the High Command:

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) artillery brigade
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery regiment
- one (1) special forces battalion

2. 1st Military Region (1st MR):

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- two (2) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops

Note: The document does not deal with individual local forces battalions but rather concerns itself with total [numbers] of local forces battalions.

- three (3) permanent regional companies
- four (4) light infantry brigades
- eight (8) local forces battalions (four local forces battalions make up the local forces battalion at ESTELI)

3. 2nd Military Region (2nd MR)

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- three (3) light infantry brigades

- twelve (12) local forces battalions
 - 4 local forces battalions = the local forces battalion at CHINANDEGA
 - 4 local forces battalions = the local forces battalion at LEON
 - 2 independent [local forces battalions]
 - 2 local forces battalions at CORINTO which are components of the Sandinista Navy but which [2 WORDS INDISTINCT] the 2nd MR [1 WORD INDISTINCT] with them.

4. 3rd Military Region (3rd MR)

- two (2) permanent infantry brigades
- five (5) light infantry brigades
- twenty (20) local forces battalions

5. 4th Military Region (4th MR)

- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- three (3) light infantry brigades
- eighteen (18) local forces battalions

6. 5th Military Region (5th MR)

- six (6) unconventional warfare battalions
- seven (7) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops (absorbed by the 55th Infantry Brigade)
- twenty-one (21) permanent regional companies
- five (5) light infantry brigades
- nine (9) local forces battalions

7. 6th Military Region (6th MR)

- one (1) border infantry brigade
- six (6) unconventional warfare battalions
- eight (8) light assault battalions
- twenty-one (21) permanent regional companies
- five (5) light infantry brigades

- fourteen (14) local forces battalions

8. 7th Military Region (7th MR)

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- three (3) permanent regional companies
- one (1) light infantry brigade
- three (3) local forces battalions

B. THE SANDINISTA AIR FORCE

- three air detachments situated as follows:
 - one (1) in the 3rd MR
 - one (1) in the 5th MR
 - one (1) in the 6th MR
- one (1) antiaircraft regiment
- one (1) heavy transport squadron
- radio communications troops with:
 - six (6) radio communications centers
 - one (1) mobile radio communications company
- combat support units
- one (1) technical services unit
- other units

C. THE SANDINISTA NAVY

- one (1) naval district on the Pacific coast
 - three (3) light motor launch squadrons
 - one (1) minesweeper squadron
 - two (2) antiaircraft artillery groups
 - one (1) radio communications company
 - eight (8) coastal surveillance posts

- one (1) repair base
- one (1) naval sector in SAN JUAN DEL SUR
 - one (1) squadron of light motor launches
 - five (5) coastal surveillance posts
 - one (1) radio communications complex
- one (1) naval district on the Atlantic coast
- one (1) naval sector at EL BLUFF
 - two (2) naval infantry companies
 - five (5) coastal surveillance posts
 - one (1) radio communications company
 - one repair base
- one (1) naval sector at PUERTO CABEZAS
 - one (1) light motor launch squadron

D. MAIN REAR GUARD SERVICES UNITS

E. SCHOOLS SUBORDINATE TO A CENTRAL UNIT

F. OTHER UNITS

II - PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE AND COMPOSITION OF THE SPA
OVER THE REMAINDER OF THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 1986-1990 (1988-1990)

As a result of the experience garnered in confronting the present mercenary aggression and pinpointing the nature of enemy actions, the variations in [his] aggression and the occupation of this country, the following are considered prime objectives in achieving the strengthening and improvement of the SPA over the period 1988-1990 (OPERATION DIRIANGEN I):

A. In the ground forces

1. To insure the functional stability and necessary outfitting of the unconventional warfare units created in the period 1985-1987 for the purpose of confronting mercenary aggression. The principal units are:
 - one (1) border infantry brigade in the 6th MR
 - twelve (12) unconventional warfare battalions
 - six (6) in the 5th MR
 - six (6) in the 6th MR
 - seventeen (17) light assault battalions
 - two (2) in the 1st MR
 - seven (7) in the 5th MR
 - eight (8) in the 6th MR
 - forty-nine (49) permanent regional companies
 - three (3) in the 1st MR
 - twenty-one (21) in the 5th MR
 - twenty-one in the 6th MR
 - four (4) in the 7th MR
 - one (1) reconnaissance battalion in the 6th MR
2. To keep the remainder of the permanent ground forces units in their present configuration throughout the period 1988-1990.

3. In keeping with the present and future requirements of the National Defense Plan, to create up to six (6) new light infantry brigades in the country's Pacific coastal regions (2nd, 3rd and 4th MRs) in addition to those now extant.

These light infantry brigades will be created within the [same] organizational structure as the present local forces brigades which carry out missions in defense of Nicaragua's most important Pacific coastal cities but which, in terms of their designation, composition and equipment will not insure the fulfillment of this mission.

The light infantry brigades to be set up are:

- one (1) in LEON (2nd MR)
- one (1) in CHINANDEGA (2nd MR)
- two (2) in MANAGUA (3rd MR)
- one (1) in GRANADA (4th MR)
- one (1) in MASAYA (4th MR)

The creation of these light infantry brigades will make it possible to firmly establish the defense of these cities and the more strategic access routes to them.

4. To improve and fortify the structure and present equipment of twenty-one (21) light infantry brigades, designating them "Type A light infantry brigades". In these Type A light infantry brigades, infantry armament (light and support), land-based, antitank and antiaircraft artillery weapons will be increased and fortified both quantitatively and qualitatively.

Strengthening these units will enable them to wield the necessary combat capacity for fulfilling their combat missions, in keeping with the demands of the probable enemy to be confronted and the specific needs of Nicaragua's Pacific Theater of Operations.

The twenty-one (21) light infantry brigades to be improved as Type A units will be:

- eleven (11) light infantry brigades in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th MRs
 - three (3) in the 2nd MR
 - five (5) in the 3rd MR
 - three (3) in the 4th MR
- six (6) newly formed light infantry brigades in the 2nd, 3rd and 4th MRs
 - two (2) in the 2nd MR
 - two (2) in the 3rd MR
 - two (2) in the 4th MR
- four (4) light infantry brigades in the 5th and 6th MRs (designated as reserves of the High Command)
 - two (2) in the 5th MR
 - two (2) in the 6th MR

5. To maintain, in their present structure and composition, the remaining eleven (11) light infantry brigades extant, designating them "Type B light infantry brigades".

The distribution of these brigades shall be as follows:

- four (4) in the 1st MR
- three (3) in the 5th MR
- three (3) in the 6th MR
- one (1) in the 7th MR

6. To create, in the country's Pacific regions (2nd, 3rd and 4th MRs), up to one hundred (100) new battalions (approximately 800 men per battalion) of local forces (Sandinista People's Militias), arming them with infantry rifles.

In keeping with the guidelines of the military doctrine of the SPR, this increase in the number of local forces shall enhance the country's capacity : : waging the People's National Patriotic War, insuring massive popular support for defense.

B. In the Sandinista Air Force/Air Defense (SAF/AD)

The primary efforts for the functional improvement and strengthening of the SAF/AD shall be directed toward:

1. the Air Force

- consolidation of the three (3) mixed Air Force detachments for the period 1988-1990:
 - PANCHITO air detachment (3rd MR)
 - two (2) squadrons of MI-17 helicopters
 - one (1) mixed squadron of MI-25 and MI-8 helicopters plus AN-2 aircraft
 - JUIGALPA air detachment (5th MR)
 - one (1) squadron of MI-17 helicopters
 - one (1) mixed squadron of MI-25 and MI-17 helicopters plus AN-2 aircraft
 - WASWALI air detachment (6th MR)
 - one (1) squadron of MI-17 helicopters
 - one (1) mixed squadron of MI-25 and MI-17 helicopters plus AN-2 aircraft
- maintaining at 100% the helicopter and air support stockpiles envisioned in the functional structure for the period 1988-1990, by means of immediate replacement of inventory presently listed as losses directly or indirectly attributable to the mercenary war we are confronting.
- insuring the additional delivery of helicopters and air materiel-- described in point 3. of the SAF/AD supplement attached to and forming a part of this document-- in line with projected real losses forecasted for the period 1988-1990 and attributable to the ongoing war.
- maintaining and consolidating the heavy transport squadron currently in existence.
- maintaining and consolidating the executive transport squadron currently in existence.
- converting the technical services unit initially designated to carry out officially prescribed [maintenance] and repair functions for fixed-wing

aircraft, into a technical services unit for effecting officially prescribed [maintenance] and repair functions for rotary-wing aircraft.

2. radio communications troops

-- maintaining and consolidating the six (6) radio communications centers and one (1) mobile radio communications company deployed as follows:

- one (1) radio communications center at EL CRUCERO (3rd MR)
- one (1) radio communications center at CHINANDEGA (2nd MR)
- one (1) radio communications center at PUERTO CABEZAS (7th MR)
- one (1) radio communications center at BLUEFIELDS (5th MR)
- one (1) radio communications center at SIUNA (7th MR)
- one (1) radio communications center at ESTELI (1st MR)

3. air defense

-- creating one (1) antiaircraft rocket regiment of the C-125 type for air defense of the capital

-- maintaining the two (2) medium- and small-caliber antiaircraft artillery regiments:

- one (1) medium-caliber antiaircraft artillery regiment
 - three (3) KC-19 100 mm gun batteries
 - three (3) C-60 57 mm gun batteries
- one (1) small-caliber antiaircraft artillery regiment
 - six (6) 37 mm gun batteries
 - three (3) ZU-23-2 batteries

The functional improvement and strengthening of the SAF/AD for the period 1988-1990 is expanded upon and set forth in the SAF/AD supplement attached to and forming a part of this document.

The index for the attached SAF/AD supplement is the following:

1. Aide memoire
2. The structure of the SAF/AD ("DIRIANGEN I")
3. Requirements for systems, equipment and weapons being replaced or on order

for the period 1988-1990.

4. Requirements for the repair of systems, arms and equipment
5. Maintenance and repair workshop equipment for [servicing] available systems
6. The meteorological laboratory and technical support/meteorological service requirements
7. The conversion of the MIG-21B fighter technical services unit into a technical services unit for rotary-wing aircraft
8. The status and behavior of commercial and military contracting (DGI, DGT AVIAEXPORT)
9. Technical support status and requirements
10. The SAF/AD school project and its requirements
11. Requirements for training cadres abroad, in line with the present structure and the outlook for 1991-1995
12. Requirements for aviation armaments and munitions, lubricants and basic training materials (literature)
13. The SAF/AD outlook for the period 1991-1995
14. Other considerations of interest

C. In the Sandinista Navy

The primary efforts for functionally improving and strengthening the Sandinista Navy , for the period 1988-1990, shall be directed toward:

1. strengthening and developing the protection of our coastal borders within the following contexts:
 - in the fight against coastal provisioning of the mercenary forces
 - in the fight against the mining of the country's chief ports
 - in the air and naval defense of the country's chief ports
 - in the struggle against the mercenary forces in the land portion of the country's Atlantic naval district.
 - in radio, searchlight and visual reconnaissance

2. maintaining the present structure of the Sandinista Navy over the period 1988-1990
3. maintaining at 100% the naval systems supplies envisioned in the functional structure for the period 1988-1990, by rapidly replacing systems currently listed as real losses or which will become real losses during combat action or with the takeover of their operational sites
4. continuing to develop the infrastructure, equipment and training of personnel for setting up repair bases and shipyards in the naval districts
5. creating four (4) 85 or 100 mm multi-purpose gun batteries with the objective of bolstering antiaircraft and naval firepower in the country's Pacific coastal region.

The functional improvement and strengthening of the Sandinista Navy, over the period 1988-1990, is expanded upon and set forth in detail in the Sandinista Navy supplement attached to and forming a part of this document.

III - PRINCIPAL GUIDELINES FOR THE SPA'S TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT AND THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER FOR ARMS, SYSTEMS AND MATERIEL SUPPORT FOR THE PERIOD 1988-1990

A. The principal guidelines for technico-material support of the SPA for the period 1988-1990 are:

1. to continue supplying the SPA with arms, systems and multilateral support aimed at enhancing the combat readiness of the primary units, granting priority, over the period 1988-1990, to the unconventional warfare units, armed forces units (SAF/AD and the Sandinista Navy) and the Type A light infantry brigades.
2. to maintain at 100% the supplies for helicopter and air operations envisioned in the functional structure for the period 1988-1990, by rapidly replacing systems presently listed as real losses attributable directly or indirectly to the the mercenary war that we are currently confronting.
3. to insure the delivery of additional systems to the SAF/AD, in accordance with projections of real losses forecasted for the period 1988-1990 and attributable to the present war. [This latter] is set forth in detail in point 3. of the SAF/AD supplement attached to and forming part of this document.
4. to establish the mechanisms for enabling the replacements of arms, munitions and basic systems of all types which, during their use, consumption or combat action can become real losses, thus necessitating their immediate replacement.
5. to bolster technical assistance, over the period 1988-1990, by employing Soviet specialists who would assist in the assimilation of systems and armaments.
6. to accelerate implementation of the 28 June 1986 operations protocol concerning the tasks jointly undertaken by Soviet and Nicaraguan specialists for the purpose of determining the level of technical assistance available to Nicaragua in the establishment of military installations.
7. to insure, by dispatching a Soviet commission, the determination of the possible volume of material and technical aid required for constructing warehouses and system complexes in the SPA, for the period 1988-1990 and on through 1995.

B. The supplemental order for arms, systems and material support, for the period 1988-1990, resulting from the functional improvement and strengthening of the SPA is attached to and forms a detailed part of this document.

C. As a result of the improvement of the functional structure of the SPA, over the period 1988-1990, and the provision of systems and arms stemming therefrom, the following guidelines are established as the basis for the supplemental order which is attached to and forms part of this document:

1. Arms and Munitions:

a. Infantry Weapons

-- for the period 1988-1990, to equip and round out the principal SPA units with models of the arms listed below:

- the MAKAROV 9 mm pistol
- the model M-43 AKM 7.62 mm rifle
- the model M-43 RPK 7.62 mm light machine gun
- the model M-1908 PKM 7.62 mm heavy machine gun
- the model M-1908 SVD 7.62 mm sniper rifle
- the model RPG-7V antitank rocket launcher
- the model ASG-17 30 mm automatic grenade launcher

-- to equip the SPA's special forces with light, helmet-mounted personal night vision gear

The quantities of infantry weapons reflected in the supplemental order, for the period 1988-1990, take into account:

- the programmed inclusion of the unconventional warfare units
- reinforcement of the Type A light infantry brigades with support infantry weapons
- the furnishing of arms to trainees at training centers
- the expansion of local forces units
- the replacement of armaments listed as real losses

b. Land-based Artillery Weapons

- for the period 1988-1990, to continue with existing models of land-based artillery weapons and mortars
- the quantities of artillery and mortar weapons reflected in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990 take into account:
 - the programmed inclusion of 82 mm mortars in the inventory of the unconventional warfare units
 - reinforcement of the Type A light infantry brigades with SPG-9 antitank artillery weapons
 - the expansion of the six (6) newly formed Type A light infantry brigades by equipping them with 82 mm mortars and GRAD-1P rocket launchers

c. Antiaircraft Artillery Weapons

- to bolster the portable antiaircraft complexes of SPA units with C-3M and IGLA-1M [systems]
- to enhance the antiaircraft capacities of the Type A light infantry brigades by supplying them with ZU-23-2 units and portable antiaircraft complexes
- to introduce the C-125 antiaircraft rocket system for strengthening the capital's air defense system
- to introduce 85 or 100 mm multipurpose artillery, destined for the Sandinista Navy, for the air and naval defense of the country's chief ports
- the quantities of antiaircraft artillery weapons reflected in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990 take into account:
 - the inclusion of IGLA-1M portable antiaircraft complexes in the inventory of the unconventional warfare units
 - the formation of antiaircraft artillery batteries, in the Type A light infantry brigades, composed of ZU-23-2 antiaircraft installations and IGLA-1M portable antiaircraft complexes
 - reinforcement of the SPA's main units with IGLA-1M portable antiaircraft complexes
 - formation of the C-125 antiaircraft rocket regiment for the air defense of the capital

- the creation of four (4) 85 or 100 mm multipurpose gun batteries for defense of the country's chief ports

d. Infantry, Land-based Artillery, Tank, Antiaircraft Artillery and Naval Munitions

In keeping with the country's defensive operations, as spelled out in the military doctrine of the SPR, and aimed at having available, even in peacetime, the necessary quantity of munitions units in the event of a possible invasion and prior blockade of our country, it has been determined that the SPA should have available the following levels of munitions units:

Item No.	Description	Units programmed	Units on hand	Total units [required]
01	M43 7.62 mm [rounds]	7	4.14	2.86
02	M1908 7.62 mm [rounds]	7	9.60	-
03	9 mm [rounds] for MAKAROV pistol	5	7.56	-
04	30 mm VPG-17 [rounds]	7	6.68	-
05	PG-7V rockets	4	3.94	0.06
06	57 mm [rounds] for ZIS-2 antitank gun	3	4.8	-
07	76 mm [rounds] for D56T and ZIS-3 tank-mounted gun	4	2.9	1.1
08	82 mm [rounds] for the BM-82	5	3.63	1.37
09	100 mm [rounds] for the D-10T2S tank gun	5	5	-
10	100 mm [rounds] for the BS-13 antitank gun	7	7	-
11	122 mm [rounds] for the D30A 122 mm howitzer	7	7.9	-
12	122 mm 9M22M [rounds] for the GRAD-1P	6	5.25	0.75
13	122 mm M21 OF [rounds] for the BM-21	6	5.56	0.44
14	152 mm [rounds] for the D20 152 mm howitzer	7	6.23	0.77
15	12.7 mm [rounds] for the DSHK	8	21	-
16	14.5 mm [rounds] for the ZGU-1, ZPU-2 ZPU-4, ZM-7 and KPVT [systems]	8	5.2	2.8
17	23 mm [rounds] for the ZU-23-2	8	5.17	2.83
18	37 mm [rounds] for the M-39 37 mm antiaircraft gun	7	8.25	-
19	57 mm [rounds] for the S-60 antiaircraft gun	5	5	-
20	100 mm [rounds] for the KS-19 antiaircraft gun	4	2.65	1.35
21	9M32M (C-2M) rocket	5	2.31	2.69
22	9M36-I (C-3M) rocket	5	2	3
23	9M319-1 (IGLA-1M) rocket	5	2.5	2.5
24	25 mm [rounds] for the 2M-3M	10	35.9	-
25	12.7 mm [rounds] for the UTIU-M	10	8.8	1.2
26	12.7 mm [rounds] for the YAK-B	15	21.1	-
27	23 mm [rounds] for the GSH	15	21	-
28	S-5KP rocket	19.9	10.1	19.8 [sic, 9.
29	9M17P missile	4.7	1.1	3.6
30	9M14 missile	4.7	1.2	3.5
31	Signal flares	5	-	5
32	PPI-26-1B pyrotechnic rounds	145	1.2	143.8
33	PPL pyrotechnic rounds	177	30.2 [sic]	95.8 [sic]
34	P-50-75-91 bomb	35.8	11.8	24
35	ZAB-100-105 bomb	13.5	6.3	7.2
36	OFAB-100-120 bomb	20.9	16.9	4.0
37	OFAB-250-270 bomb	15.4	6.6	8.8
38	RBK-250-270 bomb	1.4	-	1.4
39	RBK-250-330 bomb	22	7.7	14.3
40	CAP-250 bomb	5.6	1.5	4.1
41	FAB-500 bomb	77.5	5.5	72
42	ZB-500 bomb	97.5	25.3	72.2

- the quantities of munitions reflected in the supplemental order, for the period 1988-1990, correspond to the arms extant within the country plus the arms to be received pursuant to the agreement for the five-year period 1986-1990.
- the munitions stockpiles [cited] take into account those [munitions] to be received pursuant to the agreement for the five-year period 1986-1990.
- arms to be delivered pursuant to the supplemental order, for the period 1988-1990, should be accompanied by the [corresponding] quantity of appropriate munitions for the SPA.

2. Tanks and Transport Vehicles

a. Tanks and Armored Transports

- to maintain the following vehicle models at their currently programmed numbers:
 - T-54 and T-55 tanks
 - PT-76 tanks
 - BTR-60PB and BTR-152 armored transports
 - the BRDM-2 reconnaissance and chemical services vehicle [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: this is the translation of the vehicle type as described in the original. The vehicle was otherwise described in another part of this document].
- for the period 1988-1990, to introduce BTR-70PB armored transports into the two mechanized infantry battalions of the mechanized infantry brigade of the SPA's High Command reserves
- the quantities of tanks and armored transports reflected in the supplemental order, for the period 1988-1990, take into account:
 - the introduction of the BTR-70PB [armored transports] into the mechanized infantry brigade of the SPA's High Command reserves
 - the programmed rounding out of inventories with T-55 tanks
 - the rounding out of inventories via the replacement of two (2) BTR-70PB [armored transports]
 - the programmed rounding out of inventories and the replacement of BRDM-2 chemical reconnaissance [vehicles] (TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: See note above)

b. Transport Vehicles, [Vehicles] for Towing Artillery Pieces and for Conventional Construction and Military Engineering Support

-- to continue technically supplanting the transport inventory via the introduction of the following models:

- the replacement of KRAZ vehicles with KAMAZ vehicles
- the increase in the numbers of URAL-4320 military vehicles for towing artillery pieces, replacing ZIL-131 vehicles
- by retaining the ZIL-131 as the main troop carrier
- by retaining the UAZ model 31512 jeep as the standard light [utility] vehicle
- by introducing the IZH-27151 van as a service vehicle and rear guard services vehicle

-- nearly all the quantities of transport vehicles, artillery towing vehicles and conventional support vehicles used for construction and military engineering reflected in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990 have been requested in lists, which the Soviet foreign trade authorities have had since April 1987, with the expectation that they shall be placed on contract through a special line of credit requested of the Soviet government, for the period 1988-1990.

c. Special Purpose Vehicles and Workshops

-- according to their specific use, special purpose vehicles and workshops for the following specialties:

- tanks and transport vehicles
- main rear guard services
- military engineering
- chemical services troops
- communications
- armaments
- Air Force/Air Defense
- Navy

are reflected in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990, in keeping with SPA structural adjustments over the same period.

3. Military Engineering

a. Special-purpose and Conventional Engineering Support

- to insure the formulation of time tables for the deployment of our units in the theater of military operations of the military regions currently confronting mercenary aggression
- to continue, even in peacetime, the engineering operations of the theater of military operations, as regards plans for fortifications
- to continue equipping and rounding out the SPA's small permanent engineering and chemical [services] units with specialized engineering and chemical services support

b. Engineering Munitions

- to assure large-scale use of engineering munitions in the present confrontation of mercenary forces
- with the engineering munitions to be delivered pursuant to the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990, to insure the installation of antitank and antipersonnel barriers which shall insure an obstacle density of 0.5 in the defensive fronts of the main SPA units

c. Engineering and Chemical Services Weapons

- to assure that, for the period 1988-1990, the permanent, small units of the SPA are thoroughly equipped with engineering and chemical services weapons
- to provide and thoroughly equip the permanent units with individual protective gear, masks and a water supply

4. Communications

- to boost the supply levels of the SPA's main units [by furnishing them] with the following:
 - short-wave radio stations
 - ultra short-wave radio stations
 - [radio] receivers

- radio links
 - command[/control] vehicles
 - mobile workshops
- to continue rounding out small communications units [by supplying them] with communications systems and equipment, for the purpose of improving the communications system continually available for combat [purposes], bolstering command staff vitality in wartime, up to the battalion level, and insuring command [function] within the unconventional warfare units
- to effect the [systematic] replacement of the R-105 gear, currently in use with the unconventional warfare units, with the R-159 gear, embodying superior tactical and technical features, for use by the units
- to introduce into the unconventional warfare units, short-wave communications gear which can be supplied and which incorporates the following features:
- medium-power short-wave capacity
 - capacity for high-speed operation
 - portability for field use
 - DC power supply [using a] nickel-cadmium [battery] and a hand generator
- to introduce the R-125 mobile command post up through the level of the Type A light infantry battalions and into the unconventional warfare units
- to increase the number of telephone and telegraph communications networks at the general staff, military region, brigade and infantry levels, including the establishment of tropospheric networks
- to increase the number of radio link lines having few channels so as to insure communications with the command staffs of the military regions and the (Type A & B) light infantry brigades, relinquishing priority to the 1st and 6th MRs
- the quantities of communications gear reflected in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990 take into account:
- the inclusion of the unconventional warfare units
 - the establishment of the new Type A light infantry brigades

- the programmed inclusion of communications gear for the system continuously available for combat use
- the inclusion of communications equipment in accordance with the recommendations of the Soviet side, made in May of 1987, subsumed in the operations protocol of 26 May 1987 and requested of the Soviet Minister of Defense by the Nicaraguan Minister of Defense, in a letter dated 3 July 1987

5. Rear Guard Services

Over the period 1988-1990, for the various rear guard service specialties, the following equipment and support are planned:

a. Provisions

- to establish the following guidelines over the period 1988-1990:
 - to prioritize the supply of unconventional warfare units with technical gear and comestibles
 - to define the following priority order for supplying technical gear:
 - permanent units and armed forces units
 - Type A light infantry brigade
 - Type B light infantry brigade
 - to supply [units] with KP-125 field kitchens, up through the Type A light infantry brigade level
 - to introduce PAK-200 self-propelled field kitchens into the units of the mechanized infantry
 - to furnish unconventional warfare units , permanent units and Type A light infantry brigades with TSV-50 [portable] water supplies
 - to obtain a kiloton-capacity refrigeration unit for centralized preservation of fresh and perishable meat products; to anticipate the dispatch of a technical squad for ascertaining the levels of technical and material support for this project
 - pursuant to contract Nos. 0202/67214 and 0204/667212 of 31 December 1986, for supplying canned goods, to request the assortment of these goods in accordance with the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990 which is attached to and forms a part of this document

- to request that the annual supply of 16,000 tons of foodstuffs furnished to the Ministry of Defense by the Soviet government be distributed in the following manner:

Wheat flour	3,000 tons
Sugar	2,000 tons
Rice	5,000 tons
Condensed milk	1,000 tons
Powdered milk	1,000 tons
Animal fats	2,000 tons
Edible fats	2,000 tons

b. Medical Services

- to establish the following guidelines for the period 1988-1990:
 - firstly, to insure that the requirements of the unconventional warfare units [are met]
 - to insure that the SPA's principal units [receive] an increase in special support
 - to increase the number of UAZ-469A ambulances, particularly those supplied to:
 - military hospitals
 - centralized medical units
 - unconventional warfare units
 - the SAF/AD
 - reserve units of the High Command
- during the period [cited] to introduce the following equipment:
 - an SDP-2 sterilization/distillation trailer for the SPA's epidemiology group
 - a DDP-2 disinfection trailer for use by the platoons of anti-epidemic health personnel of the military regions
 - a DDA-66 disinfection van for the SPA's epidemiology group
 - a mobile oxygen station for the SPA's medical battalion
 - an AP treatment vehicle for [dispensing] medical first aid, destined for

Type A and B light infantry brigades

- over the period 1988-1990, to insure [supply] of the following articles for the purpose of furnishing our troops in the field with basic personal effects:

- personal health kits
- integrated health packs
- medical kits for the armored, air and naval units

c. Clothing

- to establish the following guidelines over the period 1988-1990:

- to insure that all permanent and mobilized SPA units are furnished with full clothing complements
- owing to the impact which the continued support of more than 80,000 men, necessitated by the present state of aggression, has upon the national economy, the following quantities of supplies, over and above those already approved, are necessary:

- full clothing complements approved for the period 1988-1990:

1988	40,000
1989	80,000
1990	80,000

- additional full clothing complements necessary for the period 1988-1990:

1988	280,000
1989	240,000
1990	240,000

d. Fuels and Lubricants

- for the period 1988-1990, the principal guidelines for fuels and lubricants are as follows:

- to continue supplying fuels and lubricants with the aim of insuring:
 - the mobilization of all the SPA's rolling stock
 - the operational capacity of the principal inventory items of the Sandinista Air Force and Navy
 - the maintenance of weapons and systems within the SPA

- the creation of fuel and lubricant stockpiles for wartime
- considering the maintenance of strict quality control over fuels and lubricants to be of vital importance, to equip the centralized and Sandinista Air Force fuel and lubricant laboratories with equipment and supplies included in the supplemental order for the period 1988-1990
- to replace the TZ-22 (KRAZ-258) automated fuel supply system with the KAMAZ-54112 [system], for the purpose of improving fuel supply to the troops

c. Military Transport Facilities

The principal guidelines for the period 1988-1990 are:

- to reinforce the SPA's Central Transport Unit's solid and liquid cargo transport operations
- to create a special technical support group for special operations by Nicaragua's Atlantic and Pacific seaports for receiving military materiel
- for the period 1988-1990, to continue the systematic replacement of the KRAZ [vehicle] inventory by the new inventory of KAMAZ models

6. Multipurpose Equipment

This equipment responds to the need for continuing to supply SPA units with equipment and basic means for insuring:

- the secret command staff of the troops
- that small special forces units and special purpose detachments of the Sandinista Navy [are supplied] with special equipment for the successful completion of their missions
- [the provision of] teams [furnishing] instruction and training in arms, tanks and transports, for the purpose of insuring the combat training of troops and specialists.

IV - PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE, COMPOSITION, EQUIPMENT
AND TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE SPA FOR THE PERIOD 1991-1995

The following should be considered as fundamental elements permitting the preliminary definition of the key features of the improvement and development of the SPA over the period 1991-1995 (DIRIANGEN II):

1. the degree of consolidation achieved by the national defense plans and the SPA in 1990 when the plan for improvement and strengthening, envisioned for the period 1988-1990 (DIRIANGEN I), expires
2. the level of American aggression, in its mercenary phase, in the year 1990. For purposes of this projection, we estimate that, by 1990, the mercenary forces will be reduced to their lowest strength, after sustaining a total defeat during the period 1988-1990.

This consideration will enable a gradual reduction, over the period 1991-1995, of the number of unconventional warfare units slated for the period 1988-1990.

3. Once this variation of mercenary phase military aggression is reduced to a minimum and gradually eliminated, after it is defeated, over the period 1991-1995, it shall be more vital than ever, to the consolidation and development of the SPR, to rely upon a solid national defense and a powerful Army which will more convincingly avert the possibility of a direct invasion by American troops and assure their defeat, should the invasion occur.
4. the outlook for stabilizing the deterioration of the socioeconomic situation during the period 1991-1995

5. the forecasts of population growth and distribution over the period 1991-1995

A. Over the period 1991-1995, the main improvement and development trends will be the following:

1. continuation of the improvement of the permanently combat-ready units, equipping them with the most modern arms, technology and means, thereby endowing them with

greater combat capability in the event of their deployment, firepower and autonomy in combat

2. continuation of the consolidation of Type A and B light infantry brigades, in the case of Type A light infantry brigades, improving their artillery weapons and, in some cases, their transport facilities, regulating them in terms of the type of missions that they are to carry out in defensive operations
3. the continuation of large-scale augmentation of the Sandinista People's Militias, creating additional local forces units
4. the expansion of our capacity for exercising air superiority, qualitatively strengthening the country's air defense system via the acquisition of better technology and arms
5. the enhancement of the capacity for exercising naval supremacy in our territorial waters and inland waterways, introducing naval craft with greater firepower and range as well as the improvement of the overall defense and protection of the country's seaports.

B. The Basic Composition and Equipment of SPA Units

In keeping with the principal improvement and development trends, the primary SPA units should possess the following features and composition:

1. In the ground forces

a. Mechanized Infantry Brigade

It should have greater mobility upon being furnished with BTR-70PB armored transports for the infantry as well as self-propelled guns. Its mainstay continues to be the T-55 tank.

The composition of the principal mechanized infantry brigade units will be as follows:

- two (2) T-55 tank battalions, each battalion accompanied by a mechanized infantry company [transportable via] BTR-70PB [vehicles].

In the case of the reserves of the High Command, each tank battalion will contain thirty-one (31) tanks.

- two (2) mechanized infantry battalions [transportable in] BTR-70PB [vehicles]. Each battalion will be accompanied by one (1) T-55 tank company, each company having 7 tanks.
- one (1) 0-122 mm self-propelled artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery group composed of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm guns (T-12A)
- one (1) mixed antiaircraft artillery group consisting of a battery of C-10 units and portable antiaircraft complexes

b. Permanent Infantry Brigade

It will be equipped with BTR-70PB armored transports. It retains the T-55 tanks and [its] 76 mm guns are replaced by CO-122 mm guns.

The composition of the principal permanent infantry brigade units will be:

- one (1) mechanized infantry battalion, [transportable via] BTR-70PB [vehicles], accompanied by a T-55 tank company. (In the 1st and 7th MRs, the permanent infantry brigades have no tanks).
- two (2) [truck-transportable] permanent infantry battalions. (In the case of the permanent infantry brigades of the 1st and 7th MRs, there are three (3) [truck-transportable] infantry battalions and no battalions transportable via BTR-70PB vehicles).
- one (1) T-55 tank battalion accompanied by one (1) permanent mechanized infantry company [transportable via] BTR-70PB [vehicles]. (In the case of the permanent infantry brigades of the 1st and 7th MRs, there is no tank battalion).
- one (1) mechanically-driven 0-122 mm group
- one (1) mixed antiaircraft group having ZU-23-2 [units] and portable anti-aircraft complexes
- one (1) mixed antitank artillery group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm guns (T-12A)

c. Type A Light Infantry Brigade

They shall be reinforced primarily by:

- 76 or 85 mm artillery
- antiaircraft artillery [consisting of] portable antiaircraft complexes
- SPG-9 antitank artillery
- substantially improved infantry and support weaponry

Its principal units shall consist of:

- four (4) light infantry battalions
- one (1) artillery group [consisting of] 76 or 85 mm guns
- one (1) antitank artillery group having 57 mm guns
- one (1) mixed antiaircraft artillery group having ZU-23-2 [units]
and portable antiaircraft complexes

d. Type B Light Infantry Brigade

Its principal units shall consist of:

- four (4) light infantry battalions

Four (4) new infantry brigades will be formed. These will be distributed as follows:

- one (1) in the 1st MR
- one (1) in the 5th MR
- two (2) in the 6th MR

e. Local Forces (Sandinista People's Militias)

The principal standard unit will be the local forces battalion and its primary weapon will be the AKM rifle.

2. In the Air Force/Air Defense Forces

The principal units of these forces shall consist of:

a. Air Force

- a MIG-21B fighter/interceptor squadron
- air detachments comprised of:
 - squadrons of MI-25 fire support helicopters and MI-17 transport helicopters

- MI-17 transport helicopter squadrons
- a heavy transport squadron having AN-26 and AN-12 aircraft
([for their] equivalent)

b. Radio Communications Troops

- radio communications centers
- a mobile radio communications company

c. Air Defense

- a self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment
- antiaircraft regiments [comprised of]:
 - 57 mm guns
 - 37 mm guns and ZU-23-2 [units]
 - small units armed with portable antiaircraft rockets

2. In the Sandinista Navy

- squadrons of armed vessels with displacements of up to 400 tons, ranges of 1200-1500 miles and artillery weapons no smaller than 57 mm
- squadrons of patrol boats with displacements of 40-50 tons
- squadrons of minesweepers composed of two (2) or three (3) vessels each
- squadrons of light hydrofoils composed of two (2) to three (3) vessels each
- radio communications complexes
- repair bases

C. The Concept of the Functional Composition of the SPA Over the Period 1991-1995

Taking into account:

- existing units at the end of the five-year period 1986-1990
- the principal development trends over the five-year period 1991-1995
- the national economy's forecasted capacities

the functional composition concept of the SPA's principal units, for the period 1991-1995, shall be the following:

1. In the ground forces

- a. Combat units from the reserves of the High Command

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) rocket artillery regiment comprised of three (3) BM-21 groups
- one (1) antitank artillery regiment comprised of two (2) 100 mm (T-12A) gun groups
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of twelve (12) MALIUTKA [units]
- one (1) self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment

b. 1st Military Region

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- two (2) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type B light infantry brigades
- one (1) 0-122 mm artillery group
- one (1) mixed antitank group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six 100 mm (T-12A) guns
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group consisting of ZU-23+2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- forty-two (42) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

c. 2nd Military Region

- one (1) mechanized infantry brigade
- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) field artillery regiment consisting of three (3) 130 mm gun groups
- one (1) BM-21 rocket artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA [units] ([or their] equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm (T-12A) guns

- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group with ZU-23-2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- seventy-three (73) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

d. 3rd Military Region

- two (2) permanent infantry brigades
- one (1) regular infantry brigade (with the equipment of a permanent infantry brigade)
- six (6) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) field artillery regiment consisting of three (3) CO-152 mm gun groups
- one (1) BM-21 rocket artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery regiment consisting of two (2) 100 mm (T-12A) gun groups and one (1) group of twelve (12) MALIUTKA [units]
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 [units] and portable antiaircraft rocket [units]
- one hundred twenty-three (123) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) within the city limits of the capital and over the rest of the territory of the 3rd MR

e. 4th Military Region

- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- five (5) Type A light infantry brigades
- one (1) 76 mm gun artillery group
- one (1) 57 mm gun antitank artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- seventy-six (76) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed throughout its territory

f. 5th Military Region

- three (3) unconventional warfare battalions

- four (4) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- two (2) Type A light infantry brigades
- four (4) Type B light infantry brigades
- one (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- forty-two (42) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias) distributed over all its territory

g. 6th Military Region

- three (3) unconventional warfare battalions
- four (4) light assault battalions
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- two (2) Type A light infantry brigades
- five (5) Type B light infantry brigades
- One (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
- fifty-three (53) local forces battalions deployed throughout all its territory

h. 7th Military Region

- one (1) permanent infantry brigade
- one (1) detachment of border security troops
- one (1) Type B light infantry brigade
- one (1) 0-122 mm [gun] artillery group
- one (1) antitank artillery group comprised of six (6) BRDM-transportable MALIUTKA units (or their equivalent) and six (6) 100 mm guns
- one (1) antiaircraft artillery group equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket [units]

- twenty (20) local forces battalions (Sandinista People's Militias)
deployed throughout its territory

2. SAF/AD

- one (1) MIG-21 fighter/interceptor squadron
- three (3) air detachments deployed as follows:
 - one (1) in the 3rd MR, comprised of four (4) helicopter squadrons
 - one (1) in the 5th MR, comprised of two (2) helicopter squadrons
 - one (1) in the 6th MR, comprised of two (2) helicopter squadrons
- one (1) heavy transport squadron
- two (2) antiaircraft artillery regiments
 - one (1) equipped with 57 mm antiaircraft guns
 - one (1) equipped with 37 mm guns and ZU-23-2 units
- one (1) C-125 antiaircraft rocket regiment
- radio communications troops
 - ten (10) radio communications centers
 - one (1) mobile radio communications company
- combat supply units
- one (1) technical services unit
- other units

3. The Sandinista Navy

- one (1) Pacific naval district
 - one (1) squadron of armed vessels with 400-ton displacements
 - one (1) minesweeper squadron
 - one (1) squadron of light motor launches, each displacing 40-50 tons
 - one (1) 85 or 100 mm [gun] antiaircraft artillery regiment
 - one (1) radio communications company
 - four (4) coastal surveillance posts
 - one (1) repair base
- one (1) naval sector in SAN JUAN DEL SUR

- one (1) radio communications company
- two (2) 85 or 100 mm antiaircraft gun batteries
- two (2) coastal surveillance posts
- one (1) Atlantic naval district
 - one (1) squadron of armed vessels, each displacing up to 400 tons
 - one (1) minesweeper squadron
 - one (1) light motor launch squadron, each vessel displacing 40-50 tons
 - four (4) coastal surveillance posts
 - one (1) radio communications battalion
 - one (1) repair base
 - two (2) naval infantry companies

D. PRELIMINARY GUIDELINES FOR THE EQUIPMENT AND TECHNICO-MATERIAL SUPPORT OF THE SPA
FOR THE FIVE-YEAR PERIOD 1991-1995

1. Over the period 1991-1995, the principal efforts toward equipping the SPA with arms and technology shall be aimed at:
 - introducing new weaponry and technical support responsive to SPA modernization and in line with its functional improvement over the period 1991-1995
 - in keeping with scientific and technical progress in the fields of arms technology and equipment, continuing to effect [systematic] technical replacements in the SPA's main units
 - on an annual or as needed basis, continuing the systematic replacement of arms and systems to be listed as real SPA losses, owing to their regular use or combat action
 - continuing the development of the infrastructure, equipment and training of qualified personnel, thus enabling the ground forces and SPA armed forces personnel to continue consolidating and expanding the country's capacity to provide mid-level and general

technical maintenance and repair in the fields of weapons transportation, communications, [in the] Air Force and [in] the Navy.

-- the preliminary arms and technical support order, for the five-year period 1991-1995, resulting from the improvement and strengthening of the SPA is attached to and forms part of this document.

2. Stemming from the improvement of the SPA, over the five-year period 1991-1995, the following guidelines are established for supplying arms and technical support to the following specialties:

a. Arms and Munitions

- infantry weapons

-- to maintain at base level, those weapon models in the inventory for the period 1988-1990, for the principal SPA units up to the level of a Type B light infantry brigade

-- in keeping with scientific and technical advances in the field of infantry weapons, to introduce [new systems] which, owing to their technical and tactical features, might be used by our special-purpose units, special forces and other SPA units

-- to introduce the AK-74 .545 cal rifle into the unconventional warfare units programmed for the five-year period 1991-1995 and into the special forces units

-- to introduce the RPG-9 antitank rocket launcher into the permanent SPA units operating in the Pacific Theater of Operations

-- to continue transferring older weapon models to local forces units

- land-based artillery weapons

-- to introduce new weapon models, from the stocks already extant within the SPA, such as:

- 122 mm self-propelled howitzers into the mechanized infantry brigades

- 130 mm guns for the artillery regiment of the 2nd MR
- to introduce the T-12A 100 mm antitank gun into antitank regiments and mixed antitank groups of the SPA's principal units
- to introduce MALIUTKA guided antitank missiles, to operate in conjunction with T-12A 100 mm gun antitank batteries and groups, into the antitank regiments and mixed antitank groups of the SPA's primary units
- to expand the number of BM-21 rocket artillery groups
- to increase the number of D30 122 mm howitzer groups
- for the five year period 1991-1995, to augment the antitank capability of the Type A light infantry brigades via the creation of D-48 85 mm or ZIS-3 76 mm [gun] antitank groups
- antiaircraft artillery weapons
 - to continue the introduction and wide distribution of new models of portable antiaircraft complexes
 - to create a medium-range self-propelled antiaircraft rocket regiment for the reserves of the High Command
 - to introduce C-10 rocket batteries into the antiaircraft artillery groups of the mechanized infantry brigades of the High Command's reserves and the 2nd MR
 - to enhance the antiaircraft capability of Type A light infantry brigades via the creation of antiaircraft artillery groups equipped with ZU-23-2 and portable antiaircraft rocket units
 - to enhance the antiaircraft capability along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts by employing 85 or 100 mm [gun] antiaircraft batteries
- infantry, land-based artillery, tank, antiaircraft artillery, aviation and naval munitions
 - for the period 1991-1995, to maintain the levels (in terms of

munitions units) established within the SPA for all components

b. Tanks and Transport Vehicles

- tanks and armored transports
 - to retain the T-55 tank during the functional improvement of the SPA, over the period 1991-1995
 - to increase the number of BTR-70PB armored transports in the rest of the SPA's mechanized and permanent infantry brigades
 - to shift existing SPA inventories of BTR-60PB and BTR-152 [vehicles] to the permanent infantry battalions
 - the quantities reflected in the draft of the preliminary order, for the five-year period 1991-1995, essentially refer to:
 - the T-55 tank companies operating alongside the mechanized infantry battalions
 - the BTR-70PB armored transport companies accompanying the T-55 tank battalions
 - the programmed rounding out of T-55 tank and BTR-70PB [armored transport inventories], as a result of the functional improvements over the five-year period 1991-1995
- transport vehicles, artillery-towing vehicles and vehicles for conventional technical support to construction and military engineering
 - during the five-year period 1991-1995, to continue the [systematic] replacement of the transport vehicle inventory
 - the introduction of new transport vehicle models into the SPA, such as:
 - the UAZ diesel-powered transport vehicle
 - the ZIL diesel-powered transport vehicle

- to forecast the introduction of artillery-towing vehicles, commensurate with their delivery, for the five-year period 1991-1995
- special-purpose vehicles and mobile workshops
 - to continue supplying the SPA and rounding out its inventories with new models of special-purpose and mobile workshop vehicles for various specialties

c. Military Engineering

Over the period 1991-1995, the principal guidelines concerning the engineering and chemical services troops will be:

- special-purpose and conventional engineering technical support
 - to continue furnishing the SPA's principal permanent units with special-purpose and conventional engineering and chemical services technical support which, in line with technological advances, is responsive to key missions involving engineering and chemical services technical support in conventional and unconventional warfare
 - to furnish the principal engineering units with tracked and wheeled bulldozers
 - to introduce improved MTU-20 bridge-laying units into the mechanized units
 - in the principal engineering units of the SPA, to increase [available] means for negotiating PTS-type obstacles
- engineering munitions
 - to continue supplying SPA units with plastic engineering munitions with safety mechanisms for their installation
 - to supply the SPA with antitank and antipersonnel mines, enabling it to increase obstacle density to 1-1.5 at the principal territorial defense sites
 - to continue supplying special-purpose and unconventional

warfare units with special-purpose mines of all types as well as with industrial demolition charges

- to introduce the OMP-25000 jet-propelled flamethrower into the prime combat units in the Pacific sectors

- engineering and chemical services equipment

- to increase the amount of individual protective gear so as to achieve a 50% level of gas mask supply

- to increase the amount of skin protection gear so as to achieve a 10% supply level

- to introduce explosive substance detectors into the small engineering units

- to introduce low-yield [ordnance] detonators, equal to or better than existing ones (KPM-3)

- to replace existing camouflage netting with plastic camouflage netting [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: Cf., "enmascaramiento" - "camouflage"]

- to introduce surveillance devices with greater range (PIR-20)

- to replace obstacle set up and clearance systems with more technologically advanced ones

- to supply engineering units with water storage gear having greater capacity and constructed of better material

d. Communications

- in the small communications units, to maintain, at base level, those items reflected in the supplemental order for 1988-1990.

- in line with the technological development of means of communication, over the five-year period 1991-1995, to introduce new systems which, owing to their specific characteristics, can be adapted to the missions carried out by the SPA's principal, permanent, light, unconventional warfare and special-purpose units

- to increase the use and supply of R-125 radio communications stations as well as E-350 mobile workshops
- to expand clandestine telephone and telegraph communications networks at the level of the military regions and Type A and B light infantry brigades
- to continue building the infrastructure for regional workshops and the equipment and training of technical personnel and qualified engineers, thus enabling this specialty to develop the capacity for maintenance and mid-level and general repair of communications gear in SPA units

e. Rear Guard Services

- Over the period 1991-1995, the principal efforts of material, technical and medical [support] shall be aimed at:

- continuing to raise the levels of support in the following areas:

clothing

provisions

fuels and lubricants

medical services

transportation

[support] for the units of the SPA

- continuing and, in some cases, initiating the buildup of different reserves of materiel and medical supplies
- continuing the [systematic] upgrade of the rear guard services and transportation specialties
- continuing the creation of the infrastructure, the equipment and the training of personnel for:
 - the central fuels laboratories as well as for [the fuel laboratories of other] armed forces units
 - the clothing and footwear manufacturing workshop

- the workshops for the maintenance and repair of
special-purpose equipment and rear guard transport vehicles
- continuing the construction of storage facilities in the units
of the SPA, at various levels, and for the diverse goods of
the rear guard service units.

Superpowers in Gulf: Drift Toward Sanctions

Continued From Page A1

negotiations serving only to delay an embargo.

"They're coming closer to going ahead with it," an Administration official said of the Soviet approach to an embargo. "But how close they are is not clear. One is not quite sure until we get down to the table." The detailed talks at the United Nations on drafting a resolution are expected to begin next month.

To the extent that a shift in the Soviet position has actually taken place, it may have resulted from Moscow's diplomatic problems in the region. American officials say. While the United States has been pressing since September for an embargo, the Russians have been preaching patience, cautioning Iran and consequently angering many Arab governments, especially those along the Persian Gulf.

"I think they've played it out for too long," said a well-placed American official, "and only belatedly realized how very serious the Gulf Arabs are on the question of the Iran-Iraq war, which for them is deeply threatening to their own survival and security."

Conceded Arab pressure may also have been a factor for obtaining support for the embargo from China, which has reportedly sold Silkroad missiles to Iran. American officials note that the Arab summit meeting in Amman, Jordan, last month produced a resolution suggesting a reassessment of trade and political relations with countries that continue to supply Iran with weapons.

Iran Is Not Forfeiting
At the same time, Moscow appears to have made little headway with Iran, despite Iran's resentment over the buildup of American naval forces in the Gulf. The Russians have tried to play to that Iranian concern by denouncing the

naval presence as a source of tension and proposing to replace it with a United Nations fleet.

"In the process, they confirmed for themselves that they were unlikely to get very far with the Iranian Government," an American official said. One factor may have been Iran's buildup in apparent preparation for a major ground offensive against Iraq. Nor, apparently, did the secret American arms sales to Iran do sufficient damage to the Russians, at least in the short run.

"Ultimately, the Soviet view was that they were losing on both counts—that they were losing with the Arabs

and weren't gaining much with the Iranians," the official said.

In addition, after gaining support for an embargo from other Security Council members, most notably Japan, Italy and West Germany, the Reagan Administration made clear its intention to put the Russians on the spot by submitting a resolution that Moscow would have to act upon. The gamble was that for the sake of its relations with the Arabs, the Soviet Union would not dare veto such a measure.

Moscow Changes Its Tune
Consequently, the Russians have gone from saying they were not ready to support an embargo to advocating

one with an elaborate enforcement mechanism. In some private diplomatic exchanges with Arab groups, they have changed their concept of a United Nations force from one replacing the Western navy to one charged with enforcing a blockade of Iran.

Administration officials interpret the Soviet shift as partly a diplomatic maneuver designed to put the United States on the defensive, to make Moscow look like the party desiring tough measures against Iran and make Washington appear to be resisting.

Furthermore, the questions raised by recent Soviet statements have been more numerous than the answers. While some Soviet officials are reported to have told Arab governments

that a United Nations force had to be part of an embargo, others have said publicly that the issue of enforcement could be decided separately. A Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir P. Pavlovsky, seemed to take the second approach in a news conference last week, saying, "In raising the question of creating U.N. naval forces in the Persian Gulf, we are not at all making this question some sort of preliminary condition for deciding the other. It is a matter of parallel actions in this direction."

U.S. Wants Issues Separated
Later, he seemed to muddy this slightly by adding, "We are proposing not only to discuss and review the question of a second resolution with regard to an arms supply embargo but also to discuss the question of the crea-

tion of U.N. naval forces." The Reagan Administration insists that an embargo resolution be passed first and that enforcement measures, if necessary, follow separately. Some Administration officials say that after inspection outside the Persian Gulf, the United Nations might certify a given ship as free from contraband. But the complications of mounting a United Nations blockade or policing the Gulf with a United Nations fleet are viewed as enormous. "Would this U.N. naval force protect all shipping?" one official asked. "Is that inclusive of Iranian shipping or not? What would be the response to an attack? Extremely complicated questions flow from that command and control, coordination in different national navies. It is so complicated in an explosive way like this one."

Accused Soviet Editor Appears to Lose Post

MOSCOW, Dec. 28 (Reuters) — The foreign editor of the Soviet weekly Ogoniok appears to have been dropped from the magazine's editorial board after he was accused of inventing data about reaction to the Kremlin program for change.

The editor, Dmitri Biryukov, was not listed as a board member in the issue that went on sale Saturday, as he had been previously. He could not be reached for comment.

Ogoniok, a magazine that has pushed the limits of the Soviet campaign for openness, said earlier this month that Mr. Biryukov might be dismissed for inventing data that was published in a November issue. Mr. Biryukov had written that an opinion poll in the Siberian city of Novosibirsk found the public sharply divided over the Soviet leadership's program of economic restructuring. His report said that in a poll conducted by Eko, an economic monthly attached to the Soviet Academy of Sciences, 30 percent of those questioned supported the drive for change, 50 percent were neutral and 20 percent opposed, an unusually high percentage. Ogoniok said in the Dec. 5 issue that no such survey had been carried out by Eko in Novosibirsk and that Mr. Biryukov had invented the data.

The article was an account of a trip around the Soviet Union that Mr. Biryukov took with an American reporter, Jeff Trimble, of a weekly news magazine, U.S. News and World Report.

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Bitterness and Apathy Sweep Through a Nicaragua Deeply Weary of War

Continued From Page A1

men's association — the broadest ideological opposition to arise against the Sandinista Government.

President Daniel Ortega Saavedra and other leading Sandinista officials appear worried by the threat of opposition unity. They have publicly threatened opposition leaders, accusing them of being counterrevolutionaries and warning that their freedom to organize may be revoked and their property seized, just as the Sandinistas have done in the past to punish their internal critics.

For now the opposition newspaper *La Prensa* and a Roman Catholic radio station daily hammer the Sandinistas for a variety of claimed shortcomings. Opposition leaders are equally outspoken. They say they doubt the Sandinistas will tolerate organized opposition for long and this may be a last chance to politically confront the Government.

"The Sandinistas have achieved the impossible," said Carlos Salgado, a lifelong Marxist who was educated in Moscow and who now heads the powerful Socialist Party trade union here. "They have united the opposition against them and turning the popular classes into supporters of the right."

Nicaraguans have never been an anti-Communist as today because they blame the left for what the Sandinistas have done," he adds. Mr. Salgado, a longtime trade union leader who says he was jailed 18 times by the Somoza dictatorship for leading strikes and organizing workers, was once a strong supporter of the Sandinistas.

Beyond the Battlefield: Deep Divisions

The main causes of the Sandinistas' difficulties are much debated. But they include an American-backed guerrilla war and economic pressure, the Sandinistas' own one-party conception of power and also their mismanagement of the state-run economy.

The blame ascribed to either American-encouraged hostility or the Sandinistas' own failures appears often to depend on an analyst's ideological prejudices as much as on evidence drawn from recent events. History in Nicaragua can be marshaled to match in support of very different conclusions.

What is much less in doubt is that the contra war and the Sandinistas' shortcomings have joined to produce a Nicaragua mired in poverty, bureaucracy, narrow political oligarchy, overt militarism and widespread poverty for a people once known in this region for their emotional openness, natural talent for poetry, and long history of nonviolence.

Nicaragua is now a society divided into three main groups.

First there is a well-organized ruling minority of Sandinista militants and their ample supporters, backed by a large party-directed army and police force. They remain gripped by the conviction that radical change is still necessary.

Next there is a smaller minority of contras and the growing number of their supporters in rural political circles, who angrily resist the Sandinistas' one-party rule and are showing a new willingness to fight for their conviction.

Finally, there is the great mass of the Nicaraguan people for whom strong belief, except in God, seems to have largely fled.


It has been leached away by two decades that have visited them with an earthquake that destroyed their capital city and then a successful but bloody insurrection in which 40,000 people were killed.

Now there is the pain of seeing the broad-based opposition to the former dictatorship polarize into a sectarian revolution struggling against the United States and stuck in an internal civil war that has killed and wounded another 40,000 Nicaraguans and helped drive an estimated 500,000 more into internal and external exile.

Revolutionary rallies and the nine ruling Sandinista commanders regularly proclaim that the revolution is a success and is advancing.

But the crowds of pot-belliedurchins in the streets, the city dwellers trudging in search of scarce public buses, the mass conscription of the young into the army instead of into schools, the cardboard hovels of the spreading slums and the people standing in ration lines, offer contrary evidence to the official claims of success.

Jobs, except with the state and fighting in the army, are non-existent.



Youngsters playing in a downtown area of Managua, which was heavily damaged by an earthquake in 1972.



Children on a street in the center of Managua.

Salaries, set by the state, are made almost worthless because of inflation of more than 1,000 percent and constant devaluation. The most basic foodstuffs are hard to find. Much of what is needed to survive in the slums and countryside is acquired by bartering scarce goods.

Neglect has made city streets an obstacle course of potholes and left neighborhoods in disheveled decline. The water is cut off two days a week in the capital to conserve energy.

Failed Peace Talks And an Aborted Truce

The Christmas holidays have brought news of failed peace talks with the contra rebels and a brief holiday truce is heralded by the rebels' biggest attack of the war in the north. The attack kills and wounds more than 100 Sandinista soldiers and another 100 Nicaraguan civilians.

Newspapers are filled with pictures of wounded children and angry calls to fight to the end.

Despite their greater military effectiveness, the contra rebels are still a peasant army hitting isolated targets in the countryside. The war could go on for years so long as the guerrillas continue to lack the urban political base that would be needed to topple the Government.

Having waged a successful guerrilla war to seize power themselves, the Sandinistas have concentrated, with considerable success, on keeping the contra rebels from extending their influence into the cities. They have also sternly warned opposition

parties not to be tempted to form even a tacit alliance with the rebels.

The Nicaraguan Army is everywhere. It is the armed wing of the ruling party and the backbone of state power.

One of the most commonly carried items in Nicaragua is the Russian AK-47 assault rifle, like the one brandished by the defiant statue in the city center. The most common color in the Nicaraguan Army is green, the military hue of the army trucks, army jeeps, army uniforms, army barracks that paints the tone of a state far more militarized than neighboring El Salvador, a country also at war.

President Ortega confirmed two weeks ago the revelation by Roger Miranda Bengoechea, a senior Defense Ministry aide who defected, that the Sandinistas intend to have a 500,000-man reserve army supported by the Soviet Union — even if the contra rebel war ends and the United States gives security guarantees to Nicaragua.

A Young Country Raised on Revolution

The young are being educated in Nicaragua. But a visit to schools in the city and the countryside indicates that they are being educated by Sandinista party teachers who explain history as class struggle and who lead the children in singing the Sandinista anthem glorifying revolutionary war and condemning "the Yankee" Americans as the "enemy of humanity."

The Sandinista Minister of Education opined in the government press this month that private schools are one of the main obstacles to the revolution, spurring cries of condemnation from opposition parties.

This is a young country — most of the population is less than 30 years old — and much will depend on the next generation. Having been raised in a revolution, tempered on the battlefield and, in the case of thousands of young people, educated in the Soviet bloc, it is possible that the next generation will be even more politically rigid than the current class of Sandinista militants.

The Sandinista commanders say they have tried to wage a humane revolution — and by any standard there has not been a notably bloody effort to bring social change.

They have uprooted tens of thousands of peasants to keep them from supporting the contras and they have systematically jailed and harassed thousands of other Nicaraguans for opposing the ruling party.

The Sandinistas have not carried out a campaign of state terror that slaughters tens of thousands of opponents as the armies of El Salvador and Guatemala did in recent years. But their power is based on a strong measure of authoritarianism. It is backed by the political police and gives a note of underlying cynicism to official Sandinista conduct.

State security agents are ubiquitous. The doorway to their headquarters in the Ministry of Interior in downtown Managua is framed under a large Orwellian slogan that proclaims the political police to be "the

sentinel of the people's happiness."

In what appeared to be a calculated propaganda gesture a few weeks ago, the chief of the secret police, Interior Minister Tomás Borge, led a handful of international human rights officials into his main jail in the center of Managua.

Mr. Borge, who periodically releases a few of his prisoners to visiting American Congressmen in what seems to be an effort to curry favor and show broad-mindedness, has steadfastly refused for years to let the International Red Cross visit his secret jails.

Coincidentally, perhaps, the main state security jail was empty when Mr. Borge offered his tour. And even its most tiny and most lightless cells, the size of small closets, were being repainted on the day the human rights activists came, two of the visitors said.


Yet how much had really changed? Mr. Borge still refuses to let the International Red Cross visit the more than 40 secret State Security interrogation centers around the country that human rights officials say are full of peasants accused of aiding contra rebels.

Detainees are almost never killed or grossly tortured. But on more suspicion they are held without trial and regularly beaten, deprived of sleep, left in the cold, denied in water,

threatened with persecution against their families and forced to sign confessions they have not made, according to leading human rights officials who have monitored the pattern of Mr. Borge's agents.

For Those in Power, More of the Good Life

Official favoritism that accumulates power in any system is also found here. In Nicaragua it takes the form of special access for selected Sandinista party and army officials to American dollars at preferential



The New York Times

rates, access to state stores with foods and household goods at artificially low prices and to other luxuries like Russian Lada cars and gasoline coupons, according to long-time residents of Nicaragua and evidence seen by a reporter.

A meal in a restaurant in Managua can easily cost the monthly state salary of a doctor or plant manager. Yet restaurants are full of Sandinista party officials whose salaries cannot approach what they are spending. But they pay the money or the credit from somewhere.

Mr. Miranda, the Defense Ministry defector, claimed that top Sandinista officials have stuck ample funds in private bank accounts abroad and deflected the account number and bank where, he contended, Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra kept more than \$1 million.

Such a charge cannot easily be proved and Sandinista leaders have denied Mr. Miranda's account. It was reported in the opposition *La Prensa* newspaper and on rebel radio, however, and may make an impression in a country living in poverty and sacrifice.

Despite the criticisms of their opponents and public dismay with the state of Nicaragua today, few observers think the Sandinistas will lose or hand over power.

President Ortega made that view explicit when he said in a speech two weeks ago that even if the Sandinistas were forced to give up formal control of the Government, they would never give up power.

"It is foolish to believe the Sandinistas will voluntarily let go of power," said a veteran Latin American diplomat here. "The best that can be hoped for is internal changes within the ruling party — the pressures today may force the emergence of a new form of Sandinism."

In Managua last week, hundreds of Nicaraguans walked in the dusty, choked heat of the dry season past the billboard whose white dove soars in search of peace. Few looked up as they sought a place in the long lines waiting for the next bus.

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A Nicaraguan farmer talking to a Sandinista officer during sweep of a village by a special battalion searching for contras. Tens of thousands of peasants have been uprooted to keep them from supporting the rebels.

**“WITHOUT LIBERTY
THERE WILL NEVER
BE PEACE”**

*Statements on the repression of political
and press freedom in Nicaragua*

VIOLETA CHAMORRO
publisher, *La Prensa*

JAIME CHAMORRO
editor, *La Prensa*

May 21, 1986
Washington, D.C.

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PREFACE

Anyone who may be unsure about the severity of censorship and political repression in Nicaragua today — or about the determination of the Nicaraguan people to resist — will want to ponder these moving and informative statements by the publisher and the editor of Managua's heroic newspaper, La Prensa.

VIOLETA CHAMORRO, publisher of La Prensa, is the widow of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro, the editor of La Prensa whose assassination in 1978 sparked the final uprising against the Somoza dictatorship. La Prensa, the only independent newspaper in Nicaragua, struggles to continue publishing, but is heavily censored by the Sandinistas. Violeta Chamorro served for nine months in 1979 as a member of Nicaragua's three-member revolutionary junta until her disagreements with the Sandinista Front made it impossible for her to continue.

JAIME CHAMORRO is the present editor of La Prensa and a member of the Conservative Party of Nicaragua. Throughout his career he has stood firmly against censorship and repression, whether of the right or the left.

VIOLETA CHAMORRO

publisher, La Prensa

Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, I am grateful for the honor of talking with you about a never-ending problem which is very close to my heart: that of our newspaper La Prensa of Managua, Nicaragua. I am overjoyed that this audience has come to hear me tell personally of the acute hardships that one must endure when fighting for liberty.

I want to talk to you tonight about the period between the eighth of December, 1950, the day I married Pedro Joaquin, and the day of his assassination on the tenth of January, 1978. I want to talk about his responsibility — a responsibility that, because of life's design, I have had to assume: responsibility for the democratic ideal for which my husband Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal lived and died.

It is hard to be free. La Prensa chose this path sixty years ago when it was founded by the Chamorro family and it has just completed sixty years of independent journalism. Our newspaper, in its struggle for freedom, has gone through many vicissitudes: exile, prisons, persecution, not to mention censorship and even bloodshed during the period of the three Somoza dictatorships. We at La Prensa still talk daily about my husband's legacy: his love for his country, Nicaragua, and his commitment that Nicaragua will once again become a republic. He used to tell me how necessary it was to do something for all the sons and daughters of Nicaragua — how sometimes you will win, and how at other times you will be betrayed.

What I have had to live through since Pedro's assassination has been very sad and anguishing, mainly because I have seen how the ideals of an entire people, a people seeking only liberty and justice, have again been betrayed.

Today is May 21, 1986, and my husband's murder has not yet been fully explained. As we say in Nicaragua, everything is still "under wraps." Neither in Somoza's time nor today has justice been done. As a Christian and a believer in true justice, I have not yet lost the hope that someday we will know who actually set in motion this crime, a crime against which the entire people of Nicaragua rose up. This hope for justice is innately human, and any person who cares about his loved ones has the obligation to search for the real truth.

Unfortunately, we ended the fifty-year dictatorship of the Somozas and are now completing seven years under another ideology which our people who are Christians with Western ideas cannot accept: the Marxist-Leninist communism which is being imposed upon us. This new odyssey began after my husband's assassination. The Somoza dictatorship would not permit the existence of any independent political life, and the entire country united and rose against the system.

A year after my husband's murder, while I was visiting one of my daughters living in exile in Costa Rica, I received an offer to become part of a new government that I thought would bring peace to Nicaragua, free elections for the Nicaraguans, political pluralism, a mixed economy, true non-alignment, and full respect for human rights. Under these conditions I consented to be part of the famous revolutionary junta.

However, from the very first day when I returned to Nicaragua — July 19, 1979 — I saw things were very different from the ideals to which we had committed ourselves. I began to sense an excessive militarism, an exaggerated Cuban presence, a disdain for democratic ideas and opinions, and a disregard for those who did not belong to the Sandinista party.

From that day I began to fight from within the governing junta to fulfill the commitments we had made to the democracies of Latin America and the others who had helped us to overthrow Somoza. I fought for nine months, all in vain, until I finally had to resign from the junta because I could no longer betray my conscience. The very day after the Sandinistas accepted my resignation, La Prensa was seized by the government. Thank God we were able to recover it and to continue our struggle for a Nicaraguan republic, a struggle which we have continued to this day.

With all the pain in my soul, I want to tell you that today's dictatorship is much harsher than Somoza's. Regrettably, we overthrew one dictatorship only to fall into a worse one.

With this background, I want to read a letter to you that I have just sent to the Latin American presidents whose countries participate in the Contadora process.

**WITHOUT LIBERTY FIRST,
THERE WILL NEVER BE PEACE**

My message is the thinking of La Prensa and the majority of my country, silenced both by a Marxist-

Leninist dictatorship and by Contadora's lack of attention to our views, those of the Nicaraguan people -- we who live in this country with our freedoms confiscated, but who know that we are the true masters of our destiny.

We are certain that the road to peace has reached its final and decisive crossroad: either Nicaragua signs the Contadora Act of Peace, or Contadora ends its noble gesture in a failure that will be all of Latin America's as well. We believe the Act intends to establish peace, but peace has two dimensions that are closely connected: the external and the internal.

The external dimension, which apparently has been the one more dealt with by Contadora and the Contadora Support Group, is no more than the reflection and the echo of an interior disturbance, revealed in popular discontent, emigration, and exile, which nourishes subversion and the war of those who seek through violent means what they can't achieve peaceably.

The Sandinista Front has abused power in the service of its own partisan gain, has crushed by all means of power any party, group, or person showing independence or different thinking.

Every demand for democratic participation in the development of Nicaragua's destiny has been rejected with intimidation and force.

Only the Sandinista Front has rights and guarantees in Nicaragua. But peace begins by giving back these rights that belong to all our people: by yielding power. By living together civilly and practicing democracy, the only system that allows for opposition-government relations, and that guarantees something essential to man and above all to the Nicaraguan: freedom.

Without liberty first, there will never be peace.

We democratic Nicaraguans believe that the Contadora Act should give equal importance to demilitarization and to democratization; it should give equal importance to the removal of foreign advisors and to the public liberties of an oppressed people.

If the Contadora Act is signed and all its provisions are complied with, both those that look

outward and those that look inward, we will have achieved peace and a new life for Nicaragua.

It would be a total turnaround.

The Republic of Nicaragua for which my husband died would be realized.

It would be a truly free country where one does not win through war but through dialogue, not with slaughter but with democracy.

If, on the other hand, this act is not signed by the FSLN or is signed but not complied with, Nicaragua will keep on destroying itself, our youth will keep dying, and the danger of violent confrontation in Central America will increase. Those responsible for this will not only be the nine comandantes, but all of Latin America.

This is the position of my newspaper with regard to the Central American crisis.

In closing, I would like to ask you ladies and gentlemen and particularly my colleagues, the members of the press, to please open your eyes and do not forget my country. Please realize that we are going through the worst crisis and the worst repression in our history. We fought against the worst dictatorship on the continent: the Somozas. Now, we are fighting against Cuba and the Soviet Union, who have taken possession of Nicaragua. We know it is hard to be free, but La Prensa and the people of Nicaragua have chosen the path to freedom as long as God is by our side.

I would like to show everyone present how our newspaper is censored. This paper is from Thursday, May 15. Since there is no freedom of information in Nicaragua, we do not know all that is really going on. What we do print, the Sandinistas censor. Our headline of Thursday, May 15 reads "Panamanian Foreign Minister Confirms: Sandinistas will sign the treaty." The headline was censored and written over it are the words "DO NOT PUBLISH." Another headline reading "White House affirms: The signing of the treaty is not enough" again was stricken with "DO NOT PUBLISH." Another headline: "Complete control over wholesalers" — "DO NOT PUBLISH." Another headline: "Habib meets UNO leaders" — "DO NOT PUBLISH." Yet another headline: "Sandinista protest over Opposition visit to Venezuela" — "DO NOT PUBLISH." And on the headline "Political document has great impact in

Contadora countries" they wrote: "DO NOT PUBLISH."

This last article is about the political groups who oppose the Sandinistas and still live in Managua. These groups have signed an accord as the Nicaraguan opposition against the Sandinistas, but they are never allowed to speak about themselves nor any of their affairs. This is an example of the total control under which we live in Nicaragua.

I must tell you sadly that there is complete censorship of La Prensa, a fate which I don't wish upon any of my colleagues of the press here tonight. Every day I praise and congratulate all those who collaborate with our paper, who write and rewrite our paper sometimes two, three or four times a day. But we have the obligation, as Nicaraguans, especially those of us who are still in Nicaragua, to keep publishing despite the censorship and the vicissitudes under which we live. This newspaper must exist in Nicaragua!

I ask you once again to listen to the voice of the Nicaraguans, a voice which is being extinguished. Thank you very much for listening to the story of my struggle, and good evening.

JAIME CHAMORRO

editor, *La Prensa*

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me to be here before this distinguished audience. Tonight I would like to speak about the present situation of our newspaper La Prensa. Violeta has already made reference to its democratic tradition and history.

Years ago, La Prensa came to be called "The Paper Republic" because it was a sort of people's forum for the expression of grievances and opinions. At that time the country's parliament was really only a medium for telling the people what Somoza wanted to say. That is why La Prensa struggled for forty-five years against Somoza's dictatorship on behalf of the ideals of freedom and democracy, until the day when my brother Pedro Joaquin became the victim of an assassin. Pedro Joaquin's murder was the spark that served to ignite the Nicaraguan people in their struggle for the fall of the dictatorship.

We all supported the new Revolutionary Nicaraguan Government, Violeta as a member of the Junta, and I through La Prensa. But very soon — in fact during the first few days of the new government — we began to see that the promises of social justice and social democracy were not genuine but were merely a means of leading Nicaragua towards a Marxist-Leninist form of dictatorship. The first signs of this were the substitution of the Sandinista hymn and flag for our National Anthem and the Nicaraguan flag. La Prensa's first criticisms about this state of affairs were severely attacked by the Sandinista commanders. They initiated a slanderous campaign telling people that La Prensa had turned somocista; but we continued to speak out strongly. They had no recourse but to attack La Prensa from the inside, attempting to take it over. As Violeta explained, they accepted her resignation from the junta and through a labor union under their control they proceeded to take over La Prensa.

I always like to explain, for the benefit of the people who visit us, the way in which our newspaper goes through censorship. Some people think, for example, that we only send one story per week to the censor. Actually, we have to have the entire newspaper ready by noon every day: pages,

headlines, just like you have seen in the photocopy that Violeta showed you a moment ago. We do this with every page, including the classified ad section. We also print two additional pages that are submitted for the censor's review as a backup, to substitute for whatever may be censored out. The two pages have no headlines in order to save space, because they don't allow us more than two pages of backup. After we send in the pages, five or six hours, and sometimes even an entire day goes by before we get them back.

Because of this irregularity we can't publish the newspaper at the same time every day. This is intentional interference with readers' habits, because readers expect the newspaper to come out at the same time every day. But as it is, the newspaper may come out at 6:00 on a given day, and sometimes it doesn't come out until the following day. Through all this confusion, the government hopes to discourage people from buying La Prensa.

We usually send three copies daily to the censors and they send one back, together with their decisions attached on a written page. There are three types of decisions issued:

- 1) the news is totally unpublishable;
- 2) a certain number of paragraphs must be cut, which may include cutting out only the first paragraph of a story, thereby making it unintelligible for the reader and forcing us to eliminate the entire story;
- 3) the headlines must be changed.

We are frequently told to change headlines when there is unfavorable news about the regime regarding things that don't really fall under the censorship rules: for example, a statement from a president of one of the Contadora countries. What they try to do is to disguise the real news item by changing the headline, so it doesn't reflect the actual content of the story. The rationale for this is that most people read the headlines first and pass up the text of most stories. About fifty percent of the readers just gloss over the headlines and are not interested in the rest of the news, so by changing a particular headline the censor can divert attention from a story. Once the newspaper is returned to us the editor looks at what is left after the censorship and tries to put the newspaper together again.

What type of news is subject to censorship? We obviously

don't even bother to send anything about the war or about criticisms of the Sandinistas. We don't send any stories that may detract from the image of the "people's revolution," even news of events that are not the Sandinistas' fault such as natural disasters. The government wants to project an image showing that everything is well in Nicaragua. For example, they censored the news about a flood, and another about the failure of a corn crop which was caused by insects. In short, anything that shows the social and economic failure of the Sandinista revolution is censored.

This practice is not only applied to La Prensa, many independent, non-Sandinista institutions, such as the Red Cross and the Human Rights Commission, are also subject to censorship. Obviously independent political parties, private companies, trade unions and other private organizations are censored, though not entirely. The government wants to give the impression to the world — Europe, Latin America and other areas — that it is democratic and not communist.

An extreme form of censorship is imposed on the Catholic church. Monsignor Obando is an extremely popular figure who was appointed a Cardinal by the Pope. When Monsignor Obando came back to Nicaragua after this appointment, thousands of people were waiting to see him wherever he went around the country. Since political parties cannot operate and people feel repressed, the people of Nicaragua saw in Cardinal Obando an anti-Sandinista alternative: by attending the demonstrations for Obando they were showing that they were not Sandinista.

Two things happened as a result of these popular demonstrations. The Sandinistas passed the decree of October 15, 1985 — in effect banning any outdoor meeting. Meetings could only take place in an enclosed, indoor area. Second, the Sandinistas also suppressed all radio and press announcements pertaining to the Cardinal's moves, so the people had no way of finding out where he was going to be at any given time.

Someone may ask, why do the Sandinistas even allow La Prensa to exist? Why do they allow the political parties to exist? Why do they permit private property? The answer is that they have their own strategy and tactics. Their strategy is most certainly to turn Nicaragua into a communist state. And their tactic at this particular moment is to pretend to be something other than what they really are: they need the support and the solidarity of Europe, Latin America and other areas of the world. There are two reasons for this: one is

political, the other economic. Politically, they want to neutralize the hard line policy of President Reagan. Economically, they obviously need financial aid from Europe or elsewhere. That's why they've maintained the facade of a free press and independent political parties.

Why, if we are under such heavy censorship, do we stay in Nicaragua? It is because we feel that there is a struggle going on and we cannot give it up. We cannot abandon La Prensa or the political parties and the remaining private industry; we cannot leave the battlefield because we still have great hopes for victory. The people of Nicaragua believe in us and have expectations for the future. We are there to nurture that hope. That's why we stay on.

DISCUSSION

QUESTION:

There are obvious shortages of goods in the markets and in the stores. We'd like to know to what extent this has an impact on the morale of the population, and what the reaction is.

JAIME CHAMORRO:

There is indeed a shortage of many goods. Fortunately, we are a rich country: we have a big territory and a small population. It is not like El Salvador. One always has something to eat, although there is often no cooking oil, and some foodstuffs are frequently unavailable. This does not just affect the poor people. For example, in the past two weeks my family could not find meat, even though we had the money to buy it. Poor people fare worse and this exasperates the population. But the control by the authorities is tremendous; people are afraid to talk and to say what they feel. I think the time will come when there will be a breakdown of these controls. That's what happened in Somoza's time. When they saw that he was beginning to lose ground, they rose. People don't want to be with a loser. There is a great deal of discomfort and restiveness among the people, but so far the government has been able to control it.

QUESTION:

What is the circulation of your newspaper now as compared with 1978?

JAIME CHAMORRO:

It is more or less the same, at about 65,000, even though we have restrictions imposed on newsprint supplies. In December we put out 80,000 copies. We have a quota on newsprint. Ignacio Lozano from La Opinion of Los Angeles offered to send us some newsprint, but he wanted a guarantee from the government that we would be allowed to print more pages. The government denied his request. We could receive the newsprint but we could not increase the number of pages.

QUESTION:

What about advertising?

JAIME CHAMORRO:

Don't forget that we have a small number of pages allowed each week. The government has forbidden much advertisement and, anyway, we have no space for it. Before the Sandinistas, 65 percent of our revenues came from advertising. Now they are only about 20 percent to 25 percent.

QUESTION:

How many people show up to read the copies of the uncensored paper that you put on the walls of your building?

JAIME CHAMORRO:

We are like censors to the censor. We used to send 150 copies out by mail to embassies, including the Soviet Embassy, but they told us this was against the law. We replied that it was not against the law to mail letters. They sent me a letter asking me to discontinue this practice, but I kept on. Then they closed the newspaper for three days. They also threatened us with jail because our actions, according to them, violated the law of state security. I argued my case, but they told me I was responsible even if the news were published "in Brussels." As for people showing up to read what we place on the walls, not that many come because they have other sources of news such as radio stations from Costa Rica. There we have a former La Prensa correspondent who was at one time in prison, and is now a radio announcer from exile.

QUESTION:

Have you any evidence of the numbers of foreign communists in Nicaragua?

JAIME CHAMORRO:

These are state secrets, but we know that outside Managua there are many Cubans, East Germans, Bulgarians, etc.

VIOLETA CHAMORRO:

I want to add that the Cubans and other foreigners are the ones who live the best lives in Nicaragua. They don't lack meat or food of any kind, they have no need of ration cards. They also have an airplane at their disposal that operates as an air taxi between Nicaragua and Cuba. Jaime asked me to tell you a story about the time when I

was in the Junta. I was there for nine months (and we jokingly refer to this time as my "pregnancy"). Cubans were advisors and members of the State Security and at one time they visited my home and advised me to leave the country for my own safety. While they were visiting they placed a little bug in my apartment, which I found later and I still keep as a souvenir.

QUESTION:

Is there much hope among the people of Nicaragua that the Contadora process will bring peace to Nicaragua, or has the experience with the Sandinistas made them skeptical about the Sandinistas signing a treaty and complying with it?

VIOLETA CHAMORRO:

What I wish most is that everyone would sign a document that would bring the peace that we so much need in Nicaragua. But I doubt very much that anything the Sandinistas sign will bring tranquility to my country. They are liars.

QUESTION:

Will U.S. support for the contras serve to ensure Sandinista compliance with any treaty they may sign?

JAIME CHAMORRO:

It is the general belief of many that if the contras were not there we wouldn't be there either, because they serve as pressure upon the government's actions. They have helped us to survive. The Sandinistas, after all, can say that there is a free press, political parties, etc. and in this way, they try to discredit Mr. Reagan's policies, by arguing that Nicaragua is actually a democratic country. But in fact, a semblance of free institutions survives in Nicaragua because the contras are there. By this I don't mean that we favor the contras, but if the contras are finished, we are finished too. The Sandinistas need a facade of democracy to export to Europe and Latin America, and La Prensa's existence is useful to them. If they convince people in different countries that there is democracy in Nicaragua, then those people will be persuaded that the contras should not be supported. But, again, if the contras did not exist the Sandinistas would have no need to maintain a facade of democracy, and La Prensa and the other institutions would be finished.

These statements were made at a Dinner on May 21st, 1986, held in Washington, D.C. in honor of La Prensa and the Chamorro family. The sponsors of the Dinner included individuals from the entire spectrum of views on U.S. policy toward Nicaragua, among them:

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Violeta Chamorro, publisher of La Prensa, points out the Sandinistas' heavy-handed censorship to John T. Joyce, President, International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen, AFL-CIO.



Jaime Chamorro, editor of La Prensa, discusses the Nicaraguan crisis with Dante Fascell (D-FL), Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs.